A A. Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2022 with funding from Kahle/Austin Foundation https://archive.org/details/internationaldicO003unse_p0g8 rWNID RE BAL bat ite ‘ ae ik is LONDON PURLIC: | TRARY aN Pa ¢ ELEST OO geo ees: INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DICTIONNAIRE INTERNATIONAL DE LA PSYCHANALYSE EDITORIAL BOARD AND TRANSLATORS EDITINO CRHIE F Alain de Mijolla President and founder of the International Association for the History of Psychoanalysis Neuropsychiatrist and psychoanalyst Member of the Société psychanalytique de Paris (Paris Psychoanalytic Society) Member of the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA) Member of the Conceptual and Empirical Research Committee of the IPA EDITORIAL BOARD (French Edition) Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor Psychoanalyst and professor of psychopathology and psychoanalysis University of Paris VII, Denis-Diderot Member of the Quatriéme groupe (O.P.L.F.) Roger Perron Director of Honors Research at National Center for Scientific Research, Paris Member of the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA) Bernard Golse, MD Pediatric psychiatrist and psychoanalyst Chief of staff of Pediatric psychiatry, Saint-Vincent de Paul Hospital, Paris Professor of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry University of Paris V, René Descartes U.S. ADVISORY BOARD Edward Nersessian, MD Training and Supervising Analyst New York Psychoanalytic Institute Clinical Associate Professor of Psychiatry New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center Paul Roazen, Ph.D. Professor Emeritus, Social and Political Science York University BOARD OF TRANSLATORS Philip Beitchman Jocelyne Barque Robert Bononno Andrew Brown Dan Collins Liam Gavin John Galbraith Simmons Sophie Leighton Donald Nicholson-Smith Scott Savaiano Paul Sutton Gwendolyn Wells INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DICTIONNAIRE INTERNATIONAL DE LA PSYCHANALYSE VOLUME THREE PS-Z ALAIN DE MIJOLLA EDITOR IN CHIEF MACMILLAN REFERENCE USA An imprint of Thomson Gale, a part of The Thomson Corporation THOMSON GALE Detroit * New York © San Francisco * San Diego * New Haven, Conn. ¢ Waterville, Maine * London ¢ Munich THOMSON i je—— GALE INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS DICTIONNAIRE INTERNATIONAL DE LA PSYCHANALYSE ©2005 Thomson Gale, a part of the Thomson Corporation. 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Thomson Gale accepts no payment for listing; and inclusion in the publication of any organization, agency, institution, publication, service, or individual does not imply endorsement of the editors or publisher. Errors brought to the attention of the publisher and verified to the satisfaction of the publisher will be corrected in future editions. as Dictionnaire international de la psychanalyse ©2002, Editions Calmann-Lévy LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA Dictionnaire international de la psychanalyse. English. International dictionary of psychoanalysis = Dictionnaire international de la psychanalyse / Alain de Mijolla, editor in chief. Enhanced version of the 2002 French edition. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-02-865924-4 (set hardcover : alk. paper) - -ISBN 0-02-865925-2 (v. 1) - -ISBN 0-02-865926-0 (v. 2) - -ISBN 0-02-865927-9 (v. 3) 1. Psychoanalysis—Encyclopedias. |. Mijolla, A.de. ‘Il. Title. __ ill. Title: Dictionnaire international de la psychanalyse. [DNLM: 1. Psychoanalysis- -Encyclopedias- -English. WM 13 D5555 2005a] RC501.4.D4313 2005 616.89'17'03-dc22 2005014307 Le ee eee | This title is also available as an e-book ISBN 0-02-865994-5 (set) Contact your Thomson Gale sales representative for ordering information. Printed in the United States of America 1059" 8 776 54537241 PS PSI (/) SYSTEM In his unfinished 1895 “A Project for a Scientific Psychology” Freud defines the psi (y/) system as a subdivision of the nervous system concerned with psychic processes (1950a[1895]). Later, in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a) he used the term to refer to components of the “psychical apparatus.” In the “Project,” Freud hypothesized two neuronal systems, @ (phi) and (psi), and employed the principle of inertia and the concept of permeability. Elements of what he called the system were permeable but retained nothing; while the impermeable neurons, equipped with resistance and retentive of quantity, are the vehicles of memory and psychic processes in general, and receive endogenous excitations. Subject to the principle of constancy, neurons that make up the system mitigate its impermeability by “facilitation” (Bahnung), creating a permanent alteration in “contact barriers.” Freud here adumbrated the concept of the synapse and the idea of synaptic change. In later work, Freud abandoned the nomenclature of the “Project.” He only employed the term “y system” in The Interpretation of Dreams, where it was used in the plural to describe the components of the psychic apparatus. (1900a, Chap. 7). The systems possess spatial and temporal qualities in terms of arousal, which begins with internal or external stimulation and ends in “innervation” or discharge. After 1900, Freud employed the term “yw systems” without as much spatial precision, and made use of new subdivisions: the systems Pcpt. (perceptual), Cs (conscious), Ucs (unconscious), among others. BERTRAND VICHYN See also: Ego; Principle of (neuronal) inertia; “Project for a Scientific Psychology, A”. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. Part I, SE, 4: 1-338; Part II, SE, 5: 339-625. . (1950c [1895]). Project for a scientific psychology. SE, 1: 281-387. PSYCHANALYSE ET LES NEVROSES, LA La psychanalyse et les névroses followed in the wake of Emmanuel Regis and Angélo Hesnard’s important work on the psychoanalysis of the neuroses and psychoses (1914). René Laforgue and Reneé Allendy’s book offered the French public a series of writings on psychoanalysis that were replete with clinical examples. The chapters on symbolism and those written from a non-medical point of view were by Allendy. On the title page, an epigraph from Joseph-Jules Déjerine situated the book firmly in the French medical tradition. The medical qualifications of the authors and a preface by Henri Claude, consultant to hospitals and asylums, emphasized this even further. This latter preface, however, does not mince words: “While I am happy to present Laforgue and Allendy’s book on psychoanalysis and the neuroses to the medical public, I have not hidden from the authors that I intend no endorsement of their opinions thereby.... Some of their investigative methods will shock those with delicate feelings, and some of their outrageously symbolic generalizations, though they may possibly apply to those of other races, do not seem to me acceptable to 1345 PSYCHANALYSE ET PEDIATRIE [PSYCHOANALYSIS AND PEDIATRICS] Latin clinical practice.” He nevertheless recommended the book because he knew, having seen the authors at work, that it was work written in good faith and based on direct experience. After reading Claude’s preface, Freud wrote to Laforgue that, although he had not yet read the book, he thought that it must be good, since Claude’s reservations showed that the authors had made no compromises and had no fear of controversy. Laforgue and Allendy indeed presented “the medical public” with the fundamental notions of psychoanalysis, the mechanism of the neuroses, and the technique of this new discipline. Clinical examples, often from their experience at Sainte-Anne Hospital, were adduced to support their arguments. Accordingly, female frigidity, homosexuality, and impotence were discussed. In the chapters on symbolism, Allendy demonstrated his eclecticism and erudition: philology, astrology, and studies of diverse civilizations and religious customs were all brought in to reinforce his argument. This book, by young French doctors who were also practicing psychoanalysts, was the first of its kind. Two years later they founded the Psychoanalytic Society of Paris. JEAN-PIERRE BOURGERON See also: Allendy, Rene Felix Eugene; Claude, Henri Charles Jules; France; Laforgue, Rene. Source Citation Laforgue, René, and Allendy, René. (1924). La Psychanalyse et les névroses (Psychoanalysis and the neuroses). Preface by Henri Claude. Paris: Payot, 254 p.; 2nd ed., 1950 Geneva: Ed. du Mont Blanc; corrected and revised “according to the instructions” of her husband, by Délia Laforgue, with an additional chapter and a second preface by Dr. Logre, 1964. Bibliography Regis, Emmanuel, and Hesnard, Angélo. (1914). La psychoanalyse( sic) des névroses et des psychoses. Ses applications médicales et extramédicales. Paris: Félix Alcan. PSYCHANALYSE ET PEDIATRIE [PSYCHOANALYSIS AND PEDIATRICS] When Fran¢oise Marette, the young analyst in control with Sophie Morgenstern, was working in the Breton- 1346 neau hospital under Dr. Edouard Pichon, she determined that she wanted to “heal with psychoanalysis.” And it worked. Symptoms disappeared, and family equilibrium was restored. It seemed as simple as that. If all pediatricians and general practitioners could benefit from this experience it would be a great day for medicine. She wished to direct the attention of her fellow physicians to the possible benefits of analysis to the patients who came to consult for a variety of ailments. Her thesis was addressed to her colleagues and presented in 1939. Before recounting her beautiful stories, Marette felt the need in the first part of her work to define for her lay audience some analytic concepts: instinct, castration complex, agencies of the personality, conscious, preconscious, unconscious, repression, resistance, transference—but this teaches us nothing: the essence is in the struggle between the agencies, the flow of libidinal energy. Human beings were not defined as speaking beings but as storehouses of libido. The author informs us that her first three chapters are theoretical in nature, such that some readers might prefer to go directly to the second “distinctly more concrete and clinical” part. The first chapter, “Evolution des instincts,” clearly shows that we can describe the behavior and thinking of young children with reference to the breast, excreta, the penis, and without any reference to the father; only the mother is named. The father only appears when the mother goes away “to do the housework, to keep dad happy.” Finally, “the child abandoned by the mother” comes to realize that it is not the only center of its mother’s attention: there is a rival in the form of the father, when there are not extra rivals in the form of brothers and sisters. As is clear in the work of the first child psychoanalysts (Melanie Klein, Donald Winnicott, among others), the remarkably absent father plays only a late role, toward the age of four or five, and “is part of the ambience of the mother.” Analytical theory introduces the father only in a context of oedipal rivalry, when the boy plays the despot, “donning his father’s hat.” In the beginning the child and the mother are one in the child’s experience; for many analysts, they are one and the same flesh. Marrete’s work contains original suggestions. She brings forth the notion of progressive weaning, at the age of four or five months, to be completed by the seventh or eighth at the latest. If too late, she warns, weaning is experienced as “punishment for oral INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS aggression, an assertion that received legitimate criticism. Frangoise Marette was more cautious when it came to educating the sphincter. Whereas many analysts claimed that children should receive potty training at the end of the first year, she waged war against abusive sphincter training: not before twenty-four months. In this she was innovative. Equally with regard to the discovery of sexual differences and the pleasure of masturbation. The role of the father was also a problem when it came to the Oedipus complex and the castration complex. When her work was presented in 1962, mention was made of the fact that she had married Dr. Boris Dolto in 1942. When she became a mother she acquired “experience that made her one of the representative personalities of the contemporary French psychoanalytic movement.” The second part of her thesis gives us a sense of this: in clinical vignettes and moving stories extolling the merits of psychoanalysis, sixteen children came to see her accompanied by their parents. She initially received the family all together, and then the parents withdrew to the waiting room. The children were then free to express themselves, to draw and use clay, to play and speak. But she did not see the parents again at the end of the session with the child. Some analysts and institutions immediately separate parents and children, which deprives the analyst of significant information that is indispensable for an understanding of what the child is experiencing and thus prevents the analyst from having an effective contact with the parents. Through her account of these consultations, generations of physicians gained an increased understanding of the emotional lives of children and discovered that they had an educational role to play, whether they liked it or not. Marette, inventively, invited the children to use speech and play in order to free themselves from regressive or aggressive and poorly-adapted behavior. It is a pleasure to witness the children, determined workers, undertaking an analytic cure and inviting their parents to question the influences that condition them, all without their realizing it. Attentive readers also discover the path that analysts must follow if they don’t want to become obstacles in the way of the analysis. The thesis concludes with: “The castration complex is ineluctable in the course of human development [...]. This work has not enabled us to deal with the very many questions relating to the castration complex. Its aim is to inter- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PSYCHANALYSE, LA est our non-psychoanalyst colleagues in the fundamental importance of the Oedipal stage in the history of individual development and its role in the etiology of functional symptoms and behavioral disorders in order to demonstrate the therapeutic interest of psychoanalysis.” BERNARD THIS See also: Armand Trousseau Children’s Hospital; Dolto- Marette, | Francoise; Morgenstern-Kabatschnik, Sophie; Pichon, Edouard Jean Baptiste. Source Citation Marette (Dolto), Francoise. (1940). Psychanalyse et Pédiatrie. Le complexe de castration. Etude générale. Cas cliniques. Préf. Edouard Pichon, Paris: Ed. A. Legrand; Dolto, Francoise. Psychanalyse et Pédiatrie. Paris: Le Seuil, coll. “Points” 1971. PSYCHANALYSE, LA The Société francaise de psychanalyse (SFP, French Psychoanalytic Society), was founded on June 18, 1953, following the resignation of Francgoise Dolto, Juliette Favez-Boutonier, Jacques Lacan, Daniel Lagache, and Blanche Reverchon-Jouve from the Sociéte Psychanalytique de Paris (SPP, Paris Psychoanalytic Society). The new group did not found a journal, but rather published a series of eight “notebooks” that came out according to no fixed schedule under the title of La Psychanalyse. The subtitle was Freudian Research and Teaching of the Societé Francaise de Psychanalyse. The titles of the series, all published by Presses Universitaire de France, are as follows: I. On Speech and Language (1956) II. Clinical Miscellany (1956) III. Psychoanalysis and the Human Sciences (1958) IV. The Psychoses (1958) V. Critical Essays (1959) VI. Structural Perspectives (1961) VII. Feminine Sexuality (1964) VIII. Fantasy, Dream, Reality (1964) b ics The first volume contained Lacan’s “Rome Report” from the new society’s first congress in September 1953, as well as all the presentations made at that 1347 PsycHe/ PSYCHISM conference. Volume VI, “Structural Perspectives,” published the acts of the international congress held at Royaumont in 1959. It included Daniel Lagache’s paper “Psychoanalysis and Personality Structure,” followed by Jacques Lacan’s “Remarks on Daniel Lagache’s Presentation: ‘Psychoanalysis and Personality Structure.” It also included Lacan’s “The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of Its Power” and Dolto’s “Personology and Body Image.” Volume VII included the proceedings of an international conference on feminine sexuality held in Amsterdam in 1960. It included “Guiding Remarks for a Conference on Feminine Sexuality,’ by Lacan, and papers by Dolto on “The Destiny of Feminine Genital Libido” and by Wladimir Granoff and Francois Perrier on “Feminine Ideas and the Problem of Perversion in Women.” This volume also included numerous papers and translations of texts, such as Ernest Jones’s “Early Female Sexuality” and Joan Riviére’s “Womanliness as Masquerade.” The members of the S.EP. disbanded in 1963 and announced the group’s dissolution in 1964, shortly after the publication of the last volume of La Psychanalyse. The volumes were published without an editorial committee. Among the numerous French authors whose works were included were Piera Aulagnier, Serge Leclaire, Maud Mannoni, Octave Mannoni, Gisela Pankow, Guy Rosolato, Mustapha Safouan, Daniel Widlocher. Foreign authors published in La Psychana- . lyse included Michael Balint, Martin Grotjahn, Susan Isaacs, Jacques Schotte, and Alphonse de Waelhens. JACQUES SEDAT See also: France; Société francaise de psychanalyse. PSYCHE/PSYCHISM In their most general sense, the words “psyche” and “mind” refer to phenomena and processes associated with the “soul,” understood empirically, without consideration of its content (conscious, unconscious, life principle) but excluding any metaphysical or religious meaning (unity of the soul, distinction between soul and body, immortality). Although “psyche” and “mind” can, to some extent, be considered synonymous, the first is not 1348 really a modern term (except, obviously, in modern Greek) and its use is based on the desire to allude to a context that is as much literary as philosophical. Freud rarely used it outside of such a context (however, see An Outline of Psychoanalysis, 1940a [1938]). Nonetheless, in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), he refers to the fact that “the Ancients ... provided Psyche with butterfly wings.” The mythical character of Psyche— who, in a story by Apuleius, loses her husband, Eros, after having looked upon him as he slept—has been the theme of numerous works of literature and art. The fact that, as a common noun, the word “psyche” refers to a type of mirror, has led us to reconsider the concept of the soul as a narcissistic double. The word “mind” on the contrary is—or claims to be—“scientific.” As such it can only be defined with reference to the science whose object it supposedly represents, namely psychology. While the concept of “consciousness” has escaped definition (we can only speak of lived experience), it is likely that any definition of mind will turn out to be circular, or simply limited: “Mind” is the object of psychology as a discipline distinct from metaphysics and biology. But since the limits and principles of psychology are themselves problematic, the difficulty remains. Introducing the concept of the unconscious does nothing to alleviate the difficulty, since mind cannot be defined as the simple addition of conscious to unconscious. For Freud unconscious is not identical with non-conscious, and the question of just how mind should be defined remains. Hence a reliance on a history of the concept, a history in which, it should be noted, the problem of conscious versus unconscious has only marginal importance. To vastly oversimplify the matter, we can say that for the early Greeks, “psyche” referred to the breath of life, and for Descartes the soul was identified with consciousness. In Homer the psyche, sometimes represented with butterfly wings, resembles a dream and an unreal image of a man, while the breath of life is called thumos. In the Pythagoreans and Plato the psyche appears as a reality belonging to the moral order. It is capable of good or evil, it will be judged, and it is immortal. But it is also in Plato that we find—following chapter 4 of the Republic— the celebrated distinction between intelligence, anger (thumos), and the base instincts, which Freud associated, in 1923, with the concepts of ego, superego, and id. This Platonic distinction enriched the notion of the soul with anthropological features and supplied the INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PsycHe, REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE PSYCHANALYSE ET DES SCIENCES... foundation for a rational and empirical psychology, which was developed in Aristotle, who emphasized, although not exclusively, mental functions that were vital, if not biological (biology did not yet exist as an autonomous science). In fact the Aristotelian notion of the psyche covers a very broad range of functions (metaphysical, “psychological” in the modern sense, biological), while “mind” was not distinguished until the modern era. The important milestones in this development are not those of the history of the unconscious but of the genesis of empirical psychology. The appearance in 1590, in the Latin title of a work by Rudolf Goeckel, of the word psychologia, in Greek (although the term did not exist in ancient Greek), indicates the tendency of Renaissance culture to use the term to delimit a specific field of thought and research. However, the decisive event was the distinction made by Christian Wolff, in 1732 and 1734, in two works respectively entitled Psychologia Empirica and Psychologia Rationalis. Even though Wolff’s first text remains highly speculative, the initial break with rational psychology has been made, through metaphysics, along with a top-down demarcation of the object that the term “mind” would designate. A bottom-up demarcation would take place in the nineteenth century with the development of scientific biology. What of the unconscious? It is true that Descartes, by defining mens in terms of thought and by rejecting the scholastic concept of soul and its vital aspects, made it necessary to introduce, as early as the seventeenth century, the concept of the unconscious (the term itself did not appear until the eighteenth century and did not become popular until the nineteenth). But when, in German romantic philosophy, the concept was used to designate a form of foundation or first principle, the connection with representation would be broken. For example, Eduard von Hartmann, in his famous Philosophy of the Unconscious of 1869, describes a form of panpsychism that makes it possible to introduce the notion of psychism. Freud himself was familiar with this point of view. When, in a wellknown passage from The Interpretation of Dreams, he wrote that “the unconscious is the true reality of the psyche,” he destroyed any possibility of defining mind in terms of representation (conscious or non-conscious) and left untouched the problem of the characteristics that could be used to distinguish the psychic from the biological, and from metaphysics. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS It is only through an epistemology of psychology that the concept of mind can be defined. And since psychology, in its current form, comprises various disciplines whose epistemological foundations are difficult to reconcile, we must resign ourselves to the fact that the terms “psyche” and “mind” designate only those highly amorphous objects considered by psychology as understood in the broadest sense of the terms. ; YVON BrRES See also: Agency; Animus-Anima (analytic psychology); Archetype; Collective unconscious; Determinism; Drive/ instinct; Maternal reverie, capacity for; Ontogenesis; “Outline of Psychoanalysis, An”; Phylogenesis; Primal; Principle; Psychosomatic limit/boundary; Psychic apparatus; Psychic reality; Self; Strata/stratification; Thoughtthinking apparatus; Unconscious, the. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. Part I, SE, 4:1—338. Part II, SE, 5:339-625. Hartmann, Eduard von. (1931). Philosophy of the unconscious. speculative results according to the inductive method of physical science (W. C. Coupland, Trans.). London: Routledge. (Original work published 1869) Wolff, Christian (1968). Psychologia empirica. Hildesheim: Olms. (Original work published 1732) . (1968). Psychologia rationalis. Hildesheim: Olms. (Original work published 1734) PSYCHE, REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE PSYCHANALYSE ET DES SCIENCES DE L’HOMME (PSYCHE, AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND HUMAN SCIENCES) Founded in 1946 on the initiative of Maryse Choisy, Psyché is defined as an “international review of psychoanalysis and human sciences.” The first issue of this monthly review appeared in November 1946 and was followed by another 120 issues until 1963. The idea for the review took root among a circle of intellectuals that Maryse Choisy brought together between 1944 and 1945. This group of poets, writers, philosophers, and theologians met to exchange ideas 1349 Psycne, REvuE INTERNATIONALE DE PSYCHANALYSE ET DES SCIENCES... on a variety of topics that sometimes included occultism, astrology, and clairvoyance. Philosopher Pierre Bachelard introduced the psychoanalytic element, as did psychoanalyst Juliette Boutonier, whose presence between 1945 and 1946 drew in other analysts like André Berge, Francoise Dolto, René Laforgue, and George Mauco. In the course of time, a certain number of analysts from the Paris Psychoanalytic Society thus accepted Maryse Choisy’s proposition to create the review Psyché. The Revue francaise de psychanalyse (French Review of Psychoanalysis) had not yet reappeared after the war and Psyché, with its vocation extending to include the “human sciences” was closer to the framework of applied psychoanalysis, being comparable in this respect to Imago. Maxime Clouzet (Maryse Choisy’s husband) was director of the review and the committee of patronage brought together some eminent personalities of the time, people like Louis de Broglie, perpetual secretary of the of the Academy of Science, Pierre Janet from the Institute, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, the discoverer of the Sinanthropus, Charles Baudouin, Drs. John Leuba, René Laforgue, Angélo Hesnard, Louis Le Guillant, Charles Odier, and Edouard Toulouse. Maryse Choisy directed a small team that included André Berge and George Mauco, both psychoanalysts, . as well as other collaborators with artistic and literary vocations in charge of completing the “monthly chronicle” under headings like Painting, Books, Theater, Cinemia, and a Review of Reviews. The copy desk was the responsibility of Jacqueline Massiére (the future Jacqueline Cosnier), a young philosopher in analytic training. The first issues enjoyed the benefits of a group of varied and competent collaborators. At the end of 1945, Maryse Choisy had managed to acquire the collaboration of the (rare) psychologists and psychiatrists who practiced psychoanalysis or who were beginning to take an interest in it, as well as eminent personalities from the worlds of science, literature, and philosophy. In the course of the different issues we thus find the names of André Maurois, Edmond Jaloux, Louis de Broglie, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Marcel Griaule, Georges Dumézil, Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Georges Heuyer, Serge Lebovici, 1350 Francoise Dolto, Béla Grunberger, Juliette Boutonier, Octave Mannoni, René Laforgue, Charles Odier, René Allendy, Marie Bonaparte, and Angélo Hesnard. It is worth pointing out that the last five of these were among the seven authors in the first issue of the Revue francaise de psychanalyse in 1927. Quickly enough, Psyché began to publish contributions by psychoanalysts from other societies in other countries: Emilio Servadio and Nicola Perrotti of the Italian Society, Igor Caruso from Austria, John R. Rees from London, Karen Horney and René Spitz from the United States, Heinrich Meng from German-speaking Switzerland, while the committee of patronage was completed with professors Jean Delay, Henri Gouhier, Daniel Lagache, and Jean Lhermitte. Congresses came to be organized as an extension of the review: the Royaumont study week on “The fate of collective man” (1947), the International Congress of Catholic Psychiatrists, Analytical Psychotherapists and Educational Psychologists (1949). Psyché published the proceedings of these congresses as well as reports on the different meetings relating to the field of psychology. A supplement to the review also appeared with installments of the “Dictionary of Psychoanalysis and Psychological Technique,’ directed by Daniel Lagache, the outline of the future The Language of Psychoanalysis. Psyché played a role in organizing and bringing together the psychoanalytic milieu immediately after World War II. However, the eclecticism and the “ecumenical” preoccupations of its instigator, combined also with the reorganization of the psychoanalytic societies and the reappearance of the Revue francaise de psychanalyse (in 1948), which was soon complemented by the creation of other specific reviews, led to two phenomena that were to reduce its importance in the analytic world: psychoanalysts had other places where they could exchange ideas, and because of this the review’s para-analytic and extra-analytic cultural aspects assumed increasing importance. Moreover, from issue number 15 onward the initial sub-heading of the review, “International Review of Psychoanalysis and Human Sciences,” changed to “International Review of Human Sciences and Psychoanalysis.” JACQUELINE COSNIER See also: Choisy, Maryse; France; Laforgue, René. INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PSYCHE. ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PSYCHOANALYSE UND IHR ANWENDUNGEN Psyche. Zeitschrift fiir Psychoanalyse und ihr Anwendungen (Psyche: A Journal for Psychoanalysis and Its Applications) is the most important and most widely distributed German-language psychoanalytic journal. Seven thousand copies of it are printed every month. Founded in 1947 by Hans Kunz, Alexander Mitscherlich, and Felix Schottlaender, it first appeared with the subtitle Jahrbuch fiir Tiefenpsychologie und Menschenkunde in Forschung und Praxis (Yearbook for Research and Practice in Depth Psychology and the Human Sciences). It adopted its current name in 1966, thus leaving no doubt about its Freudian orientation. In the beginning Psyche represented a mixture of the teachings of Carl G. Jung, Sigmund Freud, Alfred Adler, and the neo-analysis of Harald Schultz- Hencke. This eclecticism, which escaped the attention of the first editors, was a hangover from the period when National Socialism grouped together the most diverse therapeutic schools in the Deutsches Institut fiir psychologische Forschung und Psychotherapie (German Institute for Psychological Research and Psychotherapy). In the 1950s Mitscherlich managed to acquire contributions from emigrant Freudian authors like Michael Balint, Erik H. Erikson, Heinz Hartmann, and Edith Jacobson, thus establishing a Freudian tradition that still characterizes the journal in 2005. From its first decades up until the early 1970s, the journal aimed primarily to repromote knowledge of Freudian psychoanalysis, which had been destroyed or brushed aside in Germany by National Socialism, and to raise the scientific level of German psychoanalysis to that of international standards. Moreover, its editor Alexander Mitscherlich (who worked alone after 1968) sought from the beginning to relate psychoanalytic questions to social and cultural questions and to give the periodical the interdisciplinary orientation that has become its hallmark. Problems raised by Freud’s theory of culture were always given priority treatment, although not to the detriment of the theoretical and clinical aspects of psychoanalysis. In the 1970s and 1980s the journal opened its pages to discussion of the tense relations between psychoanalysis and feminism, and to the prickly question of to what degree and with what consequences the German psychoanalysts who did not emigrate between 1933 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PsycHic APPARATUS and 1945 had compromised themselves in National Socialist health policy. This question, which relates to the historical and moral complicity of German psychoanalysts, was the subject of an intense several-year controversy between the editors of the review and representatives of the German psychoanalytic societies. This controversy showed Psyche for what it really was: a journal that never considered itself merely a mouthpiece for the German psychoanalytic contmunity. After the death of Alexander Mitscherlich in 1982, the new editors—Margarete Mitscherlich, Helmut Dahmer, and Lutz Rosenkétter—continued the welltried editorial policy of the journal. Since 1990 Margarete Mitscherlich has been the sole editor. Hans-Martin LOHMANN See also: Germany; Marxism and_ psychoanalysis; Mitscherlich, Alexander. PSYCHIC APPARATUS The notion of psychic apparatus (or of the intellect) is common in Freud’s work from the very start (cf. for example, the article of 1898b, “The Psychical Mechanism of Forgetfulness”). It appears continuously from then on, and is the title of Chapter I of one of his last texts, An Outline of Psychoanalysis (1940a [1938]). It was borrowed from the vocabulary of nineteenth-century psychologists who were seeking to accord to animal and human mental functioning a representation conforming to the exigencies of the natural sciences (physiology and especially physics). Considered from a static point of view, the Freudian versions of the psychic apparatus correspond to what was subsequently called the “topographies.” The first one (yet to be designated by this word) appears in Chapter VII of The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a) and essentially comprises the distinction between the unconscious, the preconscious, and the conscious. The second topography (cf. The Ego and the Id, 1923b) distinguishes between id, ego, and superego, which are depicted in a diagram reminiscent of an egg, that was to be reworked into a slightly different form in Seminar XXXI of the New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1933a [1932]). 1351 PsycHic APPARATUS Still from the start the notion of psychic apparatus also pointed to a dynamic perspective: it presupposed something that functions. The schema outlined in Chapter VII of The Interpretation of Dreams occupies a place within the time’s general psychological framework concerned with the passage from perception to movement (to be found, for example, in Henri Bergson’s Matter and Memory of 1896, and which corresponds with experimental psychology’s stimulusresponse pairing). Freud’s aim was to demonstrate how “unconscious systems,’ which he was not yet referring to as “complexes,” acted upon the information gathered by the perceptual apparatus to create representations and conscious movement, and in particular, in this respect, oneiric representations. Likewise the group comprising the three instances—id, ego, and superego—was also to have permitted an accounting of psychic functioning, in particular the resolution of certain difficulties regarding the unconscious and the non-conscious. Freud never specifically says whether the id, ego, and superego were to replace the schema in The Interpretation of Dreams, thus rendered obsolete, or only to add another perspective to it. In more precise terms, the Freudian notion of psychic apparatus entails the idea—borrowed from physics— of a sort of “energic economy.’ Although he never attempted to specify the precise nature of sexual energy (as would Wilhelm Reich), nor, even less, that of psychic energy in general, Freud, (inspired by Gustav Fechner), conceived the workings of the human psyche from the perspective of the flow, equilibrium, and transformation of a certain “energy.” The “pleasure principle” articulated the idea that when tension in the psychic organism reaches a certain level, a release will ensue which is lived subjectively in the form of pleasure, but whose objective effect is to lower tension and avoid the dangers of overflowing. Although the pleasure principle itself derives from thermodynamics, the notion of sublimation, which envisions the transformation of a socially-incompatible sexual “energy” into socially-acceptable activities, originates in chemistry. Finally it is worthwhile to note that some of the Most suggestive representations of the psychic apparatus refer to models taken from optics (cf. for example the passage cited above from The Interpretation of Dreams, as well as the Question of Lay Analysis, 1926e). The fact that Freud sometimes uses the adjective psy- 1352 chisch (psychic), sometimes seelisch (relating to the intellect), does not seem significant, as the two words may be considered synonymous. The notion of psychic apparatus and the uses Freud puts it to raise the issue of the value models taken from the physical sciences have for psychoanalysis. Some, such as George Politzer and Jean-Paul Sartre, have concluded them to be an inexcusable misunderstanding of the psyche’s specificity. Indeed as Sartre says in Critique de la raison dialectique (1960) concerning the notion of defensive mechanism, that such a representation “burdens the workings of the ego with an a priori inertia.” If, as Georges Politzer reasons, the psyche as such is a kind of drama, no apparatus could represent it. These arguments could be countered by noting that these are metaphors—that topography— despite its etymology—does not imply the brain as locale, but only a “locus of the psyche” as such, and that from a dynamic point of view the flows and transformations of energy are not physiological or chemical processes. Freud was perfectly aware of these difficulties and explained himself clearly, for example concerning the problems posed by the visualization of the psyche (cf. New Introductory lectures on Psychoanalysis, 1933a, xxxi). Nevertheless for him, the representations he called “psychic apparatus” seemed to be much more than merely images, useful but misleading, which as Plotinus and Bergson have taught, should be employed with other images, incompatible with them, to avoid one’s being duped by them. Freud seems to have tried to forge a path between the neurological perspective, where psychic functions are supposedly lodged in their cerebral headquarters (a view he no longer shared at the time he invented psychoanalysis), and the phenomenological perspective which excluded anything to do with topographical location, functioning, or mechanical operation. He adopted this perspective at times, furthermore, but not in those texts where the notion of psychic apparatus intervened. Still, this path seems so narrow we may wonder if it is navigable. Without going so far as to challenge its legitimacy, we may at least consider it—in Freud’s own words—“provisional.” YVON Brés See also: Agency; Consciousness; Discharge; Disorganization; Dynamic point of view, the; Ego; Ego and the Id, The; Excitation; Id; Interpretation of Dreams, The; Metapsychology; Mnemic trace, memory trace; Model; “Note INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS upon the “Mystic Writing Pad, A”; “Outline of Psychoanalysis, An”; Perception-consciousness (Pcpt.-Cs); Pleasure principle; Primary process, secondary process; Principle of consistency; Protective shield; Psi system; Quantitative, qualitative; Regression; Structural theories; Superego; Topographical point of view; Unconscious, the. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4—5,. . (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1-66. . (1926e). The question of lay analysis. SE, 20: 177- 250. . (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. SE, 22: 1-182. Sartre, Jean Paul. (1960). Critique de la raison dialectique. Paris: Gallimard. Further Reading Boesky, Dale (1988). The concept of psychic structure. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 36(S), 113— 136. Schafer, Roy. (1988). Discussion of panel presentations on psychic structure. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 36(S), 295-312. PSYCHIC CAUSALITY In Sigmund Freud’s work, the term “psychic causality” designates a group of unconscious psychic processes (conflicting drives, structural conflicts, narcissistic and object investments) and defensive mechanisms (repression, denial, splitting, rejection) that are assumed to be the origin of the phenomena of day-today life (dreams, slips, failed acts, creative acts) as well as of neurotic and psychotic symptoms. Operating according to the logic of psychic conflict and primary processes, psychic causality is said to be dissociated from the concept of “psychic reality,” and from Freud’s ongoing attempt to discover the etiology of neuroses, psychoses, and perversions. The concept appears indirectly throughout Freud’s work but he never examined it at any length. It is known that Freud came upon the idea at the Salpétriére, working with Jean Martin Charcot in 1885— 1886. As he subsequently wrote, “[Charcot] succeeded INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PsycHic CAUSALITY in proving, by an unbroken chain of argument, that these paralyses were the result of ideas which had dominated the patient’s brain at moments of a special disposition” (1893f, p. 22). By 1890 Freud had extended this to all neuroses. In an article entitled “Psychical (or Mental) Treatment,” he claimed that “in some at least of these [neurotic] patients the signs of their illness originate from nothing other than a change in the action of their minds upon their bodies and that the immediate cause of their disorder is to be looked for in their minds” (1890a, p. 286). Based on the article, psychic causality is not yet explicitly linked to the unconscious mechanisms he would subsequently describe. However, very early in his work he postulated a “sexual etiology in all cases of neurosis but in neurasthenia the neurosis is actual; in psychoneuroses factors of an infantile nature are at work” (1896c). In 1898, in “Sexuality in the Etiology of the Neuroses” (1898a), he referred to “unconscious psychic traces.” Psychic causality implies the ability to substitute for a set of apparently unrelated facts an explanatory system based on assumptions that provide them with consistency and can be used to describe the laws governing their interrelations. All of Freud’s work revolves around “two opposed conceptions of causal necessity” (Dayan, Maurice, 1985), one of which was responsible for integrating individual differences in a coherent structure, the other tending to emphasize the subject’s singularity and originality. There is a gradual complication of the notion of psychic causality in Freud. In 1895 he proposed two models simultaneously: a causality of psychic facts conceived as part of a system that we would now call cognitivist and neurobiological (see, “Project for a Scientific Psychology,’ 1950c [1895]) and an “event-driven” traumatic conception of neurosis. His “neurotica” is supposed to comprise hysteria and obsessional neurosis based on the psychic traces of sexual aggression experienced during childhood and reactivated later on. The (relative) abandonment of this etiology (letter to Wilhelm Fliess on September 21, 1897) would confirm the effectiveness of the unconscious fantasy as a psychic act. The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a) and the first topographical subsystem enabled him to describe the laws underlying the operation of unconscious processes for which time and contradiction have no meaning, which shift and condense to produce not only dreams but the lapses and parapraxes of 1353 PsycHic CAUSALITY the “psychopathology of everyday life” (1901b), together with neurotic symptoms and delusions. Freud thus established the absence of a barrier or discontinuity between the normal and the pathological, a key idea in psychoanalysis. The same unconscious psychic mechanisms are responsible for both modes of existence. From the first to the second topographical subsystem (1923), the Freudian notion of psychic causality was radically modified. The description of the mental apparatus became increasingly complex. Mental and psychopathological facts are now the result of relations of force between id, ego, and superego agencies, and the dualism between the libido and the death drive. Metapsychology, which combines topological, dynamic, and economic points of view is the final version of this new way of thinking about psychic causality. At the same time, the role of object relations and the weight of civilization on possible subject pathologies were substantiated. The Versagung (refusal) that social reality forces desire to confront, the privation (Entbehrungen) that someone like Judge Schreber, unable to have a child, experienced, or the disappearance of the love object are considered as helping to trigger neuroses and psychoses. In 1933, in the New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1933a), Freud proposes a general theory of neurosis based on the combination of three factors: a refusal of a reality that is unsatisfactory for the id, fixation at a stage prior to libidinal development, and idiosyncratic disposition to the conflict that characterizes the potentially neurotic subject. The neurosis is triggered by regression to the points of attachment; in the case of psychosis and perversion specific defense mechanisms—splitting, denial, rejection (“Fetishism,” 1927e, “Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence,” 1940e [1938])—are also involved. In his last writings, Moses and Monotheism (1939a) and An Outline of Psycho- Analysis (1940a), published after his death, Freud insists on the particular causal value of the superego that is associated with phylogenesis and the threat of castration, which “[the boy] experiences [as] the greatest trauma of his life and introduces the period of latency with all its consequences” (1940a, p. 155). Whatever the case, Freud reaffirms the continuity of the normal and the pathological: “[T]he neuroses do not differ in any essential respect from the normal” (1940a, p. 184). The normal, neurotic, or psychotic individual will die “of his internal conflicts” (p. 150). 1354 Freud also again insists on the central importance of conflict between the body and the mind, and their interrelations, in his conception of psychic causality, which as we have seen had a number of “avatars.” It could be said that, since Freud, all writers on psychoanalysis have tried to enrich the notion of psychic causality with their own theories, which are inspired by archaic fantasies and the individual’s traumas and personal history. Jacques Lacan’s work represents an original attempt to define psychic causality on a structuralist basis by identifying the unconscious with the chain of signifiers. “The only causality the analyst knows is always that of the cause,” he wrote in Seminar XI. At the end of his life, he attempted to systematize intrapsychic activity using mathemes. The contributions of psychosomatic analysts (Georg Groddeck, Franz Alexander) and those of the French school who followed the work of Michel Fain and Pierre Marty reopened the question of psychic causality by focusing on Freud’s initial question: the relationship between physical and mental disturbances. For André Green “the term psychic causality is used by Freud rather loosely, without any genuine theoretical support” (1995). In spite of the lapidary nature of this claim, it must be acknowledged that disagreement over the nature of the concept was the origin of the split in the psychoanalytic movement. For example, Otto Rank believed he had discovered the cause of neurosis in the traumatism of birth. Wilhelm Reich focused on the idea of the sexual frustration imposed by civilization (The Function of the Orgasm, 1927). Sandor Ferenczi, after attempting to illustrate Freud’s phylogenetic theory and the concept of regression (Thalassa, 1924), reaffirmed the reality of sexual trauma experienced by the infant, and did so against Freud’s advice (“Confusion de langues entre les adultes et enfant. Le langage de la tendresse et de la passion,” 1933)% Epistemologists, making use of the criticisms that quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity had formulated concerning causality in physics, have contested the causal ambitions of psychoanalysis. Attacking Freud’s system of causal interpretation, Ludwig Wittgenstein referred to purely “aesthetic” relationships (Cambridge Lectures, 1932-1934). Karl Popper contested the scientific status of psychoanalysis, which was, according to him, a self-validating theory (The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 1934). INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS André Green, in his La Causalité psychique (1995), supplied a masterful criticism of the attempts of biology, neuroscience, and anthropology to invalidate the concept of Freudian causality. Nonetheless, in the realm of physics, measurement can be used to provide uniform descriptions of the natural universe. As far as we know, the relative force of mental drives does not lend itself to any precise form of measurement. Psychoanalysts are content to state that “it works. ...” As Piera Aulagnier wrote, we are forced to recognize that psychoanalysis can lay claim to “necessary” but never “sufficient conditions” as these are understood by philosophy and mathematics. JEAN-PIERRE CHARTIER See also: “Claims of Psychoanalysis to Scientific Interest”; Deferred action; Need for causality; Psychogenesis/organogenesis; Psychosomatic; Signifying chain; Synchronicity (analytical psychology). Bibliography Dayan, Maurice. (1985). Inconscient et Réalité. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Freud, Sigmund. (1890a). Psychical (or mental) treatment. SE, 7: 281-302. . (1893f). Charcot. SE, 3: 7-23. . (1896c). The aetiology ofh ysteria. SE, 3: 186-221. . (1898a). Sexuality in the aetiology of the neuroses. SE, 3: 259-285. . (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. Part I, SE, 4: 1—338; Part II, SE, 5: 339-625. . (1901b). The psychopathology of everyday life. SEG. . (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1-66. . (1927e). Fetishism. SE, 21: 147-157. (1933a). New introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. SE, 22: 5-182. . (1939a). Moses and monotheism. SE, 23: 1-137. . (1940a). An outline of psycho-analysis. SE, 23: 144-207. . (1940e [1938]). Splitting of the ego in the process of defence. SE, 23: 271-278. . (1950a [1887—-1902]). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173-280. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PsycHic ENERGY . (1950c [1895]). Project for a scientific psychology. SE, 1: 281-387. Green, Andre. (1995). La Causalité psychique. Entre nature et culture. Paris: Odile Jacob. PSYCHIC ENERGY The hypothesis of a psychic energy constitutes a fundamental postulate of psychoanalytical theory. It is omnipresent, from the theory of sexuality to that of the dream, of anxiety, of drives, and of affects. Of the three great metapsychological points of view, the economic one is directly founded on it, but the dynamic and topographical points of view imply it also. Any psychic movement can, in the last analysis, be linked to a phenomenon of energy. Nevertheless, this economical point of view, this “energy metaphor,” has often been criticized, put into question, and even abandoned by some. The notion of psychic energy has its source in the works of neurophysiologists at the end of the 19th century, Sigmund Exner in particular, or in the psychophysics of Gustav Fechner, and it is present in the psychiatry of that epoch. In psychoanalytical writings, it surfaced first under the pen of Josef Breuer in Studies on Hysteria (1895d). He described this energy as a “nervous tension,’ or “Intracerebral Tonic Excitations” (p. 192), contained in the reservoir of the nervous fibers. This “quiescent” energy can be put into movement and become active. Sigmund Freud, starting with Studies on Hysteria, introduced the idea of a tendency “to maintain cerebral excitation at a constant level,’ a principle of constancy that will become a principle behind the balance of pleasure and unpleasure. He first developed the notion of psychic energy in the “Project for a Scientific Psychology” (1950c [1895]) in a neuronal version; in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), the neurophysiological model disappeared and psychic energy was inserted into a theory of thought. The energy could be “free,” in the case of “primary processes,” or “bound,” as in “secondary processes.” In the latter, the binding or connecting of psychic energy is related to the linking of representations and to the “taming” of the tendency for “discharge.” “Thought must concern itself with the connecting paths between ideas, without being led astray by the intensities of these ideas” (p. 602). The quantities of energy conveyed by these 1355 PsycHic REALITY two kinds of thought are different; secondary processes of thought only convey much weaker quantities of energy, while a surfeit of non-bound energy can occur, to weaken these thought processes. For Freud, with the theory of drives, the equating of psychic energy and the libido was reinforced; the libido constituted, therefore, the essence of psychic energy. However, he always remained reticent about Carl Gustav Jung’s proposition of conflating psychic energy totally with the libido, and he held onto the idea of a psychic energy distinct from the libido, attached to ego drives and self-preservation, all the while continuing to wonder about its provenance, and admitting that this could be a desexualized energy. In The Ego and the Id, he constructed the hypothesis of a “displaceable energy, which, neutral in itself, can be added to a qualitatively differentiated erotic or destructive impulse, and augment its total cathexis. ... It seems a plausible view that this displaceable and neutral energy... proceeds from the narcissistic store of libido—that it is desexualized Eros” (1923b, p. 41). Most post-Freudian authors recognize no other psychic energy than the libido, except for the school whose source is Ego Psychology, which developed the Freudian idea of a displaceable, neutral energy; for them, this was a “neutralized” energy, participating in the functioning of an ego that had been “liberated from conflicts.” With Melanie Klein, the evolution of the stages of the libido was prominent at the beginning of her work; later, the importance accorded to unconscious fantasy and the object relation would force her, in fact, to abandon the economic point of view altogether. On the contrary, the notion of psychic energy and the economic point of view would be very important to the perspective opened up by Pierre Marty and the work of the psychosomaticists of the School of Paris. The notion of the libido and that of psychic energy will be rejected by Jacques Lacan, who replaced the drives with “desire” and spoke ironically of the theory of the libido as an “astral myth”; he allowed absolutely no room for the economic point of view. Pau DENIS See also: Binding/unbinding of the instincts; Cathectic energy; Cathexis; Decathexis; Defense mechanisms; Drive/instinct; Economic point of view; Ego; Ego-libido/ object-libido; Facilitation; Free energy/bound energy; Fusion/defusion of instincts; Hypercathexis; Libido; Nar- 1356 cissism; Pleasure/unpleasure principle; Primary process/ secondary process; Principle of consistency; Process; Return of the repressed; Sum of excitation; Work (as a psychoanalytical notion) Bibliography Applegarth, Adrienne. (1971). Comments on aspects of the theory of psychic energy. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 19, 379-416. Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. Part I, SE, 4: 1-338; Part II, SE, 5: 339-625. . (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1-66. . (1950c [1895]). Project for a scientific psychology. SE, 1: 281-387. Freud, Sigmund, and Josef Breuer (1895d). Studies in hysteria. SE, 2. PSYCHIC REALITY A concept developed by Freud to denote the level of reality specific to unconscious processes, psychic reality, from an epistemological standpoint, refers to the “object” that psychoanalysis attempts to characterize, understand, and explore. In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), the concept referred to the force of reality associated with the subject’s internal fantasy life, which could oppose and even dominate perception of external reality; it could, in other words, seem more “real” than reality itself. From the outset the emphasis was on the objective nature of subjectivity, the reality of subjectivity for the psychical apparatus—even at the expense of its relationship to external reality. The cultural context in which Freud worked tended to devalue or deprecate the character of subjective mental activity and, in particular, unconscious mental activity. He needed to assert the objective character of unconscious psychic entities in the face of opposition that would prefer to relegate them to the realm of the “imaginary” and unreal. In an article devoted to hysterical paralysis (1893c), Freud had presented the problem of the “objective” nature of hysterical conversion symptoms and their significance. The difference between biological reality, especially in terms of anatomy, and the “psychic” reality expressed by hysterical symptoms prefigured the objective character of the unconscious, as Freud was to INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS understand it. The nature of symptomatic manifestations— anesthesia, paresthesia, and so on—demonstrated that hysterical patients could not be “malingerers.” Existence of an autonomous realm of psychical life and the unconscious psyche, including the reality of fantasies, could henceforth be asserted with growing confidence. Another aspect to the emergence of psychical reality was sexual trauma and its value in terms of etiology in the debate around the role of real-life events as opposed to fantasy. The early neurotica that Freud developed tended to assign to some “real” traumatic event—childhood sexual seduction, for example—a determinative role in the etiology of hysteria and of neuroses, more generally. However, treatment gradually revealed that it was impossible to say whether the remembered scenes of traumatic seduction had actually taken place or were “invented.” The infantile and sexual fantasies that such scenes represented replaced the traumatic etiology of neurosis. These fantasies, an important type of psychical reality, impacted the psychic apparatus with all the force of “reality” and more. Thus, the concept of psychical reality was advanced initially to point out the imperious nature of fantasy with its hallucinatory quality, which could somehow dominate external reality. Any trace of opposition between external and internal as the concept is currently imployed is complicated further by the question of how to determine the source or basis of the subjectively “real” character of psychical reality. Two kinds of hypotheses can be advanced in this regard. Not necessarily antagonistic, they represent two major strands in psychoanalytic thought that need to be considered together. The first type relates psychical reality to the impact of external reality, summarized at a preliminary level by the Freudian aphorism, “Nothing in thought that was not first in the senses.” Psychical reality in this sense would indicate a previous encounter with reality; it would represent a reality that has become psychical through trace of impact. The character of reality itself would bear witness to the psychical heritage of encounters with the external world. Fantasies, according to this view, are “hybrid” structures that contain a core of reality, a kind of transformed reminiscence, the source of which lies at a remote point in time. Beyond hallucination, what is actualized and acts upon the psychic apparatus refers to a past reality—for example, cruel acts of childhood retained in feelings of guilt. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PsycHic REALITY The second type of hypothesis relates psychic reality to the constraints intrinsic to psychical activity, to its laws and operational principles. Thus, older representations of desire can be reactivated via the pleasure principle through hallucination, creating the perception of a wish fulfilled, even to the possible detriment of perception of the real world. However the psychic apparatus develops, do awareness and symbolization of lived experience obey the rhythm and laws specific to psychic reality? Its own requirements cannot be ignored. Constraints are imposed by the external world, while others arise from the psychical apparatus itself. Psychical reality makes demands with the same limitations and categorical imperatives as instincts and external reality. This has led some contemporary psychoanalysts to formulate the existence, alongside the pleasure principle and the reality principle, of a “principle of psychical reality.” An epistemological point of view would distinguish three types of reality: material reality generally, that aspect of material reality characterized by biological reality, and another aspect, independent of biological reality, to be known as psychical reality. This last is the special province of psychology. Psychoanalysis would be characterized as providing an account of “unconscious psychical reality” and its impact on psychical reality. The concept of psychical reality thus unfolds in a paradoxical way. It types reality and constrains subjectivity; it indicates the psychical objectivity of the action of subjectivity and its preeminent concern for the intelligibility of psychical facts. These arise not only from the earliest subjective experiences, from what Freud called the “psychic raw material,” but also from the requisite transformation of this material in the course of development, aiming at integration necessary for acceptance at higher levels of consciousness and in consonance with laws that govern there. RENE ROUSILLON See also: Internal/external reality. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1893c). Some points for a comparative study of organic and hysterical motor paralyses. SE, 1: 155-172. 1357 PsycHic REPRESENTATIVE . (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. Parts I and Il. SE, 4-5. Roussillon, René. (1995). La métapsychologie des processus et la transitionnalité. Revue frangaise de psychanalyse, 59. Further Reading Arlow, Jacob. (1996). The concept of psychic reality—how useful. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 77, 659-666. Friedman, Lawrence. (1995). Psychic reality in psychoanalytic theory. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 76, 25— 28. Meissner, William W. (2001). Psychic reality in the psychoanalytic process. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 49, 855-890. PSYCHIC REPRESENTATIVE Sigmund Freud used the term psychic representative— psychische Reprasentanz, the expression of an instinct in mental life—almost synonymously with Triebreprasentanz, or “instinctual representative.” The distinction seems to be that the latter term emphasizes the thing that is expressed (the instinct), whereas the former emphasizes the process of expression. In fact, this possible discrepancy raises the problem of the instinct as a “frontier-concept” between the psychic and the somatic. Controversies over this point have pit authors who have attempted to dispense with this notion and > its uncertainties, such as Jean Laplanche (1987/1989) and Daniel Widlécher (1986), against others who, like André Green (1995, 1997), have vigorously defended its position within the metapsychological edifice and who attempt to specify its status. It was in the “metapsychological” articles of 1915 (“Instincts and Their Vicissitudes,” “Repression,” and “The Unconscious”) that Freud posed this question the most clearly, by defining two components of this expression of the somatic in the psyche: the “ideational representative” and the “quota of affect.” However, he had already outlined the issue as early as 1895, in the “Project for a Scientific Psychology,” and above all in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905), to which he substantially added in 1915 based on his then current thinking. He later reformulated these issues in his second theories of the instincts in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) and The Ego and the Id (1923). ROGER PERRON 1358 See also: Drive/instinct; Ethology and psychoanalysis; Ideational representative; Instinctual representative; Neurotic defenses; Physical pain/psychical pain; Pictogram; Primal repression; Quantitative/qualitative; Quota of affect; Repressed; Repression; “Repression”; Unconscious fantasy. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123-243. . (1915c). Instincts and their vicissitudes. SE, 14: 109-140. . (1915d). Repression. SE, 14: 141-158. . (1915e). The unconscious. SE, 14: 159-204. Freud. Sigmund. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1-64. . (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1-66. . (1950c [1895]). Project for a scientific psychology. SE, 1: 281-387. Green, André. (1995). Propédeutique. La métapsychologie revisitée. Paris: LOr d’Atalante. . (1997). Les chaines d’Eros. Paris: Odile Jacob. Laplanche, Jean. (1989). New foundations for psychoanalysis (David Macey, Trans.): Oxford: Blackwell. (Original work published in 1987) Widlécher, Daniel. (1986). Métapsychologie du sens. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. PSYCHIC STRUCTURE Psychic structure defines the dominant organization of an individual’s mind, manner of establishing relationships, and way of dealing with conflicts. Structure must consequently be seen as a whole. It must also be seen as fundamental, registering its influence at a level deeper than what is apparent in the individual’s personality, character, and manner. It is not innate, however. Individual psychic structure history is combined with hereditary or biological factors, since structure and genetics are not mutually exclusive. Structure retains a unity and an immutable form, according to Freud in New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1933a [1932]), where he compares the ego to a crystal that is formed and also breaks along certain lines. Yet it is not invariable, because it is INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS a living organization that is constantly adapting, and because it can fail to maintain its equilibrium in certain modes of decompensation. In effect, components of the dominant conflict— castration anxiety, loss of the object, or problems of identity—simultaneously explain the origins of psychic structure, its points of fragility, and the form of breakdown, through neurosis, depression, or psychosis. Depending on the structure in question, the defenses put into play will take on different meanings while sometimes retaining the same form: projection in the phobic subject is not the same as in the delusional subject. Also, symptoms insufficiently define the psychic structure, according to Jean Bergeret in La violence et la vie (Violence and life; 1994). While obsession occurs more frequently in depressed patients, it is also present in many cases of psychosis, where it plays a different role, and it is also capable of becoming dominant in an obsessive structure, just as protest or the demand for vindication can be permanently inscribed in a paranoid structure. The typical stability of neurotic, psychotic, or perverse structures contrasts with the uncertainty of borderline organizations, where a narcissistic fragility produces a specific type of instability—“unstable states, stable structure,” as Daniel Widlocher put it in his foreword to Otto Kernberg’s book on borderline conditions. Lastly, psychosomatic breakdown is caused by lack of structure, unless structure is considered at the level of organic function, which is no longer exactly a mental phenomenon. In all cases, the unity of psychic structure can be defined according to different perspectives, which may converge at various points but do not completely overlap. For example, there are pregenital structures, with their archaic, oral, or anal relational modalities, and genital structures, with their more refined oedipal apprehension of the object. Taken together, these different notions of structure offer a less nosographic, more dynamic approach to the notion of structure, as Maurice Bouvet (1967) explained. AUGUSTIN JEANNEAU See also: Structural theory. Bibliography Bergeret, Jean. (1994). La violence et la vie. Paris: Payot. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PsycHic TEMPORALITY Bouvet, Maurice. (1967). La clinique psychanalytique: la relation d’objet. In his Guvres psychanalytiques, Vol. 1. Paris: Payot. Freud, Sigmund. (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22: 1-182. Widlocher, Daniel. (1979). Preface. In Otto Kernberg, Les troubles limites de la personnalité. Toulouse, France: Privat. t Further Reading Boesky, Dale. (1988). The concept of psychic structure. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 36(S), 113— 136. Loewald, Hans W. (1978). Instinct theory, object relations, and psychic-structure. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 26, 493-506. Schafer, Roy. (1988). Discussion of panel presentations on psychic structure. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 36(S), 295-312. PSYCHIC TEMPORALITY The expression “psychic temporality” does not appear as such in the writings of Sigmund Freud. In fact, it is difficult to conceive of any other kind of temporality than psychic temporality, insofar as human time is concerned, whether or not it can be readily represented to the individual subject. Psychoanalytically, psychic temporality may be defined as the way psychic processes create their own time management and sense, according to three possibilities: regression, fixation, and anticipation. Freud often argued the point that in dreams time is represented through space. He gives the example of a personage, who, in dreams, appears very diminished, as if seen the wrong way through binoculars, a figuration that he interprets not as an estrangement in space, but one in time (1933a [1932]). Reciprocally, the temporal contiguity of the associations of the patient is to be understood as spatial contiguity, recalling in its turn a relation of cause to effect (1905e [1900]). The succession in time of two consecutive dreams can even be upset without altering the causal relation, since it is the respective length of the dreams that then matters (1900a). From all these considerations, it emerges clearly that spatial representation is more important than temporal representation, and allows the latter to be expressed. This is explained by the fact that the visual is the mode of inscription of the infant’s memory. 1359 PSYCHOANALYSE DES NEVROSES ET DES PSYCHOSES, LA Fantasy, said Freud, treats chronology with even more indifference, insofar as fantasy “hovers, as it were, between three times—the three moments of time which our ideation involves”(1908e, p. 147). A current impression is necessary, to reawaken an instinctive movement linked to an event from childhood and to create, in imagination, a situation relating to a future when the desire would be realized. However, in a more general sense, it is the entire psychic life that proudly ignores time. “Neurotics,” wrote Freud, “suffer from obsession or regression” (1912—13a). Whether because it is unaware of the passage of time, or even returns to the past when the present becomes too frustrating, every psychopathological form (hysteria, paranoia, and so forth) takes, in its own way, this flight out of time that is also a flight from reality. Even more profoundly, psychic life combines simultaneously the three forms of topical, temporal, and formal regression found in dreams and in neuroses. Freud writes: “All these three kinds of regression are, however, one at bottom and occur together as a rule; for what is older in time is more primitive in form and in psychical topography lies nearer to the perceptual end” (1900a, p. 548). Freud noted the total absence of the sense of time in psychosis (1900a), but did not try to explain this. Piera Aulagnier has been concerned with demonstrating the incapacity of the psychotic to conceive of a future time that is not just a pure repetition. She emphasized, on the one hand, the work of auto-historicizing incumbent on the ego, a veritable laying hold of the past and even of the prehistory of the subject; and on the other hand, the identificatory project that allowed the ego, at every moment of its trajectory, to imagine itself in a different place, implying the possibility of change. In psychosis, where repetition dominates, the ego does not succeed in transforming the fragmentary evidence concerning it into a temporal continuity, implying a before and an after. In this regard, the question of identity and the ability to conceive of temporality seem profoundly linked. SOPHIE DE MioLLA-MELLOR See also: Apprenti-historien et le maitre-sorcier (L’- ) (The apprentice historian and the master sorcerer]; Archaic; Autohistorization; Boredom; Castration complex; Civilization and Its Discontents; Darwin, Darwinism, and psychoanalysis; Deferred action; Doubt; Ego feeling; Estrangement; Ethnopsychoanalysis; Femininity; Forget- 1360 ting; Framework of the psychoanalytic treatment; Free association; Group phenomenon; Historical truth; History and psychoanalysis; Id; Identificatory project; Infantile, the; Kantianism and psychoanalysis; Latency period; Memory; “Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams”; Mnemic trace/memory trace; Music and psychoanalysis; Myths; Nirvana; Nostalgia; “Note upon the ‘Mystic Writing Pad’, A’; Phenomenology and psychoanalysis; Prehistory; Primal repression; Primal, the; Processes of development; Proton-pseudos; Psychic causality; Psychotic potential; Regression; Repetition; Screen memory; Self-consciousness; Stage (or phase); Symbolization, process of; Thalassa. A Theory of Genitality; “Theme of the Three Caskets, The”; Time; Unconscious, the; Working-through. Bibliography Aulagnier, Piera. (1984). L’Apprenti-historien et le maitresorcier. Du discours identifiant au discours délirant. (The apprentice historian and the master sorcerer). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Castoriadis-Aulagnier, Piera. (1975). La violence de l’interpretation. Du pictogramme a lénoncé (The violence of interpretation: from the pictogram to the enunciation). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. Part I, SE, 4: 1-338: Part II, SE, 5: 339-625. . (1908e). Creative writers and day-dreaming. SE, 9: 141-153. . (1912—13a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1-161. . (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho- analysis. SE, 22: 1-182. PSYCHOANALYSE DES NEVROSES ET DES PSYCHOSES, LA La psychoanalyse des névroses et des psychoses (The psychoanalysis of neuroses and psychoses), by Emmanuel Régis and Angélo Hesnard, was the first book on psychoanalysis ever published in French. Prior to its publication, Freud mentioned it in a letter to Karl Abraham dated January 2, 1912: “Today I received a letter from a pupil of Régis at Bordeaux written on his behalf apologizing in the name of French psychiatry for its neglect of psycho-analysis and announcing his willingness to publish a long paper about it in Encéphale” (Freud and Abraham, 1965, p. 111). To Ernest Jones he wrote more specifically twelve days later: INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS “There is some stir in France even now, another man Hesnard a pupil of Regis at Bordeaux presenting in the name of his master to me ‘the excuses of the French nation’ for so continued a slighting and declaring himself prone to work for ‘WA [psychoanalysis] in the French papers” (Freud and Jones, 1993, p. 126) Regis and Hesnard published two articles in L’encéphale in April and June 1913 on “the doctrine of Freud and his school” (1913a; 1913b). They were introduced as follows: “Freud’s system, whatever may be said of it, seems to constitute one of the most important scientific movements of our psychological times. Irrespective of whether its renown, now worldwide, is justified or not, we must surely be shocked and rightly so, that this system is almost completely unknown in our country.” Régis and Hesnard’s book recapitulated and expanded on the two articles. Based on a reading of Freud and written with the collaboration of Oswald Hesnard, Germanist and brother of Angélo, the book presented the basics of Freudian theories as faithfully as possible at the time. The authors were very clear in their preface, dated May 1, 1914: “Possibly some will be shocked to see this popularization of a German theory that is at once so widely endorsed, so contested, and in certain ways so foreign, undertaken by French psychiatrists who are far from partial to the current fashion for German science. There is no cause for surprise, however. It is one thing not to accept blindly whatever comes from outside, another to ignore or misunderstand it. Impartiality and independence regarding what comes from elsewhere should not turn into xenophobia.” The first part of the work (“The Theory of Psychoanalysis”) has six chapters: “Description and History of Psychoanalysis,” “The Dynamic Psychology of Freud,” “The Sexual Theory of Freud,’ “The Morbid Sexual Constitution,” “The Technique of Psychoanalysis, Dream Analysis,” and “The Psychoanalysis of Associations of Ideas and Daily Life” (titles are translated from the French). The second part (“Applications of Psychoanalysis”) has five chapters: “Extramedical Applications of Psychoanalysis,” “The Psychoanalysis of Neuroses,” “The Psychoanalysis of Psychoses,” “The Therapeutic Role of Psychoanalysis,” and “The Critique of Psychoanalysis.” There followed a bibliography listing the works of Freud, various books and articles in French, and some non-French works on psychoanalysis. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PSYCHOANALYSE DES NEVROSES ET DES PSYCHOSES, LA Sandor Ferenczi (1915) quickly recognized the significance of the book, but nevertheless found serious fault in it because it lacked the notion of the unconscious and repeated throughout the error of deriving almost all emotional tendencies from the sexual instinct. Ferenczi also challenged the judgments of the last chapter, which he correctly attributed to Régis. He vigorously stated his objections: the book lacks scientific value; it depends on “mystical concepts” and “teleological conceptions” that are more philosophical than medical; and it bases psychoanalysis on “ingenious hypotheses” and “fragile, uncertain techniques” whose “symbolic interpretation is sometimes an insult to common sense.” One statement from Regis and Hesnard’s book served as a leitmotif for a good number of authors in the decades that followed: “Freud’s method and conceptions are based on those of Janet, by whom, it seems, he was constantly inspired. Changing Janet’s ‘psychological analysis’ to ‘psychoanalysis’ changed nothing as far as the method common to both students of Charcot was concerned.” For his part, Freud, in his “On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement” (1914d), merely noted, “Regis and Hesnard (Bordeaux) have recently [in 1913] attempted to disperse the prejudices of their countrymen against the new ideas by an exhaustive presentation, which, however, is not always understanding and takes special exception to symbolism” (p. 32). Freud never forgave Hesnard for his ambivalence, which he let pass only around 1926, and then only partially. The First World War put an end to any serious discussion in France about psychoanalysis, and hence Régis and Hesnard’s work, until 1920 (an exception being André Breton’s discovery of Freud in 1916). Régis died in 1918, and Hesnard alone was responsible for the new edition of 1922, where he wrote, “Science without scientific nationalism can be neither alive or fruitful. Freud’s teaching, which derives not, as has been claimed, from the French genius of Charcot, but rather from Germanic philosophy could have no more deniable adversary than moderation, a trait of Latin genius, from one point of view of the search for truth.” Freud did not much appreciate this remark, and four years later he spoke sarcastically to René Laforgue about such “bowing and scraping before Latin genius.” In the third edition, appearing in 1929, Hesnard revealed that the chapter critical of psychoanalysis had been written by Régis, even if Hesnard had agreed at 1361 PSYCHOANALYSIS the time. “At present,” Hesnard added, “with the benefit of five years of daily experience of it, we are in a better position to confirm the great value and significance of psychoanalysis. It is a therapeutic—and especially an exploratory—method that is indisputably superior to all others, in this, despite the drawbacks, it inevita- 29> bly shares with all ‘heroic treatments. ALAIN DE MYOLLA See also: France; Hesnard, Angélo Louis Marie; Régis, Emmanuel Jean-Baptiste Joseph. Source Citation Régis, Emmanuel, and Hesnard, Angélo. (1914). La psychoanalyse des névroses et des psychoses: Ses applications médicales et extramedicales. Paris: Alcan. Bibliography Ferenczi, Sandor. (1915). Die psychiatrische schule von Bordeaux iiber die psychoanalyse. Internazionale Zeitschrift fiir Artzliche Psychoanalyse, 3, 352-369. Freud, Sigmund. (1914d). On the history of the psychoanalytic movement. SE, 14: 1-66. Freud, Sigmund, and Abraham, Karl. (1965). A psycho-analytic dialogue: The letters of Sigmund Freud and Karl Abraham, 1907-1926 (Bernard Marsh and Hilda C. Abraham, Trans.). New York: Basic Books. Freud, Sigmund, and Jones, Ernest. (1993 [1908-1939]). The complete correspondence of Sigmund Freud and Ernest Jones, 1908-1939. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Hesnard-Félix, Edith. (1984). Le Dr. Hesnard et la naissance de la psychanalyse en France. Doctoral thesis, University of Paris I. Régis, Emmanuel, and Hesnard, Angélo. (1913a). La doctrine de Freud et de son école (1re partie). Encéphale, 8 356-378. > Régis, Emmanuel, and Hesnard, Angélo. (1913b). La doctrine de Freud et de son école (suite et fin). Encéphale, 8. 537-564. J PSYCHOANALYSIS Sigmund Freud himself provided the most complete, and now most classical definition for his invention, psychoanalysis: “Psycho-analysis is the name (1) of a procedure for investigating mental processes which are 1362 almost inaccessible in any other way, (2) of a method (based upon that investigation) for the treatment of neurotic disorders and (3) of a collection of psychological information obtained along those lines, which is gradually being accumulated into a new scientific discipline” (1923a [1922], p. 235). This definition, intended for the Encyclopaedia Britannica, is still widely used today by many psychoanalytic training institutes. Freud also wrote that the best way to understand psychoanalysis was to study its history. Its origins could be traced to the young Viennese doctor’s medical practice. He frequently treated “nervous” patients, for the most part described as suffering from “hysteria,” a field he came to specialize in after his return from Paris and his work assisting Jean Martin Charcot. He needed to heal these patients and develop a clientele large enough to support his growing family, even though therapeutic procedures at the time were practically nonexistent. The available techniques—electric shock, isolation in medical clinics, and sedatives— were soon abandoned. Hypnosis appeared to him at first to produce miraculous results, but it turned out to be a dead end, and he decided to apply the “cathartic method” that his mentor, Joseph Breuer, had discovered during the treatment of the patient known as Anna O. Taking the symptom as its starting point, this method strove to have the patient recall the circumstances of its first occurrence, and a successful outcome depended on this recollection by means of talk, which was supposed to make the symptom disappear. Freud then discovered the “resistance” that patients would put up during the search for pathogenic “primal scenes,” as if they wanted to keep the origin of their illness secret. The material that was “repressed” in this way always involved old memories associated with specific events related to the earliest sexual activity of children. His suggestion that such a sexuality even existed greatly shocked many of his contemporaries. His patients soon began drawing his attention to their dreams, which he encouraged them to recount. In keeping with his belief in determinism, Freud concluded that dreams fulfilled a function—the safeguarding of sleep through the fulfillment of wishes that had been ignored by consciousness—and consequently had an “unconscious” content, a meaning that could be deciphered. The analysis of resistance and the interpretation of dreams, together with the method of “free association,” became the pillars of the psy- INTERNATIONAL DicTioNARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS chotherapy to which Freud, in 1896, gave the name “psychoanalysis.” The term appeared for the first time in an article written in French, “Heredity and the Aetiology of the Neuroses” (1896a). By the first years of the twentieth century, the principal features of psychoanalytic treatment that still define it at the beginning of the twenty-first had been established: The patient was placed on a couch and the therapist remained out of sight. The patient was asked to say whatever came to mind. Sessions were fairly long, frequent, and expensive, so that the treatment would become an important part of the patient’s life and so that the bond with the psychoanalyst—the “transference”— would become the principal engine of the attempt to reconstruct the past and weaken the defenses the patient had set up against the pressure from contradictory drives. But the initial therapeutic successes were not as consistent or as long-lasting as Freud had hoped. The transference could become hostile and give rise to a “negative therapeutic reaction,” leading to the discontinuation of treatment or its indefinite extension. Freud was less a therapist than a researcher, something he often recognized; it was primarily his students and successors who introduced improvements to his methods, or different but connected methods, to make the “therapeutic” aspect of psychoanalysis more effective. Thus Carl G. Jung and Hermine von Hug-Hellmuth worked with psychotic patients, and Anna Freud and Melanie Klein with children. Otto Rank and Sandor Ferenczi sought to improve psychoanalytic therapy and make it more effective. They introduced so-called “active” techniques and tried to shorten the length of therapy, even exploring a form of “mutual analysis.” Traces of these early initiatives can be found in psychotherapeutic methods developed years later. Similarly, the extension of psychotherapy to patients presenting problems of psychosis or addiction, and the development of group analysis and psychodrama all tended to point up the therapeutic value of psychoanalysis. Some psychoanalysts sought to render their approach more effective by forging links with the neurosciences. Following Freud, however, who quipped about the profession’s “furor sanandi, other psychoanalysts emphasized the research implications of treatment. Thus Jacques Lacan, who in 1957 spoke of curing patients as merely an “extra” benefit of psychoanalysis, and who in 1964, when he founded the Ecole freudi- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PSYCHOANALYSIS enne de Paris, described training analysis as “pure”— as opposed to simply “therapeutic”—psychoanalysis, clearly represents the tendency that embraces the third of Freud’s three basic definitions of psychoanalysis. In his daily practice, however, Freud never differentiated between what he experienced and what he theorized later. His letters to Wilhelm Fliess allow us to follow, almost day by day, the theory-building that turned psychoanalysis into the “depth psychology” Freud hoped would supplant academic psychology. A work of construction then—but also of deconstruction— Freud considered his ideas to be superstructures whose existence was necessarily ephemeral, and anticipated new discoveries better adapted to the knowledge obtained from clinical practice. A first model, developed in 1900, which described a psychic apparatus formed of three agencies—the unconscious, preconscious, and conscious—was replaced in 1923 by another conceptual scheme comprising the id, the ego, and the superego. And while Freud remained firmly committed to the Oedipus complex, he had, over a period of forty years of work, fleshed out the speculative aspects of his metapsychology with new concepts that improved and sometimes reversed his earlier hypotheses: narcissism, the death instinct, the phallic stage, the splitting of the ego. Alfred Adler, in 1911, and Jung, in 1913, made their final breaks with Freud over theoretical disagreements and formed their own schools. The first psychoanalytic theory to be developed that broke with Freud’s theories while also claiming to further the Freudian tradition was Melanie Klein’s, developed between 1930 and 1962. Klein radically revised the Freudian view of the first moments of the formation of the mental apparatus, on the basis of her clinical experience with very young children and her interest in psychoses. Her theoretical model invoked very early stages she referred to as “depressive” or “paranoid-schizoid” positions, and she held that the Oedipus complex originated at a much earlier age than Freud thought. Her opposition to Anna Freud, who insisted on strict fidelity to the spirit and letter of her father’s theories, gave rise to several important “controversies” (1941-1945) that determined the orientation of the British Psycho-Analytical Society after the Second World War. Following Klein, Donald Winnicott, Wilfred Bion, and Ronald Fairbairn helped develop British psychoanalytical theory and practice. In the United States a number of derivative psychoanalytic theories came into being, 1363 PSYCHOANALYSIS some of which parted ways with classical Freudian theory. The theory of ego-psychology was introduced by Heinz Hartmann, Ernst Kris, and Rudolph Loewenstein, and was for years the major reference point of American psychoanalysis. Heinz Kohut developed a theory of narcissism, and Karen Horney and Harry Stack Sullivan were cofounders of a “culturalist” approach. Erik Erikson’s work was also notable. In France, Jacques Lacan, under the banner of the “return to Freud” in November 1955, proposed new models that in his view could better account for the constitution of the “subject” and the relationship between the subject and the unconscious. The three categories of the real, the imaginary, and the symbolic; the primacy of the phallus; the object a; Borromean knots; and mathemes were so many milestones in an evolving theory that Lacan developed week by week, from 1954 to 1981, in his famous seminars. His idiosyncratic use of the findings of modern linguistics, inspired by Ferdinand de Saussure, of structuralism, and of logical and mathematical models, enabled him to make an audience of even communities like the Catholic Church and the Marxist orthodoxy, which had previously rejected “Freudian doctrine” as “unscientific.” Whether or not psychoanalysis is a science has been debated for years, and the issue reappears regularly in the news. For epistemologists like Karl Popper and a host of other critics, the statements made by psychoanalysis cannot be considered scientific since they cannot be “falsified” and because the theory cannot be “refuted.” For Freud, the scientific status of his theory was never in doubt, and he considered his metapsychological hypotheses no more implausible than those of contemporary physics. Psychoanalysis, as far as he was concerned, was a “natural science” (“Naturwissenschaft’). Despite holding a position deemed by some close to “scientism,” Freud clearly distinguished his belief in a scientific ideal and the consistency of his hypotheses concerning the unconscious from a Weltanschauung, a “vision of the world” whose totalizing tendencies and illusory nature he feared. In The Question of Lay Analysis, he wrote: “Science, as you know, is not a revelation; long after its beginnings it still lacks the attributes of definiteness, immutability and infallibility for which human thought so deeply longs. But such as it is, it is all that we can have” (1926e, p. 191). Freud also insisted on the importance of psychoanalysis as a cultural phenomenon and a special instrument for studying and understanding other cul- 1364 tural phenomena. On July 5, 1910, he wrote to Jung: “I am becoming more and more convinced of the cultural value of psychoanalysis, and I long for the lucid mind that will draw from it the justified inferences for philosophy and sociology” (p. 340). His letters to Wilhelm Fliess already illustrate the extent to which his psychological discoveries provided new insights for the understanding of literature and visual art, and how their study provided him with new ideas or proofs of the correctness of his views. It was Sophocles who provided Freud with the name for his “Oedipus complex,” discovered during his self-analysis in October 1897. In 1913 he indicated the fields of knowledge he felt would benefit (1913j) from psychoanalytic concepts. Aside from psychology, he listed the science of language, philosophy, biology, the history of the development of civilization, aesthetics, sociology, and pedagogy. He confirmed this interaction in the Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis: “In the work of psychoanalysis links are formed with numbers of other mental sciences, the investigation of which promises results of the greatest value: links with mythology and philology, with folklore, with social psychology and the theory of religion. You will not be surprised to hear that a periodical has grown up.on psychoanalytic soil whose sole aim is to foster these links. This periodical is known as Imago, founded in 1912 and edited by Hanns Sachs and Otto Rank. In all these links the share of psychoanalysis is in the first instance that of giver and only to a less extent that of receiver” (1916—-1917a, p. 167-68). Despite the charge that Freudian concepts cannot be applied outside the framework of the treatment and notwithstanding the superficial way they have indeed too often sometimes been used, the fact is that “applied psychoanalysis” has profoundly modified our view of literature and the fine arts, of biography, and of sociological and political realities. Freud set the example by the way he approached Wilhelm Jensen’s story “Gradiva,” Leonardo da Vinci’s life, and Michelangelo’s sculpture, to mention only a few of his contributions. But on several occasions he expressed his reservations about the value of the psychobiographies produced by some of his followers and successors. Toward the end of his life his clinical work took a secondary position to his writings on the great problems of religion and culture: The Future of an IIlusion (1927c), Civilization and Its Discontents (1930a INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS [1929]), and especially his last work, Moses and Monotheism (1939a [1934-1938]), which expands upon the anthropological ideas he had extensively covered in Totem and Taboo (1912-13a). Later, the spread of Freudian ideas attracted the interest of writers, artists, and critics, who made use of them to enrich their own work. The Surrealists were among the first, but novelists, painters, and dramatists borrowed from psychoanalysis as well. Created at the same time as cinematography, psychoanalysis has inspired filmmakers from the early days. One has only to think of Secrets of a Soul (Geheimnisse einer Seele), the film G. W. Pabst made in 1926 in spite of Freud’s reservations; or of the films of Alfred Hitchcock, Spellbound and Vertigo; or of Freud, the Secret Passion, by John Huston, prepared with the help of Jean-Paul Sartre and released in 1962, in which Montgomery Clift plays the role of Freud; or, for that matter, of the comic treatment of psychoanalysis by Woody Allen. Throughout the twentieth century, the discoveries of psychoanalysis and its theory of the unconscious have profoundly modified the rules mankind has established concerning its behavior and sexual taboos, its relation to guilt, to femininity, and more generally to other people, about whom a whole new unconscious aspect was now apprehended. Obviously, however, the wide dissemination and renown of psychoanalysis were themselves the product of the twentieth century. Psychoanalysis was inspired and carried along by that century, with its excesses, its political ideologies, its economic and religious ups and downs, and above all, its terrible conflicts, which despite all claims to civilized behavior mobilized the darkest and most barbaric of human impulses just as Freud had understood and feared (1915b, 1933b [1932]). In so many ways—the liberalization of behavior, the advancement of the status of women (both inside and outside feminist movements and in spite of their virulent criticisms of Freudianism), the dawning recognition of sexual minorities (even though in Freudian theory their preferences have been explained as arrested libidinal development and more or less archaic fixations), a different approach to the subject and its relation to itself and the other—psychoanalysis has become a part of everyday life throughout the socalled “Western” world and is not about to simply disappear, despite all the wild swings of fashion. Its expansion toward other cultural sensibilities, like the multiplication of the often contradictory theories INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PSYCHOANALYSIS and techniques that claim allegiance to it, as demonstrated by this Dictionary, show that psychoanalysis has never been a dogma or the kind of closed theory caricatured by dishonest critics. In his own time Freud defined those “cornerstones,” which seemed to him to provide the foundation that his successors would trace back to him: “The assumption that there are unconscious mental processes, the recognition of the theory of resistance and repression, the appreciation of the importance of sexuality and of the Oedipus complex—these constitute the principal subject-matter of psycho-analysis and the foundations of its theory. No one who cannot accept them all should count himself a psycho-analyst” (1923a [1922], p. 247). Nothing has really changed regarding the basic principles, in spite of the considerable diversity found in theoretical research and methods of practice, which has enriched the great network of the global psychoanalytic movement. The recent rapid development of the neurosciences does not signal any decline in the value of the listening procedure that psychoanalysis has offered for more than a century in its attempt to understand and treat mental suffering. Apparently contradictory theoretical systems will eventually intersect and enrich each other, and the pessmism of the Cassandras can be answered with Freud’s remarks, written in 1914: “At least a dozen times in recent years, in reports of the proceedings of certain congresses and scientific bodies or in reviews of certain publications, I have read that now psychoanalysis is dead, defeated and disposed of once and for all. The best answer to all this would be in the terms of Mark Twain’s telegram to the newspaper which had falsely published news of his death: ‘Report of my death is grossly exaggerated” (1914d, p. 35). ALAIN DE MIJOLLA Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1912-13a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1-161. . (1913j). The claims of psycho-analysis to scientific interest. SE, 13: 163-190. . (1915b). Thoughts for the times on war and death. SE, 14: 273-300. —— —. (1916-17a [1915-17]). Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. Parts I and II. SE, 15-16. . (1923a [1922]). Two encyclopaedia articles. Psycho- analysis. SE, 18: 234-255. 1365 PSYCHOANALYSIS OF CHILDREN, THE . (1926e). The question of lay analysis. SE, 20: 177— 250. . (1930a [1929]). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21: 57-145. ———. (1933b [1932]). Why war? (Einstein and Freud). SE, 22: 195=215. . (1939a [1934—38]). Moses and monotheism: Three essays. SE, 23: 1-137. Freud, Sigmund, and Jung, Carl. (1974a [1906-13]). The Freud/Jung letters: The correspondence between Sigmund Freud and C. G. Jung (William McGuire, Ed., and Ralph Manheim and R.EC. Hull, Trans.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Mijolla, Alain de. (1996). Psychoanalysts and their history. International Psychoanalysis: The Newsletter of the IPA, 5 (1), 25-28. PSYCHOANALYSIS OF CHILDREN, THE Melanie Klein’s first work, this book is the thoroughly worked-out result of her substantial clinical experience in applying psychoanalytic treatment to children. Though there had been other attempts to use psychoanalysis in treating children, notably Sigmund Freud’s work with the father of Little Hans, reported in “Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy” (1909), The Psychoanalysis of Children is free of adult-centered biases and is a pioneering work. Klein’s freedom of thought, in terms first of technique and then of theory, came from her discovery of a new methodology: the use of the play technique had opened.a new field of investigation of the unconscious. She had observed that children’s play expressed their fantasies and anxieties. Gradually, she realized that children’s play could be situated within the framework of the ego’s attempts to defend itself from instinctual conflicts in order to work them out. This led to her conception of symbolism, a psychic mechanism that is essential for development of the ego. This book can be divided into two parts. The first and technical part is based on six lectures given by Klein in London at the invitation of Ernest Jones in 1925 and 1927. In these chapters, Klein emphasized the clinical signs indicative of children’s transference fantasies, which, in her view, made it possible to interpret them in a way that was similar to analytic work with adults. In fact, she demonstrated the technical value of an early interpretation of the transference resistances of certain children, in order to facilitate the 1366 establishment of the therapeutic bond and a psychoanalytic process. The second, more theoretical part of the book was written later. Here Klein developed her ideas on the early stages of the Oedipus complex, manifested in the phase of maximum sadism, where the child’s aggressive instincts are directed toward parental part-objects: the mother’s breast, the father’s penis, and in particular the mother’s body and its contents. Fixations of this kind can produce hypochondriacal fantasies about the child’s own body, or else various inhibitions, especially in relation to toilet training. In Klein’s conception, the early forms of the superego result from introjection of the persecutory breast and penis, which function as internal persecutors. In this work Klein gradually became more oriented toward a theory of psychic conflict in which aggression plays the greatest role. The destructive omnipotence of aggressive fantasies stems from the child’s immaturity in his or her struggle against the death instinct, as Klein argued in greater detail in her later theoretical work. FRANCISCO PALACIO EsPASA See also: British Psycho-Analytical Society; Childhood; Oedipus complex, early; Richard, case of; Technique with children, psychoanalytic. Source Citation Klein, Melanie. (1932). Die psychoanalyse des kindes. Vienna: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag; (1975). The psycho- analysis of children (Alix Strachey, Trans., and H. A. Thorner, Rev.). London: Hogarth. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1909b). Analysis of a phobia in a fiveyear- old boy. SE, 10: 1-149. PSYCHOANALYSIS OF DREAMS, THE In 1940, in order to obtain the equivalent, in Argentina, of his medical degree from the University of Madrid, Angel Garma presented his book, Psicoandlysis de los suefios, for his doctoral thesis. Considered a classic of psychoanalytic literature, this work has gone through a number of editions in which Garma INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS has gradually elaborated upon his differences from the Freudian interpretation of dreams as wish fulfillments. According to Garma, the dreamer’s thoughts, originating in repressed content, present hallucinatory characteristics. In becoming conscious, these thoughts inform the manifest dream. They are related to highly traumatic psychic content. The ego seeks to protect itself by masking such contents. It transforms them into what appear to be wish fulfillments, but which are in fact satisfactions more characteristic of mania. This theory maintains that the traumatic situation that causes dreams ends up as a hallucination when the charge of the repressed content is stronger than the weakened counter-charge of the sleeping ego. These contents give the ego the impression that they correspond to current situations in the real world. In Garma’s view this is a phenomenon that occurs in a way diametrically opposed to that described by Freud describes it in his theory of reality-testing. GILDA SABSAY FOKS See also: Argentina; Garma, Angel. Source Citation Garma, Angel (1940). Psicoanalysis de los suefios. Buenos Aires: El Ateneo; (1985). The psychoanalysis of dreams. New York: Jason Aronson. Bibliography Garma, Angel (1970). Neuvas aportaciones al psycoanalisis de los suefios. Buenos Aires: Paidos. PSYCHOANALYSIS OF FIRE, THE The Psychoanalysis of Fire was published by Gaston Bachelard in 1938, before Water and Dreams: An Essay on the Imagination of Matter (1940), Air and Dreams: An Essay on the Imagination of Movement (1942), and Earth and Reveries of Will (1945). This essay was part of an effort that reconnected research on pre-Socratic philosophy with the question of the fundamental constituents of the world, the “elements.” Bachelard was both a theoretician of modern science (The New Scientific Spirit, [1934]; Le Rationalisme appliquée, [1949]) and a philosopher of poetics, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PSYCHOANALYSIS OF FIRE, THE in the sense that while demonstrating the need for systematization associated with all rational thought, he insisted on the collapse of any system in the face of the infinite richness of experience. He also attempted to circumscribe existence with a profound imagination imbued with poetic experience that transcends the individual imagination of the subject. For Bachelard the phenomenon of firé is situated at this crossroads of science and poetry. In his preface, he writes, “I am going to examine a problem in which objectivity has never held sway, where the initial seduction is so compelling that it deforms the most rational minds and leads them to the cradle of poetry, where daydreams replace thought, where poems hide theorems. This is the psychological problem presented by our convictions about fire. The problem is so directly psychological that I have no hesitation in speaking of a ‘psychoanalysis of fire.” The work is broken down into seven chapters: 1. Fire and Respect: The Prometheus Complex; 2. Fire and Reverie: The Empedocles Complex; 3. Psychoanalysis and Prehistory: The Novalis Complex; 4. Sexualized Fire; 5. The Chemistry of Fire: History of a False Problem; 6. Alcohol and Water that Flames. Punch: The Hoffmann Complex. Spontaneous Combustions; 7. Idealized Fire: Fire and Purity. The two chapters that most directly concern psychoanalysis are obviously chapters three and four. It is interesting that Bachelard, who here attempts an anthropological study of the birth of fire in human history and an approach to the libidinal components represented by fire, quotes Carl Jung on several occasions but never Sigmund Freud. He also quotes James George Frazer’s Myths on the Origin of Fire, even though Freud himself referred to Frazer’s work (in 1911 Freud read The Golden Bough), which was partly responsible for his interest in prehistory. We also know that in 1930, in Civilization and Its Discontents (1930a [1929]), Freud discussed his famous hypothesis on the origins of the mastery of fire associated with a rejection of the impulse to urinate on the flame to extinguish it: “It is as though primal man had the habit, when he came in contact with fire, of satisfying an infantile desire connected with it, by putting it out with a stream of his urine. ... The first person to renounce this desire and spare the fire was able to carry it off with him and subdue it to his own use” He also wrote an entire article on this, “The Acquisition and 1367 PSYCHOANALYST Control of Fire” (1932a [1931]), in which he provides a brilliant analysis of the myth of Prometheus. Therefore, the lack of any reference to Freud in Bachelard’s text is surprising, for the direction of their thought converges at many points even though it arises from different epistemological viewpoints. As far as we know Freud never met Bachelard, an existential nonevent that may characterize, in its own way, Freud’s profound ambivalence toward philosophy, even when it was highly compatible or consistent with metapsychology. BERNARD GOLSE See also: Applied psychoanalysis and the interactions of psychoanalysis; Bachelard, Gaston. Source Citation Bachelard, Gaston. (1938). The psychoanalysis of fire. (Alan C. M. Ross, Trans.). Boston: Beacon Press [1964]. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1930a [1929]). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21: 57-145. (1932a [1931]). The acquisition and control of fire. SE, 22: 183-193. PSYCHOANALYST “Whoever has admitted that transference and resistance constitute the linchpins of treatment forever belongs in our untamed horde,” Freud wrote to Georg Groddeck on June 15th, 1917. He would later add: “The acceptance of unconscious psychical processes, the acknowledgement of the doctrine on resistance and repression, the taking into consideration of sexuality and the Oedipus complex are the principle tenets of psychoanalysis and the bases of its history, and whosoever is not prepared to subscribe to all of them should not count himself among Psychoanalysts” (1923a). Since then, disputes have run to the heart of the various psychoanalytic institutes over didactic analyses and training. The absence of a consistent code, compounded by inconsistent statutory regulations which governmental authorities have and have not have enacted in different region, has further multiplied the number of pronouncements as to what each institute reckons should best define what a psychoanalyst is. 1368 Freud had already stated a few of his own prescriptions: “It is therefore reasonable to expect of an analyst, as a part of his qualifications, a considerable degree of mental normality and correctness. In addition, he must possess some kind of superiority, so that in certain analytic situations he can act as a model for his patient and in others as a teacher. And finally we must not forget that the analytic relationship is based on a love of truth—that is, on a recognition -of reality— and that it precludes any kind of sham or deceit” (1937c, p. 248). The work of the psychoanalyst has been described as being quite similar to that of the patient. First of all he or she should be committed to the relationship and to analyzing his or her own motivations for being in it. He or she must also engage in interpretive listening, including to the manifestations of their own defenses. In short, a “free-floating” or “evenly-suspended” attention must be paid when dealing with the processes inevitably evoked or generated by the highly-charged affective moments to which psychoanalytic activity leads. The term counter-transference has been considerably expanded upon since it first appeared in 1910, and the various meanings attributed to it attest to the intricacies that develop within the analytic situation (Sandler, Joseph, et-al., 1973; Blum, Howard, 1986). These conceptual responses, like the so-called “neutrality” intended to make the analyst into a “mirror,” attest to the receptiveness with which personal analysis, often called a “didactic” or “training analysis,’ was meant to equip the psychoanalyst. In the event, only a presumptive judgment may be made in this respect. It should be recalled that language is the analyst’s fundamental operation medium. The psychoanalytic candidate must have mastered the unique system of language that a psychoanalytic dialogue will engage him in, as this language is far from being something that unfolds through one voice alone. The “Rules and Procedures of the Training Committee, Representing the French SPP [Société psychanalytique de Paris], composed in France in 1949, in which the style of Jacques Lacan is very much in evidence, detailed the criteria for the selection of candidates for apprenticeship in psychoanalysis in France in the wake of the Second World War: “Only through clinical examination may light be shed upon the deficiencies which disqualify the candidate as an aide to memory or judgment: traits pointing to future intel- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS lectual frailty, latent psychoses, cognitive difficulties compensated for otherwise; or as a guiding agent: psychical difficulties in the form of crises and mood swings including epilepsy, meaning Cyclothymia.” The “Rules and Procedures” also advise: “Among other disqualifying elements should be included such problems as might impair the basis of imaginary support the person of the analyst may furnish to transferential identifications in the generic homeomorphism of his body image: shocking deformities, visible mutilations and overt functional impairments ... Secondly, the examiner should consider the candidate’s cultural education, which is evidenced in the special kind of intellectual open-mindedness that grasps the meanings of words and inspires their usage.” Freud, relying less on specifics and caricatures in his catalogue of counter-indications, emphasized above all the characteristic element of commitment to the activity, which “cannot well be handled like a pair of glasses that one puts on for reading and takes off when one goes for a walk. As a rule, psycho-analysis possesses a doctor either entirely or not at all” (1933a, p. 153). The arguments that have taken place surrounding whether it is possible to practice psychoanalysis part-time, on the margins of other medical or university activities, are extensive. While Freud regretted the fact that “It cannot be disputed that analysts in their own personalities have not invariably come up to the standard of psychical normality to which they wish to educate their patients” (1937c, p. 247), he also added: “It almost looks as if analysis were the third of those ‘impossible’ professions in which one can be sure beforehand of achieving unsatisfying results. The other two, which have been known much longer, are education and government” (p. 248). ALAIN DE MyOLLA See also: Abstinence/rule of abstinence; Active technique; Analysand; Boundary violations; Collected Papers on Schizophrenia and Related Subjects, Counter-transference; Cure; Elasticity; Ethics; Evenly-suspended attention; Face-to-face situation; Framework of the psychoanalytic treatment; Fundamental rule; Initial interview(s); Interpretation; Lay analysis; Money and the psychoanalytic treatment; Mutual analysis; Negative therapeutic reaction; Neutrality/benevolent neutrality; Pass, the; Psychoanalysis; Psychoanalytic technique with adults; INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PSYCHOANALYTIC EPISTEMOLOGY Psychoanalytic technique with children; Psychoanalytic treatment; Psychotherapy; “Recommendations to Physicians Practicing Psychoanalysis”; Supervised analysis (control case); Tact; Termination of treatment; Therapeutic alliance; Training of the psychoanalyst. Bibliography Blum, Howard P. (1986). Countertransference and the theory of technique: discussion. Journal of the American Psychoanalytical Association, 34. Freud, Sigmund. (1923a [1922]). Encyclopaedia article: “The libido theory.” SE, 18: 255-259. . (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho- analysis. SE, 22: 1-182. . (1937c). Analysis terminable and interminable. SE, 23: 209-253. . (1960a). Letters of Sigmund Freud. (Ernst L. Freud, Ed.; Tania and James Stern, Trans.) New York: Basic Books. Revue frangaise de psychanalyse. (1949). Reglement et doctrine de la Commission de l’enseignement déléguée par la S.P.P., Paris, France. 13, (3), 426—435. Sandler, Joseph; Dare, Christopher; and Holder, Alex. (1973). The patient and the analyst: the basis of psychoanalytic practice. New York: International Universities Press. Further Reading Litowitz, Bonnie, et al. (2003). The contemporary psychoanalyst at work. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 51, 9-24. PSYCHOANALYTIC EPISTEMOLOGY The notion of psychoanalytic epistemology incorporates the epistemology specific to psychoanalytic knowledge as well as the psychoanalysis of mental processes required in the construction of knowledge. Epistemology refers to the critical examination and logical analysis of scientific knowledge. Traditionally viewed in France as the philosophy and history of science, epistemology is distinguished from the theory of knowledge, which also includes non-scientific knowledge. This distinction is not found in Anglo- American philosophy and, as a result, epistemology is frequently confused with the theory of knowledge, Freud’s Erkenntnistheorie. More recently, the concept of genetic epistemology (Jean Piaget) introduced the 1369 PsyCHOANALYTIC EPISTEMOLOGY analysis of the mental processes of knowledge within a developmental perspective. The term “epistemology” is fairly recent. It was introduced in France at the beginning of the twentieth century, at the time when the relationship between philosophy and the sciences was reversed: it was no longer philosophy that lent its stature to science but science that became an object of philosophical study. This change in perspective reflected a crisis that had two sources: first, the foundations of mathematics and physics were being called into question by the scientific community itself; and second, the claims of philosophical systems, in particular Hegelian systems, of being able to account for rationality without the need for practical applications or experiential data were being discredited. The concept of epistemology does not appear in the index to the Gesammelte Werke, and the Concordance to the Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud indicates only three occurrences of the term “epistemological” in the Standard Edition, where it appears as a translation of the adjective erkenntnistheoretisch. The word appears for the first time in the English translation of the obituary of Viktor Tausk. Freud wrote in 1919: “These writings exhibit plainly the philosophical training which the author was able so happily to combine with the exact methods of science. His strong need to establish things on a philosophical foundation and to achieve epistemological clarity compelled him to formulate, and seek as well to master, the whole profundity and comprehensive meaning of the very difficult problems involved” (1919f;p . 274). But the use of the term “epistemological” in the English and French translations obliterates the distinction between “epistemology” and “theory of knowledge.” Yet Freud’s judgment of Tausk can only be fully appreciated when viewed as re-establishing this distinction. It is not, as the translations state, “epistemological clarity” that Freud reproaches Tausk for, but his overestimation of the logico-deductive operations of philosophy. Tausk went too far in trying to prematurely establish psychoanalysis on the basis of a theoretical system that was philosophical in its need for coherence. Although the term “epistemology” is rarely found in Freud, a Freudian epistemology is nonetheless present. For Freud the epistemic identity of psychoanalysis remained that of the empirical sciences of his time, which are unrelated to the sciences of mind. He relies on observation and inductive logic to rebuff the 1370 demons of metaphysics and goes so far as to claim for psychoanalysis a “specific right to become the spokesman” for the vision of the scientific world. He defends the ideal of science against anarchist and nihilist doctrines that contested the criteria of truth found in scientific knowledge. Psychoanalysis was said to possess the heuristic means. to show that science required a determined attitude that rejected “wish fulfillment” through acceptance of observation and methodically programmed experiment, the only path capable of leading us to a true knowledge of reality. He wrote, “it would be illegitimate and highly inexpedient to allow these demands [wish fulfillments] to be transferred to the sphere of knowledge. For this would be to lay open the paths which lead to psychosis, whether to individual or group psychosis. tr (1933ae, pel6O): In Freudian discourse the scientific ideal assumes the function of a regulatory idea and barrier for knowledge in general and psychoanalytic knowledge in particular. Freud’s rationalism and positivism were consequently subverted by his discovery: by taking as its subject the gaps, contradictions, and distortions of our mechanisms of observation, language, and reason, psychoanalysis reveals what the constructions of positivist science owe to repression. In keeping with his discovery Freud recognized the anticipatory role of art and philosophy, acknowledged the historical truth of religion, and affirmed the mythopoetic element in every scientific theory. His literary style, his references to historical, philological, and ethnographic works, his interest in Moses and Shakespeare, his sense of doubt concerning thought transference, all temper the image of a realist and positivist Freud. Freud’s psychoanalytic epistemology presents the paradox, analyzed by Paul- Laurent Assoun, of sabotaging the language of science while claiming it as one’s own. The path of Freudian discovery traces the passage from a therapeutic technique to an episteme through the implementation of a method employed within the context of a specific practice. Psychoanalytic epistemology appeared to be essential as much to define and circumscribe the conditions and legitimacy of his approach as it did to respond to the epistemological criticisms to which it was subject. In both cases it is a matter of relating and analyzing whatever is resistant to his method. The criticisms of Karl Popper, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Adolf Griinbaum cast doubt on the psychoanalyst to the extent that they reveal the risk INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS psychoanalysis runs whenever it tends to transform itself into an ideology. Yet such objections have the merit of constraining the psychoanalyst to treat his concepts dialectically and be more attentive to precisely defining their use value within a specific framework. Such criticisms also indirectly reveal the limitations of the phenomenological, doctrinal, and hermeneutic revisionism of men like Ludwig Binswanger, Roland Dalbiez, or even Paul Ricoeur, for trying to save psychoanalysis by means of auxiliary hypotheses. For such thinkers, psychoanalysis could only confirm its results by borrowing from other fields of knowledge (phenomenology or neuroscience, for example) or through the addition of extraneous methods (such as surveys or experimental protocols). Quite the contrary. It is by repatriating the value and scope of discoveries where they originate—the psychoanalytic situation—that psychoanalysis can verify the consistency of its theorizations. Psychoanalysis does not consist of the analyst’s knowledge of the analysand’s unconscious or a grid for reading the world, but is based on a transsubjective knowledge created as much as revealed by a particular situation of interactive dialogue whose transference and analysis are operators. Outside that field it loses all epistemological validity. Such methodological operationalism enables psychoanalysis to participate in the ongoing epistemological debate, which tends to reject the ideal of accuracy for a concern for truth that is conceived as revelation as well as creation. ROLAND GoRI See also: Determinism; Gressot, Michel; Learning from Experience, Psychoanalytic research; Science and psychoanalysis. Bibliography Assoun, Paul-Laurent. (1981). Introduction a lepistémologie freudienne. Paris: Payot. Freud, Sigmund. (1913j). The claims of psycho-analysis to scientific interest. SE, 13: 163-190. . (1927c). The future of an illusion. SE, 21: 1-56. . (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho- analysis. SE, 22: 1-182. Gori, Roland. (1996). La Preuve par la parole. Sur la causalité en psychanalyse Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PSYCHOANALYTIC FAMILY THERAPY Further Reading Kulish, Nancy. (2002). The psychoanalytic method from an epistemological viewpoint. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 83, 491-495, Orange, Donna. (1995). Emotional understanding. Studies in psychoanalytic epistemology. New York: Guilford Press Strenger, Carlo. (1991). Between hermenutics and science: An essay on the epistemology of psychoanalysis.‘ Madison, CT: International Universities Press. PSYCHOANALYTIC FAMILY THERAPY Psychoanalytic family therapy is based on the observation that for any group that calls itself a family in a given culture, there is an objective interdependence between the subjects comprising it, owing to the hierarchy of generations and the distribution of roles within it. There are also areas of subjective interdependence. Difficulties concerning the treatment of some patients led therapists to become interested in these individuals’ families, which were viewed as pathogenic; the family and the mental patient were examined as a whole, and their specific modes of functioning highlighted. In the 1950s, researchers at Stanford, influenced by systems theory (Ludwig von Bertalanffy), described the kinds of communication that occur in the families of schizophrenics. From this arose a vast area of research that came to be applied to “systematic family therapies.” Concurrently, research on groups was conducted in the field of psychosociology (Jacob-Levi Moreno) and from a psychoanalytic perspective (Siegmund H. Foulkes, Wilfred Bion, Henry Ezriel). In France, Jean- Bertrand Pontalis, Didier Anzieu, and René Kaés proposed new concepts such as the group mind, interfantasizing, and group transference. Family groups whose members had a life in common, both past and present, have been the object of a number of specific experiments conducted by psychoanalysts. Freud suggested the concept of “psychic apparatus” to account for the existence of mental factors associated with this apparatus’s ability to distribute and transform psychic energy. Borrowing this model, René Kaés forged the concept of “group psychic apparatus,” which he defined as “an efficacious and transitional fiction—that of a psychic group, 1371 PSYCHOANALYTIC FILIATIONS backed up by a mythical group, which is seeking to become real by the construction of a concrete group.” In this connection, family therapists conceptualized a family group mental apparatus, one which originated archaically in the individual psychic “deposits” and the psychic contents of the transgenerational heritage. Their fusion created an unconscious psychic basis, common to members of the family group, inducing a specific experience of belonging, with “a feeling of familiarity,” unlike anything else. Individual fantasies were articulated on this psychic basis, from which they derive some of their content. The family psychic apparatus (FPA) is a conflicting co-construction formed from the elements of internal group feeling of each family member, and elements of a common psyche and of the social group. The FPA, as a category, includes the sexual nature of the roles active in family relations. In therapy, this psychic organization of the family group is realized within the framework proposed by the therapist. The therapist ensures psychic security, allowing the deployment of the therapeutic process through the free verbalization required, the stability of temporal- spatial conditions, the fact that the duration of the cure is not determined a priori, and the rule of abstinence. In their observations and interventions therapists focus especially on group aspects as based on the transference/counter-transference. The essential goal of therapeutic work lies on the level of the paradoxical narcissism- antinarcissism duality that is active from the very beginning in each subject and primal component of the familial psychic apparatus. This objective transcends the treatment of the symptomatology of the “designated patient.” The goal is autonomy for the individual psyche and access to the oedipal conflict, through a sufficient development of the couple/group tension that is always conspicuous within the family group. However, René Kaés has expressed doubts about the “accepted name, Analytical Family Therapy,” thinking it should rather be known as “Psychoanalytical Psychotherapy of the Family.” Family therapy requires preliminary work to allow the family group to accept this unusual situation. Maurice Berger developed a “new theoretico-clinical field,” in which reference to the group and to psychoanalysis was preserved. He drew on Winnicotian concepts, and developed the idea that the framework could not be determined ahead of time by the thera- _pist, but had to be constructed with the family. At the 1372 limit, the very notion of therapy was eschewed (but not the goal of treatment). The training of family therapists requires a personal psychoanalysis, but how necessary it is to have psychoanalytical experience with members of one’s own family is, as of 2005, still open to debate. FRANCOISE DIOT AND JOSEPH VILLIER See also: Double bind; Group psychotherapies; Individual; Individuation (analytical psychology); Intergenerational; Secret. Bibliography Anzieu, Didier. (1971). Lillusion groupale. Nouvelle Revue de Psychanalyse, 4, 37-93. Berger, Maurice. (1986). Entretiens familiaux et Champ transitionnel. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. . (1995). Le travail thérapeutique avec les familles. Paris: Dunod. Kaés, René. (1976). L Appareil psychique groupal: Constructions du groupe. Paris: Dunod. Racamier, Paul-Claude. (1992). Le génie des origines. Psychanalyse et psychoses. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Further Reading Becker, Mitchel, and Shalgi, Boaz. (2002). A psychoanalytical approach to integrating family and individual therapy in the treatment of adolescents: A case study. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 57, 203-217. Sander, Fred. (1979). Individual and family therapy: Toward an integration. New York: Aronson. Stierlin, Helm. (1977). Psychoanalysis and family therapy. New York: Jason Aronson. PSYCHOANALYTIC FILIATIONS In addition to intellectual, theoretical, and professional reasons, more personal ones usually play a part in the decision to take up an interest in psychoanalysis. Inextricably bound up with the former, but usually not as readily acknowledged or clearly understood as an influence on an individual’s choice of intellectual orientation, such psychoanalytic filiations run like a perpetual current through the life and work of the individual con- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS cerned, for which reason questions about who analyzed him or her, when, how, why, and with what effect will continue to attract much attention both inside and outside the psychoanalytic community. If collected and used properly, information about psychoanalytic filiations can help illustrate aspects of individual development, as may also be true when that individual does not subsequently engage with psychoanalysis professionally. However, where professional work follows, the psychoanalytic filiations between analyst and trainee acquire an additional significance, for in addition to involving conscious and unconscious processes at highly charged transferential and counter-transferential levels, they will themselves be an object of study during and after training, and their outcome, whether in the form of a resolution or not, will have an influence on the current and future work of both analyst and analysand. Akin to and as powerful as—indeed repeating— characteristics of family life, such filiations have held the psychoanalytic community together as often as, when excessively active, they have threatened to tear it apart. Consequently, knowledge of the extent, nature and resolution of such psychoanalytic filiations is important for an understanding of individual psychoanalysts as well as of the movement as a whole. Historically, psychoanalytic filiations preceded other forms of preparation for and involvement in psychoanalytic work (study of theory and work under supervision), and their explosive nature, particularly when not attended to psychoanalytically, showed in early dissensions and break-aways, as well as in expressions of excessive loyalty. But though seen by Freud and some early analysts as potentially too powerful, they did not lead to the adoption of a personal analysis as an obligatory part of training, but instead to the foundation in 1910 of international media (the International Psychoanalytical Association [IPA], the Zeitschrift, and congresses) to coordinate and assist local groups and coordinate the defense of psychoanalysis against outside critics. In fact, by the time the Secret Committee was formed (1912), only two of its members (Sandor Ferenczi and Ernest Jones) had had themselves been analyzed (and Ferenczi’s plan that all should be analyzed by Freud was not realized). An analysis was not made an obligatory part of training until 1922. However, once accepted, it was clearly perceived both as a valuable support for trainees and as a potential threat to their independence, for which reason the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PSYCHOANALYTIC FILIATIONS Berlin training model, which the IPA was then (Homburg Congress 1925) accepting as its benchmark, stressed “the same analyst should not conduct the instructional analysis of the candidate and later supervise him in the practical part of his training.” As subsequent dissensions have shown, neither the Homburg nor any other principles have been able to prevent periodic recurrences of destruction or adulation within the psychoanalytic family. On the contrary, whether or not in the grip of unresolved problems, some training analysts have continued to create proselytes, and some trainees continue to use their psychoanalytic genealogy as legitimization of their own position and work, or as a weapon against others. On the other hand, since the institution of a personal analysis as an obligatory part of training, members of various groups have increasingly been able to explore disagreements, tolerate differences, and establish working alliances across divisions, both at local level, through the IPA, and by measures such as exchange lectures, transfer of analysts, international conferences, and discussions at many levels about matters at times highly controversial. However, openness at the level of psychoanalytic filiations remains a problem, not least because of a tendency in some analysts as well as some archivists, editors, and historians to withhold or misrepresent such highly personal information either in part or as a whole, typically with references to propriety or confidentiality. As a result, a crucial area of knowledge has not only been left open to speculation, but has been used by supporters and opponents of psychoanalysis alike to idealize or demonize institutions or individuals, to drive psychoanalytic thinking in the direction of dogma and petrifaction, and turn the writing of its history into an ideological act. The problem of how, if at all, to use such information as can be obtained, remains. Clearly, simply refusing to consider it, either because it is incomplete or too difficult, is not an option for psychoanalysts who, by the same token, would indeed brand their profession as an impossible one. On the other hand, any decision on the part of psychoanalytic institutions to bring about change would be controversial, as it would involve the suspension of strict adherence to the principle of confidentiality where analysts and their trainees are concerned. Obviously, disclosure of details about past and present psychoanalytic filiations, perhaps even by 1373 PsyCHOANALYTIC NOSOGRAPHY putting the information into a database for psychoanalytic practitioners and historians to use, would greatly assist understanding and research, and it is encouraging that several present-day scholars seem interested in such a project. Naturally, only when—in each case—the effects of a person’s psychoanalytic filiations have been validated, can they be truly useful to serious historians of psychoanalysis. The inevitable consequence—that there will also be richer pickings for the prurient—need deter no one, as experience shows that nothing inhibits speculation more than disclosure of facts, and that in cases where that does not work, nothing short of a thorough personal analysis will. Paut Ries See also: History and psychoanalysis; Training of psychoanalysts; Transference. Bibliography Falzeder, Ernst (1994). The threads of psycho-analytic filiations, or, psycho-analysis taking effect. In 100 years of psycho-analysis. Contributions to the history of psychoanalysis (André Haynal and Ernst Falzeder, Eds.; pp. 169— 194). Karnac: London. Ferenczi, Sandor (1911). On the organisation of the psychoanalytic movement. In Final contributions to the problems and methods of psycho-analysis (Michael Balint, Ed.; pp. 299-307). New York: Brunner/Mazel. Freud, Sigmund (1914d). On the history of the psychoanalytical movement. SE, 14: 7-66. Granoff, Wladimir (1975). Filiations. Lavenir du complexe d Oedipe. Paris: Les Editions de Minuit. Mijolla Alain de (1992). France 1893-1965. In Psychoanalysis international. A guide to psycho-analysis throughout the world. Volume 1: Europe (Peter Kutter, Ed.; pp. 66-113). Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzbog. PSYCHOANALYTIC NOSOGRAPHY Is there a psychoanalytic nosography in the etymological sense of a rewriting and reorganization of psychopathology on the basis of psychoanalysis? And if so, is that nosography restricted, in its form and boundaries, to the sphere of psychoanalytic thinking and practice; that is, is there a psychoanalytical symptomatology for internal use only that does not coincide exactly with that of psychiatry? In answer to these questions, it is arguable that dynamic psy- 1374 chology sought at first to dismantle several established clinical pictures and to erode the boundaries between the normal and the pathological, but that then, having exhausted the possibilities of this approach, it abandoned the efforts. Alternatively, can psychoanalytic theory, or more precisely, metapsychology, perhaps be said in a more ambitious way.to have revised the whole of psychopathology and placed it in a perspective where, reordered, it attained a new coherence? Indeed, psychoanalysis grew out of a questioning of psychiatry, and in particular, the neurological or mental nature of hysteria. Also, before writing Studies on Hysteria (1895d), Freud thoroughly scrutinized the normal clinical treatment of patients at that time. Freud’s study of dreams, his study of the development of sexuality, his model of the mental apparatus, and his positing of the unconscious all implied a broad transcendence of the clinical data from which he set out. Yet his quest for a new understanding of the neuroses nevertheless led him back to familiar categories: conversion, phobia, obsession, and anxiety. Freud found that, in the context of the interaction between affects and ideas, the mechanisms of defense could be most effectively differentiated on the level of symptoms, for this level yielded the greatest degree of explanation. Yet even on this level, the level of Freud’s first topography, the classical syndromes tended to reassume their old forms rather than to break down as their outlines came into clear view. A specific set of conflicts could be confidently aligned with parapraxes, with phobias, or with confused or delusional states. These diverse conditions were explicable by reference to a dynamic that the earlier categories of traumatic neurosis, transference neurosis, and actual neurosis had initially tended to define too narrowly—in terms that for this very reason have fallen out of use. All the same, Freud failed sufficiently to explore the vicissitudes of the interaction between primary and secondary processes (the affective and thought processes) in trying to better understand, on the basis of conflict, the various disturbances of consciousness that challenged the existence of the object. Accordingly, what Freud called “reality-testing’ and described as an “institution of the ego” (1916-1917 [1915], p33) became an object of study alongside the still relevant material addressed in the clinical treatment of acute mental disorders. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ““PsycHo-ANALyTic NOTES ON AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL ACCOUNT OF A CASE OF PARANOIA”’ Other questions had already arisen for Freud when he found it necessary to introduce narcissism into his theory (1914c). These questions obliged him to consider the withdrawal of libido from the object and redirection toward the ego, as well as its restitution. This consideration brought in, in different ways, the notions of depression, psychosis, and delusion. Clinical and therapeutic experience with such pathology demonstrated that its organization was too complicated to be adequately explained by its unconscious meanings alone. Here too the idea of narcissistic neurosis was not up to the task of circumscribing nuances and distinctions, and this remained true even after the category of narcissistic neurosis was subsequently limited to depression alone. At this point Freud focused on hypochondria as the main decompensatory tendency: “The relation of hypochondria to paraphrenia is similar to that of the other ‘actual’ neuroses to hysteria and obsessional neurosis” (p. 84). To go more deeply into what, in 1895 in Draft G of the Fliess Papers (1950c), he had had to say about the essential nature of depression, Freud took classical melancholia as the basis for what he characterized as the withdrawal of the conflict into the ego (1916- 1917g). Such narcissistic identification with the lost object already implied a second topography that would overturn earlier mental agencies and offer even the most “endogenous” psychiatry a vast range of possible dynamic explanations. Furthermore, the heterogeneous _ borderline states, which have since achieved so much importance in clinical practice, can perhaps be unified only within the psychoanalytical perspective of seeing them as a narcissistic failure in dealing with conflict and avoiding depression by mobilizing a set of defenses against reality: negation, splitting, idealization, and so on. As for psychosis, beginning with his discussion of the Schreber case (1911c [1910]), Freud suggested that it had roots deeper than merely the various projective modalities of the homosexual drive, deeper than merely the repression of reality (1924b, 1924e). Though loath to challenge the established Germanlanguage nosography of the day with regard to what he would have preferred to call “paraphrenia,” Freud felt that the subject’s the return to autoeroticism short of narcissism, the failure of thing presentations, and the opacity of the symbol in instances of “organ-speech” (1915e, p. 198) raised questions about what was at INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS stake in psychosis, namely the integrity of the ego and the objects that were incompatible with it. Consideration of the psychic context of breakdowns of mental life, of Freud’s earliest questions concerning the actual neuroses, and of the development of psychosomatic medicine support the idea that, even though psychoanalysis has not invented a new nosography, it has nevertheless cast an incomparably clear light across the whole field of psychopathology and has provided a firm foothold to understand the field. AUGUSTIN JEANNEAU See also: Actual neurosis/defense neurosis; Alcoholism; Alienation; Character; Conflict; Narcissistic neurosis; “Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides).” Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1911c [1910]). Psycho-analytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia (dementia paranoides). SE, 12: 1-82. . (1914c). On narcissism: An introduction. SE, 14: 81-105. . (1915e). The unconscious. SE, 14: 159-204. . (1916-1917f [1915]). A metapsychological supplement to the theory of dreams. SE, 14: 237-258. . (1916-1917g [1915]). Mourning and melancholia. SE, 14: 237-258. . (1924b). Neurosis and psychosis. SE, 19: 147-153. . (1924e). The loss of reality in neurosis and psychosis. SE, 19: 180-187. . (1950c [1895]). Draft G. In his The origins of psycho-analysis: Letters to Wilhelm Fliess, drafts, and notes, 1887-1902 (Eric Mosbacher and James Strachey, Trans.). London: Imago, 1954. (Revised translation in SE, 1: 200- 206) Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Joseph. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2: 48-106. “PSYCHO-ANALYTIC NOTES ON AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL ACCOUNT OF A CASE OF PARANOIA (DEMENTIA PARANOIDES)” This paper is one of Freud’s great theoretical-clinical studies. It deals with the autobiography, published in 1375 ym” “’PoycHo-ANALYTIC NOTES ON AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL ACCOUNT OF A Case OF PARANOIA 1903, of Daniel Paul Schreber, a mental patient whom Freud never met personally. Schreber was the son of a physician who was a great believer in rigid educational methods. The young man studied and later practiced law. After a political setback, however, he fell victim to a depression accompanied by hypochondriacal ideas and spent six months (1884-1885) in a Leipzig psychiatric clinic run by Paul Emil Flechsig. In 1893 he was offered a significant promotion, but six months later he was admitted once again to Flechsig’s clinic, then transferred to an asylum, directed by Doctor Guido Weber, where he would remain for the next eight years after being diagnosed as suffering from “paranoid dementia.” During this eight-year period, he first went through a phase of intense hallucinatory delusion characterized by an extremely disorganizing anxiety; he then organized his delusions somewhat, eventually achieving a degree of stability that allowed him (at his own request) to argue for his freedom (with great legal talent) and to regain it by a judgment of the Royal Appeal Court of Dresden dated July 14, 1902. Over the years Schreber had taken occasional notes, and toward the end of his internment he made these the basis of a book, which he succeeded in having published in 1903 under the title Denkwiirdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken (Memoirs of a neuropath). Many passages were excised at the behest of the publisher—and, one may suspect, at the behest of Schreber’s family to conceal the family’s great sexual crudity. It is essential to read Schreber’s book, translated as Memoirs of My Nervous IIlness (1955), in order fully to appreciate the commentary Freud offered on it a few years later. It provides a very eloquent description of the sensory hallucinations to which Schreber fell prey, along with his own explanation of them. According to this explanation, these sensations were imposed on him by God, by means of “divine rays” connected directly to his body, and specifically to his nerves. Schreber strove mightily to satisfy God by procuring the “voluptuous sensations” that God demanded, yet at the same time he waged a ferocious, superhuman struggle to free himself from the rays. Schreber’s God was a strange, capable of this terrifying kind of possession, yet at the same time pitiful, inasmuch as God understood nothing about humans and ardently sought to become acquainted with their sensations. In Schreber, God found a unique being 1376 who gave God an ardently wished-for connection. This God, who had a dual nature (Schreber evoked the dualism of Ahriman and Ormuzd found in Zoroastrianism), had created a replica of himself in Flechsig (who was also divided into two, but who was liable to shatter into many pieces at certain moments), and Flechsig had been God’s agent with regard to Schreber. The incoherence of this account is immediately apparent, yet it is a poignant testimony to a sick man’s desperate struggle to establish a level of meaning that he could accept and that would free him from his incoherent anxiety about disintegration. Little by little, Schreber’s explanation organized itself into a vast theological cosmogony: The world was coming to an end, and for a whole stretch of time Schreber was the sole survivor, surrounded by shadows, semblances of men, mere apparitions. A new humanity would supposedly be born from Schreber himself, provided that he is transformed into a woman and offered God the voluptuous feelings of women’s pleasures. Schreber published his book to enlighten psychiatrists. Granted, he was mentally ill (as indicated in the title of his autobiography), but the causes of his illness were quite different from what the psychiatrists attributed it to. Schreber, above all, wanted to convey his message to people. at large in order to enlighten humanity about essential truths. It is instructive to read the clinical reports of Dr. Weber appended to Schreber’s narrative (1955, pp. 267ff.), for they offer a remarkable description of how a calming delusional system can cure anxiety. Also of great interest is the wise judgment passed by the appeals court in Dresden (Schreber, 1955, pp. 329- 356), which discharged Schreber in 1902. The court forcefully declared, in effect, that Dr. Schreber was completely mad, but that his worldview was interesting, and that he no longer represented any danger to himself or others. Indeed, after his release Schreber passed several uneventful years before being recommitted and dying in an asylum in 1911, the very year in which Freud published his study of the case. When he worked on this text, Freud had been engaged for two or three years in a sustained discussion of the psychoses with Carl Jung. From these discussions Freud he expected much of value to emerge, though the first signs of Jung’s coming break with Freud were already beginning to appear. Freud made no attempt here to account for all the psychopatholo- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS gical phenomena and processes characterizing Schreber’s illness. Rather, as in all of Freud’s great clinical writings, his purpose was to prove something. In this case he set out to demonstrate that the motor of the paranoiac’s persecution anxiety and delusional worldview is related to issues attending homosexuality, as was strikingly revealed by Schreber’s delusions. The first part of Freud’s discussion, “Case History,” though it hews close to Schreber’s Memoirs, nevertheless presents the material that will serve to illustrate the thesis set out in the second part, “Attempts at Interpretation.” In Freud’s view, Flechsig, as a doctor admired by Schreber, is the privileged object of Schreber’s homosexual desire, a desire justified and indeed sanctified by his delusional system. Yet the roots of Schreber’s homosexual desire must be sought in his relationship with his father, Daniel Gottlieb (“God’s love”) Moritz Schreber, a relentless educator who promoted absolute submission to God’s will. In this case the father, it would seem, was the bane of his children’s lives (an elder brother of Daniel Paul killed himself, while a younger sister was a confirmed mental patient). In the third and last section of his study, “The Mechanism of Paranoia,” Freud analyses the process of projection that constitutes the paranoiac’s chief defense and organizes the paranoiac’s delusions of persecution: the basic homosexual desire, “I (a man) love him (a man),” is negated into “I do not love him—I hate him,” which then, as a result of projection, becomes “He hates (persecutes) me,” and from this the paranoiac derives the justification “I do not love him—I hate him— because he persecutes me” (1911c [1910], p. 63). What we have is a system of transformations to defend against homosexuality. Freud presents two more variants of such systems, one being the mechanism at work in erotomania and the other the mechanism mobilized in delusions of jealousy. (A fourth possible mode of defense against homosexual desires embraces the formula “I do not love at all—I do not love anyone.”) This work of Freud’s spawned a large number of discussions and commentaries, the most notable of which are cited in the bibliography below. ROGER PERRON See also: Castration complex; Delusion; Dementia; Ego instincts/ego drive; Fixation; Friendship; Hypochondria; Megalomania; Narcissism; Paranoia; Paraphrenia; Persecution; Projection; Rationalization; Schizophrenia; Schreber, Daniel Paul; Sublimation. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PSYCHOANALYTIC QUARTERLY, THE Source Citation Freud, Sigmund. (1911c [1910]). Psychoanalytische Bemerkungen iiber einen autobiographisch beschriebenen Fall von Paranoia (Dementia paranoides) [Schreber]. Jb. psychoanal. psychopathol. Forsch., III, p. 9-69; GW, Vol. 8, p. 239-316; Psycho-analytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia (dementia paranoides). SE, 12: 1-82. Bibliography Israéls, Han. (1989). Schreber: father and son. Madison, CT: International Universities Press. (Original work published 1981) Kanzer, Mark, and Glenn, Jules (Eds.). (1980). Freud and his patients. New York: Jason Aronson. Lothane, Zvi. (1992). In defense of Schreber: Soul murder and psychiatry. Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press. Prado de Oliveira, and Luis Eduardo (Ed.). (1979). Le cas Schreber: Contributions psychanalytiques de langue anglaise. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. . (1997). Freud et Schreber: Les sources écrites du délire, entre psychose et culture. Paris: Eres. Schreber, Daniel Paul. (1955). Memoirs of my nervous illness (Ida Macalpine and Richard A. Hunter, Trans.). London: Dawson. (Original work published 1903) PSYCHOANALYTIC QUARTERLY, THE The Psychoanalytic Quarterly was founded in 1934 by four analysts: Bertram Lewin, Gregory Zilboorg, Dorian Feigenbaum, and Frankwood Williams. Their editorial policy, enunciated explicitly in the first issue, was directed at a specific task. Psychoanalysis was becoming quite popular in North America, and while the enthusiasm was welcome, it also gave rise to a certain amount of confusion. The founders of The Psychoanalytic Quarterlywanted to establish a forum for the discussion of psychoanalytic ideas that have clinical relevance. The Psychoanalytic Quarterly has always addressed the interests and concerns of the analytic practitioner. Theoretical and applied analytic studies are welcome, but only if they generate hypotheses a clinical analyst can bring back to the treatment situation and test against observations made there. An empirical, pragmatic orientation informs the journal’s editorial policy. 1377 PSYCHOANALYTIC RESEARCH The Psychoanalytic Quarterly also directs itself against the inevitable parochialism of local analytic subcultures by exposing its readers to work done from an array of theoretical perspectives. For example, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly was the first journal in the United States to publish an article by Jacques Lacan. Special issues have taken up such topics as “Knowledge and Authority in the Psychoanalytic Relationship” and “The Psychoanalytic Process,” featuring papers by a variety of analysts from widely differing schools of thought. In addition to original scientific contributions, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly includes a comprehensive Book Review Section. It also has an Abstracts Section, in which summaries of selected articles from other journals—virtually the entire non-English language psychoanalytic literature, as well as the neural sciences, philosophy, sociology, infant observation, political science, and so on,—are presented. The Psychoanalytic Quarterly is a free-standing, selfpublished journal. It contains no advertising, and is supported by subscription fees. It is not accountable to any psychoanalytic organization. Therefore, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly has been able to maintain a tradition of complete editorial independence alongside intellectual rigor and fine scholarship. OwEN RENIK See also: Fenichel, Otto; Revue francaise de psychanalyse; United States. PSYCHOANALYTIC RESEARCH Research, whether to create scientific advances or investigate historical and epistemological issues, is generally supported by the state and is often carried out by specialized institutions or in laboratories. In psychoanalysis, research with a view to theoretical and clinical advances has sometimes been conducted in such settings, but it has also been conducted by individuals and psychoanalytic associations. Freud’s hope, that analysis would find a place in the university in ways that would ensure its status as a separate discipline, has been partially fulfilled: from the 1960s, dissertations in the field of psychoanalysis 1378 have begun to appear in countries around the world. Psychoanalytic research implies scientific standing, and a persistent issue has been whether analysis is a science. If science is limited to experiment and the use of mathematical tools, the answer is no. This has been the view of such prominent philosophers as Karl Popper and Alfred Griinbaum, for whom psychoanalysis presents a body of claims that cannot be falsified or refuted. But the scientific nature of psychoanalysis has also been questioned by those who prefer to see it as an art, not so much to be taught as transmitted. It thus escapes the objective criteria on which the sciences, whether physical or social, are based. For Freud, psychoanalysis has a place among the sciences and shares its worldview: it is above all a method of investigating unconscious processes and could be adapted for use in fields unrelated to therapy. In this sense, psychoanalytic theory comprises a set of hypotheses and concepts subject to constant revision. Therapy is one possible application of psychoanalytic method and is also to a great extent its source, because therapy provides the link between theory and clinical practice, the space in which the principal hypotheses are developed and tested. Freud distanced: psychoanalysis from religion and philosophy, from unverifiable constructions in general, and from medical pragmatism. In 1911 he signed a manifesto, together with Albert Einstein, David Hilbert, Ernst Mach, and about thirty others, that appealed for the creation of a society to disseminate positivist philosophy in order “to outline a vast vision of the world on the basis of positive facts that each science has accumulated” (quoted in Hoffmann, 1995). Psychoanalysts have developed a relatively independent network by which they exchange ideas and information at professional seminars and colloquia. While university research provides new and original perspectives and is designed to address questions by reexamining them within the context of history and the critical perspective of previously published work, independent researchers often come up with their own clinical findings of the type they believe the clinical setting can provide. Some of these researchers may formulate more general hypotheses, which they then test in various clinical situations. The actual content of psychoanalysis also affects how research is conducted. In terms of theory, psycho- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS analysts have produced a body of notions and concepts— two terms that should not be confused. In psychoanalysis, fundamental concepts (Grundbegriffe), or even keystones (Grundpfeiler), are not a priori categories but result from investigations into mental processes. These create the scaffolding that Freud called “metapsychology,” the theoretical superstructure that includes such useful fictions as the psychical apparatus. For Freud, metapsychology was necessary for advancing new ideas but could always be modified or revised. The “fiction” of a “psychic apparatus,” noted in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), was followed by the first theory of the instincts with its dualities of the selfpreservation and sexual instincts and of the pleasure/ unpleasure principle. Freud introduced narcissism in 1914, which led to a revision of the theory of the ego and ego ideal, and in 1920, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, he introduced the dualism of the life and death instincts. Although these theoretical developments, advanced through clinical practice, did not require a reconstruction of the metapsychology, revision did arise from certain particularly innovative notions in psychopathology. Ongoing clinical work, with its infinite diversity of patients and variety of psychological facts, vastly added to the number of notions in psychoanalytic theory. Not all notions fared equally well. Some met a clinical need, while others fell into such disuse as to interest only historians of psychoanalysis, who sometimes resuscitate lost notions or bring forth new ones that originated in forgotten antecedents. Psychoanalytic theory and investigation have produced an abundant literature, often a surfeit that makes it impossible to read everything written in any particular area. For this reason, the division of research between academicians and individual practitioners would appear to be complementary and desirable. SOPHIE DE MiyjOLLA-MELLOR See also: Applied psychoanalysis and the interaction of psychoanalysis; Hard science and psychoanalysis; Knowledge or research, instinct for; Truth. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4: 1-338; 5: 339-625. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PSYCHOANALYTIC REVIEW, THE . (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1-64, Gori, Roland. (1996). La preuve par la parole: Sur la causalité en psychanalyse. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Hoffmann, Christian. (1995). Le manifeste positiviste signé par S. Freud en 1911. Cliniques Méditerranéennes, 45-46, 7-11. Laplanche, Jean. (1995). La psychanalyse dans la communaute scientifique. Cliniques Méditerranéennes, 45—46, 33- 42. Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie de. (1995). Potentialité des scissions dans la theorie psychanalytique elle-méme. Topique, 57, 291-306. Further Reading Schachter, Judith, and Luborsky, Lester. (1998). Who’s afraid of psychoanalytic research? International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 79, 965-970. Shapiro, Theodore, and Emde, Robert N. Ed (1995). Research in psychoanalysis: Process, development, outcome. Madison, CT: International University Press. Vaughan, Sarah, et al. (2000). Can we do psychoanalytic outcome research? A feasibility study. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 81, 513-528. Wallerstein, Robert. (2001). The generations of psychotherapy research: An overview. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 18, 243-267. PSYCHOANALYTIC REVIEW, THE The contemporary Psychoanalytic Review can trace its lineage to two disparate yet converging journals in the history of American psychoanalysis. The original Psychoanalytic Review was founded in 1913, making it the first English-language journal dedicated to psychoanalysis, and as the oldest continuously published psychoanalytic journal in the world. Smith Ely Jelliffe (1866-1945), one of the journal’s founders, was a neurologist who became interested in psychoanalysis through the influence of Abraham Arden Brill. He was also influenced by the writings of Adler and Jung, and advocated for the journal a general psychodynamic perspective on behavior, free of sectarian bias. The other founder, William Alanson White (1870-1937) was superintendent of the Government Hospital for the Insane in Washington, D.C., and one of the pioneers in psychoanalytic psychiatry. 1379 PSYCHOANALYTIC SEMIOLOGY Psychoanalysis, the other parent of the present journal, was founded in 1952 by the National Psychological Association for Psychoanalysis (NPAP), the first publication of its time situated and representing a non-medical training institute. Theodor Reik was Editor-in-Chief, and the editors were John Gustin and, later, Clement Staff. In 1958, Psychoanalysis absorbed The Psychoanalytic Review and for the next five years appeared as Psychoanalysis and The Psychoanalytic Review, under the direction of Marie Coleman Nelson as managing editor and Murray Sherman as assistant editor and later as co-editor and editor. The name Psychoanalysis was dropped for the first issue of 1963 and henceforth the journal has been known as The Psychoanalytic Review, having been edited by Marie Nelson, Murray Sherman, Leila Lerner, and Martin Schulman. The Review has occupied a unique niche in the history of the psychoanalytic movement, both in the United States and in the international arena. It has always represented a non-sectarian, open venue for all psychoanalytic perspectives. This openness, and refusal to see psychoanalysis as a finite body of truism analogous to a religion led Ernest Jones, in 1924, to call it a “refuge of all malcontents.” Schulman sees it, rather, as a forum for those, not malcontent, but discontent with orthodoxy, sectarianism, dogma, and exclusionism. While scholarship and literary style are the prerequisites for the acceptance of articles, the journal is a setting for all legitimate perspectives within the psychoanalytic movement. It has published representational articles by classical Freudians, Ego psychologists, object-relations theorists, Kleinians, self-psychologists, Lacanians, and even contemporary Jungian theorists. It has continued to be committed not only to clinical psychoanalysis, but to a psychoanalytic exploration of general culture, seeing psychoanalysis as informed by other disciplines, rather than reducing all discourses to a superordinate psychoanalytic frame. It is representative of the general philosophy of critical inquiry, and psychoanalytic scientific humanism, the historical foundational core of psychoanalysis. Martin A. SCHULMAN See also: National Psychological Association for Psychoanalysis. 1380 PSYCHOANALYTIC SEMIOLOGY Semiology, the science of signs, gains its meaning from being communicable within a given field of science. The same holds true for somatic medicine, following what Michel Foucault described in 1963 as the “fundamental isomorphism of the structure of disease.and the verbal form that describes it.” The sign indicates the symptom, just as a wheeze indicates pneumonia. Woven into the mesh of concrete banality and everyday life, psychiatric symptomology lends itself less easily to a system of directly meaningful and unchanging references. From this viewpoint psychoanalysis appears to escape any form of semiology that might be useful in treatment. But metapsychology, which theorizes experience and justifies procedure, does supply a form of semiology that is both specific to it and appropriate in certain situations. The only semiology useful to the clinical situation is specifically context dependent, belonging solely to a particular analyst/analysand relation. The observer, the analyst, is involved in a unique relation involving the dynamic of transference and counter-transference. Therefore the reality involved in analysis, even when it concerns external facts, can only serve as a reference frame for a fantasy that supports the narrative at a particular moment, for reasons that are specific to it alone. At most the reality of analysis, its framework and the patient’s attitude can, from one case to another, present some invariant elements. At all other times the sign will depend only on the context; to this extent, the symbol can express the contrary to what it might indicate elsewhere. We know that defenses can take the form of a movement of the drive and that interpretation provides no truth, but reveals a pathway of associations and reroutes energy between two signposts without any absolute value. And finally, nothing can at the same time be experienced and understood other than in small doses (Strachey, 1934). Nonetheless, metapsychology can shape a semiology that can be applied in three areas. During the evaluation, it can help to understand psychic structure and function, and thus indicate modes of therapy. The ability to associate, observed during the interview, or their various avatars, the defensive methods of repression, denial, projection, and so on, the expression of affects, and regressive forms, are all elements that can constitute a system of signs for evaluating the manifestations of the unconscious and their dynamic in the organization and operation of psychic agencies. Similarly, one INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS can read the inconsistencies and weak points in a conflict, where the risks of depressive or delusional decompensation are present. A semiotic method is perhaps even more useful in cases where a breakdown is manifested through psychosomatic symptoms. These same semiological data could be used by psychotherapy, in which the patient apprehends external reality. Such data can clarify fears of the phobic patient with regard to oedipal positions. The splittings and idealizations of the borderline patient can split, or idealize, for reasons of archaic violence and narcissistic fragility. Finally, psychiatry as a whole can be entirely revised in light of psychoanalytic semiology, which intersects psychiatric semiology, introducing the dynamic of metapsychology into clinical situations, where the unconscious reveals its presence in the most biological manifestations and the most external events. AUGUSTIN JEANNEAU See also: Neurasthenia; Psychoanalytic nosography; Psychotic/ neurotic; Symptom-formation. Bibliography Foucault, Michel. (1994). The birth of the clinic: An archaeology of medical perception (A. M. Sheridan Smith, Trans.). New York: Vintage. (Original work published 1963) Strachey, James. (1934). The nature of the therapeutic action of psycho-analysis. International Journal of Psycho- Analysis, 15, 127-159. Reprinted 1969, International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 50, 275-291. Further Reading Gay, Volney P. (1982). Semiotics as metapsychology: The status of repression. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 46, 489-506. Harris, Adrienne, and Aron, Lewis. (1997). Ferenczi’s semiotic theory: Previews of postmodernism. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 17, 522-534. Olds, David. (2000). A semiotic model of mind. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 48, 497-530. PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD, THE In 1945 there appeared a new journal, four hundred pages long, titled The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child. Due to its editors (Anna Freud, Heinz Hartmann, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD, THE Ernst Kris) and its contributors (such as Edward Glover, Ernst Kris, René Spitz, Phyllis Greenacre, and Rudolph Loewenstein), the journal immediately enjoyed huge success and prestige. Ever since, the journal has appeared regularly every year, always in the same format and always just as thick. More than fifty volumes stretch along the bookshelves of psychoanalytic institutions throughout the world. Right from the start, its intellectual and political mission was clear. Heinz Hartmann had just immigrated to New York. In London, the disciples of Anna Freud and Melanie Klein were emerging from several years of intense and sometimes violent quarrels. While one could hardly say that Anna Freud’s star was fading, that of Melanie Klein was shining ever brighter. But this was in Britain. On the other side of the Atlantic, the situation was different. The United States still appeared as a vast and as yet wide-open field, professionally shapeless and ill-defined. In particular, it still needed an infusion of Klein’s new teaching. Hence the value not just of creating an English-language journal, but also of publishing it in New York. The 1945 volume contained declarations on the part of Hartmann, Anna Freud, and Edward Glover, among others. They stated their thinking in the most trenchant terms: the psychoanalysis of children was a success, and its principles should be based on the later metapsychology of Sigmund Freud or, more precisely, on Freudian metapsychology as interpreted by Hartmann and Anna Freud. The threat from Klein was staved off by a cunning ploy. In volume 1, Klein was the subject of detailed discussion, and her “deviations” were denounced. After this discussion, there was near silence. In the following years, her name was rarely mentioned. Even in 1952, when she made a brief reappearance in the journal, it was as the author of a mere three-page heavily criticized commentary (7, pp. 51-53) of a paper given by Hartmann at the 1951 congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association. As for Jacques Lacan, his existence was never even recognized during his lifetime (the first article on Lacan, critical but nonetheless well intentioned, appeared in 1993 [48, pp. 115-142]). Despite the international tone of the first volume (which included articles by Marie Bonaparte and Raymond de Saussure), during the following years The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child militantly limited its horizons to the Anglo- Saxon world. 1381 PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD, THE Such doctrinal parameters might have paralyzed original thought, but this was far from the case. On the contrary, the 1950s saw an upsurge of creativity. Anna Freud and Hartmann, in articles exceptional in their quality, consolidated and refined their shared perspective. During the same period, a new line of thinking started to emerge. In 1952 Margaret Mahler published “On Child Psychosis and Schizophrenia: Autistic and Symbiotic Infantile Psychoses” (7, pp. 286-305), which drew a huge response. Then in 1954 came Edith Jacobson’s “The Self and the Object World” (9, pp. 75-127). Structural psychology, as the theoretical framework of Anna Freud and Hartmann came to be known, then had to reach a compromise with the new object-relations theory. Ironically, one of the strengths of object-relations theory lay in the sophisticated way in which Klein’s key concepts had been reworked—for instance, the role of so-called primitive defenses during the preoedipal period. At the end of the 1960s and during the 1970s, the wave of object-relations theory continued to develop: case studies were more and more frequently labeled “separation-individuation,” “fusion anxiety,’ “object permanence,’ and the like. During the 1980s, objectrelations theory became more important than structural psychology. Nonetheless, both viewpoints managed to coexist in the review and have continued to do so. Even after her death in 1984, Anna Freud remained a powerful presence. A good example of her unfailing authority is an excellent article by Clifford Yorke, “Anna Freud’s Contributions to Knowledge of Child Development,” published in 1996 (51, pp. 7— 24). In this paper Yorke endeavored to produce the most detailed investigation of all the journal articles written from the perspective of Anna Freud. One significant result of the increasing space given to “representations of the self and the object” was the rise in importance of the Anglo-Saxon version of parent-infant psychotherapy. Selma Freiberg was the main innovator here, and the journal has continued to support this current (Liebermann and Pawl, 339, pp. 527-548; Seligman, 49, pp. 481-500). Another subsidiary development emerged with the publication, in 1978, of “Trauma and Affects,” by Henry Krystal (33, pp. 81-116). Krystal argued for a more rigorous definition of the concept of trauma and recommended that greater attention be paid to the consequences of this notion for the psychoanalysis of 1382 the child. In 1979 and 1984 there appeared two widely-read articles by Lenore Terr: “Children of Chowchilla: A Study of Psychic Trauma (34, pp. 547— 623) and “Time and Trauma” (39, pp. 633-665). The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child was one of the main journals to grant an important place to the subject of trauma, which later become a major focus of interest in the world of child therapy. As might have been expected, what remained problematic for the journal was its relation to research on child development. In the first years, a simple solution seemed to suffice. In the first volume (1945), the hope was forcefully expressed that research might become more central. In practice, this intention amounted to almost nothing. For a long while, the sole empirical studies recognized by the journal were those practiced by its own editors and a few key contributors: Anna Freud’s diagnostic observations at the Hampstead Clinic, Margaret Mahler’s investigations on day nurseries, René Spitz’s studies on hospitalization, Ernst Kris’s observations at Yale University. In 1959, John Bowlby read a paper before a large audience during a meeting of psychoanalysts in New York. His presentation, “Grief and Mourning in Infancy and Early Childhood,” published in the 1960 volume (15, pp. 9-52) was vehemently attacked by Anna Freud (15, pp. 54-61). At the end of the 1970s, this state of affairs changed radically. “Outstanding Developmental Progress,” a longitudinal study by Bertrand Cramer (who was working in New York at the time) appeared in 1975 (30, pp. 15-48). “Four Early Stages in Development of Mother-Infant Interaction,” an important article by T. Berry Brazelton and Heidelise Als on video studies of mothers and infants, was published in 1979 (34, pp. 349-369). Even more revealing, the main specialists in early infancy in the 1990s, such as T. Berry Brazelton, Daniel Stern, and Edward Tronick, began to be cited frequently by various authors in the journal in the 1970s. This tendency, which continued during the 1980s and 1990s, represents a praiseworthy movement toward more openness. Yet the most surprising thing is that investigators seemed to imagine they could assimilate the new discoveries to the existing metapsychology without raising some rather complex questions. One would expect more objections, such as those of Fred Pine, who, in a fine 1992 article, “The Separation-Individuation Concept in Light of Infant Research” (47, pp. 103-116), brought out the existing disagreements between Mahler and Stern. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Despite the reservations one may have on its omissions, The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child has maintained a high level of professionalism. Few journals in the history of psychotherapy have managed as well as this one to retain their influence while remaining lively, dynamic, and provocative in theoretical matters. GEORGE DOWNING See also: Eissler-Selke, Ruth; Freud, Anna; Hartmann, Heinz; Kris, Ernst; Kris-Rie, Marianne. PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OF NEUROSIS, THE Otto Fenichel’s The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis is widely considered the standard reference work on this subject. It also offers a systematic summary of the literature of psychoanalysis up to the Second World War. With its seven hundred pages and its 1,600-entry bibliography, the work has contributed significantly to its author’s reputation as a first-rank theorist and “encyclopedist” of psychoanalysis. In a brief Preface, Fenichel describes how the book was conceived. After many years of activity in a training capacity and as a lecturer in various psychoanalytical institutes in Europe and America, and of vigorous participation in internal debates on theoretical deviations and on the internal practices of psychoanalysis, he had decided not to work on a second edition of his earlier Outline of Clinical Psychoanalysis, first published in two volumes by the Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag in Vienna in 1931, and in English translation in 1934, but rather to produce a completely new work. Fenichel began writing The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis in Prague, and Freud proposed the work to the Verlag. In May 1943, the author made a formal statement about his project at the Meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association in Detroit. In view of all the misunderstandings, obscurities, and deviations then besetting psychoanalysis, and in view of the continual temptation to revive resistances within the movement, it was much to be desired, he felt, that the essential part of Freud’s dynamic psychology be set forth in the clearest way. He hoped to INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PSYCHOANALYTIC TREATMENT contribute to this task by writing a “Psychoanalytic Theory of the Neuroses.” In his introductory chapters, Fenichel sets forth his scientific position, stresses his views on changes noted in psychoanalytical theory, and defines his goal, namely to understand and institute Freudian psychoanalysis as a psychology, as a natural science. In this way he hoped to keep at arm’s length psychoanalysts who confined themselves to a partial view of psychoanalytic theory, reducing it in a psychologizing or biologizing way, and hence overvaluing or neglecting one or another of its aspects. Part One of Fenichel’s book is devoted to an account of general mental development from the psychoanalytical point of view; Part Two describes the various defining characteristics and forms of the neuroses. Fenichel was very conscious of the cultural import of psychoanalysis, and conceived it as his “vital duty” to work for “the conservation, extension, and correct application” of Freud’s discoveries. Against this background, Fenichel’s book was designed to preserve the clinical basis of psychoanalysis, its libido theory, the foundations of its theory of the instincts, and its account of the perpetual conflict and interaction between the frustrations of the outside world and the demands of the instincts. ELKE MUHLLEITNER See also: Addiction; Bulimia; Dependence; Dipsomania; Fenichel, Otto; Indications and contraindications for psychoanalysis for an adult. Source Citation Fenichel, Otto. (1945). The psychoanalytic theory of neurosis. New York: Norton. Bibliography Fenichel, Otto. (1934 [1931]). Outline ofc linical psychoanalysis. New York: Norton. PSYCHOANALYTIC TREATMENT The psychoanalytic treatment is a method for treating psychic suffering that advances self-knowledge. It is characterized by the interpretation of the free associa- 1383 PSYCHOANALYTIC TREATMENT tions of a patient, who in becoming aware of feelings and forgotten memories, can thus resolve or express differently the unconscious conflicts behind his/her neurotic symptoms. The way sessions are structured— couch and armchair—and their frequency and regularity facilitate this process through the transference onto the psychoanalyst of affects and childhood fantasies. From 1886, when he set himself up in private practice to 1909, the year of the “Rat Man” analysis, Freud gradually developed the system of psychoanalytic treatment. In fact the method emerged from the hypnotic treatments that he used after his recognition of the failure of medicinal and physical therapies in vogue at the time. Sessions in which the patient relaxed on a couch in an atmosphere of calm and comparative sensory deprivation resulted from the conditions imposed by somnolescent suggestion and later by the “cathartic method” developed by Joseph Breuer to treat his patient, Anna O. Patients themselves contributed towards the maturation of the structure of the treatment, beginning with Emmy von N’s command at their first encounter on May 1, 1889, to “Keep still! Don’t say anything! Don’t touch me!” and her angry demand that he stop interrupting and let her speak freely. The abandonment of hypnosis in favor of an interrogatory technique, and the application of pressure to the forehead to release ideas, repressed through resistance, introduced a decisive turn in method, even though Freud appears to have taken a particularly active role, insisting patients surrender the pathogenic secrets buried in their unconscious, as the chapter entitled “The Psychotherapy of Hysteria” in Studies on Hysteria demonstrates (1895d). The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a) introduced the innovation “free association,’ which would become the “fundamental rule” of all psychoanalytic treatment. At the same time the therapist was required submit to the principle of “evenly suspended attention” which entails the scrutiny of even the most apparently insignificant detail (Freud, 1904a). Freud could thus describe his “psychotherapeutic method” in 1904 as follows: “Without exerting any other kind of influence, he invites them to lie down in a comfortable attitude on a sofa, while he himself sits on a chair behind them outside their field of vision. He does not even ask them to close their eyes, and 1384 avoids touching them in any way, as well as any other procedure which might be reminiscent of hypnosis. The session thus proceeds like a conversation between two people equally awake, but one of whom is spared every muscular exertion and every distracting sensory impression which might divert his attention from his own mental activity” (1904a, p. 250). Through the transference, whose importance Freud had discovered with his patient Dora, resistance became common, both as an obstacle to treatment and as its major driving force. There remained one last significant innovation in technique, which Freud reported to his disciples at a meeting of the Vienna Society on November 6, 1907, via an account of the early stages of his treatment of the “Rat Man.” Otto Rank noted in The Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society that “analytic technique has been modified to the extent that the psychoanalyst no longer actively seeks to obtain material that interests him, but rather allows the patient to follow the unprompted and natural course of their thoughts.” Hereafter the framework was determined and has remained to the present day. The features that Freud was to recall in “On Beginning the Treatment” (1913c) include the analyst’s position outside the reclining patient’s line of vision, regular sessions of a prescribed duration, and terms for the payment of fees. These conditions create the setting for a “psychoanalytic situation” in which, for Jacques Lacan (1953) and his followers, the principal, indeed the exclusive role, would be one given to speech; but a speech and an aural attention going beyond words to include silences, expressions of affect, and even minuscule movements. Freud had observed this when treating Dora: “Tf his lips are silent, he chatters with his fingertips; betrayal oozes out of him at every pore. And thus the task of making conscious the most hidden recesses of the mind is one which it is quite possible to accomplish” (1905e, p. 78). Even when supplemented by professional motives (as in training analysis), it is psychical suffering that compels individuals to consult a psychoanalyst. After one or more preliminary interviews, which Freud advised should not be repeated and in relation to which he preferred “a trial treatment of one to two weeks” (1913c), the direction of the treatment is set out; the two protagonists then decide whether to embark on this venture whose initial temporal duration is indeterminate but whose eventual length is INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS assured. “To speak more plainly,’ added Freud, “a psycho-analysis is always a matter of long periods of time [...] of longer periods than the patient expects. It is therefore our duty to tell the patient this before he finally decides upon the treatment” (p. 129). Since Freud some features of this initial framework have changed; thus the six hour-long sessions per week were reduced to five, then to four, and eventually to three and the length of sessions has been cut from one hour to forty-five minutes. Following his lead, disciples of Lacan have instituted short sessions, and even sessions whose variable length is based on the analyst’s attention to the scansion effect in his patient’s discourse, a practice that has been keenly disputed. Some analysts believe that two sessions per week is possible, others, that the couch advocated by Freud is in no way an absolute requirement. The notion of a “standard treatment” (Bouvet, 1954), which was similar to descriptions of the medical standard that characterized the manuals of the 1950s, was counterbalanced by what were described as its “variants” (Lacan, 1955); it has now been replaced by the “classic” or indeed the “orthodox” treatment for those who see themselves as liberated from its formal constraints. It is essential that a “psychoanalytic process” be established and that it is encouraged to advance through the development of the transference neurosis, whose infantile origins are revealed in analysis, but that it is also always jeopardized by the initiation of a “negative therapeutic reaction” which would counter the original love-based “therapeutic alliance.” The analyst's “abstinence” in the face of the patient’s demands for affective gratification is a requirement for thisz development, as is his capacity to manage conflicts that may engender “secondary gains” from the illness and, once the initial honeymoon period is over, a transferential and countertransferential relationship that is as intense as it is unusual. According to Freud: “the therapeutic effect depends on making conscious what is repressed, in the widest sense of the word, in the id” (1937c). Analytic interventions address this aim, but more importantly so too do interpretation, construction, and reconstruction (1937d) as well as the analysis of resistances and the dispelling of amnesia that masks infantile sexuality. Active periods alternating with inactive phases, which for Freud were occasionally indicative of a patient’s “working through” (Durcharbeitung) of the material analyzed, mark the stages of what has been INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PSYCHOANALYTIC TREATMENT described as “autohistorization” (P. Aulagnier) and highlights the journey towards autonomy which will determine the treatment’s cessation. The termination of analysis has occasioned a number of studies since Freud’s own (1937c) and is dependent on the aims that the psychoanalyst and the analysand have given themselves. Curing the symptom has never been the most important function of the treatment and so Jacques Lacan could speak of the “cure as surplus.” However, patients do have every right to expect relief from the psychic suffering that led them to analysis in the first place, alongside the capacity to better manage the pathological responses that the vagaries of life engender through the repetition compulsion. The extension of psychoanalytic treatment to more severe pathologies, to borderline conditions and psychotic disorders, has altered both the notion of its outcome and the means by which it is reached. Freud’s formulation “Where id was, there shall ego [or ‘T’] be (Wo Es war soll Ich werden)” and its possible translations has produced a range of possible interpretations according to whether the Freudian Ich is translated as “ego,” as in ego psychology for example, or as “I,” as in the “subject.” However, the termination of treatment does not mark the end of the analytic process; its ongoing working-through continues in self-analysis and in the return to the couch, of either the same psychoanalyst or of another, or to an analyst of the other sex or to one from a different school. ALAIN DE MYOLLA See also: Abstinence/rule of abstinence; Active technique; Analyzability; “Analysis, Terminable and Interminable”; Biological bedrock; Cure; Face-to-face situation; Framework of the psychoanalytic treatment; Free association; Fundamental rule; Indications and counterindications for psychoanalysis; Initial interviews; Lay analysis; “Lines of Advance in Psycho-Analytic Therapy”; Money and psychoanalytic treatment; Neutrality, benevolent neutrality; Techniques with adults, psychoanalytic; Techniques with children, psychoanalytic; Termination of treatment; Training of psychoanalysts; Training analysis; ‘Transference. Bibliography Cahn, Raymond. (1996). La cure psychanalytique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1385 PsycHO-ANALYTICAL TREATMENT OF CHILDREN, THE Freud, Sigmund. (1900a) . The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4-5, . (1904a). Freud’s psychoanalytic procedure. SE, 7: 247-254. —. (1905e [1901]). Fragment of an analysis of a case of hysteria. SE, 7: 1-122. . (1913c). On beginning the treatment. (Further recommendations on the technique of psycho-analysis 1). SE, 12: 121-144. . (1937c). Analysis terminable and interminable. SE, 23: 209-253. . (1937d). Constructions in analysis. SE, 23: 255— 269. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2: 48-106. Glover, Edward. (1955). The technique of psycho-analysis. London: Bailliere, Tindall and Cox. Greenson, Ralph R. (1967). The technique and practice of psychoanalysis. New York: International Universities Press. Grunberger, Béla, and Chasseguet-Smirgel, Janine. (1980). La cure psychanalytique. Sur le divan. Paris: Tchou. Mijolla, Alain de. (1987). De la pratique psychanalytique de Freud a la notre. Etudes Freudiennes, 30, 17-37. Further Reading Rangell, Leo. (1996). The “analytic” in psychoanalytic treatment: How analysis works. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 16, 140-166. Rothstein, Arnold, ed. (1988). How does treatment help? On the modes of therapeutic action of psychoanalytic therapy. Madison, CT: International Universities Press. PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL TREATMENT OF CHILDREN, THE This book brings together three works written during the years 1926-1945. It thus offers a longitudinal and dynamic view of Anna Freud’s basic theoretical positions regarding the technique of child analysis and, in Anna Freud’s own words, “attempts to summarize some of the advances in the understanding and evaluation of the infantile neurosis which the author has made in the [last] nineteen years of work on the subject” (p. ix). Inevitably, this volume reflects the controversies and conflicts that opposed the author’s 1386 approach to that of Melanie Klein, who is in fact cited repeatedly throughout. The first part of The Psycho-Analytical Treatment of Children is comprised of four lectures given at the Vienna Institute of Psycho-Analysis in 1926 under the general title “Introduction to the Technique of the Psycho-Analysis of Children.” Here’ Anna Freud exposes her views of that time on the preparatory phase of child analysis (Lecture 1), on technique (Lecture 2), on the role of transference (Lecture 3), and on the relationship between the analysis of children and their upbringing (Lecture 4). The second part of the book, “The Theory of Children’s Analysis,” a paper read to the Tenth Psycho-Analytical Congress at Innsbruck in 1927, takes up the same theme, while the third part, the latest, is mainly concerned with indications for the psychoanalytic treatment of children. Three main themes can be identified in this work. The first concerns the techniques used in child analysis, where, in contrast with adult analysis, free association does not play a central role; nor does dream interpretation, which in the case of children is therefore not the “royal road” to the unconscious. Play and drawing are considered to be indispensable tools, though she conceives of them far more as techniques for “observing” the child than as sources of directly interpretable material. Indeed the analyst is described by Anna Freud as an “observer,” very close to the child, who relies on the words of the parents and their wish for the child to be treated. The child is not considered capable of being conscious of its illness, nor, therefore, of asking for help, whence the need for the analyst actively and deliberately to induce the young patient to accept “a tie between us which must be strong enough to sustain the later analysis” (p. 11). The issue of the child’s participation in the analysis raises the problem—a central one in the dispute between Anna Freud and Melanie Klein—of the child’s ability to establish a transference during analytic treatment, and this question is the second essential theme of this book. Despite some evolution in her thinking, and even if she acknowledged the possibility of some manifestations of transference with children, Anna Freud always maintained that it was impossible for a childhood neurosis to be supplanted by a transference neurosis, that is, by a new neurotic formation in which the analyst replaces the “original objects” in the child’s emotional life, namely the parents (p. 34). Inasmuch as the child continues to experience its parents as love- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS objects in reality, the analyst can play a role only as an addition to, and not as a replacement for, those relations. The third and last main theme here, dealt with mainly in the last part of Anna Freud’s book, in her discussion of the indications for child analysis, concerns the distinction between normal and pathological development, between transient symptoms and real obstacles to development, between the equilibrium of defense mechanisms and the overwhelming of those mechanisms, and, finally, the relations between infantile neurosis and the formation of the ego. These are matters also discussed elsewhere by Anna Freud, as for example in The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence (1936) or Normality and Pathology in Childhood (1965), along with, notably, the idea of “lines of development.” Anna Freud thus contributed to the attenuation of an over-mechanical view of the Freudian “stages” of emotional development, laying the stress instead on a more dynamic and less linear vision of the child’s mental functioning. She also emphasized the part played by reality in the psychoanalytic treatment of children, notably the importance of an alliance with the parents and of their evolving attitudes and support during the course of their child’s treatment—ideas that have lost none of their present-day relevance. FREDERIQUE JACQUEMAIN See also: British Psycho-Analytical Society; Freud, Anna; Great Britain; Technique with children, psychoanalytic. Source Citation Freud, Anna. (1946 [1926-45]). The psycho-analytical treatment of children. (Parts 1 and 2; Nancy Procter-Grigg, Trans.). London: Imago; New York: International Universities Press. Bibliography Freud, Anna. (1937 [1936]). The ego and the mechanisms of defence (Cecil Baines, Trans.). London: Hogarth. (1965). Normality and pathology in childhood. Assessments of development. London: Hogarth/Institute of Psycho-Analysis. King, Pearl H. M., and Riccardo Steiner. (1991). The Freud- Klein controversies 1941-1945. London/New York: Tavistock/ Routledge. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PSYCHOANALYTISCHE BEWeGuNG, DIE Further Reading Cohen, J. (1997). Child and adolescent psychoanalysis: research, practice, and theory. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 78, 499-520. PSYCHOANALYTISCHE BEWEGUNG, DIE In 1929 Adolf J. Storfer founded the review Die Psychoanalytische Bewegung (The psychoanalytic movement) as one of the publications of the Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag. As its title suggests, this bimonthly periodical was intended to open the frontiers of the institutionally contained psychoanalytic world to a broader non-specialist public. As a link between the science of psychoanalysis and a public with an interest in the literature, this periodical saw itself as a forum for somewhat unorthodox propositions and ideas. This orientation was already clear in Thomas Mann’s contribution to the first issue, “Die Stellung Freuds in der modernen Geistesgeschichte” (The place of Freud in the history of modern thought). Mann described Freud as a writer and scientist with a worldwide reputation whose scope and range far exceeded the universe of specialist psychologists and who was well on the way to revolutionizing all sciences of the mind. In addition to contributions from applied psychoanalysis, the review also brought together reviews of contemporary literature in the domain, as well as short literary or scientific works dating from an earlier period and considered to be precursors of psychoanalysis. In this category of genealogical precursors it published extracts from poets, such as Boccaccio, or thinkers and philosophers like Plato, Kierkegaard, Montesquieu, and Montaigne. It also presented critical points of view from contemporary writers like Andre Maurois, Italo Svevo, Arnold Zweig, and Stefan Zweig. The section entitled “Das Echo der Psychoanalyse” provided information on events in the world of psychoanalysis and reviewed recent political and scientific critiques of psychoanalysis in various sectors After Storfer resigned from the Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, Eduard Hitschmann took over the publication in August 1932. The number of subscribers to the periodical dropped after the National Socialist party came to power in Germany, 1387 PSYCHOBIOGRAPHY when many German analysts and intellectuals close to analytic circles fled the country. The economic and political situation caused the publication of Die Psychoanalytische Bewegung to be suspended in December 1933. Lyp1A MaRINELLI See also: Goethe Prize; Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag. PSYCHOBIOGRAPHY The term psychobiography in its broadest sense designates any approach to biography that emphasizes inner life and psychological development, but in the more specific sense, it means the use of a formalized psychological theory and concepts in writing biography, and it received its decisive impetus from psychoanalysis. Psychobiography in the broad sense goes back at least to Plutarch, but Freud’s book on Leonardo’s childhood (1910) is often seen as one of the first to apply a formalized metapsychology. Although many biographies in the past had dealt with psychological development, the arrival of psychoanalysis in the twentieth century has offered a comprehensive psychological theory of early human development that explains the shaping of the life course. Psychobiography generally focuses on the formative early years of life in an effort to uncover the relational dynamics, traumas, or complexes that might explain later behavior. Psychobiography is a major instrument of psychohistory for the study of leading historical figures. But the two are not identical since psychohistory is especially concerned with group behavior. The focus of psychoanalysis on the first few years of life has led to the sharpest criticisms of psychoanalytic psychobiography. The most often heard objections center around the charge of reductionism. First, psychobiography is criticized for its focus on psychological factors to the exclusion of cultural, social, economic, and other external factors. Psychoanalytic psychobiography in particular is often accused of reducing the subject’s life to determination by complexes established in the first few years of childhood, e.g., fixation on the oral or anal stage or to a failure to successfully pass the oedipal period. Critics also point out that reliable evidence on early childhood is often almost impossible to obtain. As a result of the absence of data, 1388 many psychoanalytic biographers have used theory to project an image of what the subject’s infancy must have been like. This practice has brought especial discredit on the psychoanalytic approach since it is accused of inventing facts. A fourth objection holds that psychoanalytic biography lacks the central tool of psychoanalysis in the clinical setting—free association. Finally, there is the moral objection that psychoanalytic approaches have often denigrated the memory of great men and women by portraying them in terms of pathology or unresolved infantile conflicts. Obviously, the more sensible and cautious psychobiographers have avoided reductionistic claims. The best psychobiographies also avoid over-confident assertions about the existence of childhood events based only on the evidence of adult behavior. The absence of a living subject’s “free association,” however, is viewed as less of a handicap than critics assert because the psychoanalytic biographer can often draw upon an abundance of diaries, letters, and other writings as well as sound recordings, photographs, and films for more recent subjects. Finally, to the objection that psychobiography maligns the reputation of exemplary figures, one may reply that the same objection can be made to any critical biography which explores the determination of character. Many of the standard objections to psychoanalytic biography are also mitigated by the application of those psychoanalytic theories which place greater emphasis on ego development. In some versions of ego psychology the personality is said to continue to develop across the life span with the possibility that later experiences can modify processes rooted in early childhood. According to such perspectives there are important psychological stages and tasks to be accomplished beyond the oedipal period, as illustrated in Erik Erikson’s Gandhi’s Truth, which deals with a crisis in Gandhi’s mature years. In the early twenty-first century, psychoanalytic theories provide a variety of perspectives that can illuminate all stages of the life span, accounting for psychological health and triumph as well as the persistence of destructive traits fixed in infancy. LARRY SHINER See also: “Claims of Psycho-Analysis to Scientific Interest”; History and psychoanalysis; Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood; Life and Works of Edgar Allan Poe: A Psychoanalytic Interpretation; Psychohistory; Psy- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS chopathologie de l’échec (Psychopathology of Failure); Thomas Woodrow Wilson, Twenty-eighth President of the United States. A Psychological Study; Visual arts and psychoanalysis. Bibliography Erikson, Erik H. (1969). Gandhi’s truth. New York: W. W. Norton. Freud, Sigmund (1910). Leonardo da Vinci and a memory of his childhood. SE, 11: 57-137. Runyan, William McKinley (1982). Life histories and psychobiography. Explorations in theory and method. New York: Oxford University Press. Strozier, Charles B. (1982). Lincoln’s quest for union. Public and private meanings. New York: Basic. Tucker, Robert C. (1973). Stalin as revolutionary, 1879-1929. A study in history and personality. New York: W. W. Norton. Further Reading Mijolla, Alain de. (1996). Psychoanalysts and their History. International Psychoanalysis: The Newsletter of the IPA, 5 (1), 25-28. . (1998). Freud, biography, his autobiography, and his biographers. Psychoanalysis and History, 1 (1), 41. “PSYCHOGENESIS OF A CASE OF HOMOSEXUALITY IN A WOMAN, THE” The treatment that Sigmund Freud relates in the article “The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman” was a short one, lasting four months. He had broken it off one year or so earlier, upon recognizing the force of his patient’s negative transference towards him. Then aged nineteen years old, the young girl did not consider herself to be in any way ill and had only agreed to begin an analysis at her father’s insistence. Her father was worried not only about his daughter’s overt homosexuality but in particular about a recent suicide attempt; after he had encountered her in the street in the company of the woman with whom she was in love, she had thrown herself over a parapet wall on to a suburban railway line. The second child and sole daughter of a family of four children from the Jewish bourgeoisie in Vienna, “assimilated” by baptism, the young girl had fallen passionately INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ‘“PSYCHOGENESIS OF A CASE OF HOMOSEXUALITY IN A WOMAN, THE”? in love with a “cocotte” who was ten years older than she. In desperation, the family had decided to appeal to Freud, despite what he describes as the low esteem in which psychoanalysis was then generally held in Vienna. This is the only case of female homosexuality that Freud reports and the analysis was conducted during a period when his daughter Anna, then aged twentyfour years old, was also in analysis with him. This text could be considered as the starting-point for a development in Freud’s study of femininity, as he later elaborated it in “Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes” (1925)), “Female Sexuality” (1931b), and “New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis” (1933a). “The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman” is noteworthy in that it simultaneously concerns: ¢ Clinical questions: homosexuality in women but also in men; the concept of object-choice in relation to the Oedipus complex; the status of dreams with regard to the unconscious; adolescence and passage to the act; and suicide. ¢ Technical observations on the treatment: the negative therapeutic reaction; the transfer of oedipal hostility onto the analyst; the therapeutic alliance; and the difficulty with analysis conducted at the request of a third party. e Epistemological developments: causality in the analysis and its unpredictability; innate and acquired characteristics; and the connections between psychoanalysis and biology. It therefore becomes apparent once again how it is difficulty or even failure in clinical practice that lead Freud to reflect in a productive way, as is characteristic of scientific investigation. Freud addresses the question of homosexuality from the outset of his work in many texts. He emphasizes here that “it is not for psycho-analysis to solve the problem of homosexuality” (1920a, p. 171); that is, he considers it to be a variant of the sexual organization that in common with heterosexuality represses the other part of the original bisexuality. For him, the analytic attitude consists in re-establishing the full bisexual function in a way that leaves open the subsequent choice. The complex relations between object choice and identification with the object are demonstrated here: 1389 7 ‘(Po ycCHOGEONF EAS CAISES OF HOMOSEXUALITYI N A WoMAN, THE disappointed in her oedipal love by the birth of a new brother when she is in the throes of the pubertal resurgence of the Oedipus complex, the young homosexual girl turns away from her father and from men in general. She identifies with her new brother and takes first her mother and then another woman as love object in place of her father. Rather than the oedipal competition, Freud emphasizes here the negative consequences of the “libidinal withdrawal” as a convenient position that avoids the conflict. He also resumes and continues his analysis of the origin of the compulsion to fall in love with women of “ill repute” who need to be “saved” (1910h). Previously analyzed (1910g), suicide is emphasized here in its primary murderous and other-directed nature, which is secondarily turned back on the subject herself by identification. It is surprising, however, that the young girl’s passage to the act, which she explains by her despair in love following her rejection by the woman who evidently did not want any trouble with the family, is not discussed any further by Freud—particularly in its dual character of destructiveness both toward the mother, represented by the loved and rejecting woman (who “drops” her), and toward the father against whom the act is directed as a supreme act of defiance. The idea that the patient is attempting to mislead him with lying dreams leads Freud to an important observation that the dream is not the “unconscious” but the form into which a thought left over from conscious or preconscious waking life is recast. This is to be understood in the context of the patient’s negative transference and resistances, which he likens to Russian military tactics of encouraging the enemy to advance in order to ambush him later. Realizing that the patient has transferred to him “the sweeping repudiation of men which had dominated her ever since the disappointment she had suffered from her father” (1920a, p. 164), Freud breaks off the treatment and advises that she should resume it with a woman analyst. In his view, the young girl has therefore proved incapable of successfully completing the second phase of the analysis, which follows the period in which information is obtained and is supposed to lead the patient herself to grasp hold of the material placed at her disposal. These technical observations had already 1390 appeared in another form in the concept of workingthrough (1914g). Finally, the question of homosexuality leads Freud to distance himself from the received idea of a congenital homosexuality and to emphasize, alongside the somatic sexual characteristics and the type of object-choice, the importance of the psychic sexual characteristics—that is, the “masculine and feminine positions” —leaving the rest to biological research. This article is therefore an important clinical, technical and epistemological work. The therapeutic failure is productive not only because it leads Freud to reconsider the procedure of both analyst and analysand in the treatment, particularly in its beginnings, but also because it leads him to identify in part with the question posed by the parents: what should be done with regard to this young girl’s homosexuality and, above all, could it have been foreseen and therefore avoided? This concerns a fundamental question for psychoanalysis, to which Freud gives a firm answer: “Hence the chain of causation can always be recognized with certainty if we follow the line of analysis, whereas to predict along the line of synthesis is impossible” (1920a, p. 168). There are so many causal factors at work that it is impossible to know in advance which will prove to be the strongest. The concept of “deferred action” that characterizes the specific nature of temporality in psychoanalysis emerges here in its epistemological dimension: prediction is impossible because it is only in deferred action that it can be said which elements were the strongest, for the sole reason that it is these that have prevailed. Although it may seem a truism, this observation is nevertheless of fundamental importance for child and adolescent psychology and it conflicts with primary pseudo-determinism. On the ethical plane, it is also a perspective that leads to an active attitude of confidence in the possibility that psychic destiny is not fixed for all time. In fact, Freud does not take the view that homosexuality is a sexual pathology, although he does emphasize that female homosexuality is “much less glaring” than male homosexuality and that it is beyond the purview of the law. Despite his annoyance at not managing to get through his young patient’s defenses and polite con- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS tempt, Freud in fact appears respectful of her choices and firm with regard to the ethics of the analytic position, in which there is no question of defining a “good” sexuality to be imposed on the ailing “deviant.” A fascinating biography of the patient, Sidonie Csillag, was published in 2000 by Ines Rieder and Diana Voigt. It provides us with a useful reminder of the context of female homosexuality in this period and bisexuality as a phenomenon that accompanied women’s emancipation. The book sheds light on the unusual fate of this woman, who was to die a centenarian, after leading a life that was as free, non-conformist, and adventurous as the one that had led her to Freud against her will at the age of nineteen. SOPHIE DE MyoLLa-MELLOR See also: Adolescence; Adolescent crisis; Female sexuality; Femininity; Feminism and psychoanalysis; Homosexuality; Masculinity/femininity; Negative therapeutic reaction; Negative transference; Psychic causality; Resistance; Sexuality; Sexualization; Sexuation, formulas of; Suicide. Source Citation Freud, Sigmund. (1920a). Uber die Psychogenese eines Falles von weiblicher Homosexualitat. Internationale Zeitschrift fiir Psychoanalyse, V1, 1920, pp. 1-24; GW, XII, pp. 271-302; The psychogenesis of a case of homosexuality in a woman. SE, 18: 145-172. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1925j). Some psychical consequences of the anatomical distinction between the sexes. SE, 19: 241— 258. . (1931b). Female sexuality. SE, 21: 221-243. . (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho- analysis. SE, 22: 1-182. Rieder, Ines, and Voigt, Diana. (2000). Heimliches Begehren: Die Geschichte der Sidonie C. Franz. Vienna/Munich: Deuticke Verlag. PSYCHOGENESIS/ORGANOGENESIS The notions of psychogenesis and organogenesis come out of a classic debate in the field of psychology—a debate that, throughout history, has taken the form of INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PSYCHOGENESIS/ORGANOGENESIS a dichotomy between innate and acquired or subjective and objective. Today, its most radical form is illustrated in the opposition between neuronal and mental. These two notions are usually associated with causal deterministic or etiopathogenic types of mental disorders. Classically, psychogenesis of a mental problem is understood to mean an etiological or etiopathogenic process that is exclusively supported by events or mechanisms of a mental nature and outside of any organic factor, especially those affecting the nervous system or the brain. Psychoanalysis, as a theory of the human mind based on exploration of the unconscious, for a long time represented and illustrated the psychogenetic point of view within psychology by emphasizing the dynamics of unconscious conflict. Some doctrinal trends within contemporary psychoanalysis, such as the current informed by the work of Jacques Lacan, radicalized this viewpoint through the use of a formalization of the structures of language in relation to the unconscious. By contrast, organogenesis of a mental problem is understood to mean an etiological or etiopathogenic process grounded in an organic dysfunction. While in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries organic dysfunction was conceived in terms of lesions of certain areas of the brain according to an anatomical model, present-day contributions from molecular biology, genetics, and, above all, the neurosciences have instead situated such dysfunction within the neuronal connections that make up the structures of the brain. Certain currents within psychology, such as those derived from neuropsychobiological, experimental, or cognitive approaches, by privileging the objective dimension within observation protocols and data collection, illustrate this organogenic point of view. From a psychoanalytic point of view, the debate between psychogenesis and organogenesis can no longer be treated schematically and exclusively. This debate raises the question of psychic causality, the affirmation of which is indissociable from psychic reality. According to Freud’s conception, mental life is necessarily grounded in organic life, but there is a limit beyond which psychoanalytic inquiry can no longer be relevant. Following up from that viewpoint, today one can say that mental functioning is grounded in brain functioning, but that it does not derive directly from, nor is it reducible to, brain functioning. The logic of 1391 PsycHOGENIC BLINDNESS the mental thus remains heterogeneous to the logic of the neuronal, as is shown, in particular, by its theoretical referents. Notions such as the drive—with its two polarities, somatic and psychic—or representation, as well as modern psychoanalytic studies on borderline states or psychosomatic states, which emphasize symbolic transformations (meaning) and economic transformations (force) attest to a specifically mental reality that has its own causality. At the margins of the psychogenetic and organogenetic points of view, one current of doctrine, the organodynamic current, attempted to make a synthesis between the two. An outgrowth of the work of the neurologist John Hughlings Jackson, and based on a hierarchical, evolutionary conception of the structures of the nervous system, this trend was applied in the field of psychopathology, specially by Henry Ey and others. In this conception, it is posited that mental disorders are linked to dissolution or disorganization at a certain level of mental organization, by means of damage of organic origin that generates negative symptoms, and to reorganization at an inferior level, linked to mental life’s characteristic dynamism and ability to generate positive symptoms. In the field of psychosomatic phenomena, Pierre Marty applied this model in an original and personal way to the psychosomatic economy and its disorders. CLAUDE SMADJA See also: Constitution; “Heredity and the Aetiology of the Neuroses”; Heredity of acquired characters; Organic repression; Phylogenetic Fantasy, A: Overview of the Transference Neuroses; Psychic causality; Psychotic/ neurotic. Bibliography Changeux, Jean-Pierre. (1983). L Homme neuronal. Paris: Fayard. Ey, Henry. (1973). Traité des hallucinations. Paris: Masson. Freud, Sigmund. (1893c). Some points for a comparative study of organic and hysterical motor paralyses. SE, 1: 155-172. . (1910i). The psycho-analytic view of psychogenic disturbance of vision. SE, 11: 209-218. Marty, Pierre. (1980). Les Mouvements individuels de vie et de mort. I, L’Ordre psychosomatique. Paris: Payot. 1392 PSYCHOGENIC BLINDNESS Psychogenic blindness, whether it arises from too great a desire to see or from a refusal to see, had psychological causes for Freud. Here, as elsewhere, hysteria was Freud’s guide: it was apropos of hysteria that he broached the subject of conflict between the various visual functions, and he placed the eye (the source of visual pleasure) and the act of looking itself at the center of his thinking. His study “The Psycho-Analytic View of Psychogenic Disturbance of Vision” (1910i) dealt specifically with blindness that had its origin in hysteria. He noted that hypnosis could be used to induce blindness experimentally by suggesting to the subject not to see anything, but that in hysterical patients the idea of being blind did not proceed from third-party suggestion but arose spontaneously from autosuggestion. Hence his question: when and under what conditions does an idea become so powerful that it behaves like a suggestion and becomes a reality? For Freud “hysterically blind people are only blind as far as consciousness is concerned; in their unconscious they see” (p. 212): the stimuli reaching the blind eye arouse unconscious affects. Certain ideas associated with vision remain separate from consciousness: they have succumbed to repression because they conflict with other, stronger ideas that dominate the ego. Such conflicts between ideas are simply an expression of the conflict between instincts, especially between the sexual instincts and the ego instincts, both of which use the same organs of the body. Thus the eyes perceive not only the modifications to the outside world that are important for preserving life, but also the characteristics and attractions of the love object. But it is not easy to serve two masters: the more that an organ with this dual function enters into an intimate relation with one of the two great instincts, the more likely it is to refuse itself to the other. This can have pathological consequences if the two basic instincts are disunited, if, for example, the partial sexual instinct that uses the eyes makes excessive demands. These excessive demands disturb the relation of the eyes and the act of seeing to the ego, because the ideas linked to these demands succumb to repression and are excluded from consciousness. This circumstance may attract a counterattack from the ego instincts. When the sexual interest of sight, Schaulust, becomes too insistent, the ego no longer wants to see anything, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS and the visual organ, using its power to separate, puts itself entirely at the disposal of the sexual instinct in the unconscious. Because the ego then no longer has conscious control over the organ, the repression miscarries, and a substitute mechanism converts the repression into blindness. This blindness seems to be the result of an implacable psychic logic: by seeking to misuse the visual organ for purposes of sexual pleasure, subjects condemn themselves to see only the sexual on the unconscious stage and otherwise to see nothing. When Freud tackled the question of the uncanny (1919h), he mentioned E. T. A. Hoffmann’s tale The Sandman, in which a character plucks out children’s eyes to graft them onto automatons. This story, he felt, lent support to his view that the feeling of uncanniness is directly related to the sight of the female genitals, particularly those of the mother. He stressed the frequent unconscious equivalence between the eyes and the genital organs, and between blindness and castration. Blinding oneself, like Oedipus, is an attenuated form of self-castration, but it also makes one the bearer of a blind eye, which represents the other sex while disfiguring the face. In his theory, Freud, with a single word, iibersehen, which means both to look and to overlook, successfully condensed the story of Oedipus. Blindness is thus the result of a punishment, but what is the nature of the offense? The hysteric’s blindness seems to play out the Oedipus complex quite literally. For one, it choses a substitute organ, the eye, which stands at once for the castrated sexual organ and the desired sexual organs of the mother. Moreover, it makes the eye into the special object of the desire to see, as though it were obliged to reduce the sexual organ to the eye and were subject to the autoerotic need for the eye to derive pleasure from the eye. JEAN-MICHEL Hirt See also: Castration complex; Hysteria; Look/gaze; Psychic causality; Psychogenesis/organogenesis; Scoptophilia/ scopophilia; Visual. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1910i). The psycho-analytic view of psychogenic disturbance of vision. SE, 11: 209-218. . (1919h). The “uncanny.” SE, 17: 217-256. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PSYCHOHISTORY Rey, Jean-Michel. (1979). Des mots a l’ceuvre. Paris: Aubier- Montaigne. PSYCHOHISTORY Psychohistory may be defined as the application of formal psychological models in historical research. The modern field known as psychohistory is usually dated from the appearance of Freud’s book on Leonardo (1910), although the term psychohistory did not come into use until the 1960s. Although scattered attempts at the application of psychoanalytic theories to history were made between 1910 and 1940, the rise of Hitler and National Socialism led to a renewed interest in understanding irrational motivation. This was particularly true in the United States, where William L. Langer became president of the American Historical Association in 1958 and called for psychoanalytic methods to replace amateur psychologizing in historical research. That same year Erik Erikson published his widely read Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History. As a result of Langer’s and Erikson’s influence many younger scholars turned to psychohistory, as the new field was soon nicknamed. Although the fields of psychohistory and psychobiography are closely related, psychohistory limits itself to important historical figures like Richelieu, Hitler, or Wilson, and attempts to go beyond individual psychology to group behavior. Many historians regard the real test of the utility of psychoanalysis for history to be its success in explaining group behavior. A number of recent psychoanalytic studies, such as Robert Jay Lifton’s The Nazi Doctors, have attempted to explain group behavior in extreme historical situations. The witchcraft trials of the seventeenth century have also provided a fruitful subject for the study of group behavior, as in John Demos’s Entertaining Satan (1982) on New England or Lindal Roper’s Oedipus and the Devil (1993) on southern Germany. Psychohistory has been controversial within the history profession from its beginnings, but particularly after it became a prominent sub-field within academic history in the United States. Attacks on psychohistory have been of two kinds. One kind assails the careless research methods and hasty conclusions reached by some authors, particularly by clinicians not trained in historical method or by historians who misunderstand and misapply psychoanalytic concepts. The second 1393 PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS kind of objection to psychohistory involves specific problems such as the role of individuals in history compared to larger social and economic forces, the charge of reductionism and the importance of acknowledging possible alternative explanations, the difficulty of “analyzing” the dead from scant evidence of childhood experiences, and, finally, questions concerning the validity of psychoanalytic theory itself. Although there are reasonable answers to each of these problems, some academic historians remain hostile to psychohistory. Perhaps the most important reply to the general antagonism toward psychohistory is that since history has accepted models and theories drawn from the other social sciences (sociology, anthropology, economics), historians should not continue to use amateur psychology but draw on explicit psychological models. Of course, there can be a non-psychoanalytic psychohistory and even among those historians sympathetic to psychoanalysis there are many differences in approach, some following traditional instinctual models, others some form of object relations, and an increasing number pursing ego psychology models like that of Heinz Kohut. Some have suggested that methodological problems could more easily be avoided if psychohistorians received professional training in both history and psychoanalysis and there are a number of present-day historians who not only have doctoral degrees in history but are certified by one of the psychoanalytic institutes. In the United States a number’ of psychohistorians hold teaching and research positions in universities and offer doctoral training to younger scholars. Two journals exist, The Journal of Psychohistory, which primarily publishes the work of practicing clinicians, and The Psychohistory Review which publishes the work of historians and clinicians concerned to meet the standards of academic history. Despite some continuing resistance, psychohistory in the broadest sense is an established part of academic history in the United States and to a lesser degree in Germany and Israel. It has made its way more slowly in Britain and France. LARRY SHINER See also: Collége de psychanalystes; Erikson, Erik Homburger; Politics and psychoanalysis; Psychobiography. 1394 Bibliography Friedlander, Saul (1975), Histoire et Psychanalyse. Essai sur les possibilités et les limites de la pyscho-histoire. Paris: Le Seuil; translated by Susan Suleiman as History and psychoanalysis: An inquiry into the possibilities and limits of psychohistory. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978. Gay, Peter (1985). Freud for historians. New York: Oxford University Press. Loewenberg, Peter (1985). Decoding the past: The psychohistorical approach. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. Marvick, Elizabeth (1985). The “Annales” and the unconscious: Continuity and contrast within an_ historical school. Psychohistory Review, 13, 42-52. Runyan, William McKinley (1988). Psychology and historical interpretation. New York: Oxford University Press. Further Reading Mijolla, Alain de. (1996). Psychoanalysts and their history. International Psychoanalysis: The Newsletters of the IPA, 5 (1), 25-28. PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS Psychological tests are those that are designed to reveal individual modes of psychological functioning. Some of these are subject to strict codification and numerical evaluation that afford an assessment of individual performance in relation to a standard. Others use more flexible techniques and do not have recourse to quantification: the expression “projective personality assessment” is often then used rather than “test.” This expression is applied to so-called expressive and “projective” evaluations, the only ones to bear—often, though not always—the mark of some aspect or another of psychoanalytic theory. Hermann Rorschach, a Swiss psychiatrist trained in the Burgholzli clinic directed by Eugen Bleuler, was the first to imagine this type of test when he had the idea of asking his patients what they saw in inkblots. This test, which has given rise to innumerable publications, is the most commonly used. In his theoretical views, Rorschach himself was no doubt more influenced by Bleuler and Gustav Jung than by Sigmund Freud, although some of his successors have tried to fit him into coherent psychoanalytic thinking (Anzieu and Chabert, 1997), INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Another type of assessmentderives from the line of approach begun by Henry Murray in 1935 with the Thematic Apperception Test, or TAT. In these thematic tests the subject is presented with plates (or photographs) presenting one or more characters engaged in a situation and an action that the subject is asked to imagine. Leopold and Sonya Soral Bellak constructed a version for children in which the plates represent humanized animals (Children’s Apperception Test, or CAT). Many other evaluations using the same principle have been put forward (like Louis Corman’s Black Paw, Roger Perron’s Personal Dynamic and Images). A great many assessmentshave been imagined using different principles, almost always in a psychoanalytic context: sentences to complete and stories to complete (Madeleine Thomas); fables in which the person being tested has to comment on the moral (Louisa Diiss); stories to create and tell with the material support of dolls (Gertrude von Staabs), characters, elements of a village (Henri Arthus, Pierre Mabille); interpretation of the expressions on human faces in photographs (Leopold Szondi). Saul Rosenzweig’s Frustration-Aggression test no doubt deserves special mention because it is built explicitly on the basis of a hypothesis derived from psychoanalysis (“frustration produces aggression”). It met with great success in the world of American experimental psychology between the two wars. Lastly, we must accord a special place to “expressive” techniques that interpret the content and style of speech, walking, gestural behavior, but most of all graphic behavior: writing, but above all drawing, a procedure that Francoise Dolto in particular demonstrated (Le Dessin de l’E nfant, 1996). These techniques are said to be “projective,” based on the hypothesis that what the subject “perceives” of the material presented (which is preferably ambiguous and open to multiple interpretations in terms of graphics, situation, and so on) is in fact indicative of the subject’s representations of the world, people, interpersonal relations and, definitively, of the subject’s own psychic functioning. This often supposes a fairly psychologized and simplified definition of the psychoanalytic notion of projection, although certain authors prefer to use the notion of identification, which is also every bit as complex in psychoanalytic theory. Theoretical simplification always runs the risk of resulting in relatively simplistic interpretation procedures. Correct use of these techniques presupposes a solid grounding in clinical psychology and psychopathology, as well as specialized training. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES (ANALYTICAL PsyCHOLoGy) Under these conditions, projective tests constitute an important instrument for contributing to psychological and psychopathological diagnostics. ROGER PERRON See also: Psychological types (analytical psychology); Psychology and psychoanalysis; Rorschach, Hermann; Szondi, Leopold; Word association. ‘ Bibliography Anzieu Didier, and Chabert, Catherine. (1997). Les méthodes projectives. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Brelet, Francgoise. (1986). Fantasme et Situation projective. Paris: Dunod. Raffier-Malosto, Jocelyne (Ed.). (1996). Le Dessin de l’enfant. De l'approche génétique a l’interprétation clinique. Paris: La Pensée Sauvage. Further Reading Schafer, Roy. (1967). Projective testing and psychoanalysis: Selected papers. New York: International Universities Press. Sugarman, Alan, and Kanner, K. (2000). The contribution of psychoanalytic theory to psychological testing. Psychoanalytical Psychology, 17, 3-23. PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES (ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY) Carl Jung’s discrimination of human consciousness according to its functions (thinking, feeling, sensation, and intuition) and habitual attitudes (extraversion and introversion) was his attempt to provide a psychology of experience with a critical orientation in sorting out the empirical material of psychic dispositions, tendencies, and convictions. Jung’s first presentation of the idea of psychological types was in a lecture delivered at the Psychoanalytical Congress in Munich during September 1913. He noted the striking difference in attitude toward the external world between patients diagnosed with hysteria and those diagnosed with schizophrenia in terms of intensity of feeling, the former displaying an exaggerated emotivity with regard to the environment and the latter an extreme apathy. He also noted characteristic differences in thought content: the fantasy life of the patient with hysteria may be accounted for in a natural and 1395 PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES (ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY) human way by the antecedents and individual history of the patient, whereas the patient with schizophrenia consciously experiences fantasy closer to dreams than to the psychology of the waking state in having a distinctly archaic character, with mythological creations more in evidence than the personal memories of the patient. From these facts, Jung concluded that hysteria is characterized by a centrifugal movement of libido, which he called extraversion, and schizophrenia by a contrary movement, which he called introversion, toward the core of the personality (which he later called the self). Although Jung recognized that in these two clinical syndromes he was witnessing regressive extraversion and regressive introversion, he nevertheless concluded that there was in the development of consciousness a normal distinction between the two movements of libido. Extraversion, he postulated, tends naturally to bond and even merge with objects in the outer world, while introversion naturally turns away from such objects in order to link up with the internal objects that Jung eventually called archetypes. Kenneth Shapiro and Irving Alexander have subsequently noted that these two movements of libido are constitutive of experience itself for the different types, experience only being experience for the extravert when it is shared with another person or object in the outer world and, for the introvert, when it matches up to some a priori archetypal category or capacity to experience just that type of thing. The theory of psychological types itself is an introverted way of thinking about experience and making it real, which may account for its difficulty for psychologists using an extraverted attitude. In the years between 1913 and 1921, when the book Psychological Types finally appeared, Jung developed the theory to include what he called the functions of consciousness, which he named sensation, thinking, feeling, and intuition. Whether deployed toward objects in the outer world or toward the inner world of archetypes, sensation gives consciousness the practical sense that an object is really being presented to it; in other words, that it is, thinking gives it a name, feeling assigns it a value (for which reason Jung’s feeling is sometimes replaced by analytical psychologists with the word valuing or with feeling valuation) and intuition grants consciousness a direct, uncanny perception (from the perspective of the “absolute knowledge” of the unconscious) of the 1396 origin and fate of the object, as Jung puts it “whence it arises and where it is going.” For Jung sensation and intuition are irrational functions in being functions of perception which are irrationally “given.” Thinking and feeling, by contrast, are rational functions, being choices, in the sense of judgments by consciousness, as to how ‘to discriminate among objects that are perceived. That individuals develop consciousness in different ways, according to their preference for using certain functions over others has led the theory of psychological types to be used to type people and to predict their likelihood to succeed in certain professions. A test based on Jung’s model, known as the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), has had widespread use in the United States. The MBTI uses categories of judging and perceiving to distinguish Jung’s rational and irrational extraverted functions. In typing the preferred mode of consciousness of an individual, an attempt is made to define the person’s typical “superior function” according to whether it is extraverted or introverted, whether it is most characterized by sensation, thinking, feeling, and intuition, and whether it is rational or irrational. There will normally be an auxiliary function that is “different in every. respect” providing the individual with an alternative mode of consciousness with which to meet inner and outer situations. In depth psychological work, it is also important to define the “inferior function” which, though much less easily differentiated into a conscious competence, is the place one most often experiences unconscious complexes and conflicts. JOHN BEEBE See also: Analytical psychology; Animus-Anima; Extroversion/ introversion (analytical psychology); Midlife crisis. Bibliography Franz, Marie-Louise von, and Hillman, James (1971). Lectures on Jung’s Typology. New York: Spring. Jung, Carl Gustav (1913). A contribution to the study of psychological types. Coll. Works, Vol. 6. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (1921). Psychological Types. Coll. Works, Vol. 6. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY oF PSYCHOANALYSIS Myers, Isabel, and Myers, Peter (1980). Gifts Differing. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press. Shapiro, Kenneth, and Alexander, Irving (1975). The Experience of Introversion. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS It is important to stress the point that for Freud himself psychoanalysis was a psychology. In 1923 he wrote: “Psychoanalysis is the name (1) of a procedure for the investigation of mental processes which are almost inaccessible in any other way, (2) of a method (based upon that investigation) for the treatment of neurotic disorders and (3) of a collection of psychological information obtained along those lines, which is gradually being accumulated into a new scientific discipline” (1923a, p. 235). Rarely in his writings did he make any mention of contemporary work in “academic” psychology, however. He sometimes cited authors who wrote in German (Wundt, Hering, and Ehrenfels), French (Binet and Claparede), or English, like Darwin and his cousin Francis Galton, or Stanley Hall, whom he met in 1909 on his voyage to the United States, but such references remain episodic. The two most frequently cited authors are Fechner, from whom he borrowed the principle of constancy in the framework of his energy approach to psychic function, and Pierre Janet, with whom he had a long controversy based both on a conflict of prestige and priority and on a fundamental theoretical divergence: Janet explained hysteria in terms of reduced “psychic tone,’ whereas Freud saw the effects of conflictual tension in it. One could therefore consider Freud to be ill informed about work by psychologists in his own time. This would probably be completely false: his interest in memory and perception fits readily into the framework of a “psychology of the faculties,” which was still very much present in Project for a Scientific Psychology (1950c [1895]), the main points being reviewed in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a). Over the years, however, his concepts, which were initially strongly influenced by the dominant empiricist associationism of the late nineteenth century, progressively evolved toward a radically different approach to memory and perception that allows for the effects of deferred action and also focuses on the psychoses and delusions (Perron). This provides a INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS new solution to the whole problem of the relations between the “reality of the external world” and “psychic reality,” a solution that has nothing in common with the views developed elsewhere in psychology. We must also bear in mind that while he was still at school it was from a psychologist, albeit an amateur, Herbart, that Freud acquired the fundamental ideas of psychoanalysis, ideas such as repression, the threshold of consciousness, and the unconscious (Andersson)— these were the origins of the topical model of metapsychology. The origins of the economic model can be found in the “energetic” trend that included, among others, Brticke, his mentor, and Fechner. The “dynamic” model is specifically psychoanalytic. There is also what is sometimes referred to as a “fourth point of view,” the developmental perspective: case studies analyzing the stages in the development of a given child were very much in vogue in psychology between 1880 and 1930, from Baldwin and Binet to Piaget himself. With the cases of “Little Hans” and the “Wolf Man” Freud fit into this stream of ideas in his own way. After Freud, what were and what are the influences of psychology on psychoanalysis? And conversely, what are the influences on psychology of psychoanalysis? The asymmetry is patently clear. Although certain psychoanalytic developments are deliberately based on ideas and facts coming from disciplines such as psychiatry, biology, linguistics, sociology, and ethnology, it is not easy to cite analogous importations from psychology or any of its so-called scientific branches (experimental psychology and differential psychology, for example). Perhaps the epistemological (in terms of basic postulates) and methodological gap is such that this type of importation seems unacceptable to psychoanalysts, who dread a “psychologization” that would empty metapsychology of its essential substance. In Europe, at any rate, the opposition to Hartmannian “Ego Psychology” has often been justified in this way. However, psychoanalytic theories on memory, perception, and thought processes would gain by being better informed about the current work of psychologists and neuropsychologists on these questions, and it is regrettable that they are still too often discussed in psychoanalysis in the same terms in which Freud posed them. This discrepancy could be attributed to the “narcissism of minor differences,” the separation between things that are too similar. However, it is obvious that, 1397 PsycHo.ocy oF DEMENTIA PRACOX, THE seen from the reverse point of view, the influences of psychoanalysis on psychology are of major importance, in at least three respects: e In terms of theories. Certain research trends have developed in experimental and differential psychology based on hypotheses that have been imported from psychoanalysis (albeit with distortions and simplifications): work on selective forgetting of unpleasant experiences and on aggressive behavior caused by frustration. e In terms of techniques. Here we are referring mainly to so-called “projective” and “expressive” trials. It is important to remember that Rorschach, a psychiatrist at the Burgholzli asylum (directed by Bleuler, and where Jung also worked), created his famous ink blot test in the context of psychoanalytic ideas, as they were accepted in that institution around 1920. It is patently obvious that in recent years psychoanalytic theory has had a strong effect on this Rorschach test, as well as so-called thematic tests (Murray’s TAT), both in terms of research work and its interpretation in individual clinical practice. As for children’s drawings (classified among the “expressive” techniques), it has become commonplace though nevertheless still pertinent to interpret them in psychoanalytic terms, as Francoise Dolto illustrated particularly well. ¢ In more general terms, a whole new sector of psychology has developed in a context where many consider psychoanalytic references to be dominant, which creates no small difficulties for the professionals in question (Perron). In fact, no valid questions concerning the relations between psychology and psychoanalysis can be posed without first asking: which psychology, which psychoanalysis? In both fields questions are being asked concerning the permanently threatened unity of the respective disciplines. There is no doubt very little in common between the “pure” experimental psychologist working on the memorization of meaningless syllables and the clinical psychologist who is trying to understand the dynamics of phobic behavior leading to a total inability to work. In a similar vein, apart from very general principles, there is very little common ground to be found between Jacques Lacan, Heinz Hartmann, Melanie Klein, Kohut, Wilfred Bion, and numerous others. Heinz 1398 Can these gaps between and within each of these disciplines one day be reduced? Such an effort presupposes an analysis of the epistemological bases of each approach, and it seems doubtful that such an analysis would produce any unified theory. ROGER PERRON See also: Analytical psychology; Année psychologique, L’ Applied psychoanalysis and the interaction of psychoanalysis; Archives de psychologie, Les; “Claims of Psychoanalysis to Scientific Interest”; Claparéde, Edouard; Cognitivism and psychoanalysis; Ego psychology; Janet, Pierre; Lagache, Daniel; Metapsychology; Meyerson, Ignace; National Psychological Associaton for Psychoanalysis; Piaget, Jean; “Project for a Scientific Psychology, A’; Psychological types (analytical psychology); Self psychology. Bibliography Andersson, Ola. (1962). Studies in the prehistory of psychoanalysis. Stockholm: Svenska Bokforlaget. Assoun Paul-Laurent. (1981). Introduction a l’épistémologie freudienne. Paris: Payot. Couvreur, Catherine; Oppenheimer, Agnés, Perron, Roger, and Schaeffer, Jacqueline (Eds.). (1996). Psychanalyse, neurosciences, cognitivismes. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Perron, Roger. (1995). Prendre pour vrai. Revue francaise de psychanalyse, 59 (2), 499-512. Perron, Roger, and Perron-Borrelli, Michele. (1997). Fantasme, action, pensée. Algiers: Editions de la Société algérienne de psychologie. Further Reading Barron, James W., Eagle, Morris N., and Wolitzky, David L. (eds.). (1992). Interface of psychoanalysis and psychology. Washington, DC: American Psychological. PSYCHOLOGY OF DEMENTIA PRAECOX, THE The Psychology of Dementia Preecox dates from the period when Carl Gustav Jung was conducting clinical research at the Burghdélzli university clinic in Ziirich (1900-1909). Encouraged by Eugen Bleuler, he took an interest in Dementia precox (schizophrenia) although he had distinguished himself for years INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS through his work using the association test and aimed at acquiring a better comprehension of psychodynamic processes in normal and hysterical subjects. It was first published in book form by Carl Marhold Publishers at Halle. The work breaks down into five chapters. After a critical review of the existing literature on the subject, Jung starts out from Freudian psychology and his own research and establishes the concept of the complex, demonstrating its general influence on the psyche and the validity of associations. In chapter 4 the author describes the parallels between hysteria and Dementia precox, their symptoms and their psychodynamic foundations. As an illustration he then provides a complete analysis of a case of paranoid dementia. In both pathologies Jung discovers one or several complexes in the depths of the patient’s being. In the case of hysteria these are linked to the symptoms in an obvious way and have never been completely overcome, while in the case of Dementia pracox they are fixed in a lasting fashion and the causal link with the symptoms cannot be determined. For Jung there was a powerful affect at the beginning of the disease. The author postulates the existence of a factor X, a metabolic toxin for example, that would create a directly harmful effect of the complex, or a predisposing factor, like a sort of organic cerebral disposition. His most acerbic critics reproached Jung with trying to provide a psychological explanation for an affection with an undeniably organic cerebral origin in order to present an apology for Freud’s ideas. But Jung never had any such intention. In any case, his work is perfectly consistent with the research at the Burgholzli asylum, which also helped Bleuler to situate patients’ often-incomprehensible symptoms in a meaningful context of individual psychology. Bleuler paid his respects to Jung and to Freud in his important work on schizophrenia. BERNARD MINDER See also: Ego-libido/object-libido; Jung, Carl Gustav; Schizophrenia. Source Citation Jung, Carl Gustav. (1907). Uber die psychologie der Dementia proecox: ein versuch. Halle, Marhold; Gesammelte werke, vol. 3, Olten-Freiburg in Breisgau: Walter-Verlag, pp. 1— INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ““PSYCHOLOGY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS, THE’ , 316; The psychology of Dementia pracox. Coll. works, vol. 3, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd. Bibliography Bleuler, Eugen. (1908). Dr Wilhelm Stekel, Spezialarzt fiir Psychotherapie in Wien: Nervése Angstzustande und ihre Behandlung. Miinchner Medizinische Wochenschrift, 32, 1702-1703. F . (1911). The group of schizophrenias (Joseph Zinkin, Trans.) New York: International Universities Press. Haenel, H. (1908). Literaturkritik. Neurologisches Zentralblatt, 1, 39-40. “PSYCHOLOGY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS, THE” An article by Thédore Flournoy on the poems, reveries, and visions of an American student named Miss Miller inspired Jung to compare these products of the imagination with mythology and the history of religions. It was an opportunity for him to differentiate himself from Freud by laying the foundations for his theoretical constructions. Several powerful ideas were developed: the libido is not uniquely sexual; some unconscious content is a condensation of the collective history of psychic evolution; certain fantasies are recurrences of ancient beliefs—they cannot enable us to understand mythology but by finding the source of myths we can gain access to the psyche; and incest is first of all a psychic reality before it begins to concern the real mother. The article “The Psychology of the Unconscious” contains the seeds of all the Jungian concepts before he actually formulated them explicitly. It cost him his friendship with Freud and was followed by a long period of internal crisis. In 1950 he reworked and updated the article in the light of his research over the intervening decades, though he did not deny any of its original contents. It was published under the title Symbole der Wandlung (Symbols of transformation). In the first part Jung analyzes the religious sentiment and the difficulty of differentiating between human love and love of God or the divinity. By studying the interplay of the archetypes in the collective unconscious he reveals the psyche’s capacity to rediscover in the present, and in relatively new forms, experiences and ideas that marked the history of humanity. The second part intro- 1399 PsycuHoLocy of WomeEN, THE. A PSYCHOANALYTIC INTERPRETATION duces his concept of the libido, which he bases on his work on schizophrenia and which appears radically different from Freud’s concept. Jung then goes on to describe his concept of incest, which is one of the pivotal points of his theory. Symbolically, incest signifies an ebbing of the libido (Jung speaks of regression) toward ancient layers of the unconscious located well beyond the genetic mother. For Jung the unconscious is a place of becoming, the locus of encounter with the “Great Mother.” This return to origins is symbolized by the hero’s combat with the monster. In his quest the hero aspires to being reborn but he must nonetheless renounce this incestuous attraction in order to be liberated from the maternal, otherwise he risks being engulfed by it. Jung thus develops the question of sacrifice. In the process of individuation, the organizing influence of the Self underlies this movement and actualizes itself through the Self’s confrontation with ancient unconscious content. VIVIANE THIBAUDIER See also: Jung, Carl Gustav; Libido; Mythology and psychoanalysis; Projection and “participation mystique” (analytical psychology). Source Citation Jung, Car] Gustav. (1911-1912). Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido. Beitrage zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des Denkens. Jahrbuch fir psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen, III (1), 120-227; Psychology of the unconscious: A study of the transformations and symbolisms -of the libido: A contribution to the history of the evolution of thought. Coll. Works (Vol. 5). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Bibliography Flournoy, Théodore. (1906). Miss Frank Miller, Quelques faits d’imagination créatrice subconsciente. Archives de psychologie, 5, 36-51. Freud, Sigmund, and Jung, Carl G. (1974a [1906-13]). The Freud/Jung letters: The correspondence between Sigmund Freud and C. G. Jung (William McGuire, Ed. Ralph Manheim and R.F.C. Hull, Trans.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Guy-Gillet, Genevieve. (1984). Inceste et sacrifice. In Cahier de L’Herne, 46, Jung (pp. 64-80). Paris: Herne. Kacirek, Suzanne. (1980). Le concept de libido selon C. G. Jung: Des “Metamorphoses et symboles de la libido” a 1400 “Lénergétique psychique.” Cahiers jungiens de psychanalyse, 26, 1-20. Shamdasani, Sonu. (1990). A woman called Frank. Spring, 50. PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN, THE. A PSYCHOANALYTIC INTERPRETATION The Psychology of Women. A Psychoanalytic Interpretation consists of two volumes. The first, entitled “Childhood and Adolescence,” appeared in 1944, followed in 1945 by the second, with the sub-heading “Motherhood.” This breakdown corresponds to what Helene Deutsch called “the fundamental dualism of femininity,” which opposes individual development and personality with the role of “servant of the species.” She was trying to shed a psychoanalytic light on the conflicts that are born of this dualism, which is only surpassed and transcended through the reconciliation of the antagonistic goals of the individual and the species, a point Freud stressed in “On Narcissism: An Introduction” (1914c). Published at the end of World War II, The Psychology of Women reviews and develops, in the light of new observations, the author’s first conclusions concerning the different problems of female psychology described in her first book, Psychoanalyse der weiblichen Sexualfunktionen (Psychoanalysis of the sexual functions of women), published by the Vienna Verlag in 1925. This, together with her work on female homosexuality, was based on clinical material gathered over a twelve-year period. As her biographers have pointed out (Roazen), The Psychology of Women is also influenced by the author’s personal experiences. The book was born of her double desire to put her ideas to the test of time, and to compare them with those of Freud. Although certain concepts have aged, some of her theses are still pertinet: the “secondary” character of penis envy in girls; the slowness of the construction of femininity (the opposite position to that of Freud, who believed the fate of femininity was prematurely sealed at the phallic stage), which explains her decision to study the psychology of women only from the latency period onward; and the psychic importance of the phenomena of “expectancy” (linked to late anatomo-physiological INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS female maturation) and _ identifications. Deutsch described the development of the female personality as a process that takes place through a series of intermediary identifications that correlate with modifications affecting her objects and the links to them. Equally striking is her assertion that the rape fantasy is universal and non-pathological, being a veritable organizer of female sexuality. There was no shortage of criticism for The Psychology of Women, either from the feminists, who reproached her for her Freudian orthodoxy, or from psychoanalysts, for the converse reason. Very few of those who welcomed Winnicott’s ideas with enthusiasm were able to recognize similar ideas expressed in The Psychology of Women, particularly in volume 2, “Motherhood.” Deutsch’s great mistake is no doubt the fact that she named this vast psychoanalytic study of more than seven hundred pages The Psychology of Women. JACQUELINE LANOUZIERE See also: Deutsch-Rosenbach, Helene; Female sexuality; Femininity; Oedipus complex. Source Citation Deutsch, Helene. (1944-1945). The psychology of women. A psychoanalytic interpretation (Vols. 1-2). New York: Greene and Stratton. Bibliography Deutsch, Helene. (1991). Psychoanalysis of the sexual functions of women (P. Roazen, Ed., and Eric Mosbacher, Trans.). London: Karnac. (Original work published 1925) Freud, Sigmund. (1914c). On narcissism: An introduction. SE, 14: 67-102. Roazen, Paul. (1985). Helene Deutsch. A psychoanalyst’s life. New York: Anchor. Further Reading Schuker, Eleanor, and Levinson, Nadine. (1991). Female psychology: An annotated psychoanalytic bibliography. Hillsdale, NJ, and London: Analytic Press. Tyson, Phyllis. (1996). Female psychology: An introduction. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 44(S), 11-22. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PSYCHOPATHOLOGIE DE L'ECHEC (THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF FAILURE) PSYCHOPATHOLOGIE DE L’ECHEC (THE — PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF FAILURE) Written between 1935 and 1939, the first draft of René Laforgue’s manuscript Psychopathologie de l’échec (The psychopathology of failure) contained a chapter on Hitler, which the author is said to have destroyed because he felt threatened by the Gestapo. The first French edition of the book was published in Marseilles in 1941. In the same year, hoping to see his work translated into German, Laforgue appealed on several occasions to Matthias Goring, director of the Institute of Psychotherapy in Berlin. Having read the manuscript, a Professor von Hattenberg passed a negative judgment on the grounds that it “trots out Freud’s doctrine in an utterly uncritical manner.” In the last version, published after the author’s death, the publisher acknowledged Mrs. Délia Laforgue, who had made changes and corrections in accordance with her husband’s wishes and instructions. Laforgue’s book was a study of failure neurosis and the influence of what he called the “Super-I.” “One day,” he wrote, “we will find a better term for it, for example, ‘Ductorium’ as proposed by Edouard Pichon.” By way of example, Laforgue took the Jewish “minority” (the word was replaced by “collectivity” beginning with the edition of 1944). The Jews, he argued, “harbor an obsessive fear of persecution which they frequently associate with an atmosphere, even should that atmosphere no longer justify the fear” (1941; the edition of February 1944 has: “an atmosphere which no longer justifies that fear”). The “Super-I” of the Jews (“Super-Ego” in the 1950 and 1963 editions) “collaborates in the persecution, and if need be provokes it.... Its opposition determines (“may determine” in the editions of 1944 and 1953] in them a more or less pronounced infantilism and a more or less powerful latent homosexuality.” According to Laforgue, that homosexuality was always reflected by a tendency to be a victim rather than a victor. Laforgue also described collective and class-specific superegos, powerfully influenced by education and religion. Changing social class, specifically moving from the working-class to the bourgeoisie, produced individuals prone to failure on account of the unconscious influence exerted by a proletarian superego (comparable to the superego of ghetto Jews) reacting to the betrayal implied by upward social mobility. 1401 PsycHopaTHoLocy oF EveryDAy LiFe, THE In the second edition of Laforgue’s book, famous patients and personalities like Rousseau and Robespierre, along with Napoleon, were scrutinized from a psychobiographical point of view. Chapter 12 of the first edition, “On Professional and Affective Orientation.” in which he leaned heavily on the work of Professor Reiter, President of the German Health Institute, on the subject of the social value of an individual for the community, was removed from later editions and replaced by Laforgue’s long study of Napoleon’s failure neurosis. Historians, like those who lived through the war years in France, have great respect for Laforgue’s abilities as a clinician. But inasmuch as this some time member of International League against Anti-Semitism supported Marshal Petain, his psychoanalytical theories of collective psychology—and indeed his political judgment— should, to say the very least, be treated with great circumspection. JEAN-PIERRE BOURGERON See also: Failure neurosis; Laforgue, René. Source Citation Laforgue, René. (1941). Psychopathologie de léchec. Marseilles: Les Cahiers du Sud; (1944). 2nd edition. Paris: Payot; (1950). 3rd edition. Paris: Payot; (1963). 4th edition (Delia Laforgue, Rev.). Geneva: Editions du Mont-Blanc. Bibliography Mijolla, Alain de. (1988). Psychoanalysis and psychoanalysts in France between 1939 and 1945. International Forum of Psychoanalysis, 12, 136-156. Roudinesco, Elisabeth. (1986). René Laforgue ou la collaboration manquée: Paris—Berlin 1939-1942. Confrontation. PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE, THE Sigmund Freud’s lively book, The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, has some unique characteristics. Freud discusses psychoanalytic matter in the context of everyday life, sidestepping the experience of neurosis. He abandons his customary process, that of discussing the normal in terms of the pathological. Everyday psychopathology is discussed with few allusions to infan- 1402 tile sexuality and its impact on adult pathology. The theoretical aspect is practically nonexistent, although Freud does compare the interpretation of everyday life to dream theory, another banal psychopathological phenomenon familiar to everyone. He emphasizes the importance in life of displacement, condensation, over-determination, and the creation of compromise formations. He makes use of his knowledge and interest in literature to provide many examples by writers, poets, and dramatists, reinforcing his position by emphasizing their intuitive understanding of the meaning of parapraxis. The book contains twelve chapters on forgetting (proper names, words belonging to foreign languages, series of words, impressions, and projects); childhood memories and screen memories; slips of the tongue (spoken and written); mistakes, clumsiness, symptomatic acts, errors, associations of several “parapraxes”; and the determinism of the unconscious, the belief in chance and superstition. All these forms of behavior are grouped under the heading of “slips of the tongue”: “I almost invariably discover a disturbing influence [in slips of the tongue] ... which comes from something outside the intended utterance; and the disturbing elelment is either a single thought that has remained unconscious.... or it is a more general psychical motive force which is directed against the entire utterance” (p. 61). To belong to this category they must not exceed “the limits of the normal state” and they must “have been previously accomplished correctly.” Freud’s description emphasizes various aspects of these phenomena: These are mental functions that “cannot be justified by an explanation of the representation of the goal toward which they are directed.” This demonstrates the importance of the psychic determinism associated with unconscious desire and rejection. He notes, for example, the forgetting of a proper name, which is linked with a disturbance of a thought, due to an internal contradiction, arising from a repressed source (the name of the painter Signorelli replaced by the names Botticelli and Boltraffio). The use of free will assumes a distinction between conscious and unconscious motivation; accordingly, some motor acts are disturbed on account of the unconscious— for example, the loss or destruction of an object that has meaning either in terms of the person who has given it to us or because a symbolic association with something else has been shifted toward this INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS object. Our errors of judgment acquire a sense of certainty and remain convincing for us, precisely to the extent that they express a repressed content. This is, at the very least, the same reasoning used by the paranoiac who rejects any accidental element in the psychic manifestations of other people, such as incorrect statements. The meaning of symptomatic actions is sometimes difficult to determine; repressed ideas and tendencies remain hidden from the individual, as internal resistance presents an opposing force. Technically, slips of the tongue and bungled actions are made possible by the shifting of nervous excitation. In the example of the lapsus linguae, there can exist, between the intended word and the spoken word, a phonetic resemblance (a “contamination”) or psychological associations connected with the person’s history. As in dreams there is a disturbing element (which is repressed) that makes itself felt through “deformations, mixed formations, or compromise formations,” or, again as in dreams, a word may be replaced by its opposite. These phenomena reveal two factors simultaneously: a positive one (free association) and a negative one (relaxation of the inhibitory action of attention). What mental factors are thus expressed? The disruptive idea arises from innate tendencies and should not be confused with the intentional idea, or an association exists between the two, or the disruptive idea is unconscious and comes into play when activity is undertaken, thus revealing itself by indirectly disturbing the intentional idea. This is the case with slips of the pen, where there can exist, in a waking state, a phenomenon of condensation, in which conscious and unconscious ideas overlap as in dreams. This is also the case when we forget past events that are associated with a memory likely to awaken a painful sensation from a different time (in keeping with the idea that the “unconscious is outside time”); or when we forget certain things because of a conflict associated with an opposing wish; or likewise when we make a mistake, ot a strange impulse is manifested that contradicts an intended action. This is equally true of other kinds of acts, which are often symbolic representations of dreams or desires. The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, one of Freud’s best known works, is an excellent introduction to psychoanalysis. His observation of the psychopathology of normal life has not, however, had the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PsYCHOSES, CHRONIC AND DELUSIONAL subsequent theoretical development it deserves. Work on orality, anality, feminism, or sibling relations in everyday life would benefit from new investigations of metapsychology. GISELE HARRUS-REVIDI See also: Cryptomnesia; Déja-vu; Delusion; Forgetting; Masochism; Negative hallucination; Parapraxis; Psychic causality; Slips of the tongue; Suicidal behavior; Time. Source Citation Freud, Sigmund. (1901b). Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens (tiber Vergessen, Versprechen, Vergreifen, Aberglaube und Irrtum. Monatsschrift fiir Psychiatrie und Neurologie, 10, 1-2, 1-32, 95-143; Zur Psycopathologie des Alltagslebens, Berlin: Karger, 1904; GW, 4; The psychopathology of everyday life. SE, 6. PSYCHOSES, CHRONIC AND DELUSIONAL In psychiatry the term psychosis, first used to refer to mental illnesses in general, was later restricted to the major clinical forms: schizophrenia, chronic and delusional psychoses, and manic-depressive psychoses. Unlike the neurotic, the psychotic subject does not “criticize” the disorders of his or her thought. In 1845 Baron Ernst von Feuchtersleben used the term psychosis to refer to mental illness in his manual of medical psychology. At the end of the nineteenth century, alienists defined psychosis as the loss of reason and mental alienation. Psychoanalysis seeks less to categorize mental illnesses than to identify their structures and mechanisms. A structural and dynamic definition of psychosis must be conceived on the basis of a primary disturbance of the libido’s relationship to reality, through splitting and the reconstruction of an alternative, delusional reality. Eugen Bleuler, influenced by psychoanalysis, characterized schizophrenia as a dissociation of thought through withdrawal into the self, or autism. He posited as its basis splitting, linked to a loosening of associative texture. Skirted around by Sigmund Freud, who preferred the term paraphrenia, the notion of schizophrenia nevertheless became standard within psychiatry and psychoanalysis. A second variety of chronic psychosis, paranoia, is characterized by systematic delusions (delusions of persecution, jealous delusions, erotomania, delusions of grandeur), the 1403 PsycHOSES, CHRONIC AND DELUSIONAL predominance of interpretation, and the absence of intellectual deterioration. In Manuscript H (1894), Freud designated three conditions as psychoses: hallucinatory confusion, patanoia, and hysterical psychosis (which he distinguished from hysterical neurosis). In his texts on the neuro-psychoses of defense (“The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence” [1894a] and “Further Remarks on the Neuro-Psychoses of Defence” [1896b]), he took the distinction between neurosis and psychosis as given. From his earliest writings, he undertook to characterize the psychopathology of the psychoses through his successive theories of the psychic apparatus. His only study of a case of psychosis is his commentary on Daniel Schreber’s Memoirs of My Nervous Illness. Freud’s correspondence with Carl Gustav Jung illustrates the development of Freudian doctrine between 1909 and 1911, and the essays “On Narcissism: An Introduction” (1914), “Fetishism” (1927), and “The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis” (1924) show the further elaboration of his theories. Freud examined the individual’s relationship to reality from the vantage point of a consideration of the libidinal cathexes. in the psychoses, the loss of reality— and the changed relationship to others following a radical decathexis of the objects of everyday reality (“the end of the world,” for Schreber)—must necessarily be considered in a way other than descriptive, taking into account the attempted reorganization of reality by the psychotic processes. All psychoses are characterized by the coexistence of two attitudes: one that takes reality into account, and another that “this same ego, under the influence of the id, withdraws from a piece of reality” (1924e, p. 183). Delusions affirm the subject’s belief in the existence of an alternative reality that restores the primitive cathexes that archaically linked childhood awareness with an early love object. The reconstruction of reality in accordance with the “desires” of the id expresses both a defensive cancellation and a reparative force. This entails a process whose psychotic manifestation in no way excludes rearticulation in terms of the mechanisms defined by psychoanalysis. Thus, in Freud’s view, hallucinatory psychosis could be considered as the expression of an imaginary maintaining of an early reality whose loss the ego finds unbearable. This theorization requires the refinement of concepts such as regression, which is above all conceived as a function of development of the ego and of the libido: 1404 In the one case, regression leads to primary narcissism, and in the other, to hallucinatory wish fulfillment. Initially, Melanie Klein, like Karl Abraham, tended to base her clinical work on a psychopathological theory of the points of fixation and temporal regression of the libido. In addition to this temporal regression, Freud distinguished a topographical regression that made it possible to compare the mechanisms of dreams with those put into play in psychosis. “In schizophrenia, it is words that become the object of elaboration by the primary process; in the other, the dream, it is the thing-presentations: representations of things to which the words have led.” In schizophrenia, circulation is cut off between the preconscious cathexis of words and unconscious thing-presentations. The fundamental mechanism of paranoia is projection. The feeling of hatred toward the object is projected outward and then turned back onto the subject in the form of persecutory hatred. In the final stage of his work, in describing the splitting of the ego, Freud was on the way to defining an original mechanism of the repudiation of reality in psychosis: denial of the reality of castration. This notion of the Verleugnung (denial) of castration, which he opposed to repression, goes back to the primal experience of loss. Thus, Jacques Lacan, taking up the term Verwerfung (rejection) in his discussion of the “Wolf Man,” translated the German Verwerfung as foreclosure and, on the basis of this notion of a primordial excision of a fundamental signifier, elaborated his conceptualization of psychosis. The phallus as the signifier of castration is not inscribed within the symbolic order. Not integrated into the psychotic’s unconscious, it returns to the real, especially in the phenomenon of hallucinations. Through Lacan’s paternal metaphor, it can be considered that foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father is the hole in the symbolic that is inherent in all psychoses. The psychoanalytic elaboration of a theory concerning chronic and delusional psychoses runs up against the difficulty and complexity of a concrete approach. It becomes diversified into a theoretical eclecticism bringing together the considerations through which each school of thought, and indeed each analyst, refines and consolidates the foundations of the transference relationship. For all the intrinsic interest of the original viewpoints of John N. Rosen, Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, Marguerite Sechehaye, Gisela Pankow, Gaetano Benedetti, or Piera Aulagnier, among others, it is INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS a tlt claehcctet iglerance wit out having access to the specific techniques used in sete seapectioe therapeutic approaches, Through a “psychotic transference” that moves from _ extreme avoidance to a relationship that is almost one of merging, demands are placed on the analyst that touch his or her own archaic unconscious dispositions; “falling in love-hate” and the preponderance of narcissistic investment over object investment make it difficult to the complof emedxicaitiotn-byase d, institutional, or be remembered in a variegated context (families, caregivers, recipients of care) if one wants to maintain a certain structural coherence. Jos% Bleger’s notion of framework, Lacanis of historization, and the understanding of and institutaliwayos bne iampllem—enmtedu wshent t he challenge of treating the psychoses is undertaken. Mice: DemMANGEAT : “Oee e See also: Ego Psychology and Psychosis, Foreclosure; Historical truth; Hypochondria; Indications and contraindications for psychoanalysis for an adult; Infantile psychosis; Mathilde, case of; Paranoia; Paranoid psychosis; Paraphrenia; Persecution; Psychotic/neurotic; Schreber, Daniel Paul; Symbolization, process of. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (18942). The neuro-psychoses of defence. SE, 3: 41-61. —. (1896b). Further remarks on the neuro-psychoses of defence. SE, 3: 157-185. . (191 1c [1919]). Psycho-analytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia (dementia paranoides). SE, 12: 1-82. . (1914). On narcissism: An introduction. SE, 14: 67-102. . (1924e). The loss of reality in neurosis and psychosis. SE, 19: 180-187. . (1927e). Fetishism. SE, 21: 147-157. . (1974a [1906—-13]). The Freud/Jung letters: The correspondence between Sigmund Freud and C. G. Jung (William, McGuire, Ed; Ralph Manheim and R. F.C. Hull, Trans.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Lacan, Jacques. (1966). On a question prelimintaor ayn y possible treatment of psychosis. In Ecrits: A Selection Imtegwatiowac Dictiowary or Psycuoawmatysis Povcnosesua. DeveLorwent (Alan Sheridan, Trans.). New York and London: W. W. Norton. PSYCHOSEXUAL DEVELOPMENT = Psychosexual development is the progressive evolution of infantile sexuality as it passes through the different stages or phases of psychic organization (oral, anal, phallic) with due regard for a prevalent erogenous zone, which organizes fantasies, and a certain type of object relation. Complete psychosexual organization is not reached until the arrival of puberty and a final phase of libidinal develotphem geenitnalt ph,as e. Freud saw infantile as being active from the beginning of life. This broadened the notion of sexuality, giving it a range of extension that is specific to psychoanalysis. In the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d), Freud initially saw infantile sexuality as a sort of precursor of adult sexual perversions and a blueprint for pubertal genitality, but he later described it as the mainspring of psychic development. He used the term infantile sexuality in an effort to acknowledge the existence of the stimuli and the needs for satisfaction that involve specific body zones (erogenous zones) that seek pleasure independently of exercising a biological function. He therefore described the sexual instinct as becoming separate from the vital functions that ensure the preservation of the organism in accordance with the anaclitic model (whereby the sexual instincts initially depend on those vital functions). The pleasure bonus provided alongside the accomplishment of the function would, in a second stage, be sought for its own sake. Freud thus considered anaclisis, the erogenous zone, and autoeroticism to be three intimately linked criteria for the definition of infantile sexuality. The Freudian scheme of the phases of libidinal development links two essential components at each stage: on the one hand, an organizing erogenous zone, along with the excitations and instinctual movements for which it is both the link and the source, and on the other, the modalities of the object relation linked to development of the ego. In the Three Essays, Freud stressed the existence and importance of oral and anal erogenous zones (in addition to the genital which is the primary erogenous zone in adults), describing them as pregenital and 1405 PsYCHOSEXUAL DEVELOPMENT highlighting the autoeroticism that is linked to them: sucking in relation to oral activity, retention/expulsion for anal erotism. The specification of infantile genital organization as phallic organization nevertheless shows clearly that the prevalence of one erogenous zone is inseparable from a certain mode of symbolic organization. The Oedipus complex is organized around the idea of castration, which is represented in the unconscious as castration of the penis (Perron and Perron-Borelli, 1996). The loss of the breast and feces that are specific to the oral and anal stages can also be considered as early symbolic forms of genital castration. The relationship between weaning—as implementing the absence of the mother—and the Oedipus complex introduces the structural point of view, which relativizes the developmental model of the stages and gives it its best perspective (Brusset, 1992). In the normal evolution of sexuality the component instincts of childhood are progressively integrated into the genital sexuality of the adult. What remains of them is found in the foreplay that precedes the sexual act proper. The potential for stimulation of these pregenital erogenous zones remains present in the body and in the mind and they tend to be reactivated on the occasion of later sexual experiences. Their degree of erotism is integrated into the genital sexuality of the adult. Excessive repression of these residues from the infantile period can lead to neurotic symptoms. Similarly, what persists in a prevalent and manifest manner in the perversions is repressed in neurosis. Hence Freud’s famous aphorism: “Neurosis is the negative of perversion.” The phases Freud described between 1905 and 1923 correspond to successive organizations of the sexual instinct under the primacy of a given erogenous zone: the oral phase, sadistic anal phase, infantile genital or phallic phase, followed by the genital phase after puberty. He also distinguished at the same time the different stages leading from autoerotism to full object love, that is, the progression from autoerotism, narcissism, toward the homosexual or heterosexual object choice. Three points deserve to be raised here in order to provide a better definition of the notion of psychosexuality as envisaged by Freud. 1) The body is first and foremost considered as the seat of the instincts (drives) and the source of the exci- 1406 tations aiming for satisfaction. In the Three Essays he makes a point of defining infantile sexuality as a criterion for organ pleasure and autoerotic satisfaction. However, in the course of the following years he integrated his earlier discoveries about the role of fantasies into this. He showed, specifically, how the fantasy works “by integrating the attachments of infantile sexuality can, depending on the case, result in conscious formations (daydreaming, for example) or, on the contrary, formations that are repressed into the unconscious” (Perron and Perron-Borelli, 1996). 2) It should be noted that these infantile manifestations of sexuality only come to play their full role “aprés coup.” The adult pervert’s exclusive fixation on certain components of infantile sexuality must be understood as a regression and a return to pregenital fixations. 3) Finally, infantile sexuality culminates toward the fourth or fifth year of life, the age when sexual tumult gradually enters a latency period, and is not reactivated until puberty when it leads to adult sexuality in the context of general maturity. There is therefore at this stage a halt, a decline in psychosexuality, and this period is then subjected to the infantile amnesia of the latency period. Freud related this diphasic establishment of sexual life, which can be observed only in human beings, to events in humanity’s prehistory. In any case, it is during the period of latency “that are built up the mental forces which are later to impede the course of the sexual instinct and, like dams, restrict its flow” (1905d, p. 177). After the Three Essays, Freud gave the oedipal conflict its full organizational value, normal libidinal development being defined in psychoanalytic theory as the integration of the polymorphously perverse aspects of infantile sexuality under the primacy of the genital organization. Following the Three Essays, Freud’s successive contributions (1913-24) continued to expand on the general outline of the stages of libidinal development. Karl Abraham tried to find the etiopathogenic basis for all of psychopathology in this model. He distinguished two stages within each of the first two phases (oral and sadistic oral, anal and sadistic anal) and he further stressed the link existing between the specific erogenous zone and the modalities of object relation particular to it. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Many authors after him, such as the proponents of Ego-Psychology (Heinz Hartmann, Ernst Kris, and Rudolph Loewenstein), used the outline of libidinal development and made it a major element in a genetic psychology that could be integrated into a general psychology. Others, on the contrary, particularly in France (Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis; Brusset, 1992; Perron, Perron-Borelli, 1996) insisted on the importance of the notion of organization. Each stage or phase of development creates a structure, in the modern sense of a self-regulated functional system tending toward equilibrium. Each of these phases in psychosexual development organizes not only the present state of mental functioning but also its future state. Infantile genital organization therefore defines the oedipal phase as the great organizer of mental functioning, laying down in the infantile phase of sexuality what will become the genital organization of the adult. JEAN-FRANCOIS RABAIN See also: Libidinal development. Bibliography Brusset, Bernard (1992). Le Développement libidinal. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Freud, Sigmund (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123-243. Mijolla, Alain de, and Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie de (Eds.). (1995). Psychanalyse. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Perron, Roger, and Perron-Borelli, Michele. (1996). Le Complexe d’Edipe (2nd edition). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Further Reading Davison, Susan, rep. (1998). Panel: A contemporary review of the psychosexual phases of development. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 79, 164-167. Lester, Eva P. (1976). On the psychosexual development of the female child. Journal of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis, 4, 515-528. Siskind, Diana. (1994). Arrests of psychosexual development and separation-individuation. Psychoanalytical Inquiry, 14, 58-82. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PSYCHOSOMATIC PSYCHOSOMATIC It is difficult to provide an exact definition of psychosomatics. To some extent the term itself already indicates a theoretical bias. It joins together the normal or pathological dynamics of both mental and somatic structures and assumes their close interaction. According to Pierre Marty, psychosomatics is the clinical observation of individual mental or somatic organization, disorganization, and reorganization, the attempt to draw from those observations theoretical findings, and the practical application of those findings to the therapeutic situation. If considerably broadened, psychosomatics would involve a global understanding of what it is to be human. The term psychosomatics appeared in 1818 in the work of J. C. H. Heinroth, a German psychiatrist, and reflects a naturalist and vitalist approach to medicine. The context was formalized in 1945 by British psychologist James L. Halliday. The word has been in use since then among a wide range of practitioners, often with different interests. In the United States it is often referred to as psychosomatic medicine. Prior to these developments, the interaction of psyché and soma, both within and beyond the context of philosophy and religion, reflected a vague association of the term with organic disease. It has been said (Kamieniecki) that “the history of medicine has written the prehistory of psychosomatics.” This prehistory has gradually distinguished psychosomatic medicine, in various socio-cultural contexts, from its philosophical, mystical, and religious corollaries, the Corpus Hippocraticum being a good example. Since then there has been a continued effort to identify the links between “the ontological unity of being and the phenomenological duality of its operation.” This project, which has become for some researchers an original and fundamental discipline, can be considered part of a psychoanalytic framework, for it “consists in subjecting the somatic to the same dynamic and the energic considerations that govern the life of individuals undergoing analysis,” according to the authors of Linvestigation psychosomatique (Psychosomatic investigations; Marty, M’Uzan, and David). It must be noted that this project has generated no consensus, since it is a matter of applying these principles to the field of organic disease from the standpoint of psychoanalysis, a concept that has its detractors. Psychosomatics relates to the human indi- 1407 PsYCHOSOMATIC vidual in its concrete being, living and sexual, acting through its own body and mental organization— including the conflict within the individual movements between life and death (Marty)—and where illness is an incarnation of the logic governing the living being. In the area of organic disease, where research in psychosomatics has been directed, what has been referred to as the “psychosomatic phenomenon,” the interaction of psyché and soma, remains problematic and has led to numerous claims that have further confused the concept: psychogenesis, generalized conversion, somatization, and so on, not all of which have the same heuristic value. Somatization, seen as the result of a process in which mental causality (in the broad sense) plays a role, has become a doctrine for some. However, the real problem and focus of interest for the psychosomatic psychoanalyst, aside from any reactive mental disturbances, remains the discovery of a process for understanding and interpreting the reality of the disease, any possible exacerbation, and its resurgence in times of crisis. This entails the question of causal factors, while at the same time giving medical factors their due. It therefore includes the notion of a possible psychic causality that would interweave two histories of pathological alteration that belong to different orders but whose interactions are not purely random. When the two fields do not interact, there is no psychosomatic phenomenon, only the evolution of somatic morbidity along biological lines. The possible psychic causes remain an open question; these may be neither necessary nor sufficient but cannot be overlooked, even if we do not believe in psychogenesis or a limited determinism, and even if we feel that the “constructed meaning” of a symptom is not the cause or the origin of the disturbance. Freud was not overly concerned with a strictly psychosomatic approach to disease, but in 1923 he wrote, “According to the indications of some analysts, the psychoanalytic treatment of obvious organic disturbances is not without a future, since it is not unusual for a psychic factor to play a role in the genesis and persistence of these affections” (1923a [1922]). The libidinal organization points to the somatic as a source; the description of actual neurosis and its underlying hypotheses (for some this is related to the so-called process of somatization); the idea of libidinal stasis identified in the organic disease; and the emergence of the id (the term originates with Groddeck, a 1408 precursor of psychosomatics according to some authors)—all these theoretical hypotheses, after being reworked, have led to the conclusion that Freud was also a pioneer in this field. More recent interest in psychosomatics can be traced to the investigations of the American researchers Helen Flanders Dunbar and especially Franz Alexander during the 1940s. Their work helped develop later research and elements of it can be found, in modified form, among psychosomaticians and clinical psychologists. The so-called New York School (Dunbar) was associated with the culturalist movement of the time. They related organic pathology to pre-morbid “personality profiles,” specific to certain clinical symptoms: the structure of the personality would expose a specific part of the organism to external aggression and would prepare the way for somatization. Dunbar also hypothesized an emotional dynamic, derived from Darwin, who assigned a defensive goal to the emotions, coupled with the affective repercussions within the body itself. Dunbar was one of the first to take a neovitalist approach—the degradation of vital energy—to developing an understanding of psychosomatics. For him, the exclusion of conflict outside consciousness would result from a short-circuiting of the mental (though he does not use this word), through subcortical mechanisms. This school of thinking concluded that psychoanalysis alone would provide a deeper understanding of the processes in question. Franz Alexander believed that the personality profile alone was not sufficient to determine causality. He centered his hypotheses on the notion of a “specific psychodynamic constellation.” This constellation was based on basic reactions that ensued following an increase in tension within the psychic apparatus, reactions that encompassed the autonomic nervous system and the subcortical stem, along with basic dispositional characteristics. The idea of psychosomatic medicine (the title of his first book) was both established and subject to criticism because of its over-reliance on biology. But internal conflicts and emotional reactions culminating in physical changes also played a role. This sequence led to the concept of “organ neurosis,” corresponding to the abnormal stagnation of a quantity of energy in an organ or system. These connections between affective states and somatic behaviors resulted in “psychosomatic patterns” that, from functional disturbances, could produce organic symptoms. One finds in his work profound intuitions that have con- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS tributed to contemporary theory in spite of his overly biological approach and pertinent suspicion about the concept of organodynamics, a concept picked up by Henri Ey. During the 1960s, two approaches to psychosomatics appeared in France. These were the sources of a number of subsequent developments that altered, weakened, and expanded certain hypotheses, and modified the clinical and therapeutic approach to the field. Jean-Paul Valabrega promoted an approach to somatic symptoms through a model of generalized conversion isolation, whose rediscovered source in fantasy would give meaning to the symptom. For Valabrega the isolation of the conversion phenomenon from its source and its specifically hysterical environment resulted in the development of manifestly visceral symbolizations, which originated in conversion phenomena and were unexplained by reference to a hysterical kernel common to all neuroses. In this context of “psychosomatic conversion,’ Valabrega insisted on the resurgence of the fantasy at the very site from which it had been expelled, a hypothesis associated with the general problem of the accessibility of the symptom to symbolization and meaning. The psychosomatic symptom was said to constitute a physical barrier that had to be crossed by separating it from its hidden fantasy elements, which had been kept in check. “In other words, according to the hierarchical etiology, the specificity is defined less by physiopathological or psychopathological mechanisms than by the singular mode of organization which underlies both mechanisms” (1966/1974). In 1963, the so-called psychosomatic school of Paris (Pierre Marty, Michel de M’Uzan, Christian David, Michel Fain) formalized its approach, based on the notion of deficit, where a mental loss (fantasy, oneiric, associative, the loss of mental defenses) was seen as paradigmatic. This concept meshed satisfactorily with the findings of psychoanalysis, especially in the area of psychic economy, where the somatic symptom is asymbolic and does not produce meaning. Their approach gave rise to a number of developments. After Pierre Marty introduced the concept of operative thought, other clinical concepts emerged, such as essential depression and chronic disorganization, and Marty insisted on the reorganizing value of the regression/fixation system. The process of disorganization, triggered by trauma and incapable of stopping the regression/fixation system, became the crux of the “somatization process.” However, regression can also be pathogenic and reversible INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PsycHosomatic Limit/BOUNDARY illnesses are conceivable, in terms of points where disorganization is halted at various stages of somatic fixation. This model, based on monist, evolutionist, and neovitalist principles, and extensively described in Marty’s writings, presents an internal coherence that has made it a classic, although not always accepted, reference in the field. ALAIN FINE See also: Actual neurosis/defense neurosis; Alexander, Franz Gabriel; Groddeck, Georg Walther; Marty, Pierre; Psychogenesis/organogenesis; | Psychosomatic _ limit/ boundary; Somatic compliance. Bibliography Alexander, Franz. (1950). Psychosomatic medicine, its principles and applications. New York: Norton. Kamieniecki, Hannah. (1994). Histoire de la psychosomatique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Marty, Pierre. (1990). La psychosomatique de l'adulte. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Marty, Pierre, M’Uzan, Michel de, and David, Christian. (1963). L’Investigation psychosomatique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Valabrega, Jean-Paul. (1974). Problemes de théorie psychosomatique. In Encyclopédie médico-chirurgicale: Psychiatrie. Paris: E.M.-C. (Original work published 1966) Further Reading Winnicott, Donald W. (1966). Psycho-somatic illness in its positive and negative aspects. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 47, 510-516. PSYCHOSOMATIC LIMIT/BOUNDARY The term psychosomatic limit (or psychosomatic boundary) designates the virtual demarcations and separations between the space of the body and that of the psyche. At the same time this boundary serves as a contact barrier where, if the person has good mentalization, psychic phenomenon take on symbolic or metaphorical significance at the somatic level or, conversely, somatic excitation is registered in the psyche. This concept cannot be grounded in a monistic account of the psyche-soma (Pierre Marty, the Paris 1409 PsycHOSOMATIC Limit/ BOUNDARY School), but should rather be understood as André Green explained in Somatisation, psychanalyse et science du vivant (Somatization, psychoanalysis, and the science of the living; 1994), in terms of a “structural dualism that comes out of a de facto monism ... in which the psychic apparatus is posited as being rooted in the nervous system but as developing its own distinct properties from there, which data based on biological structures alone cannot account for.” The concept of the psychosomatic limit is present but seldom explicit in the work of Sigmund Freud. The notions of the drives, conversion, and the ego bring this concept into play. One of its synonyms, the word frontier, appeared for the first time in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d) in connection with the instincts; there Freud described an instinct as “the psychical representative of an endosomatic, continuously flowing source of stimulation.... The concept of the instinct is thus one of those lying on the frontier between the mental and the physical” (p. 168). Instinct, representing a source of internal excitations, thus becomes one of the forms of the body’s language. In “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes” (1915c), Freud again used the word frontier to convey the idea of a limit or boundary: “An ‘instinct’ appears to us as a concept on the frontier between the mental and the somatic ... as a measure of the demand made upon the mind for work in consequence of its connection with the body” (pp. 121-122). The psyche works only because of its link with the corporeal, because without this virtual contact barrier, the psyche would be nothing and the body would be only an object. In Studies on Hysteria (1895d), Freud dealt particularly with conversion, but that concept was defined for the first time in “The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence” (1894a): “In hysteria, the incompatible idea is rendered innocuous by its sum of excitation being transformed into something somatic. For this I should like to propose the name conversion” (p. 49). The psychosomatic limit is crossed and there is the mysterious “leap from the psychical into the somatic” that conversion involves owing to “motor innervation” (p. 49). The ego, as described in the second theory of the psychic apparatus (1923d [1922]), is above all a bodily ego; it is not only a surface being, but it is itself the projection of a surface. It represents the surface of the mental apparatus. If the ego is a surface with both psy- 1410 chic and somatic limits, it can be ruptured, as when physical pain results in a heightened narcissistic cathexis of the body that empties the ego and leads it to defend and reconstitute itself. Notions related to the psychosomatic boundary can be found. For example, there are the “transitional phenomena” described by Donald Winnicott (1971), an internal space and external reality where body and language, which together support this space, establish an intersection between psyche and soma. Babies experience burps and anal noises. “It can be supposed,” Winnicott writes, “that thinking or fantasies acquire a link with these functional experiences.” In his definition of holding (1965), Winnicott linked tonus (the physical holding of the body) to processes that may appear to be physiological but that in fact originate in the infant’s psychology. The concept of the psychosomatic limit, though not fully developed in Freud’s writings, nevertheless turns up there in an essential way. In his 1994 book, Green described the concept as implicitly present whenever the body expresses itself directly within the framework of the psyche: in functional signs, conversion, actual neuroses, and psychosomatic pathology. GISELE HARRUS-REVIDI See also: Body image; Ego; Drive/instinct; Holding. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1894a). The neuro-psychoses of defence. SE, 3: 41-61. . (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123-243. . (1915c). Instincts and their vicissitudes. SE, 14: 109-140. . (1923d [1922]). A seventeenth-century demonological neurosis. SE, 19: 67-105. Freud Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2: 48-106. Green, André. (1994). Somatisation, psychanalyse et science du vivant. Paris: Eschel. Winnicott, Donald W. (1965). The theory of infant-parent relationship. In his The maturational processes and the facilitating environment. London: Hogarth. . (1971). Playing and reality. London: Tavistock. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PSYCHOTERAPIA (PSIXOTERAPIJAOBROZRENIE VOPROSOV LECENUJA | PRIKLADONOJ PSIXOLOGII) In Moscow in 1909 the military physician Nikolai A. Vyroubov founded the review Psychoterapia, A Review of Questions of Therapy and Applied Psychology with a view to introducing Russian practitioners to western schools of psychotherapy. The thirty issues of the review (which appeared from January 1910 to the end of 1917) focused increasingly on psychoanalytic theories but they also presented the work of Freud’s great rivals, like Paul Dubois and Johannes Marcinowski. Readers were also informed of the split brought about by Alfred Adler (1911). The review enjoyed the support of the very influential Moscow Psychiatric Circle and the eminent psychiatrist Vladimir P. Serbski (1858-1917), who had decided to dissociate himself from the nosological and purely organicist orientation of Kraeplin’s school. Completing the work of the “Library of Psychology and Psychoanalysis,” also organized by Vyroubov and which published Freud’s major works, Psychoterapia translated no fewer than twelve of Freud’s short technical texts. It also introduced its readers to the works of Adler, Ferenczi, Jung, Rank, Reik, Sachs, and Stekel. The orthodox tendency of the review, directed by doctors Nikolai Ossipov and Mosche Wulff, gave an account of the first Russian attempts to apply the method of free association to clinical neurosis. But it also published works of psychoanalysis applied to subjects as diverse as political jousting, stage fright in actors, and folklore. Supporters of the breakaway Adlerian school, being more politicized, criticized the “monoetiology” (sexual) of the neuroses. Just before it disappeared, the review had begun to manifest great openness to the medical and scientific culture or the West, and also to its literary and artistic culture. There was no other Russian review of psychoanalysis until 1991—not even during the short and amazing period of Bolshevik psychoanalysis (1920— 1930). As a mouthpiece for democratic and liberal ideals, Psychoterapia was of capital importance for the peaceful acceptance of psychoanalysis in Czarist Russia. ALEXANDRE MIKHALEVITCH See also: Russia/USSR. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PSYCHOTHERAPY Bibliography Maximov, Valeri. (1988). Histoire de la psychanalyse: La psychanalyse russe. L’Ane, 10, 3-5. Mikhalevitch, Alexandre. (1991). Lage d’argent de la psychanalyse russe. Les premiéres traductions des oeuvres de Freud en Russie preérevolutionnaire, 1904-1914. Revue internationale @ histoire de la psychanalyse, 4, 399-406. * PSYCHOTHERAPY Psychotherapy is a method for the treatment of psychological problems, which are often expressed somatically. Therapies can be classified following various models. In the cathartic model, the patient is urged to speak, in order to expel or get rid of his suffering. The therapist favors the act of communication over the content of what is expressed. In the reparative model, the therapist tries to help the patient by bringing love and understanding to cancel out the prejudice he has been victim of or to make up for some internal deficit. With the educational model, the therapist guides the patient in the “right” direction, advising him as to his life choices. He “corrects” the mistakes of nature, parental education, or social environment. Freud demarcated himself dramatically from hypnosis and cathartic post-traumatic abreaction in developing an original psychotherapeutic dimension, centered on the exploration of the unconscious, the study of psychic functioning and intrapsychic conflicts, and transferencecounter- transference relation (Ellenberger, 1970). He emphasized psychic reality understood through the reality of narrative. Accordingly, the psychotherapy to be discussed here is psychoanalytic psychotherapy, situated within the context of the theory, technique, and framework of psychoanalysis. The term psychotherapy surfaced for the first time in 1872, while the term psychoanalysis came to be known only in 1896. But it wasn’t until 1905, in his article “On Psychotherapy” (1905a [1904]) that Freud clearly distanced himself from hypnosis by opposing the cathartic method to the analytic method. For a number of decades, he had used the terms psychoanalysis and psychotherapy interchangeably, but shortly before 1920 he abandoned the term psychotherapy definitively, qualifying his method from then on as psychoanalysis. This abandonment occurred after the defections of Alfred Adler, Wilhelm Steckel, and Carl G. 1411 PSYCHOTHERAPY Jung and, in a second stage, his differences with Otto Rank and Sandor Ferenczi. In effect, some of those in Freud’s circle were advocating a more active attitude on the part of the psychoanalyst to accelerate the psychoanalytic process as well as to shorten its duration. A reaction was not long in coming: Ernest Jones and Edward Glover emphatically denounced any deviation from a traditional treatment, and any psychotherapeutic approach, such as a return to pure suggestion of the preanalytic period (Robert Wallerstein). This traditional position was the “official” one of the psychoanalytic movement for a very long time. Nevertheless, in the 1950s the term psychoanalytic psychotherapy gained currency among psychoanalysts themselves, who came to believe that certain changes had to be made in the framework of the classical psychoanalytic model, which was not appropriate for the psychopathology of some patients. As of 2005, questions about the differences between psychoanalytic psychotherapy and psychoanalysis are still posed in terms of process: how, for example, could the psychoanalytical process be influenced by reworking the framework? The face-to-face position implies seeing the analyst, being able to observe his gestures and unconscious corporal reactions, to hang onto his every word and look into his eyes. Likewise, not being seen by the analyst can result in the patient’s feeling lost, cast into the abyss, or on the contrary allow him to feel emotions that would be blocked by a face-toface expression. However, these differences in formal framework (frequency of sessions, face-to-face or couch-armchair, more or less active position of the psychoanalyst, etc.) are insufficient, in themselves, to characterize the type of process underway. In any event, according to René Roussillon (1986), a psychoanalytic approach can only explore certain portions of the psyche. Even where the choice of the framework (psychotherapy or psychoanalysis) favors a psychoanalytical approach, this is not always necessarily the same one. Finally, the psychotherapeutic process is characterized by a transference of partial objects to the psychoanalyst while, in the psychoanalytical process, these partial transferences would be worked through until there was a full development of the transference neurosis. Other authors have brought out differences in therapeutic aims. Ideally, in psychoanalysis the framework should allow exploration of the patient’s unconscious with the psychoanalyst following the patient as far as 1412 he is able to go. According to this very strict definition, psychoanalysis does not, a priori, aim at a therapeutic goal. Instead, the therapeutic result emerges from the psychoanalytic process. By contrast, psychotherapy does imply a goal: to diminish the suffering of the patient, allowing him to return to work, and so on. However, these differences are not always so clear-cut in the reality of practice among psychoanalysts and psychotherapists. Whatever technique is chosen, standard treatment or face-to-face, the psychoanalyst has a “psychoanalytic function,” so that any psychotherapeutic approach undertaken by the psychoanalyst involves psychoanalytical work. Psychotherapy cannot be isolated from its social context. After the Second World War, the development of social health care programs allowed compensation for psychiatric care and the establishment of a variety of facilities for the treatment of specific pathologies. Many of the professionals practicing in these institutional settings were trained in psychoanalytic psychotherapy by psychoanalysts working in the field, or else were educated in teaching institutes that structured their curricula in accordance with psychoanalytic psychotherapy. These professionals engaged in personal psychoanalytic work without, necessarily, matriculating in the training courses of psychoanalytic societies; but very often a veritable analytical process developed with patients that they were treating in their institutions. Accordingly, the wish of Freud (1919a [1918]) has been fulfilled, “to alloy the pure gold of analysis freely with the copper of direct suggestion” (p. 168) to create “a psychotherapy for the people” (p. 168), and to alleviate a greater portion of “the vast amount of neurotic misery which there is in the world” (p. 166), which the small number of psychoanalysts cannot greatly affect. Clearly Freud wanted to see the traditional treatment adapted to treat a greater number of patients as soon as “the conscience of society will awake” (p. 167). The concern to preserve psychoanalytic thought in some institutional form has led national societies of psychoanalytic therapy to create organizations like the European Federation for Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy (EFPP). Psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic psychotherapy, and their particular adaptations (child psychoanalysis, group psychoanalysis, analytical psychodrama, psychoanalytical couple or family therapy, etc.) constitute a INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS “psychoanalytic field,” very different in nature from therapeutic techniques. The latter, basically anti-analytic, may be considered as “an ensemble of ready-made counter-transference approaches meant to function as institutional defenses, as a system of alleviating anxieties prompted by the relation to the other,” representing “group-oriented ideologies” (Roussillon, 1986). The psychoanalytical approach often requires much time since it favors the process rather than the suppression of symptoms, which is the case with nonanalytical therapeutic techniques. In the interest of budgetary considerations, social agencies that reimburse psychic treatment try to limit its duration or the amount of compensated sessions, or else to favor approaches that aim to eliminate symptoms very quickly, without taking account of their function in the overall psychic economy of the patient. The psychoanalytical approach runs the risk of losing its liberty and revolutionary quality in submitting overly to social constraints. Countries that seek to integrate the psychoanalytic approach in the master plan of their treatment policies risk making it shed its special and irreverent identity, becoming increasingly therapeutic, in the sense of “suppressing symptoms” (Frisch, 1998). The notion of conflict, central in psychoanalysis, has consequently been introduced in the psychoanalytic movement on issues relating to its future and its identity: it must either evolve toward isolation to maintain its purity (psychoanalysis), or adapt to social constraints to survive (psychoanalytical psychotherapy), but at the risk of losing its soul. SERGE FRISCH See also: Analyzability; Cathartic method; Deutsches Institut fiir Psychologische Forschung und Psychotherapie (Institut Géring); Directed daydream (R. Desoille); Face-to-face situation; Group psychotherapies; Hypnosis; Initial interview(s); “Lines of Advance in Psycho- Analytic Therapy”; Narco-analysis; Psychodrama; Psychoanalytic family therapy; Relaxation psychotherapy; Suggestion; Symbolic realization. Bibliography Ellenberger, Henri F. (1970). The discovery of the unconscious. The history and evolution of dynamic psychiatry. New York: Basic Books. Freud, Sigmund. (1919a [1918]). Lines of advance in psycho-analytic therapy. SE, 17: 157-168. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PsycHotic DEFENSES Roussillon, René. (1986). Préface, in M. Berger (Ed.), Entretiens familiaux et champ transitionnel. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Wallerstein, Robert S. (1995). The talking cures. New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press. Further Reading Bergman, Anni. (2002). Changing psychoanalytic psychotherapy into psychoanalysis. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 83, 245-248. Kernberg, Otto. (1999). Psychoanalysis, psychoanalytic psychotherapy and supportive psychotherapy. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 80, 1075-1092. Stone, Leo. (1954). The widening scope of indications for psychoanalysis. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 2, 567-594. Wallerstein, Robert S. (1989). Psychoanalysis and psychotherapy: An historical perspective. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 70, 563-592. PSYCHOTIC DEFENSES Psychotic defenses are psychic processes involving unconscious, or more-or-less conscious, attempts to deal with reality. They take the form of disavowal or withdrawal as the subject tries to avoid or circumscribe conflicts encountered in his relationship with the external world. In “The Neuro-Psychoses of Defense” (1894a), Freud wrote: “There is, however, a much more energetic and successful kind of defense. Here, the ego rejects the incompatible idea together with its affect and behaves as if the idea never occurred to the ego at all. But from the moment at which this has been successfully done the subject is in psychosis” (p. 58)—to which he added in 1896 that “projection,” as a “defensive symptom,” signified “distrust of other people” (p. 184). The chief psychotic defenses in Freud’s view were foreclosure (Verwerfung, reformulated by Lacan in 1956), projection, and delirium. All of these were in evidence in Freud’s analysis of the case of President Schreber (1912a). The disavowal (of reality) as a defense (1927e) was described in the context of the castration complex, particularly in the case of fetishism. 1413 PsycuHotic/NEuROTIC The work of Melanie Klein underscored the major role of the defense mechanism of projective identification in psychotic functioning. Such post-Kleinian authors as Wilfred R. Bion and Donald Meltzer viewed it also as an essential mechanism of psychic growth. Later, other mechanisms became the subject of important conceptual developments: projection, splitting (of ego or object), and the disavowal/idealization pair. Psychic defenses are not confined to psychotics. Since Bion, they have been deemed a part of the mental functioning of every individual, as long as they have not yet acquired an invasive and systematic quality. ELSA SCHMID-KITSIKIS See also: Defense; Manic defenses. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1894a). The neuro-psychoses of defence. SE, 3: 41-61. . (1927e). Fetishism. SE, 21: 147-157. Green, André. (1971). La projection: De lidentification projective au projet. In La folie privé. Paris: Gallimard. Lacan, Jacques. (1966). Commentaire sur la Verwerfung. In Ecrits. Paris: Seuil. (Original work published 1956) Further Reading Marcus, Eric. (1992). Psychosis and near psychosis: Ego function, symbolic structure, treatment. New York: Springer- Verlag. PSYCHOTIC/NEUROTIC The relationship between the neuroses and the psychoses, or between the neurotic sphere and the psychotic one, cannot be studied from a psychoanalytical point of view without clarifying the meaning of the two terms, considering their reciprocal ties as described in the work of Sigmund Freud and Karl Abraham, and, lastly, reviewing their status today. With regard to the term neurosis, the idea that medicine ought to set aside a nosological and etiopathogenic category to cover conditions presenting functional impairments, in the absence of manifest lesions, which affected the nervous system but not the 1414 brain or any other organ, arose in the classical period in the work of Thomas Willis (1622-1675) and Thomas Sydenham (1624-1689). These authors included as neuroses hysteria, to which they denied a uterine origin, and hypochondria, to which they denied the hepatic genesis attributed to it since antiquity. The word neurosis itself was coined in 1777 by William Cullen (1710-1790) to identify a class of generalized as distinct from localized disease which along with the neuroses included fevers and cachexies. Defined as sensory and motor attacks without fever or local disorder, Cullen’s “neuroses” encompassed comas, adynamias (to which he assigned hypochondria), spasms (including hysteria), and vesanias. Nineteenth-century usage veered back and forth between a narrow definition of neurosis limited to hysteria and hypochondria and a broader meaning that embraced syncopes, tetanus, epilepsy, chorea, paralysis agitans, and neuralgias. During the last quarter of the century, however, in part due to the advent of dynamic psychology (Pierre Janet, Sigmund Freud) and of semiological neurology (Jules Déjerine, Joseph Babinski, Gordon Holmes), a new system of classification began to take form. Matters were helped, too, by the new discipline of clinical neurology, which laid claim to epilepsy, chorea, Parkinson’s disease, and cerebellar syndromes while recognizing psychiatry as the sole proprietor of the neuroses (with the exception of hysterical paralyses, which called for cooperation between the two specialties). Thenceforward the neuroses were understood either in a simple way, as by Pierre Janet, who distinguished only between hysteria and psychasthenia, or in the more elaborate manner of Freud, who contrasted the actual neuroses (anxiety neurosis, neurasthenia, hypochondria) with the socalled defense or transference neuroses (conversion hysteria, phobic neurosis, obsessional neurosis), using criteria that were certainly descriptive but also psychopathological in character. The term psychosis appeared later. Introduced in 1845 by Ernst von Feuchtersleben (1806-1849), it was at first a very general designation for illnesses of the mind (“Geisteskrankheiten’) as opposed to the neuroses, attributed at the time to malfunctions of the peripheral nervous system. Psychosis thus became synonymous with mental alienation in the most general sense. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth, when psychiatry started emphasizing the irreducible variety of INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS mental illnesses, psychosis covered all cases within that domain which were clearly not of the nature of neurosis, of dementia, or of mental retardation—in other words, the label was applied to almost all institutionalized mental patients. Psychoses were considered either acute (confusional states, delusional episodes, mania, melancholia) or chronic (schizophrenia, paraphrenias, paranoia), but no answer was offered to the question whether these categories were discrete or whether they were variations expressing a single underlying (psychotic) disease process. (Not to mention issues of etiology or the inflated role assigned to general paralysis.) In the development of psychoanalysis, the relationship between the psychotic and the neurotic was at first considered a relationship of exclusion, a veritable gulf separating the one from the other, just as, in zoology, vertebrates were radically separated from invertebrates. Little by little, however, a more nuanced view prevailed: for one thing, the two realms were brought much closer together; for another, the question was raised whether a particular place should not be set aside for perversions. Even greater difficulty was met with later, when a pigeonhole had to be found for the borderline states identified in apparently neurotic subjects who, after being accepted as such for psychoanalysis, decompensated during the treatment in a psychotic manner (Kernberg, 1975). In Freud’s early works, those collected in the first two volumes of the Gesammelte Werke, a radical distinction between neurosis and psychosis was of a piece with his inaugural discoveries: the neuroses were said to reflect conflicts within the subject whose original sense escaped him, conflicts echoing others in earliest childhood, repressed but accessible in general through a transference relationship and hence accessible to psychoanalysis; the psychoses, by contrast, were related to conflicts between the subject and the outside world, hardly or not at all accessible via a transference relationship, and for that very reason contraindicating psychoanalytic treatment, even though the discourse of psychotic patients might bring directly to light aspects of the unconscious that emerged in neurotics only after many psychoanalytic sessions. Freud continued to maintain this point of view a little later, in the third part of his commentary on Daniel Paul Schreber’s Memoirs (Freud, 1911c [1910]), when he put forward the idea that the pathological process common to the various chronic delusional conditions INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PsycHotic/NEuROTIC was denial of homosexual wishes—a mechanism very different from those met with in neurosis. The work of Karl Abraham presents what is probably the most careful psychoanalytical account not only of the relationship between the neuroses and the psychoses, but also of the relationships between each of them and libidinal fixations and regressions, as well as those of individual neuroses and psychoses to one another (1927 [1924]). Abraham showed in the clearest way, albeit in a nuanced and quite unschematic way, how the received clinical distinctions between schizophrenia, paranoia, mania, and depression might be seen as corresponding to the subdivisions of the oral and anal stages, and how likewise the neuroses related, each after its own fashion, to the genital stage; thus the empirical level of clinical experience could find theoretical support in the psychoanalytic knowledge of libidinal development. This standpoint tended therefore to buttress the view that the neurotic and psychotic spheres should continue be treated as separate, because their respective connections with the libidinal stages were quite distinct. At the same time, as Abraham noted, especially with respect to melancholia and obsessional neurosis, links had to be recognized between particular psychoses and particular neuroses, as for instance the link between schizophrenia and hysteria. Later on, both the relative simplicity of the neurosis/psychosis distinction and its tendency to become absolute were contested, and the dividing-line was once more brought into question. This clear-cut division had long served a didactic purpose in the professional training of analysts, but even for the most vociferous partisans of the primacy of the totality—of the Germanic Ganzheit—training could hardly be founded on a complete absence of distinctions; indeed it was arguable that the usefulness of this clear opposition resided solely in its educational value, and that it should therefore be discarded once training was successfully completed. The development of his conception of the perversions led Freud to abandon the idea of the primacy of fixation to infantile sexuality (1905d), along with the corresponding view of perversion as the reverse of neurosis, and to assign a major role to the disavowal of reality and the splitting of the ego (1940a [1938]). Since these processes were closely akin to those in play in the psychotic realm, this meant the end of the tidy arrangement that had prevailed hitherto. A difficult choice remained between two possible revisions: to 1415 PsycuHotic PANIC reincorporate the perversions into the psychoses, or else to abandon the neurosis/psychosis dichotomy by giving the perversions their own category between the other two. The latter course was liable to jeopardize any strict distinction, for it is well known that the only good opposition is a binary one. GEORGES LANTERI-LAURA See also: Abraham, Karl; Acute psychoses; Blank/nondelusional psychoses; “Claims of Psycho-Analysis to Scientific Interest”; Indications and counterindications for psychoanalysis for an adult; Infantile psychosis; Neurosis; Neurotic defenses; Paranoid psychosis; Psychic causality; Psychoanalytical nosography; Psychoses, chronic and delusional. Bibliography Abraham, Karl. (1927 [1924). A short study of the development of the libido, viewed in the light of mental disorders. In his Selected papers on psycho-analysis. London: Hogarth. Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123-243. . (1911¢ [1910]). Psycho-analytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia (dementia paranoides). SE, 12: 1-82. . (1924c). The economic problem of masochism. SE, 19: 155-170. . (1940a [1938]). An outline of psycho-analysis. SE, 23: 139-207. Kernberg, Otto F. (1975). Borderine conditions and pathological narcissism. New York: Jason Aronson. Further Reading Jacobson, Edith. (1972). Depression, comparative studies of normal, neurotic, and psychotic conditions. New York: International University Press. Kubie, Lawrence S. (1967). Relation of psychotic disorganization to the neurotic process. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 15, 626-640. Steiner, John. (1993). Psychic retreats. Pathological organizations in psychotic, neurotic and borderline patients. London/ New York: Routledge. PSYCHOTIC PANIC In the psychotic part of the personality, according to Wilfred Bion, anxiety changes into psychotic panic. 1416 Earlier, Melanie Klein (1935) had put forward the view that the first anxieties are psychotic in content and that in the normal development of infants there is a combination of processes by which primitive anxieties of a psychotic nature are bound, worked through, and modified. Bion investigated the nature of the processes by which anxiety is modified during the 1950s and 1960s. He saw projective identification as the means by which the infant communicates primitive anxieties and emotions to the mother, and her reverie, that is, her containment with alpha function, as the process that modifies her infant’s anxieties. If there is a pathological matrix between infant and mother of an adverse endowment and adverse nurture so that the infant’s primitive and violent emotions find no container, a primitive disaster is felt to have occurred in which the container has been destroyed and anxiety has turned into psychotic panic. A nameless dread, as Bion also calls psychotic panic, is returned to the infant which threatens to suffuse and annihilate the personality, and from then on development takes a divergent course. Psychotic panic is the origin, the O, of the ensuing transformation in hallucinosis, rather than, as in the neurotic personality, transformation in thought. Defenses are adopted to avoid the experience of panic by the evacuation of ego functions capable of the experience, and there is an explosive projection of ego pieces, images, beta-elements, and objects, into a space that has no limits. EpDNA O’ SHAUGHNESSY See also: Hallucinosis. Bibliography Bion, Wilfred R. (1959). Attacks on linking, International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 40 (5—6), 308. . (1962). Learning from experience. London: Heinemann; New York: Basic. Klein, Melanie (1935). A contribution to the psychogenesis of manic-depressive states. International Journal of Psycho- Analysis, 16 (2), 145-174. PSYCHOTIC PART OF THE PERSONALITY Clinical discoveries made in work with psychotic patients enabled Wilfred R. Bion to formulate a set of INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS highly original hypotheses about psychosis. He states these in a classic paper “Differentiation of the psychotic from the non-psychotic personalities” (1957). His hypotheses are that the psychotic part of the personality arises from “a minute splitting of all that part of the personality that is concerned with awareness of internal and external reality, and the expulsion of these fragments so that they enter into or engulf their objects.” In this way the psychotic personality constructs a universe of bizarre objects in which he is unable to think and suffers existence in a state of hallucinosis. The psychic preconditions in the psychotic personality are: a preponderance of destructive impulses, a hatred of internal and external reality, and the dread of immanent annihilation, all of which lead to the precipitate formation of thin object relations tenaciously held. The psychotic personality develops “in a manner markedly different” from the neurotic personality. In the same paper Bion continues: “The difference hinges on the fact that this combination of qualities leads to minute fragmentation of the personality, particularly of the apparatus of awareness of reality which Freud described as coming into operation at the behest of the reality principle, and excessive projection of these fragments of personality into external objects.” Because of the destructive attacks on his ego and on any thought that could serve as a link between two objects, and, in addition, the bizarre nature of his world, he feels unable to restore either himself or his objects. In the psychotic personality projective identification, the primitive defense mechanism discovered by Melanie Klein (1946), is not merely excessive, but has also a different role in that it becomes the predominant psychic operation: It replaces the processes of introjection and regression, and the structuring of the mind performed by repression in the neurotic personality. In Bion’s view, contact with reality, at least in those patients who are able to attend for analysis, is never entirely lost. He considers it is important clinically to find the neurotic personality which is concealed by the psychotic personality, and also to find the psychotic personality, which exists in everyone. EDNA O’ SHAUGHNESSY See also: Bleger, José; Fragmentation; Disintegration, feelings of (anxieties); Hallucinosis; Learning from experience; Linking, attacks on; Psychotic panic. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PsycHoTic POTENTIAL Bibliography Bion, Wilfred R. (1957). Differentiation of the psychotic from the non-psychotic personalities. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 38 (3-4), 266-275. Klein, Melanie (1946). Notes on some schizoid mechanisms. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 27, 99-110; reprinted 1952 in Klein, Melanie, Heimann, Paula, Isaacs, Susan, and Riviere, Joan (Eds.), Developments in Psycho- Analysis. London: Hogarth; reprinted 1975 in The Writings of Melanie Klein, Volume 3, 1946-1963. London: Hogarth. PSYCHOTIC POTENTIAL The notion of psychotic potential was created by Piera Aulagnier, who contributed significantly to the study of the sources of psychosis. Opposing the idea of a seed of psychosis that supposedly exists in every person, she explored the necessary conditions for the psychotic “solution” to be “chosen” by the subject. These conditions were necessary, but not sufficient in themselves, to produce an out-and-out psychosis, the latter being dependent on chance happenings in the life of the subject. Meanwhile, the psychosis would be “potential.” The notion of predictability is present on two levels in psychotic potentiality. Firstly, it can be understood as a link between, on the one hand, the history and prehistory of a particular subject (on the level of both reality and fantasy), and, on the other hand, the subject they have become by the time they have been characterized in terms of psychopathology. Potentiality is then understood in the temporal sense: as the relation between a past and a present. It then leads, following the same line of argument, to the question of whether the future is predictable on the basis of the present. Further, psychotic potentiality can also be understood not just in terms of psychogenesis but also in terms of the Aristotelian opposition between potentiality and act: we can be something potentially without this ever being actualized. The idea of psychotic potential is not the result of a diagnosis made on the basis of observable criteria: it is, first and foremost, a countertransferential feeling, an extremity or an appeal for help that is felt as strange, even dangerous, by the analyst who is able to empathize. It is particularly important that attention be focused on this dimension, right from the first sessions, for the purpose of forestalling 1417 PsycHotic POTENTIAL the risk of failure of certain functions linked to the progress of the treatment itself. Aulagnier emphasized the partial character of this process: It is as if the psyche of the patient could function normally, that is to say without being in flagrant contradiction with the common mindset of other subjects in the same culture, while at the same time containing zones of shadow in which a totally different and original kind of functioning operates. In La Violence de linterprétation (The Violence of Interpretation), of 1975, she defined this concept as “the result of the fixation of a primal delirious thought, whose function it is to attempt to reconstruct a fragment missing in the discourse of the other.” It seemed then that psychotic potential would constitute a “solution” to a conflict experienced by the subject in childhood—a conflict that was too early and intense, causing so much suffering that the psychic work involved in surviving turned into “madness.” This is not the only solution. Aulagnier offers three others: the choice of death, in the form of Thanatos triumphant; the development of infantile autism; and the attempt to flee from any thought, any desire which would lead back to the conflict that was the cause of so much suffering. This latter solution is a partial mutilation, but it is not really constructed like a psychotic delirium. Because of this third possibility, the notion of psychotic potential transcends the childhood/age opposition. Rather than harboring, from childhood onwards, such delirious thoughts, the subject can try to whitewash everything that could prompt suffering or conflict. Yet this avoidance itself, which is to say the delirious “solution” itself, which may be understood as preferable to suicide, nonetheless establishes that such deeply troubled thoughts do exist. Psychotic potential involves not only the setting up of a premature and primal, delirious kind of mentality, which can develop into psychosis in adulthood. It also suggests the idea of a flaw itself created by pushing away the delirious solution—a fault line that constitutes an invitation to delirium anytime the conflict situation is reactivated by events. The theorization of psychosis by Piera Aulagnier is very different from that of Sigmund Freud, for whom the call to delirium is an attempt at reparation and reconstruction following a rupture between the self and reality (1924b [1923]). This rupture, according to Freud, is based on the “frustration, a non-fulfillment, of one of those childhood wishes which are for ever undefeated” 1418 (p. 151). Contrary to neurosis, where the reparation is carried out at the expense of the id, reparation in psychosis occurs at the expense of the relation to reality. For Aulagnier, the conflict generating psychosis is not located on the level of desire, but on the level of the thinkable, that is to say of self-identification. Behind the conditions of possibility for psychotic potential to be established, whether it turns into open psychosis or not, lies a particular situation that imposes on the subject a prohibition and/or an obligation to think something that contradicts the logic of the discourse of society. It is not society that transmits the contents of such thoughts; they result from a compromise that allows one to continue to cathect with reality, and to love objects. They amount to so many para-decathexes, a term coined by Aulagnier on the model of para-excitations. In extreme cases, the choices are limited: either real death, or psychic death; a decathexis such as the victory of Thanatos, or a delirious reconstruction. To sum up the essence of psychotic potential, as Aulagnier defined it: at the source of delirious thinking there lies, on the one hand, an intolerable frustration, whose significance is linked to the question of the origin of the subject, the world, pleasure, and so forth; and, on the other hand, an unconquerable desire, which refuses to be reduced to silence and is connected with the identificatory needs proper to the self. From her earliest texts until her most recent, Aulagnier has emphasized the fundamental quality of this need in these terms: Every self needs to think that its existence makes sense, that it is not, as Shakespeare says, “a tale, told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.” If such meaning is lacking in the discourse of the one supposed to impart meaning, the father, delirious thinking will, in its primordial way, attempt to accomplish the reconstruction of the missing fragment. This reconstruction will be illusory, but it will be in conformity with the identificatory demands of the self. SOPHIE DE MyoLLA-MELLOR See also: Apprenti-historien et le maitre-sorcier (L’-) [The apprentice historian and the master sorcerer]; Blank/ nondelusional psychoses; Encounter; Violence of Interpretation: From Pictogram to Statement, The. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Bibliography Aulagnier, Piera. (1979). Les destins du plaisir. Aliénation, amour, passion. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. . (1984). LApprenti-historien et le maitre-sorcier. Du discours identifiant au discours délirant. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Castoriadis-Aulagnier, Piera. (1975). La violence de l’interpretation. Du pictogramme a l’énoncé. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Freud, Sigmund. (1924b [1923]). Neurosis and psychosis. SE, 19: 147-153. Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie de. (1998). Penser la psychose. Une lecture de oeuvre de Piera Aulagnier. Paris: Dunod. PSYCHOTIC TRANSFERENCE The term psychotic transference describes the intense and primitive feelings experienced by some patients during analytic sessions; such experiences occur during periods marked by a deep regression, and they are totally real to the patient, which is why a number of authors speak in this connection of delusional or regressive transference. The concept of psychotic transference is often used to evoke very intense, primitive or undifferentiated experiences and emotions based on part-objects. Some authors use this model in working with patients presenting psychotic crises. Others use it with neurotics, when the relation with the therapist displays primitive and regressive features which are taken to be “psychotic aspects of the personality.” Freud at first argued, apropos of transference in psychosis, that in psychotics the libido had been withdrawn from the outside world, and that consequently no transference was possible (1914c). Later, however, he moderated this view: “Since then analysts have never relaxed their efforts to come to an understanding of the psychoses. Especially since it has been possible to work with the concept of narcissism, they have managed, now in this place and now in that, to get a glimpse beyond the wall.... [T]he mere theoretical gain is not to be despised, and we may be content to wait for its practical application. In the long run even the psychiatrists cannot resist the convincing force of their own clinical material.” Freud noted in this context, in connection with those aspects of psychosis which allow for transference, that “Transference is INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PUBERTY often not so completely absent but that it can be used to a certain extent; and analysis has achieved undoubted successes with cyclical depressions, light paranoiac modifications, and partial schizophrenias” (1925d [1924], pp. 61, 60). In his treatment of psychotic patients, Herbert Rosenfeld (1965) discovered that they did in fact establish a transferential link with the therapist, and he called this phenomenon “transference in psychosis” or “psychotic transference.” He was the first to take an interest in this question after the fashion of Hanna Segal and Frieda Fromm-Reichmann. As for Wilfred R. Bion, when he discussed the psychotic personality, he was referring, in effect, to psychotic transference or delusional transference: “Since contact with reality is never entirely lost, the phenomena which we are accustomed to associate with the neuroses are never absent and serve to complicate the analysis, when sufficient progress has been made, by their presence amidst psychotic material” (1957, p. 267). Bion described the relationship to the analyst as premature, precipitate, intense, tenacious— and founded on projective identification (p. 266). Davip ROSENFELD See also: Countertransference; Ego Psychology and Psychosis; Negative therapeutic reaction; Psychoses, chronic and delusional; Transference. Bibliography Bion, Wilfred. R. (1957). Differentiation of the psychotic from the non-psychotic personality. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 38, 266-275. Freud, Sigmund. (1914c). On narcissism: An introduction. SE, 14: 67-102. . (1925d [1924]). An autobiographical study. SE, 20: 1-74. Rosenfeld, David. (1992). The psychotic aspects of the personality. London: Karnac. Rosenfeld, Herbert. (1965). Psychotic states: A psychoanalytic approach. London: Hogarth. PUBERTY Puberty was originally defined anatomically and physiologically as the appearance of secondary signs of LONDON PUBLIC | 1A19 a2y0 EAST FIRST STREEBT Oya: PUBERTY sexual maturation that mark the beginning of the adolescent process which will put an end to the period of childhood that had been prolonged by the period of latency. The concepts of puberty and adolescence have been increasingly considered as belonging to the field of psychoanalysis only progressively. Of course the chapter on the “Transformations of Puberty” in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d) is the essential text by Freud on this subject, but to ascertain the reason for the key place this stage assumes in metapsychological development, it is necessary to go back to the early hypotheses on trauma. The seduction theory formulated in the Studies on Hysteria (1895d) assumed in effect two distinct scenes separated by puberty. It is this breakthrough from the presexual (albeit already oriented by the phallus to the genital) which gives both chronological and logical meaning to the twin ideas of latency and deferred action. For Freud therefore, above and beyond the impact it has on the body and the psychological implications of this, puberty is something that operates: initially as a real trauma, then later as a logical operand in the seduction-fantasy, where it served to delineate boundaries. That being said, the 1905 essay on puberty and all the preceding work was to be enriched by later discoveries, such as the 1914 theory of narcissism and, in 1924, the second topology and the death drive hypothesis. What is at stake in puberty is clear from the outset: “With the arrival of puberty, changes set in which are destiried to give infantile sexual life its final, normal shape. The sexual instinct has hitherto been predominantly auto-erotic; it now finds a sexual object” (1905d, p. 206). Freud then raises five questions, all of which are still being asked, on the nature of puberty: First of all, how is the erotic destiny of each person, perversion aside, determined by the way in which the pregential drives are simultaneously placed in submission to and in the service of genitality, which is the sign of normality? Secondly, what is the role, necessary but not sufficient, of the “chemical” factor in causing sexual tension and pleasure, given that even neurosis “greatly resembles” a state of intoxication and want? Thirdly, according to the theory of narcissism how will ego libido and object libido be fused in this moment of anticipated tension and complementarity between the currents of love and sex? Fourthly, how is, in a final renunciation of bisexuality, the man’s») i<¢ “more logical” 1420 development going to then be differentiated from the “involution” of the young woman who willingly rejoins her initial, oral sexual orientations at the same time as she accedes to genitality? Fifth and finally, in what way is the new sexual object, a semblance of the Other sex, at once both new and rediscovered on the basis of the primal objects, the ancestors of the Other sex? In his conclusion devoted to the risks associated with homosexual inversion occasioned by both familial and social milieus, Freud alerts us to the fact that this accession to a sexual relationship which assumes responsibility for the difference between the sexes, does not occur automatically. For a long time after Freud puberty remained a secondary preoccupation for psychoanalysts. Instead, under the influence of child analysts and fueled in particular by the debates between Anna Freud and Melanie Klein, interest tended to focus on the relationship between earliest infancy and the oedipal period, with adolescence being considered as little more than the outcome of precocious determinants. On the other hand in the field of psychopathology, the side of adolescence, dissociated from puberty, concerned with the trials of socialization and its psychopathological failures, became the privileged focus of study in the texts on this period (Siegfried Bernfeld, August Aichhorn). Only recently, and especially in Great Britain and France, has interest been renewed in puberty as distinct from the ensemble of adolescent processes, and designated as such as being their origin. Donald Winnicott was the first to recall that it is sexual maturation, not only social exigencies, which reactivate oedipal difficulties, giving rise to murderous and incestuous feelings which were all too easily repressed in childhood when they were unrealizable, and calling for a second oedipal working-through, subject to new ups and downs. Moses Laufer has elaborated on this approach by explicating the more-or-less pathological crises of adolescence using the concept of breakdown, reworked from Winnicott, but which is for Laufer a developmental fracture in the integration of the body image which, following puberty, needs to then incorporate the genital organs and allow for a new compromise between masturbatory fantasy and the demands of the superego. With this Philippe Gutton was able to produce the concept of the “pubertal, which is to the psyche what puberty is to the body.” Although he left room for debate, Gutton distinguished distinctly and INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS chronologically between the category of feelings that refashion the aim of the drive from the phallic to the genital and are oriented towards a new, complementary, part object—and the adolescens process, which is a reconstruction of referents and ideals that this genital identity imposes. On the Lacanian side, which has proved more reticent with respect to the psychogenetic approach, the texts are few and far between: For Francoise Dolto, puberty is a third “moment of synthesis” (after the mirror stage and the Oedipus complex), in the construction of an unconscious body image. Jean-Jacques Rassial views puberty in its somatic, but also psychic aspects, as the Real blow that necessitates an Imaginary reconstruction and a new Symbolic foundation, insofar as this is an adolescent function. The production of the concept of puberty points toward a certain number of theoretical modifications: First off (and this is borne out by clinical experience), the topological status of puberty, be it individual or social, and which affects not only the ego but also the id and the superego, affirms the autonomy of the psychical from the somatic and the social, because psychic puberty does not always occur at the same time as these two other puberties. Secondly, from a dynamic point of view, Freudian precepts hold that the conflicts taking place during this time are not only the repetition of earlier conflicts, and therefore all psychogenesis, and particularly the pre-pubertal function of the latency period, needs to be rethought. Thirdly, the economic function of the phallus, between drive and representation, is put into question by its separation during this period from the genital that cannot, after all, be reduced to just its imaginary employment. As is already apparent in Freud’s texts, the transformations of puberty are not a simple issue of psychogenetics, but raise the question of the function of sexuality as a whole. In other words, behind the story that goes from infantile sexuality to so-called adult normality there lies another, about the infantilism of a sexuality that destines the sexual relationship to its failures, which diverge according to the sexual genital in question. JEAN-JACQUES RASSIAL See also: Adolescence; Genital stage; Psychosexual development; Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PUERPERAL PSYCHOSES Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123-243. Gutton, Philippe. (1991). Le pubertaire. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Laufer, Moses, and Laufer, Egle. (1984). Adolescence and developmental breakdown: a psychoanalytic view. New Haven, CT: Yale University. : Perret-Catipovic, Maja, and Ladame, Francois (Eds.). (1997). Adolescence and psychoanalysis: The story and the history (Philip Slotkin, Trans.). London: Karnac. Rassial, Jean-Jacques. (1990). L’Adolescent et le psychanalyse. Paris: Payot. Further Reading Bloch, H. Spencer. (1995). Adolescent development, psychopathology, and treatment. Madison, CT: International University Press. Laufer, Moses. (1996). The psychoanalyst of the adolescent. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 51, 512-521. PUERPERAL PSYCHOSES Derived from the Latin puerpera (“woman in childbirth”), puer (“child”), and parere (“to give birth”), the term puerperal psychoses conventionally comprises all the psychiatric conditions with onset during pregnancy and in the year following it. In a more restricted sense, the same term is used as the equivalent of postpartum psychoses, in which case it concerns only major, acute problems that occur during the days or first month immediately after delivery. Puerperal disorders have been known since antiquity (Hippocrates, Galen). Puerperal psychoses were singled out in the mid-nineteenth century, with the work of Jean-Etienne Esquirol (1838) and Louis- Victor Marcé (1858). Still relevant from that time are questions that treat the specificity of these morbid states: Are they an autonomous clinical entity of which childbirth is the causal agent? Or, instead, is childbirth merely an event that precipitates the emergence of a psychiatric syndrome in an already vulnerable woman? Psychoanalysis very early on became interested in this pivotal stage in a woman’s life. Paul-Claude Raca- 1421 PUNISHMENT, DREAM OF mier, in “La mére et l’enfant dans les psychoses du postpartum” (Mother and child in the postpartum psychoses; 1961), defined puerperal disorders as accidents in the psychoaffective “process” of motherhood— a process that can be understood in light of concepts developed by Sigmund Freud: the castration complex, its impact within narcissism, and its clinical consequence, penis envy, which becomes the desire to have a child by the father during the oedipal phase. Above all, Freud discovered the strength of the bond uniting the little girl with the preoedipal mother and its articulation with the central problem of identification. Beginning in the 1970s analytic understanding of the processes of motherhood and its avatars was opened up to contributions from other disciplines, such as developmental psychology, ethology, or the practice of observation. A number of theoretical and/ or clinical concepts have since become available: primary maternal preoccupation (Donald Winnicott), the capacity for maternal reverie (Wilfred Bion), projective identifications (Melanie Klein, Bion), behavioral and fantasmatic mother-child interactions, transgenerational transmission (Mary Ainsworth, Serge Lebovici), or the motherhood constellation (Daniel N. Stern). ODILE CAZAS See also: Infant observation (therapeutic); Parenthood; Postnatal/postpartum depression. Bibliography Ainsworth, Mary D. Salter, Blehar, M. C., Waters, E., and Wall, S. (1978). Patterns of attachment: A psychological study of the strange situation. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Cazas, Odile, Dhéte, Alain, Bouttier, Daniel, and Ginestet, Daniel. (1990). Lhospitalisation conjointe de la mére et de son nourrisson dans un service de psychiatrie adulte. Psychiatrie de l'enfant, 33 (1), 635-674. Esquirol, Jean Etienne. (1838). Des maladies mentales considérées sous les rapports médical, hygiénique et médico-légal. Paris: J. B. Bailliére. Lebovici, Serge. (1983). Le nourrisson, la mere et le psychanalyste. Paris: Le Centurion. Marcé, Louis-Victor. (1858). Traite de la folie des femmes enceintes, des nouvelles accouchées et des nourrices et considérations médico-légales qui se rattachent a ce sujet. Paris: J. B. Bailliere. 1422 Racamier, Paul-Claude. (1961). La mere et enfant dans les psychoses du post-partum. LEvolution Psychiatrique, 4, 525-570. Stern, Daniel N. (1995). The motherhood constellation: A unified view of parent-infant psychotherapy. New York: Basic Books. Winnicott, Donald W. (1958). Primary maternal preoccupation. In Collected papers, through paediatrics to psycho-analysis. London: Tavistock. (Original work published 1956) PUNISHMENT, DREAM OF In punishment dreams, the dreamer is explicitly or implicitly punished for a fault, often indicated as excusable or unknown to the dreamer. In the 1911 revision of The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), Freud included an analysis of a dream of the famous Austrian poet Peter Rosegger. Freud associated the dream with his own memories of a time when, working in the physiological laboratory under the German physician Ernst Briicke, he admonished himself in a dream for boasting about his scientific and social success. In another emendation, in 1919, Freud introduced the theme of punishment dreams into chapter 7, on the fundamental psychology of the dream processes. The painful quality of dreams of punishment seems to contradict the theory that a dream represents a gratification of a wish. Freud asserted that dreams of punishment indeed represent precisely the wish to be punished, to expiate a fault. In this process, there is no return of a repressed wish but rather a need for punishment that originates with the ego or rather (as he soon would call it, in a note added in 1930) the superego. In Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1916— 1917a [1915-1917]), Freud explored the relationship between punishment and dreams in the chapter devoted to wish fulfillment. In “Some Additional Notes on Dream-Interpretation as a Whole” (1925i), Freud, in discussing the content of dreams in terms of moral responsibility, laid stress on the ego’s censorship of the wishes of the id. In New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1933a), in the chapter on the revision of the theory of dreams, Freud emphasized the superego’s role of repression. The questions Freud posed apropos of punishment dreams are also related to repetition compulsion, discussed in Beyond the INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Pleasure Principle (1920g) and The Economic Problem of Masochism (1924c). ROGER PERRON See also: Dream; Guilt, feeling of; Need for punishment; Self-punishment; Superego. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4: 1-338; 5: 339-625. (1916-1917a [1915-1917]). Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 15-16. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1- 64. (1924c). The economic problem of masochism. SE, 19: 155-170. (19251). Some additional notes on dream-interpretation as a whole. SE, 19: 123-138. - (1933a). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22: 1-182. PURIFIED-PLEASURE-EGO In 1911 Freud, in “Formulations on the two principles of mental functioning” (1911b [1910]), distinguished between a pleasure-ego “that can do nothing but wish, work for a yield of pleasure, and avoid unpleasure,” and a reality-ego that “need do nothing but strive for what is useful and guard itself against damage” (p. 223), then, in 1915 he described a “purified-pleasureego” (p. 136) in the course of his metapsychological reflections on “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes” (1915c). The purified pleasure-ego is the result of a distinction between an ego and a non-ego, and the splitting of both the external and internal world into what is pleasurable and what is not. Certain instincts are considered to be unpleasant and are then rejected or rather “projected” outside, whereas objects that are a source of satisfaction are “introjected.” “The original reality-ego, which distinguished internal and external by means of a sound objective criterion, changes into a purified ‘pleasure-ego’, which places the characteristic of pleasure above all others. For the pleasure-ego the external world is divided into a part that is pleasurable, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS PuURIFIED-PLEASURE-EGO which it has incorporated into itself, and a remainder that is extraneous to it. It has separated off a part of its own self, which it projects into the external world and feels as hostile” (p. 136). We find these same distinctions unchanged in the article entitled “Negation”: “The original pleasure-ego wants to introject into itself everything that is good and to eject from itself everything that is bad. What is bad, what is alien to the ego and what is external are, to begin with, identical” (1925h, p. 237). Following the example of Melanie Klein, who was inspired by this notion to describe projective identification (Manual Furer, 1977; James Grotstein, 1994), the majority of Anglo-Saxon writers who have described the first phases in the development of the mind have referred to this “purified pleasure-ego” as linked to the splitting into “pleasant” and “unpleasant” which becomes “good” and “bad.” The symbiotic phase described by Margaret Mahler is very close to this (Julio Granel, 1987). And Heinz Kohut goes so far as to indicate in a footnote in Forms and Transformations of Narcissism (1966) that “The purified pleasure ego may be considered as a prestage of the structure which is referred to as the narcissistic Self in the present essay” (p. 246n). ALAIN DE MYOLLA See also: Ego; Illusion; “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”; Internal object; Grandiose self; Pleasure ego/reality ego; Primary object; Projection; Reality principle; Shame; Symbiosis/symbiotic relationship; Turning around. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1915c). Instincts and their vicissitudes. SE, 14: 109-140. Furer, Manuel (1977). Psychoanalytic dialogue: Kleinian theory today. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 25, 371-385. Granel, Julio A. (1987). Considerations on the capacity to change, the clash of identifications and having accidents. International Review of Psycho-Analysis, 14, 483-490. Grotstein, James S. (1994). Projective identification and countertransference: a brief commentary on their relationship. Contemporary Psycho-Analysis, 30, 578-592. Kohut, Heinz. (1966). Forms and transformations of narcissism. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 14, 243-272. 1423 PuRPOSIVE IDEA PURPOSIVE IDEA Sigmund Freud used the term purposive idea, above all in his early psychoanalytic writings, to refer to the orienting role of an idea when it is conducive to the sudden appearance of a train of thought (ideas, affects, representations, fantasies, and so on). The stages in this train of thought converge in the direction of this idea, which thus itself seems to be the goal of all of this psychic work. Freud’s main discussion of this notion is found in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a; chapter 7, section 1); thereafter he returned to it only sporadically. His aim in this passage was to refute an objection that had been raised against his method of dream analysis by means of free association; his critics contended the material produced in this way could consist only of isolated fragments and could have no overall meaning. This objection came out of an understanding of associationism in which, at the time, ideas that thus appeared “by chance” could only be brought together based on formal criteria (synonymy, assonance, and so on) or chance (temporal coincidence, for example). It is remarkable that Freud, who elsewhere made extensive use of these formal or contingent factors in association, in this passage challenged the idea of a train of thought occurring by chance. He pointed out that conscious thought is always directed toward a goal to be reached (solution of a problem, preparing for an action, and so on). The same is true, he said, when a train of thought is unconscious and/or bears upon representations that are themselves unconscious: It is always directed toward a goal, even if the subject is unaware of it. Thereafter, when someone was asked, after relating a dream, to proceed by free association, the sequence of the dreamer’s evocations followed an orientation homologous to the one that presided over the dream-work, a process in which the goal to be reached was the fulfillment of a wish. The same applied in the analysis of a symptom, homologous to the work of producing this symptom, which could thus be decrypted. Thus, although Freud subsequently returned to this term only intermittently in his later works, he based the notion on two essential principles: First, the elements of thought, notably representations, are linked together in an ordered sequence (the analysis of several such trains of thought leading in general to a “nodal 1424 point” at the heart of the subject’s problematics); and, second, this sequence is ordered by a finality. ROGER PERRON See also: Fundamental rule; Interpretation of Dreams, The. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. Part I., SE, 4: 1-338; Part II, SE, 5: 339-625. PUTNAM, JAMES JACKSON (1846-1918) American physician and neurologist James Jackson Putnam was born on October, 3, 1846 in Boston, where he died on November 4, 1918. His family belonged to New England’s professional aristocracy. Both his father and grandfather were prominent physicians. His mother admonished him to be good, honest, and not to entirely neglect his social obligations. He studied medicine at Harvard University. In 1870, he went to Europe to learn about electrotherapeutics and neurology, concentrating on anatomy and pathology—whose proponents believed that mental diseases were due to defective heredity, and that brain and mind were parallel systems. He became one of America’s most distinguished specialists in nervous diseases. By the mid-1890s, with, among others, William James, Josiah Royce, and Morton Prince, Putnam experimented with hypnosis and psychotherapy. His practices were rooted in the ideas of Janet, Bernheim, and Charcot, as well as in the virtue and belief in progress that, habitually, was taught to the members of New England’s professional aristocracy. He was aware of Freud’s work, and after meeting Ernest Jones (who then was in Toronto), he began to think that early experiences and childhood sexuality might be important elements in later neuroses and psychoses. Thus, he came to psychoanalysis at the age of sixty-three. Together with William James, Putnam went to hear Freud’s lectures at Clark University in 1909. He was impressed and invited Freud (along with Carl Jung and Sandor Ferenczi) to his camp in the Adirondacks. Nathan Hale (1971b, p. 25) demonstrates that there they forged a friendship, and Putnam became “convinced of Freud’s integrity and sincerity, and from then on marshalled all his energies, prestige, and elo- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS quence, on behalf of psychoanalysis.” Until his death, he lectured on psychoanalysis at Harvard and published twenty-two papers on the subject. In that period, Putnam and Freud exchanged eighty-eight letters, and Freud analyzed Putnam during psychoanalytic congresses. At Freud’s urging, Putnam initiated the founding of the American Psychoanalytical Association in 1911, and the Boston Psychoanalytic Society in 1914. He fiercely defended psychoanalysis against scurrilous attacks. However, Putnam rejected Freud’s bent toward materialism and determinism, and Freud objected to Putnam’s idealistic and philosophical formulations—which led him to urge his patients to ennoble their minds—and to the belief that individuals are ruled by an inherent principle of growth. In Totem and Taboo Freud particularly rebutted the religious elements of Putnam’s book Human Motives, although already before then Putnam’s ideas allegedly had influenced him. Putnam’s convictions originated in his Unitarian upbringing; in Bergson’s belief that memory images are not “stored” in the brain but called up by the sensory-motor system; in his patient’s, Susan Blow’s, argument that “self-activity” expresses the self-determining energy of life; and in Royce’s faith in an unseen ideal. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Putnam, James Jackson (1846-1918) Throughout his life, Putnam was concerned with the moral crises which, in America, were arising out of an ingrained “civil morality’—that engendered hidden conflicts due to expectations of religious purity in upwardly mobile men who were having illicit affairs. Because Putnam’s case notes were destroyed, we do not know how he conducted his therapies. But his stature and esteem, and his dedication to psychoanalysis, were decisive in establishing the discipline on the North American continent. EpITH KuRZWEIL See also: United States. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1912—13a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1—- 161. Hale, Nathan G. Jr. (197la). Freud and the Americans: The beginnings of psychoanalysis in the United States, 1876— 1917. New York: Oxford University Press. Hale, Nathan G. Jr. (1971b). James Jackson Putnam and psychoanalysis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Putnam, James Jackson. (1915). Human motives. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. 1425 an uae Taringa ; meee 1 eve rn el aeons of QUANTITATIVE / QUALITATIVE Qualitative and quantitative are two indissociable adjectives applied to the concept of affect in psychoanalytic theory. From Sigmund Freud to André Green, affect has been approached in terms both of its dynamic (quantitative) and subjective (qualitative) dimensions. The relationship between these two terms evolved in Freud’s work at the same time as the relationship between representation and affect. Initially, representation took priority over affect, the latter being assigned a function of mere coloring, and the emphasis was on the quantitative dimension. As subsequent theoretical revisions were effected, affect took on importance and was no longer studied only in terms of its relationship to representation, and the qualitative dimension thus was given growing prominence. Quantity was the term that appeared first, in an article written by Freud for Villaret’s Encyclopedia (1891). In Studies on Hysteria (1895) Freud took up the term again and used it in an economic sense in his description of the excitation present in the nervous system and its vicissitudes. He took his inspiration from the scientific model of thermodynamics: The psychic apparatus seeks to maintain the sum of excitation at the lowest possible level, either by spreading it out by means of association, or by discharging the surplus. Freud approached the quantitative and qualitative dimensions together for the first time in “Project for a Scientific Psychology,” which was written in 1895 but never published during his lifetime. Although what was at issue was not yet affect but rather psychic energy, the fundamentals of Freud’s future hypotheses can be discerned in this text. He had not yet abandoned the idea of a scientific career in biology, and, as he explained in the introduction, was seeking to bring psychology into the framework of the natural sciences. He divided the psychic apparatus into systems (¢ system of permeable neurones, ¢)-system of impermeable neurones, and w-system of perceptual neurones) in which the psychic processes are quantitatively determined states of material particles, the neurons. The ¢ system refers to exogenous and physical quantities, while the system w refers to internal, mental quantities. The quantity Q derives from hypotheses he had already proposed in an article written the previous year, “The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence,” (1894) in which he distinguished measurable quantity, its variations, the movement associated with this quantity, and its discharge. The affects are thus, according to Freud, internal, secreted discharges. The taking into account of quality is subordinated to this dynamic conception. He had difficulty in approaching this dimension, and for this purpose introduced the third system, w, which he linked to perception. This system is aroused by perceptions, and it is the discharge of this excitation that produces a quality. Further on, he specified that quality appears where the quantity Q has been reduced beforehand. All this thus amounts to the transformation of an external quantity into a quality. Qualitative phenomena are brought back to the vicissitudes of quantity, an idea that Freud expresses in his statement that the tendency to avoid unpleasure is blended with the primary tendency toward inertia. This implies communication between the w and w systems. Freud put considerable emphasis on the sensation of a psychic modification giving the impression of an 1427 QuaNTITATIVE/ QUALITATIVE internal movement, in this way relating indices of quality to information about discharge. Attention is thus brought to bear both on indices of quality belonging to the external properties of the object and on the internal processes of the passage of a psychic quantity, Q. Because he did not allude on this occasion to the w system, it is impossible to say whether it is this system that provides this perception of movement. The confusion grows even further in a correction Freud sent to Fliess, in which he specified that the w system serves only to excite, that is, it is limited to indicating the path to be followed; this would imply that unconscious processes remain unconscious and can acquire only a secondary and artificial consciousness by being linked to processes of discharge and perception. With The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), Freud effected an epistemological break and renounced the biological model, but he nevertheless remained unclear about the qualitative, which remained subordinated to the quantitative. He stressed the quantitative, dynamic aspect of the repression of representations. Affect, independent of the latter, is not transformed in dreams; its quality remains unchanged, although it content is suppressed. Up until his metapsychological writings of 1915 (“Instincts and Their Vicissitudes,’ “Repression’), Freud distinguished two very different things: representation (or ideation) on the one hand, and on the other, the quota of affect representing the instinct. The two have very different vicissitudes. The quota of affect corresponds to instinct that is detached from representation and that finds expression, proportionate to its quantity, in processes that are experienced as affects. This amounts to saying that there are only quantitative differences between different instincts that are qualitatively alike. Freud then pursued this line of thinking and posited a duality between the quantitative factor with representation, on the one hand, and the qualitative factor with affect, on the other. He distinguished the ideational representative from the representative of affect, with the two having different fates. The first disappears from consciousness under the effects of repression. The second has three possible outcomes: suppression of the instinct, expression of a qualitatively defined affect, or transposition of the psychic energy of the instincts into affects. Not until 1924, with the article “The Economic Problem of Masochism,” did Freud come to recognize the relative independence of quantity and quality. At 1428 this point he dissociated states of pleasure and unpleasure from the economic factors of relaxation and tension, and distinguished the Nirvana principle, on the one hand, from the pleasure principle, on the other. The former has the purely quantitative task of reducing the level of psychic energy to zero. The latter is responsible for the qualitative avoidance of unpleasure and the search for pleasure. Affect is thus found in an intermediate position between annihilation by means of discharge, and the desire to transcend it. After Freud, others continued to investigate the connection between the quantitative and qualitative aspects of affect. There remained, however, a tendency to approach affect only in its quantitative dimension, neglecting its qualitative dimension. Only with Green’s book, The Fabric of Affect in Psychoanalytic Discourse (1973/1999), in which he attempted to develop a metapsychology of affect and representation, was the relationship between quantitative and qualitative significantly reexamined. Green described two poles of affect, one economic and the other psychic, that are most often complementary. In its economic aspect, affect can be considered as a quantity of dischargeable energy. This is the primary dimension of affect, closer to the id than to representation, but difficult to distinguish from the latter. In its psychic aspect, the movement of discharge is only incipient, and is overridden by the qualitative dimension. It is found in the form of the pleasure/unpleasure dichotomy, which for Green is “the principle of primary symbolization.” PHILIPPE METELLO See also: Desexualization; Discharge; Erotogenic masochism; Instinctual representative; Otherness; Pleasure/ unpleasure principle; Principle of (neuronal) inertia; “Project for a Scientific Psychology, A”; Quota of affect; Reciprocal paths of influence (libidinal coexcitation); Representation of affect; Hard science and psychoanalysis; Sum of excitation. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1915c). Instincts and their vicissitudes. SE, 14: 109-40. . (1915d). Repression. SE, 14: 141-58. . (1924c). The economic problem of masochism. SE, 19: 155-70. - (1950c [1895]). A project for a scientific psychology. SE, 1: 281-387. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Green, André. (1999). The fabric of affect in psychoanalytic discourse (Alan Sheridan, Trans.). London and New York: Routledge. (Original work published 1973) QUASI-INDEPENDENCE/TRANSITIONAL STAGE In Fairbairn’s revision of classical developmental theory, based in object-relationships rather than libido theory and underlying his theories of psychopathology, quasi-independence, or transitional stage, occurs between the stages of infantile dependence and mature dependency, and is characterized by dichotomy and exteriorization of the incorporated object. Fairbairn’s view of the ego as inherently objectseeking rather than pleasure-seeking, and invested with its own energy, facilitated his move away from instinct/libido theory and psycho-sexual development as delineated by Freud and later Abraham, and allowed him a revised theory of development based on objectrelations. He proposed an early stage of infantile dependence, or primary identification, the object, while still part of the relationship, not yet being differentiated, and the aim (libido) being incorporative, “taking.” Fairbairn described the gradual transformation of quasi-independence into an object-relationship in which the subject and object are fully differentiated, and the aim is “giving,” the stage of mature dependency. In the transition between these stages the object has split into the accepting (loved) and the rejecting (hated) object, attached to the libidinal and antilibidinal egos respectively, and increasing differentiation results in attempts to “exteriorize” these objects, modelled on the known physiological experiences of defecation and urination. The characteristic conflict of the transitional/ quasi-independent stage is between the developmental urge towards mature dependence and the regressive reluctance to relinquish infantile dependence, and Fairbairn described four transitional stages, or rejective techniques, the paranoid, obsessional, hysterical, and phobic, each consisting of different internal relationships and mechanisms, and each underlying specific psychopathologies. Based neither on the sequence of erotogenic zones, nor on “positions,” Fairbairn’s developmental theory is a more psychological and object-related theory than INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Quatriéme Groupe (O. P. L. F.), FourtH Group that of either Freud or Klein, and allows considerable flexibility of theoretical and clinical approach. These ideas have been particularly useful to British Independent analysts, and those interested in self-psychology and intersubjective analysis. JENNIFER JOHNS See also: Fairbairn, William Ronald Dodds; Object relations theory. Bibliography Fairbairn, Ronald. (1952). A revised psychopathology of the psychoses and psychoneuroses. In Psychoanalytic studies of the personality (pp. 28-58). London: Tavistock with Routledge, Kegan Paul. (Reprinted from International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 22 (1941), 250-279.) Greenberg, Stephen, and Mitchell, Jay (1983). Object relations in psychoanalytic theory. Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press. Grotstein, James, and Rinsley, Donald (Eds.). (1994). Fairbairn and the origins of object relations. London: Free Association Books. QUATRIEME GROUPE (0. P. L. F.), FOURTH GROUP The Quatrieme groupe (Fourth group) of the Organisation psychanalytique de la langue francaise (O. P. L. F, French-Language Psychoanalytic Group) is one of the larger psychoanalytic groups in France. It claims to follow principles and methods that have opened up a third way between Lacanism and the standards of the International Psychoanalytical Association. The Quatrieme groupe was born out of the third split in the French psychoanalytic movement, which occurred in March 1969. This was after the 1953 split, which gave rise to the Societe francaise de psychanalyse (French Psychoanalytic Society), and the 1963 split, which divided the Société frangaise de psychanalyse into the Association psychanalytique de France (French Psychoanalytic Association) and the Ecole Freudienne de Paris (Freudian School of Paris), created by Jacques Lacan. The founders of the Quatrieme groupe—Piera Aulagnier, Francois Perrier, and Jean-Paul Valabrega— had been members of the first board of directors of the Ecole Freudienne de Paris, but very soon, with the 1429 Quatrigme Groupe (O. P. L. F.), FourtH Group resignation of Perrier in 1967, followed by that of Valabrega, they reproached him for setting up institutional formations that he had previously criticized. In addition to this criticism of Lacan’s leadership, the direct cause of the split was their rejection of new modes of psychoanalytic training (the “pass”) that Lacan had just put in place in December 1968. The first of the meetings that would result in the formation of the Quatriéme groupe took place in Ermenonville, north of Paris. The group was officially founded on March 17, 1969, and at first included only ten people. Its officers were Francois Perrier, president; Jean-Paul Valabrega, vice-president; Piera Castoriadis-Aulagnier, psychoanalytic secretary; Evelyne-Anne Gasqueres, scientific secretary; Jean-Paul Moreigne, administrative secretary; and Gabrielle Dorey, treasurer. The Quatriéme groupe was founded on considerations of both the essence of psychoanalysis and the form of institution most likely to sustain the principles of its practice and transmission. These considerations resulted from the experience of the Société frangaise de psychanalyse, in which Lacan was the major driving force, but also from a critique of both the institution and practice of Lacanism (most notably, the short sessions). This critique lent its tone to the Quatrieme groupe’s declaration. of principles and methods: “Between the idealism of principles and the authoritarianism of ideologies, it is appropriate to pinpoint difficulties and to define the impossible. ... It will be found that the three terms of ‘ability, ‘membership, and ‘training’ are a source of insoluble conflicts and the sticking points of post-Freudianism” ( Topique, 1 [1969]). The issue of ability was linked to that of the effects of the training analysis, which is particularly dangerous if the training analysis is defined as Lacan did, that is, as aiming at “pure,” as opposed to “applied,” analysis. The issue of membership opened up the possibility of feudal loyalty based solely on analytic affiliations. And the issue of training raised the risk of basing the status of analyst on the attainment of a diploma or on the rituals of collegial recognition. This triple preoccupation can be summed up as a concern over whether an analytic society can manage to banish “alienation” (Mijolla-Mellor, 1996), and it is the basis of a functional mechanism for coping with this difficulty. The Quatrieme group’s declaration of principles and methods ultimately made up what would be called the “Blue Notebook,” that is, the founding charter of 1969 (Topique, 1 [1969]), along with later modifica- 1430 tions to that charter in 1970 (Topique, 6 [1971]), in 1983 (Topique, 32 [1983]), and in 1985 and 1986 (Topique, 38 [1986]). These successive modifications were aimed at “refounding” the institution (during “refounding” sessions) in order to avoid ossification. The two main points of its principles and methods were the following: First, the composition of the group was limited to two categories of membership. Those in the first category were successively called tenured members, then subscribing members, and finally member analysts. Those in the second category were called candidates, then contributors, and then participants. They were not considered trainees, and their status did not guarantee their potential careers as analysts. They were defined as guests—either as colleagues already authorized by other societies or as auditors in the midst of their analyses who wanted to attend the Quatrieme groupe’s scientific events (such as seminars and lectures) or participate in its institutional activities (as observers). Passage from the status of participant to that of member analyst posed difficult issues of recognition and the process of authorization. Second, at the end of a personal analysis, which was not distinguished from a training analysis, whether with a,member of the Quatriéme groupe or not, the candidate analyst, who was usually a participant member, could decide to undertake a “fourth analysis” (analyse quatrieme) with a member analyst. The fourth analysis is a private act based on an agreement between the person who requests it and the analyst who agrees to it. After one or more fourth analyses, during which the applicant not only develops an analytic ear (under supervision) but also learns to pinpoint the effects that identification with one’s own analyst can have on one’s practice, the candidate begins a process of authorization that takes place in between analyses. This process consists of a series of meetings with member analysts who have been chosen by the candidate and have agreed to the request. The “fourth analyst”? may or may not be among them. During these interanalytic meetings there is discussion of a case or any analytic question posed by the participants. After at least two or three of these meetings, there are more meetings with other analysts, always chosen by the candidate. At the end of this usually long process, one of the meetings is declared to be “authorizing” by the member analysts in attendance. They have the responsibility, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS with the agreement of the whole group, of deciding on the authorization of the new member analyst and reporting it to the ratifying assembly. At any time, the candidate can request the participation of an “analytic secretary,” a member elected by the officers of the Quatri¢me groupe, if the candidate thinks it would be useful. The secretary has no decisionmaking power over the candidate. Obviously, this procedure does away with training analysts and the status of trainee. Yet it is strictly codified so that candidates can be authorized only through this process. This procedure has several advantages. Even if there were no committees, commissions, or boards of admissions, the analytic and scientific secretaries would still provide applicants the possibility of discussing the soundness of their interests and abilities. Moreover, member analysts, merely by being chosen to participate in interanalytic meetings, also contribute to advancing the process of recognition. Consulting analysts thus fulfill their roles as institutional representatives, as opposed to the collective lack of responsibility favored by centralized bureaucracies. In addition, whether it is a matter of the interanalytic meetings or of the authorization itself, any conclusions reached or decisions made must be discussed in the presence of the candidate. Finally, the several fourth analyses and several interanalytic meetings guarantee the principle of multiple references in the process of training so that authorization is not reduced to a kind of feudal initiation based on personal loyalty. Naturally, at every step in the process the candidate’s own analyst is prohibited from intervening. In its earlier formulations, the process of authorization also included a final step in which the candidate would write a memoir to be presented to the whole group at a scientific assembly. This presentation marked the moment of the candidate’s acceptance. Even though this practice is no longer followed in quite the same form, candidates, over the course of the long process of authorization, still present their work in meetings of working groups and also possibly at conferences or in scientific journals. The mechanisms that the Quatrieme groupe has put in place aim at responding to a major problem in analytic societies and the principle cause of their dissolution, namely the question of training and authorization. The status of analyst is problematic in that it can only be put to the test during treatment, in the face of an ungraspable entity, the unconscious. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Qu’'ESTE QUE LA SUGGESTION? [WHAT |S SUGGESTION? ] A statement added to the “Blue Notebook” in 1983 concludes, “Our model of analytic training and authorization does not pretend to be permanent or perfect. It would be good if Winston Churchill’s statement about democracy could be applied to it: that it is ‘the worst form of government, with the exception of all the others.’ ” SOPHIE DE MiOLLA-MELLOR See also: Fourth analysis, Analyse quatriéme; France; Pass, the; Splits in psychoanalysis. Bibliography Aulagnier, Piera. (1986). Un interpréte en quéte de sens. Paris: Ramsay. Mijolla, Alain de. (2001). Splits in the French psychoanalytic movement between 1953 and 1964. In R. Steiner and J. Jonas. (Eds.), Within Time and Beyond Time (pp. 1-24). London: Karnac. Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie de. (1996). Aliénator, ou les enjeux theoriques de la troisieme scission dans le mouvement psychanalytique en France. Cliniques méditerraneennes, 49— 50; 79-93: Valabrega, Jean-Paul. (1994). La formation du psychanalyste. Paris: Payot. QU’EST-CE QUE LA SUGGESTION? [WHAT IS SUGGESTION? ] The questions raised in the nineteenth century concerning hypnosis and suggestion continue to preoccupy. It is part of the legend that Freudian psychoanalysis grew out of these practices and distanced itself from them, and Freud himself was careful to establish this part of the legend. In daily life the fascination of these states of mind remains, similar to the state of being in love, and the various other seductions that operate in the social realm. However, psychoanalysts continue to question the nature of Freud’s concept, which associated hypnosis with the wielding of influence. Some feel that psychoanalysis is no longer dependent on the all-seeing eye of one person; is manipulation necessary in the therapeutic relation, or suggestion the guide along the path to freedom? Is suggestion necessary or best avoided? Is it a method of control, or a forced passage toward true reappropriation of the self? The concerns confronting 1431 Question oF LAY ANALYSIS, THE Charles Baudouin are still present in the early twentyfirst century. Initially he published a study, Suggestion and Autosuggestion (1920/1962). This he followed in 1924 with the basic question: What Is Suggestion? Baudouin questioned the power of suggestion and the different conceptions of it at the time. He did not believe it was purely an outside influence; he was absolutely convinced that all effective suggestion is basically autosuggestion, that it is part of the psychology of the subject and not constructed of some social psychology in which several different individuals are in relation with each other. For a while he seemed to draw closer to Emile Coué. He always believed in the power of autosuggestion for the development of the subject, particularly in the context of education. His book develops landmarks in working with the problems posed to him. Is suggestibility in a person normal or pathological? Can there be suggestion without hypnosis? Why should autosuggestion be truly preferrable? MuIREILLE CIFALI See also: Autosuggestion; Baudouin, Charles. Source Citation Baudouin, Charles. (1924). Quest-ce que la suggestion? Introduction a la psychologie de la suggestion et de l'autosuggestion. Neuchatel-Paris: Delachaux & Niestlé. Bibliography Baudouin, Charles. (1962). Suggestion and autosuggestion, a psychological and pedagogical study based upon the investigations made by the new Nancy school (Eden and Cedar Paul, Trans.). London: G. Allen & Unwin. (Original work published 1920) Erickson, Milton H. (1967). Advanced techniques of hypnosis and therapy (Selected papers of Milton Erickson edited by Jay Haley). New York, London: Grune & Stratton. Roustang, Francgois. (1990) Influence. Paris: Minuit. . (1994). Qw’est-ce que ’hypnose?. Paris: Minuit. QUESTION OF LAY ANALYSIS, THE Freud wrote The Question of Lay Analysis as an occasional piece in support of one of his friends, Theodor Reik, who had been accused of practicing medicine 1432 illegally (he was not a physician). He cast it in the form of an informal conversation with an “impartial interlocutor? probably Julius Tandler, the Viennese city councilor for welfare, with whom he had in fact discussed the Reik case. The question of “lay” analysis had been of concern to Freud and his students for a long time because not all of them were physicians. The gap had progressively widened between those who, like Freud, felt that sound training as an analyst was all that mattered, regardless of any previously acquired diplomas, and those (particularly Abraham A. Brill and the Americans) who, considering analysis to be a medical discipline, wanted to prohibit non-physicians from practicing. Ernest Jones launched a major survey of the analytic community before the Innsbruck International Congress in September 1927, at which twentyeight contributions on the subject were discussed without any agreement being reached. Freud wrote a “Postscript” for the occasion, maintaining his claim that analysis could be practiced by non-physicians. Freud opens the imaginary conversation of The Question of Lay Analysis by describing disorders for which the ordinary physician can offer no real help, then proceeds to outline the methods of free association, dream analysis and so on, which seek to shed light on unconscious processes. He provides his putative interlocutor, whose supposed criticisms and questions frequently punctuate the exchange, with some notion, from the dynamic point of view, of his structural theory of the mind, of the instincts and, from the economic point of view, of repression and anxiety, of childhood sexuality, of the Oedipus complex, and so on. This metapsychological overview is followed by an account of the procedures of analytic therapy (transference, resistance, and the art of interpretation). Neither general medicine nor psychiatry prepares the physician for any of this, Freud declares; they may even constitute an obstacle. Special training is required, beginning with a personal analysis, without which even a physician may be no more than a quack. Any legislation on the subject would therefore be more of a hindrance than a help. Freud therefore concludes that analysis may perfectly well be practiced by nonphysicians. Such an analyst would nevertheless need the help of a physician, prior to the analysis, in order to settle diagnostic questions or, in the course of the analysis, to take over in the case of disorders beyond the scope of the analyst: but the same holds for the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS physician analyst. Freud concludes by tracing the program of what the ideal analytical training might involve (p. 246). This work has had considerable influence on the debates that continue to this day on the “question of lay analysis” and the training of analysts. On the whole—though with noticeable variations from country to country—the International Psychoanalytical Association has adopted Freud’s position. ROGER PERRON See also: Lay analysis; Reik, Theodor; “‘Wild’ Psycho- Analysis.” Source Citation Freud, Sigmund. (1926e). Die Frage der Laienanalyse. Unterredungen mit einem Unparteiischen. Leipzig-Vienna-Zurich, Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag; GW, 14: 207-286; The question of lay analysis. SE, 20: 177-250. . (1927a). Nachwort zur Frage der Laienanalyse (1926e). Internationale Zeitschrift ftir Psychoanalyse, 13: 326-332; GW, 14: 287-296; Postscript: The question of lay analysis. SE, 20: 251-258. Bibliography Jones, Ernest. (1959). Free associations. Memories of a psychoanalyst. London: Hogarth. Revue internationale d’histoire de la psychanalyse. (1990). Histoire de l’exercice de l’analyse par les non-médecins, 3. QUOTA OF AFFECT Affects are modes of expressing impulses, manifesting internal states of psychic life based on the two primitive polarities of pleasure and unpleasure, which play an essential role in the totality of mental functioning, especially in the defensive organization of the ego. The concept of affect can be found in the earliest examples of Freud’s psychoanalytic writings (1895d [1893-95}), where it is used to explain hysterical symptoms as a quantity of energy that cannot be discharged and, as a result, remains attached to memory. Therapy involves a recovery of this memory. Language, which is equivalent to the act, enables abreaction and the discharge of affect. Originally, affect was considered by Freud to be a variable amount of excitation, a quantum of affect closely associated with memory traces. André Green INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Quota of AFFECT (1973) elucidated the concept when he spoke of the ideational representative of the impulse and its affectiverepresentative. The idea of affect is also very close to the concept of libidinal energy; whenever the libido is repressed, it can be transformed into anxiety (the first Freudian theory of anxiety). This is perhaps the bestknown example of affect. In 1915 Freud wrote, “For this other element of the psychical representative the term quota of affect has been generally adopted. It corresponds to the instinct in so far as the latter has become detached from the idea and finds expression, proportionate to its quantity, in processes which are sensed as affects” (1915d, p. 152). Here, Freud seems to postulate that repression most deeply weighs upon the ideational representatives, which become unconscious, while affects are not found in the unconscious. They are excluded from consciousness through repression. This vision of affects as charges capable of undergoing conversion (conversion hysteria), displacement (obsessional neurosis), transformation (anxiety neurosis), and being manifested through internal discharges that produce changes in the body of the individual, was substantially modified in Freud’s second theory of anxiety (1926d [1925]). Here, the ego becomes the seat of affects, especially anxiety. Anxiety automatically arises whenever the ego of the nursing child is overwhelmed by an instinctual excitation that it is unable to discharge on its own; gradually, the newborn realizes that the mother will help to dissipate this experience of danger. Subsequently, the ego experiences the loss of the mother as an alarm signaling the arrival of these dangers (signal anxiety). In this same work, Freud also describes other affects, such as psychic pain and sadness. Later, following the Metapsychological Papers, he emphasizes the importance of unconscious feelings of guilt that are part of the affects residing in the ego. These are complex affects that are made manifest through fantasies, such as those mentioned concerning the loss of the mother, in which “ideational representations” and affects are closely intertwined. Melanie Klein (1948/1952) adhered to, and further developed, the Freudian concept of affects. Starting from annihilation anxiety, a primitive affect she conceived as the ego’s reaction to the internal threat caused by the death impulse, more complex affects associated with paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions came into being: persecution anxieties 1433 Quota oF AFFECT and anxieties of depression, sadness, and guilt. Anxieties, therefore, become organized as a modality of fantasies that serve as prototypes of possible interactions of the ego with objects according to basic polarities: pleasure-unpleasure or annihilation experience-security experience. These help organize and determine the ego’s relations with objects through mobilization of the various defense mechanisms that structure the mental life of the individual. FRANCISCO PALACIO EsPASA See also: Anxiety; Cathexis; Complex; Defense; Ego; Emotion; Excitation; I; Ideational representative; Inhibition, Symptoms, and Anxiety; Instinctual impulse; Instinctual representative; Memory; Music and psychoanalysis; Psychic representative; Quantitative/qualitative; 1434 Representation of affect; Repression; Splitting; Suppression; Symptom; Turning around. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1915d). Repression. SE, 14: 141-158. . (1926d [1925]). Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. SE, 20: 77-175. 5 Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2: 48-106. Green, André. (1973). Le discourse vivant: La conception psychanalytique de l’affect. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Klein, Melanie. (1952). Concerning the theory of anxiety and guilt. In M. Klein, P. Heimann, S. Isaacs, and J. Riviere (Eds.), Developments in psychoanalysis. London: Hogarth. (Original work published 1948) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS RACAMIER, PAUL-CLAUDE (1924-1996) The French psychiatrist and psychoanalyst Paul- Claude Racamier was born on May 20, 1924, in Pontde- Roide, and died on August 18, 1996, in Besancon. The youngest of three brothers, Racamier had solid roots in his native Franche-Comté by way of his father, who came from a Catholic family in the Dréme and worked as an engineer at the Peugeot factory, and his mother, who came from a Protestant family in the Montbeliard region. Racamier’s mother considered her son’s health to be delicate and home-schooled him until the age of nine; this experience imparted a life-long stance marked by a passion for very individualistic ideas and a refusal of all conformism. After receiving a good secondary education in Montbéeliard, he studied medicine in Besancon and then in Paris; he passed the medical exam qualifying him to practice in the psychiatric hospitals in 1952. Racamier spent the first part of his career at the psychiatric hospital in Prémontré, where he worked from 1952 to 1962. Shocked by the dehumanizing conditions there, he established an improved setting for patients in his ward and gradually developed the therapeutic services of the institution itself. He then followed the same course of action in Switzerland, at the clinic of Rives de Prangins (1962-66), and subsequently at La Velotte, a treatment facility he created near Besancon in 1967, which would become his life’s work. A limited number of patients (twelve at most), as many caregivers as patients, places for daytime activities and treatment, clearly separated from tastefully decorated and furnished, family-style living quarters, maintaining close contact with families, and so forth—such were the facility’s principles. They were based on Racamier’s original theories. These theories were nevertheless closely linked to Racamier’s psychoanalytic training and activity. After undergoing analysis with Marc Schlumberger (and later with Evelyne Kestemberg), he worked with Sacha Nacht and Francis Pasche. He became a member of the Société psychanalytique de Paris (SPP; Paris Psychoanalytical Society) in 1958 and was elected to permanent membership in 1962. He taught at the University of Lausanne from 1962 to 1967, and then at the faculties of medicine and human sciences in Besan¢on. At the same time, he conducted many psychoanalytic and psychiatric training seminars; he served as director of the SPP’s Institut de psychanalyse (Institute of Psychoanalysis) from 1975 to 1982. Racamier’s collaboration with colleagues who created and ran the mental health services of the 13th arrondissement in Paris (Philippe Paumelle, Serge Lebovici, René Diatkine, Rene Angelergues) led to a collectively authored book entitled Le Psychanalyste sans divan (The psychoanalyst without a couch; 1970). In this book Racamier stressed an idea he would often return to: the need to simultaneously “care for” patients, caregivers, the group they form, the institution where they live, and families. The key word is to fight against the repetition compulsion that tends toward a routine where everything becomes fixed. His theoretical writings originated in his practice working with adult psychoses: in Les Schizophrenes (Schizophrenics; 1980), he sought to show the “paradoxality” at work in these disorders. But his ideas went further. So did the ideas that came out of his work with patients suffering from postpartum psychoses. 1435 Racism, ANTI-SEMITISM, AND PSYCHOANALYSIS Developing the notions of “mothering” and “motherhood,” he found close links between maternal psychosis and the child’s development; beyond this, he showed that in such situations, the entire process of “personnation, the sense of being an autonomous, coherent, and continuous person, is disturbed. The same spirit of “going further” is evident in the notion of the Antoedipus (1989), a key element in Racamier’s thinking. In coining this term, Racamier intended to refer to both the “anti-oedipal” (that which is an obstacle to the oedipal organization) and the “ante-oedipal” (that to which the psyche is thus sent back); thus, in a “world of non-object objects,” the “anti-fantasy fantasies,” the “fantasies of selfprocreation” that radically cancel out sexual and generational differences and the like, lead, according to the vicissitudes of this “shattered Antoedipus,” to psychosis or narcissistic perversions. However, the outcome of the Antoedipus is not necessarily so tragic: it remains present but discreet in the oedipal structures, contributing to their fluctuations and necessary reequilibrations. This central notion is taken up anew in Le Génie des origines: Psychanalyse et psychoses (The genius of origins: Psychoanalysis and psychoses; 1992), where Racamier articulated it, on one side, with the notion of primal mourning (renunciation of total possession of the object), and on the other, with a eulogy to ambiguity (to be distinguished from ambivalence), the condition for a psychic life that is sufficiently flexible, rich, and creative. Racamier’s final work, L’Inceste et l’incestuel (Incest and the incestuous; 1995) returns to and broadens these ideas by going back to the very bases of his theorization, with the “incestuous,” that is, the totality of parent-child relations (particularly mother-child relations) that, by way of multiple substitutions, aim to maintain the eroticized narcissistic union of mutual seduction and block the oedipal organization. Throughout, this succession of works shows the development and blossoming of a lively and original way of thinking that inevitably resonates with that of Donald W. Winnicott, Wilfred Bion, or even Jacques Lacan, even though Racamier, firmly anchored in his own practice, was not greatly concerned with backing it up with the theories of other authors. Racamier left behind a substantial life’s work, through his creation of institutions for the care of adult psycho- 1436 tics and his practice there, through the theoretical contributions that were both the fruit of and the support for that practice, and, finally, through his teaching. ROGER PERRON See also: Ambivalence; Criminology and psychoanalysis; Delusion; Double bind; France; Incest; Infantile psychosis; Paradox; Parenthood; Postnatal/postpartum depression; Puerperal psychoses; Self-representation; Tenderness; Weaning. Bibliography Bayle, Gérard. (1997). Paul-Claude Racamier. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Racamier, Paul-Claude. (1980). Les schizophrenes. Paris: Payot. . (1989). Antoedipe et ses destins. Paris: Apsygee. . (1992). Le Génie des origines: Psychanalyse et psychoses. Paris: Payot. . (1995). L’Inceste et l’Incestuel. Paris: Editions du College de psychanalyse groupale et familiale. Racamier, Paul-Claude, et al. (1970). Le Psychanalyste sans divan. Paris: Payot. RACISM, ANTI-SEMITISM, AND PSYCHOANALYSIS The word race is derived from the Italian razza (fifteenth century, “sort or species”); the concept of racism arose from the nineteenth-century development of anthropology and the life sciences, notably genetics. A naturalist, zoologizing scientific tendency led to the classification and hierarchical arrangement of human groups according to their specific history and their morphological, cultural, or psychological characteristics, which were deemed to be hereditary. Against this backdrop, an ideological application of the term race came to justify discrimination, segregation, exploitation, expulsions, and ultimately the twentieth century’s industrialization of mass murder and extermination camps. Pierre-André Taguieff (1998) has pointed out that “protoracist” social phenomena grounded in xenophobia and ethnocentrism antedated the coining of INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS the word racism. He adduces three instances of such protoracism: 1. The myth of “pure blood,” in fourteenth-toseventeenth- century Spain and Portugal, which underlay the statutes of 1449 (estatutos de limpieza de sangre) barring all honors, privileges, public positions, or employment to converted “new Christians” and their descendants; such Moors or Jews (in practice, mainly Jews) were decreed to be “unclean,” smirched (maculados), and carriers of foul infections. 2. The colonial slave system and the exploitation of “colored peoples’—black and Indian—in the West Indies and the Americas in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which nourished fears of contamination associated with the color of the “skin” and “blood.” 3. The French aristocratic doctrine of an antagonism between “two races”: nobles with “clear and pure” blood and “commoners” whose blood was “vile and abject.” The “purity of the blood” and its corollary, the shame associated with contamination, which was feared to bring about a transmissible degradation or degeneration, gave rise to a phobia of interbreeding, of any mixing of races or misalliance with respect to lineage. The groundwork of racism was thus laid before any of the modern taxonomies of race appeared. The distinction between humans and “subhumans” gives rise to feelings of fear, hatred, and rejection, to fantasies of dangerousness and absolute possession projected onto the “uncanny” stranger. The ideology of race purification is founded on such feelings. The associations of the defense mechanisms involved (purifying, purging, purifying, cleaning, disinfecting, and so on) reflect an underlying fantasy of absolute autonomy that embodies violent ideas and hostility toward structures of kinship. The ideology of racism had its master thinkers. In France, Arthur de Gobineau, in The Inequality of Human Races (1853-55), distinguished three main races: the black, the yellow, and the white. He extolled “race consciousness” and, thanks to Richard Wagner among others, found a growing audience in Germany. Georges Vacher de Lapouge’s L’Aryen, son role social (The Aryan and his role in society; 1889-90) subdivided the white race into the superior “dolichocephalic? Aryans and the inferior “brachycephalic” variety, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Racism, ANTI-SEMITISM, AND PSYCHOANALYSIS which included Jews. Spurred on by the Dreyfus Case, Edouard Drumont, in his La France juive (Jewish France; 1886), held the Jews to account for the “devastating calamities” of socialism, internationalism, and nihilism. Richard Wagner’s son-in-law, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, whose Foundations of the Nineteenth Century (1899) was to bring grist to the mill of the Nazis, further exacerbated the rift between Germans and Jews by taxing the latter with the notorious blood libel: die Blutschande, literally “blood shame’—a charge ideally designed to project onto the Jews a perverse fantasy of transgression of the prohibition against incest. And in 1895 Alfred Ploétz brought in the expression “racial hygiene,” echoed later in the German Rassenhygien. So many words bear witness to the eugenic obsession that underpins all xenophobic and racist thinking. Anti-Semitism itself is a word that was coined in Germany by Wilhelm Marr, founder of the Antisemitic League, in a pamphlet on “the victory of Judaism over Germanism” (1879). The bloody tradition of anti-Jewish sentiment comes all the way from the ancient world down to what Roberto Finzi (1997/1998) has called the “tragic epilogue of the Shoah.” (Shoah is Hebrew for “catastrophe,” and denotes the Nazi genocide of the Jews; the term genocide was for its part introduced by Raphaél Lemkin in 1944 in his Axis Rule in Occupied Europe.) On the ever-fecund dunghill of anti-Jewish stereotypes bequeathed by the collective imaginings of medieval Christianity, which deemed “the Jew” a “deicide” and a perfidious contemner of the word of Christ the Savior, the Jews of Central Europe were subjected to senseless demonization and accused of the “ritual murder” of children during Passover. Forced to live in restricted areas under discriminatory laws, they were the frequent victims of boycotts and pogroms (a Russian word meaning destruction)—explosive and bloody outbursts reflecting the envious and fearful animosity that they aroused. The culture of antisemitism, whose denunciations of the supposed “Jewish race” sometimes had a left-wing tinge to them (as witness, in France, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Charles Fourier, and Alphonse Toussenel—who inspired Drumont—or, in Germany, Werner Sombart), was buttressed by an “economic” dimension which threw suspicion on the Jews as putative promoters and developers of the capitalist system. This calumny 1437 Racism, ANTI-SEMITISM, AND PSYCHOANALYSIS reached its acme in 1920 with the legend of a worldwide Jewish-Masonic conspiracy founded on the spurious Protocols of the Elders of Zion (1894-1905), forged by the Czar’s secret police. National Socialism carried anti-Semitism to its apotheosis. As dictator of the Third Reich, Hitler reintroduced the medieval ghetto and, taking his cue from the massacre of the Armenians in 1915, planned the genocide of the Jews (the idea was broached by him as early as 1925, in Mein Kampf), to whom he later added Gypsies and homosexuals. Germany, for Hitler, had to become judenfrei (“Jew-free”) and judenrein (“cleansed of Jews”). This will to genocide was enshrined as a doctrine of state in the Nuremberg laws (1935), later imitated in Italy (1938) and in Vichy France’s Jewish statutes of 1940-41. After World War II, new legal concepts became indispensable in order to conduct the Nuremberg Trials (1945-46), among them “crimes against humanity,’ “crimes against peace,” and “war crimes.” Racism and genocide cannot help but oblige us to consider the epistemological underpinnings of an obsession with eugenics: genesis, gene, generation, genealogy, genus engendering eugenics, genocide. From the Freudian perspective, the differences between human beings, between the sexes, and between generations, lying as they do at the heart of the hominizing process, lie in the development and sublimation of murderous, parricidal, and incestuous wishes, and hence too the structuring recognition of heredity, otherness and civilization. Beginning in 1912, with Totem and Taboo and his formulation of the myth of the murder of the primal father, as well as with the watershed or pivotal work that underlay “On Narcissism” (1914c), Freud broadened his thinking from the field of the individual to that of humanity in a collective sense. He was especially interested, against the background of World War I, in the narcissistic stakes in play for the libido and for power in mass-psychological phenomena, as he was, too, in the relationship to death. These concerns were evident in “Thoughts for the Times on War and Death” (1915b), Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921c), and Civilization and Its Discontents (1930a [1929]). Meanwhile, he pursued his reflections on the function of the individual psyche, and almost simultaneously, he produced works raising questions about the enigma of the “Uncanny” (1919h) 1438 and about the repetition compulsion and the death instinct (Beyond the Pleasure Principle [1920g]). The attention Freud paid to the “uncanny” stranger who is at the same time “secretly familiar,’ and who may in fact be understood as an “internal enemy,” was in fact the core of his thinking about racism and _ anti- Semitism. In Moses and Monotheism (1939a [1934-38]), Freud stressed the part played by the Oedipus complex in Judaism, “a religion of the father,’ as in Christianity, “4 religion of the son” (p. 88). He brought up the issue of circumcision, suggested that the claim of the Jews to be the chosen people was a cause of jealousy, and evoked the “narcissism of minor differences,’ which, by exaggerating the sense of belonging, constituted an obstacle to the effective sublimation of the instincts, to the formalizing role of the superego, to the greater sense of sanctity vouchsafed by monotheism and ethics. Rudolph Loewenstein dedicated his Christians and Jews: A Psychoanalytical Study (1952) to Christians who sacrificed themselves for persecuted Jews. In his view Judeophobia was a form of demonophobia, and as such an incurable “hereditary psychosis” that had existed since antiquity. The “Nazi religion,’ which preached the supremacy of the Aryan race, exalting earth and blood, the primacy of force over right, and the revolt of the instincts against the universal value of the superego, was certainly anti-Jew, but it was also anti-Christian. According to Imre Hermann (1945), anti-Semitism is a collective sickness that is endemic as well as epidemic in nature. In Hermann’s theory of attachment, the “clinging instinct,’ coupled with the instinct for knowledge, was the foundation of the mother/infant dual unity. Basing himself on the “clinging instinct/ dermic system” combination, which he saw as the beginning of social contact, he saw the unconscious roots of the Nazi thesis that equated non-Aryans, and especially Jews, to vermin, germs or vampires in a specific kind of cathexis of the “skin” of the social body. The pleasure obtained by masses of people clinging in regressive fashion to a gigantic nourishing mother would account, in Imre’s view, for the fascination with a leader who promised the “miraculous” destruction of the people that invented monotheism. Drawing on his biopsychic and prenatal theory of narcissism, Bela Grunberger (1997) has described INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS specifically Christian anti-Semitism as a grandiose narcissistic aspiration to purity, as the rejection of an anality unintegrated into the self and its projection onto Judaism, which, being an authentic moral system underpinned by the oedipal paternal principle, has done away with the narcissistic maternal principle. “Desolation,” a major concept in Hannah Arendt’s reflection on the origins of totalitarianism, may be said to correspond, on the level of political philosophy, to what Freud, in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926d) and The Future of an Illusion (1927c), and other psychoanalysts after him, referred to as “Hilflosigheit,’ meaning a state of helplessness (that of the human infant). The view that heredity informs totalitarian racism in general and the genocide of the Jews in particular implies a systematic attack on the links of kinship and marriage and tends towards the structural actualization of what Pierre Legendre (1989) has called a “slaughter-house theory of heritage.” The psychoanalytical reflections of Janine Altounian and Helene Piralian on the Armenian “catastrophe” or those of Jacques Ascher on the “extermination of extermination” likewise testify to the gravity of the injuries sustained. The genocide carried out by the Nazis was the outcome of a “culture of extermination” (Gillibert and Wilgowicz). This pure culture of the death instinct, characterized by collective phenomena of adherence to a leader who has replaced the ideal ego, is constitutive of what Wilgowicz has described as a “historic mass vampirism” founded on infanticide and matricide/parenticide and on a disavowal of both birth and death, which destroys the narcissistic bases of identity in the survivors. As of 2005, three generations after the Shoah, the repercussions were still being felt. JACQUES ASCHER AND PEREL WILGOWICZ See also: Austria; Chertok, Léon; Christians and Jews: A Psychoanalytical Study; Fanon, Frantz; France; Germany; Hermann, Imre; Judaism and psychoanalysis; Langer, Marie Glass Hauser de; Moses and Monotheism; Narcissism of minor differences; Politics and psychoanalysis. Bibliography Arendt, Hannah. (1951). The origins of totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. Finzi, Roberto. (1998). Anti-semitism (Maud Jackson, Trans.). New York: Interlink. (Original work published 1997) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Racker, HeinricH (1910-1961) Freud, Sigmund. (1912—13a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1- Ode . (1914c). On narcissism: An introduction. SE, 14: 67-102. . (1915b). Thoughts for the times on war and death. SE, 14: 273-300. —. (1919h). The “uncanny.” SE, 17: 217-256. . (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1-64. . (1921c). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. SE, 18: 65-143. . (1926d [1925]). Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. SE, 20: 75-172. . (1927c). The future of an illusion. SE, 21: 1-56. . (1930a [1929]). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21: 57-145. . (1939a [1934-38]). Moses and monotheism. SE, 23: 1-137. Gillibert, Jean, and Wilgowicz, Perel (Eds.). (1993). L’Ange exterminateur (Proceedings of the Colloque de Cerisy). Brussels: Editions Universitaires de Bruxelles. Grunberger, Bela, and Desuant, Pierre. (1997). Narcissisme, christianisme, antisémitisme. Paris: Actes Sud. Hermann, Imre. (1945). Az Antiscemizsmus. Budapest: Bibliotheca. Legendre, Pierre. (1989). Le Crime du caporal Lortie, traité sur le pere. Paris: Fayard. Loewenstein, Rudolph M. (1952). Christians and Jews: A psychoanalytical study. New York: International Universities Press. Taguieff, Pierre-Andre. (1998). La couleur et le sang. Paris: Mille et Une Nuits. RACKER, HEINRICH (1910-1961) Heinrich Racker, a doctor of philosophy, was born in Poland in 1910 and died in Buenos Aires on January 2,901; When World War I broke out his family sought refuge in Vienna. In the course of his youth he acquired a solid grounding in general culture: He took an interest in literature, discovered psychoanalysis, and became an excellent pianist. In 1935 he obtained a doctorate in philosophy and one year later he was 1439 Ravo, SANDoR (1890-1972) admitted to the Vienna Institute of Psychoanalysis, where he was analyzed by Jeanne Lampl-de Groot. In 1937 he enrolled as a medical student. One year later the Anschluss took place. Racker fled from Vienna, finally emigrating to Buenos Aires in 1939 after many vicissitudes. In spite of his financial difficulties he commenced analysis with Angel Garma, who generously received him. He later did his training analysis with Marie Langer and in 1946 he completed his training in the Argentine Psychoanalytic Association (APA). In 1947 he became a subscribing member of the Association and a full member in 1950, becoming a training analyst one year later. Racker was very young when he presented his first work on countertransference, a subject that was to confirm his reputation as one of the most original analysts in the history of the discipline. Presented at an APA conference in September 1948, “La neurosis de contratransferencia” (The countertransference neurosis) made a very strong impression. In this paper, which was not published for another five years, Racker emphasized the dialectical relation that exists between the transference and the countertransference. He revolted against the myth of the impersonal analyst and pointed out that countertransference reactions can give the analyst an indication of what is happening for the analysand. This was the essential point in the new theory of the countertransference that came into being in the middle of the twentieth century. | Simultaneously, at the sixteenth International Congress (Zurich, 1949) Paula Heimann presented her study On Countertransference, which was published in 1950. Without any consultation between them, Racker and Heimann had reached the same conclusions. But, as Cesio (1961) pointed out, whereas Racker developed the subject without delay and succeeded in interesting the scientific community, it took Heimann ten years to reconsider the question and her work had only a small impact. In the 1950s Racker produced fundamental work. “Observaciones sobre la contratransferencia como instrumento técnico” (Observations on the countertransference as a technical instrument), presented to a conference in 1951 and published one year later, and “Los significados y usos de la contratransferencia” (Meanings and uses of the countertransference), in 1953, published in the Psychoanalytic Quarterly in 1957. 1440 Apart from his studies of the countertransference, Racker wrote essays on music, art, and literature, which were published in book form in 1957. Psychopathological stratification was another of his interests, on which he published an article in the same year. Although his publications and his work as an analyst and teacher were the most remarkable aspects of his activity, Racker also shone through his participation in the life of the Argentinean Association. With the publication of his work on psychoanalytic technique, Racker was appointed Sloan Visiting Professor at the Menninger School of Psychiatry, as well as being made a member of the symposium “The factors of healing in psychoanalysis” at the Edinburgh International Congress in 1961. Death did not leave him the time to complete these tasks. But in November 1960 he gave a conference entitled “Psychoanalysis and Ethics,” which was published 1966, after his death. It was the crowning glory of a noble life and a message of love for science, psychoanalysis, and humanity. He died in 1961, aged fifty, at the height of his creativity. R. Horacio ETCHEGOYEN See also: Argentina; Change; Empathy. Bibliography Racker, Heinrich. (1951). Observaciones sobre la contratransferencia como instrumento técnico. Revista de psicoanalists de la Asociacion psicoanalitica argentina. (1953). A contribution to the problem of countertransference. International Journal of Psycho- Analysis, 34 (4), 313-324. . (1957). The meanings and uses of countertransference. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 26 (3), 303-357. . (1957). Psicoandlisis del espiritu. Buenos Aires: Nova. A.P.A. . (1968). Transference and countertransference. New York: International Universities Press. (Original work published 1960) RADO, SANDOR (1890-1972) Sandor Rado, a Hungarian psychoanalyst and physician, was born in 1890 in Kisvarda, Hungary, and died on May 14, 1972, in New York City. Rad6 grew up ina middle-class business family 100 miles from Budapest. He studied at the Universities of Berlin, Bonn, and INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Vienna, completing a political science degree in Budapest in 1911. He then enrolled in medical school in Budapest. In 1913, Rado became, with four others, one of the founding members of the Hungarian Psychoanalytic Society. He first met Freud before World War I, due to an introduction from Rad6o’s mentor, Sandor Ferenczi. In 1924, when Rado was already prominent in Berlin, Freud chose him to replace Otto Rank as editor-in-chief of the most important analytic journal, the Zeitschrift. Rado was known as an outstanding theoretician, and in Europe analyzed people of the stature of Wilhelm Reich, Heinz Hartmann, and Otto Fenichel. When the New York Psychoanalytic Society was establishing its first Training Institute in 1931, Rado was invited to be the founding director. In 1935 difficulties arose between himself and Freud. The Viennese analysts around Freud were a palace guard of advisors who long envied Rado’s special position. Freud resented the way Rado had been helping analysts to leave the continent for the United States. Rad6é had opposed Freud’s plan to build a new international institute in Vienna after Hitler came to power. The crisis between Freud and Rado in 1935 was occasioned by a critical review of one of the Rado’s monographs written by Jeanne Lampl-de Groot, then a current patient of Freud’s. The review appeared to be published with Freud’s tacit endorsement. Then, shortly after Karen Horney had been demoted by the education committee of the New York Psychoanalytic Society, Rado was deposed as educational director. In 1944, just as Rado was to found the Psychoanalytic Clinic at Columbia University’s medical school, he was thrown out of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute as a training analyst. Even before then he was viewed as a traitor. Unlike other so-called dissidents within Freud’s movement, who chose to make their appeal to the general reading public, Rado wanted to go deeper into university medicine. Rado had been from the outset of his career in Berlin especially concerned with establishing standards of education and training. Some of his papers from those years, on melancholia and drug addiction for example, continue to seem outstanding. As time went on Rado, like other rebels in analysis, worked out new terms for old concepts. For some years he was a member of the New York State Mental Hygiene Council, and both INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Ravo, SAnvor (1890-1972) Governors Averell Harriman and Nelson Rockefeller supported his work with state grants. Rado retired from Columbia in 1955, after which he helped to create the New York School of Psychiatry at the State University of New York, where he was director for ten years. Rado came to oppose the idea that the removal of repressions and the emergence of buried memories can necessarily be expected to have good therapeutic effects. Also, he thought that the provoking of transferences was a Clinical mistake, since regression undermined a patient’s capacity for autonomy and self-reliance. In addition, Rado was prescient enough to have emphasized the significance of genetics for the future of psychoanalytic psychiatry. Rado was a sophisticated European man of letters, who belongs to the radical left within the history of analysis; but it has remained a fragmented tradition of so-called dissenters. Although Rado was for a time allied with New York’s Abram Kardiner, and Rado’s work on therapy was similar to the ideas of his fellow Hungarian Franz Alexander, these critics of the “mainstream” in analysis have rarely hung together. None of them would have dreamed of citing approvingly such earlier “heretics” as Carl Jung, Alfred Adler, or Rank. The nonconformists have been the ones with the original ideas, even though their position has so far won them inadequate recognition. It is hard to become educated in the real story of analysis because of the sectarianism that has afflicted the movement. As of 2005, some of the most persuasive present-day critics of Freud are only now reinventing concepts that were first advanced many years ago. Rado’s later writings can be hard to follow. He disdained popularizations and put his faith in medical science. Like Freud himself, Rado was a spell-binder who spoke like a book. Yet Rado underestimated Freud’s contribution to the humanities, and was intolerant of the significance of analysis for philosophy and the social sciences. Within psychiatry itself, though, Rado may well turn out to have been prophetic. PauL ROAZEN See also: Addiction; Alcoholism; Germany; American Academy of Psychoanalysis; Bulimia; Dipsomania; Hungarian School; Hungary; Internationale Zeitschrift fiir (arztliche) Psychoanalyse; Melancholic depression; New York Psychoanalytic Institute; United States. 1441 RaimBautt, Emice (1923-1998) Bibliography Rado, Sandor. (1956-62). Psychoanalysis of Behavior, Vols. 1 and 3. New York: Grune & Stratton. . (1969). Adaptational Psychodynamics. (Jean Jameson and Henriette Klein, Eds.). New York: Science House. Roazen, Paul, and Swerdloff, Bluma. (1995). Heresy: Sandor Rado and the Psychoanalytic Movement. New Jersey: Aronson. RAIMBAULT, EMILE (1923-1998) Emile Raimbault, a French physician, psychologist, psychoanalyst, and member of the Ecole Freudienne de Paris, was born in Anjou on October 21, 1923, and died at Saumur on August 21, 1998. He first studied psychology, then, on the advice of Jacques Lacan, with whom he commenced his psychoanalysis, he also began to study medicine. He followed Lacan into the Société frangaise de psychanalyse on the occasion of the split in 1953. Michael Balint, the first guest of this society, encouraged him and his wife, Ginette Raimbault, to regularly attend the “training cum research” seminars (“training seminars for physicians on the therapeutic relationship”) that he gave at the Tavistock Clinic in London under the auspices of the National Health Service. The Balint and Raimbault families became close friends. Along with his wife and Jacques Gendrot, Emile Raimbault soon started one of the first “Balint groups” in France. This mixed group (physicians, interns, physiotherapists, an odontologist, and trainee psychoanalysts) met in the Raimbaults’ home in Paris. Known by the name of their street, the “Marignan group” became a reference for those that followed. Raimbault also practiced as an analyst under Raoul Kourilsky in the Saint-Antoine hospital, where the pneumologist began to experiment in 1949 with a new type of consultation conducted by a “therapeutic pair”: an organicist physician and an analyst. Raimbault then introduced, in addition to listening to the patient’s unconscious, listening to the suffering of the medical team treating dying patients: he created the first Balint group in the hospital department. His experience resulted in his being appointed director of the psychooncology team in the Institut Gustave-Roussy, a position he occupied for fifteen years. 1442 Along with Raoul Kourilsky and Jacques Gendrot, Raimbault co-edited the proceedings of the first congress in France, after the Brighton congress, of Balint leaders, held in the Paris medical faculty in 1964 and at the Trianon in Versailles. He was also responsible for a report on the leaders’ meeting, published in the same volume. He also wrote an essay on death with the title La Delivrance. Mrcuette Moreau Ricaup See also: Balint group. Bibliography Raimbault, Emile, et al. (1964). La Formation psychologique des médecins. Paris: Maloine. . (1976). La Délivrance. Paris: Mercure de France. RAMBERT, MADELEINE (1900-1979) Madeleine Rambert, a Swiss psychoanalyst, was born in 1900 in Lausanne, where she died on May 17, 1979. The daughter of a pastor in the Free Evangelical Church of Vaud, she trained to be a teacher and soon specialized in handling backward children. She opened a facility for such children in Croix-sur-Romainm6tier. To improve her training she moved the facility to Lausanne and enrolled in classes at the Institut Jean- Jacques-Rousseau, where she studied psychoanalysis. She was psychoanalyzed by Raymond Saussure and, after being supervised by Philipp Sarasin in Basel, she began practicing child psychoanalysis and became a member of the Société Suisse de Psychanalyse (Swiss Psychoanalytic Society) in 1942. That same year, Lucien Bovet founded the Office Medico-Pédagogique (Medical Training Center) in Vaud. Rambert worked at the Center, training the doctors and psychologists who came to practice there. She is best known for her use of puppet therapy. She published a description of the technique in 1938, and again in 1945 in Children in Conflict, Twelve Years of Psychoanalytic Practice, which included a preface by Jean Piaget. The book became an international success. Observation of the child at play led to the identification and interpretation of standard behaviors, which the game triggered. Rambert was closely associated with the Vienna school and described three phases in INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS the treatment of the child: exteriorization of conflict; conscious realization and elimination of the neurotic conflict; and re-education. During the 1960s and 1970s, she continued her training activities with teachers at the Pestalozzi School (Switzerland) and worked with delinquent women. In this way she was able to perpetuate her educational and social work, which characterize her role as one of the first clinicians in the field of child psychoanalysis in Switzerland. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Switzerland (French-speaking). Bibliography Rambert, Madeleine. (1938). Une nouvelle technique en psychanalyse infantile: le jeu de guignols. Revue francaise de psychanalyse, 10, 1. . (1945). Children in conflict, twelve years of psychoanalytic practice (Yvette Moxley, Trans.). New York: International Universities Press. Roch, Marcel (1979). Mademoiselle Madeleine Rambert (1900-1979). Bulletin de la Société suisse de psychanalyse, 9, 21-22. RANK-MINZER (MUNZER), BEATA (1886-1961) Psychoanalyst Beata Rank was born on February 16, 1886, in Neusandetz near Krakow, Poland, then part of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. She died on April 11, 1961, in Boston. Her life can be divided into four distinctive periods in different countries, which in turn delineated her professional career. Originally named Beata Minzer (or Munzer), she was born into a middle-class, assimilated Jewish family. Early on she chose for herself the name Tola, used by family and friends, but never professionally. Her mother was one of 12 children, several of whom became professionals or business people. Beata’s interest in psychology and the arts was encouraged by an aunt who had studied in Vienna and is credited with introducing her to her future husband, Otto Rank. Otto had been drafted into the army and stationed in Krakow where he was the editor of the Krakauer Zeitung from 1916 to 1918. Beata and Otto were married in a Jewish ceremony on INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS RaNK-MINZER (MuNzer), BEATA (1886-1961) November 7, 1918, a week before the armistice. The young couple moved back to Vienna soon thereafter. Vienna, 1918-1926: This period covers the last years of the Rank-Freud relationship, culminating with the well-documented, yet still not completely understood, final break. Beata and Otto’s only child, Helene, was born on August 23, 1919. With Freud’s and her husband’s encouragement, Beata attended meetings, seminars, and lectures on psychoanalysis. She worked with Otto in the Verlag. Her interest in dream work led to her translation into Polish in 1923 of Freud’s book Uber Traume (On Dreams), and a later inquiry into the dreams of six-year-old schoolchildren. Also in 1923 she presented a paper to the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society which served as her ticket of admission to the group. It appeared in Imago in 1924 in the original German. An English translation of the title would be “The role of woman in the development of human society.” The Imago paper was meant as an introduction to a large three-part study on the subject, which was never completed. Paris, 1926-1936: In 1924 Otto began visiting the United States, teaching, lecturing, and seeing patients. By 1926 the relationship with Freud had seriously deteriorated, and the Rank family moved to Paris. This was seen as a compromise since Beata did not want to move to the United States, while artistic and cultural Paris had great appeal. As for Otto, Paris was a rest stop. He would build an American practice and earn a good income while increasing his American visits. Beata did not engage in clinical work during her Paris years, but continued research at the Bibliotheque Nationale on the role of women. In 1933, Otto, with the encouragement of some American colleagues, developed the Psychological Center and Summer Institute, a training, teaching, and general education center, and Beata worked with him primarily as an administrator. In 1934 there was a “de facto” dissolution of their marriage when Otto emigrated to the United States. This was also the time when he and Anais Nin became involved. Beata remained in Paris while their daughter Helene completed her French baccalaureate. Then, with Fascism extending its power, she decided to leave. Boston, 1936-1969: Beata, still legally married to Otto, was able to enter the United States with Helene in the fall of 1936 as permanent residents under Otto’s visa. Beata came to Boston where she was quickly accepted in the Boston psychoanalytic community, 1443 Rank (ROSENFELD), OTT0 (1884-1939) due especially to the help of her longtime close friends from Vienna, Helene and Felix Deutsch. She came into her own as a prominent child analyst, as well as a highly respected supervisor and training analyst at the Boston Psychoanalytic Institute, where she was chair of the education committee for several years. Her influence reached far in the Boston community as diverse mental health professionals, as well as pediatricians and social scientists, sought out her teaching, while psychiatrists from many other countries also came to study with her. She was an honorary Professor of Psychiatry at Boston University School of Medicine, a consultant and supervisor at Judge Baker Guidance Center, and with Marian C. Putnam, cofounded and co-directed the James Jackson Putnam Children’s Center in 1943. This center was a pioneering day-treatment facility for pre-school children and their parents. It simultaneously offered day-care and/ or psychological evaluation and treatment for children with emotional and cognitive developmental problems, and their parents. Research was an integral part of the program and the staff published numerous papers, including Beata Rank’s papers on atypical development. Beata Rank’s contributions to child analysis live on through the many people she influenced through her teachings. HELENE RANK- VELTFORT See also: Rank (Rosenfeld), Otto. Bibliography Lieberman, E. James. (1985). Acts of will: The life and work of Otto Rank. New York: The Free Press. Rank, Beata. (1924). Zur Rolle der Frau in der Entwicklung der menschlichen Gesellschaft (On the role of the woman in the development of human society). Imago, 10, 1924, 278-295; Abstract in International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 7, 1926, 89. . (1942). Where child analysis stands today. American Imago, 3 (3), 41-60. . (1949). Adaptation of the psychoanalytic technique for the treatment of young children with atypical development. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 19, 130-139. . (1955). Intensive study and treatment of pre-school children who show marked personality deviations, or atypical development and their parents. In G. Caplan (Ed.), Emotional problems of early childhood: Proceedings of the International Institute of Child Psychiatry (pp. 491-501). New York: Basic. 1444 RANK (ROSENFELD), OTTO (1884-1939) — Otto Rosenfield Rank, an Austrian psychologist and psychoanalyst, was born on April, 22, 1884, in Vienna and died on October 31, 1939, in New York. He was the son of Simon Rosenfeld, an artisan jeweler, and Karoline Fleischner. His older brother studied law while Otto became a locksmith: the family could not afford higher education for both. Close to his mother but alienated from his alcoholic father, Otto adopted the name “Rank” in adolescence and formalized it a few years later, symbolizing self-creation, a central theme of his life and work. Of Jewish background, growing up in Catholic Vienna, Rank was a religious skeptic who wrote his own Ten Commandments, among them “Thou shalt not give birth reluctantly.” He read deeply in philosophy and literature, loved music, and considered himself an artist, writing poetry and a literary diary. Before he was 21, he read Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams (1900). He applied psychoanalytic ideas in an essay on the artist; the manuscript came to Freud (probably through Alfred Adler, Rank’s physician) which led to Rank’s appointment as secretary of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society in 1906. With Freud’s financial and moral support, Rank obtained his PhD from the University of Vienna in 1912, the first candidate to do so with a psychoanalytic thesis subject. Rank became the acknowledged expert on philosophy, literature, and myth in the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society and kept the minutes (1906-1918; later published in four volumes). He became the most prolific psychoanalytic writer after Freud, with Der Kiinstler (1907; expanded editions 1918 and 1925), Der Mythus der Geburt des Heldens (1909), Die Lohengrin Sage [his doctoral thesis] (1911), and Das Inzest-Motiv in Dichtung und Sage (1912, 2nd edition 1926), a 700-page survey of world literature. Except for the posthumous Beyond Psychology (1941), Rank’s books were written in his native German. Translations, mostly of his early psychoanalytic works, exist in English, French, Italian, and Spanish. Other works important in Rank’s Freudian period include “Ein Beitrag zum Narcissismus” (Jarbuch, 1911), Die Bedeutung der Psychoanalyse fiir die Geisteswissenschaften (1912, with H. Sachs), Psychoanalytische Beitrage zur Mythenforschung (1919), Die Don Juan Gestalt (1922), Der Doppelgéinger (1925), Eine Neurosenanalyse in Traumen (1924), Sexualitat und Schuldgefiihl INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS (1926), Technik der Psychoanalyse (I. Die Analytische Situation, 1926; II. Die Analytische Reaktion, 1929; III. Die Analyse Des Analytikers, 1931; II and III translated as Will Therapy, 1936), Grundziige einer genetischen Psychologie (I. Genetische Psychologie, 1927, II. Gestaltung und Ausdruck der Personlichkeit, 1928; III. Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit, 1929, translated as Truth and Reality, 1936). Rank was a member of Freud’s Committee, or “Ring” of Seven and his closest associates (1906— 1925). Of the founders of the International Psychoanalytical Association, Rank was closest to Freud geographically, professionally, and personally. He helped edit and contributed two chapters to Freud’s Die Traumdeutung (editions 4-7, 1914-1922; “Traum und Dichtung” and “Traum und Mythus”). He and Hanns Sachs edited the journal Imago, beginning in 1912, with Freud and Sandor Ferenczi he edited Die Zeitschrift fiir Psychoanalyse beginning in 1913. Rank witnessed the vicissitudes and bitter endings of Freud’s relationships with Wilhelm Stekel, Alfred Adler, and Carl Jung; Rank’s tenure with Freud lasted much longer—two decades, exceeded only by that of his friend Sandor Ferenczi and his foe Ernest Jones. Freud, who had discouraged young Rank from pursuing a medical career, after 1912 always addressed him as “Dr. Rank” and referred patients to him. This was consistent with his support of non-medical or “Jay” analysis. Freud and Rank agreed on another controversial issue: the eligibility of homosexual candidates for analytic training. Rank served in the Austrian army in Poland during World War I, where he met and married Beata “Tola” Mincer in 1918; she became a noted lay analyst and practiced in Boston after their separation in 1934. The birth of their only child, Helene (1919), enhanced Rank’s interest in the pre-oedipal phase of development (birth to age 3) and the mother-child relationship. He was co-founder of the International Psychoanalytical Association in 1910, honorary member of the American Psychoanalitic Association (1924-1930). Freud and Rank established the Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag in 1919, which became Rank’s major responsibility along with training psychoanalytic candidates from around the world. In 1924 Rank published Das Trauma der Geburt, emphasizing the importance of separation and individuation, with their attendant and inevitable anxiety in the pre-oedipal INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS RANK (ROSENFELD), OTTo (1884-1939) period. Until then psychoanalysis had been fathercentered, with oedipal conflict at the center. Rank meant only to balance and extend Freud’s work but this book, and his work with Ferenczi on active therapy— Entzwicklungsziele der Psychoanalyse (1924)—led to a final break with his mentor and virtual foster father. That same year Rank turned 40 and visited the United States for the first time. He was honored as Freud’s emissary, although his ideas were beginning to challenge established Freudian doctrine. Over the next decade Rank lectured, taught, wrote, and practiced a briefer form of psychoanalytic therapy with a more egalitarian relationship between therapist and patient. Rank modified the open-ended analytic process by using termination as the focus for separation and independent development. In this respect his work anticipated the innovations of Franz Alexander (brief analytic therapy, and the corrective emotional experience). Orthodox Freudians condemned Rank as a deviant. The American Psychoanalytic Association expelled him and required his former analysands to undergo reanalysis. Although Rank suffered from poor physical health and occasional depression, assertions that his departure from the psychoanalytic fold were a result of mental instability (by Ernest Jones and A. A. Brill) are not supportable. The work of Rank and his colleague, Ferenczi, is being studied and discussed more objectively by psychoanalytic scholars in the twenty-first century. Rank’s creativity continued to flourish in his post- Freudian period. Between 1926 and 1931 he wrote major works on developmental psychology and therapeutic technique which are considered forerunners of object relations theory and ego psychology (Rudnytsky, 1991). He emphasized conscious experience, the present, choice, responsibility, and action, in contrast with the (classical Freudian) unconscious, past history, drives, determinism, and intellectual insight. Seelenglaube und Psychologie (1930) and Art and Artist (1932) are psychoanalytically informed major works of social psychology and cultural history addressing religion and creativity, respectively. Rank’s emphasis on will, relationship, and creativity appealed to psychologists Rollo May, Carl Rogers, Esther Menaker, Paul Goodman, and Henry Murray. Noted psychiatrists influenced by Rank include Frederick Allen, Marion Kenworthy, Robert Jay Lifton, Carl Whitaker, and Irvin Yalom; writers 1445 Rapaport, Davin (1911-1960) and critics include Ernest Becker, Maxwell Geismar, Max Lerner, Ludwig Lewisohn, Anais Nin, Carl Rakosi, and Miriam Waddington. Some of Rank’s ideas which seemed radical in his time have become the mainstream of psychoanalytic thought: the importance of the early mother-child relationship; the ego, consciousness, the here-andnow, and the actual relationship—as opposed to transference—in therapy. He anticipated and influenced interpersonal, existential, client-centered, Gestalt, and relationship therapies. As a social psychologist he contributed to our understanding of myth, religion, art, education, ethics, and organizational behavior. Rank’s companion in the last four years of his life was Estelle Buel, an American of Swiss descent whom he married just three months before his death. He had applied for United States citizenship when a kidney infection led to fatal septicemia; he died in New York City at 55. The Butler Library at Columbia University in New York holds the Otto Rank papers in its rare book and manuscript collections. The Journal of the Otto Rank Association appeared twice annually from 1966 to 1983, publishing works by Rank and many others who knew him or his writings. A collection of his American lectures (1924-1938) has been published as A Psychology of Difference (Robert Kramer, Ed., 1996). E. JAMES LIEBERMAN Works discussed: Development of Psycho-Analysis; Don Juan and The Double; Myth of the Birth of the Hero, The; Trauma of Birth, The. See also: Applied psychoanalysis and interactions of psychoanalysis; Birth; Castration complex; Double, the; First World War: The effect on the development of psychoanalysis; Gesammelte Schriften; Imago. Zeitschrift fiir die Anwendung der Psychoanalyse auf die Geisteswissenschaften; Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety; Internationale Zeitschrift fiir (drztliche) Psychoanalyse, Internationaler Psychoanalitscher Verlag; “Lines of Advance in Psycho- Analytic Therapy”; Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society; Myth of the hero; Narcissism; Narcissism, primary; Neutrality/benevolent neutrality; New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis; Nin, Anais; Secret Committee, the; Signal anxiety; Splits in psychoanalysis; Termination of treatment; Technique with adults, psychoanalytic; Training analysis; Visual arts and psychoanalysis; Wiener psychoanalytische Vereinigung. 1446 Bibliography Menaker, Esther. (1982). Otto Rank: A rediscovered legacy. New York: Columbia University Press. Rudnytsky, Peter. (1991). The psychoanalytic vocation: The legacy of Otto Rank and Donald Winnicott. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Taft, Jessie. (1958). Otto Rank. New York: Julian. Zottl, Anton. (1982). Otto Rank: Das Lebenswerk eines Disstdenten der Psychoanalyse. Minchen, Germany: Kindler. RAPAPORT, DAVID (1911-1960) David Rapaport, a Hungarian psychoanalyst with a PhD in philosophy, was born in Budapest on September 30, 1911, and died December 14, 1960, in Stockbridge, Massachusetts. Born into a middle-class Jewish family, he quickly became active in the Zionist movement and, after studying mathematics and physics at the university, spent two years in a kibbutz in Palestine. There he married Elvira Strasser; their first child, Hanna, was born shortly after. Upon returning to Hungary in 1935, he ran the Young Zionist movement and began studying psychoanalysis with a relative, Samuel Rapaport, about whom he wrote two books. He was analyzed by Theodor Rajka from 1935 to 1938, and obtained his doctorate in psychology at the Royal University of Hungary, Petrus-Pazmany, in 1938, with a dissertation on the history of the concept of association from Bacon to Kant. In December 1938, with the help of the Emergency Committee on Relief and Immigration of the American Psychoanalytic Association, he and his family traveled to the United States. He worked in New York as a psychologist at Mount Sinai Hospital, then at Osawatomie State Hospital, Kansas, for a year. In 1940 he joined the Menninger Clinic, in Topeka, Kansas, where he became director of the School of Clinical Psychology, then head of the Research Department. His Emotions and Psychology, which appeared in 1942, is a record of his early research, as is Diagnostic Psychological Testing (1945-1946), published in collaboration with Roy Schafer and Merton Gill. In both books Rapaport refers to the theories of ego-psychology. In August 1948 he left Topeka for the Austen Riggs Center in Stockbridge, Massachusetts, leaving behind his wife, a mathematician, and INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS his two daughters Hanna and Juliette (born in 1943). He worked at Austen Riggs until his death from a heart attack at the age of forty-nine. Although he never worked as a psychoanalyst, Rapaport was interested in treating schizophrenics and borderline cases, and soon became an eminent theoretician of psychoanalysis. His classes and conferences on affects, activity-passivity, and memory, his comments on chapter 7 of Sigmund Freud’s The Interpretation of Dreams, his translations of Otto Fenichel, Paul Schilder, and Heinz Hartmann, provided him with many students and material for several books, including Organization and Pathology of Thought (1951), and many articles, which were collected after his death and are often cited. A member of the Western New England Psychoanalytical Society, he was an at-large member of the International Psychoanalytical Association and, shortly before his death, in September 1960, received a prize from the American Psychological Association’s division of clinical psychology. His close collaborator Merton Gill said of Rapaport that “he spoke of metapsychological abstraction with the fervor of a political orator and the thunder of a Hebrew prophet.” Gill also recalled Rapaport’s desire to create a general psychology that would include ego psychology and social psychology while retaining Freud’s revolutionary intuitions about the id. ALAIN DE MYJOLLA See also: Cognitivism and psychoanalysis; Ego autonomy; Ego states; Hungarian School. Bibliography Gill, Merton M. (1961). David Rapaport, 1911-1960. Bulletin of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 17, 755-759. . (Ed.). (1967). The collected papers of David Rapaport. New York: Basic Books. Knight, Robert P. (1961). David Rapaport 1911-1960. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 30, 262-264. Rapaport, David. (1951). Organization and pathology of thought. New York: Columbia University Press. . (1959). The structure of psychoanalytic theory: A systematizing attempt. In S. Koch (Ed.), Psychology: A study of a science, vol. 3. New York: McGraw-Hill. (Reprinted in Psychological Issues Monographs, 6, 1960.) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Rascovsky, Arnatoo (1907-1995) RASCOVSKY, ARNALDO (1907-1995) Arnaldo Rascovsky, an Argentinean physician and psychoanalyst, was born in Cordoba, Argentina, on January 1, 1907, and died on May 1, 1995. He graduated from the Medical School of the University of Buenos Aires when he was 22 years old, and became a pediatrician, much interested in neurology, endocrinology, and psychosomatic medicine. He became acquainted with Freudian ideas in 1936 and started his personal analysis with Angel Garma, who came to Argentina in 1938. Rascovsky was one of the pioneers of psychoanalysis in Argentina and in Latin America. He was the co-founder of the Argentine Psychoanalytic Association in 1942, first director of the Revista de Psicoandlisis, still appearing more than 50 years later in 2005. He was twice president of the Argentine Psychoanalytic Association and then honorary member of this association. He was the co-founder and president of COPAL/FePAL (Latin American Psychoanalytic Federation), founder and president of Filium (Interdisciplinary Association for the Study and Prevention of Filicide) and several times president of the Society of Psychological Medicine, Psychoanalysis and Psychosomatic Medicine, a branch of the Argentine Medical Association. Rascovsky made important contributions to the understanding of the emotional troubles related to psychosomatic disease. His most original contribution to Psychoanalysis was his study of early psychic development and his theoretical and clinical approach to fetal psychism (El psiquismo fetal, 1960). The papers on feminine psychology written in collaboration with his wife Matilde Rascovsky (also a psychoanalyst) threw new light on the complex phenomena taking place in different moments of the feminine life cycle. His numerous writings deal with the psychoanalytic understanding of psychosomatics, the conceptualization of fetal psychism from the metapsychological point of view, and the understanding and prevention of filicide (El filicidio, 1973; La Universalidad del felictdio, 1986). A gifted communicator, his lectures on television and radio stimulated psychoanalytic thought throughout Latin America. He is the author of more than 50 psychoanalytic papers and several books. He knew how to address parents, pediatricians, teachers, and the community in general in defense of childhood, mother-father-child relations, and to condemn sadism in teaching, and filicidal behavior. 1447 “Rat Man’”’ He was a training analyst and teacher of the Argentine Psychoanalytic Association and full member of the International Psychoanalytical Association. He is considered to be one of the main pioneers of the Argentine Psychoanalytic Movement, highly cultivated, gifted, and generous in his teaching. ELFRIEDE S. LUSTIG DE FERRER See also: Argentina; Colombia; Federaci6n psicoanalitica de América latina; Revista de psicoanalisis. Bibliography Rascovsky, Arnaldo. (1956). Beyond the oral stage. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 37, 4. . (1960). El Psiquismo Fetal. Buenos Aires: Paidos. . (1973). El Filicidio. Buenos Aires: Orion. Rascovsky, Arnaldo, et al. (1971). Niveles profundos del Pstquismo. Buenos Aires: Sudamericana. . (1986). La universalidad del filicidio. Buenos Aires: Legase. "RAT MAN". See “Psycho-Analytic Notes of an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides)” RATIONALIZATION A rationalization is a logical or moral justification for an action or attitude that is provided by a subject whose (unconscious) motives are inaccessible. Two examples are justifying a fear of cancer by referring to other family members who suffered from the disease and justifying one’s compulsive washing by offering sanitary concerns. The term was introduced in psychoanalysis by Ernest Jones (1908). Rationalization is not really a symptom. It is more a way of masking and denying the symptom. Nor is it a compromise formation, since within certain limits it satisfies the drive. Nor is it a defense mechanism, since it is not directed toward any libidinal satisfaction. It is more of a way to keep from recognizing neurotic conflicts. It is the conscious secondary thought process of covering the symptom with a screen. 1448 Rationalization is primarily found in cases of neurosis: “Compulsive acts [that occur] in two successive stages, of which the second neutralizes the first, are a typical occurrence in obsessional neuroses. The patient’s consciousness naturally misunderstand them and puts forward a set of secondary motives to account for them—rationalizes them, in short” (Freud 1909d, p..192). Can the notion of rationalization be applied to delusion in particular, the logical delusion of paranoiacs? Some psychiatric studies have made use of an analogous concept to show how megalomania is caused by a need to explain and justify the feeling of persecution. In his essay on Judge Schreber, Freud rejects this formulation: “to ascribe such important affective consequences to a rationalization is, as it seems to us, an entirely unpsychological proceeding; and we would consequently draw a sharp distinction between our opinion and the one which we have quoted from the textbooks. We are making no claim, for the moment, to knowing the origin of the megalomania” (1911c [1910], p. 49). Rationalization is sometimes compared to intellectualization, but the two concepts must be distinguished. In intellectualization, one distances oneself from psychic processes by cathecting one’s own intellectual processes and thought. Rationalization, in contrast, primarily finds support in systems of thought, representationasn,d beliefs that are socially constituted and accepted. MICHELE BERTRAND See also: Intellectualization; Jones, Ernest; Negative, work of the; Paranoia; Secondary revision; Thought. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1909d). Notes upon a case of obsessional neurosis. SE, 10: 151-318. . (1911c [1910]). Psycho-analytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia (Dementia Paranoides). SE, 12: 1-82. Jones, Ernest. (1908). Rationalization in everyday life. Journal of Abnormal Psychology. REACTION-FORMATION “Reaction-formation” refers to an attitude or a character- trait that responds to an unconscious (repressed) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY oF PSYCHOANALYSIS wish or desire by evoking the opposite of such a desire. For example, generosity covers or conceals avariciousness and hoarding; modesty may replace megalomania; kindness or reluctance to engage in conflict can mask sadistic tendencies. Reaction-formation is thus also a symptom of a psychic conflict and a defense against instinctive reactions. Even though it occurs in various pathologies, reaction-formation is most readily apparent in cases of obsessional neurosis. In his. early writings, Freud described the mechanisms of obsessive patients, discerning in them clear signs of conflicts of ambivalence through regression from tender to sadistic impulses. In “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes” (1915c), he distinguished between reaction formation and similar concepts, such as substitute formation and compromise formation, by showing that repression is carried out differently in each case. Thus, a hostile impulse towards a loved one is subject to repression, such an impulse itself being the result of regression of the erotic drive. At first the work of repression succeeds—that is, contents of the representation vanish and the associated affect disappears. A substitute formation would entail a modification of the ego through establishment of scruples of moral conscience, distinct from the symptom per se, that involves a compromise formation. Reaction-formation, by contrast, serves repression by intensifying the opposite. However, although conceptually and chronologically distinct, reaction formation and substitute formations are not unrelated. The former distinguishes itself by the antithetical choice of the substitution, which at least indirectly implies ambivalence. And, contrary to compromise formation, the instinct inhibited with respect to a reaction formation is not represented. In fact, it remains active and in evidence in various situations, in the subject’s defensive rigidity and in specific contradictions to the reactive stance. In Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d), Freud gave reaction-formation a more extended meaning. He suggested it as a pathway to sublimation inasmuch as the instinct is diverted from its aim. Unlike sublimation, however, with reaction formation the instinctual aim is not merely different but is diametrically opposed to the original. On the other hand, reaction formation does not entirely succeed in this diversion, and the inhibited desire attempts constantly to resurface. Reaction-formation can also become a permanent character trait and its significance can grow more INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS REACTION-FORMATION general; it can become not just a symptom of a specific pathology, but it heralds the process of socialization. We become social beings by acquiring, as permanent character-traits, “virtues” which move counter to our sexual goals. “A sub-species of sublimation is to be found in suppression by reaction-formation,” wrote Freud (1905c), “which. . .begins during a child’s period of latency and continues in favourable cases throughout his whole life. What we describe as a person’s ‘character’ is built up to a considerable extent from the material of sexual excitations and is composed of instincts that have been fixed since childhood, of constructions achieved by means of sublimation, and of other constructions, employed for effectively holding in check perverse impulses which have been recognized as being unutilizable. The multifariously perverse sexual disposition of childhood can accordingly be regarded as the source of a number of our virtues, in so far as through reaction-formation it stimulates their development” (pp. 238-239). Reaction-formation is not restricted to character and moral virtues, but also includes the domain of thought and intellect. The counter-cathexis of the system of conscience, organized as a reaction formation, supplies the first repression (Freud, 1915d). In “Thoughts for the Times on War and Death” (1915b), Freud showed how altruism may originate from selfishness, and compassion from cruelty. “Noble” motives can have the same effect as “non-noble” motives. We cannot divine the instinctual life of a subject, however; we only can observe his or her behavior. Humankind’s capacity to reshape instinctual selfishness is otherwise known as its aptitude for culture. People have unequal abilities in this regard, and the most solid among them may prove the least well-defended. This explains how instinctual remodeling can be more or less thoroughly undone by circumstance—war being an event that puts culture most completely at risk—and how acquired civility, or the capacity to conduct oneself towards others according to ethical considerations, may entirely unravel. Reaction-formation thus exposes the fragility of morality and suggests how repressed instincts are able to return with a great intensity, as acts of barbarism and cruelty. MICHELE BERTRAND See also: Ambivalence; Character; Compromise formation; Defense mechanisms; Desexualization; Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense, The; Libidinal development. 1449 ReALity-EGo Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123-243. . (1915b). Thoughts for the times on war and death. SE, 14: 273-300. . (1915c). Instincts and their vissicitudes. SE 14: 109-140. . (1915d). Repression. SE, 14: 141-158. REALITY-EGO. See pleastire ego/reality ego REALITY PRINCIPLE The reality principle is one of the two major principles that govern the workings of the mind. It designates the psyche’s necessary awareness of information concerning reality and stands in contradistinction to the pleasure/unpleasure principle, which seeks the discharge or elimination of drive tension at all costs. Although the reality principle was formally introduced into the Freudian vocabulary in 1911 (“Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning”), it can be found in latent form in his thought as early as the 1895 “Project for a Scientific Psychology.” The need for such a concept arose at that time as a result of an internal contradiction in the pleasure principle, or more specifically, in the notion of hallucinatory wish fulfillment, which tends to mislead the mental apparatus and leave it traumatized by producing a satisfaction that is hallucinated rather than real. It is therefore only by siding with the reality principle that the mental apparatus gives up the hallucinatory wish-fulfillment carried out by holding onto and binding its cathexes of traces of previous pleasures. It must be satisfied by representing what it wishes for, and engaging in the specific acting needed to make this wish a reality. This confirms why the reality principle is the effect of an internal transformation of the pleasure/unpleasure principle, because it arises first and foremost from the question of whether a pleasure is real, and because adaptation to reality is not its primary function. This transformation brings together both the question of external reality, concerning whether the object of satisfaction is present or absent, 1450 and the question of internal reality, concerning whether pleasure is real. As soon as it is in place, however, the reality principle comes into conflict with the pleasure principle, insofar as the latter seeks hallucinatory, immediate, wish-fulfillment. The reality principle, therefore, is the domain of the most “secondary” layers of the psychical apparatus. In the first topography it is expressed as the preconscious, and assumes its various qualities (perception, judgment, etc.). However, in 1920 Freud in effect reversed the respective positions of the pleasure principle and reality principle when he overtly located a “beyond the pleasure principle’—a repetition compulsion—at the root of the psychical apparatus itself. The impact of early reality—whether “pleasurable” or not—becomes primary (“primitive” reality-ego), and the pleasure/ unpleasure principle appears as secondary (“pure” pleasure-ego). Paradoxically, it would then be necessary to depict primary reality as falling under the primary of the reality principle (“definitive” reality-ego), due to the intervention of the external object. RENE ROUSSILLON See also: Principles of mental functioning. Bibliography Ferenczi, Sandor. (1968). Le développement du sens de la réalité et ses stades. In O.C., Psychanalyse (Volume 2, pp. 51-64). Paris: Payot. (Original work published 1913) Freud, Sigmund. (1911b). Formulations on the two principles of mental functioning. SE, 12: 213-226. . (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1-64. - (1950a [1887-1902]). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173-280. Le Guen, Claude. (1995). Le principe de réalité psychique. Revue frangaise de psychanalyse, 59 (1), 9-25. REALITY TESTING “Reality testing” is defined as the process through which the psyche gauges the difference between the internal and external worlds. Freud first defined this process as founded on perception and motility, but as INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS he progressively elaborated his theory of the ego, reality testing became one of the functions of the ego. Freud’s most complete description of this concept occurs in “A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams” (1916-1917f [1915]), where it appears in tandem with another concept, the “realityindicator,” which makes it possible for the psyche to determine whether the experience it is undergoing is present or is the recall of a previous one. The need for both of these concepts in psychoanalysis stems from the psyche’s proclivity to hallucinate. If a previous experience is hallucinated, meaning made present to perception by the action of intense instinctual cathexis, this may fog up the ego’s capacities to differentiate between past and present, internal and external, and thus require it to refer to the intensity of the cathexis to differentiate between actual perception and hallucination. In Freud’s inaugural texts, the ego’s capacity to make and change cathexes devolves upon reality testing. In the texts that followed, this capacity was assumed by perception, which conveys external reality inward (1911b), then motility, which enables flight from extreme sources of excitation and thereby enables the ego to differentiate the excitation from internal sources (1916—1917f). However, all of these processes assume means that cannot be used in the psychoanalytic session, where motility and perception are in large part suspended. Freud’s successors, Winnicott in particular, have therefore emphasized another process that contributes to distinguishing the realm of fantasy and differentiating internal and external realities. This process is based on the fact that external reality resists fantasized destruction and is not destroyed by it. Reality, or rather externality, can thus be discovered by its capacities to resist the subject’s destructiveness. This confers upon the analysis of negative transference a preponderant role in treatment. RENE ROUSSILLON See also: Act, passage to the; Anxiety; Danger; Dementia; Depressive position; Experience of satisfaction; Group phenomenon; Idea/representation; Illusion; Internal/ external reality; Isakower phenomenon; Mythology and psychoanalysis; Outline of Psycho-Analysis, An; Psychoanalytic nosography; Splitting of the ego; Truth; Wish, hallucinatory satisfaction of a; Wish/yearning. INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS REALIZATION Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1911b). Formulations on the two principles of mental functioning. SE, 12: 213-226. . (1916-1917f [1915]). A metapsychological supplement to the theory of dreams. SE, 14: 217-235. Further Reading Abend, Sander. (1982). Reality testing as a clinical concept. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 51, 218-238. Arlow, Jacob. (1969). Fantasy, memory, and reality testing. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 38, 28-51. REALIZATION Implicit in Wilfred R. Bion’s concept of inherent preconceptions is the notion of the future of the preconception in a realization in actual experience with its anticipated counterpart; thus, the infant’s inherent preconception of a breast becomes mated with the actual breast that is found and becomes real-ized as a conception. Repeated confirmatory experiences of that kind eventually confirm the anticipated experience as a concept. Thus, realization, in its capacity to confirm that which has already been autochthonously predicted or expected, bestows confidence, faith, and security to the infant’s sense of survival and thriving. The concept of realization becomes even more ratified when the infant is able to tolerate frustration and thereby allow for the experience of the absence of the breast in the context of having faith in its return. Otherwise, in the case of the infant who cannot tolerate frustration, the experience of the absent breast is eclipsed by the negative experience of the “nobreast present,’ a concrete image of a bad, persecuting breast. The concept of realization belongs to Bion’s epistemological forays into the fundamental understanding of thinking and is associated with his notions of projective identification, alpha function, and container/ contained. The inherent preconception of a breast searches for the realization of the breast in the context of felt neediness if there is an allowance for an absence of a breast that awaits fulfillment and exploratorily and projectively identifies itself in the realized breast. The object of the search who possesses the needed breast is the maternal container who is summoned by the outcry of the infant and his preconception of the 1451 REAL, SYMBOLIC, AND IMAGINARY FATHER breast. The container must appose itself accommodatingly so as to contain the infant’s anxiety of nonconfirmation (negative realization). JAMES GROTSTEIN See also: Catastrophic change; Concept; Containercontained; Invariant; Preconception; Learning from experience. Bibliography Bion, W. R. (1962). Learning from experience. London: Heinemann; New York: Basic Books. . (1962). A theory of thinking. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 43, 4-5; in Second thoughts. London: Heinemann, 1967. REAL, SYMBOLIC, AND IMAGINARY FATHER As Freud had already emphasized, the rather complicated paternal function is not assumed only by the real father, the progenitor, and the mother’s partner. In his seminar on Object Relations (1956-57), Lacan proposed, based on his rereading of Freud’s case of “Little Hans,” a distinction between the actual father and the function of the father in its real, symbolic, and imaginary instances. In the reality of the child’s life, these instances are incarnated by a variety of actual agents. From the Lacanian perspective, the instance of the real father (a term that Lacan sometimes uses in the sense of the “father in reality”) is not only embodied by the biological father or even the man who lives with the mother, that is, by a “Dad” with his own history, qualities, shortcomings, and psychic structure. The real father—insofar as “he” desires the mother and is the object of her desire—is also, and even primarily, embodied by anything that carries out the child’s symbolic castration, that is, both the renunciation and the realization of the child’s incestuous desire. Moreover, because he finds jouissance in a woman, this father does not seek an incestuous jouissance in the child. Still more broadly conceived, the real father is any being that, either in reality or by means of its reality, leads the child to give up being the mother’s phallus, on the one hand, and leads the mother to give up trying to make the child into her phallus, on the other. This symbolic castration determines the way in which the boy and the girl will 1452 FIGURE 1 Real of the father Symbolic father Real father Symbolic mother Imaginary father Real child or child in reality Real mother(s) or ‘mother(s) in reality Real father(s) or father(s) in reality assume their masculinity and femininity. Insofar as fathers in reality are always somehow lacking as an embodiment of the symbolic father and cannot measure up to the imaginary father, to which they are inevitably compared, the real father also partially represents for the child the category of the impossible (Figure 1). It should be noted that Lacan sometimes uses the term real father in a completely different way (in the sense of the “real of the father”) to designate that which is impossible for us to say concerning the father. This is the unthinkable father, the primal father that Freud was unable to bring to light except in the myth that he developed in Totem and Taboo. The imaginary father is the product of the child’s imagination and finds support in the various cultural representations of the father as terribly tyrannical or immensely good, execrable or adorable, terrifying or fascinating. Inevitably, the child makes the actual father wear the masks and disguises of one or the other of these imaginary fathers. Even though the imaginary father can in some ways be a source of suffering, usually neurotic or masochistic, he is not entirely without beneficial effects, because he gives weight to the symbolic father and thus protects the father against the ravaging effects of the all-powerful archaic mother. The symbolic father includes the two others. This more general instance of the father, also called the Name-of-the-Father, protects the child against psychosis. He imposes castration through the intervention of the real father (embodied in the actual father), frustration through the intervention of the symbolic mother, and privation through the mediation of the imaginary father. This all-encompassing instance of the father installs a definitive gap between the child and the mother, just as it institutes a distinction between the sexes and the generations. The symbolic mother, as embodied by any particular mother, participates by her speech and acts (her INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS absences, for example) in making present the Law of the father. PATRICK DE NEUTER See also: Fatherhood; Name-of-the-EFather. Bibliography De Neuter, Patrick. (1993). Fonctions paternelles et naissances du sujet. Cahiers des sciences familiales et sexologiques, 16, 105-127. Dor, Joél. (1989). Le Pére et sa Fonction en psychanalyse. Paris: Point hors ligne. Julien, Philippe. (1991). Le Manteau de Noé: Essais sur la paternite. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer. Lacan, Jacques. (1956-1957). Le Séminaire-Livre IV, La Relation d’Objet. Paris: Seuil, 1994. . (1959). Ala mémoire d’Ernest Jones: Sur sa théorie du symbolisme. In his Ecrits. Paris: Seuil, 1966. REAL, THE (LACAN) The real, a category established by Jacques Lacan, can only be understood in connection with the categories of the symbolic and the imaginary. Defined as what escapes the symbolic, the real can be neither spoken nor written. Thus it is related to the impossible, defined as “that which never ceases to write itself.” And because it cannot be reduced to meaning, the real does not lend itself any more readily to univocal imaginary representation than it does to symbolization. The real situates the symbolic and the imaginary in their respective positions. In 1953, in a lecture called “Le symbolique, l’imaginaire et le réel” (The symbolic, the imaginary, and the real; 1982), Lacan introduced the real as connected with the imaginary and the symbolic. The real, insofar as it is situated in relation to the death drive and the repetition compulsion, has nothing to do with Freudian reality ( Wirklichkeit) or with the reality principle. Lacan wrote, “One thing that is striking is that in analysis there is an entire element of the real of the subject that escapes us.... There is something that brings the limits of analysis into play, and it involves the relation of the subject to the real” (1982). Right away, Lacan raised the question of the real in relation to analytic training, and in 1953 more specifically in relation to INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS REAL, THE (LACAN) the choice of candidates for training analysis. The issue concerned the fact that the real is defined not solely by its relation to the symbolic but also by the particular way in which each subject is caught up in it. Lacan was able to extract this notion of the real from his meticulous reading of Freud. In La relation d’objet (Object relations; 1994), his seminar of 1956— 1957, Lacan, taking up the case of “little Hans” (Freud, 1909b), explained the boy’s mythical constructions as a response to the real of sexual jouissance (enjoyment) that had erupted in his field of subjectivity. Thanks to his imaginary constructions and his phobia, little Hans avoided the issue of castration. In his seminar The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-1955 (1988), Lacan presented a detailed reading of Freud’s dream of Irma’s injection (Freud, 1900a). He emphasized that the terrifying image that Freud saw at the back of Irma’s throat revealed the irreducible real and designated a limit point at which “all words cease” (1988, p. 164). Lacan returned regularly to The Interpretation of Dreams (Freud, 1900a) to indicate how the real is located at the root of every dream, what Freud called the dream’s navel, a limit point where the unknown emerges (1900a, pp. JI In, 525)7 Its is here, ate the dream’s navel, that Lacan located the point where the real hooks up with the symbolic (Lacan, 1975). Lacan approached the real through hallucination and psychosis by careful study of Freud’s “Wolf man” case (1918b [1914]), Freud’s commentary on Daniel Paul Schreber (1911c [1910]), and “Negation” (Freud, 1925h). If the Name of the Father is foreclosed and the symbolic function of castration is refused by the subject, the signifiers of the father and of castration reappear in reality, in the form of hallucinations. Hence the Wolf Man’s hallucination of a severed finger and Schreber’s delusions of communicating with God. Thus, in developing the concept of foreclosure, Lacan was able to declare, “What does not come to light in the symbolic appears in the real” (1966, p. 388). Lacan reconceived Freud’s hypothesis of an original affirmation as a symbolic operation in which the subject emerges from an already present real and recognizes the signifying stroke that engages the subject in a world symbolically ordered by the Name of the Father and castration. In his seminar The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (1978), Lacan took up Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g) and approached the real in terms of compulsion and 1453 Rea, THE (LACAN) repetition. He proposed distinguishing between two different aspects of repetition: a symbolic aspect that depends on the compulsion of signifiers (automaton) and a real aspect that he called tuché, the interruption of the automaton by trauma or a bad encounter that the subject is unable to avoid. Engendered by the real of trauma, repetition is perpetuated by the failure of symbolization. From this point on, Lacan defined the real as “that which always returns to the same place” (Lacan, 1978, p. 49). Trauma, which Freud situated within the framework of the death drive, Lacan conceptualized as the impossible-to-symbolize real. The concept of the real also allowed Lacan to approach questions of anxiety and the symptom in a new way. While his early teaching was devoted to the primacy of the symbolic, in later seminars (from 1972 to 1978) he argued that the real (R), the symbolic (S), and the imaginary (I) are strictly equivalent. In effect, the symbolism that Lacan borrowed from logic failed to formalize the real, which “never ceases to write itself” Thus Lacan attempted, by borrowing from the mathematics of knot theory, to invent a formulation independent of symbols. By affirming the equivalence of the three categories R, S, and I, by representing them as three perfectly identical circles that could be distinguished only by the names they were given, and by knotting these three circles together in specific ways (such that if any one of them is cut, the other two are set free), Lacan introduced a new object in psychoanalysis, the Borromean knot. This knot is both a material object that can be manipulated and a metaphor for the structure of the subject. The knot, made up of three rings, is characterized by how the rings (representing the real, the symbolic, and the imaginary) interlock and support each other. From this point on in Lacan’s teaching, the real was no longer an opaque and terrifying unconceptualizable entity. Rather, it is positioned right alongside the symbolic and tied to it by mediation of the imaginary. Thus, whatever our capacity for symbolizing and imagining, there remains an irreducible realm of the nonmeaning, and that is where the real is located (see Lacan, 1974-1975). In the final years of his teaching, Lacan took up the question of the symptom and the end of the treatment (1975; 1976). If the symptom is “the most real thing” that subjects possess (1976, p. 41), then how must analysis proceed to aim at the real of the symptom in order to ensure that the symptom does not proliferate in meaningful effects and even to eliminate the symptom? 1454 For analysis not to be an infinite process, for it to find its own internal limit, the analyst’s interpretation, which bears upon the signifier, must also reach the real of the symptom, that is, the point where the symbolically nonmeaningful latches on to the real, where the first signifiers heard by the subject have left their imprint (Lacan, 1985, p. 14). According to Lacan, to reach its endpoint, an analysis must modify the relationship of the subject to the real, which is an irreducible whole in the symbolic from which the subject’s fantasy and desire derive. This notion of the real has given rise to numerous misunderstandings. Some have interpreted its resistance to formalization as a slide into irrationality. Others, by identifying the real with trauma, have made it a cause of fear and anxiety. Yet we all have an intuitive experience of the real in such phenomena as the uncanny, anxiety, the nonmeaningful, and poetic humor that plays upon words at the expense of meaning. Thus, when the framework of the imaginary wavers and speech is lacking, when reality is no longer organized and pacified by the fantasy screen, the experience of the real emerges in a way that is unique for each person. MarTINE LERUDE See also: Fantasy, formula of; Foreclosure; Fragmentation; Imaginary, the; Internal/external reality; Knot; Object a; Real, Symbolic, and Imaginary father; Signifier; Subject’s castration; Symbolic, the; Symptom/sinthome. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4: 1-338; 5: 339-625. - (1909b). Analysis of a phobia in a five-year-old boy. SE, 10: 1-149. . (191 1c [1910]). Psycho-analytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia (dementia paranoides). SE, 12: 1-82. . (1918b [1914]). From the history of an infantile Neurosis. SE. l/s l—122% - (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1-64. . (1925h). Negation. SE, 19: 233-239. Lacan, Jacques. (1966). Ecrits. Paris: Seuil. . (1974-1975). Le séminaire. Book 22: R.S.1. Ornicar?, 2-5. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS « (1975), La troisieme, intervention de J. Lacan le 31 octobre 1974. Lettres de l’Ecole Freudienne, 16, 178-203. . (1976). Conférences et entretiens dans les universites nord-américaines. Scilicet, 6-7, 5-63. . (1978). The seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book 11: The four fundamental concepts of psycho-analysis (Alan Sheridan, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton. (Original work published 1973) . (1982). Le symbolique, Pimaginaire et le réel. Bulletin de l’Association Freudienne, 1, 4-13. . (1985). Geneva lecture on the symptom (Russell Grigg, Trans.). Analysis, 1, 7-26. (Original work published 1975) . (1988). The seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book 2: The ego in Freud’s theory and in the technique of psychoanalysis, 1954-1955 (Sylvana Tomaselli, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton. (Original work published 1978) . (1994). Le séminaire. Book 4: La relation d’objet (1956-1957). Paris: Seuil. REAL TRAUMA A real trauma has an exogenous cause and its disturbing, even disruptive effect is immediate and manifest. This has been the usual definition of trauma ever since its adoption in a surgical context in 1855: The word always denoted a bodily injury, but its meaning was soon expanded to alone cover the state of shock or stupor induced by that injury. The adjective real has no meaning save by way of contrast with the psychoanalytic notion of psychical trauma. Freud used it to qualify not the trauma per se but rather those childhood scenes of seduction, which according to his theory of seduction, constituted the first moment of the trauma. Although he abandoned this theory, thereby promoting the ideas of unconscious fantasy and psychic reality, Freud argued unwaveringly for the existence of real violent events and their pathogenic effects. By contrast, the majority of his immediate followers, failing to assimilate the oscillation throughout Freud’s work between reality and fantasy, gave precedence to fantasy, to the omnipotence of thought, and evinced a distinct distrust of reality. Present-day analysts tend to pay more attention to the real event in its traumatic brutality, while recognizing that this does not free them from the task of thoroughly following the fantasy activity which that reality sets in motion; they espouse the eco- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS RECIPROCAL PATHS OF INFLUENCE (LIBIDINAL COEXCITATION) nomic view of the trauma, as set forth by Freud in 1920, according to which the nature and intensity of a traumatic event can make it highly disruptive in its effects. The underlying problem here, so often debated, is the nature of internal as opposed to external reality, an issue that occasioned a profound disagreement between Freud and Ferenczi. Even if the impact of reality—of the “bedrock” of biology and of eventgoverned history—is inescapable, there can be no question, despite all that, of reducing the trauma to a strictly objective reality. Talk of real trauma might suggest that there is such a thing as fictitious, imaginary, or even “fraudulent” traumas. The term is somewhat questionable therefore, and is in fact little used in psychoanalysis. Quite obviously, any trauma, whatever its origin, is distinctly “real” in its effects. FRANCOISE BRETTE See also: Construction de Vespace analytique, La; Internal/ external reality; Trauma. Bibliography Ferenczi, Sandor. (1931). Child analysis in the analysis of adults. In Final contributions to the problems and methods of psycho-analysis. London: Hogarth/Institute of Psycho- Analysis, 1955. . (1933 [1932]). Confusion of tongues between adults and the child. In Final contributions to the problems and methods of psycho-analysis. London: Hogarth/Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1955. Freud, Sigmund. (1896c). The aetiology of hysteria. SE, 3: 186-221. . (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1-64. Freud, Sigmund, and Sandor Ferenczi. (1993-2000). The correspondence of Sigmund Freud and Sandor Ferenczi. (Eva Brabant, et al., Eds., Peter T. Hoffer Trans.; 3 volumes) Cambridge, MA/London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. RECIPROCAL PATHS OF INFLUENCE (LIBIDINAL COEXCITATION) The expression reciprocal paths of influence refers to routes that lead from a nonsexual function to a sexual function, but that can be traversed in both directions. 1455 ” ‘(RECOMMENDATIONS TO PHYSICIANS PRACTISING PSYCHOANALYSIS In Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d) Sigmund Freud added to the somatic sources of sexual excitation (erotogenic zones) other sources that are unlimited in number, since they involve any internal process that has surpassed a certain quantitative threshold. Two aspects of this notion of reciprocal paths of influence must be distinguished. e First, the anaclitic relationship of the sexual function to a given physiological function sexualizes the latter (Laplanche, 1976). Thus the lips or the tongue intervene in the act of taking nourishment, but also in the pleasure that is taken in this act (or repudiated, as in anorexia), and that which can be found outside of the vital function. This aspect makes it possible to understand the alteration of physiological functions (somatization) that in and of themselves do not have a sexual character, but have taken it on secondarily and can thus undergo the process of repression. e Second, a nonsexual activity such as intellectual effort, for example, can, if a sufficient amount of concentration accompanies it, create a related sexual excitation. This case does not, therefore, involve an anaclitic dependence on a bodily function, but rather an indirect source of sexual excitation that is in fact linked to the degree of cathexis at stake. In Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, Freud concluded that “it may well be that nothing of considerable importance can occur in the organism without contributing some component to the excitation of the sexual instinct” (pp. 204-205). This hypothesis is extremely important because it makes it possible simultaneously to account for sublimation (attraction of the sexual toward the nonsexual) and symptom formation (attraction of the nonsexual toward the sexual). In fact, it considerably broadens the notion of sexuality to encompass the notion of “pleasure in thinking,” a very different perspective from the one that equates thinking with labor. SOPHIE DE MIjOLLA-MELLOR See also: Erotogenic masochism; Fusion/defusion of instincts; Intellectualization; Masochism; Pleasure in thinking; Thought. 1456 Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of Sexuality. SE, 7: 123-243. Laplanche, Jean. (1976). Life and death in psychoanalysis. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie de. (1992). Le Plaisir de pensée. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. “RECOMMENDATIONS TO PHYSICIANS PRACTISING PSYCHOANALYSIS” “The technical rules which I am putting forward here have been arrived at from my own experience in the course of many years, after unfortunate results had led me to abandon other methods” (1912e, 111). Thus began Sigmund Freud’s “Recommendations to Physicians,” which is, together with “The Handling of Dream Interpretation in Psychoanalysis” (191le) and “The Dynamics of Transference” (1912b), among the rare technical essays that resulted from Freud’s 1908 attempt to write a “general methodology,’ a project he abandoned in 1910. Freud went on to specify that these recommendations were the result of his own methods and that it was possible that another physician would assume a different position. But he insisted on their common goal, which was to establish for the analyst conditions that paralleled the “fundamental rule” imposed on the patient. It was in line with this that he recommended an attitude of “evenly suspended attention,” the use of “unconscious memory” rather than notes, the absence of a preconceived research “plan,” and therefore the adoption of an attitude of “distance” similar to that of a surgeon. “The doctor should be opaque to his patients and, like a mirror, should show them nothing but what is shown to him” (1912e, p. 118). We know the fate of this metaphor, as we do that of the other metaphor that Freud would later return to: “To put it in a formula: [the analyst] must turn his own unconscious like a receptive organ towards the transmitting unconscious of the patient. He must adjust himself to the patient as a telephone receiver is adjusted to the transmitting microphone. Just as the receiver converts back into soundwaves the electric oscillations in the telephone line which were set up by sound waves, so the doctor’s unconscious is able, from the derivatives of INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS the unconscious which are communicated to him, to reconstruct that unconscious, which has determined the patient’s free associations” (1912e, p. 115-116). It was to Ludwig Binswanger, who was surprised at a recommendation so similar to telepathy, that, on February 22, 1925, Freud made the following comment: “The statement that the unconscious of the analysand must be seized with one’s own unconscious, that we must so to speak hold out the unconscious ear as a receiver, was one I made in an unassuming and rationalistic sense, although I grant that important problems are concealed behind that formulation. I simply meant that one must eschew the conscious intensification of certain expectations and so set up in oneself the same state one requires of the analysand. All ambiguities disappear once you assume that, in the sentence in question, the unconscious is meant purely descriptively. In a more systematic formulation, unconscious must be replaced with preconscious.” In order for this balance to occur, the analyst must first undergo an “analytic purification.” This is the inception, by Freud himself, of the “training analysis,” intended to help the analyst avoid the temptation of using his own life as an example or trying to educate the patient. It is clear from this essay that Freud is responding indirectly to the errors that the first psychoanalysts inevitably made in their eagerness to understand or heal. It also shows how difficult it was for physicians to adopt the psychoanalytic attitude when, as a result of their training and professional experience, they had developed an active attitude, if not that of a miracle worker, the very attitude that characterized Freud in the Studies on Hysteria. Have the times really changed? Freud’s “Recommendations” has continued to be read and, as Freud wrote to Ludwig Binswanger on May 28, 1911, “In truth there is nothing for which man’s disposition befits him less than occupying himself with psychoanalysis.” ALAIN DE MYOLLA See also: Question of Lay Analysis, The. Source Citation Freud, Sigmund. (1912e). Ratschlage fiir den Arzt bei der psychoanalytischen Behandlung. Zentralblatt fur Psychoanalyse, II: 483-489; GW, VIII: 376-387; Recommendations to physicians practising psycho-analysis. SE, 12: 111-120. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Rees, JoHN Rawtinas (1890-1969) Bibliography Freud, Sigmund, and Binswanger, Ludwig. (1992 [1908— 1938]). The Sigmund Freud-Ludwig Binswanger Correspondence 1908-1938 (Gerhard Fichtner, Ed.; Arnold J. Pomerans and Tom Roberts, Trans.). New York: Other Press. REES, JOHN RAWLINGS (1890-1969) A British physician and psychiatrist, John Rawlings Rees was born on June 25, 1890, in Leicester and died on April 11, 1969, in London. He was a Commander of the British Empire and a Fellow of the Royal College of Physicians. Rees came from a religious background, his father having been a Wesleyan Methodist minister (nonconformist Protestant). He had thought of becoming a missionary, but instead studied medicine. His sense of mission was fulfilled by his leadership at the Tavistock Clinic before World War II, later as chief psychiatrist to the British Army and, after the war, founding and becoming the first president of the International Federation for Mental Health. Rees served as a doctor in World War I, in France, Mesopotamia, and India. There he saw soldiers with nervous breakdowns who were not well treated. He ensured that good treatment was available in World War II. He wrote that it was through his military experiences that he grew up emotionally. At first he was interested in public health, but moved into psychiatry through meeting with Hugh Crichton-Miller, a pioneer psychotherapist who had founded Bowden House, an in-patient clinic for the early treatment of psychiatric illness. Later Crichton- Miller founded the Tavistock Clinic. Rees did not train as a psychoanalyst, though he had a personal analysis with Morris Nicoll, a Jungian. He was a fine administrator and teacher, who recognized his limits as a therapist. Crichton-Miller resigned in 1932, having grown out of sympathy with developments at the Tavistock, and Rees succeeded him as director. Under his leadership the clinic grew to becoming the main center for psychoanalytic psychiatry in the United Kingdom, in opposition to the Maudsley Hospital at the University of London. Rees encouraged training in psychiatric social work and child guidance. In the 1930s the clinic was eclectic, with Jungian, Adlerian, and other psychotherapists of many persuasions. Its leading figures were James Arthur Hadfield and Ian Suttie, whose 1935 book The 1457 Récis, EMMANUEL JEAN-BAPTISTE JOSEPH (1855-1918) Origins of Love and Hate had an important impact in British psychotherapy. Both John Bowlby and Donald Winnicott acknowledged this influence. Suttie attempted to integrate the individual, the social, and the spiritual. Among the staff in the 1930s was Wilfred R. Bion, who treated Samuel Beckett. Henry V. Dicks, for many years his colleague, described Rees “as a natural unselfconscious leader and originator.” Rees was surprised to be invited in 1939 to take command of British Army psychiatry. He found that there were hardly any psychiatrists in the army at that time and quickly assembled a team, many of whom had served under him at the Tavistock. Rees was able to cooperate with the military hierarchy and to persuade and to show them the value of psychiatry in the selection and allocation of soldiers to work appropriate to their personality and intelligence; in the rehabilitation of psychiatric casualties; and in the maintenance of good morale. He was ably assisted by Ronald Hargreaves. Through their work senior psychiatrists were appointed to army groups and were recognized as valuable advisors. The education and training of soldiers with limited intelligence was a major innovation in wartime which cleared the way to post-war developments in this field. By 1945 there were 300 trained army psychiatrists and Rees had been promoted to brigadier. After World War IJ the Tavistock was a changed institution as the younger generation had experienced power and influence in the armed forces, and they were enthusiastic to train in psychoanalysis and to use psychoanalytic knowledge in their work with the clinic. Rees was out of tune with this development and felt pressured to give up as director in 1947. At the age of 57 he was at the height of his powers and devoted himself to organizing the first Mental Health Congress in London in 1948. He became the leading figure in the movement to maintain and develop wartime international cooperation among psychiatrists. His mission then became the research and treatment of mental illness in its social roots. He was a leading figure in the formation of the World Federation for Mental Health of which he was director for many years. The Federation brought modern psychiatry to undeveloped countries, trained their personnel, and stimulated research. He was indefatigable in his travels, and his London home was always a place of welcome for colleagues worldwide. Rees published an autobiographical volume, Reflections. His own writings were not original, but he was 1458 able to explain psychotherapy in straightforward terms to the general public, and his work in exploring society was influential. MaALcoLoM PINES See also: Great Britain; Tavistock Clinic. Bibliography King, Pearl H.M. (1982). Activities of British psychoanalysts during the Second World War and the influence of their interdisciplinary collaboration on the development of psychoanalysis in Great Britain. International Review of Psycho-Analysis, 16, 15-33. Rees, John Rawlings. (1929). The health of the mind. London: Faber & Faber; New York: W. W. Norton, 1951. . (1943). Three years of military psychiatry in the United Kingdom. British Medical Journal, 2. . (1944). A brief impression of British military psychiatry. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 8, 29-35. . (1945). The shaping of psychiatry by war. New York: W. W. Norton. REGIS, EMMANUEL JEAN-BAPTISTE JOSEPH (1855-1918) Emmanuel Régis, a French physician, was born on April 29, 1855, in Auterive (Haute-Garonne) and died on June 21, 1918, in Bordeaux. He studied medicine in Paris, where he was taught by Baillarger, Laségue, Motet, Falret, and Ball, and became a professor at the Sainte-Anne psychiatric hospital, where he became assistant physician in 1881. In 1883 Régis was back in Bordeaux. Asked to teach a course on mental illness in 1892 by Albert Pitres, he became head of the department of medicine, then associate professor in 1905. In 1913 Régis was appointed to the new chair of mental pathology, which he held until his death. Régis is the author of several works in the field of criminal psychology and mental illness. His approach to etiology is based on the notion of degeneration and the importance of an accidental toxic-infectious factor, ideas that were consistent with his training and oriented his important work in medical hygiene. Under the influence of Pitres, a well-known student of Charcot, he explored the study of neuroses and, like him, was forced ta INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS confront the paradoxes of hysteria. It was while studying hysteria that both men encountered the ideas of Sigmund Freud, whose nosographic conceptions they shared without accepting his hypothesis of an underlying sexual etiology. The article “Seméiologie des obsessions et idées fixes” (Pitres and Régis, Archives de neurologie, 1897) reflects this critical rapprochement. Les Obsessions et les Impulsions (1902) followed, developing points of view that Régis would again return to in the four editions of his Précis de psychiatrie. Régis’s opinion of Freudian theory is ultimately negative, but Freud continued to arouse his curiosity. Thus, in 1913, together with his assistant Angélo Hesnard and his brother, a learned German linguist, he initiated a project of reading all of Freud’s works. This resulted in the article, “La doctrine de Freud et de son école” (Regis and Hesnard, L’Encéphale, 1913) and La Psychanalyse des névroses et des psychoses (1914). This book, in which Régis challenges the scientific value of psychoanalysis while recognizing its heuristic usefulness, has the merit, as Ferenczi acknowledged in his 1915 polemic, of describing Freudian theory accurately, supported by an exhaustive bibliography. The book marks the official entry of psychoanalysis in France. GERARD BAZALGETTE See also: Breton, André; Claustrophobia; France; Hesnard, Angélo Louis Marie; Phobias in children; Phobia of committing impulsive acts. Bibliography Ferenczi, Sandor. (1939). Die psychiatrische Schule von Bordeaux tiber die Psychoanalyse. In Sandor Ferenczi, Bausteine zur Psychoanalyse (Vol. 4; pp. 12-45). Bern: Hans Huber (Original work published 1915). Pitres, Albert, and Régis, Emmanuel. (1902). Les Obsessions et les Impulsions. Paris: O. Doin. Régis, Emmanuel. (1909). Précis de psychiatrie (4th ed.). Paris: Doin. . (1913). La doctrine de Freud et de son école. L’Encéphale, 8, 356-378, 537-564. Régis, Emmanuel, and Hesnard, Angélo. (1914). La Psychanalyse des névroses et des psychoses. Ses applications medicales et extra-médicales. Paris: Félix Alcan. INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS REGRESSION REGRESSION The Latin equivalent of regression means “return” or “withdrawal”; it also signifies a retreat or a return to a less-evolved state. There is no very precise psychoanalytic definition of the concept of regression. It is useful to introducs the idea of temporality. It could be said to represent an articulation between the atemporality of the unconscious, the primary processes, and the temporality of the secondary processes. Some analysts assign this notion a metaphoric value; it retains the connotations of a journey through time and the changes that will be necessary in psychoanalytic treatment. Sigmund Freud introduced the notion of regression in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a). The concept was necessary for his description of the psychic apparatus in terms of a topographical model, represented by an instrument whose component parts are agencies or systems with a spatial orientation. Excitation traverses the system in a determined temporal order, going from the sensory end to the motor end. In hallucinatory dreams, excitation follows a retrograde pathway. Dreams have a regressive character due to the shutdown of the motor system; the trajectory goes in the reverse direction, toward perception and hallucinatory visual representation. This regression is a psychological particularity of the dream process, but dreams do not have a monopoly on it. In the section of the last chapter of The Interpretation of Dreams titled “Regression,” Freud wrote that “in all probability this regression, wherever it may occur, is an effect of a resistance opposing the progress of a thought into consciousness along the normal path.... It is to be further remarked that regression plays a no less important part in the theory of the formation of neurotic symptoms than it does in that of dreams” (pp. 547-548). In this last chapter Freud already distinguished between three types of regression: topographical regression, in the sense of the psychic system; temporal regression, in the case of a return to earlier psychic formations; and formal regression, where primitive modes of expression and representation replace the usual ones. He also noted: “All these three kinds of regression are, however, one at bottom and occur together as a rule; for what is older in time is more primitive in form and in psychical topography lies nearer to the perceptual end” (p. 548). This basic unity is central to his metapsychological use of the concept. 1459 ReicH, Annie (1902-1971) In Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d) Freud implicitly invoked the idea of fixation, which is inseparable from regression. In “A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams” (1916-17f [1915]), he underscored the distinction between “temporal or developmental regression” (of the ego and the libido) and topographical regression, and the fact that “It]he two do not necessarily always coincide” (p. 227). Then, in the twenty-second of the Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1916-17a [1915-17]), he distinguished two types of regression affecting the libido: a return to the earliest objects marked by the libido, which are of an incestuous nature, and a return of the entire sexual organization to earlier stages. Libidinal regression is only an effect of temporal regression, with a reactivation of old libidinal structures preserved by fixation. At that point he asserted that regression was a “purely descriptive” concept, adding: “we cannot tell where we should localize it in the mental apparatus” (pp. 342-343). In making this assertion, he retrenched from his earlier position and denied regression its metaphysical status, which it would regain only after 1920 with the second theory of the instincts. It then becomes constitutive of the death instinct and can threaten to destroy psychic structures, but also becomes a mechanism that can be used by the ego. According to Marilia Aisenstein’s article “Des régressions impossibles?” (Impossible regressions?), “Freud’s reticence around the notion of regression in 1917 was linked to its relation to the first theory of the instincts and the first topography. He had difficulty in situating and formulating regression not only in topographical terms, but above all in terms of the libido and the instincts of the ego. ... It then became necessary to separate regression from disorganization, as the latter was envisioned by Pierre Marty and the psychosomaticians of the Paris School.... If the retrograde movement is not stopped by regressive systems involving fixations, the end result can be a process of somatization.” Regression is indispensable to the work of psychoanalytic treatment; it implies the notion of change and is part of the healing process, according to Donald W. Winnicott (1958). Regression is a form of defense and remains in the service of the ego. From the analyst’s point of view, formal regression provides another way of listening. MartTINE MyQueL See also: Acute psychoses; Amphimixia/amphimixis; Benign/malignant regression; Choice of neurosis; 1460 Defense mechanisms; Disorganization; Dream; Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense, The; Face-to-face situation; Fixation; Imago; Libidinal development; Libido; Maternal; “Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams”; “Mourning and Melancholia”; Narcissistic withdrawal; Ontogenesis; Paranoia; Psychic causality; Psychic temporality; Psychoses, chronic and delusional; Psychosomatic; Psychotic transference; Representability; Sadomasochism; Self (true/false); Sleep/wakefulness; Stage (or phase); Suicide; Thalassa: A Theory of Genitality; Time; Wish, hallucinatory satisfaction of a. Bibliography Aisenstein, Marilia. (1992). Des régressions impossibles? Revue francaise de psychanalyse, 56 (4), 995-1004. Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. Parts I and II. SE, 4-5. . (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123-243. . (1916-17a [1915-17]). Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. Parts I and II. SE, 15-16. Winnicott, Donald W. (1958). Through paediatrics to psycho-analysis. London: Tavistock. Further Reading Balint, Michael, (1968). The basic fault. Therapeutic aspects of regression. London: Tavistock. Blum, Harold P. (1994). The conceptual development of regression. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 49, 60-76. Inderbitzin, Lawrence, and Levy, Steven. (2000). Regression and psychoanalytic technique: A concept’s concretization. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 69, 195-224. Sandler, Joseph, and Sandler, Anne—Marie. (1994). Theoretical, technical comments on regression and anti-regression. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 75, 431-440. REICH, ANNIE (1902-1971) Austrian physician and psychoanalyst Annie Reich (nee Pink) was born on April 9, 1902, in Vienna and died on January 5, 1971, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Reich was the third child of Theresa Singer, a primary school teacher, and Alfred Pink, a Viennese merchant; Annie’s father remarried shortly after her mother’s death from influenza, during World War I. Her older brother, Fritz, was killed during the war, and her other brother, Ludwig, emigrated to INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Australia in 1939. Reich studied medicine at Vienna University from 1921 and obtained her medical degree in 1926. In 1921 she began an analysis with Wilhelm Reich, which was interrupted six months later when, in 1922, they were married. Two daughters, Eva and Lore, born in 1924 and 1928 respectively, issued from this marriage. Reich began another analysis with Hermann Nunberg and, years later, with Anna Freud. A member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society from 1928, she worked at the proletariat-oriented sex-counseling clinics founded by Wilhelm Reich and Marie Frischauf. After moving to Berlin in 1930, she became involved in the “Kinderseminar” for young, left-wing analysts that was founded by Otto Fenichel, and joined the Berlin Psychoanalytic Society. In 1933, Reich and her husband separated. Reich emigrated to Prague where she established a practice and helped constitute the new psychoanalytic community there; as a member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, she served as a training analyst until 1938. That year, she married Thomas Rubinstein and emigrated with him and her children to the United States, where she was quickly admitted into the New York Psychoanalytic Society; she served as its president from 1960 to 1962. She was also active in the International Psychoanalytical Association from 1938 until her death. Reich’s publications include some of the first psychoanalytic works dealing with pedagogical aspects of sexuality, including “Zur Frage der Sexualaufklarung” (On the question of sexual enlightenment) in 1929. In addition, she wrote numerous theoretical and clinical articles, including key papers on counter-transference and female psychology. A collection of her papers was published posthumously in 1973. LIL GAST See also: Reich, Wilhelm. Bibliography Reich, Annie. (1929). Zur Frage der Sexualaufklarung. Zeitschrift fiir psychoanalytische Padagogik, 3, 98-100. . (1973). Psychoanalytic contributions. New York: International Universities Press. Sharaf, Myron R. (1983). Fury on Earth: A biography of Wilhelm Reich. New York: St. Martin’s Press. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Reicu, WithHeLm (1897-1957) REICH, WILHELM (1897-1957) Wilhelm Reich was an Austrian physician and psychoanalyst. He was born March 27, 1897, in Dobrzcynica, a part of Galicia belonging to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, now a part of Poland. He died November 3, 1957, at the Lewisburg penitentiary in Connecticut. Reich’s parents were assimilated middle-class Jews, who had emigrated after his birth to Jujinetz, in the Ukrainian region of Austria-Hungary. His father owned an extensive tract of land, on which he raised cattle. Two teachers were responsible for the young Reich’s education. At the age of fourteen he entered the local high school in Czernowitz. He was an officer in the Austrian army during the war and began his medical studies upon his return to Vienna. In 1919 he was admitted to the local psychoanalytic society. In 1921 he married Annie Pink, a brilliant student who became a famous psychoanalyst. Reich had important responsibilities as a teacher and in clinical psychoanalysis, and in 1924 ran a seminar on psychoanalytic technique. At the same time he was working with Austrian socialists. In 1927 he published The Function of the Orgasm, which established the existence of a sexual economy focused on the power of the orgasm and genitality. He enrolled in the communist party in 1928 and, the following year, created the Socialist Society of Sexual Advice and Sexual Research. In 1929 he traveled to the USSR, where he familiarized himself with the work of Vera Schmidt, a Russian teacher who made use of psychoanalysis in her school for children. In 1930 he left Vienna for Berlin, where he continued working to promote communism and psychoanalysis. In 1931 he founded the German Association for a Proletarian Sexual Policy, known as SEXPOL for short, which at one point had several thousand members. In a 1931 brochure, The Sexual Struggle of the Young, he promoted a radical liberation of individual behavior. In 1932 he published The Invasion of Compulsory Sexual Morality, a sociological study based on the work of the ethnologist Bronislaw Malinowski. Reich lived with Elsa Lindenberg, a dancer who was active in the same cell as he. In 1933 Hitler was in power and Reich was thrown out of the German communist party. He fled to Denmark, where he published two of his most important works, Character Analysis and The Mass Psychology of Fascism. In 1934 he settled in Malm6, Sweden, and 1461 REik, THEODOR (1888-1969) founded the Review of Political Psychology and Sexual Economy. At the Lucerne Congress a decision was made to exclude Reich from the International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA). He took refuge in Oslo, Norway, where he continued to train psychoanalysts and conducted research on organic electricity. A campaign of defamation—he was referred to as a “Jewish pornographer”—led by a man named Quisling, led Reich to accept the invitation of Theodore Wolfe to move to the United States to teach “character-analytic vegetotherapy.” He arrived in New York in 1939, rented a cabin in Maine and had several buildings constructed, which he called the “Orgonon.” Here he conducted research, taught, and performed clinical work. It was a period of intense creative activity for Reich. In politics he denounced the “emotional plague,” the source of fascism, and developed the principles for a “democracy of work.” He also became interested in newborns following the birth of his son Peter to his third wife Ilse Ollendorff in 1944. He investigated the problem of cancer and, at the same time, struggled to determine orgone formations in the atmosphere and the cosmos. He successfully practiced vegetotherapy. Preoccupied by the problems of the environment, he explored the Arizona desert (“operation Orop Desert”). He continued to publish and republish at a steady rate: in 1948 The Function of the Orgasm, an autobiographical work, and the Biopathy of Cancer, The Sexual Revolution, and Listen, Little Man; in 1951 Ether, God, and Devil, and Cosmic Superimposition; in 1953 The Murder of Christ and People in Trouble, published by the Orgone Institute Press. A campaign of lies and vilification in the tabloid press resulted in Reich being called in for questioning by the police. After refusing to cooperate with the court he was convicted and sent to prison, where he died. A year earlier, as a result of a court decision, nearly all of Reich’s books were burned at the Gansevoort Street incinerator in Manhattan (New York City). RoGER DADOUN See also: Allgemeine Arztliche Gesellschaft fiir Psychotherapie; Berliner Psychoanalytisches Institut; Character; Denmark; Lehrinstitut der Wiener psychoanalytischen Vereinigung; Marxism and psychoanalysis; Norway; Orgasm; Politics and psychoanalysis; Psychic causality; Reich, Annie; Sociology and psychoanalysis/sociopsychoanalysis; Wiener psychoanalytische Vereinigung. 1462 Bibliography Dadoun, Roger. (1975). Cent Fleurs pour Wilhelm Reich. Paris: Payot. De Marchi, Luigi. (1973). Wilhelm Reich, biographie d’une idée. Paris: Fayard. Reich, Wilhelm. (1933). Character-analysis; principles and technique for psychoanalysts in practice and in training (Theodore P. Wolfe, Trans.). New York: Orgone Institute Press. . (1933). The mass psychology of fascism (Theodore P. Wolfe, Trans.). New York: Orgone Institute Press, 1946. . (1940). The function of the orgasm: Sex-economic problems of biological energy (Theodore P. Wolfe, Trans.). London: Panther, 1968. . (1948). The cancer biopathy. New York: Orgone Institute Press. . (1988). Passion of youth: An autobiography 1897-— 1922. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux. Sharaf, Myron. (1983). Fury on Earth: A biography of Wilhelm Reich. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Sinelnikoff, Constantin. (1970). LDG uvre de Wilhelm Reich. Paris: Maspero. REIK, THEODOR (1888-1969) Lay analyst Theodor Reik was born on May 12, 1888, in Vienna, and died on December 31, 1969, in New York. He was the third child of four born to the cultured, lower-middle-class Jewish family of Max and Caroline Reik. Reik’s father was a low-salaried government clerk who died when Theodor was aged 18. Freud became a father figure for the rest of Reik’s life. He attended public schools in Vienna and entered the University of Vienna at the age of 18, where he studied psychology and French and German literature. He received his PhD in 1912, writing the first psychoanalytic dissertation, on Flaubert’s The Temptation of St. Anthony. He met Freud in 1910, and two years later became a member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. From 1914 to 1915 he was in analysis with Karl Abraham in Berlin and, with the outbreak of World War I, served as an officer in the Austrian cavalry from 1915 to 1918, seeing combat in Montenegro and Italy and being decorated for bravery. Following the resignation of Otto Rank, Reik became the Secretary of the Vienna Psychoanalytic INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Society. For ten years he practiced in Vienna and began to write so extensively that Freud asked him: “Why do you piss around so much? Just piss in one spot” (Natterson, 1966). Freud wrote “The Question of Lay Analysis” in defense of Reik, who had been prosecuted under the quackery laws of Austria for practicing medicine. Reik moved to Berlin, where he lived and practiced from 1928 until 1934 and again was a celebrated teacher at the psychoanalytic institute. Fearing the rise of the Nazis, he left for The Hague, where he continued practicing and teaching. During this time his first wife Ella, mother of his son Arthur, died, and he married Marija. Two children were born of this marriage, Theodora and Miriam. Still fearful of the Nazis, he moved to New York where, as a non-medical analyst, he was denied full membership in the New York Psychoanalytic Society. Reik would not accept the position of research analyst, although he could have made a “charade” of agreement and practiced, as many did. Reik experienced financial difficulties for many periods in his life. He was treated gratis by both Karl Abraham and Freud and for a time he received financial support of 200 marks a month from Freud. After he wrote for help in 1938, Freud wrote back: “What ill wind has blown you, just you, to America? You must have known how amiably lay analysts would be received there by our colleagues for whom psychoanalysis is nothing more that one of the hand-maidens of psychiatry” (Hale, 1995). Reik persevered, however, building a practice, and soon a group of colleagues centered around him and, in 1948, the National Psychological Association for Psychoanalysis was founded. Reik’s influence on the development of nonmedical analysis in the United States was great. Not only did his many books have a profound effect on the general reading public but his influence through the NPAP (National Psychological Association for Psychoanalysis) and the institutes that split from it suggest that Reik was the major promulgator of non-medical analysis in the United States. Reik’s psychoanalytic studies include discussions of such writers as Beer-Hofmann, Flaubert, and Schnitzler as well as Shakespeare, Goethe, and Gustav Mahler, to name but a few. He had a unique way of communicating and his writing and conversational style was free associational. His autobiography is to be found in his many works. Among his better known INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Reik, THEODOR (1888-1969) are: Listening with the Third Ear (1948); the monumental Masochism in Modern Man (1949); Surprise and the Psychoanalyst (1935); his recollection of Freud, From Thirty Years with Freud (1940); an autobiographical study, Fragment of a Great Confession (1949); applied psychoanalysis of the Bible in Mystery on the Mountain (1958); anthropology in Ritual (1958); and sexuality in Of Love and Lust (1959), Creation of Woman (1960), and The Psychology of Sex Relations (1961); and music in The Haunting Melody (1960). Toward the end of his life Reik, who grew a beard, resembled the older Freud and lived modestly, surrounded by photographs of Freud from childhood to old age. He died on December 31, 1969, after a long illness. Natterson says, of Reik: “In many ways, Reik is the epitome of the sensitive aesthete, the pleasure-loving, erotic, highly intellectual, secular Jewish scholar. These characteristics are to be treasured” (Natterson, 1966). Theodor Reik, disciple of Freud, Secretary of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, author of over 20 books and hundreds of papers on literature, music, religion, analytic technique, and masochism, founder of the National Psychological Association for Psychoanalysis (NPAP) in New York, an analyst in four major cities who wrote in a confessional way about his life, loves, failures, and triumphs, occupies a unique place in the history of psychoanalysis. JOSEPH REPPEN See also: Anthropology and psychoanalysis; Applied psychoanalysis and the interactions of psychoanalysis; “Dreams and Myths”; Evenly-suspended attention; Identification; Judaism and psychoanalysis; Lay analysis; Lehrinstitut der Wiener psychoanalytischen Vereinigung; Music and psychoanalysis; National Psychological Association for Psychoanalysis; Netherlands; New York Freudian Society; Parenthood; Psychoanalytic Review, The; Question of Lay Analysis, The; United States. Bibliography Hale, Nathan G., Jr. (1995). The rise and crisis of psychoanalysis in the United States: Freud and the Americans 1917— 1985. New York: Oxford University Press. Natterson, Joseph M. (1966). Theodor Reik: Masochism in modern man. In Franz Alexander, S. Eisensten, and Martin Grotjahn (Eds.), Psychoanalytic pioneers (pp. 249-264). New York and London: Basic. 1463 RELATIONS (COMMENSALISM, SYMBIOSIS, PARASITISM) RELATIONS (COMMENSALISM, SYMBIOSIS, PARASITISM) In his book Attention and Interpretation (1970), Wilfred R. Bion conducted a parallel study of the relations between the mystic and the group, between the container and the contained, and between a new idea and the psychism in which it appears. He used the same relations model to describe these three situations with three types of relations: commensal, symbiotic, and parasitic. Bion uses the relation of the mystic to the group as a springboard for his developments. The mystic, whom he also calls the genius or messiah, is the individual who brings new ideas to the group. He is opposed to the establishment, whose role is to maintain the cohesion and stability of the group. The mystic and the establishment need each other. By maintaining the stability of the group, the establishment enables the advent of the mystic who is engendered by the group to which the mystic gives life (psychic, spiritual, or scientific); the mystic needs the group, therefore the establishment, in order to introduce new ideas to the greatest number of people, for example the benefits of Newton’s physics or Freud’s psychoanalysis. But together the group and the mystic maintain relations which, although they include a charge of creativity, also imply a charge of destructiveness. The new idea introduced by the mystic always threatens the existence of the group or one of its sub-groups. These are the definitions that Bion gives of the three types of relations he describes: “By ‘commensal’ I mean a relationship in which two objects share a third to the advantage of all three. By ‘symbiotic’ I understand a relationship in which one depends on another to mutual advantage. By ‘parasitic’ I mean to represent a relationship in which one depends on another to produce a third, which is destructive of all three” (p. 95). In the commensal relation there is coexistence on each side of the relation in such a way that each is inoffensive to the other. In the symbiotic relation “there is a confrontation and the result is growth-producing” (p. 78). In the parasitic relation the product of the association destroys the two associated parties; it is a relation that is marked by envy that “cannot be satisfactorily ascribed to one or other party; in fact it is a function of the relationship” (p. 78). 1464 Bion gives different examples of these three types of relations, sometimes drawn from the relations of the mystic and the group, sometimes from the relations of the contained, noted 4, to the container, noted 9: “The container.” he writes, “is represented by a mouth or a vagina, the contained by a breast or a penis” (p. 95). He illustrates the parasitic, symbiotic, and commensal relations with the example of a man who wants to communicate his annoyance but who is submerged by the emotion and who begins to stutter and becomes incoherent: “Such a failure is the outcome of a ‘parasitic’ relationship between the contained (or rather, not contained) material and the speech devised to contain it: ‘container’ and ‘contained’ have produced a third ‘object’-—incoherence—which makes expression and the means of expression impossible. In so far as the imaginary episode led to a development of powers of expression and of the personality that strove to express itself, the relationship could be described as symbiotic. ‘Commensal’ is illustrated by supposing that the episode occurred in an age and society (as in Elizabethan England) in which language had reached a point of development where the ordinary man was inspired to speak it well: that which was to be expressed and the vehicle for its expression profited from the culture to which they belonged” (p. 96). DipierR HouzeL See also: Bion, Wilfred Ruprecht; Symbiosis/symbiotic relation. Bibliography Bion, Wilfred. R. (1970). Attention and interpretation. London: Tavistock Publications. Grinberg, Leon, et al. (1991). New introduction to the work of Bion. Northvale, NJ, and London: Jason Aronson. Symington, Joan, and Symington, Neville. (1996). The clinical thinking of Wilfred Bion. London: Routledge. RELAXATION PRINCIPLE AND NEO-CATHARSIS The relaxation principle and neo-catharsis is an element in analytic technique that complements the principle of frustration and makes it possible to reach moments of self-hypnotic analytic trance. For Ferenczi this represented technical progress because, along with INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ? the analysis of the transference, this relaxation made it possible to reach very deep zones of the intrapsychic teratorne consequent to precocious traumatisms (he _ uses a metaphor from embryology, the teratome being _ a tumor whose appearance evokes the different stages of embryonic development). A laissez-faire principle % establishes the relaxation that is already implicit in the notion of free association. Ferenczi describes how, with the help of this relaxation and this trust, the patient reaches trance states, transitory fits of veritable hysteria that have the great advantage of “giving a feeling of reality and objectivity that is closer to a real memory.” Moreover, these states of autohypnosis relate back to the old catharsis “long thought to be buried following the development of such successful theoretical constructions.” In 1929 he read a paper entitled “Progress in Analytic Technique” to the eleventh congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association, held in Oxford. The following year he continued in the same vein with “Principle of Relaxation and Neo-Catharsis.” In his 1929 paper he referred to the work of Reich, Severn, Groddeck, and Simmel, as well as to treatment projects in clinical psychiatry. He also reported a discussion with Anna Freud, to whom he felt very close because of the techniques she used for psychoanalyzing children. Dating from early psychoanalytic practice, this concept appears to be quite different from what has since come to be known as relaxation. The new catharsis he speaks about is more, as he wrote: “A confirmation from the Unconscious, a sign of our laborious work of analytic construction, of our technique in relation to the resistance and the transference which have finally succeeded in achieving etiological reality.” These two notions deserve their place in modern psychoanalysis, although they imply a new development in traumatic theory in order to explain the grave pathologies observed when prepubescent shock leads to a “passing psychosis,” which later results in the adult patient having the equivalent of an “intrapsychic twin” or “teratome.” Ferenczi progressively came to perceive the “incestuous tendency of repressed adults who don the mask of tenderness.” Two years later he developed these notions in his famous text “The Confusion of Tongues between Adults and the Child,” as well as in his Clinical Diary, which did not appear until fifty years later. Many of the notions expressed here have been increasingly used by psychoanalysts dealing with patients in great difficulty, although some resist the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS RELALATION PoYCHOTHERAPY integration of this dynamic theory. It is worth remembering that a psychoanalyst like Georges Devereux developed the notion of the counter-Oedipus in a comparable vein. Pierre SABOUKIN See also: Active technique; Development of psycho-analysis; Elasticity. Bibliography Ferenczi, Sandor. (1930). The principle of relaxation and neocatharsis. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 11, 426-443, , (1949). Confusion of tongues between adults and the child: The language of tenderness and of passion. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 0, 225-20. (Original work published 1933) Freud, Sigmund. (1912¢). Recommendations to physicians practising psycho-analysis. SE, 12: 109-120. . (1937d). Constructions in analysis. SE, 23: 255-269. RELAXATION PSYCHOTHERAPY At the urging of eminent neuropsychiatrist Julian de Ajuriaguerra, in the early 1960s a small group of psychoanalysts, all members of the Paris Psychoanalytic Society, attempted with certain patients to employ autogenic therapy, a technique inspired by hypnosis. Developed originally by German psychiatrist Johannes Schultz (1884-1970), autogenic treatment involved training a patient to experience well-being and comfort induced by hypnosis, more or less independently of a therapist. Work with autogenic therapy soon led the group (Michele Cahen, Jorge Garcia~-Badaracco and Marianne Strauss) to develop a psychoanalytic technique that aimed not so much to induce relaxation as to listen to bodily sensations. The observation that each patient experiences their own body in a unique way shifted emphasis toward resistances, perception of body image, and examination of the experience of relaxation itself. The principal psychotherapeutic tool became what Ajuriaguerra (1959) called the tonic dialogue. Spontaneous modifications of muscle tone develop in the course of any emotional relationship but almost always go unnoticed. These variations reveal the body’s role in distinguishing pleasure-unpleasure and represent the first 1465 RELIGION AND PSYCHOANALYSIS “language” of the mother-infant dyad. The goal of relaxation psychotherapy is not primarily to soothe the patient but rather to lead them toward “verbal expression of the states of one’s own body.” (Roux, 1968). Such states, rather than the patient’s fantasies or stories, become the “signifiers” in relaxation psychotherapy. The work of relaxation therapy takes place along two axes. First of all, it helps the patient to become aware of bodily sensations as experienced in the therapist’s presence, and also helps the patient to formulate descriptions of them and to facilitate verbalization in terms of secondary-process thinking. At the same time, the therapist illuminates the role of the earliest objects in formation of the ego as revealed by bodily reactions in terms of the transference, which is more clearly in evidence. It seems apparent that the therapeutic work can take into account “behavioral” reactions without serious risk of inflicting narcissistic injury. Relaxation therapy produces in the patient a “passive” attitude towards endopsychic functioning and instinctual movements which are ordinarily in a “discharge” mode. Unlike other similar techniques, relaxation psychotherapy does not employ suggestion. The therapist remains in the patient’s line of sight and seeks to observe “what’s happening with the body” while confining participation to helping the patient describe, in their own words, associated thoughts and feelings. The “tonic-emotional responses” thus discovered are reflected in the relationship with the therapist. This “detour” via the body places the therapist in the position of a primitive transitional object, introducing a third party into the relationship. Therapeutically, this facilitates recapture of secondary-process thinking, development of insight, and integration of behavioral phenomena that can be meaningfully interpreted. Indications for relaxation psychotherapy include cases with severe underlying weakness in ego structure, whether with evidence of psychosomatic disorder or in patients suffering from narcissistic pathology. Marig-Lisz Roux See also: Group psychotherapies; Psychotherapy. Bibliography Ajuriaguerra J. de. (1959). L’Entrainement psychophysiologique par la relaxation. Paris: Expansion scientifique. 1466 Lemaire, Jean G. (1964). La Relaxation. Paris: Payot. Roux, Marie-Lise. (1968). LExpression verbale du vécu corporel. Revue francaise de psychosomatique, 14. Roux, Marie-Lise, Dechaud-Ferbus, Monique, and Sacco, Francois. (1994). Les Destins du corps. Toulouse: Erés. Roux, Marie-Lise, et al. (1993). Le Corps dans la psyche. Paris: L Harmattan. RELAIND GPSYICHOOANANLYS IS Religion is a body of beliefs and practices shared by a given social group and connecting it to a higher agency, generally a divinity or divine human. Interestingly, the word religion is the same in most western languages, Latin or Germanic. However, the origin of the term has, for more than two thousand years, been the object of an intense debate that is of interest to psychoanalysis. According to the Latin authors Lactantius and Tertullian, the word is related to the Latin verb religare, “to reconnect, to bind again.” Religion would, therefore, involve a twofold connection—among humankind and between humankind and God. In Cicero, religion is associated with the verb relegere, “to gather.” In this case religion is said to be a gathering together, an interiority, some scruple that prevents or delays action and entails the performance of certain rites. In this sense we agree with philosopher Michel Serres and the linguist Emile Benveniste that the opposite of religion is negligence. The topic of religion was initially examined by Freud and Breuer in the Studies on Hysteria (1895d), where hysteria could be considered a reaction to mental suffering associated with religious doubt. Freud’s first detailed examination of religion, “Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices,” appeared in 1907. The first book in which he discussed religious themes was Totem and Taboo (1912-1913a). Freud saw religion in its collective and individual forms. On the one hand he viewed the church as the prototype of an artificial crowd (as the army), where each individual must love his leader (Christ, for example) as a father and other men as his brothers. Religion helped maintain the cohesion of a human group threatened with disintegration if there was a loss of faith (1921c). On the other hand, he also saw religion, with its ceremonies and detailed rites, as a universal neurosis, where scruples were transformed into obsessive acts. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Religion would contribute to humankind’s transition from a natural state to a cultured one through the sacrifice of human drives. But the progress of civilization also implied a return to the irrational and the maintenance of illusions that maintained the individual within the confines of his infantile neuroses (1927c). The Freudian approach to religion has more to do with anthropology than with theology: Religion is a part of civilization and the discussion of its dogmas is less important than its hold on society and the individual. From this point of view Freud, who claimed to be an atheist, had to confront the criticisms of his friend, Pastor Pfister, along with those of his former student Carl Jung. Moreover, Freudian conceptions of religion relied on the knowledge available during the early twentieth century, which has since often been challenged by the findings of archeology and epigraphy. Thus the character of Moses leading the people of Israel through the desert and out of Egypt in Exodus, a figure magnified by Freud, seems in the early twenty-first century to have more to do with myth than with history. And, unlike Jung, Freud rarely made reference to the religions of the Far East, which are so unlike Hellenistic and Middle Eastern cultures. ODON VALLET See also: Beirnaert, Louis; Belief; Certeau, Michel de; Choisy, Maryse; “Claims of Psychoanalysis to Scientific Interest”; Future of an Illusion, The; Ideology; Illusion; Judaism and psychoanalysis; Jung, Carl Gustav; Lacan, Jacques-Marie Emile; Moses and Monotheism; Mysticism; Oceanic feeling; Philippson Bible; Rite and ritual; “Seventeenth-Century Demonological Neurosis, A.” Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1907b). Obsessive actions and religious practices. SE, 9: 115-127. . (1912-1913a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1-161. . (1921c). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. SE, 18: 65-143. . (1927c). The future of an illusion. SE, 21: 1-56. . (1939 [1934-1938]). Moses and monotheism: Three essays. SE, 23: 1-137. REMEMBERING The term remembering designates the specific psychic action of producing a memory and is to be distinguished INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS REMEMBERING from reminiscences, flashbacks, and all other elements of the past that might be seen to constitute other types of representation. Freud, together with Josef Breuer, introduced this notion in their preliminary communication (1893a) as part of their cathartic therapy and Freud’s initially trauma-based theory of hysteria. Freud stressed that simple recollection of memories with no accompanying affect, and so reduced to pure ideas, would have no therapeutic value. Remembering that is efficacious, and therefore of interest to psychoanalysis, involves the subject’s reliving traumatic events with all their original affective intensity. Here Freud, while also stressing conditions of therapy, was already distinguishing purely narrative ideas that have affective energy discharged and that remain blocked in a split-off part of consciousness. The recollection of memories in treatment introduced the difficulty of distinguishing between childhood memories and “screen memories” (1899a), despite certain clinical characteristics pertaining to the latter. Freud noted that the disparity between screen memories and other memories from childhood remained ultimately problematic. Did conscious screen memories originate in childhood or simply relate to it? This question, raised as early as 1899, remains very much alive, because there is no guarantee that the recollection of even the most authentic memories travel a direct route from the past of childhood to the present of analytic treatment, and the total reliability of such remembering is certainly open to doubt. Inevitably, childhood memories are subject to the happenstance experience of the subject, leading to unconscious distortions, infidelities, maskings, false leads, and so on. The analyst who maintains that such memories are genuine, even those with the best claim to being authentic, is either naive or is laboring under a narcissistic illusion of omniscience. In the area of remembering, psychoanalysis has to defend its sphere of authority by distinguishing itself from neurobiological, neuropsychological, and cognitive approaches to memory. Remembering remains a key element of psychoanalytic treatment. As in other relations that psychoanalysis has with proximate scientific disciplines, the issue is generally one of a crossdisciplinary misunderstanding, which it would be proper to resolve. This is what motivated Jean Laplanche to evoke Freudian pseudo-biology, pseudoneurology, and pseudo-psychology. Unconscious 1467 REMEMBERING phenomena, the area specific to psychoanalysis, inevitably pervert, or at least distort, the various types of positive knowledge about humans. Remembering in psychoanalysis can only be pertinent, therefore, when such remembering imitates the mechanisms that govern the recall function of memory, whose incredible complexity contemporary science is just beginning to plumb. Conversely, because of the necessary positivism of its project, the scientific approach to remembering cannot account for the negativism and emptiness in the psyche’s dialectic between meaning and meaninglessness. Everything— from birth to death—that constitutes the enigmatic and singular design of an individual’s destiny escapes, for the most part, from the individual’s consciousness. Hence, there are limits to remembering. To see how remembering functions in analysis, it is appropriate to chart a history of the aims of analytic treatment: ¢ The original memory model of psychoanalysis aimed at recollecting a childhood past that was buried but is likely to be brought to light. e A subsequent model yielded increasingly to structures not subject to the internal history of the subject’s life (the death drive, the Oedipus complex, repetition), in other words, to elements introduced by Freud in his second conceptualization of the psychic apparatus and to advances made in psychoanalysis since around 1930. Because psychoanalysis depends on the chance elements of the transference, this substantially relativized hope for a “spontaneous tendency towards a return of the repressed.” As a result, the unrepresentable, the repetition compulsion, and various forms of psychic breaching have taken on a prominent role in the transference (Baranés). e Finally, since the 1970s, psychoanalysis has been extending and openly accepting its own theoretical and practical divisions. Remembering should be regarded essentially as reconstructing a certain historical truth together with ceding to what is sometimes referred to as “structural truth” (truth concerned with mental organization). Remembering and the freedom to rediscover one’s own history, along with the de-centering that this entails, carves out a space that accords with some modulations of fantasy play and with the necessary mythology of origin. Analytic treatment—woven from 1468 the memorable, the infantile, the repeatable, while encountering limitations to meaning and meaninglessness and the absence of temporal references—would be lost if the analyst’s constructions and interpretations of the transference were not subordinate to the analysand and his freedom. An individual engages in analytic treatment to effect change. An assemblage of memories, even an organized one, that does not benefit from the work of composition and that does not take into account the inherent constraints of the psychic apparatuses, whether grouped or corporeal, would be nothing but a dead letter, destined to be neither interpreted nor recreated. It is the fabric of the transference that facilitates, for both analysand and analyst, the energetics of transformation. As a result, while memories and historical working through might not be enough in themselves to move the analysis forward, they are nevertheless a sine qua non of analysis. In this respect, individuals are like nations: a community that has forgotten its history is condemned to servitude. CLAUDE BARROIS See also: Abstinence/rule of abstinence; Acting out/acting in; Active technique; Amnesia; Change; Construction/ reconstruction; Déja-vu; Development of Psycho-Analysis; Ego states; Forgetting; Memory; Narcissistic elation; Relaxation principle and neo-catharsis; “Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through”; Reminiscences; Repression, lifting of; Resistance; Silence; Transference; Word-presentation. Bibliography Baranés, Jean-José. (1990). Etre a la fois mémoire et provocateur. In Société psychanalytique de Paris (Ed.), La psychanalyse: Questions pour demain. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Diatkine, Rene. (1990). Remémoration, prise de conscience. Revue frangaise de psychanalyse, 54 (4), 911-921. Freud, Sigmund. (1899a). Screen memories. SE, 3: 299-322. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1893a). On the psychical mechanism of hysterical phenomina: Preliminary communication. SE, 2: 1-17. Laplanche, Jean. (1987). Nouveaux fondements pour la psychanalyse. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Widlécher, Daniel. (1994). Psychanalyse et processus de changement. In his Traité de psychopathologie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS “REMEMBERING, REPEATING AND WORKING-THROUGH” Written and published in 1914, “Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through” clearly established Freud’s position on analytic technique, in which the cathartic method had yielded to the associative method. It thus deserves notice as one of the few technical writings to complement the great metapsychological edifice of 1915. Freud begins the essay by citing the cathartic method, without doubt in order to mention how much he owed to it for having “acquainted him with certain analytical processes,” but above all so that the reader could recognize how much technical progress had been made with the new associative method. During this period, 1914-1915, treatment began to involve real psychic work for the patient for whom passive hypnosis is no longer clinically effective. The goal of this effort is to remember, “to fill in gaps in memory,” as Freud states, and to “overcome resistances due to repression” (p. 148). The growing complexity of analytic technique was opposed to the simplicity of the hypnotic technique, which responded only to the simplest form of remembering. This required that forgetting, a psychic fact that had been previously thought to be negligible, be reconsidered in all its amplitude and complexity. “Impressions” and “experiences” (p. 148), insofar as they have a rapport with forgetting, were opposed by Freud to psychic reality, that is, to “phantasies, processes of reference, emotional impulses, [and] thought connections” (p. 148). From this point on, memory, a favorite theme of Freud’s since his work on aphasia, was to become an extensive subject for investigation. Yet remembering is not a straightforward process; thus, while the encounter between analyst and analysand might stimulate the repetition of the past, it is does not always take the form of a memory, but might reside also in actions. Repetition as action rather than as memory led Freud to examine the links between the three concepts of transference, repetition, and resistance. Transference is simply a “piece of repetition” (p. 151), and repetition is only the “transference of the forgotten past” (p. 151) onto the analyst but also onto “all the other aspects of the current situation” (p. 151). Freud then identified a further type of repetition, “the compulsion to repeat,” which replaced the “impulsion to remember” (p. 151) exposed by the analyst and which INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ““REMEMBERING, REPEATING AND WoRKING-THROUGH”’ demonstrated the powerful resistance to analysis mounted by the defenses. Respect for this resistance, and an acknowledgement of it in analytic technique, is necessary if the work of analysis is to comprehend the full extent of the psychic apparatus; hypnosis, conversely, totally suppresses this resistance. The psychoanalyst’s interest is in the contents of memory and the meaning that he can attribute to them, but he must remain particularly attentive to the means’ by which these memories are recalled. The handling of the transference then becomes an essential task for the analyst while the treatment is underway. Too intense an amorous transference, or, conversely, a hostile transference toward the analyst, will bolster the resistance, causing the analysis to slide into repetition (as act). In this case, repression is the customary defense mounted by the resistance, which deprives the analysand’s thought of memorable ideational content and displaces the corresponding quota of affect onto the act. It is clear in this article that the instinct’s quantitative potency can be made to signify so long as resistance to it is not excessively powerful, an a priori structuring, then, of the psychic apparatus around the transformation of instincts. Freud also provides some technical advice on how to advance the treatment towards a successful conclusion. Some of these recommendations are represented in the figure of the analyst and the analysand struggling against a common enemy: a state of morbidity. Freud wrote that the task of the analyst consists in treating the illness “not as an event of the past, but as a present-day force.... which consists in a large measure in tracing it back to the past” (p. 151). This approach should lead to “a change in the patient’s conscious attitude to his illness.... [and allow him to] find the courage to direct his attention to the phenomena of his illness.” (p. 152); so that it can ultimately “become an enemy worthy of his mettle” (p. 152). So long as the analyst continues to observe “the fundamental rule of analysis” (p. 155), neither the framework of the analysis nor its influence on the transference will be affected. Freud admits that it is not always easy to derive ideational mnemic content from acting out. Thus near the end of the text he writes that occasionally, “it is bound to happen that the untamed instincts assert themselves” (p. 153-154), the effects of which can be witnessed in the repetitive act whereby “the bonds which attach the patient to the treatment are broken” 1469 REMINISCENCES (p. 154), or through other instances of negative therapeutic reaction. Freud advised that in these difficult cases “The main instrument [...] for curbing the patient’s compulsion to repeat and for turning it into a motive for remembering lies in the handling of the transference. We render the compulsion harmless and indeed useful, by giving it the right to assert itself in a definite field. We admit it into the transference as a playground in which it is allowed to expand in almost complete freedom” (p. 154). In order to transform the morbid state into “an artificial illness, which is at every point accessible” (p. 154) to analytical intervention, the analyst should not rely only on the “workingthrough” of the patient, but rather on an extension of his knowledge of metapsychology, as well as an acquaintance with aspects of his own character that might pose an obstacle to the cure. Freud’s conception of the psychic apparatus in 1914 was still based on the first topography; however, in order to properly account for treatments whose virtually unassailable resistances obstruct the progress of the treatment, by mobilizing an entire procession of negative phenomena, he had to wait for the introduction of the “death drive” and the further complication of the psychic apparatus by the second topography. Thus, while Freud spoke of rendering “the compulsion harmless, and indeed useful, by giving it the right to assert itself in a definite field” (p. 154), he ended the article on a less optimistic note only a few lines later. The demonstration to a patient of their resistance is often not enough to overcome it, and indeed frequently intensifies it, which is why Freud stressed the importance of “working in common” (p. 155) and the continuation of analysis, even if the endeavour eventually becomes “a trial of patience for the analyst” (p. 155). This advice, in a form more suited to the realities of the analytic treatment, was reiterated and endorsed by the theoretical developments introduced in his 1937 article “Analysis, Terminable and Interminable.” Freud’s emphasis on the repetition compulsion from 1914 onwards might make it the precursor of the repetition compulsion of 1920, the consequence of an instinctual dualism between the life instincts and the death instinct. The compulsion to repeat of 1914 differs from that of 1920 in that the former is under the sway of the pleasure principle. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g), Freud identified compulsive instinctual phenomena that repeated psychic formations foreign to the pleasure principle, thus placing the repe- 1470 tition compulsion of 1920 in an entirely different relationship to the pleasure principle. RENE PERAN See also: “Analysis terminable and interminable”; Displacement of the transference; Remembering; Repetition; Silence; Transference neurosis; Working-through. Source Citation Freud, Sigmund. (1914g). Errinern, Wiederholen und Durcharbeiten (Weitere Ratschlage zur Technik der Psychoanalyse, II). Internationale Zeitschrift fur artztliche Psychoanalyse, 2, 485-491; Remembering, repeating and working-through. SE, 12: 147-156. Bibliography Cournut, Jean. (1991). L’Ordinaire de la passion. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Guillaumin, Jean. (1983). Psyché. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie. (1992). Le Plaisir de pensée. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. REMINISCENCES Reminiscences are special forms of memory that rise up from the past, confused, vague, involuntary, distorted, or rendered unrecognizable by unconscious mental activity. They also entail a relaxation of the psychic apparatus such that the subject does not necessarily recognize these “rememberings” as belonging to his own past. The concept entered into the field of psychopathology in Sigmund Freud and Josef Breuer’s “Preliminary Communication” (1893a). The phrase “der Hysterische leidet grdsstenteils an Reminiszenzen’ (“the hysteric suffers for the most part from reminiscences”) represents both a break with earlier psychopathology and an introductory maxim for psychoanalysis. This phrase, linking hysteria and reminiscence, introduced a new field of exploration by showing that hysteria consists in alterations of remembering, that is, the concrete affect of the past that will be lastingly expressed in symptoms. The concept of reminiscence, like its use in psychoanalysis, turned out to be both incontrovertible and difficult to identify. This difficulty has to do with INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY oF PSYCHOANALYSIS the variety of the relationships between patients and analysts and their own pasts, their histories, and conceptions of reality, as well as the appearance, from 1896 until now, of new concepts and ideas. Given growing experience with therapy and_ theoretical research, these factors require continued attention to terminological accuracy. In 1996, following the refocusing of interest an reminiscence, the notion seemed to be more difficult and problematic to identify because of its increasingly generalized nature. Initially the use of the term reminiscence referred to both the nature of the psychogenesis of hysteria and the effectiveness of cathartic therapy. Freud and Breuer associated hysterical symptoms with old psychic traumas whose memory had remained unconscious—in a space that had been split off from consciousness; in their attempt to transform these pathogenic reminiscences into true memories, the therapists showed they were capable of suppressing both the symptoms and healing the splitting from consciousness that had produced them. This, together with the notion of pathogenic psychic trauma, prefigured the notion of the unconscious. The different attempts to model the psychic apparatus (homeostatic models, memory models, linguistic models) were so many constructions needed to articulate different realities: infantile reality and its effects, sexuality, dreams, the container and content of psychoanalytic therapy. Reminiscences, which are inherent in all the analysand’s material, appear as the veiled echo of a reality that is itself problematic. The products of constructions and interpretations, these are situated between a so-called “mystic writing pad” or primal writing surface, and the decentering of a subject who reappropriates their own history. The clearest manifestation of reminiscences, which extends beyond the Freudian context of 1893, is found in the psychotraumatic syndromes or “traumatic neuroses.” Here the patient suffers from an implacable repetition of the traumatizing situation in dreams and in the production of flashbacks, which are either reproduced with cinematic accuracy or distinctly transposed. This pathology, which is fairly common and sometimes appears during the analysis of a “classic” neurosis, closely resembles Freud and Breuer’s 1893 discovery: the metaphor of the internal foreign body and the irruption of mnemonic material that does not consist of memories but of images of an almost persecutory past. It is extremely difficult to transform these reminiscences » INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS REPARATION into memories. Freud and Breuer themselves noted that the psychic trauma did not only involve Jean Martin Charcot’s traumatic hysteria, but the traumatic neuroses more generally. In the early twentyfirst century, the concept of reminiscence can provide psychoanalysis with an opportunity to return to the investigation of “psychic trauma” with greater accuracy. CLAUDE BARROIS See also: Amnesia; Cathartic method; Cinema and psychoanalysis; Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis; Forgetting; Hysteria; Lie; Memory; Neurotica; Psychic reality; Remembering; Repression, lifting of; Seduction; Scenes of seduction; Studies on Hysteria; Symbolic, the (Lacan). Bibliography Barrois, Claude. (1988). Les Névroses traumatiques. Paris: Dunod. Dayan, Maurice. (1995). Inconscient et Realité. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Freud, Sigmund. (1925a [1924]). A note upon the “mystic writing pad.” SE, 19: 225-232. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1893a). On the psychical mechanism of hysterical phenomina: Preliminary communication. SE, 2: 1-17. Laplanche, Jean. (1981). Problématiques IV, L’Inconscient et le Ca. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. REPARATION Reparation is a form of sublimation connected, in the depressive position, with putting right damage done to good objects. The pain of depressive anxiety (or guilt) starts as a deeply persecuting demand for a punishment—the talion law of an eye-for-an-eye and a tooth-for-atooth. As this position is worked through, new feelings (pining, Melanie Klein called it) appear towards the object, and are associated with specific impulses to repair the damage done by aggressive phantasies or acts. Development in the depressive position along this axis depends on the capacity to sustain a feeling of love towards the object despite the impulses of hating and, in phantasy, wanting to attack the good object. 1471 REPETITION Love takes the form of a kind of penance or atonement to a loved one, creating a mixture of sadness, regret, and activity. This is reparation. In the characteristic manic defenses the ego takes up a position in which the object is degraded, so that damage to it becomes a matter of indifference. At first reparation may be strongly colored by these defenses (manic reparation) and then reparation is not yet based on regret but is a demonstration of a strength and energy superior to that of the object. The depressive position is founded primarily on the relations to the internal good object, and reparation is a means of securing it. Though reparation may often be directed to external objects, the latter represent the internal object to which the ego is dedicated. Like sublimation, reparation is deeply dependent on the social context to provide useful directions for the effort to be channeled. Klein described reparation as a powerful impetus to creativity (1935). Aesthetic achievements are examples of the most touching and loving devotions to recreating the beauty of the loved object (Segal, 1991). Reparation without the sadness and regret betrays itself in a technical perfection of prettiness, distinct from beauty. Hanna Segal (1991) has greatly expanded the understanding of the Kleinian views on the aesthetic process based in reparation; and to some extent her descriptions of the aesthetic process compliment Donald Winnicott’s theory of the aesthetic object (as transitional object). As a further addition to the psychoanalytic theory of aesthetics, Donald Meltzer has pointed to the place of the infant’s primary “worship” of the breast, and of the parental creative couple, conflicted though that is. Sublimation is a similar drive toward the use of libido in acceptable ways, though it is conceived in terms of the quantitative distribution of the libido while reparation is in terms of object-relations. Because it is an attempt to repair the effects of aggressiveness, reparation also links with undoing. Reparation might be included within the term sublimation. However, reparation is not the result of desexualized and rechanneled libido. Instead it is the mobilization of the libidinal impulses in the context of a relationship with an object (especially an internal one) to contest the aggressive ones. Rosert D. HINSHELWOOD 1472 See also: Cruelty; Depression; Depressive position; Gift; Melancholia; Schizophrenia; Splitting; Splitting of the object. Bibliography Heimann, Paula. (1942). Sublimation and its relation to processes of internalization. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 23, 8-17. Klein, Melanie. (1935). A contribution to the psychogenesis of manic-depressive states. International Journal of Psycho- Analysis, 16, 145-174; reprinted 1975 in The Writings of Melanie Klein (Vol. 1, pp. 262-289). London: Hogarth. Klein, Melanie, and Riviere, Joan. (1937). Love, hate and reparation. London: Hogarth. Segal, Hanna. Dreams, phantasy, and art. London: Institute of Psychoanalysis-Routledge. REPETITION A characteristic expression of unconscious psychic processes, repetition drives the subject, more or less regularly, but inflexibly, to reiterate systematically certain experiences, thoughts, ideas, and representations. Discovering and accounting for repetition opened up one of the most fertile areas of study for Freudian psychoanalysis. Whereas others emphasized hereditary, physiological, traumatic or circumstantial causes, Freud stressed that what was involved was the automatic repetition of memories and experiences that are no longer conscious, according to modalities that vary with the circumstances and individual case. The technique adopted from the time of Studies on Hysteria (1895) favored placing this process of repetition within the special framework of the psychoanalytic relation, wherein the idea or affect that was blocked from conscious manifestation could be expressed (catharsis). Freud pointed out, all the same, that if the memory was blocked in the unconscious, this was because it was comprised of elements that had taken the turn of “deferred action.” Consequently, repetition does not mean similitude, which contrasts it from the symptom properly speaking, particularly the obsessional symptom, where it is repeated as such. The notion of repetition was originally introduced by Karl Groos, for whom recognition was the basis of ludic and aesthetic pleasure, and also by Gustav Fechner, who defined pleasure as the result of an economy of psychic effort, leading to a lowering of tension. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ‘pu _ tte pe area nap pia manne In the subsewqoruk eofn Frteu d, there were two _ distinct periods, separated in 1920 by Beyothne Pdle asure Principle. Until this time, when repetition was mentioned, in various contexts, it was always in the _ game sense and often conjoined with other notions such as recall, abreaction, construction, and working through. After 1920, it almost never came up again except in the form of a “repetition compulsion.” Here the focus will be, essentiallyo,n repetition of the first period, and its extensions. In the first meaning of the term, repetition was equivalent to reiteration. In The Interpretation of Dreams it was a significant primary process: “The temporal repetition of an act is regularly shown in dreams by the numerical multiplication of an object” (1900a). In Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious (1905), it was the source of the comic, by reason of the economy of concentrated effort and the effect of pleasure thus obtained. With a child this pleasurable effect of fepetisi qutitie eovidnen t. But for an adultwh,e n something is repeated, what was first pleasurable arouses anxiety and a feeling of abnormality, especially when the repetition emerges from an encounter or an experience where it was least expected. Freud cited a few examples oft his in “The “Uncanny” (1919h), such as the repetition of the same number, the same place, or the multiplied encounter of the same face—all of which can become the source of considerable anxiety. Freud was known to harbor quasi-superstitious feelings about certain times of the year, the repetition of numbers, or about coincidences. In his Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood (1910c), he called a repetition that occurred in the context of the death of the father perseveration, adding that “It is an excellent means of indicating affective colour” In his article “Remembering, Repeating and Working- Through” (1914), Freud described the role of repetition in the analytic cure, considerably narrowing its significance by linking repetition to acting out. Repetition matters only when the subject “does not remember anything - Inteewationar Dictiowazy or PsYcHOAWALYSIS Revrerition of what he has forgotten and repressed, but acts it out” (p. 150). Inw hiccahse , “We soon perceive that the transference is itself only a piece of repetition” (p. 151). This accounts for the rule that no serious decision should be made in the course of the analysis. Insofar as it is only purely and simply repetition, transfeisr aer esnisctanece , since it is marked by the anachronism of repeated contents and aims to disguise the effects of deferred action. In dinical practice, the most typical example of this is the fate neurosis, which produces ineluctably the translation of memories or repressed events into acts, a process discussed in “Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through” (1914). In transference neurosis, the repetition intervenes basically on the level of affects or representations, which constitute undeniably for Freud evidence of early repressed pleasures that the subject has not been able to renounce, to the point that his thoughts are invaded by the repetitions, or he becomes fixated and obsessed. The problem here then is to limit the fascination they exert, so as to make it possiblet o break free of them, which can onble ydon e in the framework of a transference-neurosis type of repetition—but one made flexible by means of interpretation. With perversion, the repetition is focused essentially on the scenario, the practice or means utilized in the search for pleasure, which leads to stereotyping and systematizing. Daniel Lagache placed much emphasis on the role of repetition in the transference: “In the course of the sessions of psychoanalysis, as in the course of life, the patient draws from his repertoire of habits? and on this basis, “the liquidation of the transference should be understood as a liquidation of the transference neurosis, that is to say of neurotic repetitions, inadequate for present- day reality” This assimilation of “repetition” with “inappropriate” characteristics was echoed a few years later by Ralph Greenson (1967). Jean Laplanche ciiticized this conception of repetition, which he considered too adaptationist, opposing it to a repetition such as is manifested in “full transference; which is a positive repetition of infantile images or relations—or the kind of repetition such as is behind the “hollow transference,’ whereby the infantile repeated relation rediscovers its enigmatic quality, with meaningful questions surgingt o the surface when this occurs (1987). In childhood the role of repetition is decisive. Through the first articulation of meaningful phonemes, primitive gestures or initial mimicry, it results in the establishment and gradual reinforcement of 1473 REPETITION COMPULSION signs, rhythms, and habits that will shape the being of the subject, his physiognomy and rapport with the world. However, in the form of tics, stereotypes, stammering, etc., repetition signals real blockages; but when repetition turns into swayings, rictus, suckings, cries, and so on, it constitutes a valuable sign of early autism (Leo Kanner) or of anaclitic depression (René Spitz). These repetitions are evidence, in effect, of a progressive withdrawal of the child into a regressive internal world where his tendency is to lose himself. In this sense, childhood is a privileged period for observing the relation to others and situating oneself: as long as the other person remains a partner, there are progressive clarifications that result in a relatively stable habitus, one that it is possible to build on. However, when the partner is distant, unknown, mysterious, enigmatic, and silent, then sometimes obstructions and inhibitions occur that require external intervention. On the other hand, when real stereotyping ensues, it can only mean that the other has been confused with an internal object. Repetition plays an especially important role in all activities centered on sublimation, and consequently in literary or artistic creation. In analyzing the Gradiva of Jensen (1907a), or meditating over Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood (1910c), Freud isolated a form of repetition that not only becomes renewal, but also metamorphosis or creation: in the case of Gradiva there was a risk of alienation from reality, while repetition clearly allows, in the case of Leonardo, for a very special way of working with reality. Freud’s intuition was applied later to the subject of music, where repetition becomes rhythm, which is probably its source, engendering irreplaceable drive pleasures and satisfactions at the deepest levels of psychic functioning (Guy Rosolato). GERARD BONNET See also: Repetition compulsion. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1914g). Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through (Further recommendations on the technique of psycho-analysis II). SE, 12: 145-156. Rosolato, Guy (1993). Lécoute musicale comme méditation. In Pour une psychanalyse exploratrice de la culture (pp. 187-197). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1474 REPETITION COMPULSION Repetition compulsion is an inherent, primordial tendency in the unconscious that impels the individual to repeat certain actions, in particular, the most painful or destructive ones. The repetition compulsion occupies a significantly more prominent role in French psychoanalysis than in North American psychoanalysis. Freud introduced this notion in chapters 3 and 4 of Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g), making it one of the new foundations of his theory. In the first lines of chapter 4 he presented this idea as being a “speculation, ... an attempt to follow out an idea consistently, out of curiosity to see where it will lead” (p. 24). At the same time, he stressed that he wanted to base it solidly on analytic experience, especially that of treating “traumatic neurosis” (p. 24). Just as the unconscious mind reacts to an external trauma by repeating it—a paradox, since the trauma is a frightening experience— the conscious mind resorts to repetition when unpleasurable unconscious contents surface and threaten the equilibrium of the ego as a whole. Repetition compulsion is thus initially a defense, an attempt to bind, assimilate, and integrate undesirable experiences that are incompatible with other experiences. Freud saw this as “a function of the mental apparatus which, though it does not contradict the pleasure principle, is nevertheless independent of it and seems to be more primitive than the purpose of gaining pleasure and avoiding unpleasure” (p. 32). Thus “excitations from within ... often occasion economic disturbances comparable with traumatic neuroses” (p. 34). Freud considered the repetition compulsion as a largely dominate “universal attribute ... of organic life in general” (p. 36). Modifications and development take place only because external factors regularly force the living organism to adapt to new life conditions. In this regard, he wrote, “The aim of all life is death” (p. 38). In “ever more complicated détours ... these circuitous paths to death ... would thus present us to-day with the picture of the phenomena of life” (p. 39). Unconscious instincts are also subject to this law, this aim of life, and would be completely submerged in repetition were it not for the environment and its countless demands, on the one side, and sexuality and its potentialities, on the other. “These germ-cells, therefore, work against the death of the living substance and succeed in winning for it what we can only regard as potential immortality” (p. 40). In human INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS beings, these cells were posited as being at the source of what Freud later called the “life instinct,’ while the compulsion to repeat, which is primary, is associated with the death instinct. Freud thereafter continually tried to give a more precise account of this initial insight. The phenomenon of positive transference helped substantiate the idea of a repetition compulsion, which could prove stronger than the pleasure principle, he explained in “Remarks on the Theory and Practice of Dream-Interpretation,” (1923c [1922]). In “An Autobiographical Study” (1925d [1924]), Freud wrote that “the essentially conservative character of instincts is exemplified by the phenomena of the compulsion to repeat” (p. 57). In Civilization and Its Discontents (1930a [1929]), he explained that the repetition compulsion involves a resistance of the id. And in 1930 he explained why he preferred the term compulsion to repetition automatism. In his late work, Freud emphasized the destructiveness of the repetition compulsion. In “New Introductory Lectures to Psychoanalysis” (1933a [1932]), he wrote, “And now the instincts we believe in divide themselves into two groups—the erotic instincts, which seek to combine more and more living substance into ever greater unities, and the death instincts, which oppose this effort and lead what is living back into an inorganic state. From the concurrent and opposing action of these two proceed the phenomena of life which are brought to an end by death” (p. 107). Repetition compulsion thus became synonymous with destructive impulses. Finally, Freud associated it with primary masochism, in which the subject turns violence against himself and subjugates his libido to it, endlessly repeating certain damaging patterns based on experiences rooted at the deepest levels within the self. He theorized that this is a way of tolerating feelings of guilt. The individual manifests a tendency to destroy and suffer, which brings with it feelings of overwhelming satisfaction, all of which are vestiges of a time when the individual did not yet have a sense of reality. In the famous text “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” (1937c), Freud revealed his greatest pessimism noting that instead of “permanently disposing of an instincual demand [through analysis].... we mean something else, something which may be roughly described as a ‘taming’ of the instinct” (p. 224-225) As on the dichotomy between the life and death instincts, psychoanalysts have been divided on the issue of repetition compulsion. As a result, it has been reinterpreted in several ways. Among the most influential INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS REPETITION COMPULSION interpretations is that of Jacques Lacan (1978), who saw repetition compulsion as one of the four major concepts of psychoanalysis, along with the unconscious, transference, and the instincts. He used it as the basis for his distinction between jouissance (enjoyment) and pleasure, with jouissance being situated “beyond the pleasure principle” as the desired result of repetition of the worst carried to its extreme. Jean Laplanche, by contrast, emphasized that the “repetition compulsion and the death instinct are not at all synonymous”: it is the message of the Other as such that is traumatic, and repetition is the first way of giving it meaning. The concept of the repetition compulsion turned Freudian theory on its head. It introduced the death instinct, opened the way to the second theory of the instincts, and led to modifications in clinical practice and analytic technique that are still going on in the early twenty-first century. Analysts no longer focus on deciphering slips of the tongue or dreams, or on resolving a particular symptom, but instead try to find ways to halt repetitive behavior patterns by opening up diversionary pathways for them. From a theoretical point of view, the evolution of the notion of repetition compulsion and the constant shifts it underwent in Freud’s thinking has received far more consideration than one would expect. In the beginning, the main role of the repetition compulsion was to account for the psyche’s conservative tendencies, its reactions in the face of anything that might invade it. Only at a second stage did Freud emphasize the compulsive, systematic, instinctual aspects of the repetition compulsion and bring out its fundamentally destructive side. This shift is problematic. To get beyond the resulting contradiction, which emerges in the opposing positions of Lacan and Laplanche (1980), one must return anew to one of Freud’s statements in the metapsychological articles of 1915, according to which all instincts are fundamentally active, willed, and enacted by the subject alone. And one must note in addition that the subject exists in relation to others and is the product of relationships. Subjects repeat what they internalized during their earliest relationships, in order to actively exploit this initial lived experience by all means at their disposal. This repetition turns into automatism pure and simple and becomes destructive when it runs up against some of life’s obstacles. Then repetition is completely beyond the control of the subject, who is held hostage to it. GERARD BONNET 1475 REPETITIVE DREAMS See also: Automatism; Beyond the Pleasure Principle; Compulsion; Death instinct (Thanatos); Jouissance (Lacan); Obsession; Protective shield, breaking through the; Punishment, dream of; Repetition; Repetitive dreams; Trauma. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1-64. . (1923c [1922]). Remarks on the theory and practice of dream-interpretation. SE, 19: 107-121. . (1925d [1924]). An autobiographical study. SE, 20: 1-74. . (1930a [1929]). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21: 57-145. . (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. SE, 22: 1-182. Freud, Sigmund. (1937c). Analysis, terminable and interminable. SE, 23: 209-253. Lacan, Jacques. (1964). Position de l’inconscient. In his Ecrits. Paris: Seuil, 1966. . (1978). The seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book 11: The four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis (Alan Sheridan, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton. (Original work published 1973) Laplanche, Jean. (1980). Problématiques I: Castration, symbolisations. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Further Reading Gifford, Sanford, rep. (1964). Panel: Repetition compulsion. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 12, 632-649, Inderbitzin, Lawrence, and Levy, Steven. (1998). Repetition compulsion revisited: Implications for technique. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 67, 32-53. Loewald, Hans W. (1971). Some considerations on repetition and repetition compulsion. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 52, 59-66. REPETITIVE DREAMS The repetitive dream is a dream that is dreamt repeatedly and more or less identically during one’s life. Freud first thought that “a dream contains elements from childhood...where the dream is of what has been called the ‘recurrent’ type” (1900a, p. 190); subse- 1476 quently he was of the opinion that symbolic interpretation was indispensable for an analysis of this kind of dream (1901a). He undertook a comprehensive analysis of such a repetitive dream in the case of Dora (1905e), then later, in that of the “Wolf Man” (1918b). Taking into consideration the traumatic underpinnings of such dreams, he later changed his position, especially as it related to anxiety dreams. In “Dreams and Telepathy” (1922a) he discussed a dream, cause of much anxiety, that pursued the dreaming woman “like a ghost” (p. 209) for many years. This revision of his view of the repetitive dream occurred in the general context of metapsychological modifications resulting from his reflection on repetition itself, “beyond the pleasure principle” (1920g). Ferenczi (1931/1955) was influenced by it in writing: “Every dream, even the most disturbing ones, attempt at mastery and resolution of a traumatic experience” (p. 238). Subsequently, the repetitive dream has been generally discussed from the perspective of the symptomatic repetition of a trauma (Rabain, 1988), as well as within the framework of metapsychological reflections on time (Seulin, 1997). ROGER PERRON See also: Beyond the Pleasure Principle; Dream; Introjection. Bibliography Ferenczi, Sandor. (1955). On the Revision of the Interpretation of Dreams. In his Selected Papers of Sandor Ferenczi, III (Eric Mosbacher, et al, Trans.; pp. 238-243.). New York: Basic Books. (Original work published 1931) Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4-5. . (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1-64. Rabain, Jean-Francois. (1988). La mise en scene du trauma. Revue frangaise de psychanalyse, 53 (6), 1373-1389. Seulin, Christian. (1997, April). Le temps figé des réves recurrents. Bulletin de la Société de psychanalyse de Paris, 4, 91-99. REPRESENTABILITY Representability is a sensory capacity of the psychic apparatus that makes it possible for an object that is INTERNATIONAL DicTioNARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS absent to be made present in the form of an image. It is active in the process of hallucination, artistic creation, and the dream work, where latent and abstract thoughts are transformed into visual images. The notion of representability appears in chapter 6 of The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a) titled “The Dream Work,” in which Sigmund Freud explores the relationship between manifest content and latent thoughts, and the psychic means used in the selection and transformation of abstract thoughts into visual images. It is also found in chapter 7, “The Psychology of the Dream-Processes,” where the focus is on the dream’s instinctual force, understood as a wishfulfillment by means of regression to sensory images. In the mind’s use of representability, abstract thoughts are transformed into pictorial language. Among the means involved are condensation through selection of overdetermined elements, and displacement of psychic intensities along associative chains. The omission of logical and causal relationships that cannot be represented is reminiscent of the plastic arts, but the reduction to condensed terms also resembles the work of poetry, and the ambiguous syntax obtained by plays on words. The aim of this work is to make it possible for free-flowing energy to be attracted to visual images while at the same time satisfying the mind’s endopsychic censorship by means of these distortions. Primary representation-compulsion, noted in Herbert Silberer’s account of self-symbolization, should not lead us to overlook the aim of this formal regression governed by the primary process: putting an end to internal tension and “re-finding” the sensory trace of the object and the illusion of its presence. In so doing, the dream hallucinatorily fulfills a wish, and the regression is both temporal and topographical insofar as the wish is unconscious and dates from childhood. In “A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams” (1916-17f [1915]), his perspective expanded by metapsychology, Freud delineated the hallucinatory process in its topographical and psychopathological dimensions. Representability involves a conscious cathexis of an instinctual demand; a negative hallucination makes it possible to deny the perception of reality. In “Du langage pictural au langage de l’interprete” (From pictorial language to the language of the interpreter; 1980), with regard to psychosis, Piera Aulagnier returned to the idea that a consideration of representability is necessary for the analyst’s interpretation to be INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS REPRESENTATION OF AFFECT dynamically effective, with regard to particular modes of thought that remain fixed to thing-presentations. The term representability poses the same problems of translation as the term representation, which is used to render two different German terms: Darstellung and Vorstellung. Indeed the English terms do not capture the connotation, inherent in the German Stellung-da, of the presence of the object that is associated with all hallucinatory productions. KATIA VARENNE See also: Dream work; Interpretation of Dreams, The; Representability, considerations of; Screen memory; Visual. Bibliography Aulagnier, Piera. (1980). Du langage pictural au langage de linterprete. Topique, 26, 29-54. Botella, Cesar, and Botella, Sara. (2001). La Figurabilite psychique. Lausanne and Paris: Delachaux & Niestle. Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. Part I, SE, 4; 1—338; Part IL, SE, 5: 339-625. . (1916-17f [1915]). A metapsychological supplement to the theory of dreams. SE, 14: 217-35. REPRESENTATION OF AFFECT The term representation of affect can be defined as that which constitutes the medium for the affect’s expression, in a sense serving as its vehicle in mental dynamics. This expression, which is found in some psychoanalytic texts, is nevertheless of dubious value for metapsychology as it was expressed in Sigmund Freud’s 1915 texts brought together under that title. In those texts he clearly established that instinct, situated at the “frontier” between body and mind, is expressed in mental dynamics by means of two components: on the one hand, the ideational representative, and on the other, an energy charge, the “quota of affect” (Affektbetrag), whose fate can be distinct. This energy change, when it is temporarily without a representational support, can be qualitatively transformed into various emotions (fear, pleasure, anxiety, etc.) and, under certain conditions, can cathect ideational representations awaiting the arrival of such a charge that will embody and validate them. 1477 REPRESSED This is the case, for example, when anxiety “without an object” (that is, without a conscious object) becomes focused on a clearly identifiable phobogenic object; this process was clearly demonstrated in the case of “Little Hans,” related in “Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-year-old Boy” (1909), whose castration anxiety was found to be embodied in horses. Thus, if we speak about representation of affect, it is in the sense in which a traveling salesman “represents” a product, delegated by his or her employer to perform this function for the clients (in this analogy, the instinct would be the employer, and consciousness would be the client). This usage of the term can be deemed to be congruent with one of the terms used by Freud to denote representation, Reprasentanz, which has precisely this meaning of “delegate,” “deputy, or “representative” in the commercial sense. ROGER PERRON See also: Psychic representative. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1909). Analysis of a phobia in a five-yearold boy. SE, 10: 1-149. . (1915c). Instincts and their vicissitudes. SE, 14: 273-300. . (1915d). Repression. SE, 14: 141-158. . (1915e). The unconscious. SE, 14: 159-204. Further Reading Caper, Robert. (2001). The place of affect in the representational world. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 82, 597-600. Slade, Arietta. (1999). Representation, symbolization, affect regulation between mother and child. Psychoanalytical Inquiry, 19, 797-830. Steiner, Riccardo. (2001). Affect in psychoanalytic theory: Andre Green on affect and representation. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 82, 877-900. REPRESSED The repressed is constituted by the operation of repression, which rejects and maintains in the unconscious representations deemed incompatible with the ego. 1478 The repressed is not directly knowable, since it pertains wholly to the unconscious. It can be known only by its effects and by what it produces through deferred action, in particular “derivatives” of the unconscious. Sigmund Freud always insisted on the unalterability of the repressed, while at the same time recognizing that it could be rearranged or even modified, especially in the course of psychoanalytic treatment. Initially, Freud considered the notion of the repressed as a correlative to that of an unconscious still distinguished by its dynamic role. In his early works Freud attributed an “intentionality” to the mind that seeks to forget and maintain outside of consciousness a certain number of unpleasurable representations (thoughts, images, memories). He posited that these representations are isolated in a “second psychical group” that is separated from the mainstream of thoughts. The psyche then becomes “dissociated,” the unpleasurable idea being relegated to another place, repressed, thus blocking any discharge of the emotion associated with it. It can be seen that the notion of repression, as originally set forth, is correlative to that of the unconscious. For a long time—until he put forward the idea of unconscious ego defenses—Freud used the term repressed as a synonym for the unconscious. However, the term intentionality used by Freud in 1895 must be understood in a nuanced fashion. As Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis underscored in The Language of Psychoanalysis (1967; trans. 1974), the “splitting of consciousness” is only “initiated” by an intentional act (p. 353). Indeed, as a “separate psychic group” repressed contents escape the subject’s control and are governed by the laws of the primary processes. The repressed representation in and of itself is an initial “nucleus of crystallization” capable of attracting other intolerable representations, without the intervention of any conscious intention. Repression is thus conceived as a dynamic process that involves maintaining a counter-cathexis; it is always susceptible to being thwarted by an unconscious wish seeking to return to consciousness. Freud called this process “the return of the repressed.” Repressed wishes are not annihilated in the unconscious; rather, they constantly tend to reappear in consciousness through the intermediary of more or less unrecognizable derivative formations that Freud generically called “derivatives of the unconscious” or “derivatives of the repressed.” In “Repression” (1915d), Freud explained INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY oF PSYCHOANALYSIS that these derivatives can return to consciousness in the form of substitutive formations or symptoms. The repressed is not directly knowable, since it pertains wholly to the unconscious. Just as only the products of the unconscious can be known, we can only know the derivatives of the repressed, its formations under the effects of deferred action. According to Claude Le Guen in Le Refoulement (1992; Repression): “The repressed is indeed a constituent part of the id, but the only thing that can make it comprehensible to us has to do with the fact that it is a product of the ego.” Freud pointed out in “Repression” that “repression does not hinder the instinctual representative from continuing to exist in the unconscious, from organizing itself further, from putting out derivatives and establishing connections.” The instinctual representative “proliferates in the dark ... and takes on extreme forms of expression” that “not only... seem alien” to the neurotic, but “frighten him” (p. 149). The repressed undergoes distortions in and by means of the derivatives that represent it, until, thus disguised, it can elude censorship and gain access to consciousness. The repressed, therefore, is anything but inert. Moreover, it “exercises a continuous pressure in the direction of the conscious, so that this pressure must be balanced by an unceasing counter-pressure. Thus the maintenance of a repression involves an uninterrupted expenditure of force, while its removal results in a saving from an economic point of view” (p. 151). Finally, the repressed that returns is never identical to what was originally repressed, because in the meantime it has been distorted—it has “worked.” Indeed, such changes are mandatory in order for the censorship to give its authorization. For a long time Freud privileged the study of the repressed per se. His interest in the repressing agency, the ego, only took shape later. What he described in Beyond the Pleasure Principle as “the aim which had been set up—the aim that what was unconscious should become conscious” (1920g, p. 18) proved to be a more difficult task than he had supposed in the early days of interpreting dreams and parapraxes. Analysis ran up against repetition compulsion, and the need for punishment. The repressed could thus not explain everything, and beginning in 1923 Freud shifted his focus toward the repressing agency. In Civilization and Its Discontents (1930a [1929]), he wrote: “Alterations in [analytic theory] seemed essential, as our enquiries INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS REPRESSED advanced from the repressed to the repressing forces, from the object-instincts to the ego” (p. 118). In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud posed the problem: “We shall avoid a lack of clarity if we make our contrast not between the conscious and the unconscious but between the coherent ego and the repressed. It is certain that much of the ego itself is unconscious, and notably what we may deséribe as its nucleus; only a small part of it is covered by the term ‘preconscious. Having replaced a purely descriptive terminology by one which is systematic or dynamic, we can say that the patient’s resistance arises from his ego, and we then at once perceive that the compulsion to repeat must be ascribed to the unconscious repressed” (1920g, p.p. 19-20). It is therefore appropriate to analyze the resistances rather than bringing to light the repressed (which always represents the dynamic unconscious). In the words of Claude Le Guen (1992): “The opposition is no longer to be situated between the systems, but rather between the agencies.” Unconscious resistance is thus a product not only of the repressed, but also of the ego, which does not want to eliminate repression. “We may say that repression is the work of this super-ego and that it is carried out either by itself or by the ego in obedience to its orders,” wrote Freud in New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1933a [1932], p. 69). The question of the fate of the repressed remains crucial, above all in relation to psychoanalytic treatment and the possibilities for change it promises. Freud always insisted on the “indestructibility” of unconscious contents. In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a) he described unconscious repressed wishes as being “ever on the alert and, so to say, immortal” (p. 553). The adjective immortal was used again in the lecture “The Decomposition of the Psychical Personality” in New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis. In the metapsychological writings of 1915, the derivatives of the repressed are said to continue to become organized, to work, and to undergo distortion in the unconscious, but these transformations in service of the defenses are not real “changes.” Freud subsequently envisioned them in terms of the treatment. Returning in the New Introductory Lectures to the problem of the effects of treatment on the repressed, he noted that “in certain cases the repressed instinctual impulse can subsist unaltered in the id, albeit under constant pressure from the ego. In other cases, it seems, it can 1479 REPRESSED undergo a complete ‘destruction’ during which its libido is definitively directed toward other pathways.” He had already postulated the “decline” (Untergang) of the oedipal repressed in “The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex” (1924d). Returning to the question of the effects of treatment on the repressed in “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” (1937c)], Freud wrote: “Psychoanalysis leads the ego, which has matured and grown stronger, to revise its formerly repressed contents; some are destroyed, while others are recognized but newly constructed out of more solid materials.” He spoke here of eliminating, destroying, and rebuilding with more solid materials. Does this not imply true change, rather than a mere distortion? “Despite the explicit repetition of statements about the unalterability of the repressed, the idea of its possible change remains implicitly present,’ noted Le Guen. Freud again took up this question of the possibility of modification of the repressed in a footnote in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926d): “Since the differentiation of the ego and the id, our interest in the problem of repression, too, was bound to receive a fresh impetus. Up till then we had been content to confine our interest to those aspects of repression which concerned the ego—the keeping away from consciousness and from motility, and the formation of substitutes (symptoms). With regard to the repressed instinctual impulses themselves, we assumed that they remained unaltered in the unconscious for an indefinite length of time. But now our interest is turned to the vicissitudes of the repressed and we begin to suspect that it is not self-evident, perhaps not even usual, that those impulses should remain unaltered and unalterable in this way. There is no doubt that the original impulses have been inhibited and deflected from their aim through repression. But has the portion of them in the unconscious maintained itself and been proof against the influences of life that tend to alter and depreciate them? In other words, do the old wishes, about whose former existence analysis tells us, still exist? The answer seems ready to hand and certain. It is that the old, repressed wishes must still be present in the unconscious since we still find their derivatives, the symptoms, in operation. But this answer is not sufficient. It does not enable us to decide between two possibilities: either that the old wish is now operating only through its derivatives, having transferred the whole of its cathectic energy to them, or that it is itself 1480 still in existence too. If its fate has been to exhaust itself in cathecting its derivatives, there is yet a third possibility. In the course of the neurosis it may have become re-animated by regression, anachronistic though it may now be” (p. 142n). In “Le refoulement (les défenses)” (1986), Le Guen gave a long analysis of this footnote and the new metapsychological perspectives it can provide. Only Freud’s third hypothesis seemed to Le Guen to correspond to the experience of treatment. The old, repressed wish, having disappeared as such after expending its libidinal energy for the purpose of cathecting its derivatives, can be revived by these derivatives along a regressive pathway. This involves not a meeting up, but instead a reconstruction. By reviving the past, the present acts via deferred action (aprés-coup). By organizing the past, deferred action thus serves the function of facilitation, with the most recent derivatives facilitating the older ones. The question envisioned here—is the repressed subject to modification?’—and the proposed answer— old wishes are “re-animated by regression,” with current events reviving and transforming the past—are important, in that both theory and clinical practice are closely related to our views on the fate of the repressed. Is analysis a mere bringing to light of repressed contents (Freud’s first hypothesis of a closed, inert system), does it provoke a new, defensive arrangement of them (the second hypothesis of a closed, dynamic system), or does it have a transformative role and aims (the third hypothesis of an open, dynamic system)? These three viewpoints influence the techniques used in treatment. Indeed, they indicate actual practices as well as the implicit theories of the analyst. JEAN-FRANCOIS RABAIN See also: Repression. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4—5: 1-625. . (1915d). Repression. SE, 14: 141-58. - (1926d [1925]). Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. SE, 20: 75-172. Le Guen, Claude. (1992). Le Refoulement. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Le Guen, Claude, et al. (1986). Le refoulement (les défenses). Revue francaise de psychanalyse, 50, 1. REPRESSED, DERIVATIVE OF THE; DERIVATIVES OF THE UNCONSCIOUS The term repressed was used by Sigmund Freud in the context of his dynamic conception of the unconscious. Repressed elements, which remain active in the unconscious, constantly tend to reappear to consciousness in derived formations that are unrecognizable to varying degrees: These are the “derivatives” of the unconscious that also appear in the forms of symptoms, fantasies, or free associations in the course of analysis. It would be impossible to conceive of repression without the return of the repressed, and vice versa. The point of articulation of this process is provided by the “derivative of the unconscious” or “derivative of the repressed.” That which has been repressed in the unconscious tends to resurface in the conscious mind in the form of derivatives that, in turn, become the object of new defensive measures. Freud used this expression, especially in the metapsychological texts of 1915, to refer to the symptoms, fantasies, and associations during the session that are connected to repressed ideas. In “The Unconscious” (1915), Freud compared these unconscious formations, these derivatives, to “individuals of mixed race”: “Thus qualitatively they belong to the system Pcs., but factually to the Ucs. Their origin is what decides their fate. We may compare them with individuals of mixed race who, taken all round, resemble white men, but who betray their coloured descent by some striking feature or other, and on that account are excluded from society and enjoy none of the privileges of white people.... To this species belong the fantasmatic formations of normal men as well as neurotics, in whom we have recognized the preliminary degrees of the formation of the dream and the symptom” (p. 191). This dual, Preconscious-Unconscious affiliation, together with their situation anterior to censorship, makes these derivatives into “necessary places of transition” through which the repressed can effect a return and through which repression can act, according to Claude Le Guen in Le Refoulement (Repression; 1992). According to Freud in “The Unconscious,” the most highly organized unconscious derivatives include the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS REPRESSION “substitutive formations” (Ersatzbildungen), which “succeed in breaking through into consciousness when circumstances are favorable—for example, if they happen to join forces with an anticathexis from the Pcs.” (p. 191). The substitutive formations (“parapraxes,” “jokes”) are nothing other than evolved derivatives that replace unconscious contents. In Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926 [1925]), Freyd likened neurotic symptoms to substitutive formations put into the place of the instinctual process that has undergone the action of the defense. The economic factor is what determines the various possible fates of the derivative. A reinforcing energy must retroactively intervene (for example, at puberty) for a mnemic trace from childhood, reinforced by an unconscious cathexis and having become a “tolerable” derivative, to thereafter be perceived as bearable. Its relationship to action is what seals the fate of the derivative of the repressed. The derivative is condemned in its capacity as a precursor or representative of a possible putting into action. The function of repression, which Freud in “Repression” (1915) described as “something between flight and condemnation” (p. 146), is to enlist the derivative in situations that render impossible the direct realization of unconscious desire—putting it into action. JEAN-FRANCOIS RABAIN See also: Repression; Return of the repressed. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1915d). Repression. SE, 14: 141-158. . (1915e). The unconscious. SE, 14: 159-204. . (1926d [1925]). Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. SE, 20: 75-172. Le Guen, Claude. (1992). Le Refoulement. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Le Guen, Claude, et al. (1986). Le refoulement (les défenses). Revue francaise de psychoanalyse, 50, 1. REPRESSION Repression is the operation by which the subject repels and keeps at a distance from consciousness 1481 REPRESSION representations (thoughts, images, memories) that are disagreeable because they are incompatible with the ego. For Sigmund Freud repression is the privileged mode of defense against the instincts. Closely linked to the discovery of the unconscious, the notion of repression accompanies all the developments of Freudian theory. It is one of its major points, “the corner-stone on which the whole structure of psychoanalysis rests” (“On the History of the Psycho- Analytic Movement” [1914d], p. 16). Initially described in conjunction with hysteria, repression plays a major role in other mental disorders as well as in normal psychic activity. It can be considered a “universal” psychic process insofar as it is constitutive of the unconscious, itself conceived of as a separate realm of the psyche. More generally, repression is one of the defenses (in fact the primary one) mobilized by the mind to deal with conflicts and to protect the ego from the demands of the instincts. Four main phases relating to the development of the notion of repression can be schematically described in Freud’s writings. Until 1895, based on the idea of the “intentionality” of forgetting in the neuroses, Freud assumed the existence of “unconscious motivation.” From 1895 to 1910, his research into the repressed and its contents led to the great discoveries of this period: infantile sexuality and the Oedipus complex. Repression became the mainspring of ordinary psychic functioning. From 1911 to 1919, Freud reconsidered the process of repression in terms of the threefold metapsychological viewpoint, and he described a “primal repression.” From 1920 to 1939, with the second topography (instinctual theory), repression became one “defense mechanism” among others, but at the same time remained a “separate” process. It remained at the center of analytic discourse. Although the word had already been used in Johann F. Herbart’s psychology, it stood out to Freud as a clinical fact. He deduced from his treatment of hysterics that forgetting is an active, intentional phenomenon, since the return of forgotten memories under hypnosis and their abreaction caused the symptoms to disappear. In Studies on Hysteria (1895d) Freud and Josef Breuer explained that it was “a question of things which the patient wished to forget, and therefore intentionally repressed from his conscious thought and inhibited and suppressed” (p. 10). 1482 The term repression, borrowed from everyday language, thereafter followed a remarkable trajectory. Not only did it return to common speech with a different meaning, but it became one of the four main concepts of psychoanalysis. Freud showed the existence of a veritable intentionality of the mind that seeks to forget, to cause certain disagreeable representations to disappear. These representations are isolated in a “second consciousness, a condition seconde” (p. 12) separated from the mainstream of thought. The psyche is thereafter “dissociated,” the unpleasant idea having been relegated to another place, “repressed,” thus blocking any discharge of painful emotion that might be associated with it. It can be seen that the notion of repression, here seized at its origins, from the outset appears as a correlate to that of the unconscious. For a long time in Freud’s work, until his positing of the idea of unconscious ego defenses, the term repressed was essentially synonymous with the action of the unconscious. Moreover, the term intentionality used by Freud in 1895 must be understood in a nuanced way. As Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis emphasized in The Language of Psycho-Analysis (1967; trans. 1974), the splitting of consciousness is only “introduced” by an intentional act. As a “second consciousness,” repressed contents elude the subject’s control and are governed by the laws proper to the primary processes. The specific processes of the unconscious thus mark the operation of repression. The repressed representation in itself constitutes what Freud described in Studies on Hysteria as an initial “nucleus and centre of crystallization” (p. 123) that can attract other unbearable representations, without any conscious intention having to intervene. From the outset, then, repression is conceived as a dynamic process involving the maintenance of a counter-cathexis; it is always capable of being stymied by unconscious desire that seeks to return to conscious awareness, which is what is meant by “return of the repressed” (“Repression,” [1915d], p. 154). Moreover, representations are what are repressed, but it is affect, or rather its conversion from pleasure to unpleasure, that is the raison d’étre of repression. The vicissitude of the affect is far more important than that of the representation, for it is affect that determines the judgment bearing upon the process of repression. If the vicissitude of the representation is to disappear or be held back from consciousness, the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS vicissitude of the affect, the quantitative factor of the instinctual representative, is somewhat independent. An instinct may be suppressed, or else the affect may be affirmed under a given qualitative coloring, or, in yet another case, affect itself may be transformed into anxiety. The difference, Freud explained in “Repression,” stems from the fact that representations are cathexes, whereas affects correspond to processes of discharge whose final manifestations are perceived as sensations. The term repression appeared in Freud’s writings for the first time in the “Preliminary Communication” (1893a). It was identified as a cause of pathogenic amnesia, an etiological explanatory principle leading to the envisioning of a therapeutic method that would put an opposing tendency into action. At this early date, repression was still presented as “intentional” and was not well distinguished from simple suppression. A representation appears to be painful because it is incompatible with an ego that, at this time, is still synonymous with consciousness. The ego thus treats the disagreeable idea as a “non-arrival” by repressing it. This repression is thus posited as being a mechanism common to all mental disturbances, to hysteria, obsessional neurosis, and hallucinatory confusion. It affects only the representation; the vicissitude of the affect, for its part, determines the specificity of the disorder: conversion, isolation, or rejection (“The Neuro- Psychoses of Defence” [1894a]). With the metapsychological writings of 1915, Freud distinguished different phases in the process of repression: fixation, “repression proper” (“Repression,” p. 148) and finally, the “return of the repressed” (p. 154), which occurs at the point of the fixation itself. Freud described several stages in the organization of repression, for if “repression and the unconscious are correlated” (p. 148) there was a good basis for accepting the idea of a “primal repression” (Urverdrangung, p. 148) that represents its earliest stage. This repression does not affect the instinct, the limit concept between the psychic and the somatic, but rather its “representatives,” which thus do not gain access to consciousness. An initial unconscious nucleus is created that will function as a first pole of attraction about which elements will be repressed. This is accompanied by a “fixation, and the so-called representative “persists unaltered” (p. 148), along with the instinct attached to it, in the unconscious. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS REPRESSION The second stage of repression is that of “repression proper” (eigentliche Verdringung) or “after-pressure” (Nachdrangen, p. 148), which occurs through deferred action. It involves the psychic derivatives of the repressed representative, or else a given associative chain, a predetermined train of thoughts that is related to it by association. This is a double process that joins to the attraction of the primal repressed (the earliest unconscious nucleus) a force of repulsion (Abstossung) that comes from consciousness and acts upon material that is to be repressed. These two forces act in tandem, with “something previously repressed ready to receive what is repelled by the conscious” (p. 148). In a note added in 1915 to the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d), Freud compared this dual process with “the manner in which tourists are conducted to the top of the Great Pyramid of Giza by being pushed from one direction and pulled from the other” (pp. 175-176, note 2). Finally, the third stage is that of the “return of the repressed” ( Wiederkehr der Verdrangten) (p. 154), expressed in the form of symptoms, dreams, slips of the tongue, or parapraxes. Repression does not entail the destruction or disappearance of the repressed representation. As Freud explained in “Repression,” it does not prevent the instinctual representative “from continuing to exist in the unconscious, from organizing itself further, putting out derivatives and establishing connections.... [T]he instinctual representative develops with less interference and more profusely if it is withdrawn by repression from conscious influence. It proliferates in the dark, as it were, and takes on extreme forms of expression, which when they are translated and presented to the neurotic are not only bound to seem alien to him, but frighten him by giving him the picture of an extraordinary strength of instinct” (p. 149). Thus Freud in 1915 envisioned the operation of repression from a threefold metapsychological perspective. From the topographical point of view, repression is initially described, in the first theory of the instincts, as being maintained outside of consciousness. Censorship is what ensures the role of the repressing agency. In the second topography, it is posited as a defensive operation of the ego that is considered to be partially unconscious. From the economic point of view, repression presupposes an interplay of opposing forces—of cathexis, decathexis, and anticathexis—that affect the instinctual representatives. “We may suppose that the 1483 REPRESSION repressed exercises a continuous pressure in the direction of the conscious, so that this pressure must be balanced by an unceasing counter-pressure. Thus the maintenance of a repression involves an uninterrupted expenditure of force, while its removal results in a saving from an economic point of view” (“Repression,” p. 151). Similarly, in “The Unconscious” (1915e), Freud specified that the preconscious protects itself from the drive of unconscious repression by means of an anticathexis: “It is this which represents the permanent expenditure (of energy) of a primal repression, and which also guarantees the permanence of that repression” (p. 181). The fate of the instinctual representative is to disappear from consciousness and to be kept apart from the conscious mind, but the fate of the affect, which, according to Freud, represents the quantitative factor of the instinctual representative, is different. The instinct can be suppressed, or else affect can be either expressed under a given qualitative coloration or transformed into anxiety. Finally, from a dynamic point of view, the main question is that of the reason for repression. According to Freud, the process of repression is linked to the group of defensive processes whose goal is to reduce, or even eliminate, any modification that might endanger the integrity and constancy of the psychobiological individual. Repression is one of the great “vicissitudes” of the instinct (along with sublimation and double reversal). Freud considered it a mode of defense against the instincts. This dynamic conception of the repressed and the unconscious is not without consequences. The unconscious tends to produce material that is connected with it to varying degrees, which Freud calls “derivatives of the unconscious” (Abkémmlinge des Unbewussten) (“Repression,” p. 152), and which reemerge in conscious life and behaviors. These derivatives encompass, for example, symptoms, fantasies, slips of the tongue, or meaningful associations during the analytic session. They are thus also “derivatives of the repressed” (p. 149) that become, in turn, the object of new defensive measures. In his essay on repression Freud stressed that “it is not even correct to suppose that repression withholds from the conscious all the derivatives of what was primally repressed. If these derivatives have become sufficiently far removed from the repressed representative, whether owing to the adoption of distortions or by reason of the number of intermediate links inserted, they have free access to the 1484 conscious. It is as though the resistance of the conscious against them is a function of their distance from what was originally repressed” (p. 149). In analytic practice, the analyst constantly invites the patient to produce these so-called derivatives of the repressed, which, following their distancing or distortion, can pass through the censorship of consciousness.. Based on the patient’s associations, “we reconstitute a conscious translation of the repressed representative” (p. 150). Freud explained that “Neurotic symptoms, too ... are derivatives of the repressed, which has by their means finally won the access to consciousness which was previously denied to it.... Repression acts, therefore, in a highly individual manner. Each single derivative of the repressed may have its own special vicissitude” (p. 150). Thus, repression sometimes appears as a generic term, and sometimes as a specific term. At times it is the concept on which all of psychoanalysis rests, and at other times it above all describes the mechanism of hysterical neurosis. Sometimes it is just one defense among others, and at other times it subsumes all the defenses. In psychoanalytic treatment, the stage of repression identified as “the return of the repressed” is the basis for a clinical approach aimed at the lifting of repression itself. JEAN-FRANCOIS RABIN See also: Actual neurosis/defense neurosis; Amnesia; Censorship; Defense; Deferred action; Desexualization; Dynamic point of view, the; Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense, The; “Heredity and the Etiology of the Neuroses”; Hysteria; Hysterical paralysis; Id; Latency period; Organic repression; Parapraxis; Primal repression; Repressed; Repressed, derivative of the/derivative of the unconscious; “Repression”; Repression, lifting of; Resistance; Return of the repressed; Scotomization; Signal anxiety; Slips of the tongue; Suppression; Unconscious, the; Unpleasure. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123-243. . (1915d). Repression. SE, 14: 141-158. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1893a). On the psychical mechanism of hysterical phenomena: Preliminary communication. SE, 2: 1-17. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Le Guen, Claude. (1992). Le Refoulement. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Le Guen, Claude, et al. (1986). Le refoulement (les defenses). Revue frangaise de psychanalyse, 50, 1. Further Reading Eagle, Morris. (2000). Repression, part I of II. Psychoanalytic Review, 87, 1-38. - (2000). Repression, part II of II. Psychoanalytic Review, 87, 161-188. “REPRESSION” Freud’s paper “Repression” is part of a larger work that was to be called Preliminary Essays on Metapsychology and that was to have included twelve essays; only five of these were published. Other titles were considered, notably “Introduction to Metapsychology” and “Overview of the Transference Neuroses” (Jones, 1955, p. 185). Metapsychology was conceived as a group of conceptual models that did not come directly from clinical experience, but which aimed to explain clinical experience in terms of mechanisms or fictional perspectives. Freud’s project in these essays was to introduce and synthesize its main elements. In “On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement” (1914d) he had defined the theory of repression as “the corner-stone on which the whole structure of psychoanalysis rests ... the most essential part of it” (p. 16). In this paper Freud returned to the idea of repression that had previously, in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), been conflated with the idea of the defense, which he had developed beginning with the “Neuro-Psychoses of Defence” (1894a). Here repression is the only defensive modality, whereas after 1920 repression would be seen as one defense among others. Freud believed that he had found an absolutely original idea in repression, and he did not acknowledge having encountered it in the work of Schopenhauer when Rank told him of analogous perspectives in the latter’s work (Gay, 1988). In “Repression” Freud described repression as “something between flight and condemnation” (p. 146) and said that “it is a concept which could not have been formulated before the time of psycho-analytic studies” (p. 146). His argumentation in this essay is developed step by step, by reviewing all the possibilities of this INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ““REPRESSION’’ vicissitude of the instinctual impulse. First of all, given that instinctual satisfaction is by definition pleasurable, it was necessary to posit a conflict that “would ... cause pleasure in one place and unpleasure in another” and the condition that “the motive force of unpleasure shall have acquired more strength than the pleasure obtained from satisfaction” (p. 147). However, this mechanistic explanation is followed by another that is dynamic in nature. Repression and the unconscious are “correlated” (p. 148), and “We have reason to assume that there is a primal repression, a first phase of repression, which consists in the psychical (ideational) representative of the instinct being denied entrance into the conscious. With this a fixation is established; the representative in question persists unaltered from then onwards and the instinct remains attached to it” (p. 148). This fixation will constitute a point of attraction for other, later repressions that are thus said to occur through “after-pressure” (p. 148). The same dynamism affects the instinctual representative that is fixed in the unconscious, where derivatives are formed and connections established. In “Repression” Freud explained that “Repression acts ... in a highly individual manner. Each single derivative of the repressed may have its own special vicissitude; a little more or a little less distortion alters the whole outcome” (p. 150). If these derivatives are sufficiently distorted, they can freely enter into consciousness. Such occurrences provide the basis for psychoanalytic treatment, in that the repressed contents can emerge through free association, enabling a conscious reconstitution of these contents through psychoanalytic interpretation. Mentioned in passing here is the issue of fetishism, which was already alluded to in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, and to which Freud would return much later (1940a [1938]). Here he proposed, as the origin of fetishism, a division of the instinctual representative into two parts, one of which is subjected to repression while “the remainder, precisely on account of this intimate connection, undergoes idealization” (p. 150). The distinction that Freud then proposed between representation and quota of affect enabled him to refine his ideas on the vicissitude of the instinct. One possibility is its “transformation into affects, and especially into anxiety, of the psychical energies of instincts” (p. 153). The repressed thus remains active, and returns indirectly through these substitutive formations, but 1485 REPRESSION, LIFTING OF also in the form of various symptoms. The “success” of repression is often mitigated: A given representation may indeed be eliminated, but something else has been substituted for it, and “it [repression] has failed altogether in sparing unpleasure” (p. 153). In terms of the three major categories of neurosis— anxiety hysteria, conversion hysteria, and obsessional neurosis—Freud pointed to the links that can be established between the workings of repression and the formation of neurotic symptoms. However, he added in conclusion that further research in this area needed to be done. SOPHIE DE MioLLA-MELLOR See also: Conversion; Free energy/bound energy; Instinctual representative; Metapsychology; Neurotic defenses; Physical pain/psychic pain; Quota of affect; Repression. Source Citation Sigmund Freud. (1915d). Die Verdrangung. Internationale Zeitschrift fiir arztliche Psychoanalyse, 3: 129-138; GW, 10: 248-261; Repression. SE, 14: 146-158. Bibliography Gay, Peter. (1988). Freud: A life for our time. London and Melbourne: Dent. Jones, Ernest. (1953-57). Sigmund Freud: Life and work. London: Hogarth. REPRESSION, LIFTING OF Lifting of repression is the name for the process by which gaps in memory are eliminated, notably during psychoanalytic treatment, allowing for access to formerly unknown material. While psychoanalysis is indeed an ensemble of theoretical conceptions that make up a metapsychology, and while it is a method of investigation of psychic processes, it is first a method of treatment (see Sigmund Freud’s article “The Libido Theory, 1923a [1922]). From this perspective, Freud often reiterated his aim: “extracting the pure metal of the repressed thoughts from the ore of the unintentional ideas” (1904a [1903], p. 252). In “Lines of Advance in Psycho- Analytic Theory” (1919a [1918]), he wrote that “our task [is] to bring to the patient’s knowledge the 1486 unconscious, repressed impulses existing in him” (p. 159). And in “An Outline of Psycho-Analysis” (1940a [1938]), he wrote that “the psycho-analyst is the one who is in a position to guess at repressed material.” All of these formulations refer to what Freud usually called the “lifting of repression.” He used many different formulations to remind readers of this essential aspect of treatment. In Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1916—17a [1915-17]), he wrote: “We can express the aim of our efforts in a variety of formulas: making conscious what is unconscious, lifting repressions, filling gaps in the memory—all these amount to the same thing” (p. 435). At the time of his early discoveries, Freud observed that the sudden emergence of forgotten memories during hypnosis sessions caused symptoms to disappear. He concluded from this that forgetting was active and pathogenic, and that being cured had to be the result of the recollection and abreaction of traumatic memories. It was as if the symptom appeared in place of the memory, as if the symptom itself were a way of remembering: “The hysteric suffers from reminiscences.” The observation of the revival of memories under hypnosis enabled Freud to theorize that a repressed representation could preserve a trace of that which had been repressed. He then shifted his focus toward resistance to remembering, the correlate of a repression that was still considered to be “intentional,” and thus onto resistance to the lifting of repression. In this way the obstacle (resistance) became a new means of unearthing meaning. The “talking cure” and the method of free association supplanted hypnosis. Memories no longer had to be rediscovered directly, but were now to be found indirectly, through the resistance that provided access to the repression. “Suppressing gaps in memory,” that is, “eliminating resistance,’ is reaffirmed in the metapsychological writings of 1915 with the expression “making the unconscious conscious.” But what in the unconscious becomes conscious? “This question remains flawed and is dependent upon a metapsychological conception in which the unconscious is largely equivalent to an immobilized past and is scarcely distinguishable from the repressed,” commented Claude Le Guen in 1992. The central theory and the assertion “Wo Es war, soll Ich werden” (“Where id was, there ego shall be”) in INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY oF PSYCHOANALYSIS New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1933a [1932]) meant revisiting this issue. In 1923 Freud showed that the question was less that of bringing the repressed into consciousness and the “lifting of repression” than that of the paths to follow to be able to lead the repressed into the preconscious-conscious. The work of analysis is to put in place these preconscious intermediary terms without the unconscious having to “come up” into consciousness. Thus the unconscious, as it is activated in the id, remains indestructible and constantly active, without being affected by the unconscious impulses taken into the ego, which are capable of coming into consciousness due to the lifting of repression. It is in this way that the ego becomes the locus par excellence of conflicts between the instinctual impulses and the defensive processes, beginning with the first among them, repression. Analysis of the resistances is the essential means that must henceforth be used in treatment to bring about conscious awareness of the repressed and a lifting of repression. In the words of Le Guen, “The lifting of repression, with the liberation of libidinal energy it emanates and the unification of the ego it provokes, remains the touchstone of change in treatment and its main goal.” JEAN-FRANCOIS RABAIN See also: Femininity; German romanticism and psychoanalysis; Infantile amnesia; Lifting of amnesia; “Negation”; Repression; Subject. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1904a [1903]). Freud’s psycho-analytic procedure. SE, 7: 247-254. . (1916-17a [1915-17]). Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. Parts I and II. SE, 15-16. . (1919a [1918]). Lines of advance in psycho-analytic therapy. SE, 17: 157-168. . (1923a [1922]). Encyclopaedia article: “The libido theory.” SE, 18: 255-259. Le Guen, Claude. (1992). Le Refoulement. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. REPUDIATION The term repudiation is the most literal translation of the terms Verwerfung (“foreclosure”) and Verleugnung INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Rescue FANTASIES (“denial-disavowal”) that Sigmund Freud used to refer to a psychic act he wanted to distinguish clearly from repression. In his commentary on the “Wolf Man” he declared that “A repression [ Verdringung]| is something different from a repudiation [ Verwerfung],” (1918 [1914]). Indeed, repression, while it erases an unpleasurable idea from consciousness, cannot prevent ‘this idea from “working” to produce symbolic derivatives in the form of symptoms. Repudiation, by comparison, consists in invalidating a perception or mental representation, and thus is a way that allows it to remain conscious, but emptied of meaning; it is thus unable to have a role in the subject’s fantasy life. The ultimate form of repudiation exists in what Jacques Lacan called foreclosure, where the representation is incapable of playing any symbolic role whatsoever (foreclosure in the Name-of-the-Father). But it can manifest itself elsewhere in a paradoxical manner by becoming inscribed within the individual topology of the split ego. In that case it will effect the kind of repudiation-disavowal seen in the so-called perverse structures. In any event, to varying degrees, such failure to symbolize an idea makes it impossible for the mental representation to be a part of the subject’s mental and fantasy life. BERNARD PENOT See also: Foreclosure. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1918b [1914]). From the history of an infantile neurosis. SE, 17: 1-122. Lacan, Jacques. (1966). Du sujet enfin en question. In his Ecrits (pp. 73-92). Paris: Seuil. RESCUE FANTASIES In “A Special Type of Choice of Object Made by Men” (1910h), Sigmund Freud describes a type of man who repeatedly falls in love with a woman who is “of bad repute sexually” and “to whom another man can claim right of possession.” What is striking in such men is “the urge they show to ‘rescue’ the woman they love.” Freud interprets the fantasy of rescue in light of the Oedipus complex: The boy initially believes his mother to be a saint and refuses to accept, when he begins to 1487 RESISTANCE become aware of sexual relations between adults, that his parents could behave in such a way. When the boy accepts this, the figure of the mother switches from that of the saint to that of the whore; the child is jealous of the father and regrets that the mother has not preferred him instead. “[H]e comes, as we say, under the dominance of the Oedipus complex,” and if “these impulses do not quickly pass, there is no outlet for them other than to run their course in fantasies: that of saving the beloved woman in order to win her love and obtain a baby from her, and, as a reaction to his hostility toward the father, the fantasy of saving him from a life-threatening danger by some heroic action. Freud concludes this article by evoking imaginary scenes in which the mother is saved from drowning, a symbolic translation of the birth of a child. The following year, he added a brief reference to this theme in the 1911 edition of The Interpretation of Dreams. He returned to the topic at greater length in “Dreams and Telepathy” (1922a). Although this theme is often encountered in clinical practice, it does not seem to have been further elaborated either in Freud’s work or thereafter. ROGER PERRON See also: Fantasy. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1910h). A special type of choice of object made by men. SE, 11: 165-175. —. (1922a). Dreams and telepathy. SE, 18: 195-220. RESISTANCE Psychoanalysis understands resistance as something that stands in the way of the progress of analytic work during treatment. The term appeared for the first time in Sigmund Freud’s writings in the Studies on Hysteria (1895d), where he reported—in connection with the case of Lucy R.—how he had given up testing the degree of hypnosis of his patients because “this roused the patients’ resistances and shook their confidence in me, which I needed for carrying out the more important psychical work” (p. 108). During his treatment of Elisabeth von R., already mindful of his own role in the clinical work, Freud perceived this resistance through the efforts he had to make in order to get his 1488 patient to remember certain painful representations. In the Freudian psychodynamic approach, this concept refers to the psychic force that the patient opposes to the bringing into consciousness of certain unpleasurable representations during treatment: the psychic force developed to maintain repression. If the topographical theory led to the idea that psychoanalysis was, in Freud’s words, an interpretative art that consisted of making the unconscious conscious, the analyst’s task was henceforth to “lead the patient to recognize his resistance and to reckon with it.” Analysis of the resistances thus became one of the cornerstones of analytic technique; analysis of the transference was soon linked with it. In “The Dynamics of Transference” (1912b), Freud wondered why transference, the most effective among the factors of success, could become the most powerful agent of resistance. He was thus led to distinguish between positive and negative transference, and to conclude that “transference to the doctor is suitable for resistance to the treatment only in so far as it is a negative transference or a positive transference of repressed erotic impulses.” Freud agreed that nothing in analysis is more difficult than overcoming the resistances. However, these phenomena are valuable because they make it possible to bring to light patients’ secret and forgotten emotions of love; above all, by endowing these with a sense of immediacy, the resistances facilitate the recognition of these emotions, because, as Freud put it in a wellknown formulation, “it is impossible to destroy anyone in absentia or in effigie” (1912b, p. 108). Instead of remembering, the patient reproduces attitudes and feelings from his or her life, which, through the transference, can be used as means of resistance against the treatment and against the therapist. It is as if the patient’s intention to confound the analyst, make him feel his impotence, triumph over him, becomes more powerful that his or her intention to bring an end to his or her illness. The article “Remembering, Repeating and Working- Through (Further Recommendations on the Technique of Psycho-Analysis II)”(1914g) marked a turning point where the discovery of repetition compulsion put an end to an illusion: Freud admitted that naming the resistance still did not make it disappear immediately. Analytic technique purported to be an art of interpretation that focused above all on recognizing the resistances and communicating them to the patient. INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Discovering that “The greater the resistance, the more extensively will acting out (repetition) replace remembering” (p. 151), Freud recognized the importance of the need for working-through (durcharbeiten) “One must allow the patient time to become more conversant with this resistance with which he has now become acquainted, to work through it, to overcome it, by continuing, in defiance of it, the analytic work according to the fundamental rule of analysis” (p. 155). Freud constantly reiterated that it is the working-through of the resistances that offers the patient the greatest chance of change. In the chapter “Resistance and Repression” in Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1916-17 [1915— 17]), Freud underscored the forms of the resistances, which are very diversified, extremely refined, and often difficult to recognize, and their protean character— attributes that require the physician to be cautious and to remain on guard against them. Thus, during treatment, phenomena such as gaps in memory, screen-memories, overabundant production of dreams, cessation of free association, avoidance of causal links, judgments about the insignificance of thoughts that come to mind, or even flight into treatment may all be understood as forms of resistance. But it was the most paradoxical forms of resistance—repetition compulsion and the negative therapeutic reaction— which Freud linked to unconscious feelings of guilt, that gave his study of the resistances its full amplitude. In Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926d), Freud returned to the forms of the resistances and distinguished those of the ego, the id, and the superego. The first type is under the aegis of the pleasure principle and includes three possibilities: resistance to the lifting of repression, resistance to the loss of secondary gains from illness, and transference resistance, which aims to maintain repression. The second, resistance of the id, corresponds to “the power of the compulsion to repeat” (1926d, p. 159) and necessitates workingthrough. The third, resistance of the superego, comes out of the feeling of guilt and the need for punishment, which stand in the way of successful treatment; this type was later described as a negative therapeutic reaction, itself linked to the death instinct. If Freud remained reticent on the intrinsic nature of the resistances while underscoring their variability, richness, and solidity, he always believed that the patient’s work on his or her own resistances was indis- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS RESISTANCE pensable to the success of the treatment, even positing in his last writings that this work alone carried in it the potential for real and lasting change in the ego. Analysts after Freud have done relatively little further work on the manifestations of resistance during treatment. However, Melanie Klein, by seeing resistance essentially as a manifestation of negative transference, paved the way for a certain number of other studies, notably those of Wilfred Bion, who described psychotic resistance as “attacks on linking.” MICHELE POLLAK CORNILLOT See also: Acting out/acting in; Active technique; “Analysis Terminable and Interminable”; “Autobiographical Study, An”; Cathartic method; Change; Character; “Constructions in Analysis”; Cure; Defense; Development of Psycho-Analysis; Doubt; Ego; Ego and the Id, The; Evenly-suspended attention; Face-to-face situation; Fundamental rule; Id; Interpretation; Negative therapeutic reaction; Psychoanalysis of Children, The, Psychoanalyst; “Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through’; Repressed; Repression, lifting of; Silence; Studies on Hysteria; Superego; Technique with adults, psychoanalytic; Termintaion of treatment; Therapeutic alliance; Training analysis; Transference; “Wild” Psycho-Analysis; Workingthrough. Bibliography Bion, Wilfred Ruprecht. (1959). Attacks on linking. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 43 (4—5), 308. Freud, Sigmund. (1912b). The dynamics of transference. SE, 12: 97-108. . (1914g). Remembering, repeating and workingthrough (further recommendations on the technique of psycho-analysis II). SE, 12: 145-156. . (1916-17a [1915-17]). Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. Parts I and II. SE, 15-16. . (1926d [1925]). Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. SE, 20: 75-172. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2: 48-106. Further Reading Busch, Fred. (1995). Resistance analysis and object relations theory. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 12, 43-54. Gray, Paul. (1992). Memory as resistance, and the telling of a dream. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 40, 307-326. 1489 RESOLUTION OF THE TRANSFERENCE Smith, Henry F. (1997). Resistance, enactment, and interpretation: A self—analytic study. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 17, 13-30. RESOLUTION OF THE TRANSFERENCE The resolution or dissolution of the transference means the end-point of a transference neurosis and the full recognition by the analysand that his or her relationship to the psychoanalyst is based primarily on the repetition of earlier relationships, namely those of childhood. Freud’s first explicit mention of the resolution of the transference was in “Recommendations to Physicians Practising Psycho-Analysis,” where he described it as “one of the main tasks of the treatment” (1912e, p. 118). The introduction of this idea, implying as it did an overall view of the transference, was part of Freud’s conceptualization of the transference neurosis, and of the analytic treatment as a process: “on the whole, once begun, it goes its own way and does not allow either the direction it takes or the order in which it picks up its points to be prescribed for it.... A man can, it is true, beget a whole child, but even the strongest man cannot create in the female organism a head alone, or an arm or a leg.... He, too, only sets in motion a highly complicated process, determined by events in the remote past, which ends in the severance of the child from its mother. A neurosis as well has the character of an organism” (1913c, p.130); The “resolution of the transference” is one of the most important issues of all for psychoanalytic technique. The transference is at once the motor of the treatment and a means for combating resistances, but it may also itself be the source of resistances to the progress of the analytic work. It can be seen as the manifest content where the latent content is the infantile neurosis. Transference is not just a kind of “acted-out” repetition whose elucidation opens the way to the patient’s remembering; it is at the same time a new experience—“a piece of real experience, but one which has been made possible by especially favorable conditions, and it is of a provisional nature” (1914g, p. 154). The resolution of the transference (or its “overcoming” by the analysand) necessarily subsumes all this, as well as the patient’s eventual detachment from the analyst once this “piece of experience,” with its “provisional nature,’ has come to an end. 1490 Freud was always much concerned with the proper handling of transference phenomena, with restricting the power of suggestion to what would advance the analytic work, and with the danger of embarking on some kind of mutual analysis or love relationship, even in the most limited sense. As he wrote in “The Dynamics of Transference,’ “We take care of the patient’s final independence by employing suggestion in order to get him to accomplish a piece of psychical work which has as its necessary result a permanent improvement in his psychical situation” (1912b, p. 106). Freud’s view was that the intensity of the transference neurosis must be limited, so that the patient could “recognize that what appears to be reality is in fact only a reflection of a forgotten past” (1920g, p. 19). Freud viewed the resolution of the transference as an imperative in psychoanalysis, which was properly so called solely “if the intensity of the transference has been utilized for the overcoming of resistances. Only then has being ill become impossible, even when the transference has once more been dissolved, which is its destined end” (1913c, p. 143). That this resolution had to occur by degrees, along with the progress of the treatment, was something that Freud indicated implicitly— as for example when he recommended that “the transferences” (considered here by analogy with symptoms) be destroyed one by one, as the work proceeded, or when he observed that negative aspects of the transference “in good time” (1905 [1901], p. 118). The “dissolution” of the transference, which coincided necessarily with the end of the treatment—“At the end of an analytic treatment the transference must itself be cleared away” (1916-17a [1915-17], p. 453)—-was possible only if its progress towards resolution had paralleled the evolution of the analysis itself. Thus the resolution of the transference was not just an ethical necessity for Freud, it was also an intrinsic aspect of the treatment; the patient’s presenting neurosis was transformed into a transference neurosis, a kind of relay condition whose cure by means of the resolution of the transference secured a general therapeutic outcome: “All the patient’s symptoms have abandoned their original meaning and have taken on a new sense which lies in a relation to the transference.... But the mastering of this new, artificial neurosis coincides with getting rid of the illness which was originally brought to the treatment—with the accomplishment of our therapeutic task. A person who has become normal and free from the operation of repressed instinctual impulses in INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS his relation to the doctor will remain so in his own life after the doctor has once more withdrawn from it” 1916—17a [1915-17], pp. 444-445). James Strachey (1934) introduced transference interpretation, a method of relating current transference experience to the past as a way of helping resolve the transference; he saw this method as a model of “mutational” interpretation and as a specifically psychoanalytical therapeutic approach. Paut DENIs See also: Counter-transference; Negative therapeutic reaction; Transference. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1905e [1901]). Fragment of an analysis of a case of hysteria. SE, 7: 1-122. . (1912b). The dynamics of transference. SE, 12: 97— 108. . (1912e). Recommendations to physicians practising psycho-analysis. SE, 12: 109-120. . (1913c). On beginning the treatment (further recommendations on the technique of psycho-analysis I). SE, 12: 121-144. . (1914g). Remembering, repeating and workingthrough (further recommendations on the technique of psycho-analysis II). SE, 12: 145-156. . (1916-17a [1915-17]). Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 15-16. . (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1-64. Strachey, James. (1934). The nature of the therapeutic action of psycho-analysis. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis 15, 127-159. Reprinted in International Journal of Psycho- Analysis 50 (1969), 275-291. Further Reading Modell, Arnold H. (1988). Treatment, psychic structure: Resolution of the transference. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 36 (S), 225-240. RETURN OF THE REPRESSED The return of the repressed is the process whereby repressed elements, preserved in the unconscious, tend INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS RETURN OF THE REPRESSED to reappear, in consciousness or in behavior, in the shape of secondary and more or less unrecognizable “derivatives of the unconscious.” Parapraxes, bungled or symptomatic actions, are examples of such derivatives. Beginning with The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), Freud always emphasized the “indestructible” nature of unconscious material, as likewise the irreducible character of memory traces. If we have no memories of events during the first years of life, this is because of the repression that affects them. In a sense, all memories may be said to be retained, their recollection depending solely on the way in which they are cathected, decathected, or anticathected. In the thirty-first of his New Introductory Lectures, “The Dissection of the Psychical Personality,’ Freud posited the unalterability of the repressed in the following terms: “impressions, ... which have been sunk into the id by repression, are virtually immortal; after the passage of decades they behave as though they had just occurred” (1933a [1932], p. 74). In Moses and Monotheism, he added: “What is forgotten is not extinguished but only ‘repressed’; its memory-traces are present in all their freshness, but isolated by ‘anticathexes.... they are unconscious—inaccessible to consciousness” (1939a [1934-38], p. 94). Thus for Freud repressed wishes are not destroyed in the unconscious: rather, they are forever re-emerging in the form of what are generically called derivatives of the unconscious, some of which “become conscious as substitutive formations and symptoms—generally, it is true, after having undergone great distortion as compared with the unconscious, though often retaining many characteristics which call for repression” (1915e, p. 193). Such derivatives include not only symptoms but also fantasies, slips of the tongue, and parapraxes in general, and even certain character traits. They are expressions of the unconscious manifesting themselves in consciousness without this necessarily implying that what has been repressed becomes conscious: The repressed returns, but often remains unrecognizable. Such returns of the repressed are par excellence the material that the psychoanalyst works on, and they may refer as easily to the transference as to associations produced in the analytic session that are connected to the repressed ideas. Freud links “symptom formation” (Symptombildung) to the return of the repressed: “it is not the repression itself which produces substitutive 1491 RevercHon-Jouve, BLancHe (1879-1974) formations and symptoms, but that these latter are indications of a return of the repressed” (1915d, p. 154). Broadly speaking, symptom formation encompasses not just the return of the repressed by means of “substitutive formations” or “compromise formations” but also “reaction formations” created as bulwarks against repressed wishes. The return of the repressed was considered by Freud to be a “specific” mechanism (Freud to Ferenczi, December 6, 1910), a view he reiterated in his paper on “Repression,” where it is portrayed as a third distinct phase in the overall process of repression, following “primal repression” and “repression proper” or “after-pressure” (1915d, p. 148). In a section of Moses and Monotheism dealing with the return of the repressed, Freud evokes the reemergence of the “impressions” of early childhood and the instinctual demands that can erupt into the life of the subject, orientating his actions and subjecting him to constraining impulses. The instinct “renews its demand, and, since the path to normal satisfaction remains closed to it by what we may call the scar of repression, somewhere, at a weak spot, it opens another path for itself to what is known as a substitutive satisfaction, which comes to light as a symptom, without the acquiescence of the ego.... All the phenomena of the formation of symptoms may justly be described as the ‘return of the repressed. Their distinguishing characteristic, however, is the far-reaching distortion to which the returning material has been subjected as compared with the original” (1939a, Pel27): The repressed thus retains its initial impulse, its urge to penetrate consciousness. It may achieve this, according to Freud, under three conditions: “(1) if the strength of the anticathexis is diminished by pathological processes which overtake the other part [of the mind], what we call the ego, or by a different distribution of the cathectic energies in that ego, as happens regularly in the state of sleep; (2) if the instinctual elements attaching to the repressed receive a special reinforcement (of which the best example is the processes during puberty); and (3) if at any time in recent experience impressions or experiences occur which resemble the repressed so closely that they are able to awaken it. In the last case the recent experience is reinforced by the latent energy of the repressed, and the repressed comes into operation behind the recent experience and with its help.” Freud adds that “In 1492 none of these three alternatives does what has hitherto been repressed enter consciousness smoothly and unaltered; it must always put up with distortions which testify to the influence of the resistance (not entirely overcome) arising from the anticathexis, or to the modifying influence of the recent experience or to both” (1939a, p. 95). JEAN-FRANCOIS RABAIN See also: Acting out/acting in; Character; Double, the; Dream; Estrangement; Fixation; Formations of the unconscious; Neurotic defenses; Historical truth; Idea/ representation; Ideational representative; Interpretation of Dreams, The; Judgment of condemnation; Moses and Monotheism; Persecution; Projection; Remembering; Repression; Substitute/substitutive formation; Substitutive formation; Symbolic equation; Topology; Totem/ totemism; “‘Uncanny, The.” Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4-5, . (1915d). Repression. SE, 14: 141-158. . (1915e). The unconscious. SE, 14: 159-204. . (1933a,[1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22: 1-182. . (1939a [1934—38]). Moses and monotheism: Three essays. SE, 23: 1-137. Freud, Sigmund, and Ferenczi, Sandor. (1993-2000). The correspondence of Sigmund Freud and Sandor Ferenczi (Volume 1: 1908-14; Eva Brabant, Ernst Falzeder, and Patrizia Giampieri- Deutsch, Eds.; Peter T. Hoffer, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Le Guen, Claude. (1992). Le Refoulement. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Le Guen, Claude, et al. (1986). Le refoulement (les défenses). Revue frangaise de psychanalyse, 50, 1. REVERCHON-JOUVE, BLANCHE (1879-1974) Blanche Reverchon-Jouve was a French physician and psychoanalyst, a member of the Société psychanalytique de Paris and the Société francaise de psychanalyse, and a translator of Freud. She was born in 1879 and died January 8, 1974. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS She studied in France, and later specialized in neurology under Babinski. She practiced psychiatry in Geneva and was one of the women celebrated in La Garconne (Margeuritte, 1922). In 1921 she met the poet Pierre Jean Jouve. She and Jouve were invited by Stefan Zweig to participate in two of the conferences he gave in Salzburg. In 1923, after traveling to Bavaria, they began living together in Paris. They were married in 1925, following Jouve’s divorce. Reverchon-Jouve was analyzed by Eugénie Sokolnicka and became a member of the Société psychanalytique de Paris. She appears on the 1932 list as an associate member, then on a second, corrected list as a full member. In 1923 Gallimard published Trois essais sur la théorie de la sexualité by Sigmund Freud, a translation she completed with the help of Bernard Groethuysen. With Jouve she wrote an article for the Nouvelle Revue Francaise of 1933 entitled “Moments d’une psychanalyse.” Although a clinical study, it did not resemble those published by her peers. It was the work of an analyst and writer, and its formal beauty as literature casts doubt on the authenticity of the narrative. On February 3, 1931, in Paris, she was presented as a member the French section of the Soroptimists, the international women’s association. She did not train any students and her patients, often wealthy, provided her and her husband with a good income. They created a small circle around themselves, primarily centered on her husband. Olivier, Jouve’s son by his first wife, married a woman in their circle, a dancer, in spite of his stepmother’s advice to the contrary. Reverchon-Jouve participated in the 1950 World Psychiatric Congress organized by Henri Ey and, at the time of the 1953 split, she joined Daniel Lagache when he founded the Société frangaise de psychanalyse. JEAN-PIERRE BOURGERON See also: France; Jouve, Pierre Jean; Société francaise de Psychanalyse. Bibliography Reverchon-Jouve, Blanche, and Jouve, Pierre Jean. (1933). Moments d’une psychanalyse. Nouvelle Revue Francaise, 234, 353-385. Roudinesco, Elisabeth. (1990). Jacques Lacan & Co.: A history of psychoanalysis in France, 1925-1985 (Jeffrey INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS REVERIE Mehlman, Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1986) REVERIE The term reverie refers to an imaginary representation created to help realize a desire. The term Phantasie was used by Freud to designate such mental activity collectively, whether conscious or unconscious. In French the term fantasme prevailed in psychoanalytic use, for it was felt that the term fantaisie was too marked by current usage, where it connotes the idea of capriciousness or gratuitousness. However, following Daniel Lagache (1964), the term fantaisie came to refer to imaginary conscious or preconscious creations, without ignoring their continuity with the unconscious fantasies they reflect. Daydreams, which everyone experiences, are the clearest examples of conscious or preconscious reveries. In general they explicitly satisfy a desire, providing some form of imaginary satisfaction, whether it be erotic, aggressive, ambitious, self-aggrandizing, or uplifting. It is not even unusual for people to visualize painful or humiliating experiences to their own advantage. In all these cases the narcissistic dimension of the process is obvious. There are references to such daydreams in the Studies on Hysteria (1895d), primarily in the case study of Anna O., written by Josef Breuer. Freud wrote about daydreams in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a). For example, when analyzing his dream about the “botanical monograph,” he relates a daydream during which he imagines that, afflicted by glaucoma, he travels incognito to Berlin for an operation and experiences considerable pleasure in listening to the surgeon extol the anesthetic qualities of cocaine (thus being compensated for the pain Freud experienced through being too late to be recognized as the one who discovered its properties). The “phantasies or day-dreams are the immediate forerunners of hysterical symptoms. ... Like dreams they are wish-fulfilments; like dreams, they are based to a great extent on impressions of infantile experiences; like dreams, they benefit by a certain degree of relaxation of censorship” (p. 491-492) According to Freud, a daydream is initially the expression of an unconscious fantasy; then, it is used as available material among the latent thoughts used by dreams. However, as he noted, there is an essential 1493 REVERSAL INTO THE OPPOSITE difference between night dreams and daydreams: the first is hallucinatory, the second is not, and the person remains more or less clearly aware that his daydream is an escape from a reality that is not completely suspended. This distinction can be blurred or even disappear entirely. Freud analyzes this phenomenon in his detailed commentary on Wilhelm Jensen’s Gradiva (1907a). In the same period, in “Creative Writers and Daydreaming” (1908e [1907]), he discusses the function of daydreaming in the genesis of the literary work, and later, in “Family Romances” (1909c [1908]), he foresees the situation where daydreams are used by the child to avoid the oedipal conflict by imagining himself to be adopted, to be really the child of a king and queen. Robert Desoille (1961) developed an_ original method of psychotherapy based on the development and analysis of the patient’s daydreams during therapy. For some patients and under certain circumstances, analytic psychodrama can create scenarios that are related to daydreams. ROGER PERRON See also: Amentia; Boredom; Censoring the lover in her; Compromise formation; “Creative Writers and Daydreaming”; Creativity; Directed daydream (Robert Desoille); Ego ideal; Family romance; Psychoanalysis of fire, the; Unconscious fantasy. Bibliography Anargyros-Klinger, Annie, Reiss-Schimmel, Ilana, and Wainrib, Steve. (1998). Création, psychanalyse. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Desoille, Robert. (1961). Théorie et Pratique du Réve-éveillédirigé. Geneva: Le Mont-Blanc. Lagache, Daniel. (1964). Fantaisie, réalité, verité. Revue fran- ¢aise de psychanalyse, 28 (4), 515-538. REVERSAL INTO THE OPPOSITE The expression reversal into the opposite refers to the transformation of an idea, a representation, a logical figure, a dream image, a symptom, an affect, or the like into its opposite. It is a process that affects the fate of the instincts, notably in the transformation of love into hate, and was more clearly described in Freud’s discussion of the notion of turning around. 1494 Freud first described this type of transformation with regard to dream images. Such reversals are used to create the disguises that enable the translation of latent thoughts into acceptable thoughts (which are thus able to cross the barrier of censorship). He gave numerous examples of this in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900). This process can affect characteristics of objects or people; thus, a small object can appear to be very large in a dream; someone whose intelligence is envied appears stupid in the dream, and so forth. Often a reversal of actions into their opposite is involved: Climbing a staircase expresses the idea of descending or falling; the latent idea of a heavy burden is translated in the dream by the action of carrying a light woman, and so on. In the dream “Non vixit,’ the dreamer (Freud himself) with the intensity of his gaze melts a person whose blue eyes are growing paler: This expressed a reversal into its opposite of the fear that he had experienced, when he was young, under the gaze of Briicke’s “terrible blue eyes” (1900a, p. 422). He gave a detailed analysis of a particularly interesting instance of reversal into the opposite in the case of the “Wolf Man”’s dream (related in “From the History of an Infantile Neurosis” [1918b]), in which the scary immobility of the wolves was a reversal of a violent movement (that of his parents’ coitus). Reversals of the dream protagonists’ roles may occur, such as the hare chasing the hunter, or the dreamer punishing his father. Certain logical relationships can also be expressed in this way. Contradiction, for example, may lead in a dream to a condensation in which opposites are blended together in a depiction marked by a sense of absurdity. Temporal reversal of dream episodes is particularly interesting: “The outcome of the incident or the conclusion of a line of reasoning is the introduction to the dream, and the premises of the reasoning or the cause of the incident is found at the end.” But reversal into the opposite does not only affect representations or relationships between representations, it can also apply to affects: “There is yet another way in which the dream-work can deal with affects in the dream-thoughts.... It can turn them into their opposite” (1900a, p. 471). Thus, a depressive feeling of self-devaluation can inspire a dream of brilliant success, or, on the contrary, a feeling of triumph may provoke a dream that recalls a humiliating failure. In the dream of the “uncle with the yellow beard,” Freud’s “warm dream feeling of affection [for his friend R.] in INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS the dream” masked the wish that R. be a “simpleton” (p. 140—-141).” R. was a possible rival for nomination to the title of professor. The analysis of such transformations is a valuable tool for understanding the dream-work. According to Freud in The Interpretation of Dreams: “[RJeversal [Umkehrung], or turning a thing into its opposite [Verwandlung ins Gegenteil], is one of the means of representation most favoured by the dreamwork and one which is capable of employment in the most diverse directions.... [RJeversal is of quite special use as a help to censorship” (p. 327). From this it can be deduced that in this function as a process or a subterfuge to circumvent censorship, reversal clearly comes into play beyond the realm of the dream-work. This is the case in many myths: for example, those in which birth (emergence from water) is represented either by rising from the waves (as in the birth of Venus) or, on the contrary, by an episode in which the hero enters the water (as in the story of Moses). This play of opposites is found in certain linguistic expressions that, according to context, can take on opposite meanings: Thus, the Latin word sacer means both “holy” and “damned”; the German Boden refers both to that which is highest and that which is lowest in a house, and so forth. According to Freud in “The Antithetical Meaning of Primal Words” (1910e), where he invoked the (now-contested) authority of the linguist Karl Abel, this phenomenon was frequent in “primitive languages” that were supposedly still poorly differentiated and thus often used condensations. In the eleventh lecture in the Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1916-1917a [1915-1917]), Freud explicitly compared this play of opposites in language with its function in the dream-work. But this is not limited to the semantic level: Figures of speech can be subjected to such a mechanism, the most obvious case being that of negation, discussed in “Negation” (1925h), in which a thought is expressed in inverse form, accompanied by a projection that makes it possible to attribute it to someone else (““You ask who this person in the dream can be. It’s not my mother.’ We emend this to: ‘So it is his mother” [1925h, 235].) Symptom formation often makes use of this mechanism. The hysteric who is simulating rape tears her dress with one hand and clutches it around her body with the other; the fantasy in which she holds her sexual partner against herself is translated into her hands clasped behind her back, and coitus itself is expressed via hyperextension in a circular arc (“Some INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS REVERSAL INTO THE OPPOSITE General Remarks on Hysterical Attacks” (1909a [1908]), and so on. In such cases, what the hysteric acts out is an idea or image of an action—that is, a fantasy that corresponds to one of the received meanings of the idea. The same reversal of action is seen in dreams that center on a given idea or image. Reversal into the opposite, especially in the case of a reversal of affect, involves a process very similar to those referred to as turning [aJround. The terminology is not very clear: Freud himself, moreover, in “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes” (1915c), used the term reversal to designate both processes, the turning around of activity into passivity and the reversal into opposite of the “contents” of the love/hate pair. However, it seems judicious to distinguish the two notions and to use the notion of turning around with reference (a) to expressions of drives as affects (love into hate, or the reverse); (b) to aims of drives (the active aim “turning around” into a passive aim); and (c) to the objects of drives. This also applies to the whole notion of the sadism/ masochism pair. The notion of reversal into the opposite should be used, as is evident from the preceding, when formal aspects of transformations affecting representational contents are involved. Both notions, however, can be subsumed into the broader category of “pairs of opposites” frequently found in Freud’s work, culminating in his second theory of the instincts with the oppositional pair Eros/the death instinct. ROGER PERRON See also: Activity/passivity; Death instinct (Thanatos); Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence, The; Identification with the aggressor; “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes”; Manifest; Organic repression; Partial drive; Sadomasochism; “Theme of the Three Caskets, The”; Turning around; Turning around upon the subject’s own self; Voyeurism. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4—5: 1-625. . (1909a [1908]). Some general remarks on hysterical attacks. SE, 9: 227-234. . (1916-1917a [1915-1917]). Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 15—16. . (1918b [1914]). From the history of an infantile neurosis. SE, 17: 1-122. . (1925h). Negation. SE, 19: 233-239. 1495 REVISTA DE PSICOANALISIS REVISTA DE PSICOANALISIS The Argentine Psychoanalytic Association was founded in 1942. The Revista de Psicoandlisis, its official organ, appeared only seven months later, in 1943. Its first editor was Arnaldo Rascovsky, one of the pioneers of the Argentine psychoanalytic movement. The Revista has appeared continuously ever since, without interruption; it is thus the oldest psychoanalytic journal in the Spanish language, as well as one of the oldest psychoanalytic journals in the world. From its beginning until 1976, the Revista de Psicoandlisis appeared four times a year; since 1977 it has appeared six times yearly. These circumstances, plus its edition (print run) of 2,000 issues, its scientific quality, its prestige, and the important role it has played in the diffusion of psychoanalysis in Latin America, have caused the International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA) to choose the Revista to publish its Bulletin in Spanish whenever it was required, to publish the “pre-published” Congress papers, and to have the first right to choose the Congress papers it wishes to publish. In return, the Argentine Psychoanalytic Association sends an adequate number of the issues, containing the Bulletin and the pre-published Congress papers, to each of the IPA’s Spanish-speaking component societies. At first, the Revista contained more translated papers than local productions. Long ago this situation was reversed, however, and the scientific production of Argentine analysts has come account for the vast majority of papers in a given issue. Many of Freud’s papers appeared in Spanish for the first time in the Revista; for instance, “Analysis Terminable and Interminable,” in 1946. The Freudian tradition has remained continuous through the years. All “classic” authors and their continuators have had a place in the Revista. Also all contemporary schools or frames of reference have found their place there, either in their original authors’ publications, or through the papers of local followers. Argentina is equally far from both Europe and the United States. This circumstance has many disadvantages but some advantages, that is: psychoanalysts from Argentina have been able to maintain a relative independence of thought, have been exposed to all frames of references, and have been able to avoid compromises, political or otherwise, with a given system of thought. This pluralism is reflected in the Revista de 1496 Psicoandlisis; the titles and authors who have appeared in it offer a balanced view of current psychoanalytic thinking. Also, in the bibliography of the papers of Argentinian analysts, it is usual to find references to European, North American, and Latin American authors. Some decades ago the Kleinian School was preponderant, as European authors have become somewhat preponderant. Following an international trend, the Revista has begun to publish issues with a given theme. In addition, a “Special International Issue,” also with a given theme, has appeared, but with the collaboration of invited and interested prominent analysts from many countries. In spite of its respectable age, the Revista de Psicoandlisis remains an extremely active, contemporary, and purposely pluralistic publication. CARLOS MARIO ASLAN See also: Argentina; Carcamo, Celes Ernesto; Rascovsky, Arnaldo. REVISTA DE PSIQUIATRIA Y DISCIPLINAS CONEXAS Hermilio Valdizan and Honorio Delgado founded the review Revista de psiquiatria y disciplinas conexas in Lima in 1918. The subtitle highlights its interdisciplinary vocation: “A quarterly publication on psychiatry, psychoanalysis, pedagogy, sociology, forensic medicine, criminology and the history of medicine.” By 1924 five volumes had appeared in quarterly issues. The review achieved the objective it had set for itself: it was the first modern review of psychiatry in Peru. The psychoanalytic content of the publication is remarkable in comparison to the dates of appearance of the dedicated psychoanalytic reviews of the time: Imago (1912), Internationale Zeitschrift fiir Psychoanalyse (1913), and The Psychoanalytic Review (1913) are the only ones to precede it. The International Journal of Psycho- Analysis and the Revue Frangaise de Psychanalyse did not appear until 1920 and 1927 respectively. In a country as isolated from the international psychoanalytic community as Peru, and exposed to the difficulties of communication and the prejudices of a Catholic society, such an event is all the more remarkable. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS With the appearance of the third issue (January, 1920) the review became militant, with an editorial signed by Delgado, “Freud and the psychoanalytic movement,” illustrated with a full-page portrait of the founding father. Sigmund Freud mentioned the publication on two occasions: in a footnote added in 1923 to “On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement,” (1914d) and in a note added in 1924 to The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901b). These facts confirm that Freud read the review attentively. In a letter dated 1924 he complained about its disappearance and asked Delgado if he intended to introduce another publication. In a report on Spanishlanguage psychoanalytic literature, Karl Abraham quotes from and comments on different works by Delgado and authors writing in the review. In 1922 an agreement was reached to publish a Spanish version of Die Don Juan Gestalt, but the project was hindered by the length of the work. The content of the review with regard to psychoanalytic books and publications proved to be top quality; it published timely comments on recent works by Freud, Abraham, and Sandor Ferenczi, and reports on the journals Imago, Internationale Zeitschrift fir Psychoanalyse, and The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis. Honorio Delgado figures with Paul Wilson and Hermilio Valdizan among those who published most on psychoanalysis in Peru at the time. Wilson, who always published in English, is most noteworthy for “The Imperceptible Obvious,” on which Freud commented in detail in the above-mentioned note in Psychopathology. The article that appeared under the pseudonym “A. Z.” in volume 2, number 1 (July, 1919): “Psychoanalytic treatment of a case of compulsive neurosis,” constitutes the first Spanish-language account of psychoanalytic treatment. It is difficult to determine the impact of the review. Its authors lacked analytic experience and made excessive claims to therapeutic success. Their theories were eclectic: a blend of ideas from Freud, Adler, and Jung. In spite of this, the review played a pioneering role in Latin America and in the Spanish-speaking community, contributing in a remarkable fashion to the spread of knowledge about psychoanalysis. ALVARO Rey DE CASTRO See also: “A. Z.”; Delgado, Honorio; Peru; Valdizan, Hermilio. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS REVUE FRANCAISE DE PSYCHANALYSE Bibliography Abraham, Karl. (1921). Literatur in spanischer Sprache. In Bericht iiber die Fortschritte der Psychoanalyse in den Jahren 1914-1919 (pp. 366-367). Leipzig, Wien and Ziirich: Internationaler psychoanalytischer Verlag. Freud, Sigmund. (1901b). The psychopathology of everyday life. SE, 6. . (1914d). On the history of the psycho-analytic movement. SE, 14: 1-66. Mariategui, Javier, and Leon, Ramon. (1987). La Revista de psiquiatria y disciplinas conexas (1918-1924) (pp. 1-41). Lima: Instituto de Salud Mental y Universidad Peruana Cayetano Heredia. Rey de Castro, Alvaro. (1993). Lettres de Sigmund Freud a Honorio Delgado, 1919-1934. Revue internationale d’histoire de la psychanalyse, 6. REVUE FRANCAISE DE PSYCHANALYSE At the founding of the Societe psychanalytique de Paris (SPP; Paris Psychoanalytical Society) on November 4, 1926, “it was decided to create a French journal of psychoanalysis, the medical part of which would be edited by MM. Laforgue and Hesnard, possibly joined by MM. de Saussure and Odier after their acceptance into the society, and the nonmedical part of which would be edited by the Princess Marie Bonaparte. M. Ed. Pichon accepted in principle the responsibilities of general secretary of this publication.” From the very inception of this publication, which could not have come into being without the financing of Marie Bonaparte, Rene Laforgue, and Pryns Hopkins, a very wealthy former patient of Ernest Jones, disputes arose around the issue of whom it belonged to. Even its title was contentious in this regard, for while Laforgue presented it to Sigmund Freud on November 27 as the “Revue internationale de psychoanalyse,’ the spelling psychanalyse, associated with the habits of the Swiss and the Jungians, was finally chosen. There was another, more serious problem that had to do with ambivalence on the part of the young psychiatrists who had created the journal Evolution psychiatrique (Developments in psychiatry) the previous year and who dreamed of a “French-style” psychoanalysis: the exclusion of the phrase “under the patronage of Professor Freud” from the title page, on the pretext that its presence might “gravely offend” 1497 REVUE FRANCAISE DE PSYCHANALYSE Henri Claude. Writing to Laforgue from Vienna on November 12, Marie Bonaparte expressed her indignation over this: “But I feel we are cowards, triple cowards, if we do not dare to put the name of the founder of the science we represent on the first journal in France devoted to his work.” She added: “Freud made a comment to me that I must pass on to you. It was that we should not name our journal the “Revue internationale de psychanalyse, because it is not international at all. If the British journal uses that name, it is because it is only a reproduction of the German journal.... Freud believes that we should go back to one of our first titles: ‘Revue frangaise de psychanalyse; with, below it, ‘organ of the Paris Psychoanalytical Society, French section of the International Psychoanalytical Association (and I say) published under the patronage of Sigm. Freud. And nothing else on the title page. All our names on the back of the page, written in the smallest possible characters! If Claude takes offense, he is really too stupid.” Finally, the French opted for “Revue frangaise de la psychanalyse, organ of the S.P.P., published under the patronage of Professor Freud” in the first issue, which appeared on June 25, 1927. “We believe that today French psychoanalysis is ripe to have its own organ of expression. It will be the mirror of the young Paris Psychoanalytical Society, born this winter,” said the editorial. Alongside original pieces by Laforgue, Charles Odier, René Allendy, Angelo Hesnard, Félix Deutsch, and the First Conference of French-Speaking Psychoanalysts, and the administrative minutes of the nascent SPP, the issue included Freud’s “Moses and Michelangelo” and Bonaparte’s “The Case of Madame Lefebvre.” By way of a contribution, Freud did not ask for any royalties for his text, which was translated by the princess, and even provided an unpublished addendum. The phrase “section of the International Psychoanalytical Association” did not appear until the second issue. It was the nationalistic contingent, enamored of a “Latin” mindset tinged with anti-Semitism and led by Edouard Pichon, that was behind these acts of pettiness— to the great anger of Bonaparte, who would not rest until she saw him removed from the editorship of the journal; at one point she wanted to withdraw it from the publisher Doin in favor of Gaston Gallimard. In late October 1929, opposition to the International Psychoanalytical Association by a “very active minority” that wanted to take control of the journal, since it 1498 was referred to as the “Official Organ of the French Group,” again raised the idea of “transforming the French Journal into an International Journal of Psych.” (letter from Laforgue to Freud, October 26, 1929). The princess was opposed to this and succeeded in having Rudolph Loewenstein appointed editor in place of Pichon. By contrast, Ernest Jones deplored the label “French Journal” because it allowed the Americans to use this precedent for The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, which was a competitor to his International Journal. Publication went on, sometimes very irregularly, as attested by the fact that there were only three issues, rather than eight, for the year 1930-1931. It resumed under a new publisher, Denoél & Steele, in 1932. In 1939 only a single issue was published, with a new blue cover. It contained Freud’s “Analysis Terminable and Interminable,” translated by Ann Berman. Publication of the journal was interrupted for eight years, despite John Leuba’s announcement to Jones on December 31, 1944: “I have prepared two complete issues of the journal of psychoanalysis. Our printer has disappeared. We need to study the issue of a publisher. In any case, it would be impossible for us to publish until several months from now, since owing to. the shortage of paper the number of journals that are authorized for publication is extremely limited.” The princess, on her side, explained to Loewenstein on July 2, 1945: “As for the Revue, I can no longer support it, either. Besides, it never really took off. Perhaps Rodker could start up a journal in London that would revive Imago in three languages, where we could publish our articles in French. The only risk would be problems with Jones, who only wants his English journal with ultra-Kleinian articles” (Bertin). Negotiations for the journal’s resumed publication with the Presses Universitaires de France took place only in 1947. In fact, beginning with volume eleven, published in 1948, the SPP took over the publication of its “official organ,’ underwritten by means of systematic subscription of its members. Authors gave up all potential royalties in exchange for disbursement by the publisher of a global sum intended to cover editorial costs. Despite discussions over the advantages and disadvantages of contracts that were renegotiated over time, the journal became sufficiently profitable to ensure its ongoing publication. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS During the split of 1953, no disputes arose over the journal, which remained in the hands of the SPP and unfailingly published all information that was unfavorable to its competitor, the Société frangaise de psychanalyse (SPF; French Psychoanalytical Society). It also disseminated the works arising out of rivalries with the secessionists, and owing to its regular publication— something other groups could not achieve—it became the most stable reference work of French psychoanalytic thinking during these decades. Of anecdotal interest is the fact that in April 1960, at the age of seventy-eight, the indefatigable Bonaparte had a telegram sent to herself “accrediting her as a reporter for the Revue francaise de psychanalyse,” in order to visit Caryl Chessman in his cell prior to his execution, which she tried in vain to prevent (Bertin). In the 1960s the problem arose of how to handle the publication of the proceedings of the Congress of Romance-Language Speaking Psychoanalysts, which the journal had undertaken from the outset. The growing importance of these proceedings had inflated the number of pages required for them, and a series of solutions were found. From 1961 to 1964 the congress proceedings were printed in a separate volume, but this practice was not maintained. Just as ineffective was the reiterated wish of the Teaching Committee of the Institute of Psychoanalysis that “the number of pages of the reports and papers hereafter be limited.” Denise Braunschweig and Jean Kestenberg obtained permission from the Presses Universitaires de France to return to the practice of publishing the proceedings in a special number of the journal. The value of this publication as a reference work must be underscored; each year it treats in depth a well-defined theoretical or practical point, and, beyond its historical perspective, inaugurated during the 1951 Congress with Daniel Lagache’s report on transference, it offers readers a broad spectrum of research and discussions. Since 1991 the Bulletin de la S.P.P., created in October 1982 by Michel Fain, has undertaken advance publication of reports and papers. After Maurice Bénassy’s resignation as editor of the Revue francaise de psychanalyse in April 1969, Christian David, Michel de M’Uzan, and Serge Viderman were chosen by the tenured members of the society in January 1970, in an informal vote, to take over editorship of the journal, with Jacqueline Adamov as copy editor. They attempted to make the journal more inde- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Revue FRANCAISE DE PSYCHANALYSE pendent of the SPP so that it would not appear to be a mere scientific brochure, but rather a publication unto itself. Their effort, from 1970 to 1975, to have the phrase “Official Organ of the S.P.P.” changed to “Published under the aegis of,” if it had the merit of raising the issue of a separation of objectives, was called into question during negotiations for a new contract with the Presses Universitaires de France. Beginning with the first issue of 1976, the words “Official publication of” reappeared. Overall it continued to run at a deficit, despite undeniable editorial success: In November 1977, there were 2,382 subscriptions, 684 of these from foreign subscribers, plus 1,022 copies sold by the issue. In March 1980, Jean Gillibert, Claude Girard, and Evelyne Kestemberg were named co-editors. They in turn experienced problems and resigned three years later. They were held responsible for a decrease in subscriptions, even though the total readership had increased. They cited as a reason for the decrease in subscriptions the competition of the Bulletin de la S.P.P., which nevertheless was the response to their often-expressed wish to be relieved of the burden of systematically publishing lectures and administrative information. The idea of thematic issues seemed sound, as Claude Le Guen stressed in May 1983. After proposing his own candidacy, he left the new editorship of the journal to a team made up of Ilse Barande, Claude Girard, Marie-Lise Roux, and Henri Vermorel. They remained on the job beyond their mandate, which ended in 1986, and were replaced only in February 1988. The merger of the SPP and its Institute of Psychoanalysis had taken place two years earlier when André Green, then president of the SPP, announced on July 8, 1988: “The Board of Directors has entrusted the editorship of the Revue to Claude Le Guen. The new editor has presented to the Board of Directors the new policy he intends to implement. Articles published by the journal will be divided into two categories, each of which will be entrusted to an adjunct editor. One category, heated by J. Cornut, will bring together publications and articles of a scientific nature. The other, headed by G. Bayle, will bring together publications of a more topical, critical, or even polemical nature, as well as those focused on training: clinical, technical, or theoretical points, in the form of regular columns. The editorial staff will also include J. Adamov, C. Athanassiou, J. J. Baranes, J. Begoin, T. Bokanowski, P. Denis, 1499 RICHARD, CASE OF M. Gibeault, C. Janin, R. Menahem, J. F. Rabain, J. Schaeffer, H. Troisier. The first issue of the R.F.P. produced by the new team will appear in October 1988 with a new format and a new cover design.” The choice of presenting thematic issues definitively prevailed and led to a marked increase in the readership of this journal, which is both the oldest and the most widely read French psychoanalytic journal. The same year, 1988, Le Guen, assisted by Gilbert Diatkine, also created the “Monographies de la R.EP.” (Monographs of the R.EP.), a series in which each volume, focused in a specific theoretical or practical issue, was a sure-fire editorial success. “Débats en psychanalyse” (Issues in psychoanalysis), with Jacqueline Schaeffer as adjunct editor, was created in 1995 for the purpose of publishing papers from colloquia and scientific meetings, which the Bulletin could no longer handle on its own. Since 1996 Paul Denis, creator of the series “Psychanalystes d’aujourd’hui” (Psychoanalysts of today), has been the editor of the Revue francaise de psychanalyse. ALAIN DE MIOLLA See also: France; Societe psychanalytique de Paris and Institut de psychanalyse de Paris. Bibliography Bertin, Celia. (1982). Marie Bonaparte, a life. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Bourgeron, Jean-Pierre. (1993). Marie Bonaparte et la Psychanalyse a travers ses lettres a René Laforgue et les images de son temps. Geneva: Champion-Slatkine. Freud, Sigmund, and Laforgue, René. (1977h [1923-33]). Correspondance Freud-Laforgue, preface d’André Bourgiugnon. Nouvelle Revue de psychanalyse, 15, 235-314. Mijolla, Alain de. (1991). Le Congrés des psychanalystes de langue francaise des pays romans: Quelques éléments Vhistoire. Revue frangaise de psychanalyse, 55 (1), 7-36. . (1992). France (1893-1965). In P. Kutter (Ed.), Psychoanalysis International: 4 Guide to Psychoanalysis throughout the world, (Vol. 1; pp. 66-113). Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzbog. RICHARD, CASE OF Melanie Klein’s case of Richard is published in two forms: (a) “The Oedipus complex in the light of early anxieties” (Klein, 1945) and (b) Narrative of a Child Analysis (published posthumously, Klein, 1961). 1500 In 1939, Klein moved out of London because of the war, and settled eventually in the small Scottish town of Pitlochry between June 1940 and September 1941. She used this time, away from colleagues, to reflect on her work; to plan further writing, especially on technique, and to conduct an exemplary analysis of a 10- year-old boy, Richard, six sessions each week from April to August 1941. She kept process records of the play and conversations—for example, Richard’s associations, and Klein’s interpretations of them—during each of the sessions. The theoretical conclusions from this case, especially about the early form of the Oedipus complex in a boy, were presented as a paper in 1945. The book, Narrative of a Child Analysis, is a detailed presentation of the case. The ten-year-old boy Richard was treated in 1941. Each of 93 sessions is described in a brief process record, and each is followed by a commentary written much later, just before Klein’s death in 1960. It was intended as a supplement to her early book The Psycho-Analysis of Children, and to present her technique in detail. The fact that it was not published for nearly 20 years is due to a number of reasons, including the fact that her interests had moved on to the urgent need to present her developing theoretical conclusions. But Klein believed this record represented her technique at the time and that it had not changed very much by the time the record was published. She wrote this case history for presentation as a paper, “The Oedipus complex in the light of early anxieties,” to the British Psycho-Analytical Society in 1945. It is a very detailed account of the early stages of the Oedipus complex as it had emerged in her early work with children, and then subsequently revised in the light of her theory of the depressive position which she had described five years before. She believed this significantly added to Freud’s descriptions of the Oedipus complex, though she was clear that it did not replace Freud’s work. As far as the boy’s complex is concerned, development through the Oedipal conflicts is propelled not only by the boy’s fear of castration from his vengeful father, but the boy’s love for his father and wish to protect him from his own damaging hatred. As to the little girl, she concluded that Freud was only partly right in his notion of penis envy, which he over-rated. More prominently, the little girl is occupied by the phantasy INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS of father’s penis residing inside mother with the future babies there. The little girl is as preoccupied with the desire for father’s penis inside her, and her internal babies, as she is with the hopeless wish for a penis of her own. The anxiety that little girls suffer most is therefore the fear of a retaliatory mother arising out of the girl’s wish to steal the penis from inside her mother. Her conclusions were not new and are found in her earlier book (Klein, 1932). Klein’s wish to write a thorough account of her technique was only partly realized in a paper in 1955 on “The Psycho-Analytic Play Technique: Its History and Significance.” Towards the end of her life she returned to the full set of process notes she had made of Richard’s analysis, and began the task of annotating every session. She completed this just before her death, and the work was published a few months later as Narrative of a Child Analysis. This was her very last word on child analysis and is a major statement on her technique. What the book does is to explore in careful detail the ways in which these configurations of objects are worked out for the 10-year-old boy in an analytic setting. In particular she concentrates carefully on the location of the objects; felt by the boy to be inside him, often accompanied by physical sensations, or in the external world and represented by actual things and people which interact in ways that make them suitable to incorporate into his play, his phantasies, and his dialogue. The book is of fascinating and major interest for its portrayal of a child analysis in detail. It is written with considerable poignancy and charm, and with an obvious affection for Richard, a frightened but quite courageous little boy. At the time it attracted great interest because it revealed Klein at work, and it has remained an important complement to her often complex theoretical writings. By the time she published her first account of Richard, in 1945, the technique employed by Klein and her colleagues was about to change in significant ways as she and her colleagues explored the fragmented and partobject world of schizoid and schizophrenic patients. Technical aspects of Anna Freud’s method of child analysis had also changed by this time (Geleerd, 1963). Rosert D. HINSHELWOOD See also: Phobic neurosis. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Rickman, JoHN (1880-1951) Bibliography Geleerd, Elisabeth R. (1963). Evaluation of Melanie Klein’s narrative of a child analysis. International Journal of Psychoanalysis; 44, 493-506. Klein, Melanie (1932). The psycho-analysis of children. London: Hogarth. . (1961). Narrative of a child analysis. London: Hogarth. RICKMAN, JOHN (1880-1951) John Rickman, a doctor of medicine, psychiatrist, and psychoanalyst, was born on April 10, 1880, at Dorking, Surrey, England, and died on July 1, 1951, in Regent’s Park, London. He was the only child of Quaker parents, and his father died when he was two. He went to Leighton Park, a Quaker boarding school in Reading. He fulfilled the requirements of a Natural Science Tripos at the University of Cambridge, and he completed his medical degree and qualified in 1916 at St. Thomas’s Hospital in London. He joined the Friends War Victims Relief Unit in Russia (Rickman, 1949). In 1918 he met and married Lydia Lewis, an American. He then studied psychiatry at Cambridge, where Dr. William H. R. Rivers advised him to see Freud in Vienna. Freud agreed to see him for two guineas. Freud asked him to work on what was published as The Development of the Psycho-Analytical Theory of the Psychoses (Rickman, 1928a). He returned to London and was elected an associate member of the British Psycho-Analytical Society in 1920 and a member in 1922. He played a key role in the early years of the society and its Institute of Psycho-Analysis, especially in administration, publication activities, and links with allied professions. In this regard, it was particularly helpful that he was an editor of the British Journal of Medical Psychology for 14 years. He was elected to the council and to the first training committee in 1926. In 1929 he went to Budapest to have analysis with Sandor Ferenczi, and later, prior to the Second World War, he underwent some analysis with Melanie Klein and supported her approach. After 1936 the Spanish Civil War convinced him of the need to oppose the Nazis. He was often asked to write editorials for The Lancet during periods of politi- 1501 Rie, Oskar (1863-1931) cal crisis. In 1939 he joined the Emergency Medical Services, later becoming a major in the Royal Army Medical Corp. He met Wilfred R. Bion when he worked in Wharncliffe and Northfield Hospitals. He was then posted to the British Army War Officer Selection Board to select officers. Impressed by his approach, some colleagues later applied to be trained as psychoanalysts. After the war he took an active part in the British Psycho-Analytical Society and in its new training arrangements. He also facilitated the rapprochement between the Tavistock Clinic and the society. In 1948 he was elected president of the society. At that time he was considered a member of the Middle Group, not a Kleinian. His thoughts as president are contained in his seminal paper on the functions of a psychoanalytic society (Rickman, 1951). In 1928 he published The Development of the Psycho- Analytical Theory of the Psychoses, 1893-1926 and also Index Psycho-Analyticus. He edited the Psychoanalytical Epitome Series and wrote over a hundred papers and reviews. In 1957 his Selected Contributions to Psycho- Analysis was published. His early death in 1951 was a loss to the British Psycho-Analytical Society, which missed his ability to act as a bridge between colleagues in other disciplines and analysts exploring the contributions that psychoanalysis could make to the understanding of group relations and the structure of society. Peary H. M. Kinc See also: Great Britain; Group analysis; International Journal of Psychoanalysis, The; Tavistock Clinic. Bibliography Rickman, John. (1928a). The development of the psychoanalytical theory of the psychoses, 1893-1926. London: Bailliere, Tindall & Cox. . (1928b). Index psycho-analyticus, 1893-1926. London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis. . (1949). Sketches of Russian peasant life (1916- 1918). In Geoffrey Gorer and John Rickman (Eds.), The peoples of greater Russia: A psychological study (pp. 23-89). London: Cresset. . (1951). Reflections on the functions and organization of a psycho-analytical society. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 32, 218-237. 1502 . (1957). Selected contributions to psycho-analysis. London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho- Analysis. RIE, OSKAR (1863-1931) The Austrian pediatrician Oskar Rie, friend and physician to Freud and his family, was born on December 8, 1863, in Vienna, where he died on September 17, 1931. The Ries were a Jewish family from Prague; Isidor Rie was a gem merchant. Oskar, the second of five children, studied in Vienna and received his medical degree in 1887. Rie was one of Freud’s most faithful friends. From 1886 to 1896 he served as Freud’s assistant at the Kassowitz Institute in Vienna (Offentliches Kinder- Krankeninstitut), where Freud held consultations in pediatric neurology several times each week. Together they published a monograph on cerebral palsy in children, Klinische Studie iiber due halbseitige Cerebrallahmung der Kinder (Clinical study of cerebral paralysis of children [1891a]), which won considerable influence and insured Freud’s reputation as a specialist. Rie also served as family physician to Freud’s children and sister-in-law Minna Bernays. While often acknowledging his devoted friendship, Freud viewed Rie with antagonism around the end of his friendship with Wilhlem Fliess. In the psychoanalytic literature Rie is known above all for his appearance as “Otto” in Freud’s famous “dream of Irma’s injection” in The Interpretations of Dreams (1900a). In the manifest dream, he is Freud’s friend and the doctor who injected the patient with “a preparation of propyl, propyls ... propionic acid ... trimethylamin” (Freud 1900a, p. 140)—that aggravated her condition. Free associations clearly indicated Freud’s ambivalence toward Rie, who was also taken to task in correspondence with Fliess. Freud took Rie’s resentment concerning the revelations in The Interpretation of Dreams and “his lack of understanding for my findings” (Freud 1985, p. 447) to be another illustration of his observation that “[a]n intimate friend and a hated enemy have always been indispensable to my emotional life; I have always been able to create them anew, and not infrequently my childish ideal has been so closely approached that friend and enemy have coincided in the same person; but not INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS simultaneously, of course, as was the case in my early childhood” (1900a, p. 483). But Rie would remain a close friend. He accompanied Freud on vacations in the mountains, including _ the sojourn at the Alpine retreat where Freud “treated” Katharina, one of the cases presented in Studies on Hysteria. Rie instructed Fliess (his brother-in-law) to insist that Freud stop smoking. On Saturdays, he played tarok with Freud and his brother Alfred, and often accompanied Freud to the theater. On January 5, 1898, together they saw Theodor Herzl’s play The New Ghetto, then later met Herzl at a meeting of B’nai Brith, of which he became a member in 1901, the same year as Alexander Freud. A member of the Wednesday Evening Society, Rie was admitted to the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society on October 7, 1908, at the same time as Sandor Ferenczi, and numerous traces of his presence can be found in the Society's minutes. Rie’s marriage to Ida Fliess’s sister, Melanie Bondy, on November 10, 1896, generated further connections in the history of psychoanalysis. In addition to a son, Norbert (b. Oct. 30, 1897), his daughter Margarethe (b. March 25, 1899) would marry Hermann Nunberg in 1929 and be analyzed by Freud in the 1920s (about the same time as her friend, Anna Freud). Marianne (born May 27, 1900) would marry Ernst Kris in 1927 and become a well-known analyst in the United States. Especially known for her work in psychoanalysis with children, among her adult patients were Marilyn Monroe and Diana Trilling; one of her closest friends was Anna Freud. On August 4, 1921, Freud wrote to Rie: “Your friendly words about me have done me good although they didn’t tell me anything new because I have been looking upon your friendship for more than a lifetime as an assured possession. I have been able to give something to many people in my life; from you fate has allowed me only to receive” (Freud 1960, p. 335). ALAIN DE MYJOLLA See also: Institute Max-Kassowitz; Kris-Rie, Marianne. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund, and Rie, Oskar. (1891a). Klinische Studie iiber die halbseitige Cerebrallahmung der Kinder. Vienna: Moritz Perles. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Rite AND RITUAL Nunberg, Herman, and Federn, Ernst (Eds.). (1962-1975) Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, Vol. 1, 1906— 1908; Vol. II, 1908-1910; Vol. Ill, 1910-1911; Vol. IV, 1912-1918. New York: International Universities Press. RITE AND RITUAL Rites and rituals have been studied from antiquity: Western philosophers pondered these practices, which in modern times have become an object of study in anthropology, ethnology, and sociology. The diversity of practices makes an authoritative definition problematic, but certain general descriptors apply: A rite is a well-ordered, obligatory action or group of actions that is performed precisely and repetitively; it often moves to an individual or collective rhythm; its meaning and aims are generally opaque, and of no obvious practical purpose. Rites and rituals are related to the sacred: religion, magic, purification, and so forth—the notion of the rite of passage remains in use. Sigmund Freud’s writings on the ritual can be included among the great variety on the subject, although, but he privileges the German word Zeremoniell, meaning ceremonial or ceremonious; in so doing, he underscores the sacred character of these practices. + From 1894 to 1896 Freud developed the idea of obsessional neurosis. In “Further Remarks on the Neuro-Psychoses of Defence” (1896b), in the context of the trauma theory, he interpreted the ceremonials it can entail. These derive from the idea of obsessive actions, which are among the defenses and result from repression. Freud cited ceremonials associated with the anal zone and with infantile masturbation in, respectively, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d) and the case of Dora, related in “Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria” (1905e [1901]). The article “Obsessive Actions and Religious Practice” (1907b) was devoted to this topic and, according to Freud’s “Short Account of Psycho-Analysis” (1924f [1923]), marked the beginning ofh is work on religious psychology. The deepening of the analogy of the dynamics between obsessional neurosis and collective ritual practices, by way of the notion of primal ambivalence and its expression toward the father, in Totem and Taboo (1912-13a), is the basis for Freud’s perspective on individual and collective ceremonials. In “A Short Account of Psycho-Analysis,” written in 1923, Freud presented this study in a broad context: “If 1503 Rite AND RITUAL the psychological discoveries gained from the study of dreams were firmly kept in view, only one further step was needed before psycho-analysis could be proclaimed as the theory of the deeper mental processes not directly accessible to consciousness—as a ‘depth-psychology — and before it could be applied to almost all the mental sciences. This step lay in the transition from the mental activity of individual men to the psychical functions of human communities and peoples—that is, from individual to group psychology; and many surprising analogies forced this transition upon us.... To take an instance. ... It is impossible to escape the impression of the perfect correspondence which can be discovered between the obsessive actions of certain obsessional patients and the religious observances of believers all over the world. Some cases of obsessional neurosis actually behave like a caricature of a private religion, so that it is tempting to liken the official religions to an obsessional neurosis that has been mitigated by becoming universalized. This comparison, which is no doubt highly objectionable to all believers, has nevertheless proved most fruitful psychologically. For psychoanalysis soon discovered in the case of obsessional neurosis what the forces are that struggle with one another in it till their conflicts find a remarkable expression in the ceremonial of obsessive actions. Nothing similar was suspected in the case of religious ceremonial until, by tracing back religious feeling to the relation with the father as its deepest root, it became possible to point to an analogous dynamic situation in that case too” (pp. 205-206). In the Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1916-17a [1915-17]), after noting an economic difference between ceremonials in obsessional neurosis and those of communities, the former expressing a defense against repressed sexuality and the latter against narcissistic and aggressive impulses, Freud granted the importance of “extremely strong sadistic impulses” in obsessional neurosis. The taboo against touching, whether actual or metaphoric, that is evident in the phenomenology of ceremonials thus becomes intelligible. In fact, the fundamental theme of any ritual having to do with “touching” is the “first aim of object-cathexis, whether aggressive or tender,” wrote Freud in Totem and Taboo (1912—13a). If we add that the psychic position necessary for any ritual is narcissistic, or animistic from the collective point of view, and that it presupposes the omnipotence of wishes and thoughts, it becomes apparent that the underlying obsession in any ceremonial is that of the 1504 contagion of instinctual impulses; this explains the prevalence of magical actions and thoughts having to do with contagion—by contiguity, similarity, isolation, and retroactive annulment. Throughout his writings Freud described and gave a detailed analysis of various rituals: scatological, money-related, rituals of washing, for going to sleep, or for beginning something. Collective rituals such as those governing relations between son-in-law and mother-in-law, rituals relating to the dead, to chiefs or enemies who have been killed, and rituals relating to defloration and marriage have been extensively studied, in addition to the totemic meal and its repetition in the Christian sacrament of Communion, based on the idea of the murder and consumption of the primal father of the horde. Ceremonials, as compromise formations, presuppose a repression, and the primary processes thus play a part in their creation. Displacement and the condensation of a multiplicity of fantasies in the ceremonial lead to overdetermination; an absence of contradiction that enables the ceremonial to actualize both wish and defense. In addition, the abundance of symbolism is unmistakable. From an economic point of view, the pleasure principle prevails, and Freud emphasized the sexual excitation that occurs during ceremonials. In Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926d) Freud explained that from a topographical and dynamic point of view, regression, linked to powerful aggressive impulses, results in “the erotic trends being disguised” and that accordingly, “the struggle against sexuality will hence-forward be carried on under the banner of ethical principles” (p. 116). The ego “recoils in astonishment” from suggestions of cruelty emanating from the id, and “[t]he overstrict superego insists all the more strongly on the suppression of sexuality, since this has assumed such repellent forms” (p. 116). The theme of guilt is omnipresent, which phenomenology alone reveals, as is the theme of punishment. There is thus continuity between ceremonials and _ taboos. Moreover, the persistence of unconscious wishes and their fulfillment in ceremonials, no matter what the defenses have undertaken, provokes excessive scruples in their enactment and systematic doubt as to their propriety. The ceremonial’s common compulsion to repeat seems to depend on the same factors. In Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, written in 1925, Freud lamented the fact that “no one has as yet collected [ceremonials] and systematically analysed INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS them” (p. 116). With regard to their emergence, often during the latency period, he noted: “Why this should be so is at present not at all clear; but the sublimation of anal-erotic components plays an unmistakable part in it” (p. 116). Sublimation remains a lively issue in psychoanalysis. The compulsion to repeat, as linked to the death instinct and to masochism, is another. Lastly, the generalization of the obsession with touching or not touching, in our ostensibly secular culture, seems more misunderstood than acknowledged. Thus, ceremonials, rites, and rituals are an area that awaits further study. MICHELE PorTE See also: Framework of the psychoanalytic treatment; Myth of origins; Religion and psychoanalysis; Sadism; Symptom. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1912—13a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1-161. . (1916-17a [1915-17]). Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. Part I, SE, 15; Part II, SE, 16. . (1924f). A short account of psycho-analysis. SE, 19: 189-209. . (1926d). Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. SE, 20: 75-172. Reik, Theodor. (1975). Ritual: Psycho-analytic studies (Douglas Bryan, Trans.). Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. (Original work published 1949) Van Gennep, Arnold. (1960). The rites of passage. (M. B. Vizedom and G. B. Caffee, Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1909) RITTMEISTER, JOHN FRIEDRICH KARL (1898-1943) John Rittmeister, a German neurologist and psychoanalyst, was born in Hamburg on August 21, 1898, and was guillotined in Plotzensee prison, outside Berlin, on May 13, 1943. The last of three children in a long-established and well-to-do family of merchants, he studied the humanities before joining the armed forces in 1917 during World War I and serving on the Italian and French fronts. From 1920 to 1925 he studied medicine at the universities of Géttingen, Kiel, and INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS RITTMEISTER, JOHN FRIEDRICH KARL (1898-1943) Hamburg. He specialized in neurology with Max Nonne and received his state doctorate at Hamburg. After three years of neuropsychiatric training in the hospitals of Munich, he began practicing psychotherapy there. He gave conferences and demonstrations of hypnosis and familiarized himself with the teachings of Carl Gustav Jung. In 1929 he settled in Zurich, staying there for two years before acquiring a post as a voluntary physician at the polyclinic for nervous diseases of the Burghdlzli Psychiatric Clinic, under the directorship of Erich Katzenstein, where he also conducted neurological research. From 1935 to 1937, with a few interruptions, he worked as an assistant psychiatrist at the Miinsingen cantonal hospital under Max Miller, where he developed an excellent personal and philosophical relationship with senior lecturer Alfred Storch, who had been driven out of Germany. During his stay in Switzerland, he joined socialist groups for students and workers, went on a study trip to the Soviet Union, and became a convinced Marxist, for which the Swiss authorities often threatened to deport him. In Zurich he quickly distanced himself from Jung’s psychology club because of its “suffocating, mystical and obscure atmosphere.” He explained his position in a scientific lecture titled “Voraussetzungen und Konsequenzen der Jungschen Archetypenlehre” (The presuppositions and consequences of teaching Jungian archetypes; 1982). In 1922, while still a student in Munich, he sought psychological help from Hans von Hattingberg, and in 1935 he commenced his analysis with Gustav Bally in Zurich. In “Die psychotherapeutische Aufgabe und der neue Humanismus” (Psychotherapeutic duty and the new humanism), published in Holland in 1936, he advocated a comparison between the Freudian and Jungian schools and “a humanism of decision, which establishes joint, concrete goals.” He attacked, in a barely disguised way, the political situation of National Socialist Germany, and he returned to this theme at the end of 1937. In Berlin he was chief medical officer in a psychiatric clinic. He trained in psychoanalytic work group A of the Goring Institute, more formally known as the Deutsches Institut fiir psychologische Forschung und Psychotherapie (German Institute for Psychological Research and Psychotherapy), doing his training analysis with Werner Kemper. After he married Eva Knieper in July 1939, he obtained a position in the 1505 RIVALRY polyclinic in September and later became its director. He played an active part in the scientific life of the Goring Institute, giving lectures and conferences for candidates. His report on the current state of the polyclinic appeared in the Zentralblatt fiir Psychotherapie in 1941, and his last conference in the spring of 1942, “Die mystiche Krise des jungen Descartes” (The mystical crisis of the young Descartes) was published as late as 1961, when it appeared in Confinia psychiatria. During the last years of his life in Berlin, he gathered around him a circle of young people (mainly his wife’s fellow students), teaching them philosophy and politics and organizing them to help Jews and foreign workers recruited by force. On Christmas 1941, with the help of Harro Schulze-Boysen, he managed to join the Red Orchestra, a resistance group organized around Schulze-Boysen and Arvid Harnack. Rittmeister participated in clandestine political work, designing and distributing pamphlets and propagandizing for foreign workers, but he did not spy for the Soviet Union, as was claimed. After being arrested on September 26, 1942, he was condemned to death by the war tribunal of the Reich, along with most of the members of his group, and was executed in May 1943. LupGER M. HERMANNS See also: Deutsches Institut fiir Psychologische Forschung und Psychotherapie (Institut Goring); Germany; Marxism -and psychoanalysis; Second World War: The effect on the development of psychoanalysis; Kemper, Werner Walther. Bibliography Brautigam, Walter. (1987). John Rittmeister: Leben und Sterben. Ebenhausen bei Miinchen: Langewiesche-Brandt. Hermanns, Ludger M. (1982). John F. Rittmeister und C. G. Jung. Psyche, 36, 1022-1031. Rittmeister, John F. (1936). Die Psychotherapeutische Aufgabe und der neue Humanismus. Psychiatrische en neurologische Bladen, 5, 777-796. . (1961). Die mystische Krise des jungen Descartes. Confinia psychiatrica, 4, 65-98. . (1982). Voraussetzungen und Konsequenzen der Jungschen Archetypenlehre. Psyche, 36, 1032-1044. 1506 . (1992). Hier brannte doch die Welt: Aufzeichnungen aus dem Geftingnis, 1942-1943 (Christine Teller, Ed.). Giitersloh, Germany: Jacob van Hoddis. Schulz, Manfred. (1981). Dr. John Rittmeister, Nervenarzt und Widerstandskampfer. Medical dissertation, Humboldt University, Berlin. RIVALRY Etymologically, the word rival refers to people who live by the river and draw their water from the same stream. From a psychoanalytic point of view, rivalry is not simply a struggle for possession of the object, but can also be understood as having sexual, identificatory, and narcissistic aspects. The ensemble of partial drives directed toward the mother, once she is perceived as an object that is differentiated from the self, is accompanied by hostile rivalry toward the father. This oedipal rivalry is extended to the hostile relationships that occur among siblings. The object of rivalry can change in relation to bisexuality. Wishes for the rival’s death are repressed, and the formerly hated rival becomes a homosexual love-object. In “Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality” (1922b), Sigmund Freud posited an analogy between this mechanism and the process that is the basis for social bonds: “In both processes, there is first the presence of jealous and hostile impulses which cannot achieve satisfaction; and both the affectionate and the social feelings of identification arise as reactive formations against the repressed aggressive impulses” (p. 232). Freud thus attributed the decline of rivalry to repression, which results from the establishing of the superego and from the confrontation between hostile wishes and the child’s impotence. Rivalry creates a link of ambivalence between the subject and an other who can always become the subject’s alter ego, because the object of desire is the same for both. Putting himself in the place of this other, the subject imagines himself as being dispossessed of a source of enjoyment (jouissance) that tolerates no sharing. The subject’s hatred is all the stronger because unconsciously, this struggle is for possession of an object that bears the narcissistic illusion of perfect continuity between self and other. The destructiveness of the tendency away INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS from differentiation is thus transformed into hatred and suspended through triangulation. Rivalry, which tends toward repetition and acquires its various layers through reaction formations, is one component in the structuring of human desire. STEVEN WAINRIB See also: “Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy” (Little Hans); Anxiety; “Contributions to the Psychology of Love”; Counter-Oedipus; Dead mother complex; Examination dreams; Family romance; Forgetting; Masculine protest (individual psychology); Oedipus complex, early; Primitive horde; Wish for a baby; Wish/ yearning. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1909c). Family romances. SE, 9: 235-241. (1922b). Neurotic mechanisms in jealousy, paranoia and homosexuality. SE, 18: 221-232. RIVIERE-HODGSON VERRAL, JOAN (1883-1962) British psychoanalyst Joan Riviere was born Joan Hodgson Verrall in Brighton, England, June 28, 1883, and died in London, May 20, 1962. A founding member of the British Psycho- Analytical Society, she used her highly accomplished literary skills and sensitivity to meaning in her translations of Freud’s work and the writings of other psychoanalysts. As translation editor of the International Journal of Psycho-Analysis she was responsible for the translation of all papers from its inception in 1920 until 1937, after which she gave more time to her teaching and writing. As a friend, colleague, and collaborator of Melanie Klein, she was an articulate proponent of Klein’s ideas, probably the most able among Klein’s colleagues to express her theories incisively and convey them with subtlety. Most important, Riviere contributed many original ideas to the body of psychoanalytical knowledge that was being developed during the more than 40 years of her professional life. Her education was irregular, even for late Victorian times: school in Brighton, a seaside town in Sussex where she was born, was followed by some unhappy INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS RivicRE-HopGson VERRAL, JOAN (1883-1962) years in a girls’ boarding school. Then, at 17, she spent a year in Gotha, Germany, where she gained the remarkable command of German that was to play such an important part in her translations. She was married in 1906 to Evelyn Riviere, a barrister, and her only child, Diana, was born in 1908. In the following years she struggled to find a place in the professional world. She was involved in various movements for social change, such as divorce reform and suffragette activity. However these efforts did not alleviate the considerable emotional distress from which she suffered, and this led her to a therapeutic psychoanalysis with Ernest Jones in 1916. The latter was so impressed with her deep and sensitive understanding of psychoanalytic principles and processes that he made her a founding member of the British Psycho- Analytical Society, formed in 1919. The analysis with Jones was difficult and, reaching an impasse, he recommended her to Freud for further psychoanalysis. This took place in 1922 with evident success. On her return to London from Vienna, Riviere became actively involved in the work of the British Psycho-Analytical Society, becoming a training analyst in 1930. She was the analyst of such well-known individuals as Susan Isaacs, John Bowlby, and Donald Winnicott. She was reported by those she supervised, such as Hanna Segal, Herbert Rosenfeld, and Henri Rey, to be an excellent supervisor. Her original contributions to psychoanalysis are to be found in her papers: “Femininity as a Masquerade” (1929) examines an area of sexual development, in which the femininity of certain women is found to be the mask assumed to hide phallic rivalry and hatred of men. “Jealousy as a Mechanism of Defence” (1932) shows remarkable originality in that she finds jealousy to be a defense against envy aroused by the primal scene. Her most original work is “A Contribution to the Analysis of the Negative Therapeutic Reaction” (1936). In it she incorporates Klein’s findings on the depressive position, and describes for the first time the concept of a “defensive organization” as a protection against a psychic catastrophe. In the same year she showed her ability to put Klein’s theories in a context of Freud’s discoveries with “The Genesis of Psychical Conflict in Earliest Infancy,” delivered in Vienna in 1936 in honor of Freud’s 80th birthday. The richness of her thinking about our unconscious drives is apparent in the inner world in Ibsen’s “Master- Builder” (1952), where she describes how the forces 1507 RivisTA DI PSICOANALISI that shape the world find expression on the stage as in life. ATHOL HuGHES See also: British Psycho-Analytical Society; Controversial Discussions; Dependence; Feminism and psychoanalysis; Great Britain; Negative therapeutic reaction; Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. Bibliography Riviere, Joan (1929). Womanliness as a masquerade. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 10, 303-313. . (1932). Jealousy as a mechanism of defence. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 13, 414-424. . (1936). A contribution to the analysis of a negative therapeutic reaction. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 17, 304-320. . (1936). On the genesis of psychic conflict in earliest infancy. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 17, 395— 422. . (1952). The inner world in Ibsen’s “Master Builder.” International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 33, 173-180. RIVISTA DI PSICOANALISI La Rivista di psicoanalisi has been the official organ of the Italian Psychoanalytic Society (SPI) since 1955, when this quarterly review was first published. Each volume contains approximately 180 pages, for a total of 720 to 760 pages per year. The articles are organized by section: theory and clinical practice, current issues (“Reflections on Psychoanalysis and Science”), ethics, technique, and social issues (“Beyond the Couch”), discussions of work in progress, reports of congresses and meetings, reviews, reports of foreign-language publications, reviews of studies and trials, and obituaries. Since being founded in 1925 and its subsequent revivals (1932 and 1945), the SPI has always attempted to publish a review that would serve as an instrument of scientific understanding and the diffusion of knowledge. In 1925, professor Marco Levi Bianchini, the society's founder, transformed the review he had created in 1920, Archivio generale di neurologia e psichiatria, into the official publication of the SPI with the 1508 title Archivio generale di neurologia, psichiatria e psicoanalisi. In 1938 Italy’s racial legislation forced him to sell the publication to Agostino Gemelli, who changed the title to Archivio di neurologia, psichiatria e psicoterapia. After re-establishing the SPI in 1932, Edoardo Weiss provided it with a new official publication, the Rwista italiana di psicoanalisi, the first issue of which was published that same year. The Fascist government suspended publication, and the first issue of 1934, which had already been printed, was never distributed. In addition to articles by Edoardo Weiss, Nicola Perrotti, and Emilio Servadio, the first issue contained contributions from foreign authors including Heinrich Meng, Ernest Jones, Franz Alexander, Ludwig Jekels, Paul Federn, Sophie Morgenstern, Sigmund Freud (“The Moses of Michelangelo,’ 1914b), and Marie Bonaparte. Two other articles defended psychoanalysis against the attacks of the literary critic Francesco Flora and the philosopher Guido De Ruggiero. The second volume published Sigmund Freud’s New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (nos. 29-35), along with contributions by Weiss and Servadio, and two articles by Cesare Musatti. La Rivista di psicoanalisi, which has primarily promoted Italian authors, has also published several special issues: “Psychoanalysis of Psychiatric Institutions” (1971), “Aggression” (1972), “Interpretation” (1974), “Creative Processes” (1975), “Wilfred R. Bion” (1981). In 1986, in a supplement to volume 32, there appeared a general index covering the years 1932-1933 and 1955-1984, which provided information on authors, titles, and keywords. ROSARIO MERENDINO See also: Italy. Bibliography La Rivista di psicoanalisi (1986). Supplemento al numero 2: General index 1932-1933; 1955-1984, ROBERTSON, JAMES (1911-1988) A psychoanalyst, filmmaker, and influential researcher at the Tavistock Clinic on the impact of early separation on child development, James Robertson was born in Rutherglen, Scotland, on March 22, 1911, and died in London on December 31, 1988. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Robertson was the eldest child of five in a workingclass Scottish family, and left education at 14 to work in a Glasgow steelworks. From 19 to 27 years of age he attended various part-time Glasgow University Extension Courses on literature, history, economics, and philosophy, and in 1939 spent a year at Fircroft College for the Higher Education of Working Men in Birmingham, studying the humanities. From 1941 to 1945 he studied for the External Diploma in Social Studies at London University. In 1946-47 he completed the Mental Health Certificate at the London School of Economics. He trained in the British Psychoanalytical Society, attaining associate membership in 1952, and full membership in 1970. Robertson met his future wife and colleague, Joyce, while studying in Birmingham. A Quaker, he registered as a conscientious objector during the war, and joined his wife to work with Anna Freud as the only male social worker at the Hampstead War Nurseries. He was accepted for psychoanalytic training on the recommendation of Anna Freud, being analyzed by Barbara Lantos. In 1948 he joined John Bowlby at the Tavistock Clinic to do research on the effects on separation from the mother in early childhood. This research was conducted in children’s hospital wards at the time when national policy was weekly visits. He could not forget the unnecessary unhappiness of the children and was concerned at the time that harm was being done. He and his wife made a series of important films illustrating these effects vividly, and actively campaigned for change. Later films, about institutionalization, foster care and substitute mothering, were influential in promoting the use of fostering rather than children’s homes. Robertson’s untiring campaigning over 30 years was critically important in changing the United Kingdom National Policy on recognizing and meeting the emotional needs of children in hospital. Parents are now expected to stay with their young children in hospital. The vivid illustration on film of increasing disturbance in young children separated from their families initially shocked many pediatricians and nurses, and Robertson came under attack, but finally, following the first two films, the Platt Report in 1959 recommended that practice should change. In the 1960s, the National Association for the Welfare of Children in Hospital was formed, with the help and support of both Robertson and his wife. Robertson's pioneering use of film has been developed using video, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Roueim, GEza (1891-1953) particularly by those in the field of attachment, and in recent studies of infant and child development. JENNIFER JOHNS See also: Tavistock Clinic. Bibliography , Robertson, James. (1953). A two-year-old goes to hospital. London: Robertson Centre and Ipswich, Concord Films Council. . (1958). Going to hospital with mother. London: Robertson Centre and Ipswich, Concord Films Council. . (1958). Young children in hospital. London: Tavistock Publications. . (1976). Young children in brief separation, series of five. London, Robertson Centre and Ipswich, Concord Films Council. . (1989). Separation and the very young. London: Free Association Books. ROHEIM, GEZA (1891-1953) Anthropologist and psychoanalyst Géza Roheim was born in Budapest on September 12, 1891, and died in New York on June 7, 1953. Born to a prosperous family of Jewish merchants, as a child Geza had a passion for folk tales and while a high school student he delivered a paper before the Hungarian Ethnological Society. At the University of Budapest he studied geography, linguistics, philosophy, law, and literature; then, in Berlin and Leipzig, anthropology and the history of religion. Because anthropology was not yet a fully developed discipline, when he received his doctorate in 1914 his examination was in geography. As an assistant librarian in 1917 in the Széchenyi Library of the Hungarian National Museum, Roheim essentially specialized in folklore. In 1918 he married Ilona, who would become his partner in anthropological research. Roheim had become acquainted with psychoanalysis while a student, and his first article “Dragons and Dragon Killers,” published in 1911, brought a psychoanalytic perspective to the explanation of myths. In 1916 he began analysis, first with Sandor Ferenczi and later with Vilma Kovacs. In Spiegelzauber (Mirror Magic), first 1509 RoLLAND, ROMAIN EDME Paut-Emice (1866-1944) published in 1919, Roheim made extensive use of Freud’s recently developed theory of narcissism. During Béla Kun’s short-lived communist revolution in 1918, Réheim helped reorganize the Hungarian National Museum, where he held the first chair of anthropology at the University of Budapest. But when the regime failed after just three months, Roheim lost his academic position. Henceforth he made a living through analytic practice and by giving occasional courses in English. In 1921, Roheim received the Freud Prize for his study “Das Selbst” (“The Self”) and for his paper on Australian totemism delivered at The Hague Congress in 1920. In 1927, when Bronislaw Malinowski famously contested the existence of the Oedipus complex in matrilineal societies, Roheim had the task of gathering material to refute the ethnologist’s arguments. Several expeditions, beginning in 1928 and sponsored by Marie Bonaparte, enabled Roheim to do field work in Central Australia, New Guinea, Normanby Island, and in Arizona among the Yuma. From this work in the field Roheim developed his major themes. In 1932 he published “Psychoanalysis of Primitive Cultural Types” and arguably his central work, The Riddle of the Sphinx, appeared in 1934. He emphasized the significance of the primal scene and, relying on work in comparative anatomy by German physiologist Ludwig Bolk, attempted to demonstrate the role of fetal characteristics in human mental life, which he believed had important and to some extent pathogenic consequences. In the autumn of 1938, after the rise of fascism and with war fast approaching, Roheim emigrated to the United States. He first settled in Worcester, Massachusetts, where he practiced as a psychoanalyst at the State Hospital for the Insane; he subsequently settled in New York. As a non-medical analyst, R6heim was not accepted into the New York Psychoanalytic Society, nor could he find an academic appointment. His work, based on a systematic human psychology, found little support among the functionalist ethnologists then predominant in the universities, while he himself remained critical of cultural anthropology. Ever creative and intrepid, Roheim organized a seminar in his home that brought together, among others, anthropologists Weston La Barre, Werner Miinsterberger, and Georges Devereux. In 1947, he undertook a new expedition among the Navajo. 1510 Roheim left a considerable body of work that includes some one hundred fifty studies and a dozen books on a host of topics in anthropology, sociology, history, mythology, folklore, and psychoanalysis. To him is owed a method of applied psychoanalysis buttressed by field investigation. He developed an ontogenetic theory of culture and, citing Ferenczi, he contended that a foundational trauma lies at the root of each culture. Also, influenced by Melanie Klein, Roheim offered an account of basic human activities, emphasizing the significance of fantasies of destruction and reparation. Marked by a deep cultural pessimism, Roheim always pointed to the cultural superiority of “primitive” people while viewing Western societies as dominated by anal retentiveness and reaction formations. EvA BRABANT-GERO See also: Anthropology and psychoanalysis; Ethnopsychoanalysis; Hungarian School; Hungary; Magical thinking; Myth; Oedipus complex; Primitive horde; Second World War: The effects on the development of psychoanalysis; Sociology and psychoanalysis/sociopsychoanalysis. Bibliography Roheim, Géza (1919), Spiegelzauber. Wien: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag. . (1932). Psychoanalysis of primitive cultural types. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 13: 2-224. . (1934). The riddle of the sphinx. London: Hogarth Press . (1943). The origin and function of culture. New York: Nervous and mental disease monographs 3. . (1955). Magic and schizophrenia. New York: International Universities Press. . (1992). Fire in the dragon and other psychoanalytic essays on folklore (Alan Dundes, Ed.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. ROLLAND, ROMAIN EDME PAUL-EMILE (1866-1944) The French author Romain Edmé Paul Emile Rolland was born on January 26, 1866, in Clamecy, a small town in Burgundy, and died on December 30, 1944, in the old village of Vézelay. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY oF PSYCHOANALYSIS Freud held Rolland in high esteem for his insight into the mind of a child, and he called The Enchanted Soul “a most beautiful novel.” André Malraux thought Rolland was “the last of the great French romantic novelists.” Quite unlike Freud, Rolland was musical to the core and the seven volumes of his Beethoven the Creator were published between 1928 and 1943. He was awarded the 1915 Nobel Prize for literature for his novel Jean-Christophe. A politically engaged intellectual from the time of the Dreyfus Affair at the turn of the twentieth century, Rolland aroused Freud’s admiration for the anti-war stance he took in 1914 with his essay “Au-dessus de la meélée” (Above the Battle), in which he argued for international brotherhood instead of mutual destruction. Rolland denounced Hitler as early as 1933 and condemned Jewish persecution as a “crime against humanity.” Indeed, Rolland declined the Goethe Prize after the Nazis came to power. After lending critical support to the Soviet Union as a part of anti-Hiterlian strategy, Rolland’s idealism moved him for a time in the direction of non-critical communist fellowtraveler. Rolland’s correspondence shows his introspective side and his value as an eyewitness to history. (Duchatelet, 1976). Aware of trends in German culture, Rolland read Freud as early as 1909. The two men would exchange about twenty letters from 1923 to 1936; Freud’s first communication was written the same week he was diagnosed with cancer of the jaw. Rolland visited Freud only once, on May 14, 1924. The highly idealized intellectual and emotional relationship between Freud and Rolland suggests a veritable epistolary transference that served Freud as a sounding board for self-analysis during his later years, and several of his major works found their point of departure in exchanges with his “venerated” alter ego. Despite differences of background and culture, powerful affinities joined these two romantic heroes. Freud admired the poet and “apostle of love for mankind” (Freud, 1960), while Rolland viewed Freud as a “conquistador” of the new world of the mind. In Spinoza they shared a common thread of influence— Rolland, the Christian without a church, inspired by “the enlightened Spinoza” and Freud the “Jewish heretic.” Both were critical of the dogmas of organized religion but differed over the role of religious feeling. Rolland reproached Freud for not having analyzed the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Rottano, Romain Eomé Paut-Emite (1866-1944) “oceanic feeling” associated with religiosity. Rolland’s pantheism led him to view mysticism, by contrast, as a path to knowledge of the human mind; this represents an element of Spinoza’s intellectual heritage and contrasts with the uncompromising nineteenth-century atheism of David Friedrich Strauss and Ludwig Feuerbach, to which Freud was heir. In the first chapter of Civilization and Its Discontents Freud located the “oceanic feeling” in the primitive, undifferentiated ego; he pursued the dialogue with Rolland by searching for the causes of civilized unhappiness, which he attributed to excessive repression of sexual and aggressive drives and to the loss of collective ideals. Close to Rolland in his critique of Nazi anti-Semitism, Freud differed with him in showing that quasi-religious idealization of communist dogma masked its underlying violence. The Journey Within (1942), a kind of self-analysis, which Rolland began after his visit to Freud, reveals an unconscious communication with him: he wrote about mourning his two-year-old sister, Madeleine, who died when he was five. In a mirror transference, with twelve years in age between them, Freud analyzed his own childhood grief, associated with the death of his infant brother Julius, when he was about two years old, in his “A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis” (1936a), addressed to Rolland on the occasion of the latter’s seventieth birthday. Capping their correspondence and transference relationship, several of Freud’s last writings developed themes first sketched in this final burst of self-analysis. HENRI VERMOREL AND MADELEINE VERMOREL See also: Certainty; Civilization and its Discontents; Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis, A; Future of an Illusion, The; Jouissance (Lacan); Judaism and psychoanalysis; Mysticism; Oceanic feeling; Symbiosis/symbiotic relation. Bibliography Duchatelet, B. (1976). A propos dune correspondance qui nest pas encore générale. Revue @’histoire littéraire de la France, 76, 958-975. Freud, Sigmund. (1927c). Future of an illusion. SE, 21. . (1930a). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21. . (1960). Letters. New York: Basic. 1511 ROMANIA Rolland, Romain. (1959). The journey within. New York: Philosophical Library. Vermorel, Henri, and Vermorel, Madeleine (Eds.). (1993) Sigmund Freud et Romain Rolland: Correspondance 1923— 1936. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. ROMANIA On returning from training courses in France and Germany, Gheorghe Preda (1879-1965), a medical officer in the Romanian army, published his considerations on psychoanalysis in a Romanian journal of medical sciences in 1912. Without any personal experience of psychoanalysis, he encouraged the interest of his collaborators, who were the first to propagate Freud’s work. Later, in 1923, one of Jean Martin Charcot’s students, Gheorghe Marinescu, contributed to making psychoanalysis known to Romanian intellectuals by publishing two articles: an introduction to the study of psychoanalysis and a critique of Freudian theory. Several psychologists and psychiatrists then took an interest in psychoanalysis. One of them, Ion Popescu-Sibiu, entered into correspondence with Freud and became the author of a very complete book on the theory and practice of psychoanalysis: Conceptia Psihanalitica (1947). In 1932 he won a Romanian Academy prize for this book. It was in fact a revision of the thesis he presented in 1927, with an addendum of “medico-psychological vocabulary.” It was first published in three thousand copies. Around this time more than ten books and theses were published dealing with the applications of psychoanalysis to psychotherapy, forensic medicine, literature, the study of dreams, spiritualism, and career guidance. In a setback, in 1932 an application of psychoanalysis to the work of the Romanian national poet Mihai Eminescu (1850-1889) was considered iconoclastic. In 1934, and again in 1935, attempts to start a journal of psychoanalysis resulted in the appearance of one issue and no follow-up. Over the next few decades the development of psychoanalysis was limited by the economic crisis of 1929, the rise of the fascist Iron Guard party, which aligned Romania with Nazi Germany, and the communist takeover of the country. In 1946, just after the Second World War, Ion Popescu-Sibiu and Constantin Vlad (1892-1971) founded the Romanian Society for Psychopathology and Psychotherapy. They rallied 1512 around them all those who had been interested in analysis before the war. But psychoanalysis was prohibited in 1948, as it was in all communist countries. Not until 1973 and the new directions opened up by the political head of state Nicolae Ceausescu did a clinical psychological circle organize regular meetings of practitioners. This breach in the wall was short lived, however, and in 1977 it was forbidden to teach psychology. People nevertheless continued to study psychoanalytic texts. The first volume of a translation of Freud’s Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1916-1917a [1915-1917]) was published in 1980. But the almost total absence of personal and training analysis was detrimental to any real development of psychoanalysis. Not until after the fall of the Ceausescu regime could a group of psychotherapists, largely nonphysicians, found the Romanian Psychoanalytic Society in 1990. This society publishes an internal bulletin and a journal that appear on a regular basis. The desire of Romanian analysts to improve themselves professionally is manifest in the numbers that have gone abroad for training and by the 1995 Conference for Eastern Europeans at Constanza, organized with the help of the European Federation for Psychoanalysis. MiIcHEL VINCENT Bibliography Diatkine, Gilbert, Gibeault, Alain, Gibeault, Monique, and Vincent, Michel. (1993). La psychanalyse en Europe orientale. In Gilbert Diatkine, Gerard Le Goues, and Ilana Reiss- Schimmel (Eds.), La psychanalyse et Europe de 1993. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. RORSCHACH, HERMANN (1884-1922) Swiss psychoanalyst and creator of the projective test that bears his name, Hermann Rorschach was born in Zurich on November 8, 1884. He died in Herisau on April 3, 1922, probably from acute appendicitis, at the age of thirty-seven, nine months after publishing his seminal work, Psychodiagnostik. From childhood Rorschach evinced considerable artistic skill and while in secondary school he hesitated between fine art, natural science, and medicine, opting finally for the latter. In Zurich, where Rorschach principally studied, Eugen Bleuler had created a revolution in INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS hospital psychiatry by introducing Freud’s theories, while his colleague, Carl Gustav Jung, had worked out a word association test on psychodynamic principles. Rorschach obtained his medical license in 1909 and his medical degree in 1912, from the University of Zurich. From 1909 to 1913, Rorschach worked as an assistant in the psychiatric hospital in Minsterlingen, and there prepared his doctoral thesis, “On Reflex- Hallucinations and Kindred Manifestations.” At the same time, he conducted some early experiments on children and adults in which he compared verbal associations with associations aroused by blots of ink, but did not elaborate on this work at the time. Rorschach developed an interest in psychoanalysis about 1911, the date of his first publication. He contributed short articles, reports, and book reviews to the Zentralblatt fiir Psychoanalyse from 1912 to 1914. After visiting Russia in 1913, Rorschach returned to Switzerland to assume a position as assistant in Waldau, a psychiatric clinic near Bern; his main interest during this period were several unusual Swiss religious sects. In 1915 he was appointed associate director of the asylum at the small town of Herisau, where he would remain until his death. While at Herisau, Rorschach rekindled his earlier interest in the use of inkblots in psychiatric diagnosis. Over the course of three years, beginning in 1918, he developed a series of cards through experiments with patients to develop a projective test that could indicate the presence of certain personality traits and characteristics. The Rorschach test is an example of a scientific advance due as much to artistic talent as to intellectual rigor. Published in 1921, Psychodiagnostics was not yet a definitive text when Rorschach died the following year. The test won acceptance over time, and by the 1930s it had garnered considerable attention in the United States. The Rorschach Institute was founded in New York in 1939, and Henri Ellenberger, with his biographical essay in 1954, restored Rorschach’s stature and significance. In the United States, although the test was widely criticized from the 1950s and remains a controversial assessment tool, a revision by John Exner in the 1970s brought the Rorschach renewed and continuing attention. In 1919, when the Swiss Society of Psychoanalysis was founded by Oskar Pfister and Emil and Mira Oberholzer, Rorschach was one of its eight members, and served as vice-president. He practiced psychoanalysis with a small number of patients. Training analyses INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ROSENFELD, Eva Maric (1892-1977) were not then required, and Rorschach himself was never analyzed. A selection of Rorschach’s articles was published in Germany in 1965. MuIREILLE CIFALI See also: Psychological tests; Psychology and psychoanalysis; Switzerland (German-speaking). Bibliography Ellenberger, Henri. (1954). Hermann Rorschach, M.D., 1884-1922: A biographical study. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 18 (5), 173-219. Exner, John E., Jr. (1974). The Rorschach: A comprehensive system. New York: John Wiley. Rorschach, Hermann. (1942). Psychodiagnostics: A diagnostic test based on perception. New York: Grune & Stratton. . Gesammelte Aufsdtze. (1965). Bern, Germany: H. Huber, 1965. ROSENFELD, EVA MARIE (1892-1977) The psychoanalyst Eva Rosenfeld was born in Berlin in 1892 and died in Great Britain in 1977. Her father, Theodor Rosenfeld, an impresario and a member of Berlin’s wealthy Jewish bourgeoisie, died in 1907, when she was fifteen, leaving her with a mother who went into mourning until her death in 1942. Shortly after her father’s death, she decided to look after the Zellerhaus, an institution for poor young orphan girls. At the age of seventeen she became engaged to her cousin Valentin, a young lawyer who knew Freud, and having married him in 1911, she moved to Vienna to live. She had three children, the first two of whom, both boys, died of dysentery in 1918. She then created an establishment for adolescent girls in difficulty, which Siegfried Bernfeld recommended to Anna Freud in 1924 when Anna was seeking a home for a patient in difficulty. This was the beginning of a friendship between the two young women that lasted until 1932. In July 1927 the death of her fifteen-year-old daughter, Rosemarie (Madi), in a mountain accident, again drove her to care for children in order to overcome her heartbreak. With the help of Dorothy Burlingham and under the pedagogical and psychoanalytical authority of Anna Freud, she then founded the Burlingham-Rosenfeld Heitzing School, named after the district where the garden of Eva’s house was home to the school. 1513 ROSENFELD, HERBERT ALEXANDER (1910-1986) Encouraged by Anna Freud, she commenced analysis with Freud in March 1929, an analysis that lasted until 1932, of which she later said that the “transference was intense and passionate.” She also exchanged abundant correspondence with Anna while the latter was staying with her father in the clinic at Tegel. Ernst Simmel, who needed help to manage this disorganized clinic, appealed to Rosenfeld in 1931. As bursar, she was in charge of organizing its dissolution. When Eva moved to Berlin, it marked the end of the school and her intense friendship with Anna Freud, which was further accentuated by her departure for Great Britain in 1936. She met Melanie Klein shortly after her arrival in London and, fired with enthusiasm for her personality and her work, she commenced analysis with her in 1938, an analysis that was to last in fits and starts until 1941, when Nein left for Scotland and Rosenfeld went to Oxford. Their relationship ended with a break: “You have sacrificed your analysis for the friendship of Anna Freud!” Eva and Anna, in fact, remained in contact until the very end. There are few details concerning the rest of Rosenfeld’s long life, and her career as an analyst. Throughout her life she remained in contact with Anna Freud, although it was obvious that as soon as she left Vienna her place with Anna was taken by Dorothy Burlingham. ALAIN DE MYOLLA See also: Blos, Peter; Burlingham-Tiffany, Dorothy; Erikson, Erik Homburger; Freud, Anna; Guilbert, Yvette; Hietzing Schule/Burlingham-Rosenfeld School; Tegel (Schloss Tegel). Bibliography Heller, Peter. (1990). A child analysis with Anna Freud. Madison, CT: International Universities Press. . (1992). Anna Freud’s letters to Eva Rosenfeld. Madison, CT: International Universities Press. ROSENFELD, HERBERT ALEXANDER (1910-1986) Psychoanalyst Herbert Alexander Rosenfeld was born in Nuremberg, Germany, on July 2, 1910, and died in London on October 27, 1986. 1514 Rosenfeld came from a middle-class Jewish family. He studied medicine at several German universities and became interested in psychiatry while at Munich University, from which he graduated in 1934. In 1935, due to the anti-Jewish racial laws, Rosenfeld emigrated to England, where he worked in several hospitals after having taken all his medical examinations again in Glasgow. During this period he became interested in the possibility of treating severely psychotic. patients using psychotherapy instead of drugs. In 1942 he began his training analysis with Melanie Klein at the British Psycho-Analytical Society in London. He qualified as an associate member in 1945, became a full member in 1948 and a training analyst in 1949. In 1972 he became a FE. R. C. Psych, fellow of the Royal College of Psychology. For decades until his death, Rosenfeld practiced in London and taught at the Institute of Psycho-Analysis as well as abroad, being particularly interested in the psychoanalytic treatment of psychotic and severely disturbed patients. Together with Wilfred Bion and Hanna Segal, he widened the teaching of Melanie Klein and became a world-wide acknowledged authority in his field. In 1947, using the clinical material from his first training case, he published his first psychoanalytical contribution, “Analysis of a Schizophrenic State of Depersonalisation.” The case became one of the landmarks in the history of the psychoanalytical treatment of psychosis, because it was the first case of an adult psychotic patient being successfully treated by a purely interpretative psychoanalytic method. In this paper Rosenfeld used Klein’s seminal concept of projective identification, which he widened and clarified in successive papers. Another important observation already present in his first paper was that of transference psychosis, which Rosenfeld differentiated from that of transference neuroses in order to describe the massive projection of unconscious fantasies of the psychotic patient on the analyst and the primitive nature of his object relations. Another important paper related to the problems faced in treating psychotic patients was Rosenfeld’s research into what he called “confusional states” (1949). Although mainly related to processes characteristic of chronic schizophrenia, Rosenfeld’s observations help to better understand the problem of the impossibility or difficulty in normal splitting between bad and good aspects of the self and of the external INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS and internal objects which massively characterize chronic schizophrenia but to a certain degree can be found even in less disturbed patients.He collected his first set of papers in 1965 in a book Psychotic States, which soon became a classic. Later, Rosenfeld became increasingly interested in the study and treatment of narcissistic disturbances and personalities. Particularly important is his paper “A Clinical Approach to the Psychoanalytic Theory of the Life and Death Instincts: An Investigation into the Aggressive Aspects of Narcissism,” published in 1971, where he stressed the link between narcissism and the death drive. During the last years of his life Rosenfeld became interested in problems related to the difficulties in communication and the impasse in the psychoanalytic treatment of severely and less severely disturbed patients, and on the role played by the analyst in creating those impasses. (See Impasse and Interpretation, published in 1986.) RICCARDO STEINER See also: Alcoholism; Envy; Infantile psychosis; Narcissism; Projective identification; Paranoid position; Paranoidschizoid position; Psychotic transference; Schizophrenia. Bibliography Green, André. (1976). Un, autre, neutre: Valeurs narcissiques du méme. In Narcissisme de vie, narcissisme de mort (pp 31-79). Paris: Minuit. Kernberg, Otto F. (1989). Impasse and interpretation by Herbert Rosenfeld. International Journal of Psycho- Analysis, 70, 173-177. Segal, Hanna, and Steiner, Riccardo. (1987). H. A. Rosenfeld. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 68, 415-419. Steiner, John. (1993). Psychic retreats. London and New York: Routledge. Steiner, Riccardo. (1989). On narcissism: The Kleinian approach. In Otto F. Kernberg (Ed.), Narcissistic Personality Disorder, vol. 12 (pp. 741-770). Psychiatric Clinics of North America. ROSENTHAL, TATIANA (1885-1921) Tatiana Rosenthal, a Russian psychoanalyst, physician, and specialist in neurology, was born in Saint Petersburg in 1885 and committed suicide there in 1921. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ROSENTHAL, TATIANA (1885-1921) Coming from a Jewish family, she emerged from childhood with an uneasy disposition coupled with a passionate temperament. During the Russian revolution of 1905, she embraced the cause of the workers’ movement. In 1906 she settled in Zurich, where she studied medicine. When she read The Interpretation of Dreams (Freud, 1900a), she was inspired with the idea of combining the ideas of Freud and Marx. After she finished her studies, she moved to Vienna. She became a member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society in 1911, and the following year she began to attend the Wednesday meetings. After the outbreak of World War I, she returned to Saint Petersburg and the Psychoneurological Institute there, devoting considerable energy to interesting Vladimir Bechterev, head of the institute, in psychoanalysis. Fighting to have psychoanalysis used in the education of children, she was a precursor of Vera Schmidt at the Moscow Detski dom (Children’s Home). In 1919 she became director of the polyclinic for the treatment of psychoneuroses attached to Psychoneurological Institute. In 1920 she was appointed director of the clinic for neuropathic children. One year later Rosenthal, mother of a young child, committed suicide. Her death at her own hand becomes less enigmatic when placed in its historical context: Bolshevism, having repressed the workers’ strikes in Saint Petersburg and crushed the Cronstadt uprising, was beginning to show its terrorist face. Her suicide, at the age of thirty-six, may have been the reaction of a personality whose idealism was strained to breaking point. Rosenthal’s only published work is the essay “Stradanie i tvortchestvo v Dostoievskoni” (Suffering and creation in Dostoyevski), published in Russian in 1920 in the journal Voprosi psychologiu litschnosty. The second part of this essay and two other articles, on war neuroses and Alfred Adler’s individual psychology, have never been published. In her Dostoyevski essay, Rosenthal dealt with the psychology of the artist and unconscious influences in the genesis of artistic work. To do so, she had to clarify what psychoanalysis can contribute to understanding works of art. For Rosenthal, certain insufficiently sublimated pathological components of the artist’s psychology detract from artistic works. Dostoyevsky’s three youthful novels are a case in point. ANNA MariA ACCERBONI 1515 Ross, Heten (1890-1978) See also: Germany; Russia/USSR. Bibliography Accerboni-Pavanello, Anna Maria. (1992). ‘Tatiana Rosenthal: Une bréve saison analytique. Revue internationale d’histoire de la psychanalyse, 5, 95-109. Neidisch, S. (1921). Dr Tatiana Rosenthal, Petersburg. Internationale Zeitschrift fiir Psychoanalyse, 7, 384-385. Rosenthal, Tatiana. (1920). Stradanie i tvortchestvo v Dostoievskoni. Voprosy psychologiu litschnosti. ROSS, HELEN (1890-1978) Helen Ross, a psychoanalyst and administrator, was born March 16, 1890, in Independence, Missouri, and died August 10, 1978, in Washington, D.C. One of seven children, Helen Ross was born into a family that highly valued education. Her older brother supported her college education, and after her own graduation from the University of Missouri in 1911, she worked for five years as a school teacher to enable her younger siblings to continue their education. During this period she augmented her income by teaching English to immigrants in a Jewish settlement night school in Kansas City. In 1916 she began graduate work in sociology and economics at Bryn Mawr. Ross gave up her graduate studies, however, at the urging of Pauline Goldmark, one of the famous Goldmark sisters, whose sister Alice was married to Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, to accept a job as a field agent for the U.S. Railroad Administration, whose women’s division was headed by Pauline Goldmark. For two years she traveled all over the United States, investigating the working conditions of women working on the railroads and, she emphasized in a memoir, making sure they were getting equal pay for equal work. In 1914 she and an older sister established a summer camp for girls in Michigan, which they ran together for the next thirty-four years. Ross later wrote that the constant contact with “the everyday problems of normal children” sharpened her interest in human development and made her eager to deepen her understanding of personality development. This led her to an interest in psychoanalysis, and in 1929, at the urging of Franz Alexander who had recently arrived in Chicago, she went to Vienna. There she was analyzed by Helene Deutsch and began a lifelong friendship and 1516 collaboration with Anna Freud. In particular, Ross was instrumental in the establishment of the Hampstead Clinic through her efforts to secure ongoing financial support for the clinic from the Marshall Field Foundation in Chicago. She also assisted in the translation of August Aichhorn’s Wayward Youth. After returning to Chicago in 1934, she began a private practice and acted as a consultant to a number of social agencies. She also wrote a newspaper column, About Our Children, for the Chicago Sun-Times. Ross used her influence as a consultant to social welfare agencies and her newspaper column to convey in clear and intelligent language the insights of psychoanalysis to teachers, social workers, and parents. In 1942 she began a fourteen-year tenure as the administrative director of the Chicago Psychoanalytic Institute. In 1956, at the request of the American Psychoanalytic Association, she and Bertram D. Lewin undertook an extensive survey of the training programs of seventeen American psychoanalytic institutes. The resulting book, Psychoanalytic Education in the United States (1960), reviewed, among other topics, the history of psychoanalytic education, presented a detailed analysis of candidates in training and how they were selected, analyzed curriculums for both adult and child analysis programs, and discussed the role of the teaching and supervising analyst’ in psychoanalytic training. The thoroughness of their survey, combined with its dispassionate tone, created a climate that allowed many institutes to closely examine and make changes in their educational programs. This was a considerable achievement and the success of the survey probably owes something as well to the deep respect and affection that their colleagues felt for Ross and Lewin. After completing this project Ross moved to Washington, D.C., and became a faculty member and supervising child analyst of the Washington Psychoanalytic Institute, and also served as a psychoanalytic consultant, teacher, and supervisor at other institutes. Helen Ross’s contributions to psychoanalysis as a supervisor, writer, consultant, and administrator were considerable. Anna Freud, in a touching letter to one of Ross’s sisters after her death, described her own sense of deep loss by gracefully noting the personal qualities that made Ross such a formidable and beloved figure. “For me it means that something inexpressibly precious has gone and will never come again. Helen’s rare combination of goodness and cleverness, firmness and gentleness, tolerance and sharpness of INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS judgment, friendship and undemandingness was hers alone. I hope she knew how much not only I, but many other people felt about her.” These personal qualities were accompanied by an indomitable intellectual curiosity and a determination that took her from the Midwest of Missouri and Kansas east to Bryn Mawr and finally to Europe and Vienna, where she found her vocation in one of the most vibrant intellectual movements of the twentieth century. NELutE L. THOMPSON Bibliography Hunter, Doris. (1979). Helen Ross 1890-1978. The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 48, 465-469. Ross, Helen. (1951). Fears of children. Chicago: Science Research Associates. Ross, Helen, and Lewin, Bertram D. (1960). Psychoanalytic education in the United States. New York: W. W. Norton. Thompson, Nellie. (2001). American women psychoanalysts 1911-1941. Annual of Psychoanalysis, 29, 161-177. RUBINSTEIN, BENJAMIN B. (1905-1989) American physician Benjamin B. Rubinstein was born on December 3, 1905, in Helsinki and died on December 7, 1989, in New York City. He grew up in a warm, moderately affluent family of Finnish Jews. After attending a gymnasium in Copenhagen, he graduated from the University of Helsinki Medical School in 1936. He worked as an undergraduate research assistant to the neurophysiologist Ragnar Granit, gaining a lasting appreciation of scientific research and neurophysiology. His residency in psychiatry and neurology, begun in London, was interrupted by military service in the Finno-Russian wars, and completed at the University Hospital, Helsinki, in 1947. In 1940 he married Dinorah Rosenthal (who later became a well-known photographer). David Rapaport recruited him as a psychiatric research fellow at the Menninger Foundation (Topeka, Kansas) in 1947. From 1948 to 1953, he was a staff psychiatrist and received psychoanalytic training. On graduating he moved to New York, where he remained in private practice until his death. He and his wife became American citizens in 1957; they had no children. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS RUBINSTEIN, BENJAMIN B. (1905-1989) Rubinstein had strong interest and talents in music, poetry, and the theater, having been an actor and composer, principally of songs. He held teaching positions at the Albert Einstein College of Medicine and at Bronx Municipal Hospital Center, and served as a consultant to the Research Center for Mental Health, NYU. For several years, with Hartvig Dahl, he led a research seminar on clinical inference at the New York Psychoanalytic Society. { Because of the traumatic reception of his first psychoanalytic paper in 1952 ( on the psychoanalytic concept of sexuality), he was slow to attempt other publication. He began with a paper on “Psychoanalytic Theory and the Mind-Body Problem” (chapter 1 of the Collected Papers of Benjamin B. Rubinstein; 1997). His final published work was “The Experience of Tragedy, Expectations, and the Moral Order” (chapter 17). All but a few discussions of papers were collected in a posthumous volume, plus several previously unpublished manuscripts. Rubinstein had no peer among working clinical psychoanalysts in his expert grasp of the philosophy of science and his ability to apply it to psychoanalysis. His contributions to the juncture of these disciplines were warmly appreciated by such outstanding philosophers of science as Adolf Grunbaum (University of Pittsburgh) and Robert Cohen (Boston University). He contributed to the training and inspired the work of philosophers (Robert Shope), psychoanalysts (Hartvig Dahl, Emanuel Peterfreund), and psychologists (Morris N. Eagle, Robert R. Holt) alike, though his works and via informal seminars on psychoanalytic theory. His unpublished first paper anticipated many of the most cogent criticisms of Freud’s metapsychology that have appeared in the past four decades. His clarification of the clinical theory, its basic assumptions, and its hierarchical organization makes it more easily convertible into a workable, cumulative, and testable scientific theory. Rubinstein was first to demonstrate the probabilistic nature of the theory’s propositions, with profound implications for its verification— for example, Karl Popper’s model of testability is shown to be inapplicable. It is difficult to predict the eventual impact of his work, but if psychoanalysis makes major progress toward becoming a true science it will have been made possible as much by his work as by that of anyone else. Rosert R. Hout 1517 Russia/USSR See also: Psychoanalytic epistemology; Science and psychoanalysis. Bibliography Rubinstein, Benjamin B. (1997). Psychoanalysis and the philosophy of science. In Robert R. Holt (Ed.), Collected papers of Benjamin B. Rubinstein, M.D. Madison, CT: International Universities Press. RUSSIA/USSR Psychoanalysis was introduced into Russia in 1905 when Nikolai Osipov (1877-1934) returned to Moscow after training with Carl G. Jung, about the same time as Moshe Wulff (1878-1971) settled in Odessa after studying with Karl Abraham. Like their teachers, neither man underwent a personal analysis. Osipov and psychiatrist Osip Feltzman carried out the first psychoanalytically-based treatments and taught Freudian theory at a university clinic directed by Vladimir Serbski who, although critical of the significance accorded sexuality in psychoanalysis, recognized therapeutic successes of the approach. Near the beginning of the First World War, Sigmund Freud (1914d) wrote: “In Russia, psychoanalysis has become generally known and has spread widely; almost all my writings, as well as those of other adherents of analysis, have been translated into Russian. But a really penetrating comprehension of analytic theories has not yet been evinced in Russia; so that the contributions of Russian physicians are at present not very notable. The only trained analyst there is M. Wulff who practices in Odessa” (p. 33). That Wulff was considered an exception is explained by the quality of his publications in German; he was also the chief translator of Freud’s works into Russian. Among the early Russian analysts, Wulff and Sabina Spielrein (1882-1941) produced the most innovative clinical and theoretical work, but they wrote in German. Spielrein’s important paper, “Destruction as the Cause of Becoming,” influenced Freud’s development of the theory of the death instinct. Articles by Osipov and Alexander Luria (1902-1977) discussed applied psychoanalysis while revealing their authors’ lack of training and clinical experience. The advent of the communist regime after the 1917 revolution upset the development of psychoanalysis, 1518 both ideologically and institutionally. The Communist Party, with Nietzschian aspirations to create the “new man,” at first lent its indispensable imprimatur to the creation of the Russian Psychoanalytic Society in 1922, presided over by Serbski’s successor at the State Psychoanalytic Institute, Ivan Ermakov. These organizations shared offices in a beautifully appointed Art Nouveau mansion in Moscow. Following in the footsteps of Tatiana Rosenthal, who in 1911 had introduced psychoanalysis to St. Petersburg, Vera Schmidt (1889-1937), a physician and pedagogue, opened a psychoanalytic “children’s home” (Detski Dom) in 1921. In 1922 her husband, Otto J. Schmidt (1891-1956), although a mathematician, began to supervise the Psychological and Psychoanalytic Library, an imprint of the State Publishing House; he made possible the publication in Russian of Freud’s works. In spite of such developments, conflicts inside the Soviet Union proved lethal for analysis both as a profession and a psychological theory even as it gained international recognition. Although at the Berlin Congress in 1922 Freud seemed pleased with progress, Ernest Jones was more cautious, especially as regards the Moscow group; he supported a group based in Kazan and headed by Luria. The International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA) requested that the Russian Society have at least two “instructors”; Spielrein thus returned to Moscow from Switzerland, joining Wulff, who had been in the city since 1919. The Kazan group relocated to Moscow and the IPA recognized the Russian Society at the Salzburg Congress in 1924. But all was not well from the start. Osipov had already fled communism to settle in Prague, and after just eighteen months in Moscow, Spielrein retired to her birthplace, Rostov-on-Don, where she and her family met a tragic end at the hands of the Nazis during World War II. In 1927, Luria turned to neuropsychology and Wulff fled to Berlin. By the end of the 1920s, when physicians were compelled to solemnly renounce private practice, training analyses were no longer available in the Soviet Union. The Russian Psychoanalytic Society, which formally existed until 1933, was vitally dependant upon the whims of various “red professors” who were controlled by the Communist Party; this would have made training with Wulff or Spielrein impossible in any event. This situation went unappreciated by Wilhelm Reich INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS when he visited Russia in 1929 under the auspices of the IPA. Reich paid no attention to Wulff and Spielrein; he was instead duped by the communist professors to such an extent that he reported that analysts occupied important posts in the Soviet Union. Psychoanalysis required the approbation of the Communist Party, and initially received it most especially from the revolutionary leader Leon Trotsky. The fortunes of analysts in the Soviet Union declined upon Trotsky’s fall from grace and political exile to Alma- Ata (now Almaty, Kazakhstan) in 1928, shortly before the Psychoanalytic Institute closed its doors and the Psychoanalytic Society became inoperative. In 1930, a year after Trotsky was exiled from the Soviet Union altogether, all psychoanalytic publications stopped. Otto Schmidt had not awaited the inevitable; he retrained to become a noted Arctic scientist and explorer. In Civilization and Its Discontents (1930a [1929]) Freud commented, apropos Russian communism: “One only wonders, with concern, what the Soviets will do once they have wiped out their bourgeois” (p. 115). In 1931, the great proletarian writer Maxim Gorky (1868-1936) settled into Ryabushinsky Mansion, where Stalin met with him and famously called writers “engineers of human souls.” Freud’s works were consigned to “special storage” in public libraries; they might be consulted, but propagation of Freudian ideas was in this way greatly limited. The Cold War saw development of a powerfully anti-psychoanalytic establishment in the Soviet Union. In 1950, at the Pavlov Conference, sponsored by the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Academy of Medical Sciences, psychoanalytic concepts were criticized in a welter of attacks, with many participants obliged to repent for having previously voiced positive comments about analysis. The official anti-psychoanalytic stance was modified somewhat three decades later when, at the end of East-West detente, participants at the Tbilisi Congress, held in Georgia in 1979, promoted a theory of “unconscious behavior” proposed by the Georgian experimental psychologist Dmitri Uznadze (1887— 1950). The congress was preceded by publication of three long volumes on “the unconscious” that included a significant number of articles by Western authors such as André Green and Daniel Widlocher; these texts, however, were not translated into Russian. For fear of ideological manipulation and compro- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS RussiaA/USSR mise, well-known psychoanalysts from the IPA did not attend, although Leon Chertok and others, and especially Lacanians such as Serge Leclaire, accepted the invitation in the hope of starting a dialogue that was expected to be difficult in any event due to linguistic and political barriers. The Western articles were not included in the fourth volume, which appeared in 1985, concerning “Results of the Discussion.” Some present-day Russian analysts consider the Tbilisi Congress the first step in the renewal of Russian psychoanalysis. During perestroika, from 1985 to 1991, Russians were allowed to organize psychoanalytic meetings. In 1987, a first encounter with French analysts from the Institute of the Freudian Field took place in Moscow, followed by meetings with representatives of the School of the Freudian Cause. In 1988, a meeting seems also to have taken place with representatives of the American Psychoanalytic Association. Two new academic societies were created, the members of which almost all belonged to the Society of Moscow Psychoanalysts. The Franco-Soviet Group of the Freudian Field, founded in 1988, became the Russian Circle of the European School of Psychoanalysis from 1991 until 1995; its orientation was Lacanian and it was established without official statutes or stable direction. The Soviet Psychoanalytic Society, founded in 1989 and in 1991 renamed the Russian Psychoanalytical Association, did have official statutes and was presided over by Aron Belkin (1927-2003), who had a special interest in the social uses of psychoanalysis. The IPA welcomed Belkin at its congresses in Rome in 1989 and in Buenos Aires in 1991, and gave his group the special status of guest study group. The historic events of August 1991, during which Russia separated from the Soviet Union (which itself was dissolved several months later), created prospects for travel and genuine psychoanalytic training. Thus, in 1992, Pavel Katchalov was able to undergo a personal analysis and training in Paris, helped by a grant from the French government and an alliance between Hopital Esquirol in Saint-Maurice, a suburb of Paris, and the Serbski Center in Moscow. Alexander Khostov, of Lomonosov University, and Victoria Potapova traveled to Paris in 1994. All three joined the Paris Psychoanalytical Institute; others followed _ suit. When, in 1995, Lola Komarova left to train in London, it was the end of the Russian Psychoanalytical Association. Some former members, decided to create 1519 Rycrort, CHARLES FREDERICK (1914-1998) a new group following an IPA curriculum, the Moscow Society of Psychoanalysts. Several of its members had classical or shuttle analysis; the French influence was dominant. Since 1995, an annual Franco-Russian debate has been held every fall by Katchalov and Hervé Benhamou, a member of the Paris Psychoanalytic Society, with the support of the French Embassy. The Moscow Psychoanalytic Society was founded due to Boris Kravtsov, who in the 1970s ran a psychoanalytic seminar that was attended by a number of psychologists, including Pavel Snejnevsky, Julia Alyoshina, and Sergei Agrachev. In 1988 he established a psychoanalytic section of the Association of Practicing Psychologists, and by 1990 contacts were established with IPA members in the United States, Germany, the Netherlands, and the Czech Republic, where several members were trained. Alyoshina and Snejnevsky were trained in the United States and decided to remain there. In 1995, this group became the Moscow Psychoanalytic Society, over which Agrachev presided until his death in 1998, promoting a training program for psychoanalysts with IPA support. Publications of this group soon included translations of works by Otto Kernberg, the three volumes of the Modern Psychoanalysis by Helmut Thoma and Horst Kachele, and Melanie Klein’s Envy and Gratitude. The institute’s subsequent director, Igor Kadyrov, was the first Russian to be elected a direct member of the IPA; he was trained by shuttle analysis, as were the other members of the society, which by 2004 included six members of the IPA. In 1998 the St. Petersburg Society of Child Psychoanalysis was founded, the result of productive exchanges between psychoanalysts at the Anna Freud Centre in London and a Russian group that included Svetlana Chaeva and Nima Vasilieva, the society’s president at that time. Problems of quackery and imposture have plagued recent psychoanalysis in Russia. Institutes and societies of dubious origin have sprung up throughout the country, which train ersatz therapists without personal analysis, “certifying” them to take profitable advantage of psychosocial misery. With the decree of June 19, 1996, concerning “the revival and development of philosophic psychoanalysis, clinical and applied,” President Boris Yeltsin made possible establishment of the controversial East European Institute of Psychoanalysis in St. Petersburg. The Russian intelligentsia and general public alike have grown more distrustful of 1520 untrained or quack psychoanalysts. As a countermeasure, the two Moscow Institutes have combined forces to provide training and to improve awareness through yearly psychoanalytic seminars. ALEXANDRE MIKHALEVITCH Bibliography — Angelini, Alberto. (1988). La psicanalisi in Russia: dai Percursori ali anni trenta. Naples: Liguori Editore. Freud, Sigmund. (1914d). On the history of the psychoanalytic movement. SE, 14: 1-66. . (1930a [1929]). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21: 57-145. Katchalov, Pavel. (1994). Historiques des méthodes psychothérapiques dans l’ancienne URSS. Journal de psychiatrie, 7, 102-104. Marti, Jean. (1976). La psychanalyse en Russie et en Union Sovietique. Critique, 32, 199-236. Miller, Martin. (1998). Freud and the Bolsheviks: Psychoanalysis in imperial Russia and the Soviet Union. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. RYCROFT, CHARLES FREDERICK (1914-1998) Psychoanalyst and psychiatrist Charles Frederick Rycroft was born on September, 9, 1914, in Basingstoke, England, and died on May, 24, 1998, in London. Rycroft grew up in Hampshire. His father, Sir Richard, was a country squire and the fifth Baronet in a family that traced its ancestry to before the Norman Conquest. When Charles was eleven his father died, and an elder half-brother succeeded to the title and the estate. Charles was educated at Wellington College, and then Trinity College, Cambridge, from which he graduated with honors in 1936 in economics and history. Charles had briefly been a Communist at Cambridge, where the Bloomsbury analyst Karin Stephen encouraged him to apply for psychoanalytic training. Ernest Jones thought that Charles should become a qualified physician; accordingly he started his psychoanalytic and medical training in 1937. He was analyzed first by Ella Sharpe, and after her death by Sylvia Payne. He finally qualified in medicine in 1945. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS For almost three decades Rycroft was the leading intellectual force in independent British psychoanalytic circles. Within the British Psychoanalytic Society he became an associate member in 1949, a full member in 1952, and a training analyst in 1954. He was joint librarian (1952-54) with Masud Khan, served on the editorial board of the International Journal of Psychoanalysis (1953-54), and was scientific secretary (1956— 59). He began to write reviews and essays for The Observer and The New York Review of Books, and beginning in 1965 started to withdraw from the British Society. Rycroft was bored and alienated by the longstanding ideological quarrels within the British Society. Nonetheless he analyzed such notable figures as R. D. Laing, Peter Lomas, and Alan Tyson, in addition to a series of eminent people within British intellectual life. He also became one of the most well-known public expositors on psychoanalytic matters, best known for his A Critical Dictionary of Psychoanalysis (1968) and his book The Innocence of Dreams (1979). He remained in private practice until a week before he died. Rycroft’s special contribution to psychoanalysis stemmed directly from his being broadly welleducated and cultured. Out of his aristocratic background he succeeded in being a distinctive and original voice. He always stressed the constructive power of imagination, and he tried to steer clear of the reductionism and negativism that characterized so much of the early psychoanalytic thinking. Psychoanalysis belonged, he felt, within the humanities and moral sciences, not the natural sciences. He felt particularly inspired by the examples of Donald Winnicott and Erik Erikson, both of whom he considered kindred spirits. Rycroft took a special interest in the problem of creativity, and wrote on how analysts tended to rely on the “ablation” of their biological pasts, substituting instead their lineage in analytic training. The illusion of having created oneself was, he proposed, a defensive reaction characteristic of analysts, an ahistorical or INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Rycrort, CHARLES Freperick (1914-1998) anti-historical tendency that could be good individually but was not desirable for the field as a whole. Idealizations of the training analysis and the so-called apostolic succession follow from such use of ablation. Ablation as a concept can help understand why it has unfortunately been so often a case of lese-majesté to talk about Freud—who had his own difficulties acknowledging his antecedents—within the regular categories of intellectual history. Rycroft’s spiritual daring was in a sense an extension of Freud’s own historic independence, even though that common trait had inevitably to lead in different directions. Rycroft, widely acknowledged for his general brilliance, represented the best tradition of British free-thinking within psychoanalysis. He not only interpreted dreams independently of Freud, but took an individual slant on Freud’s whole legacy. Rycroft expressed himself in careful, understated prose that is rewarding for its subtleties. PauL ROAZEN See also: Creativity; Dream; Great Britain; Internal/external reality; Reich, Wilhelm. Bibliography Rycroft, Charles (Ed.). (1967). Psychoanalysis observed. New York: Coward. . (1968). Anxiety and neurosis. London: Allen Lane. . (1968). A critical dictionary of psychoanalysis. London: Nelson. -. (1968). Imagination and reality. London: Hogarth Press. . (1971). Wilhelm Reich. New York: Viking. . (1979). The Innocence of dreams. London: Hogarth Press. . (1985). Psychoanalysis and beyond. London: Chatto. . (1991). Viewpoints. London: Hogarth. 1521 ti oe a, ee — ae eee « Aca 2 - pe ee be och a apomne ieecangt _ Ve $ Spegs mcnnerdty pee ring ca iow Ewalt ae iaensten eh S00: acaba des i Soe (: a Se... at obra ARE, en te on ee ed ee BiG ns cop Da,a ry eh cheer) oe Be Fees rn Ra Ji we ain e ae "yugr ay sal ae i) ¥ _< aa ; eis pan Sit etthss ~~ s.¥ _ eee r a) ARNG La or vd slg ore = a ines ABD dys Wem ° OTOL yar a Se ee cwsttone tl) neither 9 biea e Ch ciel tae af 4 Oe ss 7 ee i. Go MUSICK a cuekidemanee epnegrer ioeeenraitennre se wieriaa babea 5 epa id , tete en ns? Privy i Vtowwt: [eaten Wh bii bihiesb: asesa na SACHS, HANNS (1881-1947) The Austrian psychoanalyst and doctor of law Hanns Sachs was born on January 10, 1881 in Vienna and died on January 10, 1947 in Boston. Sachs was the son of a Jewish lawyer whose family roots were in Bohemia. After studying law at the University of Vienna, he earned his doctorate in 1904 and began to practice as a lawyer. The same year was marked by the determining experience of his life, his reading of Sigmund Freud’s The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), which made a very strong impression on him. He made contact with Freud and, in 1909, was admitted to the Wednesday society. He then participated in the “Committee,” the limited circle of the first psychoanalysts around Freud. Sachs had artistic and literary gifts. He translated Rudyard Kipling’s poems into German, and had a sustained interest in the possibilities of applying the views and methods of psychoanalysis to cultural phenomena. Together with Otto Rank, with whom he was closely linked until Rank’s break with Freudian psychoanalysis, he published The Significance of Psychoanalysis for the Mental Sciences (1913), and co-directed the journal Imago, created the previous year, whose title Sachs himself had chosen with reference to Carl Spitteler’s 1906 novel. In 1918 Sachs abandoned his legal practice to become a professional analyst in Ziirich. In 1920 he became a training analyst at the Berliner Psychoanalystiches Institut (BPI; Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute) headed by Karl Abraham. The analysts who trained with him included, notably, Franz Alexander, Michael Balint, Erich Fromm, Rudolf Lowenstein, and Karen Horney. In 1932, anticipating the full magnitude of political developments, he left Germany and emigrated to the United States. He taught at the Harvard Medical School in Boston, where he was one of the few analysts without a degree in medicine. Despite his authority as a training analyst in the Boston Psychoanalytic Society (BoPS), and despite the esteem in which he was held as someone close to Freud, his role was not universally accepted, mainly because of the issue of lay analysis. In 1939, following in the footsteps of the Austrian journal, he founded American Imago, which is still published today. He died on January 10, 1947, on his sixty-sixth birthday, in Boston. Sachs always showed himself to be a loyal disciple of Freud. His Freud: Master and Friend (1944) presents a portrait of Freud that is dominated by loyalty, respect, and sympathy. In his presentations on clinical analysis, dealing with various themes, he always remained within the framework of Freudian theory. In works intended for the general public, such as Zur Menschenkenntnis: Ein psypsychoanalytischer Wegweiser fiir den Umgang mit sich selbst und anderen (Contribution to the knowledge of man: psychoanalytic guide to relations with oneself and others, 1936), he attempted to popularize psychoanalysis. He and Abraham advised Georg Wilhelm Pabst on Mysteries of a Soul (1926), a cinematic translation of Freud’s world and ideas. Sachs took an interest in all realms—political, social, cultural, and, in particular, literary—whose understanding he believed could be enhanced by psychoanalysis. He wrote essays on Otto von Bismarck, the psychoanalysis of films, and kitsch. In 1930 he published a historical psychoanalysis of the Roman emperor Caligula, entitled Bubi Caligula (Little Caligula). He was also interested in Shakespeare, Schiller, and Baudelaire, among others. 1523 SanGer, Isipor Isaak (1867-1942?) In Gemeinsame Tagtriume (Collective daydreams), published in 1924, Sachs developed a remarkable theory of literary creation that even today remains under-appreciated. Its argument is as follows: The determining factor is not talent or the individual effort of the artist, but rather the social character of the work. Sachs saw literary production first and foremost as a social performance: Literature, he argued, creates a social bond in the form of a recognized discourse, in which the unconscious and the repressed, which cannot express themselves otherwise, come into language. The condition for this is the literary form of the work of art, which he interpreted as a social compromise in which repressed instinctual needs are worked through. This theory of the work of art as a collective daydream was further reworked in his later works. His last book, Masks of Love and Life, published posthumously in 1948, broadens these conceptions by considering philosophical problems in the light of psychoanalysis. REINER WILD See also: American Imago; Applied psychoanalysis and the interaction of; Berliner Psychoanalystisches Institut; Cinema criticism; Cinema and psychoanalysis; Germany, history of psychoanalysis in; Imago. Zeitschrift fiir die Anwendung der Psychoanalyse; Imago Publishing Company; Secrets of a Soul; Visual arts and psychoanalysis; Secret Committee; Sociéte psychanalytique de Paris and Institut de psychanalyse; Training analysis; Wiener psychoanalytische Vereinigung; World War I. Bibliography Moellenhoff, Fritz. (1966). Hanns Sachs, 1881-1947: the creative unconscious. In Psychoanalytic pioneers. (FE. Alexander, S. Eisenstein, and M. Grotjahn, Eds.) New York and London: Basic Books. Sachs, Hanns. (1924). Gemeinsame tagtraume. Berlin, Leipzig, and Vienna: Internationaler psychoanalytischer Verlag. . (1942). The creative unconscious: Studies in the psychoanalysis of art. Cambridge, MA: Sci-Arts Publishers. . (1948). Masks of love and life: The philosophical basis of psychoanalysis. (A. A. Roback, Ed.) Cambridge, MA: Sci-Arts Publishers. Sachs, Hanns, and Otto Rank. (1916). The significance of psychoanalysis for the mental sciences. (Charles R. Payne, Trans.) New York: Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Co. 1524 SADGER, ISIDOR ISAAK (1867-19427) Austrian physician and psychoanalyst Isidor Isaak Sadger was born in Neuzandec, in Galicia, on December 29, 1867, and died, probably in a Nazi concentration camp, during the Second World War. An important figure in early psychoanalysis, Sadger began his career as a specialist in nervous diseases who, in 1894, began publishing a series of articles on psychophysiology. One such article, which vaunted the discoveries of Paul Flechsig (who would become physician to Daniel Paul Schreber), was noted when Freud, after reading it, dreamed of the sentence: “It’s written in a positive style” (1900a, p. 296). A proponent of degeneracy theory, Sadger defined this hereditarian concept as an abnormal reaction of the central nervous system, and he investigated its incidence in the lives of significant writers. In his early writings, Sadger alluded to Freud in discussions of hysteria. He also appears to have attended some of Freud’s university lectures in the late 1890s, about the time he began to practice the various neuropsychiatric therapies. In addition to employing the degeneracy concept, Sadger also evinced considerable interest in Freud’s seduction theory. In 1906, Sadger joined the group of analysts then gathering around Freud. His disregard for psychoanalytic conventions with patients earned him the disdain of colleagues; he took notes in shorthand during sessions and published them. However, he was regarded by Freud as a “good worker” for his varied research and particularly for his contributions concerning narcissism and homosexuality. Some of Sadger’s publications were devoted to the medico-legal defense of homosexuality, and he analyzed homosexuals with a view to curing “perversion.” Such patients had to promise—indeed, certify—that they would undergo treatment even if the law did not punish their sexual behavior, and to admit that they possibly already had experienced some feeling for the opposite sex (Sadger, 1908). From these analyses emerged an etiology. The homosexual had a dominating mother and weak, sometimes absent father. Sadger regularly claimed that his homosexual patients recovered childhood memories of a precocious love for a woman, most often the mother. Sadger’s biography of Heinrich von Kleist, published in 1910, took up this theme. While Freud accepted this discovery, and made INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS use of it in his study of Leonardo da Vinci (Freud, 1910c), he rejected most of Sadger’s ideas about narcissism (Sadger, 1908). Sadger was the first Viennese analyst to employ the term “narcissism,” bringing together Wilhelm Fliess’s theory of bisexuality and the word “Narzismuss” which had been invented by Paul Niacke about 1899. He developed a theory of the ontogenesis of sexuality based on the concept of childhood seduction, in which sexuality manifested by the adult toward the child is taken up by the child and transformed into a closed circle of adoration. By contrast, Freud created a theory of narcissism in which the role of the object remains to a great extent concealed (Vichyn, 1984). Sadger ended his work with, and his participation in, the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society about 1930. He may have written a biography of Freud but the manuscript has never been found. Sadger alone among Viennese analysts was either unable or unwilling to profit from his relationship with Freud in order to escape Austria after the German annexation in 1938. He died in the Theresienstadt camp in about 1942. AUTHOR NAME See also: Applied psychoanalysis and the interaction of psychoanalysis; Heterosexuality; Homosexuality; Lehrinstitut der Wiener psychoanalytischen Vereinigung; “On Narcissism: An Introduction”. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. Part I, SE, 4: 1-338. The interpretation of dreams. Part II, SE, 5: 339-625. . (1910c). Leonardo da Vinci and a memory of his childhood. SE, 11: 57-137. Nunberg, Hermann and Federn, Ernst. (1962-75). Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. New York: International Universities Press. Sadger, Isidor. (1908). Psychiatrisch-Neurologisches in psychanalytischer Beleuchtung. (Psychiatry and neurology in the light of psychoanalysis). Zentralblatt fur das Gesamtgebiet der Medizin und ihrer Hilfswissenschaften, 7-8. . (1910). Ein fall von multipler perversion. (A case of multiple perversion). Jahrbuch fiir psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen, 2. . (1921). Die lehre von den geschlechtsverirrungen (Psychopathia sexualis), auf psychoanalytischer grundlage. Leipzig-Vienna: F. Deuticke. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SADISM Vichyn, Bertrand. (1984). Naissance des concepts: autoérotisme et narcissism. Psychanalyse a l Université, 936. SADISM Sadism is pleasure derived from inflicting cruelty on another person. Richard von Krafft-Ebing coined the term in reference to the writings of the Marquis de Sade. In “Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality” (1905d) Sigmund Freud described sadism as the active form in a pair of opposites, masochism being the passive form of the same sexual perversion. Two pregenital libidinal phases are described, the oral-sadistic (or cannibalistic) stage, and the analsadistic stage, which remains active during later libidinal development. During the genital stage sadism becomes linked with the masculine position, owing to the active character of both. In neurotic organization, particularly of the obsessional type, sadism plays an important part, both as an instinctual impulse to be repressed, and because of the ambivalence of the instinctual investment. The case of the “Rat Man,” related in “Notes Upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis” (1909d) is particularly illustrative of sadism, as is the case of the “Wolf Man,” described in “From the History of an Infantile Neurosis” (1918b [1914]), which shows that the child often interprets the primal scene as sadistic. Sexual sadism is propped analytically on certain developmental events: the coming in of the teeth during the oral stage, during which satisfaction coincides with destruction of the object; mastery of the anal sphincter muscles; and muscular development that brings the genitalia under the control of reproductive functions. Freud in addition took into account from the outset a nonsexual type of aggression, in which a need to eliminate an obstacle to instinctual satisfaction also allows the instinct for mastery to be satisfied. Thus, as he wrote in “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes” (1915c): “Psycho-analysis would appear to show that the infliction of pain plays no part among the original purposive actions of the instinct. A sadistic child takes no account of whether or not he inflicts pain, nor does he intend to do so” (p. 128). It is in this article that Freud gave his most complete account, within the framework of the first theory of the instincts, of the links between sadism and masochism. Sadism, first, can be transformed into masochism by 1525 SADOMASOCHISM means of a double reversal, wherein activity is transformed into passivity and the subject is substituted for the object. The same outcome is found in the other pair of opposites described, voyeurism and exhibitionism. Nevertheless, Freud noted that the sexual sadistic component presupposes a prior knowledge of masochism, and that it therefore entails the following contradiction: “The enjoyment of pain would thus be an aim which was originally masochistic, but which can only become an instinctual aim in someone who was originally sadistic” (p. 129). This contradiction was resolved in 1924 in “The Economic Problem of Masochism,” in which Freud confirmed his earlier intuition from “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” (1920g) of a masochism that could be primary. He posited an erotogenic primary masochism that binds the part of the death instinct remaining within the organism. Sadism in effect results from the diversion outward, through the intermediary of the musculature, of the libidinally bound destructive instinct onto objects. “It is appropriate, then, to call it the destructive instinct, the instinct for mastery, the will to power. Part of this instinct is directly placed in the service of the sexual function, where it has an important function to fill. This is sadism, properly speaking.” Even in his second version accompanying the introduction of the death instinct, Freud allowed for consideration of sadism in a broad and not necessarily sexual sense, as representing the destructive instinct directed outwards toward the objects. Analysts who deem it, unnecessary to adhere to the second theory of the instincts are thus justified in equating sadism and destructiveness, all the more so in that anality, for all its abundant potential for instinctual erotization, also lends itself to the metaphorization, by means of fecalization, of the most radical forms of deanimation (Béla Grunberger). Some authors, such as Jean Bergeret, have even maintained that sadism exists as a fundamental narcissistic violence, well before the emergence of sexuality is clinically revealed in narcissistic structures, and that it is inaccurate to describe it in terms of objects, even pregenital ones. Paul Denis has reassessed the element of mastery present in any instinct, with respect to the aim of satisfaction. Like Karl Abraham, whom Freud also followed in his conceptualization of sadism and the libidinal stages, Melanie Klein adopted the second theory of the instincts and their dualism, but in her clinical work 1526 she focused on sadism as the main expression of the destructive impulse, giving it considerable and early importance. Its turning back against the subject is what puts him or her in danger. Other authors, such as André Green and Benno Rosenberg, have taken further Freud’s conception of the fusion of life and death instincts prior to any sadism, which thus becomes a projected masochism, and accordingly they see sadism as a protection against the threat of the death instinct and its deobjectivizing aim, particularly in borderline states in which primary anality (Green) intervenes against disintegration and its destructive consequences (Rosenberg). In such a view, sadism protects the individual just as masochism does, but with a more secure external object. This is not always the case, however, since in melancholia incorporation of the object endangers the subject’s life and illustrates the threat of the superego’s sadism toward the ego, which is also present, in a less severe form, in self-punishment. Denys RIBAS See also: Allergy, Ambivalence; Anality; Childhood; Compulsion; Cruelty; Dipsomania; Eroticism, anal; Eroticism, urethral; Hatred; Imago; Infantile sexual curiosity; Jouissance (Lacan); Kantianism and psychoanalysis; Masochism; Mastery; Mastery, instinct for; Melancholia; “Notes upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis” (Rat Man); Object, change of/choice of; Organization; Phallic mother; Phobias in children; Pregenital; Primal scene; Psychosexual development; Reaction-formation; Rite and ritual; Sadomasochism; Stage (or phase); Stammering; Tics; Ulcerative colitis; “Vagina dentata,” fantasy of; Violence, instinct of. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123-243. . (1915c). Instincts and their vicissitudes. SE, 14: 109-140. . (1924). The economic problem of masochism. SE, 19: 155-70. SADOMASOCHISM Sadism and masochism represent contrasting forms of pleasure derived from sexual excitation linked to cruelty and the infliction of pain. While both currents INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS are present in any given individual, they also represent pregenital links in an intersubjective context in which one partner is the sadist and the other the masochist. Sadomasochism may have an oral component but takes on characteristic form during the anal sadistic stage. In Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d), Freud pointed out that sadism and masochism, terms that first gained currency in the work of Richard Krafft-Ebing, “are habitually found together in the same individual” and “occur together regularly as pairs of opposites” (pp. 159-60). Freud eventually generalized this dynamic to psychic structures as a whole, when he posited the relations governing the mental agencies in his second topography. Thus the superego’s sadism toward the ego figures prominently in the idea of self-punishment and moral masochism. Sadomasochism may also characterize relationships between individuals, regardless of gender, and even if the context is a normal sexual relationship. Sadomasochism may be viewed as a regression in the face of castration anxiety, provoked by the oedipal conflict and associated with the perception of the anatomical differences between the sexes. This interplay can be seen in cases of obsessional neurosis—for example, with the “Rat Man” in “Notes upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis” (1909d). Freud also found sadomasochistic aspects to the oedipally tinged autoerotic fantasies discussed in “A Child Is Being Beaten: A Contribution to the Study of the Origin of Sexual Perversions” (1919e). In general, Freud’s original conception of sadomasochism developed from his early instinct theory, which included a drive to mastery without a sexual aim. However, in terms of the genesis of the sadism and masochism, Freud eventually gave pride of place to the latter, which he discussed first in 1915 in “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes” in terms of the presence of sexual excitation, and then formulated more generally in “The Economic Problem of Masochism” (1924c), written after the introduction of the death instinct. In Freud’s later theory, sadomasochism derives its importance and power, so to speak, from a singularly effective form of instinctual fusion that protects the individual from the death instinct by diverting it outward (sadism) or binding it either internally or to an object (masochism). This amounts to a profound explanation of the human capacity to hurt oneself and one another, with both sexual and survival benefits. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SAINTE-ANNE HOSPITAL This idea can elicit at least as much if not more resistance than infantile sexuality. In dealing with sadomasochism, the analyst may confront resistances that are especially rigid, together with fixations on pregenital object relations, moral masochism, and negative therapeutic reaction. Freud’s conception of sadomasochism can be clinically validated by role reversal found among sadomasochistic couples, in the establishment of reverse relationships with another partner, and in the special durability of such relationships. The masochist’s victory lies in the fact that the master cannot free him- or herself from the ties that bind. For analysts who remained faithful to Freud’s first theory of instincts, sadomasochism expresses mental destructiveness, sometimes in the most extreme fashion. For those who preferred the death instinct, sadomasochism instead offers protection from instinctual destructiveness, both internally and through cathexis of a particularly solid object relationship, albeit a pregenital one. Both camps are in agreement in referring to sadomasochism clinically in the analysis of borderline or narcissistic situations in which triangulation gives way to dyadic relations, but they view it differently, as either negative or positive, with regard to destructiveness. This difference would tend to dissolve if it were specified whether internal destructiveness or external destructiveness was involved, because only the latter is taken into account in terms of aggression. Denys RIBAS See also: Sadism. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123-243. . (1915c). Instincts and their vicissitudes. SE, 14: 109-140. . (1919e). A child is being beaten: A contribution to the study of the origin of sexual perversions. SE, 17: 175-204. . (1924c). The economic problem of masochism. SE, 19: 155-170. SAINTE-ANNE HOSPITAL In an edict issued on July 30, 1863, Napoleon III “state approved” that an asylum be established in Paris for 1527 SALPETRIERE HOSPITAL, LA the treatment of mental illness. This hospital was built on a plot of land that was formerly a farm called Saint- Anne, which was in a remote district, but provided forty-four acres that would allow for the construction of a model facility based on the ideas of Jean-Etienne Esquirol and able to accommodate up to 500 patients of both sexes. The program set out by the committee established by Baron Haussmann included plans for a central admissions office, which was intended to replace immediately the “city madhouse,’ where patients would be observed and then redirected to one of ten buildings constructed around the periphery. Work was quickly begun by Charles Auguste Questel, the architect who had drawn up plans for the project under the direction of alienist Girard de Caillaux, and construction was completed in 1866. The chief administrator of the central office was Valentin Magnan, but the “madhouse” was made a special infirmary under the prefecture of police, and when it was decided in 1875 that a clinical chair for mental illness and the study of the brain was to be created, Benjamin Ball won the appointment with the support of Charles Laségue, under whom he served at the infirmary. Sainte-Anne maintained a long tradition of competition between academic teaching sponsored by the chair and clinical lectures or seminars given by notable teachers who attracted large audiences. Henri Claude, who held the chair from 1922 to 1939, opened a public clinic (which Edouard Toulouse turned into the Henri-Rousselle Hospital in 1926). From 1936, Claude entrusted consultations in psychoanalysis to René Laforgue, and in 1926 sponsored a series of lectures on psychoanalysis at Sainte-Anne. Under his chairmanship Henri Claude allowed only doctors who had psychoanalytic training to practice at the clinic. When the war began, Claude was replaced by M. Laignel-Lavastine, but in 1942, the faculty council installed Leévy-Valensi, who was prohibited from teaching under Vichy laws. He was arrested on September 15, 1943, and deported to Auschwitz where he died in the gas chamber three days later. Jean Delay, who served as acting chair after Lévy-Valensi, was named permanent chair in 1946. An analysand of Edouard Pinchon, Delay allowed only analysts to practice in the clinic. Lacan held his seminar in the departmental amphitheater until November 1963, while Henri Ey spoke at the Magnan Amphitheater at Henri- Rouselle Hospital. 1528 But the advent of psychopharmacology, heralded by the International Conference on Thorazine at Sainte- Anne, was to make the hospital one of the birthplaces of neuroleptic treatment, in effect eliminating its role in the development of clinical psychiatry and psychopathology enriched by psychoanalysis. JEAN GARRABE See also: Aimée, the case of; Allendy, René Felix Eugene; Aulagnier-Spairani, Piera; Berman, Anne; Borel, Adrien Alphonse Alcide; Claude, Henri Charles Jules; Congress of French-speaking analysts from Romance-language countries; Delay, Jean; Ey, Henri; France; Heuyer, Georges; Inconscient, L’; Janet, Pierre; Lacan, Jacques- Marie Emile; Laforgue, Rene; Male, Pierre; Minkowski, Eugene; Nacht, Sacha Emanoel; Narco-analysis; Parcheminey, Georges; Pasche, Francis Léopold Philippe; Perrier, Fran¢ois; Schiff, Paul; Seminar, Lacan’s; Sokolnicka- Kutner, Eugenie. SALPETRIERE HOSPITAL, LA On the site of a former gunpowder warehouse for the military, the “Salpétriere,’ Louis XIII constructed a building that would become part of the General Hospital of Paris and used to house beggars. The project was part of the general cleanup of the city that resulted from the edict published in 1656 by Louis XIV. For more than two decades the Salpétriére Hospital was used to house women. They lived in different buildings depending on the reason for their confinement (beggars, prostitutes, criminals, the ill). Gradually the facility was transformed into an asylum. Shortly before the Revolution of 1789, Philippe Pinel, who had arrived from the Hospital of Bicétre (the men’s asylum), working with the director, Cusin, introduced patient control methods similar to those he had already put into effect at Bicétre. When, in 1862, Jean Martin Charcot joined the General Hospital, it became his job to care for the women in the asylum. He began conducting clinical and anatomical-pathological research, which led to the foundation of rheumatology and neurology in France. While conducting research on neuropathology (the anatomical study of infantile brain diseases), Freud, in 1895, requested a grant to study at the Salpétriére. INTERNATIONAL Dictionary oF PSYCHOANALYSIS Coincidentally, Charcot had just begun a critical revision of the pathogenesis of hysteria. Although Charcot had long believed in the organic nature of full-blown neurosis and in animal magnetism, when Freud came to attend his lectures (October 1885-March 1886), his approach was based on the psychological nature of hysteria, where the symptom was believed to result from a voluntary refusal to function. Hypnosis had no therapeutic advantage. It could, however, “experimentally” produce symptoms illustrating the role played by suggestion in their pathogenesis. Freud was deeply influenced by Charcot and his ideas. Extremely disappointed by his welcome in Paris (which perhaps led to his life-long antipathy for the French), he idealized Charcot to the extent of calling one of his sons Martin in his honor. In 1889 he stopped in Nancy (the rival school) to deepen his understanding of hypnosis. However, he remained faithful to the teachings of the Salpétriére, which held that the effect of hypnotic suggestion is observed only in subjects who are predisposed to it and that hysteria is the result of this predisposition. On his return to Vienna, Freud found that Joseph Breuer maintained the same position regarding hysteria. Several years later, in 1890, Pierre Janet, with Charcot’s support, opened a psychopathology laboratory that allowed him, in spite of the organicist revisionism of Joseph Babinski and Pierre Marie, to continue his own clinical work, until Jules Déjerne had him replaced in 1910. DANIEL WIDLOCHER See also: Charcot, Jean Martin; Congres International de l’Hypnotisme Expérimental et Scientifique, Premier; France; Hypnosis; Hysteria; Janet, Pierre. SAN FRANCISCO PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY AND INSTITUTE Psychoanalytic training came to the United States first on the Atlantic seaboard during the 1930s with the establishment of institutes connected with societies in New York, Boston, and the Baltimore-Washington area and then, in one extension westward, in Chicago. A decade later, in the early 1940s, a society and institute were established for the first time west of the Mississippi River, in Topeka, Kansas, by Karl and Will Menninger, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SAN FRANCISCO PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY AND INSTITUTE who had been trained psychoanalytically by commuting to Chicago during the 1930s. The Topeka institute was authorized to sponsor all training in the western part of the United States, including California. The San Francisco Psychoanalytic Institute was established in 1942 as part of the combined California Psychoanalytic Society (a joint society of Los Angeles and San Francisco), both branches being under the direction and supervision of the Topeka society and institute. The initial ten charter members of the new society (in Los Angeles and San Francisco, with one even in New York) were William G. Barrett, Bernhard Berliner, Otto Fenichel, George Gero, Bernard A. Kamm, Jascha Kasanin, Donald McFarlane, Douglass W. Orr, Ernst Simmel, and Emanuel Windholz. Because of the strictures of the American Psychoanalytic Association at that time against the training or membership of nonphysicians (lay analysts), the local nonmedical members of the analytic community (Frances Deri in Los Angeles and Siegfried Bernfeld, Erik Erikson, and Anna Manchen in San Francisco) had to be designated as honorary members in the local society, not eligible for membership in the American Psychoanalytic Association. Almost all of these charter members in the new California society were refugees from Hitler’s Europe who had immigrated to America in the 1930s. In the latter half of the 1930s they started an informal psychoanalytic study group in San Francisco. This group was open to all interested medical or academic individuals, whether they had been psychoanalytically trained or not. One of the most prominent and active participants of the group was Robert Oppenheimer, the famed nuclear scientist, then at the University of California at Berkeley. From these initial members, soon joined by others (such as David Brunswick, Ralph Greenson, Norman Reider, and May Romm), the California Psychoanalytic Society grew rapidly in the post-World War II boom years, and soon separated into two organizations. With candidacy limited at the time to psychiatric physicians, the San Francisco Society and Institute drew some candidates from among those in psychiatric training at the two local medical schools, Stanford University and the University of California at San Francisco, but the Departments of Psychiatry at both these medical schools, despite having a number of psychoanalysts on their clinical teaching faculty, were quite unfriendly to psychoanalysis and thus furnished fewer psychoanalytic candidates than the next source. 1529 San FRANCISCO PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY AND INSTITUTE The greater bulk of the candidates came rather from the Department of Psychiatry of the Mt. Zion Hospital, a local independent Jewish clinical and teaching hospital. Its Department of Psychiatry was established when, in the late 1930s, it recruited as chief the psychoanalyst Jascha Kasanin from Chicago (who was, as stated above, one of the charter members of the California Psychoanalytic Society). Over a three-decade period, he was succeeded as chief by psychoanalysts Norman Reider, Edward Weinshel, and Robert Wallerstein. During this same period the department grew in scope in its training of residents in adult and child psychiatry and also, in accord with its multidisciplinary commitments, in its training of graduate and postgraduate students in clinical psychology and psychiatric social work, growing to a size and prominence that rivaled the training programs at the two medical schools. This deeply psychoanalytic Department of Psychiatry became so well-known nationally that internship applications to this regional Jewish hospital came from all over the country, with the majority of the interns coming so that they could vie for acceptance into specialty training in the Department of Psychiatry, often to the dismay of the medical and surgical specialties, which competed for interns. Over a fifteenyear period (1973-1988), the Mt. Zion Department of Psychiatry conducted a Doctor of Mental Health program, a five-year experimental program for psychoanalytically informed mental-health practitionersi, n content an amalgam of the most relevant aspects of separate disciplinary training in clinical psychiatry, clinical psychology, and psychiatric social work. This program furnished a substantial additional cadre of applicants for full psychoanalytic training at the San Francisco Institute (see Wallerstein, 1978, 1991, for a detailed account of the Doctor of Mental Health). Until the early 1960s the San Francisco Society and Institute had no building. Its seminars and supervisions were held in institute instructors’ and supervisors’ private offices, which were primarily in the clusters of medical office buildings surrounding Mt. Zion Hospital, and the monthly scientific meetings were held in the hospital auditorium. When the San Francisco Society and Institute did erect a building, on the site where it still stands, it was kitty-corner from Mt. Zion Hospital. About half the training analysts in the institute, plus other graduate analysts, held part-time salaried administrative and teaching positions on the Mt. Zion Hospital staff, and the Department of Psy- 1530 chiatry at the hospital served much like a prep school for the institute. Psychiatric trainees hoped to enhance their chances to be accepted as a candidate at the institute by impressing their psychotherapy supervisors and their clinical and theoretical seminar leaders who were also institute faculty members. During the 1960s and 1970s, serious tensions over training issues arose within the Education Committee and threatened to split the institute. One of the principle protagonists in these battles regularly urged Robert Wallerstein, as chief of psychiatry at Mt. Zion Hospital, to join him and other training analysts on the Mt. Zion staff and split from the San Francisco society to found an alternative and rival Mt. Zion Psychoanalytic Society. One of Wallerstein’s periodic tasks was to block this move. The internecine difficulties at the institute were finally resolved by the end of the 1970s, and the integrity of the society and institute has not been threatened since. During the 1980s the long-simmering struggles within the American Psychoanalytic Association came to a head over the issue of accepting nonmedical mental-health professionals (for the most part, clinical psychologists and psychiatric social workers) for full clinical psychoanalytic training. In early 1985 four clinical psychologists, on behalf of a presumed class of many thousands, instigated a lawsuit against the American Psychoanalytic Association for its restrictive training and membership policies, a suit based on Sherman Antitrust grounds. They had the full backing of Division 39, the psychoanalytic division, of the American Psychological Association. (See Wallerstein, 1998, for a detailed accounting of the almost century-long struggle over this issue until its final resolution with the settlement of the lawsuit in 1988.) Many of the leading figures in the San Francisco society and institute had long been in the substantial minority within the American Psychoanalytic Association, who favored opening its doors to full clinical training of nonphysicians. As early as the early 1970s, Stanley Goodman, then the chairperson of the Education Committee of the San Francisco institute, led a finally successful effort to get the American Psychoanalytic Association to accord membership to the dozen or so nonmedical training analysis in institutes around the country, who, to that point, had not been allowed as members, though those they trained were, of course, eligible. This enabled Anna Manchen, the one nonmedical analyst from the original nonmedical trio of founding INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS members of the psychoanalytic group in San Francisco and a long-time training analyst at the San Francisco Institute, to become an official member of the American Psychoanalytic Association. While the 1984-1985 countrywide planning for the lawsuit against the American Psychoanalytic Association was underway, a group of nonmedical mentalhealth professionals in the San Francisco Bay Area were planning a similar suit, and they were actually given moral and financial support by a significant number of members of the San Francisco institute, including the then chairperson of its Education Committee, Daniel Greenson, even though those who supported the effort were at the same time members of the American Psychoanalytic Association, the parent organization that was planning a vigorous resistance to the lawsuit. The lawsuit was settled in October 1988, and under the terms of the settlement, nonmedical mentalhealth professionals became eligible for candidacy, and later membership, in the institutes and societies of the American Psychoanalytic Association, and organized psychoanalytic training centers outside the American Psychoanalytic Association could qualify for membership in the International Psychoanalytical Association if they met its standards. Before the settlement of the lawsuit, membership in the International Psychoanalytical Association was possible in the United States only through the American Psychoanalytic Association. Although the local group in the San Francisco Bay Area never filed a lawsuit separate from that of Division 39, the individuals involved in the lawsuit went on in 1989 to create a new and separate entity, the Psychoanalytic Institute of Northern California, with strong assistance from some senior members of the San Francisco Psychoanalytic Society and Institutes. The Psychoanalytic Institute of Northern California has had a thriving history of over a decade and in 2004 is in the process of working out membership in the International Psychoanalytical Association, outside the American Psychoanalytic Association. During the tise of the Psychoanalytic Institute of Northern California, several dissident members of the San Francisco Psychoanalytic Society and Institutes also established a new entity, the San Francisco Institute and Society for Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy, and it too, now more than a decade later, is in the process of working out membership in the International Psychoanalytical INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SAN FRANCISCO PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY AND INSTITUTE Association outside the framework of the American Psychoanalytic Association. Thus San Francisco now has three mainline psychoanalytic societies and institutes: the San Francisco Psychoanalytic Society and Institute (since 1942 a member of the International Psychoanalytical Association through the American Psychoanalytic Association), and in addition the Psychoanalytic Institute of Northern California and the San Francisco Institute and Society for Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy (two recent groups that became members of the International Psychoanalytical Association outside the American Psychoanalytic Association). San Francisco has also been one of the few American cities with a functioning Jungian Psychoanalytic Society and Institute, with a history of more than a half century. For the last decade it has also had a Lacanian training program inaugurated by two Belgium-trained Lacanian analysts, one from Greece and the other from Germany. In 2004 this amounts to five psychoanalytic groups in the San Francisco Bay area, all seemingly thriving and living together in relative harmony. On occasion, scientific events are organized across more than one of them (usually the San Francisco Psychoanalytic Society and the Psychoanalytic Institute of Northern California), and at times, scientific and social events are held for candidates of all five groups. Yet none of these developments have in any way diminished the intellectual vigor or activity of the original San Francisco Psychoanalytic Society and Institute. With the 1988 opening of training possibilities for nonmedical mental-health professionals, there was a fresh burst of applications from individuals who had for years been hoping for just this opportunity, and the San Francisco Psychoanalytic Society and Institutes has offered a steady curriculum of active classes for candidates through the years since then. This is despite the decline in candidate applications that has beset most institutes of the American Psychoanalytic Association and around the world during these years. This is also despite the collapse of the renowned Department of Psychiatry at Mt. Zion Hospital after the School of Medicine of the University of California at San Francisco took over Mt. Zion Hospital. After Robert Wallerstein left the chair of the university’s Department of Psychiatry, which he held from 1975 to 1985 after holding the chair of the Mt. Zion department, his successor as department chair at the university was a biological psychiatrist and neuroscience 1531 San FRANCISCO PSYCHOTHERAPY RESEARCH Group AND CONTROL-MASTERY THEORY researcher not friendly to psychoanalysis. Nonetheless, the flow of psychoanalytic candidates from medical and nonmedical sources has continued unabated. Morale in the society and institute has been consistently high: the educational program has been pointed to in many circles of the American Psychoanalytic Association as a model for the nation; a supportive San Francisco Psychoanalytic Foundation has been established; and plans are now in the final phase for an improved and enlarged physical headquarters for the society and institute on the same site. Such developments promise to continue. Although the San Francisco society is only middle-sized, and not among the larger groups within the American Psychoanalytic Association, two of its members, William Barrett and Robert Wallerstein, have been presidents of the American Psychoanalytic Association, and two other members, Stanley Goodman and Edward Weinshel, have been chairpersons of the Board on Professional Standards, the educational arm of the American Psychoanalytic Association. And from 1985 to 1989, Robert Wallerstein was president of the International Psychoanalytical Association and Edward Weinshel was secretary. ROBERT S. WALLERSTEIN Bibliography Wallerstein, Robert S. (1978). The mental health professions: Conceptualization and reconceptualization of a new discipline. International Review of Psychoanalysis, 5, 377— B92, . (Ed.). (1991). The doctorate in mental health: An experiment in mental health professional education. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. . (1998). Lay analysis: Life inside the controversy. Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press. SAN FRANCISCO PSYCHOTHERAPY RESEARCH GROUP AND CONTROLMASTERY THEORY The San Francisco Psychotherapy Research Group (formerly called the Mount Zion Psychotherapy Research Group) was founded in the early 1970s by Joseph Weiss, M.D., and Harold Sampson, Ph.D., both analysts at the San Francisco Psychoanalytic Institute. 1532 A large number of professionals have been associated with the group, which is one of the few in the United States engaged in programmatic research of the therapeutic process and development of a full-scale psychoanalytic theory. The theory is informally known as Control-Mastery Theory, from two of its assumptions: (1) people exercise considerable unconscious control of their mental lives (an assumption that contrasts with the view that the unconscious serves only as a repository of drives, blindly seeking expression), and (2) patients enter treatment seeking to master their difficulties, although they may be unaware of significant parts of their treatment goals (an assumption that contrasts with the perspective that sees patients as seeking to continue infantile gratifications and resisting modification even of partial symptomatic expression of such impulses). Symptoms stem from “unconscious pathogenic beliefs,” which are inferences about traumatic events, often involving fear of harm to a loved one as a consequence of trying to meet a normal developmental goal (Weiss, 1990; 1993). These assumptions and several others have been articulated in many publications, in case examples, and especially in formal research. An early phase of the research examined psychoanalytic cases, especially the case of Mrs. C (see Weiss, Sampson, et al., 1986). Among other things, it was shown that patients test their therapists, often unconsciously, by (1) transferring (acting toward the therapist as they had acted toward a parent earlier in life) and (2) turning passive into active (acting toward the therapist as a parent had acted toward them earlier). In both cases, the patient unconsciously hopes that the therapist will not be traumatized as the patient was earlier. When the therapist responds in a way that passes the test, the patient improves immediately (as measured by standard psychotherapy progress measures, as well as several measures developed specifically by the researchers). Other research has investigated short-term psychodynamically oriented psychotherapy, short-term therapy conducted from other theoretical frameworks (for example, cognitive-behavioral therapy), and therapy with elderly clients and several other patient populations. It has been shown that explicit plan formulations can be developed for patients. The more congruent that a therapist’s interventions are with this plan, the greater the improvement (Silberschatz, Fretter and Curtis, 1986). ROBERT SHILKRET INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Bibliography Sampson, Harold. (1992). A new psychoanalytic theory and its testing in formal research. In James W. Barron, Morris N. Eagle and David L. Wolitzky (Eds.), Interface of psychoanalysis and psychology (pp. 586-604). Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association. Silberschatz, G., Fretter, P., and Curtis, J. (1986). How do interpretations influence the process of psychotherapy? Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 54, 646-652. Weiss, Joseph. (1990, March). Unconscious mental functioning. Scientific American, 103-109. . (1993). How psychotherapy works: Process and technique. New York: Guilford. Weiss, Joseph; Sampson, Harold; and The Mount Zion Psychotherapy Research Group. (1986). The psychoanalytic process: Theory, clinical observation, and empirical research. New York: Guilford. SANDLER, JOSEPH (1927-1998) Joseph Sandler, English physician, psychoanalyst, and psychologist, was born in Cape Town, South Africa on January 10, 1927 and died in London on October 6, 1998. Sandler’s family was Jewish. He received his Master’s degree in psychology at age nineteen, from the University of Cape Town. He moved to England in the late 1940s to further specialize in psychology, and received his PhD from London University at age twenty-three. He then began his medical education at University College London, and applied to become a psychoanalyst. In 1952 he qualified as psychoanalyst of the British Psychoanalytical Society, having been trained by the classical Freudian psychoanalyst Willie Hoffer, and then by his wife, Hedwig Hoffer. He became a training analyst at the age of twenty-eight, and specialized also in child analysis. Subsequently he was awarded both a MD and a D.Sc. Sandler had a outstanding career both as theoretician and clinician, but also as an administrator in psychoanalysis. He is considered a central figure in the second half of twentieth century psychoanalysis. He was editor of the British Journal of Psychology (1959-1963), and then became the editor of the International Journal of Psycho-analysis from 1969 to 1978, and he founded the International Review of Psychoanalysis. He was the first Sigmund Freud professor of psychoanalysis at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He then became the first full-time Sigmund Freud professor of Psychoanalysis at London University, until INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SANDLER, JosSePH (1927-1998) his retirement in 1992, the year in which was nominated Professor Emeritus. He held several honorary degrees. He held more than twenty visiting professorships, and was elected President of the International Association of Psychoanalysis in 1989. As a theoretician, Sandler is remembered for his effort to reexamine and update the theoretical and clinical issues of classical psychoanalysis. He was the leader of the so-called Hampstead Index Project, working with Anna Freud and her colleagues for many years at the Hampstead Child Therapy Clinic during the 1960s and the 1970s. He became more and more interested in trying to bridge the gap between classical Freudian psychoanalysis and the British school of object relations. His close friend Arnold Cooper described his work as “the silent revolution in psychoanalysis.” Sandler was the author of more than 200 papers and author, editor, or co-editor of forty-four books. The most important of his papers are collected in From Safety to Superego (1988), The Patient and the Analyst, written in collaboration with Christopher Dare and Alex Holder (1973), and particularly in Internal Objects Revisited (1998), which he wrote together with his wife, Anne Marie Sandler. In addition to being a prolific author, Sandler was also a great facilitator of the work of colleagues and young psychoanalysts. He also pioneered the rapprochement between psychoanalysis and empirical research, creating the annual research conference of the IPA at University College, London. This annual meeting of researchers has been given in his name since his death. Sandler was married twice, having lost his first wife, and he had three children. RICCARDO STEINER See also: British Psycho-Analytical Society; Evenlysuspended attention; Great Britain; Identification; International Journal of Psychoanalysis, The; International Psychoanalytical Association; Israel; Object relations theory; Primary identification; Projective identification; Pscyhoanalyst; Tavistock Clinic; Technique with children, psychoanalytic; Therapeutic alliance. Bibliography Sandler, Joseph. (1988). From safety to superego. New York, London: Karnac Books International Universities Press. 1533 SaRASIN, PHILipe (1888-1968) Sandler, Joseph, Dare, Christopher, and Holder, Alex. (1997). The patient and the analyst: The basis of the psychoanalytic process. New York: International Universities Press: Sandler, Joseph, and Sandler, Anne-Marie. (1998). Internal objects revisited. London: Karnac Books. Steiner, Riccardo. (1999). Some observations on ‘projection, identification, projective I fication. (Joseph Sandler, Ed.) International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 70, 727-35. (Original work published 1989) Fonagy, Peter; Cooper, Arnold; and Wallerstein, Robert S. (Eds.) (1999). Psychoanalysis on the move: The work of Joseph Sandler. London, New York: Routledge. SARASIN, PHILIPP (1888-1968) Philipp Sarasin, the Swiss physician, psychoanalyst, and specialist on psychiatry and psychotherapy, was born at Basel on May 22, 1888, and died there on November 28, 1968. He came from an old Huguenot family that played an important role in the cultural and economic life of Basel. Having first hesitated between studying Greek or botany, he finally opted for medicine. When he finished his studies in 1915 he worked as a volunteer physician with Eugen Bleuler in Ziirich, where he commenced his first Jungian analysis with Franz Riklin. From 1916 to 1921 he worked under Ris as an assistant physician in the Rheinau clinic. After a short period of analysis with Hanns Sachs, he had the opportunity to encounter Freud at the 1920 congress in The Hague. In spring 1921 he began his analysis with Freud, and in 1924 he set up his own practice in Basel as an independent psychoanalyst. He was a member of the Swiss Psychoanalytic Society (SGPsa) from its foundation and, following the breakaway of president Emil Oberholzer he replaced him as president from 1928 to 1961. Thanks to his unstinting devotion to Freudian orthodoxy and the fact that he never pushed himself to the fore, he succeeded in saving the SGPsa from crisis and maintained its cohesion through difficult circumstances. Although his contribution was limited in terms of publications and lectures his main activity consisted in adopting “positions that were constantly renewed through considered comments in the course of hundreds of discussions on the scientific and practical questions that arose.... Through his eniightened mind, his rigorous thinking and honesty he formed 1534 the scientific conscience of our country’s psychoanalysts” (Parin). His only psychoanalytic writing of import, on Goethe’s Mignon, was in his own words the result of his discussions with Freud in the course of his analysis. It is also based on a good knowledge of Goethe’s life and work. In it, he analyzes the character of the androgynous young woman, Mignon, who dies as a result of being separated from her beloved, fatherly friend, and the old Harfner, who grows violent in the course of a melancholic episode, as a reworking of the poet’s youthful memories. KASPAR WEBER See also: Schweizerische Arztegesellschaft fiir Psychoanalyse; Société Psychanalytique de Geneve; Switzerland (French-speaking); Switzerland (German-speaking). Bibliography Parin, Paul. (1968). Philipp Sarasin: 80 jahre. Bulletin der Schweizerischen Gesellschaft fiir psychanalyse, 7, 1—2. Roazen, Paul. (2001). Interview with Philipp Sarasin. In The historiography of psychoanalysis. (p. 167-171) New Brunswick, NJ : Transaction Publishers. Sarasin, Philipp. (1929). Goethes Mignon. Eine psychoanalytische Studie Imago, 15. . (1966). Meine richtlinien. Bulletin der Schweizerischen Gesellschaft fiir psychanalyse, 3, p. 1. . (1968). Wie ich zu Freud kam. Bulletin der Schweizerischen Gesellschaft fiir psychanalyse, Sommer 1968, pp. 1-2. SARTRE AND PSYCHOANALYSIS French philosopher, novelist, and playwright Jean Paul Sartre (1905-1980) attended the Ecole Normale Superieure, received his accreditation in philosophy, and was a resident at the Institut Francais in Berlin during 1933-34. He was awarded, but declined, the Nobel Prize for literature in 1964. Sartre’s first major work, The Transcendence of the Ego (1936-1937) published in English in 1957, called into question the interiority of consciousness and, based on Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology, he wrote that “the ego is neither formally nor materially in consciousness: it is outside, in the world. It is a being of the world, like the ego of another.’ The subject does INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS not possess himself and consciousness, “defined by intentionality,” provides no privileged self-knowledge because, as Sartre writes, “My I, in effect, is no more certain for consciousness than the I of other men. It is only more intimate.” These ideas formed the springboard for a radical critique of introspection, selfknowledge, and inner life. Sartre developed his ideas further in Being and Nothingness (1943). In this text he suggested that Sigmund Freud’s work (which he characterizes as “empirical”), in his estimation, represents a provisional formulation, subject to critique, of what he calls (more by reference to Soren Kierkegaard than to Ludwig Binswanger) “existential” psychoanalysis. He postulates the principle that the human being is a totality, expressed completely through fortuitous conduct. “In other words there is not a taste, a mannerism, or a human act which is not revealing” (p. 568). The goal, to elucidate the actual behavior of human beings, is based on “the fundamental, preontological comprehension which man has of the human person” (p. 568). All conduct symbolizes and conceals, in various ways, the basic choice of every individual subject. Each person must be unveiled and revealed, as Sartre himself would attempt to do with Jean Genet (1952) and Gustave Flaubert (1971-72). With this as a starting point, Sartre moves on to discuss the similarities and differences between Freudian psychoanalysis and what he calls existential psychoanalysis. In terms of similarities, both analysis and existential psychoanalysis “consider the human being as a perpetual, searching, historization. Rather than uncovering static, constant givens they discover the meaning, orientation, and adventures of this history” (p. 569). With knowledge anterior to logic, the subject has absolutely no privileged capacity for self-knowledge, while conflicts and projects can be apprehended only from the point of view of the other. But there are also radical differences. Most decisive, according to Sartre, is that for Freud the libido is an irreducible psychobiological given. By contrast, Sartre suggested that the subject’s own demarche is centered on choices that cannot be constituted in advance and which vary with each individual. “For human reality there is no difference between existing and choosing for itself” (p. 572) because “consciousness is a being, the nature of which is to be conscious of the nothingness ofi ts being” (p. 47). INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SAUSSURE, RAYMOND DE (1894-1971) In sum, from a somewhat dated view of Freud’s work, Sartre fashions a critique that views psychoanalysis as an acceptable albeit awkward and provisional expression of what will become existential psychoanalysis, while on a practical level it is more successful. “Empirical psychoanalysis, to the extent that its method is better than its principles, is often in sight of an existential discovery, but it always stops part way” (p. 573). GEORGES LANTERI-LAURA See also: Action-language; Determinism; France; Freud, the Secret Passion; Phenomenology and psychoanalysis; Politzer, Georges; Thought-thinking apparatus. Bibliography Sartre, Jean Paul. (1972 [c1957]). The transcendence of the ego: An existentialist theory of consciousness. New York: Octagon Books. (Original work published 1936-1937) . (1964 [c1956]). Being and nothingness: An essay in phenomenological ontology. Special abridged ed. New York: Citadel Press. (Original work published 1943) . (1963). Saint Genet, actor and martyr. (Bernard Frechtman, Trans.) New York: G. Braziller. (Original work published 1952) . (1976). Critique of dialectical reason, theory of practical ensembles. (Jonathan Rée, Ed.; Alan Sheridan-Smith, Trans.) London: NLB; Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press. (Original work published 1960) . (1981 [1993]). The family idiot: Gustave Flaubert, 1821-1857. (Carol Cosman, Trans.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1971-1972) SATISFACTION. See Experience of satisfaction SAUSSURE, RAYMOND DE (1894-1971) Raymond de Saussure, the Swiss psychoanalyst, was born in Geneva in 1894 and died there on October 19, LOT1 s Descending in a direct line from a number of Geneva scientists, Raymond was the son of Ferdinand de Saussure, the founder of modern linguistics. He studied medicine in Geneva and Zurich from 1914 to 1535 Saussure, Raymonp dE (1894-1971) 1920, then trained as a psychiatrist in Paris, Vienna, and Berlin. While still very young, Saussure took an interest in psychoanalysis, and in 1919 he became a member of the newly-founded Swiss Psychoanalytic Society. In 1921 he met Freud at the conference in The Hague and began analysis with him in 1921. He then set up in Geneva, practicing essentially as a psychoanalyst until 1937. During the 1920s he began another analysis with Franz Alexander in Berlin. Spreading Freud’s ideas to France, he and Charles Odier were among the founders of the Paris Psychoanalytic Society in 1926, the Revue francaise de psychanalyse and the Congress of French-Speaking Psychoanalysts. In 1937 he left Geneva for Paris, where he began a new analysis with Rudolph Loewenstein, but returned to Switzerland in 1939 because of the war. In 1940 Saussure was sent to the United States as part of the Swiss American Fund for Scientific Exchanges. He lived in New York until 1952, became a member of the New York Psychoanalytic Society, took an active role in the training activities of the New York Institute, was Associate Professor at Columbia University, and taught in the Free France university. Upon returning to Geneva in 1952, Saussure put all his experience and energy into developing psychoanalysis in French-speaking Switzerland. He organized clinical and theoretical training seminars in collaboration with Germaine Guex in Lausanne, with Michel Gressot in Geneva, as well as with Marcelle Spira, a Swiss psychoanalyst trained in Argentina. He also lectured in psychotherapy in the medical faculty of Geneva University. He continued his efforts to promote the development of psychoanalysis not only in his own country—he was president of the Swiss Society for several years—but also internationally, and was one of the vice-presidents of the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA) from 1955 to 1961. In 1966 he helped found the European Federation for Psychoanalysis. In the late 1960s Saussure lent his support to a movement, coming mainly from candidates in Frenchspeaking Switzerland, for the creation of a psychoanalytic training center. This movement resulted in the inauguration of the Centre Psychanalytique Raymond- de-Saussure (Raymond de Saussure Psychoanalytic Center) in Geneva in 1973, two years after his death. This center for exchange and encounter played a leading role in the expansion of psychoanalysis in French-speaking Switzerland that began in the early 1970s, particularly in Geneva. 1536 La Méthode psychoanalytique (The psychoanalytic method; 1922), with a preface by Freud (1922e), surprised the public of the time and was prohibited. “Les fixations homosexuelles chez les femmes névrosées” (Homosexual fixations in neurotic women), a report to the Conference of French-speaking Psychoanalysts, puts forward the original notion of “hermaphroditic narcissism,” in order to shed light on identity problems in homosexuality (1929). “Psychologie génétique et psychanalyse” (Genetic psychology and psychoanalysis), a congress report, attempts to reconcile the ideas of Freud and Jean Piaget (1933). Le Miracle grec (The Greek miracle; 1939), a psychoanalytic study of the century of Pericles, was burned by the Nazis. In 1959 at the IPA Congress in Copenhagen he presented “The Metapsychology of Pleasure,” a reflection on desire, pleasure, and happiness, in their relationship to the conscious and unconscious ego. His bibliography numbers about ninety publications. Raymond de Saussure was intimately involved in the foundation and development of the Swiss society in 1919 and the Paris society in 1926, as well as the European Foundation for Psychoanalysis in 1966. JEAN-MICHEL QUINODOZ See also: Character; Congrés de psychanalystes de langue francaise des pays romans; Fédération européenne de psychanalyse; France; Revue frangaise de psychanalyse; Société Psychanalytique de Geneve; Société Psychanalytique de Paris et Institut de Psychanalyse de Paris; Switzerland (French-speaking); Switzerland (German-speaking). Bibliography Roch, Marcel. (1980) A propos de histoire de la psychanalyse en Suisse romande. Bulletin de la Société Suisse de psychanalyse, 10, 17-30. Saussure, Raymond de. (1929). Les fixations homosexuelles chez les femmes nevrosees. Revue francaise de psychanalyse, 3, 50-91. . (1939). Le miracle grec. Paris : Denoél. . (1959). The metapsychology of pleasure. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 22, 649-674. Vermorel, Henri. (1994). Raymond de Saussure ou la passion de la psychanalyse. (p. 74) In C. Degoumois (Ed.), Actes du centenaire de la naissance de Raymond de Saussure. Geneve : Medecine et Hygiene. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SCHIFF, PAUL (1891-1947) Paul Schiff—French physician, psychoanalyst, psychiatrist, and neuropsychiatrist known for his work with prisoners—was born in Vienna on August 5, 1891, and died in Paris on May 17, 1947. Though Austrian by birth, Schiff was culturally French. His father, a foreign correspondent for an Austrian newspaper, settled in Paris when his son was a month old. At the Collége de France, Schiff studied philosophy and was especially influenced by Henri Bergson’s lectures on Spinoza (1632-1677). He subsequently studied medicine. During World War I, Schiff, not a French citizen but unwilling to fight in the Austrian army, moved to Switzerland, where he became friends with the novelist Romain Rolland and the poet Pierre-Jean Jouve. Returning to France, he interned in psychiatry at the Asiles de la Seine (Asylums of the Seine) and later served as chief of the psychiatric clinic at Sainte-Anne Hospital in 1927. He married Suzanne Wertheimer, an ophthalmologist. Analyzed by Eugenie Sokolnicka, Schiff became a member of the Société Psychanalytique de Paris (Paris Psychoanalytic Society) in 1928. He was also a founding member of Evolution psychiatrique, a medical organization for French psychoanalysts. He worked with Edouard Toulouse at the Henri-Rousselle Pavilion, where he directed a clinic for sex-related disorders until 1936. Increasingly drawn to criminology, Schiff was appointed neuropsychiatrist of prisons in 1935. The same year, at the Ninth Conference of French-Speaking Psychoanalysts, he presented the paper “Psychoanalysis and the Paranoias.” In his work on criminality, Schiff established an intellectual foundation for crossdisciplinary research employing a range of different perspectives, including the biological bases of behavior and the role of unconscious conflict. But World War II intruded, and his projected treatise on criminology remained unpublished. In 1938, with Daniel Lagache and others, Schiff founded the publication Psychologie Collective (Collective psychology), which terminated with the war. Schiff enlisted as a battalion physician before returning to Paris after the 1940 defeat of the French forces. He and his wife both entered the Resistance and then joined the Free French in Algeria; he was later taken prisoner in Germany. Back in Paris after the end of the war, he immediately returned to his work with INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SCHILDER, PAUL FERDINAND (1886-1940) prisoners, published actively, but suddenly died of a stroke just two years later. CLAIRE Doz-SCHIFF See also: Congres des psychanalystes de langue frangaise des pays romans; Criminology and_ psychoanalysis; France; Societe psychanalytique de Paris and Institut de psychanalyse de Paris; Second World War: The effect on the development of psychoanalysis. Bibliography Mijolla, Alain de. (1988). Psychoanalysis and psychoanalysts in France between 1939 and 1945. International Forum for Psychoanalysis, 12, 136-156. Schiff, Paul. (1935). Les paranoias et la psychanalyse. Revue francaise de psychanalyse, 8, 44-105. . (1946). La paranoia de destruction: Réaction de Samson et fantasme de la fin du monde, séance du 25 mars 1946. Annales Meédico-Psychologiques, 1, 3, 279-289. Schiff, Paul, and Antheaume, André. (1925, July). La psychanalyse envisagee du point de vue de quelques applications meédico-legales. Encephale (July 1925): 400. SCHILDER, PAUL FERDINAND (1886-1940) The Austrian psychiatrist and psychoanalyst Paul Schilder was born in Vienna on February 2, 1886, and died in New York on December 7, 1940. He was the son of Ferdinand Schilder, a Jewish silk merchant who died when he was three, and Berta Firth, who favored him over his brother. He attended secondary school and received his medical training in Vienna. He became a medical doctor in 1909, but he also always maintained an interest in philosophy; he earned a doctorate in that field 1922 and in 1928 published Gedanken zur Naturphilosophie (Reflections on natural philosophy). Schilder turned his attention toward neurology and psychiatry and became the assistant of Gabriel Anton in Halle, and later of Paul Flechsig in Leipzig. At this time he published an article on Encephalitis periaxalis diffusa (a syndrome that thereafter bore his name), that made him famous in the field of neurology from 1912. In 1914 he published Selbstbewusstein und Personlichkeitsbewusstein. Eine psychopathologische Studie (Consciousness of self and personality: a psychological study), a work informed by Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology, before serving as a doctor in the First 1537 ScHILDER, PAUL FERDINAND (1886-1940) World War. But it was Wahn und Erkenntnis. Eine psychopathologische Studie (Delusion and knowledge: A psychological study), published in 1922, that marked his first real approach to psychoanalysis, despite the fact that on March 22 Sigmund Freud wrote to Karl Abraham: “Today I received—after the Simmel—a monograph extracted from the Lewandowskysche Sammlung (notebook number 15): Delusion and knowledge by Paul Schilder (Leipzig), which, in its results, is already thoroughly analytical, and which only leaves aside, as is appropriate, the Oedipus complex. Of course, Sch. acts as if these gentlemen had discovered everything themselves, or almost everything. In short, this is how German clinicians are going to ‘appropriate’ our discoveries. All things considered, I vow, it is of no importance.” In fact, in 1919 Schilder was elected to membership in the Psychoanalytical Society of Vienna, and on March 7, 1920, he presented his first paper, on identification, there. During the same time, he became the assistant, at the Vienna Hospital, of Julius Wagner- Juaregg, who took a somewhat dim view of his interest in psychoanalysis. He was nevertheless appointed Privatdozenti n 1921 and professor in 1925. Although his book Uber das Wesen der Hypnose (On the nature of hypnosis) led Paul Federn to accuse him of plagiarism in 1922, Schilder’s works were nonetheless known and recognized by Freud and psychoanalytic circles. In 1923 he began to elaborate his theory of “body image,” an expression borrowed from the psychiatrists Arnold Pick and Henry Head, in Le Schema corporel. Contribution a Tétude du corps propre (The corporeal schema: contribution to the study of the individual’s own body). He developed Freud’s suggestion that the ego is derived from bodily sensations (elaborated in Freud’s 1923 encyclopedia article, “The Libido Theory”), and he made the body image a formation under construction that brings together perceptions, affects, fantasies, and thoughts, and that plays a fundamental role in human behavior and relations with others. In 1935 Schilder published his most famous work, The Image and Appearance of the Human Body. Donald Winnicott, Esther Bick, Piera Aulagnier, Gisela Pankow, Francoise Dolto, and Didier Anzieu are among the many psychoanalysts who subsequently further developed this notion, which is particularly useful for understanding certain psychotic states. In 1923 he had also published Seele und Leben (Soul and life), a prelude to the many works that made him one of the most original and productive thinkers in his 1538 generation of psychoanalysts—but he remained a relatively isolated man, because he did not wish to become linked with Freud, as was attested by his repudiation of the death instinct. However, although Freud, according to Fritz Wittels (1941) reproached him for working in “overly broad dimensions” instead of limiting himself to a miscroscopic psychoanalysis, he continued to hold him in esteem and in 1927, for example, he advised Marie Bonaparte to attend Schilder’s visits and lectures at the Vienna Hospital. Before her, Anna Freud had gone to learn the essential basics of psychiatry from him and from Heinz Hartmann, Wagner-Jauregg’s other assistant. Schilder was consistently hostile to the practice of psychoanalysis by non-physicians, attached as he was and would remain to his hospital-based psychiatric practice. He also refused to undergo training analysis and publicly maintained its uselessness. Still, his book Entwurf zu einer Psychiatrie auf psychoanalytischer Grundlage (Outline for a psychoanalytically based psychiatry), published in Leipzig in 1925, was a pioneering work on psychoanalytic approaches to the psychoses and has been too often neglected by his successors. In 1928 he traveled to the United States at the invitation of Adolf Meyer and taught for three months at the Henry Phipps Psychiatric Clinic. He left the Vienna Hospital in 1929 and emigrated to the United States, in 1930 becoming médical director of the psychiatric division of Bellevue Hospital and research professor of psychiatry in New York University’s College of Medicine. He married his collaborator Lauretta Bender in 1937. Although he resigned from the New York Psychoanalytic Society that same year, his contributions continued to influence American psychoanalytic thought. Struck by a car as he was leaving the hospital where his son had been born a few days earlier, Paul Schilder died in New York on December 7, 1940, a short time after the accident. As Hartmann wrote, “In my view, Schilder’s conception of the psychic apparatus is very close to the ideas that have been developed in recent years in another field, the psychoanalytic psychology of the ego” (cited in Ziferstein). He also stated, in “The Psychiatric Work of Paul Schilder”: “Schilder did more to spread psychoanalytic discoveries among European psychiatrists than, with the exception of Freud, any other psychoanalyst.” ALAIN DE MYOLLA See also: Body image. INTERNATIONAL DICTIGNARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Bibliography Hartmann, Heinz. (1944). The psychiatric work of Paul Schilder. Psychoanalytic Review, 31, 1, 296. Muhllheitner, Elke. (1992). Biographisches lexikon der psychoanalyse (die mitglieder der psychologischen Mittwoch- Gesellschaft und der Wiener Psychoanalytischen Vereinigung 1902-1938). Tubingen: Diskord. Schilder, Paul (1953). Medical psychology. (D. Rapaport, Ed.) New York: International Universities Press. (Original work published 1924) . (1925). Entwurf zu einer psychiatrie auf psychoanalytischer grundlage. Leipzig, Vienne, Ziirich: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag. . (1935). The image and appearance of the human body. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner. Wittels, Fritz. (1941). Paul Schilder, 1886-1940. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 10, 131-134. Ziferstein, Isidore. (1966). Paul Ferdinand Schilder 1886— 1940. Psychoanalysis and psychiatry. In Psychoanalytic pioneers (F. Alexander, S. Eisenstein, and M. Grotjahn, Eds.) London: Basic Books. SCHILLER AND PSYCHOANALYSIS Johann Christoph Friedrich von Schiller, the German poet and dramaturge, was born on November 10, 1759 in Morbach and died on May 9, 1805 in Weimar. He was the last and most exemplary representative of the Sturm und Drang movement before evolving—always in the company of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, whose friend he became in Weimar—toward the aesthetic humanism of his classical period. He was a fundamental model for Sigmund Freud, whose identification with the poet was so strong that Schiller was a familiar figure in his dreams: for example, the dream about Hollthurn, in which Schiller’s birthplace was the object of scorn, analyzed by Freud in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901b). In difficult periods in his self-analysis, Freud’s dreams referred to the plays of Schiller, whose sensibility is darker and more violent than Goethe’s. Freud had been familiar with these works since his adolescence, and at age fourteen, with his nephew John, had performed an act from Schiller’s Brigands (1781) depicting the murder of Caesar by his adoptive son, Brutus; he evoked this memory in his associations with the dream “Non vixit” to analyze his rivalry with his brother. Schiller’s modernity exalts the “deviltry of INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SCHILLER AND PSYCHOANALYSIS freedom,” the main theme of the play that earned its author honorary citizenship in the French Republic. The twenty-seven quotations from Schiller in Freud’s work, as identified in the Concordance, attest to his intimate knowledge of the writer, who was also a Dicterphilosoph (poet-philosopher) who articulated a theory of the drives: “The animal drives [Triebe] awaken and develop the spiritual drives”; he opposed ‘the material drive (Stofftrieb) to the form drive (Formtrieb). The Spieltrieb (play-drive)—which expresses play, the beautiful, freedom, and the total man—is posited as an ideal nexus between the two Triebe. It is also the force that drives creation: “It is union of the unconscious and reflection that makes the poetic artist.” In 1910, Freud situated himself in Schiller’s wake by distinguishing the sexual instincts from the ego instincts, acknowledging in 1930 that Schiller, with hunger and love, had provided him with an initial “foothold.” The poet was again called to the rescue to provide the words to complete an elaboration, dealing with the oceanic feeling that was being held in abeyance: Freud alluded to the poem “Der Taucher” (The diver) to evoke the dangers of the maternal body inhabited by monsters, citing only the diver’s ascent toward “the rosy light,” to justify his avoidance of submersion in the maternal unconscious. Elsewhere, he used Schiller’s poem “The Ring of Polycrates” as an illustration in “The Uncanny” (1919). Ultimately, Freud considered the age of Goethe to be a prehistory to psychoanalysis, and he credited Schiller for his emphasis on free association as the basis for literary creation. MADELEINE VERMOREL See also: Ego; Goethe and psychoanalysis; Instinct; Sudden involuntary idea; ““Uncanny,’ The.” Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1901b). The psychopathology of everyday life. SE, 6. . (1920b). A note on the prehistory of the technique ofa nalysis. SE, 18: 263-65. Hell, Victor. (1974). Friedrich von Schiller: théories esthetiques et structures dramatiques. Paris: Aubier. Vermorel, Madeleine. (1990). The drive (Trieb), from Goethe to Freud. International Review of Psychoanalysis, 17, 249-56. 1539 SCHIZOPHRENIA . (1995). La pulsion, de Goethe et de Schiller a Freud. In Freud, judéité, lumiéres et romantisme. (p. 133-49) (H. Vermorel, et al, Eds.) Lausanne: Delachaus and Niestlé. SCHIZOPHRENIA For psychoanalysis, as for medical research and the entire field of mental health, schizophrenia is a complex, baffling, and frustrating disorder. It is not particularly rare, affecting about 1 percent of the population; its distribution is worldwide. A century after Emil Kraepelin created the diagnosis of dementia praecox and its extensive symptomology—renamed schizophrenia by Eugen Bleuler—it remains poorly understood. In spite of revolutionary advances in biology and neuroscience, no treatment or combination of therapies offers a reliable cure. Like all the psychotic disorders, schizophrenia was thought from the start to have an organic basis, but Kraepelin was forced describe it as a “functional disorder.’ Early age of onset and absence of brain lesions such as might be found in epilepsy or tertiary syphilis, for example, encouraged early analysts to attempt treatment, especially in light of the limitations of other therapeutic modalities. It became plausible to suggest, at least tentatively, that schizophrenia was a psychological disorder that originated, like neurotic conflicts, in infancy and early childhood. The fact that some small but significant percentage of patients experienced full or partial recovery made it a target for therapies of all kinds, including psychoanalysis. Although Freud himself was skeptical about prospects for successfully treating schizophrenia, the disorder was central to the activity of many early analysts, who often were associated with hospitals for the insane. Karl Abraham’s first letters to Freud concerned psychosis; like Carl Jung, he worked at the Burgholzi Central Asylum and University Clinic in Zurich, which Bleuler directed. In the United States, where psychiatry only gradually became a primarily office practice beginning about 1920, psychiatrists influenced by Freud also worked in asylums. Adolf Meyer and William Alanson White were both hospital-based psychiatrists, as was Harry Stack Sullivan, who reported impressive results with his analytically oriented treatment beginning in the 1920s. Particularly influential, Sullivan’s work led to the creation of a psychoanalytic enclave at Chestnut Lodge in Rockville, 1540 Maryland, devoted to the treatment of patients with schizophrenia and related disorders. The rapid growth of psychoanalysis as a medical specialty in the United States after World War Il affected the way that schizophrenia was perceived, understood, and treated. The broad theoretical reach of psychoanalysis, with its ambitious aims to provide a general psychology, extended to schizophrenia both as an explanatory tool and treatment modality. In retrospect it is clear that as a treatment it was not successful and that the early-childhood environmental deficit model that analysts proposed could not be sustained. At the time, however, without benefit of drugs or a significant knowledge base in neurochemistry, and in the wake of a period during which biological explanations of mental disease had favored eugenics, psychoanalysts appeared to be modern and forward-looking professionals who were making an earnest and humane effort to understand severe psychopathology in terms of developmental deficits. Psychoanalysis was not seriously affected by the introduction of phenothiazine in the mid-1950s. But the narcoleptics and their successor drugs set the stage for the de-institutionalization of the mentally ill that began a decade later and also opened the way for the dopamine hypothesis, the first of various neurochemical pathways to be implicated in schizophrenia. By the late 1960s the authority of psychoanalysis was eroding, both as therapy and theory, and it had to compete with a diversified marketplace of competing treatments. As psychoanalysis in the United States entered a period of steep decline in the 1980s, its efforts on both a theoretical and clinical level were often held to be of no account. However, one positive outcome of analytic interest in the severe mental disorders, in fact, was a sophisticated and durable typology of what became known as the borderline and narcissistic disorders (Kernberg 1975), which developed along separate lines and found a respected place in clinical psychiatry and mental health practice more generally. The list of analysts who studied and wrote about schizophrenia is long and includes interpersonalists, ego psychologists, Kleinians and their successors, together with any number who might be described as individualistic or idiosyncratic. Key texts included papers by Paul Federn, Melanie Klein, Harold Searles, and many others. Some analysts published books on schizophrenia that remained in print for decades, such as Frieda Fromm-Reichman’s Principles of Intensive INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Psychotherapy (1950) and Silvano Arieti’s The I nterpretation of Schizophrenia (1955). Arieti served for years as editor of the voluminous American Handbook of Psychiatry. Today, psychoanalysts view schizophrenia through a diversity of lenses. Many if not most would acknowledge the medical consensus that it is essentially a biological disorder and would not recommend the kind of intensive therapeutic efforts employed in the past. Analysts seeking an in media res would hold that analytic therapy can be beneficial while giving up earlier etiological views. A minority of analysts, post-Kleinians and others, continue to view schizophrenia as amenable in a global sense to therapeutic intervention and theoretical elaboration. Although the classic psychoanalytic model of the etiology of schizophrenia is definitively obsolete, all these currents can coexist and develop alongside the diathesis-stress model of the disorder, currently dominant in psychiatry and medicine. JOHN GALBRAITH SIMMONS See also: Ambivalence; Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia; As if personality; Basic Problems of Ethnopsychiatry; Blank/nondelusional psychoses; Character Analysis; “Claims of Psycho-Analysis to Scientific Interest”; Collected Papers on Schizophrenia and Related Subjects, Dementia; Disintegration, feelings of, (anxieties); Ego Psychology and Psychosis; Foreclosure; Infantile schizophrenia; Internal/external reality; Language and disturbances of language; “Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams”; Narcissism, secondary; Numinous (analytical psychology); “On the Origin of the ‘Influencing Machine’ in Schizophrenia’; Organic psychoses; Paranoia; Paranoid psychosis; Paranoidschizoid position; Paraphrenia; Persecution; Psychological types (analytical psychology); Psychology of Dementia preecox, Psychology of the Unconscious, The; Psychoses, chronic and delusional; Psychotic/neurotic; Psychotic transference; Splitting of the ego; Symbolic equation; Symbolic realization; Thought-thinking apparatus; “Unconscious, The”; Violence of Interpretation, The: From Pictogram to Statement, Word-presentation. Bibliography Arieti, Silvano. (1955). The interpretation of schizophrenia. New York: Brunner. Fromm-Reichmann, Freida. (1950). Principles of intensive psychotherapy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kernberg, Otto. (1975). Borderline personality disorders and pathological narcissism. New York: Jason Aronson. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ScHLUMBERGER, Marc (1900-1977) Shapiro, Sue. (1981). Contemporary theories of schizophrenia: Review and synthesis. New York: McGraw-Hill. Willick, Martin. (2001). Psychoanalysis and schizophrenia: A cautionary tale. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 49, 27-56. Further Reading Munich, R.L. (1997). Contemporary treatment of schizophrenia. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 61, 189-221. SCHLUMBERGER, MARC (1900-1977) Marc Schlumberger, the French physician and psychoanalyst, was born in Mayenne on July 26, 1900 and died in Paris on June 26, 1977. Son of the writer Jean Schlumberger, whose homosexuality he had difficulty in coming to terms with, and a British mother who died prematurely, he studied medicine purely with a view to becoming a psychoanalyst. Dissatisfied with his first training analysis with Rene Laforgue, he began a second round of analysis with Sacha Nacht. He became an associate member of the Paris Psychoanalytic Society (SPP) on October 17, 1933, and a full member on March 2, 1937. He was secretary of the Revue frangaise de psychanalyse from 1934 to 1936. He continued to practice discreetly during the Occupation, forming, along with Andre Berge, Francoise Dolto and Juliette Boutonier, what they called the “Sainte-Geneviéve Quartet.” He also contributed to Georges Parcheminey’s lectures on psychoanalysis, given at the Sainte-Anne hospital. In 1946 he became secretary of the first bureau of the SPP under John Leuba as president, a position he retained until 1951. He remained true to Sacha Nacht during the 1953 rift and became president of the Society in 1957— 1958. While occupying various positions within the SPP and in the training Commission he continued to practice as psychoanalyst until his death. He stated without reserve that the future of psychoanalysis depended on women and “non-physicians.” (Chasseguet-Smirgel J., 1978) Although his colleagues recognized him as an excellent practitioner, the fact that he never overcame his reluctance to write prevented him from being among the leading figures of the SPP. In his first lecture to the SPP in November 1936 he described a case of masculine impotence that improved greatly after the patient admitted to using a dildo as a penis substitute. Although the analysand 1541 ScHMIDEBERG-KLEIN, Metitta (1904-1983) was very satisfied with this “cure” and terminated the treatment shortly afterward, the analyst went on to outline elements that could have been brought more to the fore while stressing the unconscious aggressive instinct and the insufficiently explored transference. The few articles he wrote illustrate his interest in interpreting dreams and studying the transference in the analytic process. He wrote a report: “Introduction 4 étude du transfert en clinique psychanalytique” (Introduction to the study of the transference in clinical psychoanalysis) for the fourteenth Conference of French-Speaking Psychoanalysts in 1951 and, with Serge Lebovici and Maurice Benassy, for the SPP colloquium in Paris in 1958. An article entitled “Paul,” written directly in English, recounts the short therapy and death of a young epileptic; in it, the depth of Schlumberger’s psychoanalytic thinking combines with the esthetic sense of a talented writer. In his obituary Janine Chasseguet- Smirgel saw the article as the sublimated elaboration of the author’s mourning for his young patient. She also stressed his “great independence of spirit, his humor and the total absence of conformism that his reserve, his courtesy and discretion at first belied.” His training couch was very much in demand. He analyzed Wladimir Granoff, Evelyne Kestemberg, Pierre Marty, Ruth Lebovici, Moustapha Safouan, Joyce McDougall, Conrad Stein, Georges Devereux, and many others. JEAN-PIERRE BOURGERON See also: France. Bibliography Chasseguet-Smirgel, Janine. (1978). Hommage a Marc Schlumberger. Revue francaise de psychanalyse, 42, 4, 757— VSD. Schlumberger, Marc. (1936). Sur la guerison @un cas d’impuissance. Revue francaise de psychanalyse, 9, 4, 589-605. . (1952). Introduction a l’étude du transfert en clinique psychanalytique. XIVth Congress of French-Speaking Psychoanalysts, Paris, 1951. Revue francaise de psychanalyse, 16, 1-2, 123-169. . (1959). Expression du transfert dans les réves. Revue francaise de psychanalyse, 23, 3, 381-392. Schlumberger, Marc; Benassy, Maurice; and Lebovici, Serge. (1958). Sur Putilisation du materiel onirique en thérapeu- 1542 tique psychanalytique chez l’adulte. Introduction. Colloque de la S.P.P., Paris, 1958. Revue francaise de psychana- VW Sepa Sy ln x ede SCHMIDEBERG-KLEIN, MELITTA (1904-1983) Melitta Schmideberg-Klein, physician, psychiatrist, and psychoanalyst, was born on January 17, 1904 in Rosenberg, Slovakia. She died in London on February 10, 1983, at seventy-nine. Melitta was the oldest child and only daughter of Arthur and Melanie Klein. Before the 1914-1918 war, the family moved to Hungary and Melitta grew up and was educated in Budapest. After the war Arthur Klein moved to Sweden and Melanie Klein moved to Rosenberg, where Melitta matriculated in 1921. She joined her mother in Berlin. Melitta worked for and obtained her MD in 1927 from Wilhelms-Universitat in Berlin. In 1924 she met and married Walter Schmideberg, who was an Austrian psychoanalyst and a friend of Freud, and who had joined the Berlin Society. In 1929 she started her analytic training with Karen Horney at the Berlin Institute, qualifying as an associate member of the Berlin Society in 1931. In 1927, Melanie Klein moved to London and joined the British Society. In view of the growing anti- Semitism in Germany, the Schmidebergs also moved to London and joined the British Society. Schmideberg- Klein was elected an associate member in 1932 and a full member the next year. She wrote many papers and eventually became a training analyst. Initially she often made use of her mother’s ideas in her papers (1930, 1935). She then went into analysis with Edward Glover in order to deal with her dependence on her mother, whom she hoped would understand. However, following the death of her elder brother Hans in 1934, and her mother’s reaction to it, she became increasingly critical of both her mother’s contributions and her behavior in the Society, as was her analyst, Glover. As Melitta increased her criticisms, the atmosphere in scientific meetings worsened. With the arrival of numerous colleagues from Vienna in 1938, the theoretical differences became more obvious, together with the fear that the essentials of psychoanalysis were in danger. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS When Schmideberg-Klein addressed the “extraordinary business” meetings to discuss these issues, her main contribution was concerned with the effect of Kleinian proselytizing on the conduct of the affairs of the Society, rather than concern about theoretical issues (1942). When Glover resigned from the training committee and from the Society in 1944, Melitta also withdrew from active participation in the Society, and she concentrated on her other interest—the treatment of delinquents. In 1945 she went to America. There she helped to found the Association for the Psychiatric Treatment of Offenders in New York. After the death of her mother in 1960, she decided to return to Europe. In 1962 she resigned her membership of the British Society, having developed her own form of psychotherapy (1938). In addition to many scientific papers and reviews, in 1948 she published her book Children in Need (1948). In 1957 she started The International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology of which she was managing editor. She died in 1983, unfortunately unable to make a rapprochement with her family or with other psychoanalysts in the British Society. PEARL H.M. KING See also: Controversial Discussions; Klein-Reizes, Melanie. Bibliography Schmideberg, Melitta. (1930). Psychotic mechanisms in relation to the development of civilisation. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 11, 387-418. . (1935). The psycho-analysis of asocial children and adolescents. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 16, 22-48. . (1938). After the analysis... some phantasies of patients. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 7, 122-142. . (1991). Paper read at the second Extraordinary Business Meeting. In PH.M. King, R. Steiner (Eds.), The Freud- Klein controversies 1941-1945. London: Institute of Psycho- Analysis-Routledge, p. 92-99. (Original work published 1942) SCHMIDT, VERA FEDEROVNA (1889-1937) Vera Schmidt, the Russian educationist, was born in Odessa in 1889 and died in Moscow in 1937. INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ScHmipt, VERA FeDERovNA (1889-1937) She was one of the leading figures of the “Silver Age” of psychoanalysis in Russia. Her parents were both physicians and she was particularly attached to her mother, Elisaveta Yanitskaia, who treated children who suffered from neurological disorders. Vera was later to say that her mother had a determining influence on her choice of career. In 1908 Vera enrolled in the Bestoujev classes in Saint Petersburg. This prestigious establishment was reserved for young girls: it specialized in training educationists and physicians. In 1912 she was brilliantly successful in completing her studies and graduated as a teacher. In 1913 she met Otto Youlievitch Schmidt and they married in the same year. Early in 1917 she worked Kiev in the supplies Committee. It was also at this time that she developed a passion for reading Freud, her perfect German enabling her to read him in the original. Otto Schmidt shared his wife’s passion for psychoanalysis and in this respect his role merits our attention. He was the only member of a large family of originally German peasants to have a university education. The brilliant young mathematician became a Privatdozent (university lecturer) while preparing his PhD thesis in order to become a professor. An enthusiastic supporter of the 1917 Revolution, he enlisted his talents as a scientist and organizer in support of the Soviets. He was a high-ranking functionary in several ministries ranging from public education to finance and the Gosplan (State Planning Committee), as well as being vice-president of the USSR Academy for Science. As a scientist he conducted several polar expeditions, exploits that won him a place in schoolbooks. However, the man had another passion: psychoanalysis. In 1921 and 1926 as vice-president of the coordinating committee of the Moscow Psychoanalytic Society and the Psychoanalytic Institute (with Ivan Ermakov as the head), he financed the publication of the “Library of Psychology and Psychoanalysis,” an important collection, under the directorship of the same Ermakov. Still via the Coordinating Committee, and thanks to his government posts, Otto Schmidt provided the necessary means for psychoanalytic institutions. In 1917 the committee moved from Petrograd to Moscow and the Schmidts moved also. Vera worked in the Childhood department of the Ministry for Public Education. She applied herself to an in-depth reading of Freud’s works, as well as writings by other western psychoanalysts. 1543 ScHnelper, ERNST (1878-1957) August 1921 saw the opening of the experimental child laboratory Home (Detski Dom), which was to be her life’s work. Vera had no psychoanalytic training, but her publications on the experiment and the work methods of the Home (which she herself translated into German for foreign reviews) were greatly appreciated by her colleagues in the West. Moreover, Vera kept a day-to-day detailed diary of the development of her son, Vladimir Schmidt, born in 1920. He was nicknamed Volik, not Alik, as erroneously indicated by certain publications on psychoanalysis in Russia. This immense monograph has never been published in Russian, nor translated into any other language. In early 1923 the Schmidts went to Vienna where they met Freud, with whom they discussed the children’s Home and psychoanalytic activities in Russia. They also visited other analysts, most notably Otto Rank and Karl Abraham. Discussions focused mainly on psychoanalysis and the organization of the collective educational system. This constituted a veritable apotheosis for the Russian Psychoanalytic Association, which became an associate member of the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA) in 1924. However, as early as mid-1923 problems began to arise for the Home. The threat of ideological censorship cast its shadow over psychology and child education. On August 14, 1925 the ministry for public education decreed the definitive closure of the children’s Home. Until 1929 Vera Schmidt was a researcher at the nervous system Study Center attached to the Academy of Science, where she worked on conditioned reflexes. From 1930 to 1937 she conducted research, in the cerebral pathology Experimental Center, into innate illnesses of the nervous system in young children. But she was already seriously ill with a thyroid tumor and her participation in the Tchelouskine polar expedition organized by her husband only contributed to hastening her demise. On July 17, 1937, Vera Schmidt died on the operating table. IRINA MANSON See also: Detski Dom; Russia/USSR. Bibliography Etkind, Alexandre. (1995). Eros niévozmojnogo-Istoria psykhoanalisa v Rossit. Moscow : Progress; Histoire de la psychanalyse in Russie. (B. Berelowitch, Trans.) Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1544 Schmidt, Vera. (1920-22). Le Journal de Volik (unpublished). SCHNEIDER, ERNST (1878-1957) A psychoanalytically oriented Swiss educator, Ernst Schneider was born on October 17, 1878, near Liestal, and died in 1957 in Muttenz, near Basel. A member of a large family living in the countryside around Basel, Ernst entered the Protestant Normal School of Muristalden, near Berne, at the age of sixteen. For five years he was a teacher in a one-room schoolhouse, then pursued studies at the University of Berne. During a year he spent in a pedagogical seminar at the University of Jena, his attention was drawn to the new currents of thought circulating in Germany. Back in Switzerland, in 1903 he headed a course in continuing education for teachers and thereafter, from 1905, the Hofwil-Berne Normal School. There Schneider put into practice his ideas on school reform, wrote instructional manuals for use in the primary grades, and in 1907 founded the Berner Seminarblatter, a renowned pedagogical journal that was later renamed Schulreform, which he headed until 1920. Schneider first learned of psychoanalysis in 1910. He then entered into contact with the Swiss Society of Psychoanalysis, underwent analysis with Oskar Pfister and later with Carl Gustav Jung, and participated actively in the summer courses organized by Pfister in 1912 on the relationship between pedagogy and psychoanalysis; he introduced Sigmund Freud’s science into his courses at the Normal School, where Hans Zulliger was his student. Recalled from his post as director in 1916, he taught psychoanalysis to educators at the Institut Jean-Jacques Rousseau in Geneva, then, from 1920 to 1928, taught general psychology, psychopathology, and characterology at the University of Riga (Latvia). He then established himself as a therapist in Stuttgart. On his return to Switzerland in 1946, he taught at the Institut de psychologie appliquée (Institute of applied psychology) in Ziirich. In 1926, together with Heinrich Meng, whom he had met in 1922 at the Berlin Congress (where he also met Freud), he founded the Zeitschrift fiir psychoanalytische Paidagogik (Revue of psychoanalytic pedagogy). He was an active contributor, publishing numerous articles on the relationship between the two sciences and on teacher training. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS An independent thinker who was passionate about pedagogy and open to new ideas, Schneider was more a practitioner than a theorist. Still, his institutional activity promoting an educational model informed by Freud’s discoveries is worth remembering. JEANNE MOLL See also: Switzerland (French-speaking); Switzerland (German-speaking). Bibliography Moll, Jeanne. (1989). La pédagogie psychanalytique. Origine et histoire. Paris: Dunod. Schneider, Ernst. (1929). Psychoanalyse und lehrerbildung. Zeitschrift fiir psychoanalytische Padagogik., 3, 237-251. SCHREBER, DANIEL PAUL (1842-1911) Daniel Paul Schreber, the subject of Freud’s famous retrospective case history, was born on July 15, 1842, in Leipzig, and died in April 1911 in the state mental asylum at Leipzig-Désen. In 1893 Paul was at the zenith of his legal career, having just been promoted to presiding judge at the Dresden Higher Regional Court, when he suffered a severe mental breakdown. Thereafter he spent about thirteen years of his life in mental institutions, and while at the Sonnenstein Asylum he composed his only book, Memoirs of My Nervous Illness (1988), a masterpiece that has since inspired scholars in diverse fields. Freud (1911c [1910]) used the book to illustrate his theory of the causal link between homosexuality and paranoia. This heuristically important essay was an exercise in applied, not clinical, psychoanalysis; it was a hermeneutic, not historical, account of a paradigmatic case of paranoia; it was not about Schreber’s life. Paul’s father, the son of Moritz Schreber and Pauline (née Wenck) Schreber, was a physician who specialized in exercise therapy for skeletal and muscular disorders, both with and without appliances. He attained fame with his 1855 book, I/lustrated Medical In-Door Gymnastics, which may be considered a forerunner of modern rehabilitation medicine. Moritz also published works on child rearing and education and was posthumously immortalized by the eponym “Schrebergarten,” or community garden, which he advocated as part of healthful living. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SCHREBER, DANIEL PauL (1842-1911) After completing his studies at the well-known Thomasschule (Thomas school), in 1860 Paul began studying law at the University of Leipzig, obtaining his doctorate in jurisprudence in 1869. Two years earlier he entered the ministry of justice and served as judge in a variety of cities in Saxony. In 1878 he wed Ottilie Sabine Behr (1857-1912), the daughter of operatic director Heinrich Behr. His family considered the bride unsuitable. A diabetic, Sabine suffered six miscarriages or stillbirths. Schreber was hospitalized three times with depressive illnesses, all following real and symbolically important losses: in 1884, after he was defeated in elections to the Reichstag; in 1892-1893, after he was made presiding judge and his wife gave birth to a stillborn boy; and in 1907, when his mother died and his wife suffered a stroke. He functioned normally after the first (moderate, nonpsychotic) depression, and between the second and third (severe, psychotic) episodes, during which time he raised an adopted daughter. The second depression (the first psychotic episode) began as a prodrome in the summer of 1893. He experienced anxiety dreams about his illness returning and had a fantasy of what a woman might feel during intercourse. By the fall he had a dramatic explosion of symptoms, including insomnia, agitation, hypochondriacal and nihilistic delusions, and attempts at suicide. He voluntarily returned to the Psychiatric Hospital of Leipzig University, under Paul Flechsig, director of the hospital. Months after admission, his agitated depression evolved into a syndrome that involved prosecutory hallucinations and delusions of sexual abuse and hostile human and divine influences, which Schreber described as soul murder. The human influences he attributed mainly to Flechsig. He also developed elaborate ideas of a fantastic cosmology and religion. By June 1894, with his wife’s consent and collaboration, Schreber was transferred by Flechsig to Sonnenstein. There major depression abated by 1897 but his wishes to be allowed to go home went unheeded. Superintendent Guido Weber (using Emil Kraepelin’s taxonomy) diagnosed him with incurable paranoia, and he was declared mentally incompetent, yet his wife remained hesitant. Schreber continued to express rage, and he elaborated fantasies that he was to be transformed into a woman to redeem the world. But he was lucid and able to get along socially. He was also able to write his book and to conduct his own defense 1545 ScHREBER, DANIEL Paut (1842-1911) in court, setting a legal precedent and regaining his freedom in 1902. However paranoia and schizophrenia might be parsed in the history of psychiatry, in psychoanalysis the former came to signify a delusional defense against homosexuality. Freud followed Kraepelin’s classification but was more interested in syndromes and character than in psychiatric diagnoses. He developed his dynamic formulation in collaboration with Sandor Ferenczi and in 1908 shared his ideas with Carl Gustav Jung, from whom he learned about Schreber in 1910. Locked into his theory, the universality and validity of which have since been challenged, Freud hypothesized that Schreber had a passive-negative oedipal constellation. He suggested that Schreber experienced through transference a passive sexual desire for Flechsig, transformed into the delusion of soul murder. This conflicted wish, Freud claimed, was pathogenic in Schreber’s second illness. It had previously appeared in the prodromal fantasy of what a woman feels during intercourse, a fantasy that occurred before Schreber had any personal dealings with Flechsig. In his delusion of soul murder, Schreber intended the soul murder to indicate that Flechsig betrayed him by banishing him to Sonnenstein. One should differentiate what may be valid in Freud’s dynamic ideas from what remains correct in his interpretation of Schreber. Focusing on Schreber’s so-called paranoia, Freud did not seem to consider the possibility of what today would be called a mood disorder; his own “Mourning and Melancholia” would not appear until 1917, after analytic contributions by Karl Abraham and Alphonse Maeder. Subsequent studies of the Schreber case have brought to light much new material. Zvi Lothane (1992) extended work by William G. Niederland (1974) and Hans Israéls (1989). Schreber’s fears of sexual abuse were a result of the psychotic process, not the cause; he suffered from repressed and manifest envy, aggression, and rage. In his illness, his real conflicts and transference relationships were decisive. These included conflicts with his mother (not mentioned by Freud), his relationships with the psychiatrists Flechsig and Weber, his career choice and work as a judge, and conflicts with his wife (which included serious disputes over money). In addition, there was the transfer to Sonnenstein and the incompetency ruling, which doomed his legal career. 1546 On the other hand, Freud did acknowledge that the fantasy of being transformed into a woman, completing the trajectory of the prodromal feminine daydream, was a self-healing rediscovery of a lost human relatedness. Lothane discovered that Schreber engaged in nonhomosexual cross dressing, a vehicle for dealing with heterosexual conflicts by means of diffusion of gender identity arising from identification with woman, mother, and wife. Although Niederland developed a heuristically fruitful formulation, he departed from Freud significantly by reading Schreber’s symptoms as determined not by endogenous wishes but by childhood trauma: paternal sadism alternating with physical seduction. These ideas are unsupported by the extant biographical evidence. For Niederland, Schreber’s father was a tyrant who tortured his son with terror-inspiring “machines.” In reality, these were rather innocuous appliances. Lothane showed a lack of support for Niederland’s inference of such trauma taking place when Paul was three to four years old, or for the idea that the father made use of antimasturbation devices. Israéls first pointed out that the father was unduly demonized. Niederland (1974) suggested that some of Moritz Schreber’s ideas were “useful in our effort to unravel a few among the many obscure features of the clinical picture and to make the hitherto incomprehensible aspects of Schreber’s delusional system accessible to further investigation” (p. 206). A psychoanalytically informed longitudinal case study supports a reappraisal of the basic facts, premises, diagnoses, and dynamics of Schreber’s story. Generally, psychoanalytic method, to be clinically valid, must combine hermeneutics and history. Zv1 LOTHANE See also: “Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides).” Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1911c [1910]). Psycho-analytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia (dementia paranoides). SE,12: 1-82. Israéls, Han. (1989). Schreber, father and son. Guilford, CT: International Universities Press. Lothane, Zvi. (1992). In defense of Schreber: Soul, murder, and psychiatry. London: Analytic Press. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ScHULTZ-HENCKE, HarRALD JULIUS ALFRED Cart-Luowie (1892-1953) Niederland, William G. (1974). The Schreber case: Psychoanalytic profile of a paranoid personality. New York: Quadrangle. Schreber, Daniel Paul. (1988). Memoirs of my mental illness (Ida Macalpine and Richard A. Hunter, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Original work published 1903) SCHULTZ-HENCKE, HARALD JULIUS ALFRED CARL-LUDWIG (1892-1953) Harald Schultz-Hencke, the German general practitioner, was born in Berlin on August 18, 1892 and died there on May 23, 1953. His father, Dankmar Carl Sigbert Schultz-Hencke, a physicist and chemist, founded an Institute of Photography (Lette-Verein) in Berlin, where he taught. His mother, Rosalie Adelaide May Zingler, a graphologist, claimed to be the natural daughter of Edward VII. She died of tuberculosis in 1902. Schultz-Hencke had a sister, Luanna Astrda, a half-sister, Hanna, and a brother, Walter, wno was killed during World War I (on May aid 15). In 1911 he began to study: medicine at Fribourgen- Brisgau (doctorate in 1917), philosophy with Heinrich Rickert, Edmund Husserl, and Martin Heidegger, and psychiatry with August Hoche and Ferdinand Kehrer. He volunteered as an army physician in 1914 and in 1915 he joined the Freideutsche Jugend, a German youth organization. Having somewhat mediocre health, he set about perfecting his knowledge of biology (studying fish from the Cichlidae family) and philosophy. Influenced by Siegfried Bernfeld, he “resolved” to shed light on schizophrenia “with the help of Freud.” In 1922 he did his training analysis with Sandor Rado, then trained in the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute (BPI). In 1927-28 he lectured there and created, with Otto Fenichel, the Clinical Seminar for “young analysts” (Kinderseminar). His critiques of metapsycholcgy and libido theory, as well as his relatively active therapeutic methods, resulted in his being forbidden to teach, and made him an “enemy within” for the German Society. First married to Frieda von Brixen, who suffered from acute nephritis, he left her and, after her death, married one of his patients, Gerda Bally, a Swiss half- Jew and former wife of analyst Gustav Bally. They INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS divorced in 1945. Neither union resulted in any children. In 1934 he was one of the founding members of the Deutsches Allgemeine Artzliche Gesellschaft fiir Psychotherapie (General german society for psychotherapeutic medicine) under Matthias H. Goring, and developed “neoanalysis.” In 1942-43, though not a member of the NSDAP (the Nazi party), he was chief medical officer to the army, before being freed from this to do therapeutic work in the Géring Institute, founded in 1936. On May 4, 1945, he founded the Institute for Psychopathology and Psychotherapy (IPP) with Werner Kemper, and became its director. The Institute practiced “neopsychoanalysis” (Neopsychoanalyse), supposed to be an amalgamation of all psychoanalytic schools, which Schultz-Hencke hadcreated in opposition to classic psychoanalysis. On November 7 of the same year he created the Neopsychoanalytische Vereinigung (Neopsychoanalytic association). The IPP was then transferred to the Zentralinstitut fiir psychogene Erkrankungen der Versicherungsanstalt Berlin (Berlin social security central institute for psychogenic diseases), which united the social security and retirement authorities under the directorship of Werner Kemper. The Institute for Psychotherapy was then founded on May 9, 1947. At the sixteenth Congress of the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA) in August 1949, a controversy broke out, in which Schultz-Hencke found himself in total opposition to Carl Miiller-Braunschweig and he refused to resign from the German Psychoanalytic Society (DPG) because he was convinced that he enjoyed the support of the “progressive forces” in the IPA. This resulted in Miller-Braunschweig creating the Deutsche Psychoanalytische Vereinigung (DPV, German psychoanalytic association) on June 10, 1950. Schultz-Hencke’s request for a chair of psychotherapy at the Charity was refused because of opposition from the DPG (September 26, 1949) which, in accordance with a directive from the Berlin court, opposed his appointment because the candidate already had financial revenues both in East Berlin (Charity) and West Berlin (director of the Institute for Psychotherapy). A brilliant and much respected professor, he was extremely disappointed by this lack of international recognition for his neopsychoanalysis. But in the GDR 1547 Scuur, Max (1897-1969) his psychoanalysis was the only form recognized until the end of the fifties and the DPG remained under the influence of his teachings until the sixties. His most outstanding works are: Einfiihrung in die Psychoanalyse (Introduction to psychoanalysis; 1927), Schicksal und Neurose (Fate and neurosis; 1931), Der gehemmte Mensch (The inhibited being; 1940), and Lehrbuch der analytischen Psychotherapie (Treatise on analytical psychotherapy;1951). REGINE LOCKOT See also: Allgemeine Arztliche Gesellschaft fiir Psychotherapie; Berliner Psychoanalytische Poliklinik; Deutsches Institut fiir Psychologische Forschung und Psychotherapie (“Institut Géring”); Germany; International Federation of Psychoanalytic Societies; Psyche. Zeitschrift fiir Psychoanalyse und ihre Anwendungen; Psychoanalytic splits. Bibliography Kemper, Werner W. (1973). Selbstdarstellung. In L. Pongratz (Ed.), Psychotherapie in Selbstdarstellungen. Bern-Stuttgart: Hans Huber, pp. 259-345. Schultz-Hencke, Harald. (1972). Einfiihrung in die psychoanalyse. Jena-Gottingen: Fischer-Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht. (Original work published 1927) . (1931). Schicksal und neurose. Jena: S. Fischer. . (1982). Der gehemmte mensch. Leipzig, Stuttgart: Thieme. (Original work published 1940) . (1951). Lehrbuch der analytischen psychotherapie. Thieme. SCHUR, MAX (1897-1969) Austrian physician Dr. Max Schur was born September 26, 1897 in Stanislaw, then in the Austro—Hungarian Empire and today part of the Ukraine. He died in New York on October 12, 1969. He completed his high school education in Vienna after his family moved there in 1914 to escape the advancing Russian army. After attending medical school at the University of Vienna from 1915 to 1920, he had most of his postgraduate training at the Vienna Poliklinik. He remained there as an associate in internal medicine until he left Vienna in 1938. His psychoanalytic education was less direct. As a medical student he attended Sigmund Freud’s intro- 1548 ductory lectures, which kindled a lifelong interest in psychoanalysis. He had a personal analysis with Ruth Mack Brunswick from 1924 to 1932 and was accepted into the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society in 1932. It was this combination of psychoanalytic orientation and internal medicine that led to his becoming Freud’s physician in 1929, a position he fulfilled admirably until Freud’s death in 1939. In the “biological study,” Freud: Living and Dying (1972), Schur tells the full story of this relationship and traces the theme of death in Freud’s life and writings. After Freud’s death the Schur family emigrated to the United States. Schur resumed his medical practice and obtained a position at the Bellevue Hospital in New York. While there he analyzed several patients with chronic skin disorders and in 1950 published a series of papers on the psychopathology and psychoanalytic treatment of psychosomatic disorders. In 1953 he became a training and supervising analyst and teacher at the Psychoanalytic Institute at the Downstate Medical Center of the State University of New York, where he was appointed Clinical Professor of Psychiatry. His scholarship and critical skills led to an editorial career that included three terms on the editorial board of The Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, and positions as editor of Drives, Affects, Behavior Volume 2 (1965), an anniversary volume dedicated to Marie Bonaparte, and co-editor of Psychoanalysis— A General Psychology (1966), a volume to honor Heinz Hartman on his seventieth birthday. © He was a founding member Psychoanalytic Association of New York and was its President in 1967 when the officers and board presented him with a festschrift as the most suitable gift for a man with his love of knowledge and learning. He died before it was published as The Unconscious Today: Essays in Honor of Max Schur (1971). By 1950 he had published more than fifty papers on medical subjects, rarely with psychological emphasis. From then on he published a series of clinically detailed and theoretically reasoned psychoanalytic articles and books. The first group of papers, on symptom formation and the development of affects, explored the implications of structural theory, especially from a genetic and adaptive perspective. “The ego in anxiety,” “The ego and the id in anxiety,” and “Comments on the metapsychology of somatization” were instantly influential and his concepts “somatization,’ “desomatization,’ and “resomatization” have entered the psychoanalytic lexicon. Studying the development of the instinctual drives, Schur compared INTERNATIONAL DICTICNARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ethological and child developmental concepts, as can be seen in his critical discussion of Bowlby’s Grief and Mourning in Infancy (1960) and “The Theory of the parent—infant relationship.” (1962) His monograph, The Id and the Regulatory Principles of Psychoanalysis (1966), argues firmly for a structured id and clarifies the pleasure/unpleasure principle. He felt that the idea of the repetition compulsion as a regulatory principle was superfluous. Schur was a major contributor among those analysts who in the 1950s and 1960s worked to elaborate, integrate, and systematize the theoretical and clinical implications of the later work of Freud, working to expand the ideas in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, Anna Freud’s The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense, and Heinz Hartmann’s Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation. Roy K. LILLesKov Work discussed: Freud: Living and Dying. See also: Annihilation anxiety; Coprophilia; Wiener psychoanalytische Vereinigung. Bibliography Schur, Max. (1953). The ego in anxiety. In R.M. Loewenstein (Ed.), Drives, affects, behavior. Essays in memory of Marie Bonaparte. (p. 67-103). New York: International Universities Press. . (1955). Comments on the metapsychology of somatizatization. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 10, 119-164. . (1958). The ego and the id in anxiety. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 13, 190-220. . (1962). The theory of the infant-parent relationship. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 43, 243-245. . (1966). Some additional “day residues” of “the specimen dream of psychoanalysis.” In R.M. Loewenstein, L.M. Newman, M. Schur, A.J. Solnit (Eds.), Psychoanalysis. A general psychology. (p. 462). New York: International Universities Press. . (1972). Freud: Living and dying. New York: International Universities Press. SCHWEIZERISCHE ARZTEGESELLESCHAFT FUR PSYCHOANALYSE The Swiss Psychoanalytic Society (SGPsa), consisting of physicians and non-physicians, was created in 1919. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SCHWEIZERISCHE ARZTEGESELLESCHAFT FUR PSYCHOANALYSE The Swiss Medical Society for Psychoanalysis, or Schweizerische Arztegeselleschaft fiir Psychoanalyse, is the result of a rift that took place within the first society in 1928. In 1928 Emil Oberholzer and Rudolf Brun founded a medical society for psychoanalysis, which admitted only physicians as full members, non-physicians being considered as no more than “scientific collaborators or collaborators in their specialty.’ This new society applied to be admitted to the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA) in 1929. The central committee of the IPA rejected the application in the following terms: “After careful consideration of the question the central committee feels obliged to reject this application because it deems the reasons given in justification of this new foundation to be insufficient. It deeply regrets the fact that the differences that appeared could not be resolved otherwise than through a rift of the old group.” The wording is Anna Freud’s. Oberholzer and Brun explained the reasons for the foundation of the new 1928 society in a very long memorandum. The rift was born out of a desire to reorder and was introduced in opposition to “the membership of non-physicians in the Swiss Psychoanalytic Society,” but also in rejection of “pseudoanalysts and physicians to whom psychoanalysis is in fact unknown.” The difficulties with regard to the non-physician fraction of the old society crystallized around Oskar Pfister. He was reproached with a variety of things: contenting himself with short treatment periods; being essentially preoccupied with symptoms to the detriment of defenses; practicing propaganda; receiving into the society people who claimed to be psychoanalysts when they had in fact been insufficiently trained; being unable to discuss deep theoretical matters; working insufficiently on his own selfanalysis; and using religious faith as a therapeutic lever. This difficulty seems to have existed from the foundation of the SGPsa. The division of the society into two sections, one medical, the other non-medical, had already been suggested in 1926. It was quite probably Freud’s 1926 text on lay analysis (1926e) that led to this foundation. Sigmund Freud, Max Eitingon and Johan H. W. Van Ophuijsen took the side of the old society. In 1936 the Swiss Medical Society for Psychoanalysis renewed its application for membership of the IPA. Philipp Sarasin, as president of the SGPsa, set up a commission, 1549 SCIENCE AND PSYCHOANALYSIS comprising Pfister, Kielholz, Zulliger, Christoffel, and Blum, which proposed to recognize the members of the medical Society on condition that they request it and that they accept “Freud’s point of view on the question of lay analysis and upon their agreeing to accept the Oxford ruling by non-physicians.” This report seems to have remained unanswered. In 1938 some members of the medical Society joined the SGPsa individually just as Oberholzer was emigrating to the United States. MuIREILLE CIPALI See also: Brun, Rudolf; Oberholzer, Emil; Switzerland (German-speaking). Bibliography Cifali, Mireille. (1990). De quelques remous helvétiques autour de l’analyse profane. Revue internationale d'histoire de la psychanalyse, 4, 291-305. Meerwein, Fritz. (1979). Reflexionen zur Geschichte der Schweizerischen Gesellschaft fiir Psychoanalyse in der deutschen Schweiz. Bulletin de la Société suisse de psychanalse, 9, 25-40. SCIENCE AND PSYCHOANALYSIS Sigmund Freud defined psychoanalysis as the “science of the unconscious” (Wissenschaft des Unbewussten). The use of the German term Wissenschaft suggests a particular mode of understanding: Wissenschaft is constituted as a system of knowledge organized into a coherent and ordered arrangement of fundamental concepts (doctrine), capable of accounting for empirically observed phenomena (the objects of possible experiments) by means of a method that ensures their intelligibility and verification through controlled reproduction of the experiment. This view of science, which was dominant in the nineteenth century, characterizes a form of rational experimentalism that gradually reduced the meaning of the word “science” to a narrowly defined “phenomeno-technique” (in the coinage of Gaston Bachelard). Freud’s project to scientifically account for psychic processes appears clearly in 1895 in the introduction to the Project for a Scientific Psychology: “In this ‘Project’ the intention is to furnish a psychology that shall be a natural science: that is, to represent psychical processes as quantitatively determinate states of specifi- 1550 able material particles, thus making those processes perspicuous and free from contradiction” (1950c [1895]). At this time he situated his discovery within the field of positivist materialism, where psychic processes are represented by means of the concepts of neurophysiology and the empirical data of clinical research; described, ordered, and _ reconstructed according to the method of the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften). The construction of a metapsychology, a set of concepts specific to psychoanalysis, would lead Freud to abandon the neurophysiological representations found in the “Project” without renouncing his ideal of science. Freud’s belief in a “scientific conception of the world,” his fidelity to the positivist ideals of his masters (especially Ernst Briicke) led him, in 1911, to cosign, along with Albert Einstein, David Hilbert, and Ernst Mach, an appeal (Aufruf) in favor of the creation of a society to help develop the awareness of positivist philosophy. This belief in the ideals of science can be found throughout his work, up to and including the Outline of Psychoanalysis (1940a [1938]), in which he writes: “Whereas the psychology of consciousness never went beyond the broken sequences which were obviously dependent on something else, the other view, which held that the psychical is unconscious in itself, enabled psychology to take its place as a natural science like any other. The processes with which it is concerned are in themselves just as unknowable as those dealt with by other sciences, by chemistry or physics, for example; but it is possible to establish laws which they obey and to follow their mutual relations and interdependences unbroken over long stretches— in short, to arrive at what is described as an ‘understanding’ of the field of natural phenomena in question.” Freud’s adherence to the ideals of science is tempered by an epistemological relativism remote from a “scientific catechism.” He writes: “It is a mistake to believe that a science consists in nothing but conclusively proved propositions, and it is unjust to demand that it should. It is a demand only made by those who feel a craving for authority in some form and a need to replace the religious catechism by something else, even if it be a scientific one. Science in its catechism has but few apodictic precepts; it consists mainly of statements which it has developed to varying degrees of probability. The capacity to be content with these approximations to certainty and the ability to carry on INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS constructive work despite the lack of final confirmation are actually a mark of the scientific habit of mind” (1916-17a). In other words, science demands that we renounce beliefs like magic, globalizing visions of the world, and absolute knowledge of metaphysics and religion. The work of the scientist entails the sublimation of epistemophilic sexual drives, which are present in the primal paradigm of the theories and techniques of infantile sexual investigation. Freud raised science to the level of a perfect model of the renunciation of the pleasure principle. Freud’s need to preserve psychoanalysis from the grip of religion and philosophy did not result in his abandoning it to physicians and scientists. As early as The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a) and the Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901b), he took the side of antiquity and popular knowledge against the exclusivity of official science. Throughout his work he manifested this oscillation between art and science, which he discovered that he shared with Leonardo da Vinci. On several occasions he pays homage to the poets and novelists, the true precursors of his own discoveries: “The authors of works of the imagination are valuable colleagues and their knowledge should be held in high esteem, for they have the gift of understanding many things that occur between heaven and earth and of which we have no idea. As for knowledge of the human heart, they exceed us considerably, we humble mortals, for they appeal to sources that are not yet accessible to science” (1908e [1907]). Freud recognized the role of the imagination in scientific work. This element of fiction within any theory leads him to speak of a “mythology of drives” and the metapsychological “sorcerer.” He identifies a dream element at work in science itself and shows, especially in Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's “Gradiva” (1907a [1906]), the overdetermination inherent in scientific discourse: science, as a whole, can be used for fantasy. Science, with its origins in dream and fantasy, can withdraw only temporarily behind respect for its methodological protocols and critical rationalism. Psychoanalysis can only maintain its scientificity through the implementation of a method within a given form of practice. This epistemological option appears constant over the development of Freudian thought: “What characterizes psychoanalysis, as a science, is less the material on which it works, than the technique of which it makes use” (1916-1917a). INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SCIENCE AND PSYCHOANALYSIS The ideal of Freudian epistemology has gradually given way to the ideal of analysis, which has sometimes been referred to as an ethic. The scientific ideology to which Freud clung has shown itself to be dated, and has been rejected by modern epistemology. Freud’s initial belief in the positivist demands of science has been beneficial: It has situated the specificity of psychoanalysis within a method capable of elevating resistance and transference, along with their analysis, to the rank of operators of knowledge of the unconscious. Freud refused to construct and describe a particular structure in which concepts, as well as objects, would remain inseparable from a method. But his positivist and realist prejudices sometimes prevented him from recognizing that the psychoanalytic system created its objects as it discovered them. With Freud, psychoanalysis, by recognizing its debt to poets and scholars, continued to enjoy the prerogatives of one and the privileges of the other, and vice versa, inscribing its praxeological specificity within the interstices of the traditional loci of knowledge. Having done so, and notwithstanding the classical and modern culture of its founder, it participates indirectly in the decompartmentalization of discourse characteristic of postmodernity. ROLAND GorRI See also: Catastrophe theory and psychoanalysis; Future of an Illusion, The, Matheme; Psychoanalytic epistemology; Psychoanalytic research; Weltanschauung. Bibliography Bachelard, Gaston. (1938). La Formation de I esprit scientifique: Contribution a une psychanalyse de la connaissance objective. Paris: Vrin. Freud, Sigmund. (1908e [1907]). Creative writers and daydreaming. SE, 9: 141-153. . (1916-1917a). Introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. Part I, SE, 15; Part II, SE, 16. . (1940a [1938]). An outline of psycho-analysis. SE, 23: 139-207. . (1950c [1895]). Project for a scientific psychology. SE, 1: 281-387. Hoffmann, Christian. (1995). Le manifeste positiviste signe par S. Freud en 1911. Cliniques méditerraneéennes, 45—46. Lacan, Jacques. (1966). La science et la verite. In Ecrits (p. 855-878). Paris: Le Seuil. 1551 SCILICET Further Reading Grunbaum, Adolph. (1984). The foundations of psychoanalysis. A philosophical critique. Berkeley: University of California Press. Holt, Robert (Ed.). (1997). Psychoanalysis and the philosophy of science. Collected papers of Benjamin Rubenstein. Madison, CT: International Universities Press. Wallerstein, Robert S. (1986). Psychoanalysis as a science: Response to new challenges. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 55, 414-451. Weinberger, J. et al. (2000). On integrating psychoanalysis and cognitive science. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought, 23, 147-176. SCILICET The first issue of the review Scilicet, under the direction of Jacques Lacan, appeared in May, 1968 from Seuil, the same publisher that two years earlier had brought out his Ecrits. Just seven issues would appear in all, counting two double numbers (2/3 and 6/7), over the next eight years. The Latin adverbial Scilicet (scire licet) means “it goes without saying”; Lacan translated it, as he stated in the first issue of the review, as: “You are permitted to know.” Beginning with the observation that he had “failed in a teaching project over the course of a dozen years which addressed only analysts,” Lacan added that during four years of teaching at the Ecole Normale Supérieure he had taken an interest in notions of formal mathematics. He wrote, “This review is one of the ways by which I expect success in my school, which operates differently from the so-called Societies, over resistance I encountered elsewhere” Thus, Scilicet was not addressed to analysts but to novices. That was why, punning on the English word bachelor, he stated, “I’ve decided to call you bachelier, to remind you of your place in this empire of pedantry, now so prevalent that actually entering this world will guarantee you nothing except a cultural sewer.” This comment may be viewed as a harbinger of the revolutionary period of May, 1968. Texts published in Scilicet were to be unsigned, “at least by anybody who would publish as a psychoanalyst.” The no-signature rule appeared to Lacan as “a radical solution... the right one to disentangle the 1552 contortions by which in psychoanalysis experience is forced to reject anything that might change it.” The decision to publish Scilicet was announced in the “Proposition of October 9, 1967...” that introduced the idea of the passe, a test that Lacan designed to evaluate students as they advanced from being analysands to becoming analysts. He also made reference to “Nicolas. Bourbaki,” the pen name that an influential group of French mathematicians lent to their collective work beginning in the 1930s. “Let us be clear,” Lacan added: “Scilicet excludes no one, but that whoever does not appear in it will not be recognized as one of my students.” Although Lacan listed the names of analysts who wrote for the journal in the next issue (2/3), anonymity for individual articles was maintained. Lacan published a number of interventions in Scilicet, these would later be republished in Autres Ecrits (2001). Around the same time, another review, L’Ordinaire du psychanalyste, also appeared, also with anonymous contributions, under the direction of Francis Hofstein and Radmila Zygouris. Although inspired by Lacan, these analysts had no allegiance to him and their review was a forum in which they could freely discuss clinical matters, providing a counterweight to Scilicet that proved a great critical success. After Scilicet ceased publication in 1976 due to Lacan’s loss of interest, it was followed by the first issue of Ornicar? in which Lacan published “Peut-étre a Vincennes....” Here he reaffirmed his aspirations for the department of psychoanalysis at the University of Vincennes and reiterated his confidence in Jacques-Alain Miller: “Hopefully, the curriculum at Vincennes will include teachings that Freud considered fundamental, enabling the analyst to confirm the findings of his personal analysis, to understand not so much the ends it served as the knowledge of which it made use.” By this time, Lacan seemed to be counting on the school to advance the foundations he laid down. He had furthered efforts to bring to bear mathematically-inspired formulas on psychoanalysis, with a lecture by Jean-Toussaint Desanti, “Reflections on the Concept of Mathesis,” which he introduced at a conference at Sainte Anne on “Psychoanalytic Knowledge,” on December 2, 1971. JACQUES SEDAT See also: Ecole freudienne de Paris (Freudian School of Paris); Ornicar?. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY oF PSYCHOANALYSIS Bibliography Lacan, Jacques. (2001). Autres ecrits. Paris: Seuil. SCOPTOPHILIA/SCOPOPHILIA The term scoptophilia, subsequently replaced by scopophilia, took its place in Anglophone psychoanalytic literature as a translation of the Freudian notion of Schaulust, “pleasure in looking,” in the sense of both seeing and being seen, as well as “curiosity.” Freud distinguished between two frequently encountered forms of this partial drive: one active, “voyeurism,” and the other passive, “exhibitionism,” neither of which he would necessarily rank among perversions (1910a [1909]). As early as 1936, Ernest Jones wrote a critique of Howard C. Warren’s Dictionary of Psychology in which he noted that the Glossary of Psychoanalytical Terms, which Jones edited in 1924 in preparation for the planned Standard Edition, contained “an important mistake ... , one which has been widely copied in psycho- analytical literature, namely, the incorrect term scoptophilia, which should be scopophilia” (p. 247). In 1963, James Strachey gave a more detailed explanation: “I must admit that the Glossary Committee disgraced itself lamentably over at least one word. The question was how to translate “Schaulust—the pleasure in looking. Greek terminology was all the rage, and the word ‘scoptophilia’ was suggested and accepted with acclamation. It certainly looked a little odd; but nevertheless it passed into all the four volumes of the Collected Papers uncriticized. You might have imagined that we should have remembered telescopes and microscopes and so have suspected that the Greek root for looking was something like ‘scop.’ Actually there is a Greek root ‘scopt,’ but what it means is ‘to make fun of.’ And so to this day you may still come upon references to the component sexual instinct of pleasure in derision” (p. 229). In fact, just as Bruno Bettelheim wrote in Freud and Man’s Soul, both terms are wrong and “the monstrosity contrived by Freud’s translators and perpetuated in the Standard Edition—“scopophilia”—certainly conveys nothing at all” (p. 91). He comments moreover that this seems a betrayal of Freudian thought: “It would admittedly be difficult to find a single English word to express what Freud had in mind with Schaulust— a term that combines the German word for lust, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SCOTOMIZATION or sexual desire, with that for looking, seeing, or contemplating— but a phrase on the order of ‘the sexual pleasure in looking’ would make his meaning clear; or since ‘lust’ is the near equivalent of the German Lust and has the further advantage that it can be used both as a noun and as a verb, it might be preferable to ‘sexual pleasure.’ In either case, the reader would know immediately what is meant. Sincewe have all repeatedly experienced great pleasure in watching something, in taking it in with our eyes, and have occasionally been ashamed of doing so, or even been afraid to look, although we wished to see, it would be easy to have both a direct intellectual and emotional understanding of Freud’s concept” (p. 90-91). Several hundred articles by the most illustrious names in psychoanalysis nevertheless testify to the persistence of the use of these two suspect terms up to the present day—a particularly striking example of the absurd errors that can be passed on from text to text. ALAIN DE MIOLLA See also: Exhibitionism; Identification with the aggressor; Look/gaze; Voyeurism. Bibliography Bettelheim, Bruno. (1983). Freud and man’s soul. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Freud, Sigmund. (1910a [1909]). Five lectures on psychoanalysis. SE, 11: 7-55. Jones, Ernest. (1936). Review of the “Dictionary of psychology.” (Howard C. Warren, Ed.) London: Allen and Unwin. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 17, 247-248. Strachey, James. (1963). Obituary of Joan Riviere, 1883-— 1962. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 44, 228- 230. SCOTOMIZATION The term scotomization, borrowed from ocular pathology, where scotoma refers to a spot in the visual field in which vision is deficient or absent, came into use by young psychiatrists in the 1920s to refer to a lack of awareness of others. Rene Laforgue, who refers to this origin for the term, proposed the notion in the context of his thinking on schizophrenics and “schizonoia” at the time of his earliest work in psychoanalysis. He believed it would account for his patients’ 1553 SCOTOMIZATION misapprehension of reality, and explained in a letter of June 10, 1925, to Sigmund Freud that “scotomization corresponds to the wish that is infantile, and therefore not repressed, not to acknowledge the external world but to put the ego itself into its place. In these conditions, the process of repression seemingly has not overcome the primitive stages in the normal way, but, on the contrary, has allowed them to persist.” Freud was puzzled and rather opposed to this innovation, which seemed to him a bit too “French” in its tendency toward simplification. In a letter to Laforgue dated May 1925, he argued: “A very important point seems to me that in repression ( Verdrangung) you distinguish a scotomization. I do not believe there are any grounds for this. We have stated that repression means that an instinct is suppressed and that the fact of being conscious is withdrawn from its ideational representation. Why split this unitary process in two? As for the other differences you establish between repression and scotomization, I do not understand them.” He nevertheless accepted Laforgue’s presentation of the notion in the article “Verdrangung und Skotomisation” (Repression and scotomization), which appeared in 1926 in the Internationale Zeitschrift fiir Psychoanalyse. However, he criticized it in a letter of February 18, 1926: “I read your article in German on scotomization from start to finish. I now understand why this concept and its relationship to repression pose such difficulties for me. I note that on one point you have abandoned me. You do not accept the metapsychological view that tries to characterize a psychical event in terms of its dynamic, topographical, and economic aspects—in terms of three coordinates, so to speak. It is especially by disregarding the topographical coordinate that you give up a sort of certainty, whereas it makes itself felt in the whole. You are not concerned with what happens in the three layers of the conscious, preconscious, and unconscious, and phenomena are therefore ambiguous. No doubt you have not dared to present to your compatriots this element of complication and speculation.” Freud returned to the topic in “Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety” (1926d), citing Laforgue’s notion as an example of the hysterical mechanism “which, by means of restrictions of the ego, causes situations to be avoided that would entail such perceptions, or, if they do occur, manages to withdraw the subject’s attention from them”. But his reflections on lack of awareness 1554 continued in the article “Fetishism,” where he wrote: “If we wish to separate in it [repression] more clearly the vicissitude of the representation from that of the affect and reserve the expression ‘repression’ for the affect, for the vicissitude of the representation it would be correct to say in German Verleugnung (disavowal). The term ‘scotomization’ seems to me to be particularly improper, for it evokes the idea that perception has been completely swept away, as in the case where a visual impression strikes the blind spot of the retina. On the contrary, the situation which we are describing shows that perception remains and that a very energetic action has been undertaken to maintain its denial.” Laforgue attempted a further refinement the following year in “Uberlegungen zum Begriff der Verdrangung” (Considerations on the notion of repression), but the notion of scotomization did not withstand Freud’s commentaries for long, even in France, where Edouard Pichon had been extremely receptive to it. If this notion is no longer used today, we can imagine that the discussions to which it gave rise, before the war, and Freud’s refusal to believe that a perception could be purely and simply suppressed, without conflict or any permanent psychic modifications, such as a splitting of the ego (1938), were no doubt not unrelated to what Jacques Lacan based on his-translation of Verwerfung called “foreclosure.” ALAIN DE MyOLLA See also: Disavowal; Laforgue, René; Pichon, Edouard Jean Baptiste. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1926d). Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. SE, 20: 75-172. . (1927e). Fetishism. SE, 21: 147-57. Freud, Sigmund, and Laforgue, René. (1977h [1923-33]). Correspondance Freud-Laforgue, préface d’André Bourguignon. Nouvelle Revue de psychanalyse, 15 (1977), 235— 314. Laforgue, René. (1926). Verdrangung und Skotomisation. Internationale Zeitschrift fiir Psychoanalyse, 12, 54-65. . (1928). Uberlegungen zum Begriff der Verdrangung. Internationale Zeitschrift fiir PsychoanalySE, 4, 371— 7A. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SCREEN MEMORY A screen memory (like forgetting and amnesia) is a compromise between repressed elements and defense against them. A paradoxical feature of recollections of this kind is they are less childhood memories than memories about childhood, characterized typically by their singular clarity and the apparent insignificance of their content. Important facts are not retained; instead, their psychic significance is displaced onto closely associated but less important details. Displacement is indeed the main mechanism here, as it is in the case of mnemic symbols or in the forgetting of a proper name, although to some degree condensation may also be present. The notion of screen memories was first presented by Freud in his paper so named (1899a), an extension of his work on mnemic symbols and the recollection of trauma in hysteria, a paper written as he was beginning to develop the idea of unconscious fantasy. Later, he concluded that such memories, so long as one knew how to interpret them, supplied the best available source of knowledge about the “forgotten” childhood years (1914g, p. 148). Any memory could be a screen memory inasmuch as one aspect of it screened out something unacceptable to the ego. In the “Project for a Scientific Psychology” (1950c [1895]), Freud told of Emma, who attributed her phobia to an insignificant scene recalled from adolescence while repressing a more important childhood event. The scene from adolescence, described by Freud as pseudos, was in effect a screen memory serving to negate the unacceptable fact of the traumatic seduction of a child by an adult, the memory of which was transformed into age-appropriate amorous feelings of adolescence (pp. 352-54). Freud clarified his notion of the defensive and idealizing falsification of memories in his account of the “Rat Man” case, where he noted “that people’s ‘childhood memories’ are only consolidated at a later period, usually at the age of puberty, and that this involves a complicated process of remodeling, analogous in every way to the process by which a nation constructs legends about its early history. It at once becomes evident that in his phantasies about his infancy the individual as he grows up “endeavours to efface the recollection of his auto-erotic activities’ (1909d, p. 206n). The adolescent’s memories concerning his or her childhood thus sought to negate an infantile sexuality incapable of oedipal victory and INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Screen Memory replaced it with more heroic ideas by means of a process that Freud compared to the creation of legends and myths. In “Remembering, Repeating and Working- Through” (1914g), Freud compared screen memories and dreams, observing that their common trait of visual representability enabled them to contain mnemic traces, albeit in the form of “dream-thoughts.” He added that the analysis of dreams and screen memories facilitated access to the reality of the direct experience of the past just as effectively as the analysis of simple memories: screen memories, he wrote, retained “all of what is essential. ... They represent the forgotten years of childhood as adequately as the manifest content of a dream represents the dream-thoughts” (p. 148). Could screen memories conceivably be considered a more faithful representation than memories per se? A note added in 1920 to the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality drew an analogy between screen memories and the fetish which conceals female castration (1905d, p. 154n); and in Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood, memory covers up a fantasy of the mother with a penis (1910c, p. 98). This fetishistic aspect of screen memories, as likewise of sensorily intense mnemic symbols and images, clearly foreshadows Freud’s later view of fetishism. The key reference here nevertheless remains “Screen Memories” (1899a). In this paper Freud evoked one of his own memories of childhood (though he ascribed it to someone else), in which he saw himself playing with other children in a very green meadow across which vivid yellow flowers were sprinkled; analysis led to a later memory, from adolescence, in which he was in love with a girl in a yellow dress. Thus the childhood memory was in this case screening off a later sexual wish: “there was no childhood memory, but only a phantasy put back into childhood” (p. 315). The displacement was flagged by the intensity of sensory representability (a gauge of the persistence of the wish). Sensory representability was not always primary, however: figurative elements could sometimes reflect wishful verbal connections, as, in the present context, when the delicious taste of bread in memory could be interpreted as reflecting the adolescent wish to “earn one’s bread” like an adult. As early as 1899, then, Freud suspected that any memory that presented itself to consciousness with great intensity might be a screen, so creating a theory of memory as a realm deeply affected by elements of 1555 SecHEHAYE, MARGuUERITE (1887-1964) fantasy: “There is in general no guarantee of the data produced by our memory” (p. 315). Without such a guarantee, psychoanalytical interpretation would place its hopes in the study of repetition (1914g) or on the evidence from analytic constructions (1937d). Inasmuch as screen memories cover up that which is unacceptable to the ego, they may be considered essentially defensive in nature. Their illusory aspect tends to infect all remembering, which thus may always be suspected of having a screen function. The notion tends to subvert the idea of historical reality, for it prompts the question whether such a reality is the outcome of creative interpretation or of genuine access to mnemic traces. In analyzing his own screen memories, therefore, Freud developed an idea that implied a new epistemology of time and of the complexity of reality: “as though a memory-trace from childhood had here been translated back... at a later date” (p. 321). “The recognition of this fact must diminish the distinction we have drawn between screen memories and other memories derived from our childhood” (p. 322). FRANCOIS RICHARD See also: Adolescence; Bernfeld, Siegfried; Lifting of amnesia; Memory. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1899a). Screen memories. SE, 3: 299-322. . (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123-243. . (1909d). Notes upon a case of obsessional neurosis. SE, 10: 151-318. . (1910c). Leonardo da Vinci and a memory of his childhood. SE, 11: 57-137. . (1914g). Remembering, repeating and workingthrough (Further recommendations on the technique of psycho-analysis II). SE, 12: 145-156. . (1937d). Constructions in analysis. SE, 23: 255-269. . (1950c [1895]). Project for a scientific psychology. SE, 1: 281-387. SECHEHAYE, MARGUERITE (1887-1964) Swiss psychologist Marguerite Sechehaye was born on September 27, 1887, and died in Geneva on June 1, 1964. 1556 The child of an authoritarian mother and an egalitarian father, Marguerite Burdet received a Protestant education, attended a secondary school for girls, and graduated with a diploma in literature and pedagogy. While at the university, she attended Ferdinand de Saussure’s lectures on linguistics and, thanks in part to her notes from that course, Charles. Bally and Albert Sechehaye, her husband, established the famous Course in General Linguistics. She also studied psychology and professional orientation at the Institut Jean-Jacques Rousseau, which was directed by psychologist Eduard Claparéde. After graduation, she became Claparéde’s assistant and opened a private practice as a psychologist. Psychoanalyst Raymond de Saussure was friends with Marguerite and Albert Sechehaye and, according to their adoptive daughter, Louisa Sechehaye-Duess, “Saussure once asked Marguerite why she would not undergo psychoanalysis. She refused on the pretext that psychoanalysis was too concerned with sexuality and that her religion forbade it. When Saussure replied that she ought not judge a method without having experienced it, Sechehaye quickly admitted as much and the next day began a training analysis with Saussure. According to her own emotional reactions at the time, she seems not to have considered it a serious analysis. This was during 1927-28. Soon thereafter, Saussure advised her to take on cases of her own, to analyze them first under control, then he let her practice on her own.” A group of analysts used to meet, during the 1930s, at the homes of Saussure and the Sechehayes, including Charles Odier, Henri Flournoy, Gustave Richard, and Georges Dubal. This gathering represented the first circle of analysts in Geneva after those of Charles Baudouin and Sabina Spielrein, who had analyzed Jean Piaget. Louisa Sechehaye-Duess wrote that Sechehaye “had a special influence among this group, gained by daring to show her ignorance while proposing very modern ideas. Everybody admired her mind and her beauty, knowledge, and modesty.” Marguerite Sechehaye was an attentive reader of Freud and Piaget. Analytic practice with schizophrenic patients led her to develop an original method of psychotherapy. When Freud learned of her research, he wrote her an encouraging note, but also informed her of his doubts. The method she called “symbolic realization” would become her tool in psychotherapy with schizophrenics. In 1950, she published her major INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SeEcoND WorLD War: THE EFFECT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF PSYCHOANALYSIS work, Autobiography of a Schizophrenic Girl, in which she demonstrated, directly and indirectly, the essentials of her method applied to her patient Renée, whom she would eventually adopt and who would later become a psychoanalyst. Marguerite Sechehaye agreed with Melanie Klein on many issues. For both, the quality of mothering was essential. They corresponded on the decisive importance of the earliest stages of psychic development. Sechehaye had also frequent contacts with renowned analysts such as Marie Bonaparte, Renée Spitz, Anna Freud, and Donald W. Winicott. In 1951-52, at Zurich University, assisted by her daughter, she gave a series of lectures to the physicians of the Burgholzli Psychiatric Clinic. She examined several schizophrenic patients in the presence of the house physicians and taught them the steps of her psychotherapeutic method. Sechehaye also published articles and refined her concept of symbolic realization. In 1962, psychiatrists in Milan honored her with a gold medal. On January 1, 1964, several months before her death, Christian Miller honored Sechehaye with a stirring homage before the Swiss Psychoanalytic Society, noting her influence upon young Swiss psychiatrists and psychoanalysts. Mario CIFALI See also: Psychoses, chronic and delusional; Schizophrenia; Switzerland (French-speaking); Symbolic realization. Bibliography Sechehaye, Marguerite. (1951). Autobiography of a schizophrenic girl. New York: Grune and Stratton. . (1956). A new psychotherapy in schizophrenia: Relief of frustrations by symbolic realization. New York: Grune and Stratton. . (1970, [c1951]). Symbolic realization. New York: International Universities Press. SECOND WORLD WAR: THE EFFECT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF PSYCHOANALYSIS The Second World War, like the First and in spite of the upheavals it caused in the psychoanalytic movement, was the origin of the international expansion of psychoanalytic theories and practices. Three principal factors were involved: The Nazi persecutions, by forcing Jewish psychoanalysts to emigrate and by elimi- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS nating all references to Freud in occupied Europe, shifted the international core of the movement to America. Freud’s death in the first weeks of the world conflict made all psychoanalysts responsible for what would or would not be considered “psychoanalytic,” leading to the gradual evolution from an autocratic to a democratic structure within the movement. The Allied victory in 1945, by spreading American culture abroad, promoted interest in liberated Europe in a certain conception of psychoanalysis, understood as a liberalization of behavior and a new understanding of the individual in a “free” Western world, essentially opposed to Soviet totalitarianism. Anna Freud and Ernest Jones made a determined effort to organize the emigration of Jewish analysts from Europe to countries willing to receive them (Steiner). Once Hitler came to power in Germany in 1933, persecutions against Jews forced many of them to leave professional organizations, emigrate from Germany and leave the famed Psychoanalytic Institute in the hands of Matthias Goring. The “German Institute of Psychological Research and Psychotherapy” attempted to eradicate psychoanalytic theory and practice, and the majority of therapists who remained in Germany compromised themselves during the twelve years the Nazi regime was in existence, although a few of them resisted. John Rittmeister attempted to, and was guillotined in 1943. Karl Landauer died in the Theresienstadt camp, Salomea Kempner in the Warsaw ghetto. In Austria the situation was similar after the Anschluss, when analysts were forced to emigrate. Freud and several family members and friends left Austria in 1938. In Italy Mussolini’s fascists had, less brutally but just as efficiently, muzzled publishing and destroyed psychotherapy and helped to eradicate support for Freud in Europe, where psychoanalysis had come into being and flourished. There were a number of Hungarian analysts, for example, who had to flee to South America or Australia, where they became active proponents of Freudian theories. In France, where several psychoanalysts like Rene Spitz and Heinz Hartmann had gone before the war and where Rudolf Loewenstein and Marie Bonaparte had emigrated after closing their institute and discontinuing the Revue frangaise de psychanalyse, some psychoanalysts continued to practice, although discreetly. Only René Laforgue, originally from Alsace, tried to collaborate with the Goring Institute, an attempt that was ultimately unsuccessful. Sacha Nacht joined the 1557 SECONDARY GAIN Resistance movement and Paul Schiff joined the Free French forces with whom he fought until the Allied victory. But it was among the Allies that psychoanalysis found the greatest support, and it was in Allied countries that it flourished to an unprecedented degree. In Great Britain the controversy between Melanie Klein and Anna Freud gave the British Psychoanalytic Society the tripartite structure it subsequently retained. Just as important were the contributions by psychoanalysts to the war effort through selection and psychological care of English soldiers. John Rickman and Wilfred Bion, among others, developed techniques that were the origin of group therapy practices such as the application of psychoanalytic practices to social problems. In America the influx of refugees disturbed the equilibrium of the American Psychoanalytic Society (APSA), the number of members rising from ninetytwo in 1932 to one hundred ninety-two in 1940 and to two hundred forty-seven in 1945. Obviously there were conflicts. In 1941 Karen Horney left the New York Psychoanalytic Society to found, with Harry Stack Sullivan and Clara Thompson, the Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis. The European analysts and their students took the reins of the APA and continued the discussions and quarrels that had characterized their behavior prior to emigrating. Some, like Otto Fenichel, who had been politically militant in the past, had to keep their opinions to themselves and adapt to an “American way of life,” of which, with the passage of generations, they became the most ardent defenders. We know that the APSA’s requirement of a medical degree led to the exclusion of many highly capable analysts, like Theodor Reik, from traditional psychoanalytic organizations; others, like Géza Roheim, were not allowed to teach. The International Psychoanalytic Association was in turn “Americanized,” with Freud’s prestigious students taking an increasingly greater part in its management. Their responsibilities also grew through the global expansion of psychoanalysis that emigration had caused and which accentuated the popular vogue for Freudian ideas in the United States. The 1945 Allied victory put an end to the dominance of German as the language of psychoanalysis, and English became the principle vehicle for Freudian theories. This was secured by the publication, between 1953 and 1974, of 1558 the twenty-four volumes of the Standard Edition of the Works of Sigmund Freud. The Cold War, and the time it took for traditional European psychoanalytic organizations to resume their activities in countries not subject to Soviet control, resulted in the unchallenged dominance of Anglo-American ideas for nearly fifty years in both international politics and psychoanalysis. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: First World War: The effect on the development of psychoanalysis. Bibliography La psychanalyse et les psychanalystes dans le monde durant la Deuxiéme Guerre mondiale. (1988). Revue internationale dhistoire de la psychanalyse, 1. Steiner, Riccardo. (2000). ‘It is a new kind of diaspora’: Explorations in the sociopolitical and cultural context of psychoanalysis. London: Karnac. SECONDARY GAIN. See Gain (primary and secondary) SECONDARY PROCESS. see Primary process/ Secondary process SECONDARY REVISION Secondary revision first appears in The Interpretation of Dreams (Freud, 1900), at the end of the section in Chapter 6 describing the mechanisms of the dream work. Viewed strictly with respect to dreams, secondary revision is a rearrangement of the seemingly incoherent elements of the dream into a form serviceable for narration. This involves logical and temporal reorganization in obedience to the principles of noncontradiction, temporal sequence, and causality which characterize the secondary processes of conscious thought. Above all, it is instrumental dream censorship and may produce omissions or additions. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS But this process, Freud goes on to explain, is also at work in daydreams, which organize remembered materials by “threading them onto the string of desire, between past, present, and future.” Furthermore, dreams may rework such fantasies, since they are just nearby in the Preconscious. Secondary revision may also be found in the symptoms of various afflictions, neurotic or otherwise, involving rationalization, the most extreme instances of which may be seen in obsessional neurosis. Secondary revision is a concept that has been studied relatively little since Freud (except for rationalization in obsessional neurosis), because analysts have preferred to explore the mechanisms of condensation, displacement, and symbolic representation. However, there is no shortage of promising avenues of research in this realm. First of all, we might consider its most important modes of operation: the act of putting into words, the translation of dream images into verbal images, and the transformation into narrative structure. This is somewhat akin to the rhetorical modes that effect the translation of visual images into figures of speech or style and, inversely, produce images in the mind of the listener. The difference is that the rhetoric of secondary revision serves the ends of censorship more than those of the drives and the primary processes of the unconscious (Duparc, 1995). Secondary revision seems to be more or less constituted of ready-made, second-hand rhetorical figures that are already stored in a dictionary of such images without occasioning the emergence of much in the way of the affect or desire of the person using them, in contrast to the novel and creative images produced by the representation of unconscious wish. The images in secondary revision are like the prefabricated fantasies that the dream disposes of like the day’s residues. They might also be compared to symbols, impersonal or collective materials described by Freud as the remains of ancient linguistic identities and cultural artifacts that work against the emergence of the dreamer’s individual unconscious. For some, the construction of the dream’s narrative is one of its most important aspects, perhaps even its driving force. Dreams are always meant to be told, even if only to oneself, and it is the moment of awakening itself, accompanied by the waning of the paradoxical sleep observed by neurobiologists, that triggers INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SECONDARY REVISION the transformation of reactualized remembered material into instinctual manifestations and finally into an organized narrative (Dejours, 1986). Moreover, dreams that have undergone secondary revision are, as Freud puts it in The Interpretation of Dreams, “dreams which might be said to have been already interpreted once, before being submitted to waking interpretation” (p. 490). This aspect might lead us to reflect upon the deferred effect of intellectual revision which analytic treatment aims for and which assumes, insofar as secondary revision is concerned, the somewhat dubious form of constructions involving a significant temporal element. As for pathology, the predominance of secondary revision over the other mechanisms of representation in dreams and language produces a hypermanifest discourse, in contrast to living discourse that is capable of breathing and resonating with the various levels of representation and figuration (rhythms of speech, mobile shapes, visual images, living rhetorical figures, and contemporary fantasies tied into a network of primal fantasies). This discourse is composed of what could be called “manifest mechanisms,” as opposed to representations with multiple meanings that allow for glimpses of latent thought and the return of the repressed. These mechanisms are a caricature of the mechanisms of dream representation: incessant displacement leading to acceleration, a manic flight by thinking, flooding-dreams (manic defense); massive metaphorization that produces uninterpretable symbolic dreams (for example symbolic equations in the dreams of paranoid patients), major ellipses, or traumatic repetitions in the operative thought of certain psychosomatic patients. FRANCOIS DUPARC See also: Day’s residues; Displacement; Dream; Dream work; Dream symbolism; Evenly-suspended attention; Manifest; Myth; Working-over. Bibliography Dejours, Christophe. (1986). Le Corps entre biologie et psychanalyse. Paris: Payot. Duparc, Frangois. (1995). L’Image sur le divan. Paris: L’Harmattan. Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4—5: 1-625. 1559 SECRET Guillaumin, Jean. (1972). Le réveur et son réve. Revue francaise de psychanalyse, 37 (1-2), 5-39. Further Reading Jacobs, Theodore. (2002). Secondary revision: rethinking the analytic process and technique. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 22, 3-28. SECRET A secret is a form of hidden knowledge. The word is etymologically related to excrement and seduction. Secret and excrement are both derived from the Latin verb cernere (crevi, cretum) which means: 1) to sift, to separate, to sort; 2) to discern or distinguish an object from a distance. The prefix “ex” relates to the idea of evacuation by sifting (excrement), the prefix “se” to the idea of separation, setting aside, and preserving (secretion, secret). The secret has a positive, necessary side and a negative, destructive side. Freud referred to it periodically throughout his work, but gave it a central place that anticipated his later research in “The Uncanny” (1919h). In 1892 the term appeared in his writings with an anal connotation whenever it brought to mind “foul words, those secrets we all know, knowledge of which we force ourselves to hide from others” (“A Case of Successful Treatment by Hypnotism” (1892-93a)). The secret was then associated with unhealthy obsessions in the neuro-psychoses of defense (1894a). In 1900, in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), Freud interpreted dreams of exhibitionism as a desire to “keep a secret.” In his discussion of Dora’s secret, masturbation, Freud wrote, “He who has eyes to see and ears to hear knows that mortals cannot keep any secret” (1905e [1901]). In 1906, in “Psycho-Analysis and the Establishment of Facts in Legal Proceedings,’ (1906c), Freud distinguished the criminal’s conscious secret from the unconscious secret of the hysteric. In “Infantile Sexual Theories” (1908c), he demonstrated the importance of the parents’ lying and secrecy regarding the question of the child’s origins, which allows the infant to access the secret in turn. “Children, once they have been deceived (the stork theory) ... begin to suspect that there is something hidden that grownups keep for themselves and for this reason they surround their later research in secrecy.” The parents’ secret is an enigmatic message triggering the birth of thinking in the infant. 1560 In 1919, in his article “The Uncanny” (1919h), Freud gave considerable space to secrets and their transmission. He discussed the various meanings of the secret and its connections with the familiar, meetings, love affairs, sin, intimate organs, commodes, and oubliettes. He also quotes Friedrich Schelling, who writes: “‘We call unheimlich anything that must remain secret and which becomes manifest.’ Heimlich also designates a ‘place without a ghost.’” Freud goes on to study the theme of the double, and its analysis strangely anticipates the ideas of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok on the phantom, the crypt, and the intrapsychic cave, and all the later work on the transmission of the secret across generations: “Doubling of the ego, splitting of the ego, substitution of the ego— the constant return of the similar, repetition of the same traits, characteristics, criminal acts, even the same names in several successive generations.” Abraham and Torok make an analogy between the work of the phantom and the work of the death drive, both working in silence without being mediated in words. In their article, “De la topic réalitaire: Notations sur une métapsychologie du secret,” they define the phantom as “a formation of the unconscious that is unique in never having been conscious. It is a result of the transition, whose method remains to be determined, from the parents’ unconscious to the child’s unconscious.” They add that the phantom is the “work in the unconscious of another’s inadmissible secret.” The phantoms that haunt the living are “the holes left in us by the secrets of others.” For these authors the phantom is associated with a preservative repression that fixes, immobilizes, and “the present past forms a block of buried reality, incapable of coming back to life without crumbling into dust.” After 1970 research on the role of the secret and non-symbolization in alienating transgenerational transmission increased. Clinical work increasingly helped illuminate concepts such as non-transmission, the transmission of the inert (with Micheline Enriquez and the heritage of psychosis), the leaping of generations and alienating unconscious identification (Alain de Mijolla, Haydee Faimberg), and failed blocked mourning (Jean Cournut). Incorporation, encryption, psychic fossilization, and unfulfilled mourning are reflections of the work of the negative that is active in the transmission of secrets across several generations. The work of Daniel Stern on affective tuning may, perhaps, serve as an explanatory link to account for this INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS intergenerational psychic transmission, which continues to remain enigmatic. Systemic family therapy is also relevant to secrets and their relation to family myths. The oedipal myth is already a history of a family secret. In families it is guilt that creates secrets and all the pathogenic rules that follow from them. Many American family therapists have shown that family secrets (divorce, suicide, madness, incest) can mask an implicit narcissistic wound, a devaluation of self image and family image leading to abnormal behavior in a descendant. We must not forget that our psychic life can only develop against a background that remains silent, secret—the secret Self of which Winnicott speaks. And along with negative and positive secrets, living transmissions exist alongside deadly transmissions of the secret. ANNE-MARrRIE MAIRESSE See also: Boundary violations; Cultural transmission; Free association; Ideational representation; Intergenerational; Phantom; Psychoanalytic treatment; Secret Committee; Thing, the; Truth; ““Uncanny, ’ The.” Bibliography Abraham, Nicolas, and Torok, Maria. (1994). The shell and the kernel. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1971) Faimberg, Haydeeée. (1988). A Vécoute du télescopage des generations: pertinence psychanalytique du concept. Topique, 42, 223-238. Freud, Sigmund. (1919h). The “uncanny.” SE, 17: 217-256. Kaés, René. (1993). “Introduction au concept de la transmission psychique dans la pensée de Freud,” in R. Kaés et al., Transmission de la vie psychique entre generations, Panis: Dunod. Mijolla, Alain de. (1982). En guise d’ouverture ... In Psychanalyse et musique, Paris: Les Belles Lettres. . (1987). Unconscious identification fantasies and family prehistory. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 68, 397-403. SECRET COMMITTEE The “Secret Committee” was the name given by Freud to the intimate circle of his closest collaborators. Its members were Karl Abraham, Sandor Ferenczi, Otto Rank, Ernest Jones, Max Eitingon, and Hanns Sachs. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SECRET COMMITTEE Hanns Sachs revealed its existence for the first time in 1944 in Freud, Master and Friend. Since Sachs was himself a member of this mysterious group, which had a profound effect on the construction and extension of the “psychoanalytic movement,” his memoirs must be taken with a grain of salt, especially when it concerns the image of his “hero Freud.” Nonetheless, the information is invaluable for understanding the significance of this group for the psychoanalytic movement and the institutionalization of psychoanalysis. The “psychoanalytic movement” achieved its organizational goals through the drafting of its first bylaws in 1910 by Freud and Ferenczi. What appears to be an alternate process of institutional development was initiated in 1912 with the formation of the secret committee. The creation of an informal organization within the organization was the result of tension between Sigmund Freud and his Swiss “dauphin” Carl Gustav Jung. Between 1910 and 1912 Jung had begun to distance himself from Freud, not only in terms of theory and clinical practice, but also in terms of their personal relationship (Schréter, Michael, 1995). The history of the secret committee took place in three phases: from 1912 to 1920, from 1920 to 1927, then from 1927 to 1936 (Wittenberger, Gerhard, 1995). Details about the committee’s first period— from its creation during the summer of 1912 until the Hague congress in 1920—are provided in five Komiteebriefe (committee letters), which do not yet present all the characteristics of the Rundbriefe (circular letters). These letters illustrate how, at this time, members of the committee discussed and jointly worked out the policies of the International Psychoanalytic Association (Wittenberger, 1996). The second phase covers the actual history of the institution. From this time, September 20, 1920, until March 14, 1926, there is an extensive correspondence of 361 circular letters. The significance Freud gave to the creation of the secret committee and the importance of each of its members in the struggle for “the thing” (die Sache) held in common, is reflected in the symbol of the ring bearing a Greek inscription, which he offered to each of his colleagues as a sign of recognition and esteem. Those who were so honored wore the ring as a mark of their intimacy. The uncertainty about when the exchange of circular letters ended is an indication that the secret committee had been disbanded. This was the result of the dynamic of the group as well as the 1561 SECRETS OF A SOUL relational dynamic between Otto Rank and Sigmund Freud and between Rank and his rival colleagues. There is a break in the circular letters (April 1924 to November 1926) corresponding to the period between the gradual cessation of letter writing among the members, following Rank’s break with Freud and his colleagues and ultimately from psychoanalysis, and the official renewal of correspondence. At the same time there was an increased exchange of private letters among the members of the secret committee and Freud, which had been noted by Ferenczi in a letter to Freud in March 1924. Because of the important role played by Rank during the peak years of the “international psychoanalytic movement” (Lieberman, E. James, 1985), his departure (end 1924—beginning 1925) and Abraham’s death (December 1925), together with Freud’s cancer (1923) all contributed to the destabilization and final breakup of the committee. It was only after the appearance of a circular letter, dated November 23, 1926, written by Anna Freud under her father’s dictation, that a new agreement was reached to reintroduce the circular letters. This initiated the third period of the former secret committee, which now functioned as the “central governing body of the International Psychoanalytic Association.” Jones relates how “After the Innsbruck Congress (1927), we modified the structure of the committee by establishing our private group at the head of the International Psychoanalytic Association. Eitingon was named president, Ferenczi and myself, vice presidents, Anna Freud secretary, and van Ophuijsen treasurer” (1957). Hanns Sachs left the committee. The governing body resumed writing the circular letters. The eighty-three letters whose existence we are currently aware of provide a glimpse of the problems facing those who were forced to emigrate during the rise to power of National Socialism. GERHARD WITTENBERGER See also: International Psychoanalytical Association; “On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement”; Psychoanalytic filiations. Bibliography Grosskurth, Phylliss. (1991). The secret ring. Toronto: McFarlane, Walter & Ross. Jones, Ernest. (1957). Sigmund Freud: Life and work. London: Hogarth Press. 1562 Lieberman, E. James. (1985). Acts of will: The life and work of Otto Rank. New York: The Free Press. Schréter, Michael. (1995). Freuds Komitee, 1912-1914: Ein Beitrag zum Verstandnis psychoanalytischer Gruppenbildung. Psyche, 49, 513-563. Wittenberger, Gerhard. (1995). Das “Geheime Komitee” Sigmund Freuds. Institutionalisierungsprozesse in der psychoanalytischen Bewegung zwischen 1912 und 1927. Tubingen: Diskord. . (1996). The circular letters (Rundbriefe), as a means of communication of the “secret committee” of Sigmund Freud. International Forum of Psychoanalysis, 5, 111-121. SECRETS OF A SOUL A silent film about the talking cure which tells the story of the outbreak, psychoanalytic treatment, and cure of a knife phobia in a man, who has been living for some years in a happy but childless marriage. A murder next door and the return of his wife’s cousin from abroad release in him a desire to murder his wife, which he does in a nightmare, but which a sudden inability to touch knives of any kind prevents him from carrying out in reality. Distressed to the point of suicide, he flees to his mother’s house where he remembers a psychoanalyst, who had previously recognized his state of mind, and whose help he now seeks. During months of treatment, telescoped into three sessions of intense dream interpretation, the analyst takes the analysand through the presenting problem back to the original childhood trauma and forward into health via a cathartic abreaction as unconscious processes are made conscious. Originally conceived as an educational film (Lehrfilm) with a booklet explaining the basic tenets of psychoanalysis in simple yet scientifically correct language, and based on an actual case history supplied by Karl Abraham and Hanns Sachs, the film developed into a full-length feature film with a cast of famous actors directed by Georg Wilhelm Pabst. Hailed as a masterpiece on its first showing in Berlin on March 24, 1926 it remains a milestone in the history of European cinema. By contrast, it sparked off an intense controversy among psychoanalysts. Siegfried Bernfeld and Adolph Joseph Storfer used Vienna and the Verlag to publicly accuse their Berlin colleagues of bringing psychoanalysis into disrepute by presenting it in a facile and bowdlerized version and tried, unsuccessfully, to launch a INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS rival project of their own. Freud, who from the outset had expressed his doubts about he feasibility of the Berlin project, was supported in his opposition to the making of any psychoanalytic film by Max Eitingon, Sandor Ferenczi, and Ernest Jones. The even-handed review printed in the Internationale Zeitschrift fiir Psychoanalyse—but not in the International Journal of Psychoanalysis—praised Abraham and Sachs for what they had achieved within the limitations imposed by the medium, and Sachs’s booklet as a textbook on the essentials of psychoanalysis. But it also made the point that the resolution to psychic conflict as presented was similar to the cathartic abreaction as described by Freud in his first two American lectures, and concluded that the film did not represent psychoanalysis as a whole, but the quintessence of “psychoanalytic therapy.” Paut Ries See also: Cinema criticism; Cinema and psychoanalysis; Germany; Sachs, Hanns. Source Citation Pabst, Georg Wilhelm. (1926). Geheimnisse einer Seele (Mysteries of a Soul). Newmann-film de Ufa-Kulturabteilung, Berlin. Bibliography Fallend, Karl; and Reichmayr, Johannes. (1992). Psychoanalyse, Film und Offentlichkeit : Konflikte hinter den Kulissen. In Fallend and Reichmayr, (Eds.): Siegfried Bernfeld oder Grenzen der Psychoanalyse Frankfurt am Main: Stroemfeld-Nexus. Harnik, Jend. (1927). Psychoanalytischer Film. Internationale Zeitschrift fiir Psychoanalyse, 13, 580-581. Lacoste, Patrick. (1990). L’Etrange Cas du Pr. M. Psychanalyse a Vécran. Paris: Gallimard. Ries, Paul. (1995). Popularise and/or be damned. Psychoanalysis and film at the crossroads in 1925, International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 76, 759-792. Sachs, Hanns. (1926). Psychoanalyse. Ratsel des Unbewussten. Berlin: Buchdruckerei Lichtbildbihne. SEDUCTION The “scene of seduction” connotes attempts at seduction, real or fantasied, in the form of advances, incita- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SEDUCTION tions, manipulations, or suggestions that are actively initiated by an adult vis-a-vis a child who is passive, even frightened. The “theory of seduction” was a metapsychological model worked out by Sigmund Freud between 1895 and 1897 and then abandoned; it assigned an etiological role in the production of psychoneuroses to memories of actual seduction attempts. In 1893, bolstered by the accounts given him by his patients, Freud spoke of seduction as a clinical discovery. During the period 1895-1897, based on these clinical observations, he worked out a theory designed to explain the repression of infantile sexuality. On September 21, 1897, in a well-known letter to Wilhelm Fliess, he laid out his reasons for abandoning this model (1950a, pp. 259- 260). This whole episode is eminently instructive from an epistemological as from a heuristic point of view, and is worth reviewing. On May 30, 1893, Freud wrote to Fliess: “I believe I understand the anxiety neuroses of young people who must be regarded as virgins with no history of sexual abuse” (1950c, p. 73). This was his first allusion to the role of sexual seduction, still very broad in its application. In “Draft H,” dated January 24, 1895, he presented the following narrative: “He had called her up to the bed, and, when she unsuspectingly obeyed, put his penis in her hand. There had been no sequel to the scene, and soon afterwards the stranger had gone off. In the course of the next few years the sister who had had this experience fell ill... . I endeavored to cure her tendency to paranoia by trying to reinstate the memory of the scene. I failed in this.... She wished not to reminded of it and consequently intentionally repressed it.... She had probably really been excited by what she had seen and by its memory. ... The judgment about her had been transposed outwards: people were saying what otherwise she would have said to herself” (1950a, pp. 207-209). Here then we have seduction, repression, and the foreshadowing of rejection, or what would much later be called foreclosure. On October 15, 1895, Freud wrote enthusiastically to Fliess: “Have I revealed the great clinical secret to you, either in writing or by word of mouth? Hysteria is the consequence of a presexual sexual shock. Obsessional neurosis is the consequence of a presexual sexual pleasure later transformed into guilt. ‘Presexual’ means before puberty, before the production of the sexual substance; the relevant events become effective only as memories” (1895c, p. 127). On May 30, 1896, he 1563 SEDUCTION distinguished the periods of life in which the event occurred from those in which repression came into play (1950a, pp. 229-231); and on May 2, 1897, with reference to fantasies in hysteria, he elaborated: “all their material is, of course, genuine. They are protective structures, sublimations of the facts, embellishments of them, and at the same time serve for selfexoneration. Their precipitating origin is perhaps from masturbation fantasies” (p. 247). The references to “structures” “embellishments,” and “fantasies” indicate clearly that Freud was becoming increasingly dubious. In “Draft L”” an attachment to this last-cited letter, he went on: “The aim seems to be to arrive [back] at the primal scenes. In a few cases this is achieved directly, but in others only by a roundabout path, via phantasies. For phantasies are psychical facades constructed in order to bar the way to these memories. Phantasies at the same time serve the trend towards refining the memories, towards sublimating them” (p. 248). Truth to tell, the great revision was already under way. In the famous letter to Fliess of September 21, 1897, Freud wrote: “I will confide in you at once the great secret that has been slowly dawning on me in the last few months. I no longer believe in my neurotica. This is probably not intelligible without an explanation. ... Then came surprise at the fact that in every case the father, not excluding my own [a phrase long censored by successive editors of the Freud-Fliess papers], had to be blamed as a pervert... though such a widespread extent of perversity towards children is, after all, not very probable” (p. 259). Freud now realized that scenes of seduction could be the product of reconstructions in fantasy whose purpose was to conceal the child’s autoerotic activity. This was a historic moment in the shaping of psychoanalysis, rich in lessons about Freud’s creative functioning and typical of the tendency of his innovative thinking to be overtaken by its own development, often changing course when faced by contrary evidence but always anchored in clinical experience. Freud’s self-analysis, undertaken in the preceding months, following the death of his father, certainly made it possible for him to carry through this radical break, to approach the discovery of the Oedipus complex, and eventually to reject his seduction hypothesis as false. Much later, in 1924, he would write the following in a footnote to his “Further Remarks on the Neuro-Psychoses of Defence” (1896b): “At that time I was not yet able to distinguish 1564 between my patients’ phantasies about their childhood years and their real recollections. As a result, I attributed to the aetiological factor of seduction a significance and universality which it did not possess. When this error had been overcome, it became possible to obtain an insight into the spontaneous manifestations of the sexuality of children which I described in my Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d)” (p. 168n). A return to clinical observation was thus mandatory, and Freud had no theoretical alternative in the end but to assign seduction to the category of those primal fantasies whose origin he ascribed to the prehistory of humanity. In the first Freudian clinical doctrine, the child at birth was naive, innocent, and when confronted by the sexuality of the other perceived it as external, foreign, and strange: this was the context of the seduction theory; in Freud’s second clinical doctrine, the child was acknowledged to be the “polymorphously perverse,” inherent possessor of a primitive sexuality, destined to unfold in its interactions with its human surround. But while, historically speaking, infantile sexuality thus replaced seduction (scene and theory), it never obliterated it completely, and both clinical views continued to be discernible within psychoanalytic treatment, as Freud himself frequently pointed out from the Three Essays to the Outline of Psycho-Analysis (1940a [1938]). HENRI SZTULMAN See also: Amnesia; Character neurosis; Childhood; Deferred action; Fantasy; General theory of seduction; “Heredity and the Aetiology of the Neuroses; Memories; Mnemic symbol; Primal fantasies; Hysteria; Introjection; Libido; Narcissism; Neurotica; Seduction scenes; Trauma. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1896b). Further remarks on the neuropsychoses of defence. SE, 3: 157-185. . (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123-243. . (1925d [1924]). An autobiographical study. SE, 20: 1-74. (1940a [1938]). An outline of psycho-analysis. SE, 23: 139-207. . (1950a [1887—1902]). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173-280. INTERNATIONAL DiCTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS - (1950c [1895]). Project for a scientific psychology. SE; 1; 281-387. Le Goues, Gérard, and Roger Perron (Eds.). (1996). Scenes originaires. Monographs of the Revue francaise de psychanalyse. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Further Reading Blum, Harold. (1996). Seduction trauma: representation, deferred action, pathogenic development. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 44, 1147-1164. Eissler, Kurt R. (1993). Erroneous interpretations of Freud’s seduction theory. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 41, 571-584. SEDUCTION SCENES Seduction scenes are real or imaginary situations of a sexual character involving a child, whether as a spectator or forced participant. During the first period in his work, Freud placed under the rubric of “seduction scenes” both the child’s observation of sexual relations between adults (generally the parents) and sexual advances made by an adult (often the father) or by an older child. Freud early on had the idea of seeking the cause of the neuroses in traumas brought on by premature sexual experiences imposed on a child by an adult. In a letter to Wilhelm Fliess dated May 30, 1893, he reported having “analysed two such cases, and the cause was an apprehensive terror of sexuality, against the background of things [a child] had seen or heard and only half-understood; thus the aetiology was purely emotional, but still of a sexual nature” (1950c, p- 73). This theme was central to Freud’s contribution to Studies on Hysteria (1895d), written in collaboration with Josef Breuer. The case of Katharina reported there (pp. 125-134) is typical: Freud related the young woman’s trouble to the fact that she has been a furtive witness to sexual relations between her elder sister and their father and then herself suffered similar assaults from him (in Freud’s original account, the father was discreetly described as an uncle). To begin with, Freud believed that such “seductions” were imposed upon children still in an asexual state. Their fright arose from incomprehensible scenes that they interpreted as violent and from their mystification by the adults’ apparent excitement. The imma- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SEDUCTION SCENES ture child thereafter retained a trace of an event whose traumatic character emerged only later, at puberty, when new events revived it. Freud’s initial misapprehension of childhood sexuality gave rise to two major psychoanalytic notions: the idea of the diphasic character of sexuality (the notion that psychosexual development occurred in two steps) and the idea of deferred action’ (according to which a mental event could derive its meaning and force from later events, by which it was reorganized retrospectively). From the outset, Freud faced the problem of how such a potential trauma could actually be deferred in this way. He first attempted to delineate an obscure “sexual-presexual” period (1950c, p. 127). He acknowledged that excitement and pleasure in response to a scene of seduction could exist in boys, if not in girls. Boys, he argued, being more active, tended toward obsessional neurosis, whereas girls, who experienced such scenes passively, were more likely fated to relive them in a hysterical mode (1950a, pp. 223-224, 228). The unsatisfactory nature of such attempted solutions led Freud, in his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d), unequivocally to accept the role of infantile sexuality. A correlated major revision is foreshadowed in Freud’s letter to Wilhelm Fliess of September 21, 1897. There he conceded that the scenes of “seduction” by the father that his hysterics recounted probably related “in every case” not to real events but to fantasies (1950a, p. 259). Although this startled Freud at first, he made a swift recovery, as he later recounted in vivid terms in his Autobiographical Study (1925d [1924]). The psychic implications of fantasies were much more important than the real event, he there claimed, and fantasies could be nourished by apparently banal or minor incidents (for example, the copulation of animals might be related in the child’s imagination to sexual activity between the parents). Freud never disavowed his theory of trauma, but in his second period, in which he focused his attention on the “primal scene” (the real or fantasized observation of sexual relations between the parents), he returned again and again to the issue of the relationship between “psychic” and “historical” (event-governed) reality. In his account of the “Wolf Man” case (1918b [1914]), the following question forms a veritable leitmotif: did the eighteen-month-old child really see his parents engaged in coitus a tergo (vaginal penetration from behind), with the trauma making its appearance by way of a dream 1565 SELECTED FACT only when he was four, or was the entire scene merely a “product of the imagination” (p. 49)? Freud was thus led to postulate that primal scenes, bequeathed to every individual by the history of humanity itself, helped form the psychic apparatus (1912—1913a). Sandor Ferenczi (1955), who fully acknowledged the role of childhood sexuality, emphasized the traumatic character not of the seduction itself but rather of the frustration that the child dramatically experiences when an adult, in the wake of exciting solicitations, disappoints the child by a rejection that points up the child’s powerlessness. This is perhaps inevitable if, as Freud himself emphasized, the mother, as the earliest caregiver, is, by force of circumstance, the first seductress (psychoanalytically conceived). Along similar lines, Jean Laplanche has made his “general theory of seduction” the centerpiece of his New Foundations for Psychoanalysis (1989). ROGER PERRON See also: “Confusion of Tongues between Adults and the Child”; Deferred action; “From the History of an Infantile Neurosis (Wolf Man)”; General theory of seduction; Katharina, case of; Seduction; Sexual trauma. Bibliography Ferenczi, Sandor. (1955). Confusion of tongues between adults and the child. In his Final contributions to the problems and methods of psycho-analysis. London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis. (Original work published 1933) Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123-243. . (1912-1913a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1-161. . (1918b [1914]). From the history of an infantile neurosis. SE, 17: 1-122. . (1925d [1924]). An autobiographical study. SE, 20: 1-74. . (1950a [1887—-1902]). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173-280. . (1950c [1895]). The origins of psycho-analysis: Letters to Wilhelm Fliess, drafts and notes, 1887-1902 (Eric Mosbacher and James Strachey, Trans.). London: Imago, 1954. . (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2: 48-106. Laplanche, Jean. (1989). New foundations for psychoanalysis (David Macey, Trans.). Oxford: Blackwell. (Original work published 1987) 1566 SELECTED FACT The expression “selected fact” was borrowed by Wilfred R. Bion from the French mathematician Henri Poincaré to refer to the element that makes it possible to give coherence to a group of scattered data. In Science and Method (1908), Poincaré considered the “selection of facts” that enabled science to discover laws of general validity—that is, facts that introduce order and coherence into the complexity of the world. Bion, elaborating his ideas in “A Theory of Thinking” (1962), initially placed emphasis on the containercontained relationship, taking as his paradigm the mother-infant dyad: The baby projects unassimilable “bad” elements of its own psyche onto the maternal psyche, and the mother bears the responsibility of restituting this material to the baby in a form that is psychically assimilable. Bion denotes this relationship using the conventional female and male symbols: 9 3. Bion later became interested in the process by which the mind transforms a chaotic, persecutory experience into an experience that is integrated, representable, and thinkable. This corresponds to the passage from what Melanie Klein calls the schizoid-paranoid position, in which the elements of the psyche are split and projected, and thus dispersed, to what she calls the depressive position, where these elements can come together and become stabilized in a stable configuration. Bion proposes the equation PS [<¢] D, where PS represents the schizoid-paranoid position and D represents the depressive position. The selected fact is the element that allows for passage from the first position to the second; it serves as a starting point for interpretation by the psychoanalyst, who becomes aware that a multitude of aspects of the patient’s material come together and make sense, beginning with a given element of the transference. Although he borrows the notion of the selected fact from scientific methodology, Bion establishes an essential difference between the scientific approach that seeks the laws of nature and the psychoanalyst exploring the psychic reality of their patient. The scientist is searching for logical connections among the objective data collected, whereas the psychoanalyst is interested in the emotional links that seem both to dominate the transference relationship and to create interconnections among the disparate elements of associative material: “Selected fact is the name for an emotional experience, the emotional experience that INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS consists in discovering coherence; its meaning is thus epistemological, and the relation among selected facts must not be considered logical,” writes Bion in “A Theory of Thinking.” Diper Houze. See also: Bion, Wilfred Ruprecht Bibliography Bion, Wilfred Ruprecht. (1962). A theory of thinking. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 63, 4—5. Reprinted in Second thoughts. London, Heinemann: 1967. Grinberg, Léon, Sor, Dario, and Tabak de Bianchedi, Elizabeth. (1991). New introduction to the work of Bion. Northvale, NJ, and London: Jason Aronson. Symington, Joan, and Symington, Neville. (1996). The clinical thinking of Wilfred Bion. London: Routledge. SELF The term se/fis used in several different senses. It can refer to the ensemble of the psychic agencies, the narcissistic organization of the psyche, or the conscious part of the psyche that enables the individual to recognize himself or herself as an agent and a subject endowed with reflexive consciousness. The German Selbst is sometimes encountered in Freud’s writings to refer to the person. Beginning in the 1940s, Melanie Klein used the word self in the general sense of representation of the inner world. We can attribute the first psychoanalytic usage of the term to Heinz Hartmann, who in 1950 used it to refer to the ensemble of the psychic agencies, all of them being the object of the narcissistic drive. The concept of self was partly included in the term Ich (“TY”), in the sense that Freud used it until 1920. Ich was both the person in his or her totality and subjectivity, and the organizing portion of the psyche. From the time of the second topography, the ego became a specific structure. To avoid ambiguity, some Englishspeaking psychoanalysts began to use the word self, already in use in philosophy and social psychology (William James, George Herbert Mead, Gordon William Allport), to refer to the whole person. The term self evolved in three different directions. During the 1950s it was used with similar meanings by the two British schools. In “Our Adult World and Its INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SELF Roots in Infancy” (1959), Melanie Klein proposed this definition of it: “The self is used to cover the whole of the personality, which includes not only the ego but the instinctual life which Freud called the id” (p. 249). Anna Freud also used it to refer to the totality of the psyche, but preferred to use it in reference to the self understood as the object of narcissistic investment. In the theories of Heinz Kohut, the self is no longer the object of narcissistic libido but instead an organizing structure of the mind. In his “generalized” conception (1978), the self is a “superordered” center, constructed outside of the action of the drives through the relationship with the self objects. The self objects (ideal, mirroring, or alter ego), which are manifested by the corresponding narcissistic transferences, create the major components of the self: the pole of ideals, the pole of ambitions, and the pole of knowledge (1984). The cohesion of the self, which depends on the empathy of the self-objects, determines the capacity to overcome the conflicts linked to the drives. The self is a structure, but Kohut also often alluded to self-representation and self-consciousness. The mind’s reflexive function was not particularly explored by psychoanalysis, although in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) Freud defined consciousness as “a sense organ for the perception of psychical qualities” (p. 615). Edith Jacobson described the self as the source of internal subjective reality and referred to the representations of self that are manifested in analysis (1964). Donald Winnicott (1961) considered this subjective perspective obvious. He attributed to the self the feeling of the reality, continuity, and rhythm of mental life, at the same time emphasizing that it is rooted in bodily sensations. In “Ego Distortion in Terms of True and False Self” (1960), he contrasted the true self, whose positive aim is “the preservation of the individual in spite of abnormal environmental conditions” (p. 143), to the false self, which is constructed in conformity to parental expectations and throughout life takes on the role of protecting the true self. Formation of the self is an aspect of psychic development, whether in terms of an epigenetic conception of development (Erik Erikson, Heinz Lichtenstein), a psychic skin (Esther Bick, Didier Anzieu), or precursors to the self (Daniel N. Stern). Kohut’s followers proposed an intersubjective theory of the analytic process that attributes a structuring role to the selfs reflexivity (Robert D. Stolorow, George E. Atwood, 1567 SeLF-ANALYSIS Bernard Brandschaft). A similar orientation is found in the work of Thomas Ogden, a post-Kleinian who developed the notion of the “analytic object” (André Green) in a theory of a third, subjective space, the locus of the relationship between patient and analyst. The use of self in a specific sense is often criticized for potentially depriving the word ego of the richness of its multiple meanings. Yet clearly, this concept has been instrumental in the formation of several important developments in psychoanalysis. However, owing to the very breadth of the term self, it only has a heuristic value if the sense in which it is being used is specified. MavurICE DESPINOY AND MONIQUE PINOL-DOURIEZ See also: Autism; Ego; Ego psychology; Fragmentation; Heroic self, the; Identity; Narcissism; Principle of identity preservation; Self (analytical psychology); Self psychology; Self (true/false); Symbolic equation. Bibliography Hartmann, Heinz. (1950). Comments on the psychoanalytic theory of the ego. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 7, 9-30. Klein, Melanie. (1959). Our adult world and its roots in infancy. In Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946— 1963. London: Hogarth, 1975. Kohut, Heinz. (1977). The restoration of the self. New York: International Universities Press. Ogden, Thomas. (1994).Subjects of analysis. London: Karnac Books. Winnicott, Donald W. (1960). Ego distortion in terms of true and false self. In The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment. London: Hogarth and Institute for Psycho-Analysis, 1965. SELF-ANALYSIS Self-analysis consists of interpreting one’s own preconscious and unconscious material (such as dreams, parapraxes, memories, fleeting thoughts, and intense emotions). Psychoanalysis is to a great extent a result of Freud’s self-analysis between 1895 and 1902. The analysis of his own dreams brought him confirmation of what he found in the dreams of his patients and, reciprocally, he better understood their dreams on the basis of his own. Freud’s self-analysis only became systematic after 1568 the death of his father in October 1896, and that it complemented and sustained his project of writing a book on the interpretation of dreams. The method of self-analysis developed by Freud included four steps: writing down the material obtained; breaking it up into sequences; free associating on each of the sequences; and finally, forging links based on the associations produced, these links thus taking on an interpretive significance. In his first conception of psychoanalytic training, Freud assumed that what was needed was a preliminary experience of self-analysis based on his model. Later, he took the position that the experience of a personal analysis should be required of future analysts. The risk of self-analysis is that it favors narcissistic selfsatisfaction or obsessional rumination. Self-analysis could never be a purely solitary mental activity: Freud developed it in the course of a scientific, emotional, and fantasy exchange with his friend Wilhelm Fliess from Berlin. An active self-analysis takes place within the context of interrelations (with family or patients, for example). Furthermore it presupposes a subjective commitment to remain in analysis despite the development of personal crises. Self-analysis can be fruitful if it prolongs the psychoanalytic work of which it is an echo. The main difficulty is the neglect of transference/countertransference relationships. One solution to this problem might be an introjection of the image of the analyst as an ideal object with whom an interior dialogue may then be pursued. This is probably what occurred in the case of Samuel Beckett after the interruption of his analysis with Wilfred Bion. His subsequent novels Mercier and Camier, Molloy, Malone Dies, and The Unnamable may thus constitute fictional sessions with a fictional analyst. DipiER ANZIEU Freud’s Self-Analysis; Interpretation of Dreams, The; Introspection; Jung, Carl Gustav. See also: “Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis, A”; Bibliography Anzieu, Didier. (1986). Freud's self-analysis (Peter Graham, Trans.). Madison, CT: International Universities Press. (Original work published 1975) Barron, James W., et al. (1993). Self-analysis. Hillsdale, NJ, and London: The Analytic Press. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS Self-consciousness is the mental activity through which the subject feels a sense of being or existing as a unique and total individual. Although it does not obviate the idea of the unconscious, this notion comes out of reflexive philosophy and its derivatives that hold that the human faculty of consciousness, apparent to itself and having itself as its object, marks the primacy of consciousness in the definition of the human psyche. This sense of identity, this initial subjective stance, is established gradually, being linked with the general development of the human mind in its relationship to itself and the outside world. This notion has taken on different forms throughout intellectual history, beginning with René Descartes’s insistence on the primacy of consciousness in the human mind. In the nineteenth century, after Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s work but before that of Edmund Husserl, Franz von Brentano posited selfconsciousness as being secondary to consciousness or intentionality toward the object. Husserl inverted that order, positing a reflective unit that is the mental locus of the relationship between subject and world, a pronominal form in which the subject, through discourse, identifies with what it believes it is or would like to be. This internal perception is also linked to the specular image of the body. Finally, this notion is found in the work of Ludovic Dugas, a late-nineteenth-century semiologist. Drawing from the work of Hippolyte Taine and Théodule Ribot, Dugas approached the idea of self-consciousness from a negative perspective by looking at its dysfunction: “state[s] in which the subject feels estranged from his being and from things and begins to doubt that all that he is feeling is real.” Such states entail alienation and the ego’s inner loss of meaning—a loss of the immediate grasp of the ego’s own inner states and the sense of existing. This sense of self-estrangement when the subject, in a state of indifference, feels his acts and emotions eluding him, is called depersonalization or loss of self-consciousness. The idea of mental activity that supposedly situates the individual as being self-present and in an unmediated state in relation to himself, first attacked by Friedrich Nietzsche, was to be further diminished by Sigmund Freud and psychoanalysis. Jacques Lacan showed how Freud’s discoveries decentered the subject INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS from the self-consciousness heretofore upheld by Hegelian philosophy and the solipsism of the Cartesian cogito. In “The Mirror Stage As Formative of the I Function” (1949/2002), Lacan describes the conditions for the appearance of self-consciousness: the moment when the infant, first in its mother’s arms and later, once the baby is physically able, by itself, can “already recognize his own image as such in a mirror. This recognition is indicated by the illuminative mimicry of the Aha-Erlebnis” (p. 3). This jubilatory assumption on the part of the infant situates the ego and the recognition of the bodily imago within the necessary mediation of the gaze and the desire of the other, initially represented by the mother. Without letting himself be caught up within the fiction of this movement, Lacan emphasizes “the imaginary capture of the self through specular reflection within the function of misrecognition [méconnaissance|] that remains attached to it” since alienation is the fact of the subject who is not “a being conscious of itself.” Jean Laplanche later called this mental activity the “capability or incapability of consciousness.” Child psychoanalysis (Donald Winnicott, Serge Lebovici, and Michel Soulé) defines the child’s sense of existing within the movement of his or her constitution of an inner universe, a container that makes possible relations with the self and the outside world. This container is elaborated gradually beginning with the child’s experience with the mother, which is never totalizing, and it keeps the subject from being absent from itself. The child’s rudimentary ego, after a period where there is no distinction between it and the world, creates a boundary where the J and the not-/ are distinguishable, just as the image of the body takes on wholeness. Didier Anzieu emphasizes in The Skin-Ego (1985) that “all mental function, in its development, is supported by a bodily function whose workings it transposes onto the mental plane.” This implies that all ego feeling is both mental and corporeal. Involved here are the subject’s sense of continuity in time, of proximity to self, of causality (the I), and of boundaries of which the subject is not always conscious, but which are revealed when normal mechanisms fail (depersonalization and certain states of mystical ecstasy). Carl Gustav Jung, although he prefers to speak in terms of “ego-consciousness,’ also links this mental activity to the child’s progressive individual differentiation. If the mother is the condition for the appearance of ego- 1569 SELF-ESTEEM consciousness, she is also that from which the child must distinguish itself. The process of individuation becomes merged with self-consciousness and “affect enables us to experience consciousness of ourselves with greater acuity and intensity.” Finally, in Freud’s work the notion of self-consciousness is not often used. In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) he emphasizes that self-consciousness is suspended in dreams. In “On Narcissism: An Introduction” (1914) he links it to, on the one hand, moral consciousness, which serves philosophical introspection, and, on the other, to the self-perception that nourishes self-esteem. In “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego” (1921) this sense of continuity that the individual acquires through his traditions, habits, and sphere of activity, this conscious personality, this “voice of consciousness” will be overtaken by the force of suggestion and hypnosis or, alternatively, will be deemed to be temporarily lost to the individual “following his absorption into the crowd.” Expanded knowledge about children, neurology, and the study of failures of self-consciousness can provide a better approach. It should also be noted that the distinctions between the self (in the various usages of that term) and the ego can help to establish with precision their locus and movement. Overall, the notion of self-consciousness remains marked by its philosophical origins. There can be no complete assurance of its consistency within psychoanalysis. Maris CLAIRE LANCTOT BELANGER See also: Alienation; Alpha-elements; Brentano, Franz von; Depersonalization; Ego feeling; I; Identity; Infant development; Mirror stage; Phenomenology and psychoanalysis; Schilder, Paul Ferdinand; Self-image; Selfrepresentation. Bibliography Anzieu, Didier. (1989). The skin ego. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. (Original work published 1985) Dugas, Ludovic. (1898). Observations et documents: Un cas de dépersonnalisation. Revue philosophique, 14, 500-507. Freud, Sigmund. (1921). Group psychology and the analysis oft he ego. SE, 18: 65-143. Lacan, Jacques. (2002). The mirror stage as formative of the I function. In Ecrits: A selection (Bruce Fink, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton. (Original work published 1949) 1570 SELF-ESTEEM Esteem for the self consolidates the sense of one’s own value or, more mundanely, one’s pride. Hence Freud’s interest in it in “On Narcissism” (1914c): “One part of self-regard is primary—the residue of infantile narcissism; another part arises out of the omnipotence which is corroborated by experience (the fulfillment of the ego ideal), whilst a third part proceeds from the satisfaction of object-libido” (p. 100). As the effect of ego demands on the “narcissistic” ego ideal and “moral conscience,” the feeling of self-esteem is at the origin of repression: “In paraphrenics self-regard is increased, while in the transference neuroses it is diminished” (p. 98). It is nevertheless the narcissistic part that proves to be determinant: when self-esteem is threatened, the result is shame rather than guilt. It therefore depends, in each individual life and in the different psychopathological cases, on the quality of the subject’s narcissism and thus on the modalities of the subject’s cathexis by and of the object, as it depends for its regulation on its relations with the ego ideal (Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel). All situations of existential crisis shatter it particularly, adolescence being an example, but especially melancholy because, according to Freud (1916—-17g), what differentiates it from “normal mourning,’ over and above the common loss of object that characterizes them both, is the fact that it calls itself into question. RAYMOND CAHN See also: Ego ideal; Inferiority, feeling of; “Mourning and melancholia”; Omnipotence of thought; “On Narcissism: An Introduction”; Self-consciousness; Self, the; Suicide. Bibliography Chasseguet-Smirgel, Janine. (1973). Essai sur ’Idéal du Moi. Contribution a l’etat psychanalytique de “la maladie d’idéalite.” Revue francaise psychanalyse, 37 (5-6), 735-929. Freud, Sigmund. (1914c). On narcissism: An introduction. SE, 14: 67-102. . (1916-17g). Mourning and melancholia. SE, 14: 237-258. SELF-HATRED Self-hatred is a reflexive notion: In it, the subject is the hating person and at the same time the hated person. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS The concept of self-hatred appeared in Sigmund Freud’s “Mourning and Melancholia” (1916-17a [1915-17]): “If the love for the object... takes refuge in narcissistic identification, then the hate comes into operation on this substitutive object” (p. 251). This concept was thus initially understood as the vicissitude of identification with the object of loss: “The self-tormenting in melancholia... signifies... a satisfaction of trends of sadism and hate which relate to an object, and which have been turned round upon the subject’s own self” (p. 251). Later, in “The Ego and the Id” (1923), it was developed in connection with obsessional neurosis and melancholia, but this time within the framework of the second topography. At this point, the superego was theorized as replacing the object that persecutes the ego: “The fear of death in melancholia admits of one explanation: that the ego gives itself up because it feels itself hated and persecuted by the super-ego, instead of being loved” (p. 58). Revealed here is the degree to which self-hatred is infiltrated by sadomasochism, and to which the superego, in this context, can become the “culture of the death instinct” (1923b, p. 53). In Language and Insight (1978), Roy Schafer emphasized the idea that the persecutor and the victim can unconsciously be persons other than the self, “say, one’s father in the act of hating one’s mother; here, ‘I hate myself translates into ‘In this way I enact, experience, and perpetuate my father’s hating my mother” (pp. 123-124). In (1990), André Green introduced the interesting idea of the logic of despair, in which self-hatred is posited as reflecting “a compromise between the inextinguishable desire for revenge and concern for protecting the object from the hostile desires directed against it.” NICOLE JEAMMET See also: Turning around upon the subject’s own self. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1916-17a [1915-17]). Mourning and melancholia. SE, 14: 237-258. . (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1-66. Schafer, Roy. (1978). Language and insight. New Haven: Yale University Press. SELF-IMAGE The term self-image has entered common usage. Initially referred to by psychologists, it was then taken up INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SELF-IMAGE by psychoanalysts without really being theorized. The self-image is ostensibly the representation that everyone has of themselves, in physical as well as physiological, sociological, and mental terms, envisioned through the prism of each individual self-evaluation at different stages of development and in different situations. Formerly, this notion was often considered to be the equivalent of the body scheme, postural scheme, somatopsyche, image of body-ego, or even somatognosia, although each of these notions had its own characteristics in terms of both its limits and its basic conception. Within this current of thought, the self-image can be seen as the representation of one’s own body, as both body-object within one’s environment and body in relation to others; or as the totality of a body that is initially experienced as being fragmented; or, finally, as a body that is experienced as autonomous, upon emergence from the period of non-differentiation. When used in psychoanalysis, the self-image brings together the notions of body image, self-consciousness, the concept of the self, self-identity, and egoidentity. Self-image is constructed through imitations of (for psychology), or identifications with (in psychoanalysis), people around the subject or real or heroic imaginary figures, throughout the development of narcissism and the setting up of the ideal ego, the ego ideal, and the superego. The self-image is dependent as well upon the type of object relations established. The notion of the self-image emerged in and was refined through the work of a number of authors, in particular that of Henri Wallon, who described the emergence, during the fifth stage of development (personalism), of self-awareness, which can only occur if the child is capable of having a self-image. This ability is related to the test in which the child recognizes itself in a mirror, whereas previously it had mistaken its specular image for another person. Heinz Hartmann, founder of the ego psychology movement, introduced the distinction between the ego, as psychic agency, and the self, in the sense of the person or personality proper. Paul Schilder posited that the formation of body image plays a determining role in the genesis of the representation of self that follows organization of the ego and the evolution of narcissism. In the view of Donald Winnicott, the mother and the primary mothering environment mirror (or do not mirror) back to the child an image of itself with which the child can (or cannot) identify. In this view, the self is 1571 SeELF-MUTILATION IN CHILDREN an agency of the personality in the narcissistic sense, a representation of self for the self, a libidinal investment of self. Heinz Kohut, in self-psychology theory, proposed the self as a notion that relates to the personality in its entirety, to psychic functioning as a whole, to the bodily self, as well as to more clearly defined elements such as self-representation. Jacques Lacan returned to the “mirror stage” to show that the young child’s recognition of its own specular image founds the dual relation, the dimension of the imaginary, and the ideal ego. In the view of Francoise Dolto, body image plays a part in the subject’s identification and determines the possibility of a feeling of self—of self within a body. Here, the body is the basis for the construction of the subject’s identity in relation to others, and the unconscious image of the body is the forgotten (repressed) bodily foundation for the feeling of self. It is important, too, to make clear that the selfimage also depends on how others see and assess us. We should perhaps add to the notion of the self-image the feeling of competence that is the cognitive construction corresponding to the opinion that each of us is subject to on the cognitive, social, and physical levels, and the relational feeling of self-esteem. PHILIPPINE MEFFRE See also: Body image. Bibliography Ajuriaguerra, Julian de. (c1980). Handbook of child psychiatry‘ and psychology. (Raymond P. Lorion, Ed.) New York: Masson. (Original work published 1970) Dolto, Francoise. (1997). Sentiment de soi, aux sources de limage du corps. Paris: Gallimard. Oppenheimer, Agnés. (1998). Heinz Kohut. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. SELF-MUTILATION IN CHILDREN In psychiatric usage the term “self-mutilation” (automutilation), a combination of the Greek root autos (self) and the Latin verb mutilare (mutilate), refers to behavioral forms characterized by acts of physical injury initiated by the subject; such acts are subject to various interpretations. Some authors have suggested the use of the expression “unintentionally self-inflicted injury,’ which avoids the assumption of intentionality (Carraz, Yves, and Ehrhardt, Raymond, 1973). 1572 The term “self-mutilation” was first used to describe physical injuries that schizophrenic patients or those suffering from melancholia sometimes inflicted on themselves. These were frequently directed at the genital organs, but the hands and eyes were also affected, especially in schizoid patients experiencing a period of mystical delirium. Karl-A. Menninger in 1935 wrote.a psychoanalytic study on the question. Menninger considered these signs of self-mutilation to be acts of self-punishment, which symbolized castration. Self-mutilation has also been described in other psychopathological contexts: in relation to masochistic compulsions or within the context of some perversion; such behavior has also been described during states of heightened or chronic anxiety. A particular and relatively frequent aspect is represented by the repetitive scarification or carving resorted to by some adolescents. The meaning of such behavior is difficult to interpret, especially since the subjects themselves do not associate any mental imagery with it. Aside from serving as a discharge designed to temporarily eliminate psychic suffering and short-circuit the activity of thought (Delarai- Chabaux, Catherine, and Roche, Jean-Francois, 1996) common to the majority of such behavior, this type of self-mutilation involves questions about the psychic status of the body in the adolescent. In the infant, self-mutilation is observed in children who are severely mentally retarded or autistic, and especially when both types of pathological organization are combined. The most severe forms occur in children who cannot speak. In this clinical context, several authors have attempted to identify the different psychopathological interpretations of self-mutilation. Salem A. Shentoub and Andre Soulairac refer to motor discharges, possibly “self-offensive,’ that can arise during normal development, especially between the ages of twelve and eighteen months, during the activity of sensory-motor exploration, although these have no pathological value. This primitive self-mutilation decreases rapidly with the development of the bodily schema and the differentiation between ego and not-ego. The infant perceives the causality of the pain; aggressive behavior towards others may then appear. In infantile psychoses self-mutilation is associated with the inability to modulate relational distance and the failure of defense mechanisms, which leads to a massive regression to undifferentiated stages of psychic INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS organization, where the ego is confused with the nonego. F. Dumesnil attempted to differentiate self-mutilating behavior in different forms of autism and infantile psychosis. Referring to the work of Frances Tustin and Margaret Mahler, he distinguished between “internal shell autism,” “external shell autism,” the “regressive autistic position,” “symbiotic psychosis,” and “moderate retardation.” In internal shell autism, self-mutilation appears to be a ritualized self-injurious gesture intended more for protection than destruction, in which the mutilatory aspects appear to be accidental. In external shell autism, self-mutilation, which is less mechanical but more violent than in the previous group, can be considered a self-destructive gesture without any specific intentionality. According to Dumesnil, its appearance is determined by an “experience of conflict” and must be understood as “the acting out of an intensely difficult emotion,” probably of a depressive nature. In the regressive autistic position, self-mutilation corresponds to a “discharge of hostility and anxiety” that occurs in connection with an anxiety- causing situation of internal or external origin, and which can be directed, in an undifferentiated manner, towards others or the self, because of the absence of a defined bodily limit. In symbiotic psychoses, where the mechanisms of splitting are prevalent, self-mutilation appears in situations where hostility gives rise to an “intense discharge of hatred.” Again, according to Dumesnil, these violent acts of self-mutilation, which specifically affect certain parts of the body, involve “an interplay of introjections and projections enabling the person to actualize the bad object within himself” and to maintain the feeling that the outside is completely good. Finally, in moderate retardation, self-mutilation results in a relatively disorganized discharge of anger triggered by some kind of frustration; it does not appear to be “directed” toward an object. Some self-injurious behavior observed in cases of autism or mental retardation seems to fall within the framework of the auto-sensory phenomena described by Frances Tustin. These serve to maintain the child in a “constant bath of stimuli” that helps to form a “psychic skin” (Esther Bick), protecting the child from environmental discontinuities. The attempt to damage corporal integrity here appears to be an unintentional consequence of self-stimulation. The physiological phenomenon of habituation likely contributes to their INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SELF-MUTILATION IN CHILDREN gradual intensification. In other cases, the deliberate search for a more or less violent contact with hard objects evokes what Tustin has described as an “autistic object.” The sensation of hardness serves to ensure a corporal limit while avoiding separation from the nipple. The distinction observed in clinical psychoanalytic work between the repetitive search for experiences of pure stimulation—which are aimed, well below the threshold of autoeroticism, at “feeling that one exists”—and a very real self-destruction can be compared with the opposition between life narcissism and death narcissism introduced by André Green. Self-mutilating behavior can also occur when relations involve a form of partial object cathexis, which gives rise to attempts at omnipotent control of the object; separation then leads to violent displays directed toward another or toward the infant himself. The intentionality of self-mutilating behavior appears more clearly here since it reflects a form of aggression turned against the self, as a response to frustration, or because it represents an appeal or request, possibly reinforced by the responses provided by those in the subject’s immediate environment. On another level self-mutilation raises the question of pain and its perception in the autistic child. Is there an elevation in the threshold of pain perception in these infants, as some neurobiological theories claim (endorphins)? Or is this apparent insensitivity the expression of an “intractable interweaving of pleasure and pain,” leaving the observer with the impression of a “desperate pleasure” (Jean Ochonisky)? There also exist a number of forms of rhythmic behavior, most notably head banging, which can result in lesions of varying severity. It is known that these symptoms are particularly frequent in situations of separation or emotional deprivation. It can be hypothesized that for the infant rocking plays the role of maternal holding, or that the self-mutilation is a substitute, in the body of the child, for the missing object. These attempts at psychopathological understanding are important for ensuring proper institutional care of such pathologies. Self-mutilating behavior arouses strong feelings of powerlessness and guilt, and sometimes even depression, in caregivers as well as parents. CLAUDE BURSZSTEJN See also: Autism; Infantile psychosis; Suicide. 1573 SeELF-OBJECT Bibliography Carraz, Yves, and Ehrhardt, Raymond. (1973). Lautomutilation chez des enfants en institution. Revue de neuropsychiatrie infantile, 21, 217-227. Delarai-Chabaux, Catherine, and Roche, Jean-Fran¢ois. (1996). Les coupures cutanées a l’adolescence: le carving. Sens et fonction du symptéme. Neuropsychiatrie de lenfance et de adolescence, 44, 43-48. Dumesnil, E. (1984). Analyse différentielle de cing pathologies précoces et des automutilations qui en découlent. Neuropsychiatrie de ’enfance et de ladolescence, 32, 183-— 195. Ochonisky, Jean. (1984). Lautomutilation a-t-elle un sens? Neuropsychiatrie de V'enfance et de adolescence, 32, 171— 181. Shentoub, Salem A., and Soulairac, André. (1961). Venfant automutilateur. Psychiatrie de l'enfant, 3, 111-145. Further Reading Fowler, C., and Hilsenroth, M. (1999). Some reflections on self-mutilation. Psychoanalytic Review, 86, 721-732. Fowler, J.C., et al. (2000). The inner world of self-mutilating borderline patients. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 64, 365-385. SELF-OBJECT The term self-object refers to any narcissistic experience in which the other is in the service of the self, the latter being defined as a structure that accounts for the experience of continuity, coherence, and well-being. It is a source of narcissistic feeling. The notion of selfobject appeared in the work of Heinz Kohut as early as his 1968 article, “The Psychoanalytic Treatment of Narcissistic Personality Disorders,” in his discussion of the narcissistic transference, in which the analyst is an archaic selfobject function in the narcissistic pathology. It was further developed in The Analysis of the Self (1971) in Kohut’s reconceptualization of narcissism. It refers to a normal narcissistic function that evolves in stages. The selfobject can be the object of a fixation that is the basis for a narcissistic transference. When the object is narcissistically invested, the narcissistic object relation is opposed to object-love. The hyphen (self-object) disappeared in The Restoration of the Self (1977), because the selfobject is 1574 not reducible to the archaic configurations of narcissism, but is rather defined as a dimension of experience. In 1979, Kohut generalized a selfobject that is inseparable from the self, of which it is the existential correlate and the source. At the beginning, Kohut reminded us in his 1980 article, “Selected Problems of Self Psychological Theory,” the descriptor selfobject was reserved for pathology in the sense of an archaic fixation, with the emphasis being placed on the grandiose self or the omnipotent selfobject. Like the object, the selfobject is at first replaceable, before becoming meaningful. In the mature self/selfobject relationship, the archaic selfobjects continue to exist at a deep level and to resonate as leitmotivs at various times. In How Does Analysis Cure? (1984), the selfobject became a dimension of experiencing another person whose functions are related to the self. The selfobject can thus be archaic or mature, anachronistic or appropriate. A support for the vulnerable self, it is the appropriate medium of the healthy self, like the oxygen that is necessary for life. The self is a feeling of unity, strength, and harmony if, at each stage of life, it receives the appropriate responses from the selfobject environment: availability and receptivity, the conditions for all mental life. The selfobject is an intrapsychic experience. In times of temporary vulnerabilty, the better equipped the subject is to find the selfobjects he or she needs, the healthier he or she will be. The selfobject is not necessarily a person; it can be music, an outing, a talent, culture, and so forth. It is often difficult to distinguish between that which comes from the object and that which comes from the selfobject, especially in adults. In pathologies or in the context of treatment, the distinction is easier to make. The object is recognizable through representation and comes from desire. The selfobject is an archaic or mature function that comes from need. If the other is the target of desire, anger, love, or aggression, that other is an object. If the other maintains cohesion, strength, and personal harmony, it is a selfobject. Object-loss results in mourning; the relationship to the selfobject cannot be lost but can instead undergo transformation. Kohut’s successors disagreed about the generalization of this term. In the view of some, the selfobject reflects vulnerability, even if it is temporary, in the self. An intact Self, according to this view, does not need a selfobject and the notion should be reserved for pathology. However, Kohut’s view is clear: The INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS selfobject is the oxygen that we are only aware of when we think about it. Deficiencies in the self result from the self/selfobject relationship. What was once limited to pathologies is generalizable to every subject and every course of treatment, and pathology stems from narcissism alone. The selfobject preserves the ambiguity of being simultaneously both a relationship and an experience. The metapsychology of the self underlying this concept can be criticized. AGNES OPPENHEIMER See also: Alter ego; Amae, concept of; Disintegration products; Idealized parental imago; Narcissistic injury; Narcissistic rage; Self psychology. Bibliography Kohut, Heinz. (1971). The analysis of the self. New York: International Universities Press. . (1978). The psychoanalytic treatment of narcissistic personality disorders. In The search for the self: Selected writings of Heinz Kohut (Vol. 1). New York: International Universities Press. (Original work published 1968) . (1984). How does analysis cure? Chicago: University of Chicago Press. . (1991). Four basic concepts in self psychology. In The search for the self: Selected writings of Heinz Kohut (Vol. 4). New York: International Universities Press. (Original work published 1979) . (1991). Selected problems of self psychological theory. In The search for the self: Selected writings of Heinz Kohut (Vol. 4). New York: International Universities Press. (Original work published 1980) SELF-PRESERVATION The term self-preservation in its simplest definition describes both the set of behaviors by means of which individuals attempt to preserve their own existence and the psychical processes that establish these behaviors. In an initial period of his work Freud associated these behaviors with the sexual instincts. He claimed that a person’s life is conditioned by two major forces: self-preservation instincts, by means of which people preserve their own existence, and sexual instincts, by means of which they ensure the survival of the species. This, he asserted, was fundamental biological data, adding that, as simple observation illustrates, they can INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SELF-PRESERVATION be opposed in conflicts that result in the essentials of psychic dynamics. Although the notion of “self-preservation’ itself did not appear until later, we find it foreshadowed as early as 1895 in “A Project for a Scientific Psychology” (Freud, 1950a), in which Freud accords major importance to attention viewed as the cathexis of perception and thought processes by the ego for the purpose of adaptation. He did not however explicitly formulate his thesis until 1910 in an article on “The Psychoanalytic View of Psychogenic Disturbance of Vision” (1910i, pp. 209-218), where he evoked “the undeniable opposition between the instincts which subserve sexuality, the attainment of sexual pleasure, and those other instincts, which have as their aim the self-preservation of the individual, the ego instincts” (p. 214). He was to return to this question and discuss it in greater detail in “Instincts and their Vicissitudes” (1915c, p. 124): “I have proposed that two groups of such primal instincts should be distinguished: the ego, or self-preservative, instincts and the sexual instincts.” He added cautiously—and somewhat short of his earlier affirmation that it was “fundamental biological data’—that it was merely a working hypothesis. In this passage we notice that in accordance with the approach opened up in the “Project,” he considers “self-preservative instincts” and “ego instincts” as being equivalent terms and that they are indeed instincts. However, “As the poet has said, all the organic instincts [...] may be classified as ‘hunger’ or ‘love’” (1910i, p. 214-215). This brings up the question as to what is a purely organic need (Berdiirfnis), what is instinctive behavior (Instinkt, in the sense of preformed and automatically executed behavior), and what is drive (Trieb, in the sense of a “borderline-concept” between the organic and the psychic). Freud was to be much more explicit on this question in relation to psychosexuality than in relation to self-preservation, which was relegated somewhat to the rear of his theoretical preoccupations. This opposition-complementarity nevertheless plays an important role in the theory that the sexual instincts are connected to the self-preservation instincts, based on the first case of sucking (1905d), and in the opposition between the pleasure principle and the reality principle: the ego instincts force the way to the reality principle, whereas the sexual instincts remain much more durably in the service of the pleasure principle (1911b). 1575 SELF PSYCHOLOGY With the arrival of the structural theory and the second theory of instincts opposing life instincts and death instincts, the question takes on new dimensions. All instincts are now seen as libidinal whereas the ego—at the expense of its largely unconscious function—more clearly takes charge of all adaptive functions (in the service of one of its “masters,” the reality of the external world, though simultaneously tyrannized by the other two, the id and the superego). The result is that, in the structural theory with the notion of conflict among the agencies, the status of the notion of “self-preservation” becomes relatively uncertain and the expression “ego instincts” tends to disappear from Freudian vocabulary. However, several post-Freudian trends have again highlighted the value of the notions of self-preservation instincts and ego instincts, particularly the Paris psychosomatic school (Marty, 1990). ROGER PERRON See also: Anaclisis/anaclitic; Drive/instinct; Ego-instinct; Eros; Sexual drive; Violence, instinct of. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1910i). The psychoanalytic view of psychogenic disturbance of vision. SE, 11: 209-218. . (1911b). Formulations on the two principles of mental functioning. SE, 12: 213-226. . (1915c). Instincts and their vicissitudes. SE, 14: 109-140. —. (1950a). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173-280. Marty, Pierre (1990). La Psychosomatique de Padulte. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. SELF PSYCHOLOGY Self psychology is the name Heinz Kohut chose for his psychoanalytic theory, which focused on narcissism. Beginning with his new metapsychology of the Self in Restoration of the Self (1977), Kohut distinguished between the limited form of self psychology proposed in The Analysis of the Self (1971), in which he maintained the classical theoretical formulations, and a generalized self psychology that formed a system, albeit a replaceable one. The application of self psychology to other pathologies was the result of further clinical and theoretical elaboration, and also of criti- 1576 cisms leveled against Kohut that may have led him to adopt more or less extreme positions. Kohut presented the limited form of self psychology as both a complement to Freudian psychoanalysis and a critique of Heinz Hartmann’s ego psychology. He held that uncovering narcissistic transference makes it possible to analyze narcissistic pefsonalities, just as transference neuroses do for neurosis. The rehabilitation of narcissism against the ideal of health and maturity led to a preoccupation with development of the self and its defects. Soon, however, postulations concerning the self as a narcissistic structure came into conflict with the theory of the drives. Without eliminating the latter, Kohut considered them to be secondary to the structural defects in the self. The status of neurosis always remained ambiguous in Kohut’s work, where it was seen both as a nosological entity unto itself and as being included among the disorders of the self. Neurosis is seen as resulting from oedipal conflicts and castration, but the self is deemed either to be whole at this phase of development, or else already weakened and incapable of resolving the difficulties of the oedipal phase, which then becomes a complex. Self psychology, through the empathic method advocated by Kohut from 1959, focuses on the self and its fluctuations. It considers microstructures, in contrast to the analysis of neuroses, which focuses on - macrostructures—the agencies of the psyche. Self psychology represented an epistemological turning point in which the analyst was no longer, or no longer only, a screen for the patient’s projections, but rather a participant in treatment, which the analyst influences; the impact of the analyst’s presence and, of course, his or her attitudes and interventions on the patient’s narcissism, becomes an object for analysis. The emergence of self psychology can only be understood in relation to ego psychology, in which the ego, as an agency endowed with functions, is distinguished from self-representations that are the object of narcissistic cathexis. Self-representations are supplanted by representations of the Self, and the Self thus becomes a structure within the psychic apparatus, a reflection of the state of the subject’s narcissism. Self psychology is sometimes considered to be a major deviation from metapsychology. Its focus on a psychology of defects and not only on instinctual conflict has generated a great deal of controversy. AGNES OPPENHEIMER INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS See also: Action-thought (H. Kohut); Alter ego; Bipolar self; Borderline conditions; Compensatory structures; Disintegration products; Ego; Ego (ego psychology); Empty Fortress, The; Fragmentation; Grandiose self; Id; Identity; Instance; Kohut, Heinz; Mirror transference; Narcissistic defenses; Narcissistic injury; Narcissistic transference; Object; Paranoia; Principle of identity preservation; Schizophrenia; Self; Self (analytical psychology); Self-image; Self-object; Self-state dream; Self, the; Self (true/false); Transference of creativity; Twinship transference/alter ego transference; United States. Bibliography Kohut, Heinz. (1971). The analysis of the self. New York: International Universities Press. . (1974). The restoration of the self. New York: International Universities Press. . (1984). How does analysis cure? Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Further Reading Goldberg, Arnold. (1988). A fresh look at psychoanalysis: The view from self psychology. Hillsdale, NJ: The Analytic Press. . (1998). Self psychology since Kohut. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 67, 240-255. SELF-PUNISHMENT Self-punishment (or the “need for punishment”) is a tendency, postulated by Freud, which drives certain subjects to inflict suffering upon themselves and search out painful situations, for the purpose of neutralizing a feeling of unconscious guilt. In the framework of the second topography of the psychic apparatus, Freud later attributed self-punishment to the activity of an especially intransigent superego, to which the ego submits. Freud utilized the two notions “need for punishment” and “self-punishment” throughout his work. The emphasis in the former was on the feeling of unconscious guilt, and on the masochism proper to the ego, which demands punishment, whether it comes from the superego or from the outside, whereas the latter stressed the punishing activity of the superego, to which the ego submits—the superego in turn draws its energy from the reversal of sadism into autosadism. Punishment then was applied with no recourse to an external object, through the intervention of internal topographical duality of the ego-superego. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SELF-PUNISHMENT Very early in his career, Freud began noticing a certain number of phenomena and symptoms which conveyed a dimension of self-punishment. In manuscript N (May 31, 1897, in 1950a) he discussed the question of symptom formation and postulated that it constituted a compromise between the libido and the desire for punishment, based on hostile feelings towards the parents: “The motives of libido and of wish-fulfillment as a punishment then act by summation.” In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), he distinguished certain “punishment dreams,” whose punitive value allows the lifting of censorship and thereby the realization of certain desires. Subsequently, the whole field of pathology and all the suffering connected with it came to be looked at through the perspective of self-punishment, whose goal was to satisfy feelings of unconscious guilt: e in obsessional neurosis, where self-reproach and self-punishing behavior were connected to repressed, aggressive, hostile, and cruel feelings. ¢ in melancholia, where the self-punishment compulsion can lead to suicide. In a fit of melancholia there is introjection of the lost object and the possibility of unleashing sadism against the object. Without introjection, the guilt of the melancholic prevents the sadism from emerging. After the introjection the sadism can reign unchecked because it is also an attack on the subject, becoming self-punishment (1916—17g [1915]). Within the second topography, Freud attributed to the superego the punitive role to which the ego submits, and culpability became a tension between the two entities. He emphasized also that some behavior can be motivated by the quest for punishment. For example, the transgressing subject, by obtaining punishment, is looking to gratify a desire for masochistic satisfaction (1928b [1927]). Freud was especially interested in what he called the negative therapeutic reaction, where the repressed sadism of the patient inclines him to sabotage the cure, combining revenge against the therapist with self-punishment. More recent works have attempted to distinguish more clearly between guilt and moral masochism. Schematically, it can be averred that in neurotic guilt, the sadism of the superego is in control, while in moral masochism, the ego eroticizes the feeling of guilt. The desire for punishment is then resexualized 1577 SeELF-REPRESENTATION in a regressive way, becoming the source of masochistic satisfactions. BERTRAND ETIENNE AND DOMINIQUE DEYON See also: Aimée, case of; Castration complex; “Dostoyevsky and Parricide”; Guilt, feeling of; Moral masochism; Suicide; Superego. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. Parts I and II. SE, 4-5. . (1916—17¢ [1915]). Mourning and melancholia. SE, 14: 237-258. . (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1-66. . (1924c). The economic problem of masochism. SE, 19: 155-170. . (1928b [1927]). Dostoevsky and parricide. SE, 21: 173-196. . (1950a [1887-1902]). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173-280. Mvuzan, Michel de. (1972). Un cas de masochisme pervers. In La Sexualité perverse. Paris: Payot. Nacht, Sacha. (1971). Le transfert. In Guérir avec Freud (pp. 41-43). Paris: Payot. (Original work published 1965) Rosenberg, Benno. (1991). Masochisme mortifere et Masochisme gardien de la vie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Further Reading Fenichel, Otto. (1928). The clinical aspect of the need for punishment. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 9, 47-70. Roth, Bennett. (2000). The piano: A modern film melodrama about passion and punishment. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 17, 405-413. SELF-REPRESENTATION Self representation is the image the subject has of him or herself based on his or her own interpretation. It is one of the factors of the ego and its representation as termed “an individual, differentiated, real, and permanent entity” (Racamier) particularized by a distinctive history and modes of feeling, thinking, and doing. This accounts for Heinz Hartmann’s distinction between, on the one hand, the ego as a function and 1578 the self as the object of narcissistic investment, and, on the other, “object representations” and “self representations,” meaning the unconscious, preconscious, and conscious representations of the corporeal and mental self within the system of the ego, representations that are invested with both libidinal and destructive energy to become love objects and objects of hatred. Jacques Lacan took a different approach. In “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience” (1949/2004), he described the mirror stage as “a drama whose internal pressure pushes precipitously from insufficiency to anticipation—and, for the subject caught up in the lure of spatial identification, turns out fantasies that extends from a fragmented image of the body to what I call “orthopedic” form of its totality—and to the finally donned armor of an alienating identity that will mark his entire mental development with its rigid structure” (p. 6). Thus self representation is just of one aspect of the subject’s representations, marked by its belonging to the ego—that is, its insertion into reality, the aim of a consubstantial coherence with its narcissistic dimension and the lure it implies. To varying degrees it can be destabilized, called into question, unmasked by desires and conflicts, or seriously disturbed. The latter may take the form of the radical self-depreciation of melancholia, the overvaluation of self in mania, or a collapse into schizophrenia, where a more or less delusional new self representationis reconstituted as savior of the world, self-procreator of all human lineages, of other such variant. Other less dramatic but particularly trying forms occur when the self representation is called into question in borderline states or transformed into transsexualism. Any existential crisis, particularly in adolescence, can challenge or cause serious disturbances in self representation. These occur in anorexia, bulimia, dysmorphophobia (fear of deformity), or psychotic decompensation, all considered by American authors as defects in self-representation or as pathologies of identity (Erikson). Among the various elaborations proposed by authors who espouse Hartmann’s conception, Edith Jacobson’s has the merit of showing the correlation between the self and the object world, between identity and the feeling of identity within a framework that combines individuation and identification, and thus grants a determining role to the unconscious. RAYMOND CAHN See also: Object; Object relations theory; Self; Self-image. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Bibliography Erikson, Erik H. (1968). Identity: Youth and crisis. New York: Norton. Jacobson, Edith. (1964). The self and the object world. New York: International Universities Press. Lacan, Jacques. (2004). The mirror stage as formative of the function of the I as revealed in psychoanalytic experience. In Ecrits: A selection (Bruce Fink, Trans. ), pp. 3-9. New York: Norton. (Original work published 1949) Racamier, Paul-Claude. (1963). Sur la personnation. In De psychanalyse en psychiatrie. Paris: Payot. SELF-STATE DREAM Heinz Kohut believed that there were two types of dreams: the first expresses verbalizable latent contents, such as conflicts; the second expresses efforts to bind the nonverbai tensions of traumatic states. In the first type, the analyst can follow the free associations of the patient to uncover unconscious meaning. In the second, free associations do not lead to unconscious layers of the mind; rather, the imagery remains on the same level as that of the manifest content. Examination of the manifest content reveals that the healthy sectors of the psyche of the patient are reacting to a changed condition of the self, either overstimulation or depletion or a threatened dissolution. This second type of dream is called a “self-state dream” and is similar to dreams occurring in traumatic states. The correct interpretation of such dreams is to recognize the patient’s specific and general vulnerabilities. Other writers after Kohut have expanded on his idea, stating that nearly all dreams can be seen as representing the state of the self in that they all express some vulnerability and/or psychoeconomic imbalance. On this view, a dream may be interpreted both as to its latent content and as to its portrayal of the self. These authors see no inherent contradiction in Kohut’s dualistic view of dreams, though some have suggested that patients have limited capacity for association. ARNOLD GOLDBERG See also: Dream; Self psychology. Bibliography Kohut, Heinz. (1977). The restoration of the self. New York: International Universities Press. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SELF, THE SELF, THE The concept of the Self that was proposed by Heinz Kohut in The Analysis of the Self (1971) is not a Freudian concept and it does not appear as such in the Vocabulaire de la psychanalyse (Laplanche and Pontalis); nor does another concept of self that refers to the narcissistic axis of the psyche. When Freud spoke of the instinctive mechanism of “turning around upon the subject’s own self” in “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes” (1915c, p. 126), he did not mean the subject’s own self as an intrapsychic entity, but rather an equivalent of the subject’s own body, upon which the second phase of the drives was founded. The concept of “Self” is really the invention of Heinz Kohut: the Freudian idea of the “splitting of the ego, through the Kleinian idea of the splitting of the object molding the ego, by way of the mechanisms of introjection and projectionled, finally to the Kohutian idea of a Self, which becomes the object of all the narcissistic cathexes. Understanding Kohut’s model is only possible within the context of the history of ideas. In the 1960s the nosographic concept of limit-states and borderline pathologies, belonging neither to neurotic nor psychotic structures, surfaced. This resulted in the progressive delineation of hybrid or composite disorders, centered on issues linked to representation or identity of the Self—that is to say, in the last resort, to narcissistic personality disorders (Otto Kernberg). Researchers and clinicians had swung back-andforth from the oedipal to the narcissistic axis. This seesawing may be what is behind the emergence of the concept of Self. In effect, Heinz Kohut proposed a new theory of the ego, adding a notion of the Self, partially of Winnicottian provenance (c.f. Winnicott’s false self) to the Freudian Ich. In any case, the Kohutian theory of the Self has shown itself to be quite fecund. It has had considerably more of an impact in the Anglo-Saxon world than in Europe, especially in France, where it has been often understood as an attempt to desexualize psychopathology, or even as something similar to the ego psychology of Heinz Hartmann, Ernst Kris, and Rudolph M. Loewenstein. Even Kohut has been very critical of the so-called psychology of the ego. Anxious to purify psychoanalysis of any notion foreign to its domain, Kohut first defined empathy as specific to psychology, thinking of it as a technique of vicarious introspection 1579 Sef, THE (ANALYTICAL PsycHoLoGy) enabling knowledge of another’s psyche. He did this as part of the larger project of extending psychoanalysis to types of personalities previously thought unanalyzable. Having defined two particular transferences, the “mirror transference” and the “idealizing transference,” he reconsidered the question of narcissism, which, according to him, could not be understood as a simple libidinal retreat into the ego. For Kohut, the quality of lived experience defines narcissism, which he then opposes to what he termed a “Self-object” relation, in which other people seem to exist predominantly in roles defined by function. In the cure, as in psychic ontogenesis, narcissism and object love develop conjointly and interactively, with Self-object roles finding themselves gradually interiorized in the form of internal regulatory structures (there is a hint of a goal of adaptation in this model). On this basis, in The Analysis of the Self (1971), Heinz Kohut proposed what he called a restricted theory of the Self and, later, what he called a general theory of the Self. This was presented as complementary to Freudian theory, but in reality it attempted to subsume the latter into a larger model. The Self became progressively a relatively autonomous principle of motivation, integrating the drives, and accorded its own program of realization; it no longer was separate from the Self-object, a concept that was enlarged to include the entire narcissistic dimension of experience. A third kind of transference was described as “alterego transference,” where the controlling element is the need, for a peer, particularly someone of the same sex. For Kohut, the Self is something very much different from intrapsychic entities like the ego, id, or superego. Beyond a certain number of notions, like the corporal or archaic Self, the nuclear Self, the consistency of the self, the permanent disintegration of the self, the fragmented self, and self-esteem, Kohut has particularly emphasized the notion of the grandiose Self to try to account for “the child’s solipsistic vision of the world and the manifest pleasure he derives from the admiration he receives from it.’ However, his descriptions of the grandiose Self cover a wide range of phenomena, from “paranoiac delirium and the crudely sexual acts of the adult pervert, to certain kinds of simple, sublimated satisfaction that adults derive from what they are, what they do, and what they succeed in.” Some authors have attempted to deal with the concept of Self from a more topical point of view. 1580 Among them is Jean Bergeret, who describes the ego ideal as originating in the maternal, rather than the paternal, attachment. Finally, the concept of the Self, in spite of all ambiguity and the criticism directed at it, has been shown to be of heuristic value; it has influenced many works, including The Privacy of the Self (1974), by Masud Khan, and, more recently The Forces of Destiny (1989) by Christopher Bollas. For Bollas, the destiny of the subject is the result of an encounter with an object; certain objects favor the emergence of the true Self, while others obstruct and condemn the individual to organize himself around a false Self. Donald W. Winnicott has also used the notion of the Self in developing his work on the “false self.” Both concepts, however, invite questions about the status of the Freudian theory of drives, which runs the risk of being somewhat obscured. BERNARD GOLSE See also: Self psychology. Bibliography Bollas, Christopher. (1989). The forces of destiny. London: Free Association Books. Freud, Sigmund. (1915c). Instincts and their vicissitudes. SE, 14: 109-140. Kernberg, Otto F. (1975). Borderline conditions and pathological narcissism. New York: Jason Aronson. Khan, Masud. (1974). The privacy of the self. London: Hogarth. Kohut, Heinz. (1971). The analysis of the self. New York: International Universities Press. Laplanche, Jean, and Pontalis, Jean-Bertrand. (1967). Vocabulaire de la psychanalyse. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Oppenheimer, Agnes. (1995). Psychanalyse du Moi, psychologie du Moi et psychologie du Self. Encyclopédie médicochirurgicale (Vol. Psychiatrie). SELF, THE (ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY) Jung originally defined his concept, “the Self” (Selbst), as follows: “As an empirical concept, the Self designates the whole range of psychic phenomena in man. It expresses the unity of the personality as a whole.” INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS “But insofar as the total personality, because of its unconscious component, can only be partly conscious, the concept of the Self is, in part, only potentially empirical and is to that extent a postulate. In other words, it encompasses both the experienceable and the unexperienceable (or the not-yet experienced). From an intellectual point of view it is only a working hypothesis. Its empirical symbols, on the other hand, very often possess a distinct numinosity, that is, an emotional value. It thus proves to be an archetypal idea... which differs from other ideas of the kind in that it occupies a central position befitting the significance of its content and numinosity.” Of the content and development of his ideas, Jung wrote: “The Self appears in dreams, myths, and fairy tales in the figure of a ‘supra-ordinate personality, ’ such as a king, prophet, or savior, etc., or in the form of a totality symbol, such as the circle, square.... When it represents... a union of opposites it can also appear as a united duality in the form, for instance, of Tao as the interplay of Yang and Yin.” Related ideas pertaining to Self-symbolism were initially described by Jung: “The Self is not a philosophical idea since it does not predicate its own existence.” By way of critical appraisal the Journal of Analytical Psychology published a symposium on the self in 1985. In Joseph L. Henderson’s contribution it is written: “I am impressed with how much serious thinking by Jungian analysts has gone into clarifying the multifaceted subject. For the most part the theoretical basis as expressed by Jung himself has been reaffirmed, namely that the Self as a symbol of totality of psychic life and as a central archetype of order equally exist.” But if we place metaphor to one side and look at the manifestation of self-hood in action we may find our centering totality at work in more humanly understandable forms, as in analysis where analyst and analysand enter into a common ego-self relationship. The self in this context approaches the concept of the self in other psychologies, such as Kohut’s self-psychology. Perhaps Jungians are in general becoming more comfortable with self as a psychological concept only and less in awe of the self as an archetype with its metaphysical aura. Knowing the danger that too much emphasis upon the self may have an inflationary effect on the ego (grandiosity), or that too little emphasis upon it may agerandize the importance of ego consciousness over INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SetF (TRUE/FaLSE) the unconscious, normal self-definition is found where ego and self are separate but inherently related. Jung writes: “Sensing the Self as something irrational, as an undefinable existent, to which the ego is neither opposed or subjected, but merely attached, and about which it revolves very much as the earth revolves around the sun—thus we come to the goal of individuation.” The individuated ego senses itself as the object of an unknown and supra-ordinate subject. It seems that a psychological inquiry might come to a stop here. JosePH L. HENDERSON See also: Archetype (analytical psychology); Compensation (analytical psychology); Ego (analytical psychology); Individuation (analytical psychology); Numinous (analytical psychology); Projection and “participation mystique” (analytical psychology); Psychological types (analytical psychology); Shadow (analytical psychology); Transference (analytical psychology). Bibliography Henderson, Joseph L. (1985). The self in review. Journal of Analytical Psychology, London, 30, p. 243-246. Jung, Carl Gustav. (1923). Psychological types. Coll. works, Vol. VI. Bollingen Series XX. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1971, p. 460-461. Kohut, Heinz. (1971). The analysis of the self. New York, International Universities Press. . (1977). The restoration of the self. New York, International Universities Press. SELF (TRUE/FALSE) Donald Winnicott used the term “self” to describe both “ego” and self-as-object. He describes the self in terms of a psychosomatic organization, emerging from a primary state of “unintegration” by gradual stages. The true self, which in health expresses the authenticity and vitality of the person, will always be in part or in whole hidden; the false self is a compliant adaptation to environmental impingement. This characteristically fluid use of the term can be traced throughout his work, evolving in terms of true and false selves. The first paper to clarify the existence of true and false selves as entities is “Aggression in Relation to Emotional Development” (1950-55). Winnicott, from within his own object-relations 1581 Secr (TRuE/FALSE) theory, postulates the necessity for the innate maturational tendency to operate within the facilitating environment (1960). This is expressed in terms of the individual baby’s need for an environment allowing uninterrupted continuity of being, which lays the foundations for psychosomatic integration, aliveness, and the beginnings of awareness of self, true self being “the summation of sensori-motor aliveness.’ In several papers, notably “Primary Maternal Preoccupation” (1956) and “Ego Distortion in Terms of True and False Self,’ (1960) he describes the exquisite adaptation, or primary maternal preoccupation in the new mother, whose handling (and in particular, holding) of her infant, protects the baby from “impingement,” or environmental failure. Within such holding, which must involve both physical contact and empathic attunement, “going on being” is supported, and this allows the beginning of individuation. Environmental failure at this stage, when primitive agonies threaten, can result in psychosis, which Winnicott thought of as an environmental deficiency disease (1949). Later, careful maternal adaptation must of necessity fail, gradually, and in stages (good-enough mothering), at such a pace that the developing infant can manage each stage, and replace each environmental lack with mental activity. Early on, the “good-enough mother” succeeds repeatedly in meeting and realizing the infant’s sensory hallucination, or “gesture,” thus allowing in infantile sense of omnipotence and the development of the later capacity for symbolization. With gradual failures of response from mother, the infant’s experience of omnipotence can then be gradually relinquished, and recognition of reality, together with spontaneity and authenticity, becomes possible— the “true self.” The “not-good-enough mother” cannot respond sensitively and empathically, and fails to “meet the infant’s gesture.” While the infant can adapt to this up to a point, filling the gap with hallucination, eventually this mechanism fails and the infant loses touch with their own needs, responds excessively to the environment, and becomes “impinged upon,” traumatized, and incapable of symbol-usage. At this point the infant, seduced into compliance, develops a “false self,” reacting to environmental demands and relinquishing or hiding the remnants of spontaneity, the “true self.” The existence of the “false self” is a defense against the feared annihilation of the true self, and becomes a 1582 “caretaker self,” taking over those functions unfulfilled by mother. In some infants, particularly those well endowed with intellectual potential, the mind becomes the “caretaker self” over-valued and in conflict with the psyche-soma (1949). Winnicott described five degrees of false self formation, from severe limitation of spontaneity and liveliness with convincing imitation of normality, to those ordinary social adaptations necessary for life in human society. False self personalities may be superficially successful, but empty; they may become caretakers of others while being unable to allow dependency in themselves. Winnicott believed that in psychoanalysis regression was a necessary phase for “false self personalities,” in order to work through the earliest environmental failures. He advised against inexperienced analysts taking on this kind of work. Winnicott’s work has been usefully adapted in several ways. For Ronald Fairbairn, the “schizoid personality” derives from his understanding that the infant’s primary need is for intimacy. In his reading environmental failure leads to splitting and to defenses against it. Michael Balint’s “harmonious mix-up” can be seen as an early undifferentiated phase; his ideas about the “basic fault” relate to primary position of the infant’s desire to be loved by its mother. Heinz Kohut develops a “psychology of the self” and describes “maternal self-object functioning.” Margaret Mahler locates in early childhood a “symbiotic fusion” with the mother, and describes separation/individuation phases. Daniel Stern compares the “core self” and the “self with other.” Winnicott, while not abandoning drive theory, stresses the importance of relationships from the beginning. His writing is elusive, idiosyncratic, and often cryptic. Unlike Melanie Klein, whose concern was with the infant’s internal, often instinctual struggles, his focus was on the emergence of the individual from the earliest relationship, an emergence which could be adversely affected by either impingement or deficiency of provision. JENNIFER JOHNS See also: Addiction; Anality; As if personality; Autistic capsule/nucleus; Breakdown; Child analysis; Creativity; False self; Good-enough mother; Holding; Integration; Internal object; Lie; Narcissism; Object; Protective shield, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS breaking through the; Self; Splitting; Transitional phenomena. Bibliography Winnicott, Donald. (1949). Mind and its relation to the psych-soma. British Journal of Medical Psychology, 27, 1954; and in Collected papers, through paediatrics to psycho-analysis. London: Tavistock Publications, 1958, pp. 243-254. . (1955). Aggression in relation to emotional development. In Collected papers, through paediatrics to psychoanalysis. London: Tavistock Publications, 1958, pp. 204-218. . (1956). Primary maternal preoccupation. In Collected papers, through paediatrics to psycho-analysis. London: Tavistock Publications, 1958, pp. 300-305. . (1962). Ego distortion in terms of true and false self. In Maturational processes and the facilitating environment. London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1965, pp. 140-152. SEMINAR, LACAN’S In contrast with Freud, whose work was primarily written, Jacques Lacan’s work was for the most part an oral improvisation from notes delivered as an ongoing seminar that he held in Paris from 1953 to 1980. From 1953 to 1963, Lacan’s seminar was held at the Sainte- Anne Hospital in Paris. From 1964 to 1969, starting with seminar 11, it was held at the Ecole Normale Supérieure on rue d’Ulm. And finally, from 1969 to 1980, starting with seminar 17, it was held before a much larger audience in the amphitheater of the law school at the Pantheon. Even during Lacan’s lifetime, the seminar circulated in the form of photocopies of diverse and unreliable written versions of the spoken text. Beginning in 1973, Lacan entrusted the transcription of the seminar to Jacques-Alain Miller. In an editor’s note to The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, the first of his publications of Lacan’s seminars, Miller wrote, “My intention here was to be as unobtrusive as possible and to obtain from Jacques Lacan’s spoken work an authentic version that would stand, in the future, for the origina!, which does not exist apex). The individual seminars that make up Lacan’s seminar are as follows: a) Seminar 1 (1953-1954): Freud’s Papers on Technique. (John Forrester, Trans.) New York: W. W. Norton, 1988. INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SEMINAR, LACAN’S b) Seminar 2 (1954-1955): The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis. (Sylvana Tomaselli, Trans.) New York: W. W. Norton, 1988. c) Seminar 3 (1955-1956): The Psychoses. (Russell Grigg, Trans.) New York: W. W. Norton, 1993. d) Seminar 4 (1956-1957): La relation do bjet (Object relations). Paris: Seuil, 1994. e) Seminar 5 (1957-1958): Les formations de linconscient (Formations of the unconscious). Paris: Seuil, 1998. f) Seminar 6 (1958-1959): Le désir et son interprétation (Desire and its interpretation). Unpublished. g) Seminar 7 (1959-1960): The Ethics of Psychoanalysis. (Dennis Porter, Trans.) New York: W. W. Norton, 1992. h) Seminar 8 (1960-1961): Transfert (Transference). 2nd ed. Paris: Seuil, 2001. i) Seminar 9 (1961-1962): Lidentification (Identification). Unpublished. j) Seminar 10 (1962-1963): L’angoisse (Anxiety). Paris: Seuil, 2004. Name-of-the-Father was to be the next seminar, but only a single session was given, on November 25, 1963, at Sainte-Anne Hospital. Lacan stopped giving this seminar when he learned that the International Psychoanalytical Association had refused to reinstate him as a training analyst. k) Seminar 11 (1964): The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis. (Alan Sheridan, Trans.) New York, W. W. Norton, 1978. 1) Seminar 12 (1964-1965): Problemes cruciaux pour la psychanalyse (Crucial problems for psychoanalysis). Unpublished. m) Seminar 13 (1965-1966): L’objet de la psychanalyse (The object of psychoanalysis). Unpublished. n) Seminar 14 (1966-1967): La logique du fantasme (The logic of fantasy). Unpublished. o) Seminar 15 (1967-1968): L’acte psychanalytique (The psychoanalytic act). Unpublished. p) Seminar 16 (1968-1969): D’un Autre a Tautre (From one Other to the other). Unpublished. q) Seminar 17 (1969-1970): L’envers de la psychanalyse (The other side of psychoanalysis). Paris: Seuil 99d: 1583 Sense/NONSENSE r) Seminar 18 (1970-1971): D'un discours qui ne serait pas du semblant (On a discourse that might not be a semblance). Unpublished. s) Seminar 19 (1971-1972):... worse). Unpublished. t) Seminar 20 (1972-1973): On Feminine Sexuality: The Limits of Love and Knowledge, Encore. Translated by Bruce Fink. New York: Norton, 1998. u) Seminar 21 (1973-1974): Les non-dupes errent (Those who are not duped err). Unpublished. v) Seminar 22 (1974-1975): R.S.I. Ornicar? 2-5. w) Seminar 23 (1975-1976): Le sinthome (The sinthome [an archaic spelling of the word “symptom” ]). Ornicar? 6-11. x) Seminar 24 (1976-1977): L’insu que sait de l'une bévue s aile a mourre. Ornicar? 12-18. our pie... OF The punning French title of this seminar is based on a fanciful French translation of the German word for the unconscious, “Unbewusste,” as “une-bévue,’ which means a blunder or a mistake. As written, the title might be translated as “The unknown that knows about the one-blunder chances love.” But as spoken, with written puns ignored, the French title might be rendered most simply as “L’insuccés de l’une-bévue, cest l'amour,” which means “Love is the failure of the one-blunder.’ y) Seminar 25 (1977-1978): Le moment de conclure (Time to conclude). Unpublished. z) Seminar 26 (1978-1979): La topologie et le temps (Topology and time). Unpublished. aa) Seminar 27 (1980): Dissolution. Ornicar? 20-23. Because Lacan was old and ill, seminar 27 was not delivered publicly but only published. It dealt with the dissolution of his school, Ecole freudienne de Paris (Freudian School of Paris). JACQUES SEDAT See also: Delay, Jean; Ecole freudienne de Paris (Freudian School of Paris); France; Lacan, Jacques-Marie Emile; Merleau-Ponty, Maurice; Ornicar?; Sainte-Anne Hospital; Splits, psychoanalytic. Bibliography Dor, Joél. (1994). Nouvelle bibliographie des travaux de Jacques Lacan. Paris: E.P.E.L. 1584 Ecole Lacanienne de psychanalyse. (1991). Le transfert dans tous ses errata and Pour une transcription critique des seminaires de Jacques Lacan. Paris: E.P.E.L. Miller, Jacques-Alain. (1985). Entretien sur le seéminaire avec Francois Ansermet. Paris: Navarin. SENSE/NONSENSE Unlike meaning (signification), which unites a signifier, the material manifestation of the sign, to a signified, the concept to which it corresponds, sense (sens) has an axiological dimension: It is a sense “for” and orders a behavior by linking an object to a desire. Jacques Lacan (1966) and Piera Aulagnier (The Violence of Interpretation: From Pictogram to Statement, 1975/ 2001) showed that the preverbal infant’s manifestations of needs are interpreted by the mother as signs that have a sense. She will consequently respond to them according to her own desire, which will or will not be in agreement with the sense that she has given to the infant’s demand. The latter’s responses will in turn take on sense and value for her. Sense later corresponds to a need for causality that constitutes, in the realm of thought, the equivalent of a rediscovery of the earliest experience of satisfaction. In Lacan’s work there is a specific theory of sense that will not be treated here. In the work of Sigmund Freud, this issue was essentially addressed in connection with jokes and the pleasure of sense in nonsense. Traces of the issue are nevertheless present elsewhere, particularly in all of the manifestations of the unconscious that the subject takes to be absurd or devoid of sense. However, Freud was much more specific about absurdity in dreams, which is not just a product of its noninterpretation. In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), he wrote: “A dream is made absurd, then, if a judgement that something ‘is absurd’ is among the elements included in the dream-thoughts—that is to say, if any one of the dreamer’s unconscious trains of thoughts has criticism or ridicule as its motive. Absurdity is accordingly one of the methods by which the dream-work represents a contradiction.... Absurdity in a dream, however, is not to be translated by a simple ‘no’; it is intended to reproduce the mood of the dream-thoughts, which combines derision or laughter with the contradiction” (pp. 434-435). This is the laughter of irony, the oedipal game par excellence, for it perverts the identification that is supposedly necessary to the edification of the superego by INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS identifying not with the manifest level of what is given as an example, but with its latent, infantile, and instinctual content. In this, the joke converges with the art of the ellipsis characteristic of ironic persiflage, by actualizing what Freud, in “Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious” (1905), calls an “omission without a substitute” (p. 77), in which the forbidden representation disappears. How does nonsense become a joke? The nonsense contained in a joke is in fact a criticism; it imitates a supposedly profound proposition that in reality is ridiculous or a sophistry, and, precisely in doing so, reveals the nonsense behind its respectable appearance. Hence Freud’s formulation in “Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious”: “[I]n jokes nonsense often replaces ridicule and criticism in the thoughts lying behind the joke” (p. 107). However, the tendentious joke also uses a technique characteristic of jokes in general, which is “pleasure in nonsense” (p. 125), a relic of the pleasure of playing with words for their assonance alone, independent of meaning. Children, like adults, give themselves up to this pleasure, fully aware of its absurdity, just for the sake of the attraction of fruit forbidden by reason. Inherent in this is a perspective that goes beyond tendentious wit, since the capacity for rational thought is what is challenged here. In “Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious” Freud associated this pleasure of untrammeled nonsense with adolescence, but also with adults in a relaxed state, especially as a result of drinking alcohol. He cited as examples the “cheerful nonsense of the Bierschwefel (a ludicrous speech delivered at a beer party)” and the Kneipzeitung (literally, “tavern newspaper”; a comic set of minutes), and noted: “Under the influence of alcohol the grown man once more becomes a child, who finds pleasure in having the course of his thoughts freely at his disposal without paying regard to the compulsion of logic” (p. 126). Pleasure in nonsense, a challenge to the constraints of reason and a narcissistic claim to being the omnipotent master of meaning, appeared to Freud to be the basis for the “sense in nonsense” factor: “The psychogenesis of jokes has taught us that the pleasure in a joke is derived from play with words or from the liberation of nonsense, and that the meaning of the joke is merely to protect that pleasure from being done away with by criticism” (p. 131). In the mind, nonsense appears as an end unto itself, and “the intention INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Sense/NONSENSE of recovering the old pleasure in nonsense is one of the joke-work’s motives” (p. 176). However, we can wonder about the function of this challenge, precisely because it allows sense to subsist. More than a destruction, at issue here is a condensation that brings to light contradictions, and this process could be compared to what Freud wrote in “The Antithetical Meaning of Primal Words,” emphasizing, with the linguist Karl Abel, that “our concepts owe their existence to comparison” (p. 157) and in consequence they simultaneously express contradictory images, each of them ensuring its pregnance by its relational dependence on the other. For sense constitutes a fundamental need, and when the a-sense of psychosis develops, this again involves a sense in revolt against another that has been unduly imposed upon the subject. Aulagnier showed how psychosis does not stem from a revolt of the id against reality, as Freud stated, but rather from “the struggle the infantile psyche puts up each time it is confronted with the powerlessness of the maternal discourse to make sense of lived experience and with the overwhelming power of the mother’s desire to appropriate the ‘thinking activity’ of the child.” Aulagnier, like Wilfred Bion (1963), showed how the mother substitutes for the a-sense of the real a reality that is cathected and thought by the mother, who retransmits it to the baby. This work of sense-making is later incumbent upon the I itself, and accordingly, causal explanations are a part of what is necessary for thought. This sense is not abstract, for it is initially a libidinal sense, all acts of knowledge being preceded by an act of cathexis. Constructing sense makes the I’s relationship to reality coherent; such, then, is the primary function of the activity of thinking and, accordingly, delusions themselves will have as their function the creation of a meaningful interpretation of the violence undergone by the subject (Mijolla-Mellor). SOPHIE DE MijOLLA-MELLOR See also: Abel, Carl; Bulimia; Infans; Jokes; Manifest; Metonymy; Need for causality; “Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides)”; Remembering. Bibliography Aulagnier, Piera. (2001). The violence of interpretation: From pictogram to statement. (Alan Sheridan, Trans.). Hove, UK, 1585 Servaplo, Emitio (1904-1994) and Philadelphia: Brunner/Routledge. (Original work published 1975) Bion, Wilfred. (1963). Elements of psycho-analysis. London: Heinemann. Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4-5; 1-625. . (1905c). Jokes and their relation to the unconscious. SE, 8: 1-236. Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie de. (1998). Penser la psychose: Une lecture de l oeuvre de Piera Aulagnier. Paris: Dunod. SERVADIO, EMILIO (1904-1994) Emilio Servadio, an Italian physician and psychoanalyst, was born in Sestri (Genoa) in 1904 and died in Rome in 1994. Servadio was born into a Jewish family and studied in Genoa, where he received a law degree. He wrote his dissertation on forensic medicine, specifically about hypnosis. It was the beginning of his interest in paranormal phenomena, which became one of his primary areas of research throughout his life. Servadio was the editor of the Enciclopedia italiana Treccani in Rome, where he settled in 1929. He met Edoardo Weiss and asked him to write several articles on psychoanalysis for the encyclopedia. Weiss, in turn, began analyzing Servadio, who became a devoted student of psychoanalysis. After his departure for America, he remained in contact with Servadio, who was always grateful to Weiss for the role he played in his training. In 1934 at the Lucerne Congress, in which the Italian contingent, led by Weiss, participated for the first time, Servadio made his first appearance on the international psychoanalytic scene by presenting a study on the links between psychoanalysis and telepathy. His paper, “Psychoanalysis and Telepathy,’ was subsequently published in Imago. For the time it was an innovative and courageous work, in which he tried to relocate the telepathic phenomena that occur during the course of a seance within the framework of the patient-analyst relationship. Far from leading Servadio to abandon an original field of research, his encounter with psychoanalysis—as his most brilliant student, Eugenio Gaddini, has written— enabled him to “investigate as fully as possible his initial aspirations and make use of an investigative method appropriate to the study of paranormal phenomena.” 1586 Servadio’s use of psychoanalysis was unconventional and could have had an influence on psychoanalysis through his focus on the scope of counter-transference phenomena, which he wrote about in 1962 in an article that appeared in the Rivista di psicoanalisi (VII, [2]). In 1939, because of the race laws then in effect in Italy, he was forced to leave the country. He settled in India, attracted by Asian cultures and ancient religions. After his return to Italy in 1946, Servadio was, together with Nicola Perrotti and Cesare Musatti, one of the principal protagonists in the rebirth of psychoanalysis in the country. In 1962 he created a center for psychoanalysis in Rome and was president of the Italian Psychoanalytic Society (SPI) from 1964 to 1969. Servadio was highly esteemed within the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA) and was a friend of Anna Freud, Marie Bonaparte, and Ernest Jones; within the Italian psychoanalytic movement he played the role of institutional tutor. At the end of the 1950s, he visited Weiss, then in America, to request that an audit committee from the IPA come to Italy to ensure that its training regulations were consistent with international norms. In 1992, leading a minority group that had broken with the SPI, he helped form a second Italian Psychoanalytic Society, which was recognized by the IPA in 1993. Although Servadio was intransigent in institutional matters and a brilliant writer and popularizer of psychoanalysis, he was very open-minded in matters of behavior and current events. He was a prolific writer, primarily in the field of applied psychoanalysis, with essays on a wide range of topics. They include his “Punzione dei conflitti preedipici” (Functions of preoedipal conflicts), published in 1953 in the Rivista di psicoanalisi (republished in issue 20 [3], 1974, devoted to Servadio), which remains his most important contribution to metapsychology. ANNA Maria ACCERBONI See also: Congres des psychanalystes de langue frangais des pays romans; India; Italy. Bibliography Errera, Giovanni. (1990). Emilio Servadio: Dall’ipnosi alla psicoanalisi. Florence: Nardini. Gaddini, Eugenio. (1974). I settanta anni di Emilio Servadio: Un tributo. Rivista di psicoanalisi, 20 (2), pp. 5-13. INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Novelletto, Arnaldo. (1995). Emilio Servadio. Rivista di psicoanalisi, 61 (1), pp. 171-179. Servadio, Emilio. (1935). Psychoanalyse und Telepathie. Imago, 23, pp. 489-497. (1955). A presumptively telepathic precognitive dream during analysis. International Journal of Psycho- Analysis, 36, pp. 27-30. “SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY DEMONOLOGICAL NEUROSIS, A” In this work Sigmund Freud examined the case of Christopher Haitzmann, a painter whose story he had learned from documents preserved in the sanctuary at Mariazell (in Lower Austria). According to these documents, in 1668 Haitzmann wrote and signed in his own blood a pact with the Devil, thereby becoming his son and, in addition, vowing to belong to him body and soul nine years later. In 1677, when the nine years were almost up, Haitzmann was seized with remorse and terror, asked for help from monks, and was freed from his promise through the intercession of the Virgin Mary. Among the documents preserved at Mariazell are his diary, relating the apparitions of Satan, paintings by Haitzmann himself illustrating these scenes, and texts written by monks who witnessed or were commenting on the miracle. These documents were the basis for Freud’s analysis. Freud emphasized the evidence of the psychopathological problems afflicting this man. He further noted that the “pact with the Devil” had been concluded at a time when Haitzmann, having no commissions and suffering from serious inhibitions in his work, had been reduced to poverty. This distress grew more acute at the death of his father, and shortly thereafter he declared himself to be Satan’s son, thus instituting Satan as a father substitute—although in Haitzmann’s paintings Satan was depicted with monstrous breasts. Referring back to the Schreber case, published twelve years earlier, Freud interpreted this “demonological neurosis” as stemming from Haitzmann’s homosexual position in relation to his father, and from the castration anxiety linked to such a position (cf. Malcapaine and Hunter; Urtubey). ROGER PERRON INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SEX AND CHARACTER See also: Castration complex; Neurosis; “Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides).” Source Citation Freud, Sigmund. (1923d [1922]) Eine Teufels-neurose im siebzehnten Jarhundert. Imago 9, 1-34; GW, XIII, 317-53; A seventeenth-century demonological neurosis. SE, 19, 72-105. Bibliography Macalpine, Ida, and Hunter, Richard. Schizophrenia 1677. London: William Dawson: 1956. Urtubey, Luisa de. Freud et le Diable. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1983. SEX AND CHARACTER Otto Weininger began to draft Sex and Character in 1900, at the time when Hermann Swoboda informed him of Freud’s interpretation of bisexuality, and the book was elaborated concurrently with an exchange of ideas between the two friends. In 1901, having registered his manuscript, then called Eros and Psyche, in order to preserve his intellectual property rights, he wished to have it published and to this end this he met with Freud who took an unfavorable view of it. In 1902 Weininger successfully presented his reworked manuscript for his doctoral thesis in philosophy. He converted to Protestantism and then presented a third version of the book, which was characterized by the addition of chapters on Jews and women and the fact that he extended the metaphysical system. First published in 1903 by a major publisher, Braumiller, the book became a bestseller after its author’s suicide. It ran to twenty-eight editions between 1903 and 1947 and was translated into ten languages. Many articles in The Torch (Die Fackel) contributed to the success of the book, as did accusations of plagiarism, by Paul J. Moebius in 1904 and most of all by Otto Fliess in 1906. Otto Rank was convinced by the work, each of its arguments reflecting his personal experience: “They were even expressed in my own terms,” he said. In a footnote to Herbert Grafs (“Little Hans”) analysis, Freud wrote that “Being a neurotic, Weininger was completely under the sway of his infantile complexes; and from that standpoint what is common 1587 Sexual DIFFERENCE to Jews and women is their relation to the castration complex” (1909b, p. 36). Although consisting of multiple philosophical digressions, Weininger’s book does in fact revolve around a central question that brings it closer to psychoanalytic research, the impossibility of establishing a definite group relation between the sexes. For Weininger there were two ideal types, M and §, which are analogous to Platonic types. Real individuals were intermediary bisexual states, defined by their proportions of M and F. There was no break in nature between masculine and feminine but a bisexual structure in varied proportions which, because of psycho-physiological parallelism, involved both the microscopic body and the mind. This Male/Female mosaic explains sexual attraction, which seeks to achieve complementarity: a man with the equation 3/4M+1/4F seeks a woman with the equation 3/ 4F+1/4M. It thus transpires that the ideal relation would be between a homosexual man and a homosexual woman. However, men and women who are attracted to each other are corporally individuated; they are not types. Weininger realized that: “In spite of the infinite gradation of the intermediary forms, the human being is definitively either man or woman,” but diverges from the point when he postulates a substance that he used as the basis of his characterology. The permanent confusion between the outline of substantialized types and empirical experience gives his statements about women a shocking character—“The absolute female has no ego” (p. 186). The same holds true for his comments on Jews, whom he compares to women, speaking of Judaism as a “Platonic idea” (p. 311). For this reason he sometimes has to explain that he does not wish to “lend the faintest support to any practical or theoretical persecution of Jews” (p. 311). Jewish himself, Weininger’s thesis is a testament to what he calls “self hatred.” ERIK PORGE See also: Bisexuality; Fliess, Wilhelm; Self-Hatred; Swoboda, Hermann; Weininger, Otto. Source Citation Weininger Otto. (1908). Geschlecht und Charakter. London: Heinemann. (Original work published 1903) Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1909b). Analysis of a phobia in a fiveyear- old boy. SE, 10: 1-149. 1588 Le Rider, Jacques. (1982). Le cas Otto Weininger. Paris: P.U.F. . (1990). Modernité viennoise et crises de Tidentité. Paris: P.U.F. Porte, Erik. (1994). Vol didées?. Paris: Denoél. Rodlauer, Hannelore. (1990). Otto Weiningers Eros und Psyche. Vienna: Osterreich Akademie der Wissenschaften. SEXUAL DIFFERENCE Sexual difference refers to recognition by the child of the difference of the sexes. This recognition is related to the Oedipus complex and the castration complex. In 1908 (1908c) Sigmund Freud presented for the first time the notion of the castration complex, centered on fantasies of castration and closely linked to the drives. Through this complex, whose framework is the “theory of infantile sexuality,” the child is able to acknowledge sexual difference. In the same text Freud indicated that before the question of castration becomes important for the child, the child is capable, through the use of external signs, of making a (gender) distinction between men and women. Of its own initiative, the child will develop a sense of gender identity— male or female. This distinction is not dependent on the drives or the genitals. It is only with the “primacy of the phallus” (1923e) that the genital - organ will be taken into account for both sexes, based on the presence or absence of the male genital organ. It is this awareness that leads to the question of castration. Moreover, it is through identification with the father and mother during the oedipal period that the child acquires the symbolic cues for masculine and feminine, whose dynamic will not be completed until adolescence. At that time, the material reality of the penis-vagina duality will replace the apparent reality of the phallus-missing phallus duality. By separating penis and phallus and emphasizing symbolic castration, an operation though which the subject is formed, Jacques Lacan provides a very different interpretation for the castration complex, which now becomes dependent on phallic logic. If human sexuality is immediately subverted by language and if “the imaginary function of the phallus completes the challenge to sexuality through the castration complex in both sexes” (1958), then understanding what differentiates the sexes becomes problematic. Lacan then developed his idea of sexuation—a term borrowed from biology—to show the subject’s modes of inscription in INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS the phallic function. This refers to the way in which both sexes recognize and differentiate themselves in the unconscious. Since Freud recognized that his description related only to boys and for Lacan the relation to the phallus “was established without regard for the anatomical difference of the sexes,” we are led to the conclusion that psychoanalytic theory on sexual difference and, in particular, on what a woman is, remains highly incomplete. Finally, it is important to point out that sexual difference, which enables the subject to relate to its own anatomical sex and position itself as man or woman, introduces important questions in psychoanalysis, as important as the problematic of identification/ identity. PauLo R. CECCARELLI See also: Gender identity; Oedipus complex; Phallus; Sexuality. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1908c). On the sexual theories of children. SE, 9: 205-226. . (1923e). The infantile genital organization (An interpolation into the theory of sexuality). SE, 19: 141- 145. Lacan, Jacques. (1966). La signification du phallus (Die Bedeutung des Phallus). Ecrits, 685-695. Paris: Le Seuil. (Original work published 1958) SEXUAL DRIVE “ _.. The sexual [drive] does not originally serve the purposes of reproduction at all, but has as its aim the gaining of particular kinds of pleasure. It manifests itself in this way in human infancy, during which it attains its aim of gaining pleasure not only from the genitals but from other parts of the body (the erotogenic zones).... We call this stage the stage of autoerotism.... The development of the sexual [drive] then proceeds from auto-erotism to object-love and from the autonomy of the erotogenic zones to their subordination under the primacy of the genitals which are put at the service of reproduction” (Freud, 1908d, p. 188). The psychoanalytic movement is a revolution of “The sexual [drive]—or more correctly, the sexual INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SEXUAL DRIVE [drives], for analytic investigation teaches us that the sexual [drive] is made up of many separate constituents or component [drives]” (p. 187). Thus Freud dissociated reproduction and sexuality. The innate sexual drive appears in earliest infancy. Its composite origin accounts for its perverse, neurotic, and normal adult manifestations, which appear, in a vast synthesis. The importance of its dynamic manifestations in the psyche is well recognized in the form of libido, which is the fixed point in psychic conflict. The libido is opposed first to the drives of self-preservation or the ego drives, and then to the death drive. In this latter case, the libido goes under the name of “life drives” or Eros. The term Geschlechtstrieb (sexual drive) appeared in 1894, at the same time as “libido” (1895b [1894]). In 1895, Freud published a review of a lecture entitled, “Der Geschlechtstrieb,’ and denounced the underestimation of the sexual drive (1895i). He noted the importance of sexuality in the etiology of the neuroses and referred to “the participation of sexual motive forces as an indispensable premise” (1896c, p. 200). The discovery of infantile sexuality and its synthesis with the diversity of adult sexual life was announce in 1905 in the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d). The Three Essays can be credited with “enlarging the concept of sexuality” (1905d, p. 134). Insofar as it is supported by all the other vital functions, the sexual drive in infancy is perverse, ubiquitous, and a composite of partial drives. Education and the development of the ego are able to modify the sexual drive: with no predetermined object it is entirely plastic, except for fixation. When its energy is deflected, libido can be invested in the interests of the ego and of culture. This view of the sexual drives (though disturbing) accounted for the essentials of psychic energy with repression playing a central role and is to be modified through the next two steps. Libidinal investment in the ego makes its appearance as an original contribution, necessary and essential to the sexual drive for survival. And then it is only the sexual drives that have the power to stand against the death drive. As the very paradigm of the drive, the sexual drive is so central that there could be no conception of psychoanalysis without it. As Freud stated at the time of his break with Carl Jung in 1913, to dispute the importance of the sexual drive is tantamount to rejecting psychoanalysis. MICHELE PORTE 1589 “SexyAL ENLIGHTENMENT OF CHILDREN, THE”? See also: Adolescence; Anaclisis/anaclictic; Anxiety; Desexualization; Dipsomania; Drive/instinct; Ego-libido/ object-libido; Eroticism, anal; Eroticism, oral; Libido; Lost object; Oral stage; Otherness; Pleasure ego/reality ego; Psychogenic blindness; Puberty; Reciprocal paths of influence (libidinal coexcitation); Sexuality; Symbol; Transference/counter-transference (analytical §psychology); Work (as a psychoanalytical notion). Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1896c). The aetiology of hysteria. SE, 3: 186-221. . (1908d). “Civilized” sexual morality and modern nervous illness. SE, 9: 177-204. . (1895b [1894]). On the grounds for detaching a particular syndrome from neurasthenia under the description “anxiety neurosis.” SE, 3: 85-115. . (1895i). Rezension von: Hegar, Alfred, Der Geschlechtstrieb. Eine social-medicinische Studie. In Wiener klin. Rdsch., 9 (1895): 77. . (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123-245. “SEXUAL ENLIGHTENMENT OF CHILDREN, THE” This short text by Freud was written in the form of an open letter addressed to Dr. First for publication in a journal on social medicine and hygiene. “The Sexual Enlightenment of Children” is contemporaneous with the: Three Essays on Sexuality (1905d) and “Little Hans” (1909b), in both of which this same question of infantile sexual curiosity is developed. However, in this essay Freud discusses the ethical and epidemiological (with regard to the prevention of neuroses) aspects of a question he will examine from a more relativist perspective thirty years later in “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” (1937c). Freud’s question has three components: “Can we, in general, supply explanations to children about sexual activity? At what age and how?” Freud strongly rejects the relevance of the first question, arguing that any possible refusal will only lead the child to obtain the withheld information from a different source and consider sexuality as something dirty. His principal argument is related to the existence of infantile sexuality as revealed in the Three Essays and he concludes that “‘refusal’ only deprives the child of the ability to 1590 intellectually overcome the exploits for which he is psychically prepared and somatically ‘adjusted’ except with respect to reproduction.” Freud addressed the two major problems that preoccupy the child: the difference between the sexes and the origin of children, and he refers to infantile sexual theories, which are first discussed in a short essay that would be published later on (“On the Sexual Theories of Children,” 1908c). He concluded with these words: “What is most important is that children never develop the idea that we prefer to hide from them the facts of sexual life rather than other facts that are not yet accessible to their understanding.” The question of how to express this is resolved in the suggestion of adapting knowledge of sexual matters to knowledge of animal life in general, depending on the age and aptitude of the child. This short essay is a precious example of how concepts in ethics and pedagogy can be spontaneously generated by the process of psychoanalytic discovery. SOPHIE DE MioLLA-MELLOR See also: Sexual theories of children; Technique with children, psychoanalytic. Source Citation Freud, Sigmund. (1907c). Zur sexuellen Aufklarung der Kinder (Offener Brief an Dr M. Furst). Soz. Med. Hyg., 2, 360— 367; GW, 7, 19-27; The sexual enlightenment of children. SE, 9: 131-139. SEXUAL THEORIES OF CHILDREN In Freud’s view, children’s sexual theories arise neither in response to “some inborn need for established causality” nor out of an interest in sex that assumes a theoretical dimension. Rather, they are the product ofa life need (Lebensnot) that encourages the child to master in thought, and perhaps even to avert, the feared arrival in the family of a new, younger sibling with whom the parents’ love will have to be shared. Such theories seek to explain the differences between the sexes and the origins of sexual relations. Three aspects may be considered for each theory: its content, the modalities of its development, and the sexual (not theoretical) cathexis that the child can thereby mobilize. In this last aspect, the child’s sexual INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS theories closely resemble fantasies in that they are largely excluded from the demands of critical reasoning. Freud describes children’s sexual theories as the direct expression, uninhibited and untransformed, of infantile sexual component instincts. This explains why children can maintain “accurate” theories, imparted by adults, alongside their own, for which they have a preference of an instinctual kind. “For a long time after they have been given sexual enlightenment [children] behave like primitive races who have had Christianity thrust upon them and who continue to worship their old idols in secret” (Freud, 1937c, p. 234). More generally, the sexual fantasies of adults, especially masturbatory fantasies, may be looked upon as remnants of childhood theories. They are never abstract, for they are accompanied by a sexual excitement that supports the ideational content. The sexual cathexis of a “theoretical” realm offers the best possible example of the origin of the sublimating function, which makes possible a diversion of sexual excitation to a theoretical activity dissociated from sexual questions (investigation and the invention of answers to riddles). This process, however, may be eliminated, impeded (as in inhibition), or aborted (as in obsessional rumination). According to Freud, the construction of childhood sexual theories is based on information provided by adults and other children and also on the sensations of the child’s own body that accompany the work of thinking: “If children could follow the hints given by the excitation of the penis they would get a little nearer to the solution of their problem” (Freud, 1905d, p. 218). Observation of the animal world can also be a source of “exact” knowledge and the basis of projections, as with “little Hans” and the horse (Freud, 1909b). It is fair to say, even though Freud does not theorize matters thus, that the case history of little Hans reveals the role of language in how children work out their theories. Before it is possible to speak of a theory, and not merely of a fantasy, what is being represented must be capable of attaching itself to words. If in general the naming of affects always falls short of reality, this is especially flagrant when a child has to relate direct experience as murky and violent as that associated with the primal scene (adults engaged in sex) or birth. So the child sets up a divide: the child reacts to experience by either abdicating or else relentlessly pursuing a quest for a theory that no INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SEXUAL THEORIES OF CHILDREN setback can stop, since it merely supplies another motive for research. The content of childhood sexual theories, as described by Freud, is confined to a few typical ideas that can also be found in folklore and that constitute the basis of complexes (as for example the castration complex). However, the subject matter of these theories is just as varied as the content of ordinary fantasies (as distinct from primal fantasies). The content depends on whatever elements the child happens to come across: magical words, formulas, distorted words given a sexual meaning by the child (like the phrase “horse way” for Little Hans), or obscenities (Ferenczi, 1910). At first sight, the term “sexual theories” might seem open to objection, but the great utility of the notion has been demonstrated by the link it makes between abstract theorizing and the sexual origins of such theorizing. These theories are clearly marked by a childish manner of thinking, a cumulative logic in which one causal explanation can be superimposed upon another without creating any contradiction overall. The child’s research does not proceed by making use of known elements in order to master other, unknown elements, which is the usual form of the theoretical approach; instead, the child collects heterogeneous clues, because one mystery may stand for another and can therefore be conjoined with it (Mijolla-Mellor, 1999). SOPHIE DE MijoLLA-MELLOR See also: Infantile sexual curiosity; Family romance; Feces; Historical reality; Knowledge or research, instinct for; Modesty; Pregnancy, fantasy of; Primal scene; Psychic revision; “Sexual Enlightenment Of Children, The”; Trauma of Birth, The; “Vagina dentata,” fantasy of. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123-243. . (1908c). On the sexual theories of children. SE, 9: 205-226. . (1909b). Analysis of a phobia in a five-year-old boy. SE, 10: 1-149. . (1918b [1914]). From the history of an infantile neurosis. SE, 17: 1-122. . (1937c). Analysis terminable and interminable. SE, 23: 209-253. hog SEXUAL TRAUMA Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie de. (1996). Le meurtre comme théorie sexuelle infantile. Topique, 59, 15-29. _ (1999). Les mythes magico-sexuels autour de l’origine et de la fin. Topique, 68, 19-32. Further Reading Maldonado, J.L. (1998). Panel: Childhood sexual theories and childhood sexuality. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 79, 148-151. SEXUAL TRAUMA The term sexual trauma refers to a sexual situation that causes intense fear because the subject, a child, is exposed to it in a state of passivity and unpreparedness. Classical psychiatry was already interested in traumas when Freud was developing his ideas. He borrowed the term, but replaced the psychiatric notion of a shock from a serious accident causing a fear of death with that of the impact of sexual aggressions against children. In a letter of October 15, 1895, he wrote to Wilhelm Fliess: “Have I revealed the great clinical secret to you?... Hysteria is the consequence of a presexual sexual shock” (1954a [1887-1902], p. 127). The notion of sexual trauma was here implicitly evoked for the first time; it would play a fundamental role in the history of psychoanalysis. In the early days of his practice, Freud concluded from the frequency with which his patients recounted sexual scenes that such adult seductions of children were real, and that psychical traumas were always sexual in nature. Based on these clinical observations, Freud developed a theory, in 1895-1897, of the twostep effect of the trauma. According to this view, an initial event left traces that would be awakened a later time, usually at puberty, and lead to a flooding of the psyche with libidinal energy and a corresponding generation of anxiety. With the discovery of infantile sexuality (1905d), Freud realized that scenes of seduction were often fantasy reconstructions; nevertheless, despite the abandonment of what he called his “neurotica,’ he never stopped worrying about the question of just how fictitious and how real such scenes were. What was traumatizing in Freud’s view was not the event per se but the affects and representations, including fantasies, to which it gave rise. Its impact was a function of the 1592 time it occurred relative to the child’s ego development and ability to metabolize the excitation thus initiated and relative to the effects it had on the child’s fantasy organization. For a trauma to be represented on an inner stage, and in more than one phase—and so to “offer by far the more favorable field for analysis” (Freud, 1937c, p. 220)—it must be neither premature nor too strong. Sexual trauma, as defined by Freud in his first topography, cannot be understood independently of the notions of seduction, repression, deferred action, and internal versus external reality. At this phase of his thinking Freud did not yet consider the narcissistic injury caused by such traumas. And in his concern to locate scenes of seduction at an ever earlier date and to study their much later pathological effects—a concern that necessarily put the spotlight on the mechanism of deferred action—he paid scant attention to sexual aggressions suffered in adulthood or to their traumatic effects. FRANCOISE BRETTE See also: “Confusion of Tongues between Adults and the Child”; “Heredity and the Etiology of the Neuroses”; Hysteria; Memories; Neurotica; Seduction scenes; Trauma. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123-243. . (1937c). Analysis terminable and interminable. SE, 23: 209-253. . (1939a). Moses and monotheism. SE, 23: 1-137. . (1954a [1887-1902]). The origins of psycho-analysis: Letters to Wilhelm Fliess, drafts and notes, 1887—1902 (Marie Bonaparte et al., Eds.; Eric Mosbacher and James Strachey, Trans.). London: Imago. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2: 48-106. Further Reading Levine, Howard (Ed.). (1990). Adult analysis and childhood sexual abuse. Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press. Scharff, Jill S., and Scharff, David E. (1994). Object relations therapy of physical and sexual trauma. Northvale, NJ: Aronson, Inc. INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Shengold, Leonard. (1989). Soul murder: The effects of childhood abuse and deprivation. New Haven: Yale University Press. SEXUALITY Sexuality as understood by Sigmund Freud is “psychosexuality,” and should be taken “in the same comprehensive sense as that in which the German language uses the word ‘lieben’ (to love).” (1910k, pp. 222-23) In his clinical work during the closing years of the nineteenth century, Freud noticed how significant a role sexuality played in the mental conflicts of his patients, eventually concluding that it was invariably one of the poles of any symptom-generating conflict. In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), he evoked the importance of childhood sexuality solely in connection with neurotics, but beginning with the first edition of the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d) he asserted its presence and its essential role in all children. Thereafter Freud conceived of human sexuality in a broadened sense that included childhood and perverse sexuality. Childhood sexuality had three main characteristics: it was autoerotic, subject to the primacy of erotogenic zones and component instincts, and anaclitically dependent on the self-preservation instincts or ego-instincts. It would take twenty or so years for Freud to arrive at the theory of the four stages of psychosexual development that we now find in the manuals. Each stage was characterized by the dominance of a different erotogenic zone: oral, anal, phallic, genital. The child was polymorphously perverse in that the primacy of the genital zone and of the relationship to the object was not yet established. The pervert remained fixated in, or regressed to, a subordination to one or other of the non-genital zones, ruled by component instincts. Despite this broadening of the concept of sexuality, Freud continued to define a so-called normal sexuality, reached at the end-point of development and characterized by the primacy of the genital zone and of the relationship to the object. But he had trouble completely detaching normal sexuality from the goal of procreation, something he had been able to do in the cases of infantile and perverse sexuality (see the twentieth of the Introductory Lectures | 1916-17a]). Another point, often insufficiently stressed, is the distinction Freud drew between two currents, the affectionate and the sensual, “whose union is necessary INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SEXUALITY to ensure a completely normal attitude in love” (1912p.41 8,0) . The whole of childhood sexuality falls under the rubric of the “Oedipus complex,” a term first used by Freud in “A Special Type of Choice of Object Made by Men” (1910h, p. 171), even though he had referred to Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex as early as 1897 in a letter to Fliess. The Oedipus complex was at first presented by Freud from the young boy’s point of view, and in a simplified form: the little boy is in love with his mother and so becomes his father’s rival. In the complete form, bisexuality came into play: the boy also wants to take his mother’s place vis-a-vis his father (inverted Oedipus complex). The Oedipus complex of the girl was not in Freud’s view symmetrical with that of the boy, for the girl did not experience the tragic conjunction of love for the mother and a rivalry with the father provoking murderous wishes. A sexuality that could be called perverse inasmuch it activated erotogenic zones other than the genital nevertheless had a place in normal sexuality in the shape of “fore-pleasure.” What characterized perverse sexuality proper was the rigidity and exclusiveness of the manner of achieving orgasm. Until 1920 Freud described mental conflict as a clash between the sexual instincts and the self-preservative instincts, also known as ego-instincts. Beginning with Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g), however, a new opposition came to the fore in Freud’s thinking, though without eradicating the earlier: that between Eros (life instincts or sexual instincts) and Thanatos (death instincts). This was yet another broadening of the concept of sexuality: Eros—love—sought to hold things together, while Thanatos—death—strove to tear them apart and destroy them. As noted above, Freud gave sexuality the same extension as the verb “to love”; since one side of the conflict is always sexuality, it may reasonably be deduced that all mental disturbance has a connection with sexuality conceived as love, as a tie to an object. Freud was accused by some of “pansexualism.” It is true that sexuality was present everywhere in his theory, yet it was always seen as in conflict with other instinctual forces, so that Freud was surely right to defend himself against this charge. On the other hand, the issue of the relationship between sexual disturbances and psychopathology is not simple. It is quite possible to encounter dysfunctional 1593 SEXUALITY sexuality in the strict sense in a person who presents no particular mental symptoms in other areas, while a perfectly satisfactory orgasm may occur in otherwise deeply disturbed individuals. But the libidinal tie and the relationship to the object are always implicated in the organization of the personality and in mental pathology. In psychoanalytic treatment, the transference instates a relationship of libidinal dependence with the analyst that repeats the relationship with parental figures. The transference—the motor of psychoanalysis—may become an obstacle to treatment if it takes a totally eroticized form. For Freud, then, human sexuality was psychosexual, and individual and cultural ideas played an important role therein; yet in his view it was also biological, and he was certainly not mistaken in this. The object of the instinct is not given with the instinct itself. The history of the individual, which is to say the history of that individual’s relationships with his mother, father, and other key people in the entourage, contributes to the constitution of his particular sexuality. Freud wrote that the infant’s relationship with the mother who gave it the breast supplied the prototype for the adult’s later love relationships. Weaning brought about the loss of the breast as libidinal object, and thereafter the individual would seek to rediscover that lost object. But some infants are not breast-fed, in which case weaning will not have the same character, and may not be so late. The breast has become a metaphor for all bodily attentions from the mother (Donald W. Winnicott), or else as a part-object (Melanie Klein). In language, and for the infant—even an infant which has not been breast-fed—the breast symbolizes the mother, and is an object of desire. Freud seems never to have heard little boys crying because they cannot have breasts like their mother, and he retained only the little girl’s penis envy as a mark of the child’s confrontation with the anatomical difference between the sexes. Freud’s patriarchal and phallocentric assumptions echo his culture, and he was unaware of them. Only rarely do we now see the typical neuroses and disturbances of sexuality that Freud described in his “Contributions to the Psychology of Love” (1910h, 1912d); and when we do, patients usually come from families where they have received a traditional patriarchal upbringing. Freud never suggested that unbridled sexual activity could remedy sexual and mental problems. Certainly, he at first emphasized the conflict between sexual 1594 wishes and the external world, and made “civilized sexual morality” responsible for “modern nervous illness.” (1908d). But later on he located the essential conflict—that between the forces of binding and the forces of unbinding—within the psyche. A strong superego, constituted by means of identification with the father as prohibitor of incest—and also (as something of an afterthought on Freud’s part) by the mother—he judged necessary not only to morality but also to creativity, to sublimation, that is to say to the inhibition and diversion of strictly sexual instinctual aims. Libido seemed to Freud to be masculine in essence, and he considered the woman’s superego— and hence her moral sense and creativity—to be weaker than the man’s. Women were destined to passivity, or at least to activities with passive aims. Freud rejected feminist aspirations to equality between men and women. COLETTE CHILAND See also: Bisexuality; Death instinct (Thanatos); Female sexuality; Heterosexuality; Homosexuality; Life instinct (Eros). Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4-5, . (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SEs . (1908d). “Civilized” sexual morality and modern nervous illness. SE, 9. (1910h). A special type of choice of object made by men (contributions to the psychology of love DY SEO . (1910k). “Wild” psycho-analysis. SE, 11. . (1912d). On the universal tendency to debasement in the sphere of love (contributions to the psychology of love II). SE, 11. ———. (1916-17a). Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 15-16. . (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18. Further Reading Chodorow, Nancy. (1989). Feminism and psychoanalytic theory. New Haven: Yale University Press. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Friedman, Robert. (2001). Psychoanalysis and human sexuality. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 49, 1115-1132. Kulish, Nancy. (2002). Female sexuality: Pleasure of secrets and the secret of pleasure. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 57, 151-176. SEXUALIZATION Heinz Kohut has a view of sexualization that differs from Freud’s. In fact, he sees it not so much as a defensive structure, but rather as the indication of a structural deficit. From the point of view of the drives, this deficit appears as an insufficient neutralization. From the point of view of the Selfobject [SIC], one might say that there is a lack of a necessary relation with another source of responsiveness. There is another idea involved, too: it is possible to attenuate or to dissipate sexualization by establishing a Selfobject transference. Independently of the theoretical perspective, sexualization becomes, in practice, an activity that imbues the whole personality and contributes, in an episodic or regular way, to the maintenance of psychological equilibrium. It procures pleasure and helps to obliterate painful feelings. It can also help to stem regression and enable the establishment of a relation that, while it may appear infantile, still helps to develop the Self’s cohesion. Given all the psychological gains that it implies, it often resists analytical intervention without the elaboration and working-through of a Selfobject transference. The way the diverse forms of sexualization are considered consists in translating behavior into a narrative that represents individual psychodynamics. Thus the exhibitionist or the pedophile is expressing a specific psychological configuration that can be read as a manifest content. This is most probably an exaggerated simplification, since many forms of sexualization are more a matter of fortuitous circumstances, or even of biology, than of psychological meaning. Sexualization is essentially perpetuated by vertical splitting. Any treatment of difficulties involving sexualization needs to study this particular structural problem. ARNOLD GOLDBERG See also: Self-object; Splitting, vertical and horizontal. Bibliography Goldberg, Arnold. (1995). The problem of perversion. (p. 29— 45, 64-79). New Haven: Yale University Press. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SEXUATION, FORMULAS OF Kohut, Heinz. (1971). The analysis of the self. New York: International Universities Press. SEXUATION, FORMULAS OF According to Jacques Lacan, sexuation, as distinct from biological sexuality, designates the way in which the subject is inscribed in the difference between the sexes, specifically in terms of the unconscious and castration, that is, as “inhabiting language” (Lacan, 1998, p. 80). Lacan presented the complete table of the formulas of sexuation on March 13, 1973, during one of the lectures of his seminar Encore (1972-1973), but as early as 1971 he began to use his own symbols for the logical quantifiers and the function ®x (figure 1). Lacan’s choice of the term sexuation, and not sexuality, indicates that being recognized as a man or woman is a matter of the signifier. The phallus is situated as a symbol, the signifier of castration and thus also of desire. The Law that is transmitted by the father and that states the prohibition against incest is also the foundation of desire. And this is the Law of castration, which Lacan designated in his graph as the phallic function, ®x. To construct these formulas, Lacan relied on the Aristotelian logic according to which propositions are categorized in four classes: the universal affirmative, the universal negative, the particular affirmative, and the particular negative. But Lacan adopted modern symbols for these categories, which are based on the universal quantifier, V, and the existential quantifier, 3. On the left side of the table, there appears the formula Vx@®x, for all x ® of x (all men are submitted to the phallic function, that is, castration). But modern logic has demonstrated the necessity of a particular negative, 4x@x (there exists at least one that is not submitted to the phallic function), in order to found the universal affirmative. This is the hypothesis that Sigmund Freud developed in his myth of the primal father in Totem and Taboo (1912-1913a), and also in his argument that Moses was not a Jew in Moses and Monotheism (1939a): there always exists one who is an exception. This is how man is inscribed: by the phallic function, but on the condition that this function “is limited due to the existence of an x by which the function ®x is negated” (Lacan, p. 79). This is the function of the father. The other side of the table concerns the “woman portion of speaking beings” (p. 80). The upper line is 1595 SHapow (ANALYTICAL PsycHOLoGy) FIGURE 1 read as follows: there does not exist any x that does not fall under the phallic function. In other words, castration functions for all women. But on the lower line Lacan introduced a negation marked by the barring of the universal quantifier, which is quite inconceivable from the perspective of formal logic. Lacan proposed that it be read as “not-whole.” The woman’s side of the table “will not allow for any universality” (p. 80). Woman is not wholly within the phallic function. On this side there is no exception that could serve as the basis for a set of women. It is from this fact that Lacan derived the formula, “Woman doesn’t exist.” This formula leaves no room for any idea of an “essence” of femininity. Below the table of formulas, there is a “scanded | indication of what is in question” (p. 80). On the masculine side, there is the barred subject “and the ® that props him up as signifier” (p. 80). For the male is only able to reach his partner, the Other, through castration and the mediation of the object a as its effect. This is indicated by the arrow that crosses from the male side to the female side, which also reproduces the Lacanian formula of fantasy. On the feminine side, woman is doubled: she has a relation with ®, insofar as a man incarnates it for her. But she is not wholly in that relation. She also has a relation to the signifier of A, the signifier that the Other would need if a set of women were going to be formed. Woman’s jouissance is thus divided between phallic jouissance, linked to castration and appearing on the graph as ®, and an Other jouissance that is unique to her. Thus there is neither symmetry between the two sides of the table, nor any complementarity between the sexes. ALAN VANIER See also: Graph of Desire; Jouissance (Lacan); Matheme; Phallus; Sex differences. 1596 Bibliography Lacan, Jacques. (1970-1971). Le séminaire-livre XVIII, dun discours qui ne serait pas du semblant. [On a discourse that might not bea semblance] (unpublished seminar). . (1971-1972). Le séminaire-livre XIX, ... ou pire [... or worse].(unpublished seminar). . (1998). The seminar of Jacques Lacan, book XX, on feminine sexuality: The limits of love and knowledge, encore. (Bruce Fink, Trans.) New York: Norton. (Original work published 1972-1973) SHADOW (ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY) — In Carl Gustav Jung’s analytical psychology, the shadow as a concept comprises everything the conscious personality experiences as negative. In dreams and fantasies the shadow appears with the characteristics ofa personality of the same sex as the ego, but in a very different configuration. It is presented as the eternal antagonist of an individual or group, or the dark brother within, who always accompanies one, the way Mephistopheles accompanied Goethe's Faust. The role of the shadow within is sometimes hidden, and sometimes rejected or repressed, by the conscious ego. In the latter case it is pushed into the unconscious, where, because of its energy, it acts as a complex. People can, for example, be fully aware that they are avaricious, greedy, or aggressive and still manage to hide these truths from others beneath the mask of the persona. But they can also repress those characteristics. Then they are no longer conscious of them at all, and their moral ego is reestablished. The shadow in everyone varies considerably depending on the guidelines in force within the family, the community, and the culture in which they grow up. Moreover, the shadow is not only made up of aspects of personality experienced as disagreeable or negative, but it can also have a positive side. When the shadow is not integrated into the conscious personality and remains unconscious, it can manifest itself in two different forms. On the one hand, it can project itself onto another person in one’s immediate or distant circle, leading to serious conflicts among siblings, couples, or colleagues that have a tendency to recur and lead to lasting misunderstandings. On the other hand, it can also cause deflation, so that those involved find themselves subjugated and thus inferior, bad, or clumsy. In fact, the shadow corre- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS sponds to what one does not want to become but still is, within the self. It is even something necessary, for just as a painting needs shadow to give it life and depth, each human needs a shadow—as illustrated by Peter Schlemihl de Chamisso (1824)—to become a true human being with all the genuine weaknesses and defects, qualities which can even make them likeable. Jung developed and enriched the concept of the shadow throughout the 1930s, when he began studying closely alchemical literature and iconography in relation to his experience and conception of the process of individuation. He compared the “black work” of the alchemists (the nigredo) with the often highly critical involvement experienced by the ego, until it accepts the new equilibrium brought about by the creation of the self. In the work he did after World War II, Jung developed the distinction between the personal shadow and the collective shadow, emphasizing the fact that while recognition and analysis of the shadow lead to a confrontation with the drives and the most intimate representations, they also lead to a confrontation with the collective unconscious. It is this that gives rise to projections of the shadow onto other cultures, other peoples, and other races—something that occurred during the twentieth century to an alarming extent. Hans DIECKMANN See also: Analytical psychology; Collective unconscious (analytical psychology); Ego (analytical psychology); Jung, Carl Gustav; Projection and “mystical participation” (analytical psychology). Bibliography Jung, Carl Gustav. (1921). Psychological types. Collected works, v. 6. Princeton: Princeton University Press (Bollingen Series). . (1928d). Instinct and the unconscious. Collected works, v. 8. Princeton: Princeton University Press (Bollingen Series). . (1944). Psychology and alchemy. Collected works, v. 12. Princeton: Princeton University Press (Bollingen Series). . (1951). Aion: researches into the phenomenology of the self. Collected works, v. 9. Princeton: Princeton University Press (Bollingen Series). . (1955-1956). Mysterium conjunctionis: an inquiry into the separation and synthesis of psychic opposites in INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SHAKESPEARE AND PSYCHOANALYSIS alchemy. Collected works, v. 14. Princeton: Princeton University Press (Bollingen Series). SHAKESPEARE AND PSYCHOANALYSIS Throughout the century, psychoanalysts have studied Shakespeare’s works to deepen their understanding of psychic conflict and to hone their interpretive skills. Literary scholars have turned to psychoanalysis to solve perennial problems in interpreting Shakespeare’s text. In a letter to his friend Wilhelm Fliess (15 October, 1897), Sigmund Freud sketched out his first formulation of what he would come to call the Oedipus complex, then promptly went on to show how this notion could be used to interpret some notorious cruxes in Hamlet. Freud linked, through the triangular structure of the Oedipus complex, Hamlet’s hesitation to avenge his father, his pangs of conscience, his hostility to Ophelia, the sexual disgust expressed to Gertrude, and his final destruction (1900a, 4: 264-266). “There are more things in heaven and earth Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy” (1910c, 11: 137n.): Freud’s favorite quotation from any source, according to Jones, was this tribute to the complexity of existence, from Hamlet. The nature of Freud’s attachment to Shakespeare’s work is also conveyed in his association of a “special cadence” in his own dream speech, with a cadence in Brutus’s speech of self-justification in Julius Caesar. “As Caesar loved me, I weep for him; as he was fortunate, I rejoice at it; as he was valiant, I honor him; but, as he was ambitious, I slew him.” (1900a, 5: 424) Freud shed light on the unconscious conflict over gender and ambition that fractured Lady Macbeth’s psyche, and on Shakespeare’s technique of splitting a character in two “she becomes all remorse and he all defiance” (1916d, 14: 324). In Shakespeare criticism, after classic papers by Ludwig Jekels, Ernest Jones, Theodor Reik, Hanns Sachs, Wangh (Faber, M., 1970) and others, there has been a proliferation of essays, applying various aspects of psychoanalytic theory to Shakespeare’s texts: dream theory, the structural model, incest fantasies, primal scene fantasies, and the symbolizing and creative functions of the psyche itself. There are several English bibliographies that catalogue these works, including those by Norman Holland (1964), D. Wilbern (1978), and Murray Schwartz and Copelia Kahn (1980). “On the 1597 SHAME Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love” (1912d, 11: 179-190) has featured in the discussion of obstacles to love regularly encountered in comedy. “Mourning and Melancholia” (1916-1917, 14: 239-258), has been used in thinking about ambivalence toward the lost object and severe depression in tragedy or in a comedy like Twelfth Night. Freud’s “On Narcissism” (1914c, 14: 69-91), and the thinking that grew out of it on the structure of the psyche and its roots in infantile development, have influenced many recent interpretations of Shakespeare’s plays. “Negation” (1925h, 19: 235-239) has been useful to Shakespeareans as it explores one way in which the psyche negotiates its own internal contradictions. Beyond Freud, Jacques Lacan’s “mirror stage,” Donald Winnicott’s “transitional object,” Margaret Mahler’s “separation/individuation,” and Erik Erikson’s “basic trust” have generated new psychoanalytic readings of Shakespeare’s plays. Of the classic psychoanalytic essays on Shakespeare, Ernst Kris’s essay, “Prince Hal’s Conflict” (Faber, 1970) has remained a model of sophistication. Integrating elements of the play’s language, characterization, and plot with corresponding elements of psychic structure, Kris, examining the play’s sources and speeches, recognizes Shakespeare’s exceptional genius for historical and psychological observation. More recently, psychoanalysis has influenced the critics who see Shakespeare as a dramatist whose “plays and poems do not merely illustrate his identity but are in each instance a dynamic expression of the struggle to re-create and explore its origins” (Schwartz, 1980, xv—xvi). In this spirit, Janet Adelman (1992) has analyzed masculine identity and “fantasies of maternal power” and of “the maternal body” in Shakespeare. Psychoanalytic criticism of Shakespeare has dominated the application of psychoanalytic theory to the arts and has articulated debates over the nature of applied psychoanalysis. One side insists that Shakespeare’s text be treated with respect for its genre, for its formal and aesthetic properties, for its artifice, so that we must not invent an unconscious or an infantile neurosis for a character, or do wild analysis on the author; we must not go beyond the language of the text. Another position responds that a text is the product of the human psyche, which always uses the unconscious and its desires in creativity. Perhaps the most fruitful psychoanalytic interpretations of Shakespeare occupy a middle ground wherein the text is 1598 evidence and arbiter, but where the characteristically Shakespearean illusion that a stage person has interior being, with motives that he himself does not fully understand, is recognized and explored. MARGARET ANN FITZPATRICK HANLY See also: Failure neurosis; Hamlet and Oedipus; Literature and psychoanalysis; Mythology and psychoanalysis; Negative capability; Parricide; Primal fantasy; “Theme of the Three Caskets, the.” Bibliography Adelman, Janet. (1992). Suffocating mothers: Fantasies of maternal origin in Shakespeare’s plays. “Hamlet” to lhe Tempest.” New York: Routledge. Faber, M.D. (Ed.). (1970). The design within: Psychoanalytic approaches to Shakespeare. New York: Science House. Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. Part I. SE, 4: 1-338; The interpretation of dreams. Part II. SE, 5: 339-625. . (1910c). Leonardo da Vinci and a memory of his childhood. SE, 11: 57-137. . (1912d). On the universal tendency to debasement in the sphere ofl ove. SE, 11: 177-190. . (1914c).-On narcissism: an introduction. SE, 14: 67-102. . (1916d). Some character-types met with in psychoanalytic work. SE, 14: 309-333. . (1925h). Negation. SE, 19: 233-239. . (1950a). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173— 280. Holland, Norman N. (1966). Psychoanalysis and Shakespeare. New York and London: McGraw-Hill Book Company. Kris, Ernst. (1952). Psychoanalytic explorations in art. New York: International Universities Press. Schwartz, Murray and Kahn, Copelia. (1980). Representing Shakespeare. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University. SHAME The word shame encompasses: 1) the raw emotion linked to a loss of one’s bearings; 2) judgment about this state (the perception of shame as such resulting from the comparison of oneself with a model); and 3) judgment about both this emotion and the possible INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS causes of shame (implying possibilities for action). In all cases, shame is a sense of anxiety about being excluded, that is, not only fear of a withdrawal of love, but even withdrawal of any form of interest. In “Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality” (1905), Sigmund Freud linked shame to the action of the forces of repression (what was initially an object of pleasure becomes an object of modesty, disgust, or shame). By contrast, in “La honte comme angoisse sociale” (Shame as a Social Anxiety; 1929), Imre Hermann described shame as a “social anxiety” linked to attachment. Shame always has two aspects: one relating to individual mental functioning (anxiety about mental disintegration), and the other relating to relations with the group (anxiety about being excluded). Pathological shame is to be distinguished from shame as a signal of alarm. Coping with shame involves both naming it and reinforcing the secondary processes to limit its disintegrative effects. It can be displaced or masked, especially by resignation, anger, guilt, or hate. To a certain extent, shame was a “blind spot” for Freud and, in his wake, for many psychoanalysts who reduced it to a pathological affect linked to the ideal ego and opposed to the guilt associated with the oedipal superego. However, it is a concept that is essential to the understanding of the dynamics of social bonds (it protects people from engaging in nonhuman actions) and intergenerational secrets. SERGE TISSERON See also: Alcoholism; Bulimia; Clinging instinct; Erythrophobia; Latency period; Modesty; Nakedness, dream of; Narcissistic injury; Narcissistic rage; Obsessional neurosis; Organic repression; Self-esteem; Unpleasure. Bibliography Chasseguet-Smirgel, Janine. (1973). Essai sur L’Idéal du Moi. Contribution a l’état psychanalytique de la “maladie didéalité.” Revue francaise de psychanalyse, 37, 5-6, 735- 929: Freud, Sigmund. (1905). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123-243. Hermann, Imre. (1982). La honte comme angoisse sociale. Confrontation, 8, 167-177. (Original work published 1929) Nathanson, Donald L. (Ed.). (1987). The many faces of shame. New York and London: Guilford Press. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SHARPE, ELLA FREEMAN (1875-1947) Tisseron, Serge. (1993). La honte, psychanalyse dun lien social. Paris: Dunod. SHARPE, ELLA FREEMAN (1875-1947) British teacher and psychoanalyst, Ella Freeman Sharpe was born in Haverhill, Suffolk, England, on February 22, 1875, and died in London on June 1, 1947, Ella Sharpe was the eldest of three daughters. Her father, who read Shakespeare to her as a child, died when she was in her teens, and she took over responsibility for the family. She studied English at Nottingham University, but turned down a position at Oxford University in order to take a teaching job to support her family. She was then co-head and English mistress of Hucknall Pupil Teachers Training Centre for boy and girls from 1904-1916. Ella Sharpe became depressed at the death of friends and pupils during the First World War and suffered anxiety attacks. She went to the Medico-Psychological Clinic in Brunswick Square, London, was treated successfully by Jesse Murray and James Glover, and became interested in Psychoanalysis. In 1917 she gave up teaching to study psychoanalysis at the clinic. In 1920 she went to Berlin to be analyzed by Hanns Sachs, who shared her interest in art and literature. On October 13, 1921. she was elected an Associate Member of the British Psycho-analytical Society and a Full Member two years later, in 1923. She took an active role in the administration of the Society and Institute, and was elected to the Board and Council a number of times, being a director of the Institute when war broke out. She was first elected a member of the Training Committee in 1930, and served on it for many years. She was soon involved in teaching analytic technique, and her experience as a teacher enabled her to present her material in a lively and clear way. She was one of the first British Analysts to work with children, and she supervised both child and adult patients. She read her first paper to the Society in 1923 on the work of Francis Thompson. At the Oxford Congress in 1929, she read a paper on sublimation and delusion, and at the Lucerne Congress in 1934, she read a paper on sublimations underlying pure art and pure science (Sharpe, 1935), using ideas from Klein’s work. She was particularly interested in those artists, 1599 SIGMUND FREUD ARCHIVES including Shakespeare, who used words to express themselves. Her paper on her examination of metaphor and poetic diction shows her own rich understanding of words and the link between metaphor and instinctual tension (Sharpe, 1940). Her lectures on technique (Sharpe, E., 1930/ 1931) were published in the International Journal of Psycho- Analysis (vols. 11 and 12) and later in book form together with her other papers (Sharpe, 1950). Her lectures on dreams were also published as a book (Sharpe, 1937). Ella Sharpe’s main impact was that she could apply Freud’s technical concepts to her clinical experience and communicate it to others, and she alerted readers to the importance of understanding, more deeply, the language of patients. Peart H.M. KING See also: Controversial Discussions; Great Britain; Hamlet and Oedipus. Bibliography Sharpe, Ella F. (1930). The technique of psycho-analysis. Seven lectures. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 11, 251-277; 12, 24-60. . (1935). Similar and divergent unconscious deteminants underlying the sublimations of pure art and pure science. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 16, 180— 202. . (1937). Dream analysis: A practical handbook for psychoanalysts. London: Hogarth and the Institute for Psycho- Analysis. . (1940). Psycho-physical problems revealed in language: An examination of metaphor. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 21, 201-213. . (1950). Collected papers on psycho-analysis. (M. Brierley, Ed.) International Psycho-Analytical Library, vol. 29. London: Hogarth and the Institute for Psycho- Analysis, SIGMUND FREUD ARCHIVES The Sigmund Freud Archives, incorporated in the United States in 1952 by the leading analysts of that period, developed under the leadership of Dr. Kurt R. Eissler, who was the chief administrative officer until 1985. Dr. Harold P. Blum succeeded him as executive 1600 director of the archive. The other officers in 2005 were Drs. Alexander Grinstein, president; Bernard L. Pacella, secretary and treasurer; and Sidney S. Furst. The goal of the archive is to discover, collect, and preserve all of Freud’s publications, letters, and other documents and to maintain an archive of these materials. The archive also facilitates research, writing, publishing, and other activities relating to the work of Freud and other pioneers of psychoanalysis. The Sigmund Freud Collection comprises Freud’s letters, publications, first editions, personal documents, photographs, movies, and other personal items. Letters and papers of Anna Freud and many other renowned psychoanalysts are in separate collections, coordinated with the Sigmund Freud Collection. The archive has a continuing contract with the Library of Congress under which the Freud Collection is protected and preserved at the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C. The Freud Collection was almost completely derestricted as of 2005, and is accessible to all scholars upon application to the Library of Congress. As a co-trustee, the archive is also responsible for the administration and development of the Freud Museum in London. The Freud Museum opened in July 1986 and contains a major collection of Freud’s personal effects, including his extensive library, antiques, study, and consulting room. The Freud Museum displays Freud’s professional and working environment, and sponsors relevant education, writing, and research. A nonprofit organization, the archive offers all scholars equal access to all unrestricted documents. For more than a decade, the archive has steadily been derestricting documents in its control. Most of the Freud correspondence that has recently become available has been released by the archive. The goal of total derestriction was reached the year 2000, when documents under Anna Freud’s will were scheduled for derestriction. Then only documents legally restricted, in writing, by the donor, will still be unavailable to scholars. Documents are released at the Library of Congress for reading and research, but such release does not entail permission for publication. Documents are released completely unaltered and unexpurgated, with the single exception of the names of psychoanalytic patients. Patients’ names are deleted to protect anonymity and confidentiality, but to facilitate scholarly research, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS names are available to editors of correspondence upon special application to the Sigmund Freud Archives. In such cases, the editors are bound to maintain the confidentiality of patients’ identities. Everyone using the documents in the Freud Collection is obligated to abide by the rules of the Library of Congress. Dr. Harold Blum proposed a “Freud Exhibit” to the United states Library of Congress. Developed over several years, relying mainly on the Freud Collection of the Library of Congress, it opened in 1998 at the Library of Congress in Washington, DC. It was the largest exhibit of the life and work of Sigmund Freud ever held. The exhibit traveled to venues in four continents, including several additional major American cities, Vienna, Rio de Janeiro, and Tel Aviv. The Freud Archives continues to support Freud scholarship and research. Plans are under consideration to digitize the Freud collection and as many other Freud documents as possible. In 2004 the Sigmund Freud Archives constructed its own web site, which will eventually be linked to the Library of Congress. An outline of the Freud Collection and its contents can be viewed on the web site. Derestriction of the small number of still classified correspondence and interviews is proceeding, consistent with legal and ethical requirements. Haro_p P. Blum See also: Eissler, Kurt Robert; Freud Museum. SIGMUND FREUD COPYRIGHTS LIMITED Sigmund Freud bequeathed the income from this world copyrights, which was seen as “pocket money,’ to five of his grandchildren, who were still all minors at the time of his death in 1939. His will appointed three of his children, Ernst, Martin, and Anna as trustees. After World War II, the trustees decided that a limited company should be formed to handle the copyrights, promote publication and translations, and collect royalties and distribute them to the grandchildren. The company was incorporated April 15, 1946, and acquired from the trustees the copyright in all Sigmund Freud’s works and other writings, letters, and so on, by an agreement of April 5, 1947. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SIGMUND FREUD CopyriGHTs LiMiTED The company was managed for many years by Ernst Freud, operating from his home in St. John’s Wood, London, where he also continued to carry on his architect’s practice. With his wife, Lucie, Ernst was also closely involved with editorial work, dedicating himself wholeheartedly to keeping his father’s name before the public. He acquired an intimate knowledge of his father’s vast correspondence and one of the earliest volumes of these letters, a selection to various correspondents, published under the title The Letters of Sigmund Freud 1879-1939 (1960) was entirely Ernst’s idea and his almost unaided achievement. Several other volumes followed, such as Psych-analysis and Faith; The Letters of Sigmund Freud and Oskar Pfister (with Heinrich Meng) in 1963; A Psycho-alanytic Dialogue; The Letters of Sigmund Freud and Karl Abraham 1907-1926 (with Hilda C. Abraham) in 1965; and The Letters of Sigmund Freud and Arnold Zweig in 1970. It had also long been Ernst’s dream to publish a picture biography of his father, using letters and other documents and photographs mainly from the family’s private collection. He worked on this for many years, together with his devoted wife, Lucie. The work remained uncompleted when he died in 1970, when the German scholar and psychoanalyst, Ilse Grubrich- Simitis, took on the task of finishing it. It finally appeared as Sigmund Freud: His Life in Pictures and Words in 1976 and was translated into many languages. Although in 1960 he had passed the work of administering most German and foreign language rights in his father’s published works (except English, Spanish, and Portuguese) to the S. Fischer publishing house in Frankfurt, by the mid-1960s Ernst Freud’s health was failing and he was seeking someone to help him. At this point the literary agent, Mark Paterson, was asked by an American publisher to clear the rights in one of Freud’s pre-analytic works. He contacted Anna Freud, who referred him to her brother Ernst. The two men met and warmed to each other immediately, and Paterson was appointed as a consultant. Shortly after Ernst’s death he took over as Director. The company continued to thrive, promoting new editions of Freud’s works and many more editions of correspondences. The limited company became dormant in 1987 but the name “Sigmund Freud Copyrights” continues to be used as the collective name of the literary heirs of Sigmund Freud and its affairs are handled by Mark Paterson and Associates, 10 Brook Street, Wivenhoe, Essex, GB-C07 9DS. 1601 SIGMUND FREUD INSTITUTE This company also handles the works of many other psychoanalysts, including those of Anna Freud, and in conjunction with administering the Freud copyright, maintains a small archive comprising letters and other documents, many of them originals, relating to the history of psychoanalysis. THoMaS ROBERTS AND MARK PATERSON See also: Freud, Anna; Freud, Ernst. SIGMUND FREUD INSTITUTE Located in Frankfurt, Germany, the Sigmund Freud Institute is a state-supported research institute for psychoanalysis and its various applications. Research covers three broad areas: psychoanalytic therapy, foundations of psychoanalysis, and psychoanalysis and society; investigators target aspects of psychological health and illness in the context of economic development, and they study the theoretical and practical bases of psychoanalysis. The institute’s psychoanalytically- oriented psychotherapy clinic focuses on treatment and research alike. The institute is closely identified with its founder and first director, Alexander Mitscherlich (1908- 1982). In the summer of 1956, Mitscherlich organized a series of conferences at the Institut fiir Sozialforschung (Institute for Social Research) with the support of Max Horkheimer (1895-1973). With the intention of restoring contacts with the international psychoanalytic community, Mitscherlich invited the participation of analysts who had left Germany prior to the Second World War. Somewhat later, on April 27, 1960, the Institut und Ausbildungszentrum fur Psychoanalyse und Psychosomatische Medizin (Institute and Training Center for Psychoanalysis and Psychosomatic Medicine) officially opened. After moving to new quarters in West Frankfurt on October 14, 1964, it was rechristened the Sigmund Freud Institute. Psychoanalysis originated in Frankfurt with the Frankfurter Psychoanalytisches Institut, which opened in 1929 but met an abrupt end when in 1933 the National Socialists expelled its first director, Karl Landauer, who would later to die at the Nazi concentration camp at Bergen-Belsen. Heinrich Meng (1887- 1972), the institute’s second director, was forced to 1602 emigrate along with colleagues Frieda Fromm-Reichmann (1889-1957), Erich Fromm (1900-1980), and Siegmund Heinrich Fuchs (S.H. Foulkes, 1898-1976). The considerable achievement of the Sigmund Freud Institute under Mitscherlich’s direction was to train new analysts with the help of analysts from abroad and to mount and maintain a conceptual and institutional forum for psychoanalysis in Germany. During the Cold War, the Sigmund Freud Institute became the most important psychoanalytic teaching institute in West Germany; its training protocols conforming to guidelines set by the German Psychoanalytic Society (DPV/API). In addition to Mitscherlich, who led the institute from 1960 to 1976, its other directors include Clemens de Boor (1976-1983), Hermann Argelander (acting director, 1983-1985), Dieter Ohlmeier (1985-1992), and Horst-Eberhard Richter. Since 1995, in addition to providing treatment on an outpatient basis, the institute has supported research and education programs. The training of analysts, however, was transferred from the Freud Institute to the newly-created Frankfurter Psychoanalytische Institut in 1994. Werner Bohleber became president of the Frankfurter Institut in 1994. The Sigmund Freud Institute, state supported and independent of the university system, has greatly contributed to reestablishing psychoanalysis in Germany, with its unique dual role as a research center and training institute. It has developed an original approach to research projects and brought psychoanalytic investigations to bear on questions of social psychology. MiIcHAEL LAIER See also: Berliner Psychoanalytisches Institut; Foulkes (Fuchs), Siegmund Heinrich; Germany; Goethe Prize; Landauer, Karl; Meng, Heinrich; Mitscherlich, Alexander. Bibliography Bareuther, Herbert et al. (1989). Forschen und Heilen. Auf dem Weg zu einer psychoanalytischen Hochschule, Beitrage aus Anlass des 25 jahrigen Bestehens des Sigmund-Freud Instituts. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Kutter, Peter. Germany. In Psychoanalysis international: A guide to psychoanalysis throughout the world. Vol. 1, Europe. (p. 114-136) Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann- Holzboog. INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Mitscherlich, Alexander. (1980). Ein Leben fiir die Psychoanalyse, Anmerkungen zu meiner Zeit. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Plankers, Thomas et al. (1996). Psychoanalyse in Frankfurt am Main: Zerstorte Anfinge, Wiederanniherung, Entwicklungen. Tubingen: Diskord. SIGMUND FREUD MUSEUM In 1971 in Vienna, with Anna Freud present at inaugural ceremonies, the Sigmund Freud Museum opened in Berggasse 19, the apartment house where Freud had lived and worked from 1891 until 1938. Originally the museum consisted of the rooms on the first floor (second floor in American usage) that housed Freud’s office; it subsequently expanded to include Anna Freud’s consulting room and the family apartment, which opened to the public in 1996. The Sigmund Freud Museum, managed by the Sigmund Freud Foundation, is private. It shares the bulk of Freud’s legacy with the Freud Museum in London and the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C. Visitors enter the museum through the entrance hall of the family’s private apartment. In the lobby that leads to Freud’s office, the original wood paneling with bast covering has been preserved; several of Freud’s belongings are on display and his diplomas hang on the wall. Freud’s patients and visitors entered his consulting room from the waiting room, which was restored in accordance with the memories of Anna Freud and Paula Fichti, the Freud’s housekeeper. Furnishings, donated by Anna Freud, comprise a wooden table, three armchairs and a dark red couch. Objects from her father’s collection of antiquities are also displayed in a glass case, a selection that offers a sampling of Freud’s taste and his passion for archeology. Some bookcases have been replaced by pictures from Freud’s scientific career. Patients entered Freud’s offices through soundproof padded double doors; his consulting room opened onto a separate study. On the walls, photomontages by Edmund Engelman, taken in 1938, show the way the rooms were furnished just before Freud left Austria. Beginning in the consulting room and continuing through the study, documents and memorabilia line the walls. Showcases include more items from Freud’s collection of antiquities; first editions of his books and offprints, some signed by him; handwritten inscriptions; and various other documents and personal INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SIGMUND Freup Museum memorabilia. Photographs provide a visual and chronological account of the founder of the psychoanalysis from his birth and early childhood in Freiberg through his decades in Vienna and the final months of his life in London. Freud’s education, his cultural milieu and personal relationships throughout his career are highlighted; scenes from his private life, which Freud attempted to keep strictly apart from his professional life, are also on view. In a media room located in an adjoining room, formerly the kitchen, a documentary film, Freud 1930- 1939, features a commentary by Anna Freud, who helped produce it just prior to her death. It includes footage of Freud from 1930 to 1939 in Vienna, Paris, and London with family, friends, and close collaborators. The original print of the film remains at the Anna Freud Center in London; the museum has exclusive rights to its use in continental Europe. Another film, by Philip R. Lehrman and Lynne Lehrman Weiner, Sigmund Freud. His Family and Colleagues, 1928-1947, finished in 1985, is also shown at the museum. Anna Freud’s consulting room, dedicated in her memory, opened in November 1992 on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of her death; furniture from the Freud family private apartments and part of Anna Freud’s library are on view. A multipurpose room (three former bedrooms) has been appointed for exhibitions and lectures. A library, which opened in the museum in 1991, has holdings of over 30,000 items, the largest collection of its kind in Europe. In 1996, the Sigmund Freud Museum celebrated its twenty-fifth year; on this occasion, the new exhibition room and lecture hall were inaugurated. Together with the exhibition and lecture rooms they provide suitable spaces for temporary exhibitions. In 2002, a show called “Freud’s Lost Neighbors” was put on; it showed the history of the residents of the house at Berggasse 19 from 1939 to the present. The Foundation for the Arts, Sigmund Freud Museum Vienna, a collection of contemporary art, has been on display in the exhibition rooms since 1997; the theme is the relationship between psychoanalysis and artistic production. In 2003, the Museum opened another exhibition space on the ground floor, with a display window facing the street. This is used for the mounting of art installations. INGRID SCHOLZ-STRASSER See also: Austria; Berggasse 19, Wien IX. 1603 SIGNAL ANXIETY SIGNAL ANXIETY In the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, written in 1905, Sigmund Freud saw the anxiety of separation as a special case of anxiety based on the phenomenon of “unused libido.” The absence of the mother (due to separation) prevented the infant from binding its affects to the maternal representation and it was these affects, together with their libidinal energy, that were transformed into anxiety. Otto Rank (1924) saw anxiety as rooted in the trauma of birth, which constitutes the quintessential separation experience (biologically, in fantasy, etc.). In Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (Freud, 1926d [1925]), which, to a large extent, is a response to the position taken by Otto Rank two years earlier, Freud developed the theory of signal anxiety, which represents a kind of evolutionary progress since it involves anticipatory behavior. The infant no longer experiences anx1- ety when faced with the loss of an object but when faced with the fear of the loss of love from the object. There Freud developed different models of anxiety that, rather than being mutually exclusive, probably refer to different types of anxiety and different maturational steps. The conceptual transition from automatic anxiety to signal anxiety involves a profound reworking of his thinking about repression. In the case of automatic anxiety Freud made anxiety a direct consequence of repression. Repression, by ejecting the instinctual representation from consciousness, leaves a certain amount of libido unused, which is immediately transformed into anxiety. “One of the most important results of psycho-analytic research is this discovery that neurotic anxiety arises out of libido, that it is the product of a transformation of it, and that it is thus related to it in the same kind of way that vinegar is to wine” (1905d, note of 1920). When discussing signal anxiety, repression is no longer the origin but the consequence of the anxiety. When an instinctual representation becomes dangerous, threatening, or guilt-ridden, it gives rise to anxiety within the ego, leading to repression. Anxiety now serves to alert the subject to the dangers associated with the possible separation and is no longer simply the expression of an instantaneous and automatic anxiety reaction to loss or separation. BERNARD GOLSE See also: Anxiety. 1604 Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 130-243. . (1926d). Inhibitions, symptoms, and anxiety. SE, 20: 87-172. Rank, Otto. (1924). The trauma of birth. Reprinted, with a new introduction by E. James Lieberman. New York: Dover Press, 1993. SIGNIFIER As it is understood today, the notion of the signifier is attributed to Ferdinand de Saussure, founder of linguistics and semiology and author of the influential Course of General Linguistics (1907/1960). For Saussure, the linguistic sign was a mental entity with two aspects: the signified (the “concept”) and the signifier (the mental impression of the sound). The relationship between these two aspects, which Saussure compared to the recto and verso of a sheet of paper, was considered “arbitrary” in that what linked signifier to signified was merely a convention: the signifier “sister” and the signifier “soeur,’ for instance, both refer to the same signified element, even though they belong to two different linguistic systems. At the same time, signifier and signified were connected syntagmatically and paradigmatically, and these connections— and not the designation of a referent or external object—were the basis of the meaning of statements. In the wake of Saussure, structural linguistics from Roman Jakobson to Emile Benveniste built extensively on his work. This account of the structure of the sign supplied the chief algorithm of the science of semiology, whose mandate was to assess and decipher all the sign systems generated by a given society, linguistics being merely a part of this whole— and a model for it. Critical thinking about the signifier centered at first on what was called the priority of the signifier relative to the signified. Inasmuch as the material nature of signifiers was highly diverse (including sounds, images, objects, text, and so on), semiology opened onto all fields of expression—art, fashion, discourse— to the point where it came to be defined as the science of the signifier, or rather, of signifying practices (Kristeva). Claude Lévi-Strauss’s structural anthropology is a magisterial demonstration of this linguistics-inspired approach. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS In psychoanalysis, Jacques Lacan, invoking both Freud and Saussure, as well as linguistic and anthropological structuralism, took the discussion beyond the signifier to what he called “the signifying chain.” Deeming that “the unconscious is structured like a language,” Lacan borrowed the methodology and operating concepts of Saussurian linguistics and applied them in an idiosyncratic way to psychoanalysis. In his view the discovery of the unconscious coincided with the discovery of a subject whose position, decentered (or “ex-centric”) relative to consciousness, was established solely by virtue of the retroactive operation of certain signifiers. Accordingly, the definition of the signifier as a component in a signifying chain was worked out on the basis of three notions: ¢ Vacillation: The signifier can fulfill its purpose of engendering meaning only by ceding its place to another signifier with which it is linked in the chain of signifiers. e The subject: Located nowhere before the advent of the signifier, nor anywhere outside the signifier, the subject receives its place from the signifier, yet can occupy its own place only as a function of the lack whose place a signifier fills; the subject thus becomes the extra signifier that supports enunciation as it proceeds. This is the basis of Lacan’s formula according to which the order of the signifier is founded on the fact that “a signifier is what represents a subject to another signifier” (Ecrits). ¢ The object: The object is that towards which discourse qua desire is directed; it governs the signifying chain and its operation. The object of enunciation too is always decentered relative to the one designated by an utterance. That object is also always lacking, for the subject is never finished with the work of signifying that desire entails. For Lacan, that work is orthonormal, both vertically by virtue of metaphor (condensation or substitution of signifiers), and horizontally by virtue of metonymy (displacement or contiguity of signifiers). The idea of the signifier is cardinal in Lacan’s theory, determining as it does the very definition of the unconscious, of the subject, of the oedipal law, of castration, and of desire. It lies at the intersection ofsa reformulation of the Oedipus complex conceived of as the subjugation of the subject to the law (of language) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SIGNIFIER and a consideration specific to Lacan (and only hinted at by Freud) of the effects of speech on the subject as revealed by analysis. To say that the unconscious is a “signifying chain” is the same thing as saying that the “symbolic function” is what superimposes the rule of culture (Oedipus) on the rule of nature. The Other was viewed by Lacan from the outset as the logical empty place where the laws of language and speech are laid down; he described the Other as a “treasure trove of signifiers.” The fact remains that Lacan’s system retained aspects not subsumed by the linguistic realm: the “subject” (of the unconscious) qua “signifier effect,” the object of desire as alien to the sphere of need and even to that of demand, desire as inseparable from speech effects. This independent realm of the signifier was anchored to that “pure signifier,’ the Name-of-the-Father: the three clinical categories of neurosis, psychosis, and perversion were viewed as three possible variants of the relationship of the subject of the unconscious to this paternal signifier. Later in his work, Lacan would in fact insist that his teaching was not akin to linguistics; before his final “knot” theory, he proposed an account of “the letter” as an element linking the three orders of the Real, the Imaginary, and the Symbolic—as distinct from his first theory of the signifier, which seemed to concern itself solely with the order of the Symbolic. Saussure’s account of the structure of the sign (signifier/ signified) and Lacan’s thinking on the signifier prompted a philosophical critique of the notion of the signifier that took Freud’s idea of “facilitation” as its starting-point and developed the concept of “trace” (Derrida). The resulting deconstruction of the Saussurian sign led in turn to the deconstruction of metaphysics and opened up the question of the truth of meaning from the point of view of Derrida’s “grammatology’— a perspective of distinct relevance to psychoanalytical interpretation. In the light of psychoanalytical discourse, though also in that of poetic language, Julia Kristeva has suggested another way of understanding the Saussurian signifier: first, in “semiotic” terms, taking into account the infralinguistic indications of the drive, as discernible in the language of poetry and also in the discourse of psychotic or depressed patients—indications excluded from the realm of the signifier as understood by Lacan; and, secondly, in “symbolic” terms, opening up the dimension of signs and syntax. JULIA KRISTEVA 1605 SIGNIFIER/SIGNIFIED See also: Economic point of view; Intergenerational; Linguistics and psychoanalysis; Sense/nonsense; Signifier/ signified; Symbol; Symbolism; Thing-presentation; Word-presentation. Bibliography Derrida, Jacques. (1974). Of grammatology (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Trans.). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins. (Original work published 1967) Kristeva, Julia. (1974). La Révolution du langage poétique. LAvant-garde a la fin du dix-neuvieme siecle—Lautréamont et Mallarmé. Paris: Seuil. Lacan, Jacques. (2002). Ecrits: A selection (Bruce Fink, Trans.). New York: Norton. (Original work published 1966) Saussure, Ferdinand de. (1960). Course in general linguistics (Wade Baskin, Trans.). London: Peter Owen. (Original work published 1907) SIGNIFIER/SIGNIFIED A signifier, an element of language, is a material representation of a linguistic sign. In psychoanalysis, it is a phonemic sequence of the discourse that intervenes in conscious and unconscious processes to determine the subject engaged in the discourse. A signified is the idea or concept associated with a signifier, which together constitute the linguistic sign. These elements, which come from Ferdinand de Saussure’s linguistic theory, were introduced and problematized in the field of psychoanalysis by Jacques Lacan during his “return to Freud” phase in early 1950s. Lacan relied on the following main points of Saussure’s structural model. The linguistic sign, which belongs to language, establishes a relationship between an acoustic wave form, or signifier, and a concept, or signified (Figure 1). The directed and temporal sequence of an articulation presupposes the division of language into two axes: the syntagmatic axis, which refers to a system of speech as a system of signs capable of being combined and concatenated, and the paradigmatic axis, which refers to a system of language as a system of signs selected and substituted for particular meanings. A sign taken in isolation does not define a meaning: a signifier can refer to several signifieds. Each sign thus gains its value by being placed in the context of other 1606 FIGURE 1 signified signifier concept acoustic image signs. The “break” between a flow of sounds and a flow of thought associates the signifier with a signified. Freud’s definition of psychoanalysis as a treatment through speech led Lacan to propose that the “unconscious [is] structured like a language.” This theory, advanced and developed on the basis of Freud’s work, led Lacan to assign to the signifier and to the structure of language a fundamental role in the unconscious processes of the speaking subject. At the level of the primary processes, Lacan posited an analogy between condensation and metaphor, as a substitution of meaning, and between displacement and metonymy, as a connection in meaning. At the level of the expressions of the unconscious, the elaboration of symptoms appears to be analogous to the mechanisms of metaphor, while witticisms and slips of the tongue appear to be analogous to metaphorical condensation and/or metonymic displacement. The dynamic of desire in the speaking subject is expressed in an indefinite sequence of signifiers operating metonymically. However, this notion only holds because Lacan transformed Saussure’s definition of the linguistic sign and, more specifically, that of the signifier in the structure of language. He referred to this as his “linguisteria” (linguistérie). Analysis of the neuroses, the structure of unconscious formations, and the discourse of psychotics led Lacan to believe that the signifier is autonomous and dominant over the signified, which he symbolized as shown in Figure 2. The bar that separates S from s shows the relationship between the subject and the language. The subject is thus subordinated to signifiers, without always having access to the meaning that they delimit. This is seen clearly in psychotic discourse, which unleashes the signifier. The primacy of the signifier implies that signifieds draw their coherence only from a network of signifiers. The relationship between signifier and signified can come undone at any time. Lacan replaced Saussure’s “break” (coupure), Saussure’s correspondence between the flow of signifiers and the flow of signifieds, with INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FIGURE 2 Signifier signified the point de capiton (literally, “quilting stitch”), the operation that stops the indefinite slippage of meaning by making a deferred limitation. The logic of the signifier thus defined by Lacan calls for a change in how the unconscious processes are analyzed. Lacan focused on how the unconscious expresses itself in the patient’s language, as revealed through meter, punctuation, and interpretative breaks. Within this logic, certain signifiers, such as “phallus”, “Name-of-the-Father”, and “lack in the Other’, are invested with a fundamental metapsychological value. JoEL Dor See also: Blank/nondelusional psychoses;Cinema and psychoanalysis; Displacement; Ego ideal/ideal ego; Fantasy, formula of; Feminine sexuality; Feminism and psychoanalysis; Foreclosure; Formations of the unconscious; Four discourses; Graph of Desire; Imaginary identification/ symbolic identification; Infans; Jouissance (Lacan); Letter, the; Literature and psychoanalysis; Matheme; Metaphor; Metonymy; Monism; Mother goddess; Nameof- the-Father; Negation; Object a; Other, the; Parade of the signifier; Phallus; Philosophy and psychoanalysis; Phobias in children; Phobic neurosis; Psychoses, chronic and delusional; Real, the (Lacan); Schizophrenia; Sexuation, formulas of; Signifier; Signifying chain; Slips of the tongue; Splitting of the subject; Structuralism and psychoanalysis; Subject; Subject of the unconscious; Subject’s castration; Symbolic, the (Lacan); Symptom/ sinthome; Thing, the; Topology; Unary trait. Bibliography Dor, Joél. (1997). Introduction to the reading of Lacan: The unconscious structured like a language. Northvale, N.J.: J. Aronson. Lacan, Jacques. (2002). The function and field of speech and language in psychoanalysis. In his Ecrits: A selection (Bruce Fink, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton. (Original work published 1953.) . (1993). The seminar of Jacques Lacan (Book 3: The psychoses). (Russell Grigg, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton. (Original work published 1955-1956) Saussure, Ferdinand de. (1986). Course in general linguistics (Roy Harris, Trans.). LaSalle, IL: Open Court. (Original work published 1915) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SIGNIFYING CHAIN SIGNIFYING CHAIN Inspired by the notion of facilitation, which was central to Freud’s description of the functioning of the psychic apparatus, Jacques Lacan defined the signifying chain as an association and combination of signifiers, connected in diverse ways, like the “links by which a necklace firmly hooks onto a link of another necklace made of links” (Lacan, 2002a, p. 145). The unconscious activity of desire is expressed through the associative and combinatory links of the signifier and is repeated in a kind of succession that sets up a chain reaction. The signifying chain originates in the process of primal repression, during which the Name-of-the-Father signifiers are substituted for the signifier of the desire for the mother. From then on, conscious and unconscious signifiers are woven together through metonymy and metaphor, the two functions that generate signifieds. The signifying chain has only one destiny: to insert the subject’s unconscious desire in the subject’s utterances. Thus it constitutes the design and the weave of the speaking subject’s psychic fabric. More generally, it is involved in all psychic causality. JozL Dor See also: Four discourses; Graph of Desire; Infantile, the; Letter, the; Matheme; Psychic causality; Signifier; Symptom, sinthome; Unary trait. Bibliography Lacan Jacques. (1993). The seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book 3: The psychoses, 1955-1956 (Russell Grigg, Trans.) New York: W. W. Norton. . (2002a). Ecrits: A selection (Bruce Fink, Trans.) New York: W. W. Norton. . (2002b). The function and field of speech and language in psychoanalysis. In his Ecrits: A selection (Bruce Fink, Trans.) New York: W. W. Norton. (Original work published 1953) . (2002c). The instance of the letter in the unconscious, or reason since Freud. In his Ecrits: A selection (Bruce Fink, Trans.) New York: W. W. Norton. (Original work published 1957) . (2002d). The subversion of the subject and the dialectic of desire in the Freudian unconcsious. In his Ecrits: A selection (Bruce Fink, Trans.) New York: W. W. Norton. (Original work published 1960) 1607 SILBERER, HERBERT (1882-1923) SILBERER, HERBERT (1882-1923) Austrian psychoanalyst Herbert Silberer was born on February 28, 1882, in Vienna, where he ended his life by suicide on January 12, 1923. Victor Silberer, his father, was a self-made man who ran a sports newspaper and a publishing house. A sportsman himself, Herbert was one of the pioneers of Austro-Hungarian aeronautics. He came to psychoanalysis self-taught, with a view to resolving his personal conflicts. After receiving Silberer’s observations on the intermediary stages between waking and sleep, Freud advised Jung (July 19, 1909) to publish the paper, remarking, “Silberer is an unknown young man, probably a better-class degenerate; his father is a wellknown figure in Vienna, a member of the city council and an ‘operator.’ But his piece is good and throws light on an aspect of dream work” (p. 242). In 1909, Silberer’s “Report on a Method of Eliciting and Observing Certain Symbolic Hallucination- Phenomena” was published in the second volume of the newly launched Jahrbuch; it eventually appeared in English (Silberer 1951). In this article, Silberer described the hypnagogic states and explained the formation of symbols as revealing affects and emotions in a “functional” way and personalizing various states characteristic of the dreamer’s psychic processes. In “On Narcissism: An Introduction” (1914c), Freud wrote that this was “one of the few indisputably valuable additions to the theory of dreams,” adding that Silberer had “thus demonstrated the part played by observation—in the sense of the paranoiac’s delusions of being watched—in the formation of dreams” (p. 97). In October 1910, Silberer became a member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. Articles published over the next several years showed Silberer’s increasing interest in esotericism and mysticism. Freud recognized his contributions to symbolism, as did Wilhelm Stekel, with whom Silberer would maintain a close relationship after the latter’s rupture with Freud. Silberer’s major work, Problems of Mysticism and Its Symbolism, published in 1914 and translated into English three years later, distinguished Freud’s views on the dream from his own. Freud criticized his concept of “anagogic” interpretation, describing the evolution of dreams during treatment toward more general and universal symbolization, and he also noted Silberer’s 1608 deemphasis of sexuality and tendency to rationalize. Similarly, Ernest Jones wrote to Freud (February 8, 1911), “As to Silberer, I don’t know what to make of him. He seems to be badly infected by the philosophic virus.” Jones subsequently elaborated still stronger criticism of Silberer in his 1916 paper on “The Theory of Symbolism.” Although it left Freudian colleagues more than skeptical, Silberer’s comparison of transference to the alchemical reactions between male and female elements in nature inspired both Theodor Flournoy and, in particular, Carl G. Jung. With Wilhelm Stekel and Samuel Tannenbaum, Silberer directed a review published in the United States, Psyche and Eros. Despite resigning after the publication grew increasingly hostile to Freud and psychoanalysis, his association with the journal further damaged his relations with the Vienna Society. Paul Roazen (1976) published a letter of Freud dated April 17, 1922: “Most Honored Sir, I ask you not to make your intended visit to me. After my observations and impressions of recent years I no longer desire personal contact with you.” Roazen believes this letter was addressed to Silberer and became one of the motives for his suicide nine months later. Bernd Nitzschke (1989) does not share Roazen’s conviction; based on the obituary by Stekel (1924), he believes the letter was addressed to Silberer’s father, Viktor. In fact, Stekel, who was sur- ‘prised by Silberer’s suicide, stressed the Vienna Society’s unfavorable reaction to his lecture on dreams on November 1, 1922. Forty years after his death, Carl G. Jung wrote: “Herbert Silberer has the merit of being the first to discover the secret threads that lead from alchemy to the psychology of the unconscious” (Jung, 1955-57, p. 792). ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Alchemy; Anagogical interpretation; Functional phenomenon; Representability. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1914c). On narcissism: an introduction. SE, 14: 67-102. mae (1993 [1908-39]). The complete correspondence of Sigmund Freud and Ernest Jones,1908-1939. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Jones, Ernest. (1961 [1916]). The theory of symbolism. In Papers on psychoanalysis. Boston: Beacon Press. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Jung, Carl Gustav. (1955-57). Mysterium Conjunctionis. An Inquiry into the separation and synthesis of psychic opposites in alchemy. Coll. Works, Vol. 14, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul . Nitzschke, Bernd. (1989). Freud et Herbert Silberer. Hypotheses concernant les destinataire d’une lettre de Freud de 1922. Revue internationale d’histoire de la psychanalyse, 2, 267-277. - (1989). Freud und Fechner. Einige Anmerkungen zu den psychoanalytischen Konzepten “Lustprinzip” und “Todestrieb.” In Freud un die akademische Psychologie. Beitrage zu einer historischen Kontroverse. Munich: Psychologie Verlagsunion. Roazen, Paul. (1976). Freud and his followers. New York: Alfred A.Knopf. Silberer, Herbert. (1917). Problems of mysticism and its symbolism. New York: Moffat, Yard. . (1951). Report on a method of eliciting and observing certain symbolic hallucination-phenomena. In Rapaport, David. Organization and pathology of thought. Selected sources. New York: Columbia University Press. Stekel, Wilhelm. (1924). In memoriam Herbert Silberer. Fortschritte der Sexualwissenschaft und Psychoanalyse, 1, 408— 420. SILBERSTEIN, EDUARD (1856-1925) Eduard Silberstein, an intimate friend of Freud’s when he was an adolescent and young adult, was born on December 27, 1856, in Iasi, then the capital of Romania, and died in Braila, Romania, in 1925. Freud’s eighty extant letters to Silberstein, part of their steady correspondence from 1871 to 1881, have been preserved and published. His father, Osias Silberstein, was a prosperous merchant, Orthodox Jew, and father of four. He sent Eduard and his brother Adolf to a local heder, but they soon rebelled against the narrowly religious education. Eduard then pursued his studies in Vienna, where he was one of Freud’s classmates in the gymnasium. They were friends by 1870. Tongue in cheek, Freud and Silberstein founded a secret “Spanish Academy” (Academia castellana), of which they were the sole members. In correspondence Freud often signed using the nickname “Cipion, dog of the hospital at Seville”; Silberstein was “Berganza,” another canine hero from Cervantes’s Exemplary Stories. Freud’s letters paint a lively picture of Freud’s adolescence: the two students’ academic worries, readings, INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SILBERSTEIN, Enuarpo (1856-1925) and early infatuations with girls. During the summer of 1871, when Freud was fifteen, Silberstein and Freud went to Freiberg, where Freud had a very brief meeting with Gisela Fluss, a girl almost twelve years old. This encounter was important enough to Freud that he recalled it while writing “Screen Memories” (1899a) and again in a slip of the pen in preparing his “Notes on a Case of Obsessional Neurosis” (1909d, p. 209). During his first stay in Great Britain in 1875, at the Manchester home of his half-brothers Emanuel and Philipp, and during his stay in Trieste, Italy, at the experimental zoological station, Freud confided to Silberstein his impressions, youthful desires, and ambitions. Freud’s last preserved letter to Silberstein dates to January 1881, when Freud was preparing to receive his medical diploma. On February 7, 1884, Freud wrote to his fiancée, “We became friends at a time when one doesn’t look upon friendship as a sport or an asset, but when one needs a friend with whom to share things. We used to be together literally every hour of the day that was not spent on the school bench.... [We] compiled a great mass of humorous work which must still exist somewhere among my old papers” (1960a [1873-1939], pp. 96-97). Those papers probably disappeared in the fire of April 1885. As for Silberstein, after his exams he left for Leipzig to study jurisprudence, later moving to Vienna, where in 1875 he attended classes in law and Franz Brentano’s lectures on philosophy. He took his doctorate in law in 1879, but would never practice. After a reversal in his family’s financial situation, he was compelled to work in banking, then in the grain trade. Silberstein’s first marriage, with Pauline Theiler, ended sadly. According to his granddaughter Rosita Braunstein Vieyra, this young woman “became mentally ill, was treated unsuccessfully by his friend Sigmund Freud, and threw herself from a window in Freud’s apartment building” (Freud, 1989a [1871- 1881, 1910], p. 192). By other accounts, published at the time of the incident in 1891, she did not actually see Freud before committing suicide. Silberstein subsequently remarried and had a daughter, Theodora. A socialist, Silberstein, together with fellow student Heinrich Braun, initiated Freud into social-democratic politics. Throughout his life Silberstein was politically active and played an important role in the Jewish community, fighting for the right of Jews to become 1609 SILENCE Romanian citizens and for their right to vote. He was president of the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, the Alliance Israélite universelle, and B’nai Brith. Three years after Silberstein’s death, Freud recalled him a final time in a letter to the president of B'nai Brith in Braila: “I was deeply touched to learn of the honor your Lodge has bestowed on my late childhood friend, Dr. Eduard Silberstein. I spent many years of my boyhood and young manhood in intimate friendship, indeed in fraternal fellowship, with him. ... Later, life and physical distance separated us, but early friendship can never be forgotten” (1989a [1871—1881, 1910], p. 186). ALAIN DE MIOLLA See also: Fechner, Gustav Theodor; Fluss, Gisela; Freud, Sigmund (siblings); Vienna, Freud’s secondary school in; Vienna, University of. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1899a). Screen memories. SE, 3: 299-322. . (1909d). Notes on a case of obsessional neurosis (“the rat man”). SE, 10: 151-318. . (1960a [1873-1939]). Letters of Sigmund Freud (Tania Stern and James Stern, Trans.) New York: Basic Books. . (1989a [1871-1881, 1910]). Letters of Sigmund Freud to Eduard Silberstein, 1871-1881 (Arnold J. Pomerans, Trans.) Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990. SILENCE Silence in the course of an analytical session, whether it comes from the patient or the analyst, has constantly posed problems for the theorists of psychoanalytical technique. According to certain authors, silence is to be interpreted as a resistance (Karl Abraham, Sandor Ferenczi, Sigmund Freud, Wilhelm Reich, Otto Fenichel, Anna Freud, Stephen Weissman). Edward Glover was the first to emphasize the counter-transferential positions involved in it, and noted the role of the super-ego. Karl Abraham, Sandor Ferenczi, Edmund Bergler, Ella Sharpe, Robert Fliess and Kata Levy make of it a particular mode of instinctual expression, while Rudolph Loewenstein and Leo S. Loomie approach it as the 1610 translation of a distortion of the ego. Silence has also been studied as an object relation by Jacob Arlow (defense or discharge) and by Ralph Greenson (resistance or communication), as an object relation properly speaking (Carel Van der Heide, Meyer A. Zeligs) and as a particular mode of object choice (Robert Barande). According to Freud (“The Dynamics of Transference.” 1912b, p. 101): “Ifa patient’s free associations fail, the stoppage can invariably be removed by an assurance that he is being dominated at the moment by an association which is concerned with the doctor himself or with something concerned with him. As soon as this explanation is given, the stoppage is removed, or the situation is changed from one in which the associations fail into one in which they are being kept back.” And elsewhere, in “The Theme of the Three Caskets” (1913f, p. 295): “in dreams dumbness is a common representation of death.” He also says in “Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through” (1914g, p. 150) that when the patient “is silent and declares that nothing occurs to him,” this, “of course, is merely a repetition of a homosexual attitude which comes to the fore as a resistance against remembering anything,” while Sophie Morgenstern, in “A Case of Psychogenous Muteness” (1927), gave us the first work known in France to use drawing, in place of speaking, as a method of child analysis. Other authors have added to these views: silence is “a state of restoration of primary narcissism, it is the realization of desire” enabling one to “re-experience narcissistic omnipotence” (Pierre Luquet, Béla Grunberger), or a sign of “good maternal care that provides the ego with a silent but vital support” (Donald W. Winnicott). The sense of the ego’s inability to mask instincts from the super-ego in discourse may explain the very frequent silences that are encountered in child therapy. In the analytical couple, of whatever kind, “the support of the amorous exchange as the patient lives it is indeed silence [...] It’s within the crucible of the therapist’s silence that the patient’s spoken words will be revealed as fantasy” (Robert Barande). Luisa de Urtubey, in her report on the “work of the counter-transference” (1994), sets out the theories of a great number of authors who discuss silence. For her, “silence—as well as speech, its interpretations, its emphases, the links it weaves—is the expression of counter-transference in this analytical space and at this precise moment.” Pearl Lombard expresses an aptitude for the silent maternal counter-transference: “speech is INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS > silver, silence is golden” (“The Silence of the Mother, or: Twenty Years Later”, 1986). She remarks that “a succession of images wells up in the analyst’s mind as she or he accompanies a silent patient: astonishment, anxious questioning, an experience of depression and an obligation to imagine if we are to survive, but also if our patients are to survive psychologically. There are long periods in which the exchange between patient and analyst, although it is very intense, happens in both directions, in the mysterious depth of silence. The way these analyses evolve depends to a large extent on the existence of counter-transferential movements that are sufficiently intense to arouse representations of highly personal images or things, related to the analyst’s narcissism—representations that can invigorate the treatment only insofar as they can be linked and bound to a moment in the patient’s history, either in narrative form, or in the shape of images visualized on the basis of that narrative. Thus the vital bridge between word representations and thing representations is created or recreated in the analyst himself or herself. This bridge is highlighted by interpretation, the invigorating effect of which fulfils the silence and makes it speak.” The evaluation of “silence” is possible only if each case—patient and analyst—is taken on its merits. PEARL LOMBARD See also: “Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria” (Dora/Ida Bauer); Listening; Nacht, Sacha Emanoel; Stone, Leo. Bibliography Barande, Robert. (1989). Parcours d’un psychanalyste, son esthétique et son éthique. Paris: Pro-Edi. Freud, Sigmund. (1912b). The dynamics of transference. SE, 12: 97-108. . (1913f). The theme of the three caskets. SE, 12: 289-301. . (1914g). Remembering, repeating and workingthrough (Further recommendations on the technique of psycho-analysis II). SE, 12: 145-156. Green, André. (1979). Le silence du psychanalyste. Topique, 23, p. 5-25. Lombard, Pearl. (1986). Le silence de la mere ou vingt ans apres. Bulletin de la Société de psychanalyse de Paris, 9, p. 33-48. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Simmec, Ernst (1882-1947) Nasio, Jean-David. (1987). Le Silence en psychanalyse. Paris: Rivages. Urtubey, Luisa de. (1994). Le travail de contre-transfert. Bulletin de la Société de psychanalyse de Paris, 31, p. 147-148. SIMMEL, ERNST (1882-1947) Neurologist and psychoanalyst Ernst Simmel was born on April 4, 1882, in Breslau, Germany (now Wroclaw, Poland) and died in Los Angeles on November 11, 1947. From a Jewish background, Simmel was the youngest of nine children. His father, Siegfried, was a banker; his mother, Johanna, managed an employment agency for domestic servants. After studying medicine and psychiatry in Berlin and Rostock, Simmel received his medical degree in 1908; his dissertation concerned the psychogenic etiology of dementia praecox. Early in his career he worked as a general practitioner in Berlin. During World War I, however, he served as military doctor and chief of a hospital for psychiatric battle casualties in Posen. There he introduced the use of psychodynamic principles; at the time, he was still self-taught in psychoanalysis. Returning to Berlin after the war, Simmel underwent a didactic analysis with Karl Abraham in 1919. Together with Abraham and Max Eitington, he helped establish the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute in 1920. He served as president of the Berlin Psychoanalytic Society from 1926 to 1930, and founded and served as chief physician of the Tegel sanatoriumat Schloss Tegel, outside Berlin, in 1927. The sanatorium, the first ever designed to employ psychoanalytic principles in treating patients who might benefit from observation, went bankrupt and closed in 1931. In 1910, Simmel married Alice Seckelson, and the couple would have two sons. In 1929 he married his second wife, Hertha Briggemann. Simmel, a liberal who had helped to found the Society of Socialist Physicians and served as its president from 1924 to 1933, ran afoul of Nazi authorities soon after Hitler came to power in 1933. Emigrating to the United States in 1934, he moved to Los Angeles after a brief period at the Topeka Psychoanalytic Institute. He was instrumental in founding the Los Angeles Psychoanalytic Institute soon after the Second World 1611 SKIN War; he also helped establish the San Francisco Psychoanalytic Society, and served as its first president. Simmel published both clinical and theoretical papers. On the Psychoanalysis of War Neuroses (1921) became a classic. His 1927 lecture at the Innsbruck Congress on the use of psychoanalytic principles in treating institutionalized patients was also highly original. A major theoretical contribution is “Self-Preservation and the Death Instinct,’ published in 1944. Another significant contribution to theory was Simmel’s hypothesis concerning the existence of pre-oedipal anal libido, germane to certain psychosomatic and psychotic disorders. These ideas would find resonance in the work of Melanie Klein, Wilfred Bion, and Donald Meltzer. Simmel also published some thirty original works on social issues, clinical problems, and matters of mental health policy. He is important both as a founder of the institutions noted above and for establishing a place for psychoanalysis in health care and suggesting its applications to clinical medicine. Many of his works concern psychosomatic medicine, including his “Uber die Psychogenese von Organst6rungen und ihre psychoanalytische Behandlung” (The Psychogenesis of Organic Disturbances and Their Psychoanalytic treatment”) from 1931. He edited the anthology Anti-Semitism. A Social Disease, published in 1946. Psychoanalyse und ihre Anwendungen [Psychoanalysis and its applications], a collection of numerous abstracts, lectures, and unpublished manuscripts, appeared in 1993. LuDGER M. HERMANNS ULLRICH SCHULTZ- VENRATH See also: Alcoholism; Berliner Psychoanalytische Poliklinik; Berliner Psychoanalytisches Institut; Christians and Jews: A Psychoanalytical Study; First World War: The effect on the development of psychoanalysis; Germany; Indications and contraindications for psychoanalysis for an adult; “Lines of Advance in Psycho-Analytic Therapy’; Money and psychoanalytic treatment; Racism, antisemitism, and psychoanalysis; Relaxation principle and neo-catharsis; Technique with adults, psychoanalytic; Tegel (Schloss Tegel); War neurosis. Bibliography Peck, John S. (1966). Ernst Simmel: psychoanalytic pioneering in California. In F Alexander, S. Eisenstein, M. Grotjahn (Eds.), Psychoanalytic pioneers. New York: Basic Books. 1612 Simmel, Ernst. (1921). On the psychoanalysis and the war neuroses. London: International Psychoanalytic Press. . (1931). Uber die Psychogenese von Organstorungen und ihre psychoanalytische Behandlung. In Report on the sixth general medical congress for psychotherapy (p. 56— 65; 251-260). Leipzig: Hirzel. . (1937). The psychoanalytic sanitarium and the psychoanalytic movement. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 1, 133-143. . (1944). Self-preservation and the death instinct. Pyschoanalytic Quarterly, 13, 160-185. . (1946). Anti-Semitism: A social disease. New York: International Universities Press. . (1993). Psychoanalyse und ihre Anwendungen. Frankfurt-am-Main: S. Fischer. SKIN The skin is of interest to psychoanalysis because it is anaclitically related to narcissism, because it is an erotogenic zone, and because it is the object of particular kinds of assaults. Manifestly, the skin is a potential vector for the main instincts (attachment, libido, destructive impulses). At the end of the first essay of Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d), in connection with his notion of polymorphous component instincts, Freud treated the skin as an erotogenic zone specifically excitable by the sadism/masochism “pair of opposites,” in contrast with the eyes, which he conceived of as the bodily seat of the voyeurism/exhibitionism antithesis. Later, in his paper “ ‘A Child Is Being Beaten” (1919e), he described and analyzed the basic scene in masochism: an active adult beats a passive child, while another child bears silent witness to the event. The skin has a particular place in the evolution of living beings: while the husk characterizes the vegetable realm and the membrane the animal realm, the skin is peculiar to vertebrates. In the development of the embryo in vertebrates, the ectoderm gives rise to both the skin and the cortex, so that the skin is in a sense the surface of the brain. The structure of the skin is complex in that it is a sense organ that contains the other sense organs. It comprises several interlocked layers of greatly varied structures. The skin and the sense organs that it envelops constitute an interface ensuring the individual’s contact with the outside world. Like most outer coverings or membranes, the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS skin has a twofold nature: it is a protective shield and it facilitates the communication of meanings. Freud mentioned this nature in his discussion of the “mystic writing pad” (1925a [1924]), on which traces and signs are inscribed. The skin helps give the body its form and coherence. The human body can more readily assume a vertical posture because the skin protects and holds in the skeleton and musculature. The unity of the individual thus depends on the skin. Certain areas of the skin (mucous membranes, erectile tissue, hair on the head, pubic hair, hollows) are especially sensitive to sexual arousal (in comparison with overall presexual skin-to-skin contact). Didier Anzieu has advanced the hypothesis of a fantasy of a skin common to mother and child, and on that basis he developed the idea of a skin ego—an idea that converges with Esther Bick’s notion of a psychic skin and Wilfred R. Bion’s concept of container/contained. For Anzieu, this fantasy of a common skin contributes both to the narcissistic foundation of the individual and to the anaclitic reinforcement of the sexual instinct. In sadism and masochism, humans experience a mixture of pleasure and pain. Here the fantasy of a common skin is replaced by the fantasy of its being ripped off, which is necessary if the individual is to progress toward autonomy but also is a source of guilt feelings. Mother’s and child’s joint cathexis of the newborn’s skin is immediate and is sometimes a source of sexual pleasure. Indeed, if the mother does not spontaneously cathect this first contact, any of a large number of pathologies, ranging from asthma to autism, may result. Psychodermatology has shown a correlation between flaws in the ego and skin disorders. The greater the impairment of the ego, the more seriously the skin seems to be affected. DipierR ANZIEU See also: Adhesive identification; Anzieu, Didier; Bick, Esther; Body image; Dream screen; Erotogenic zone; Infant development; Infant observation; Isakower phenomenon, the; Masochism; Object; Protective shield; Psychic envelope; Skin-ego; Tenderness. Bibliography Anzieu, Didier. (1990). Formal signifiers and the ego-skin. In Didier Anzieu et al. (Eds.), Psychic envelopes (Daphne INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SKIN-EGo Briggs, Trans.). London: Karnac Books. (Originally published 1987) . (1989). The skin ego (Chris Turner, Trans.). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. (Originally published 1985) . (1994). Le penser: du moi-peau au moi-pensant. Paris: Dunod. Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123-243. . (1919e). “A child is being beaten”: a contribution to the study of the origin of sexual perversions. SE, 17: 175— 204. . (1925a [1924]). A note upon the “mystic writing pad. SE, 19: 225-232. SKIN-EGO The term “skin-ego” designates a mental representation that the child forms on the basis of its experience of the surface of its body and uses to picture itself as the vessel of mental contents. The skin-ego belongs to the period in development when the psychic ego differentiates from the body ego on the practical level while remaining indistinguishable from it in the imagination. Intermediate between metaphor and concept, the notion of the skin-ego was worked out by Didier Anzieu and first presented in 1974. According to Anzieu, the ego encloses the psychic apparatus much as the skin encloses the body. The chief functions of the skin are transposed onto the level of the skin-ego, and from there onto the level of the thinking ego. The functions of the skin-ego are to maintain thoughts, to contain ideas and affects, to provide a protective shield, to register traces of primary communication with the outside world, to manage intersensorial correspondences, to individuate, to support sexual excitation, and to recharge the libido. In brief, the skin-ego is an interface between inside and outside, and is the foundation of the container/contained relationship. The skin-ego develops and is enriched by integration into the various envelopes of the sensorimotor system. It has two functional aspects, with one aspect focused on excitations of either internal or external origin and the other oriented toward communications with its entourage. An important part of psychoanalytic work with borderline patients is the reconstruction of the earliest 1613 Svceer/WAKEFULNESS phases of the skin-ego and their consequences for mental organization. This task calls on the techniques of transitional analysis. DipierR ANZIEU See also: Adhesive identification; Body image; Ego; Infant development; Infant observation; Protective shield; Psychic envelope; Skin; Tenderness. Bibliography Anzieu, Didier. (1974). Le moi-peau. Nouvelle revue de psychanalyse, 9, 195-208. . (1989). The skin ego (Chris Turner, Trans.). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. (Original work published 1985) SLEEP/WAKEFULNESS Unlike being awake, a vigilant consciousness, sleep corresponds to a withdrawal of cathexis from the outside world accompanied by a suspension of motor activity. It is an active phenomenon, and although at the beginning of life the opposition wakefulness/sleep is closely dependent upon that of satisfactions and needs; wishes, the capacity for regression, and the nature of the infant’s relations to the mother soon modify this binary rhythm. In the waking state, excitation begins with sensory perception and in a sense traverses the psychic apparatus to emerge any motility; whereas during sleep the reverse happens: excitation passes from ideation to sensory perception, the dream. Sigmund Freud approached the issue of waking and sleep through the analysis of dreams. In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), he advanced the hypothesis that dreams are the guardians of sleep. Unconscious excitation, linked to previous day’s residues, is liable to disturb sleep. The dream is responsible for bringing this free energy under the control of the Preconscious; it diverts this energy, serves as a safety valve, and thus, with a minimal effort of vigilance, ensures sleep. Freud did not modify this hypothesis, but later did flesh it out, most notably in the article “A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams” (1916— 1917 [1915]), where he introduces the concept of a wish to sleep emanating from the ego, a veritable sleep drive that impels the sleeper to return to intrauterine 1614 life. Sleep must be understood as a period of withdrawal toward primary narcissism: The mind renounces most of its acquisitions via a return to its developmental starting point as a way of reliving of its stay in the maternal body, some of the conditions of which are reproduced in sleep. It is as if a kind of inversion happens in sleep: The subject turns: toward his or her inner world by almost totally withdrawing interest in the outer world of waking reality. As Freud pointed out in the introduction to his “supplement,” sleep, like mourning or being in love, can be considered the normal prototype of a pathological state. Regression and backward steps in development are observed. There are two types of regression. First, a temporal regression involving the organization of the ego, which, through this step backward, moves closer to the id. Second, a regression of libidinal development at the level of the drives which goes so far as to restore primary narcissism during sleep. Associated with a relaxation of repression during sleep, which is conducive to the emergence of the Id’s drive energies, this state leads to the formation of dreams through hallucinatory wish-fulfillments. The dreamer is only interested in external reality to the degree it may threaten to bring about an end to the sleeping state by awakening. After Freud, and until the early 1950s, this conception of the opposition sleep waking remained unchanged, and made enriched by concepts such as Bertram D. Lewin’s 1949 postulation of the “screen dream,” the result of introjecting the good maternal breast, which opens up “the dream space” and actualizes the matrix in which the dream’s binding activity can occur. In 1953, when electroencephalographic images revealed the alternation between periods of slow sleep (also called non-rapid eye movement, or NREM sleep), which has a reparative function, and periods of paradoxical sleep (or REM sleep), in which dreams occur, attempts were made to distinguish between the somatic and psychic aspects of hypnic phenomena. As André Green emphasized, it appears to be essential to not transpose concepts from one domain to the other. However, it is both legitimate and productive to explore points of convergence between the two. Authors do agree that sleep plays an organizing role in the case of both the physiological paradoxical sleep, and the psychological dreams. Dream phenomena seem to have binding functions: maintaining the continuity of sleep, connecting waking mental life to INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS sleeping mental life, and integrating lived experiences by binding them to libidinal needs. Masud Khan called this linking function the “capacity for dreaming,” and Didier Houzel suggested that this involves a process of stabilization, not in the form of a return to a fixed energy level of zero, but rather as a form of “structural stability,” that is, a dynamic equilibrium that assumes constant exchange with the environmental milieu. PHILIPPE METELLO See also: Alpha-elements; Amphimixia/amphimixis; Animal magnetism; Contact-barrier; Day’s residues; Development disorders; Dream; Ego feeling; Functional phenomenon; Hypnosis; Infantile omnipotence; Infantile psychosis; Isakower phenomenon; Mania; Manifest; Maternal care; “Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams”; Mourning; Narcissistic withdrawal; Narco-analysis; Nightmare; Night terrors; Outline of Psychoanalysis, An; Perception-consciousness (Pcpt.-Cs.); Phobias in children; Projection; Somnambulism; Thalassa. A Theory of Genitality; Wish, hallucinatory satisfaction of a. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4-5. . (1916-17f [1915]). A metapsychological supplement to the theory of dreams. SE, 14: 217-235. Houzel, Didier. (1980). Réve et psychopathologie de l’enfant. Neuropsychiatrie de Tenfance et de Padolescence, 28 155-164. Khan, Masud. (1972). La capacité de réver. Nouvelle Revue de psychanalyse, 5 283-286. Lewin, Bertram D. (1949). Sleep, the mouth and the dream screen. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 15, 419-434. SLIPS OF THE TONGUE Slips of the tongue are errors involving the uttering (Versprechen), or hearing (Verhdren), or writing (Verschreiben), or reading (Verlesen) of a word and which entail an involuntary parody of the word, assuming the word is known. This kind of slip is an ordinary occurrence but is structurally related to the paraphasias found in pathological conditions. Freud became interested in slips and word play in 1890, and discussed them in his correspondence with Wilhelm Fliess. Both resemble dreams in that INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SLIPS OF THE TONGUE they are part of normal behavior although they introduce an incongruous and, in the case of slips of the tongue and dreams, an involuntary element. Freud’s interest arose from his conviction that it would be impossible to understand psychopathological processes without having a clear notion of their relation to normal mental processes. It was in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901b) that he provided the first and most complete discussion of slips of the tongue, but he discussed them again at length in the Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1916—1917a [1915-1917]). In The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, Freud made use of an earlier, essentially functionalist work on slips of the tongue and reading errors (Meringer and Mayer, 1895), which he contrasted with his own theory. He eliminated two hypotheses: that of the “contamination” of the sound of one word by another and that of “wandering” speech images, which interested Freud to the extent that these disturbances were located below the threshold of consciousness (1901b, pp. 57-58). Using numerous examples, some of which are undeniably comical, Freud illustrated the way in which repressed drives return in the disturbance of language. Slips during reading and writing are not structurally different from those that occur in hearing or speaking, and the same motives are found in both, either libidinal or hostile. But slips provide infinite forms of expression for those drives, while disguising them, and some require a complex effort of interpretation that presupposes familiarity with the life and memories of their author. In general, slips of the pen are not as readily noticed by their authors as slips of the tongue. Freud sums up the character of slips of the tongue as follows in the Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis: “the suppression of the speaker’s intention to say something is the indispensable condition for the occurrence of a slip of the tongue.’ However, the intention can be conscious or unconscious and still produce a slip. “In almost every case in which a slip of the tongue reverses the sense, the disturbing intention expresses the contrary to the disturbed one and the parapraxis represents a conflict between two incompatible inclinations.” Slips are especially interesting when they lead us, in trying to understand them, to dissociate the sound (the signifier) from the meaning contained in the 1615 SMELL, SENSE OF word (the signified). The same was true for the most famous parapraxis made by Freud, forgetting the name Signorelli, to which Jacques Lacan (1966) devoted an entire essay. We find in both word play and jokes, as in slips or the forgetting of names, a complex dynamic and the same processes (displacement and condensation) that Freud showed to be operative in dreams, whose relevance for the study of the unconscious he recognized. Listening for slips of our own often has an immediate revelatory component, similar to that of the patient who hears himself say things that are unknown and yet familiar during the course of analysis. SOPHIE DE MioLLA-MELLOR See also: Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, Formations of the unconscious; Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis; Language and disturbances of language; Linguistics and psychoanalysis; Parapraxis; Psychopathology of Everyday Life, The; Repression; Substitutive formation; Topology. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1901b). The psychopathology of everyday life..SE, 6; . (1916-1917a [1915-1917]). Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 15-16. Lacan, Jacques. (1966). Ecrits. Paris: Le Seuil. Meringer, Rudolf, and Mayer, Carl. (1895). Versprechen und Verlesen: eine psychologisch-linguistiche Studie. Stuttgart: G.J. Géschen. SMELL, SENSE OF Throughout his writings, Sigmund Freud made explicit reference to the role of the sense of smell in mental sexuality. “Olfactory substances...are disintegrated products of the sexual metabolism.... At time of menstruation and of other sexual processes the body produces an increased number of these substances and therefore of these stimuli,’ he wrote to Wilhelm Fliess on January 1, 1896. Later, in his “Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality” (1905d), he added that the repression of a coprophilic olfactory pleasure governs fetish choice: “Both the feet and the hair are objects with a strong smell which have been exalted into fetishes after the olfactory sensation has become unpleasurable and has been abandoned” (p. 155, note 3). 1616 This inhibition of the sense of smell in humans, under the sign of the repression of the pleasure that it can bring, can play a major role in the development of certain neuroses; this is what Freud maintained in the case of the “Rat Man,” recorded in “Notes upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis” (1909d). “The ‘organic’ repression of smell is also a factor in civilization,” he told his students at the Psychoanalytic Society of Vienna in a lecture delivered on November 17, 1909. Soon thereafter, in “On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love” (1912d), he posited this as a consequence of the fact that the human sensory organ had been raised up off the ground with the appearance of the upright stance. The coprophilic instinctual components then became incompatible with the esthetic demands of human civilization. He further elaborated this line of thought in “Civilization and Its Discontents” (1930a), where he speculated that the role of the olfactory sensations “was taken over by visual excitations, which, in contrast to the intermittent olfactory stimuli, were able to maintain a permanent effect. The taboo on menstruation is derived from this ‘organic repression’, as a defence against a phase of development that has been surmounted” (p. 99, note 1). DoMINIQUE J. ARNOUX ~ See also: Coprophilia. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123-243. . (1909d). Notes upon a case of obsessional neurosis. SE, 10: 151-318. . (1912d). On the universal tendency to debasement in the sphere of love. SE, 11: 177-190. . (1930a). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21: 57-145. . (1950a). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173— 280. . (1950c [1895]). The origins of psychoanalysis: Letters to Wilhelm Fliess, drafts and notes: 1887-1902. (Marie Bonaparte, Anna Freud, and Ernst Kris, Eds.; Eric Mosbacher and James Strachey, Trans.) New York: Basic Books, 1954. Nunberg, Hermann, and Federn, Ernst. (1962-1975). Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. New York: International Universities Press. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PsYCHOANALYSIS SMIRNOFF, VICTOR NIKOLAIEVITCH (1919-1995) The French psychoanalyst and neuropsychiatrist Victor Smirnoff was born on November 27, 1919, in Petrograd and died in Paris on November 5, 1995. The child of doctors belonging to the social-democratic intelligentsia, he emigrated with his parents in 1921 after the Bolsheviks came to power. He spent some early years in Berlin before moving to Paris in 1929. After medical training, he worked as a psychiatrist under Georges Heuyer. In 1950, a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation took him to the United States on a fellowship in child psychiatry. There he came into contact with the pioneers of the Child Guidance movement, while his cultural interests and love of books led him into artistic and literary avant-garde circles. Back in Paris in 1954, he undertook an analysis with Jacques Lacan at the suggestion of Wladimir Granoff. Much involved in the internal debates of the Societe Francaise de Psychanalyse leading up to the split of 1963, Smirnoff was one of those, when that split occurred, who opted for rejoining the International Psychoanalytical Association and distanced themselves from Lacan’s practical procedures while acknowledging the value of his teaching. As a child psychoanalyst, Smirnoff took part in the organization of teaching at La Salpéetriere with Jean- Louis Lang and Daniel Widlécher, and founded the psychotherapy clinic of the fifteenth arrondissement of Paris, known as “La Rue Tiphaine,’ where the psychoanalytical approach predominated. He was very active in the founding and running of the Association Psychanalytique de France (APF), contributing most importantly to training issues through his writings and his many control analyses. He was the association’s president in 1975 and again in 1984. He took part in numerous conferences and built up the association’s external relationships as much in France (notably with the Quatriéme Group) as abroad. Smirnoff’s friendship with Masud Khan in London and his desire for cultural expansion led to his translation into French of several essential texts, including Winnicott’s “Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena” (1953) and Klein’s Envy and Gratitude (1955). Smirnoff's book The Scope of Child Analysis, first published in 1966, has been widely translated and frequently reprinted, and in 1992 it was completely revised. It is a basic work of reference in its field. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SOCIAL FEELING (INDIVIDUAL PsYCHoLoGy) A member of the editorial board of the Nouvelle Revue de psychanalyse, Smirnoff also contributed many articles to other journals, among them Topique, LEsprit du Temps, and L’Inactuel. The titles of his books attest to his eclecticism: Et Guérir de plaisir, De Vienne a Paris, Une Tenébreuse Affaire, and Les Limbes de la répression (written in collaboration with Marie- Claude Fusco, his partner of many years). , Victor Smirnoff contributed broadly to the development of the psychoanalysis of adults as well as that of children, and he never cordoned child analysis off, preferring to integrate it into an overall theoretical perspective. He liked to refer to himself as ein analytischer Wandersmann, an analytic journeyman, and his personal itinerary indeed enabled him to maintain a cosmopolitan cultural openness and a wide acquaintanceship with a variety of analytical tendencies without wavering in his commitment to the APF and his position within it. The legacy of Victor Smirnoff is that of a humanist for whom psychoanalysis was a true passion, a way of thinking, and indeed a way of living. HELENE TRrvouss-WIDLOCHER See also: Association Psychanalytique de France; Documents et Deébats; France; Nouvelle Revue de psychanalyse; Societe francaise de psychanalyse. Bibliography Smirnoff, Victor. (1971 [1966]). The scope of child analysis. (Stephen Corrin, Trans.) New York: International Universities Press. . (1978). “.. Et mourir de plaisir.” Nouvelle Revue de psychanalyse, 17, 139-167. . (1979). De Vienne a Paris. Sur les origines d’une psychanalyse a la francaise. Nouvelle Revue de psychanalyse, 20, 13-59. . (1994). Autopresentation. In L. M. Hermmanns (Ed.), Psychoanalyse in Selbstdarstellungen, vol. 2. Sonderdr. Tiibingen: Diskord. SOCIAL FEELING (INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY) After long emphasizing feelings of inferiority and their consequences, Alfred Adler came to grant more and 1617 SOclETE FRANCAISE DE PSYCHANALYSE more importance to the social feeling found in the notions of bonds or attachments that had been studied by such authors as René Spitz, John Bowlby, and Hubert Montagner. At birth, the infant is extremely vulnerable because of its physiological immaturity. The mother-child relationship is thus vital for the newborn. In Adler’s view, preestablished schemes are triggered in the interactions between mother and child: “The mother, taken as the nearest kin at the threshold of development of social feeling, is the source of the first impulses enjoining the child to enter into life as an element of the whole,” he wrote. He thus considered the act of suckling the mother’s breast as an act of cooperation. The socialization of the infant is a potentiality that represents an evolutionary acquisition of the species: “The evolutionary acquisition of maternal love is generally so strong in animals and human beings that it can easily outweigh the instinct for food and the sexual instinct.” Social feeling is not simply adaptation to the group, which itself can be a form of compensation for feelings of insecurity, as can be seen in cults or in totalitarian systems. This notion extends to both the political and economic dimensions of the object-relations that ensure the subject’s autonomy. In the child, compensation for feelings of inferiority is modulated by the harmonious development of social feeling, in which the mother plays an essential role. According to Adler in Problems of Neurosis: A Book of Case Histories (1929/ 1964), it is she who “effects the first major and specifically human changes in the infant’s behavior. Under her influence, the infant, for the first time, inhibits its desires and organic instincts and introduces delays and indirect methods into the pursuit of what it desires ... it is also the mother who interests the infant in other people and enlarges its social circle.” This potentiality is not expressed automatically. The mother may reject the child from birth, as happens in puerperal psychosis. A fusional relationship, by contrast, will prevent any possibility of autonomy. René Magritte’s painting The Spirit of Geometry illustrates this type of relationship, in which the mother can see herself as the son she would have liked to be. Fernando Botero’s painting Melancholy represents one of its consequences. Compensation for feelings of inferiority mobilizes aggressive impulses, expressed in the form of antisocial behaviors that may develop in the direction of delinquency or criminality. It is the 1618 development of social feeling that directs these aggressive impulses toward socialized behaviors or sublimation. In the neurotic, the aggressive behaviors are only masked. They are expressed in a systematic tendency toward devaluation. In The Practice and Theory of Individual Psychology (1920/1951), Adler likened melancholia to paranoia. This is not surprising if we think in terms of compensation for feelings of inferiority and the degree of social feeling—that is, the relationship to the other in the two cases. The melancholic expresses a narcissistic breakdown resulting from a loss of love, for which he or she blames the other. The paranoiac hallucinates this feminine other, which enables him to idealize himself at the price of homosexual feelings of persecution, since he becomes both God and the wife of God. The annihilation of the other in the schizophrenic culminates in an all-pervasive self in a delusional world. FRANCOIS COMPAN See also: Attachment; Inferiority, feeling of (individual psychology); Masculine protest (individual psychology). Bibliography Adler, Alfred. (1951). The practice and theory of individual psychology (P. Radin, Trans.). New York: Humanities Press. (Original work published 1920) . (1964). Problems of neurosis: A book of case histories (P. Mairet, Trans.). New York: Harper and Row. (Original work published 1929) SOCIETE FRANCAISE DE PSYCHANALYSE The Societe francaise de psychanalyse (SFP; French Society of Psychoanalysis) was born in 1953 out of the first split in the French psychoanalytic movement. The reasons for its creation, already present within the Societe psychanalytique de Paris (Paris Psychoanalytic Society), involved disagreements about the criteria for the selection and training of future analysts. The conceptions of Sacha Nacht, among other points of disagreement, were concretized in the statutes of the new Institut de psychanalyse (Institute of Psychoanalysis), and these were opposed by Jacques Lacan. At the administrative session of the meeting of the Paris Psychoanalytic Society on June 16, 1953, Lacan resigned after his presidential mandate was withdrawn in favor of Vice President Daniel Lagache. Lagache then INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS announced his own resignation. Also resigning were Fran¢oise Dolto and Juliette Favez-Boutonier, soon followed by Blanche Reverchon-Jouve. Lacan joined forces with them to found the SFP, which André Berge and George Mauco also joined, though they concomitantly remained members of the Paris Psychoanalytic Society. During the ten or eleven years of its existence, the SFP proved to be singularly active, productive, and open to other disciplines under the influence of, in particular, Lagache, Lacan, Dolto, Favez-Boutonier, and Georges Favez, seconded by the “troika” of Serge Leclaire, Vladimir Granoff, and Francois Perrier, who were to play a major role. Among the successes of the society, especially noteworthy are the Royaumont Colloquium of 1961 and the creation in 1956 of the journal La psychanalyse, which was active until 1964, eight issues later. Meanwhile, a setback came to light. The founders of the SFP did not realize that by leaving the Paris Psychoanalytic Society, they were also, ipso facto, relinquishing their membership in the International Psychoanalytical Association. Thereafter, successive presidents of the society—Lagache, Lacan, and Angélo Hesnard—repeatedly approached the International Psychoanalytical Association to get the association to recognize the SFP. The history of the second split, for anyone who did not actually experience it, is difficult to reconstruct. Those in charge of the future Association psychanalytique de France (French Psychoanalytic Association), except perhaps for Vladimir Granoff in veiled form, have not given their versions of events, while those in rival societies, except for Alain de Mijolla, gave only approximate glimpses often lacking in objectivity, or even obviously biased, imprecise, and polemical. The reasons for this second split appear to be twofold and intertwined: recognition of the SFP by the International Psychoanalytical Association and the issue of training, in particular, training analysis. After a defeat on the former goal at the 1959 Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Copenhagen, which had dispatched an investigative commission, the next congress, in Edinburgh in 1961, recognized the SFP with the provisional status of a study group and named Lagache, Leclaire, and Favez- Boutonier as members at large, but it combined these decisions with a series of “recommendations”—all INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SOCIETE FRANCAISE DE PSYCHANALYSE technical in nature, dealing with training, and challenging the practices of Lacan and Dolto. The approach of the Stockholm congress in 1963, which was supposed to rule on the request for affiliation, sparked intense discussion, both within the SFP and with members of a new investigative commission. These discussions, not always devoid, of misunderstanding or naiveté, mainly involved attempts at reconciliation, notably through the mediation of Granoff and Leclaire. A motion for relative reconciliation was thus presented to the International Psychoanalytical Association on July 11, 1963, by six of Lacan’s analysands, dubbed the “motionnaires”: Piera Aulagnier, Jean-Louis Lang, Jean Laplanche, Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, Victor Smirnoff, and Daniel Widlocher; with the support of Didier Anzieu and Jean-Claude Lavie (also analysands of Lacan) and Granoff. But the executive committee of the association, though it added Granoff to the previously recognized members at large, further hardened its requirements, demanding that Lacan and Dolto be excluded from all training activity. From then on, the split gradually solidified between the two groups: one around Lacan, with Leclaire and Perrier, and the other with Lagache, Favez-Boutonier, Favez, and Berge. The representatives of the first group, until then in the majority in the administration of the SFP, resigned in October 1963 and in December created, around Jean Clavreul, a “psychoanalysis study group” not recognized by the SFP. The second group, which became the majority in November, was recognized by the International Psychoanalytical Association only as a “French study group.” The split was then inevitable. The statutes of the Association psychanalytique de France were registered on June 9, 1964, and Lacan, on June 21, announced the founding of the Ecole francaise de psychanalyse (French School of Psychoanalysis), which quickly renamed itself the Ecole Freudienne de Paris (Freudian School of Paris). In January 1965 representatives of the two societies announced the dissolution of the SFP, whose membership at the time included 20 permanent members, 25 associate members, 4 corresponding members, and 80 candidates. JeEAN-Louis LANG Association psychanalytique de France; of French-speaking psychoanalysts from See also: Congress 1619 Société PSYCHANALYTIQUE DE GENEVE Romance-language-speaking countries; Ecole freudienne de Paris (Freudian School of Paris); France; Psychanalyse, La; Société psychanalytique de Paris and Institut de psychanalyse de Paris; Splits in psychoanalysis. Bibliography Editors of Ornicar? (1977, December). Sur la passe. Ornicar?, 12-13. Lang, Jean-Louis. (1996). La scission de 1963. Cliniques meéditerranéennes, 49-50, 73-77. Mijolla, Alain de. (1996). La scission de la Société psychanalytique de Paris en 1953: quelques notes pour un rappel historique. Cliniques méditerranéennes, 49-50, 9-30. . (1988). Splits in the French psychoanalytic movement between 1953 and 1964. In R. Steiner and J. Johns (Eds.), Within Time and Beyond Time (pp. 1-24). London: Karnac. Roudinesco, Elisabeth. (1990). Jacques Lacan & Co.: A history of psychoanalysis in France, 1925-1985 (Jeffrey Mehlman, Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1986.) SOCIETE PSYCHANALYTIQUE DE GENEVE The Geneva Psychoanalytic Society was founded in September 1920, its creation being announced in the Internationale Zeitschrift fur Psychoanalyse (1921), although it never figured among the component societies recognized by the International Psychoanalytic Association. It was founded shortly after the Swiss Psychoanalytic Society, which was constituted in Zurich in 1919. The Geneva Psychoanalytic Society brought together both physicians and non-physicians, as well as people who practiced psychoanalysis and others who took an interest in it without practicing it. Its president was Edouard Claparéde, physician and professor of psychology at the science faculty of Geneva University. Although not a psychoanalyst, Claparede took a great interest in psychoanalysis from 1906 onwards and regularly kept the readers of Archives de psychologie up to date with Freud’s latest discoveries. In 1920 he wrote the preface to the first French translation of Freud’s Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1910a), which he first published in the Revue de Geneve. Alongside Claparéde we find Pierre Bovet, director of the Jean-Jacques Rousseau Institute, as well as Henri Flournoy and Charles Odier, who were among the first to practice psychoanalysis, and Raymond de Saussure, 1620 who joined the society a little later. Also active in the society was Dr. Ferdinand Morel, who later abandoned psychoanalysis, Dr. William Boven, from the Lausanne medical faculty, and Sabina Spielrein. One of Jung’s former patients, Sabina Spielrein came to Geneva in 1920 and was Jean Piaget’s analyst. We know little enough about the life of the society or how it came to be dissolved. It is easy to imagine that after 1928 the Swiss Psychoanalytic Society, reorganized by its new president, Philipp Sarasin, had a greater attraction for psychoanalysts in French-speaking Switzerland. JEAN-MICHEL QUINODOZ See also: Claparede, Edouard; Flournoy, Henri; Odier, Charles; Sarasin, Philipp; Spielrein, Sabina. Bibliography Roch, Marcel. (1980). A propos de histoire de la psychanalyse en Suisse romande. Bulletin de la Société suisse de psychanalyse, 10, 17-30. Saussure, Raymond de. (1967-68). L’histoire de la psychanalyse en Suisse romande. Bulletin de la Société suisse de psychanalyse, 6, 1-4. SOCIETE PSYCHANALYTIQUE DE MONTREAL Around 1968 and 1969 it became obvious that for linguistic and geographic reasons, among others, sections based on a federal model were needed within the Canadian Psychoanalytic Society. In the Francophone community, the growing number of candidates and the emergence of a strong nationalist sentiment meant that the training program in English had become an anachronism. In and around Toronto, with the increase in the number of psychoanalysts between 1959 and 1969, there was no longer any reason why candidates should have to travel every week from Toronto to Montreal for their training, as had been the case for ten years. The Canadian Psychoanalytic Society thus created Francophone and Anglophone sections for Montreal, called respectively the Société psychanalytique de Montreal (SPM) and the Canadian Psychoanalytic Society/Quebec English. A third section was created for Ontario: Ontario Branches. As early as May 1965, the Canadian Institute of Psychoanalysis communicated its intention of setting up.a training program in INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS French, beginning in 1967. Initially, the three sections used the same training program that the institute had established in 1959, which corresponded to the program used by the British Institute of Psycho-Analysis. This four-year program consisted of conferences; clinical, technical, and theoretical seminars; and three supervised analyses. Considering the program to be too classical, the new wave of French-speaking psychoanalysts trained in Paris in the 1960s began to question it toward 1970. In September 1969 a few Paris-trained Frenchspeaking psychoanalysts created the Groupe frangais de Montréal (Montreal French Group). Some Englishspeaking colleagues quickly saw this as a desire for separation that was inspired by the political movement Souveraineté-Association. After the initial euphoria, the new group quickly found itself confronted with the harsh political realities of the Canadian Psychoanalytic Society: the requirements, programs, and traditions of the Canadian Institute of Psychoanalysis were very different from what they had known in Paris, and they aspired to greater autonomy than their Anglophone colleagues were willing to grant them. The Sociéte psychanalytique de Montréal diverged from the other two sections of the society mainly over training issues: differences in the teaching program, a refusal to allow the institute to intrude in personal analyses, a non-evaluative concept of training, ongoing seminars that could be run by nontrainers, and above all, the creation of the category of authorized analysts, which allowed nontrainer analysts to analyze candidates after five years of membership. It is important to point out that as early as 1965 those concerned had agreed on how the three Canadian sections would be constituted, and that in the winter of 1965/1966 the three future sections had established a common ground. At this stage the Francophone members of the institute expressed their fears that “due consideration for the needs of the sections in terms of geographic and cultural autonomy was hardly compatible with the maintenance of organizational unity.” Nevertheless, in 1968 the three sections of the institute were created, and in 1969 those of the society were created. On October 9, 1969, the members of the Francophone group unanimously adopted the name Société psychanalytique de Montréal (Psychoanalytic Society of Montreal), although the name was not officially adopted by the Canadian Psychoanalytic Society until 1972. At this point some members favored a INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SocieTE PSYCHANALYTIQUE DE MONTREAL complete separation in the Canadian Psychoanalytic Society, while others feared the isolation that such an early separation might lead to. Another attempt to launch the idea of a separation was again rejected by the members in the mid-1990s. In the fall of 1967, the first monolingual French training program got its start. There were 8 analysts and 9 students. Twenty-one years later (1988), 95 students had completed their training in French. The first elected council of the Société psychanalytique de Montreal held its inaugural meeting on November 24, 1969. Dr. Jean-Louis Langlois was the first president. During this meeting Roger Dufresne put forward the idea of ongoing seminars with a view to enhancing collaboration between the institute and the society, and the members voted in favor of an annual scientific colloquium to be held every spring, an idea that was dear to Andre Lussier. The teaching at the institute was initially didactic and continued the tradition of the 1959 program. This situation continued until 1972, when ongoing open seminars directed by both members and nonmembers of the institute were made available to candidates. Work in such small groups best fostered the free and open exchange of ideas. The great originality of these seminars was that they consisted of older members, younger members, and students. The only requirement retained was study of Freud’s texts, spread out over four years, the training being dispensed by any member who expressed the desire to do so, whether a training analyst or an ordinary member. In addition, stress was placed on supervision (which was seen as more helpful than evaluation) and particularly on the training analysis, later considered to be the core of training. For this reason the position of reporting analyst was abolished, in order to protect the transference of the training analysis from third-party institutional interference. In this context, the training analysis was considered a personal analysis in which the desire to become an analyst also had to be analyzed. As part of the commitment of candidate analysts, as soon as candidates are accepted, they are required to attend all scientific meetings. This teaching model became the obvious choice among alternatives as the result of debate at international precongress meetings on training, the influence of the Francophone analytic groups, and the workshop “The current situation for psychoanalysis,’ launched in February 1970 by four Paris-trained members: Jean 1621 SocléTe PSYCHANALYTIQUE DE MONTREAL Bossé, Claude Brodeur, Roger Dufresne, and Jean-Louis Saucier. Every second Wednesday they reflected on the nature of the analytic process and on the relationships between psychoanalysis and society, psychoanalysis and medicine, psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic institutions, free treatment and direct payment by insurers, training analysis and personal analysis, training seminars and ongoing seminars, and supervision as assistance versus evaluation. Also important was the first annual scientific congress of the French section, in June 1970, on the theme “the transmission of psychoanalysis.” The reflections arising from these debates led to many policies later adopted at administrative meetings. Even in 2005 the structures of the Société psychanalytique de Montréal remain profoundly marked by the principles that made their appearance at that time. Early on, the society found itself confronted with considerable challenges, particularly the establishment of the Quebec social security system. Psychoanalystphysicians in Quebec had to decide on the medical or nonmedical character of psychoanalysis. At stake was the issue of state payment for analyses conducted by psychiatrists and whether there would be two categories of analysts: analysts with medical degrees and those without. Sufficiently aware of the obstacles that arise when the state interferes in treatment and because a second-class status would make it practically impossible for nonphysicians to practice, the French and English Quebec societies, after intense debate, bravely affirmed the nonmedical character of psychoanalysis. The Toronto Psychoanalytic Society made the opposite decision. This is one indication that many Canadian analysts, as well as many American analysts, considered psychoanalysis a subspecialty of psychiatry, and it provides a glimpse of the cleavage existing in the Canadian Psychoanalytic Society with regard to the nature of psychoanalysis. The questioning was then extended to society-institute relations, to training in accordance with the Anglo-Saxon model (so different from the prevalent models in Paris), and to the centralizing influence of the Canadian Psychoanalytic Society, which delegated only the scientific program to sections, without providing any financial resources to organize scientific life or set up a library. During the three decades from 1967 to 1997, the financing and administration of the sections was partly autonomous and partly centralized. Up until the foundation of the Société psychanalytique de Montréal, all theoretical references were to works in 1622 English, with the exception of Freud’s works, which had to be read in English. The authors to whom Paristrained analysts referred seemed to be unknown. The difficulty of establishing a French-language library was the beginning of a long and arduous struggle toward administrative and financial autonomy for the sections— a struggle that reached its conclusion only in 1997 when they acquired complete autonomy in these domains. The Société psychanalytique de Montréal was distinctly different from other Canadian psychoanalytic societies. First, it was open to diverse influences, but gravitated toward French psychoanalytic thinking. When founded in 1969, the society had 29 members, 13 of whom had trained in Paris, 3 in the United States, 1 in London, and 12 in Montreal. Second, it choose an open training program, unlike what was practiced in the other sections of the Canadian Psychoanalytic Society and in the United States. The Société psychanalytique de Montréal, like the Canadian Psychoanalytic Society/Quebec English, is the fruit of diverse contributions arising from several theoretical models following in the wake of Freud. As a result, points of dissent and rupture tend to be situated more around language and culture, or around questions of training and modes of transmitting psychoanalysis, rather than around schools and the theoretical rifts that found them. From a long cohabitation with English-speaking analysts, Francophone analysts have developed the arts of compromise and gentlemen’s agreements, which have enabled them so far to avoid the rifts that are so common in Europe. As a North American Francophone society, the Sociéte psychanalytique de Montréal serves as a point of convergence between European and American influences. The Societe psychanalytique de Montreal and the Canadian Psychoanalytic Society/Quebec English share the same building, which is also the headquarters of the Canadian Psychoanalytic Society. Relations between the two sections have always been characterized by respect and courtesy. Some members of each section are greatly esteemed by those of the other. Ever since the establishment of the sections and in varying ways, there have always been candidates on either side who have gone to the other side for their supervision or analysis, just as from time to time some analysts, after their training, request transfers to the other section. Moreover, members of the French section attend INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS meetings of the Anglophone section more frequently than the converse. In spite of all this, apart from differences over common issues that were resolved for a time, relations between the two sections have long been characterized by mutual incomprehension and distance. Though not applicable to all members, the most tenacious preconception is that the Francophones indulge in abstract philosophy and literature and are not clinically oriented, whereas the Anglophones are pragmatically engaged in psychiatry and psychology, but not psychoanalysis. These prejudices have not, however, prevented friendships and collaborations from developing between individuals. Moreover, by incarnating an external enemy against which cohesion had to be maintained, each society may perhaps have enabled the other to avoid internal divisions. Scientific relations with other sections are more tenuous. Even so, some members of the Société psychanalytique de Montreal are regularly present at the annual scientific congresses of the Canadian Psychoanalytic Society and play an active part in the different study committees of the umbrella organization. Thirty years after its foundation, the Société psychanalytique de Montreal has more than quadrupled in size despite the inevitable departures. The society prides itself on having opened its doors to nonphysicians, which has enriched it with points of view from associated disciplines and consequently has enabled it to get a clearer grasp of the specific nature of psychoanalysis. The ongoing seminars of the society have exceeded the wildest hopes. They have enabled analysts, after their training is complete, to remain in contact with reflective networks of analysts of all ages. These seminars also serve to counterbalance the more impersonal relations that set in as the society grew larger. Analysts thus have a forum where they can discuss questions that arise in individual practice. Unfortunately, the society has not succeeded in providing an analytical presence in Quebec’s main regions outside of Montreal and Quebec. As a result, the society has often been reproached for being closed. In spite of the risks involved, the Société psychanalytique de Montréal, always supposing that its window onto society is compatible with its nature, has sought in the 1990s to maintain a higher social profile. The public conferences (Francoise Boulanger conferences, Julien Bigras roundtables), the open-house days, the project for an institutional psychoanalytic clinic, and INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SOcIETE PSYCHANALYTIQUE DE PARIS the creation of a permanent communications committee are all signs of a new desire to be open to society. JACQUES VIGNEAULT Bibliography Editors of Frayages. (1987). La naissance de la psychanalyse ... a Montréal. Frayages, 3. Parkin, Allan. (1987). History of psychoanalysis in Canada. Toronto: Toronto Psychoanalytical Society. Societe psychanalytique de Montréal. (1992). Bulletin de la SPM. . (1994). Bulletin de la SPM. Vigneault, Jacques. (1993). Transferts et déplacements: fondements de psychanalyse en Amérique du Nord. Trans, 3, 223-237. SOCIETE PSYCHANALYTIQUE DE PARIS AND INSTITUT DE PSYCHANALYSE DE PARIS From its creation in 1926 until the split of 1953, the history of the Société psychanalytique de Paris (SPP; Paris Psychoanalytical Society) practically coincides with the history of psychoanalysis in France, and since 1954 the society’s history has been indissociable from that of the Institut de psychanalyse de Paris (Paris Institute of Psychoanalysis). “On November 4, 1926, Princess George of Greece, née Marie Bonaparte, Mme. Eugenie Sokolnicka, Professor Angelo Hesnard, the two Drs. Allendy, A. Borel, R[ene] Laforgue, Rudolph Lowenstein, Georges Parcheminey, and Edouard Pichon founded the SPP. The goal of this Society is to bring together all the French-speaking doctors qualified to practice the Freudian therapeutic method and to give doctors who wish to become psychoanalysts the opportunity to undergo the training analysis that is indispensable to the practice of Freud’s method.” This was a fairly heterogeneous group of young psychiatrists (their average age was around thirty) who, after founding the group Evolution psychiatrique (Psychiatric Development) in 1925, were led to join forces with the non-physicians Eugenie Sokolnicka, a Polish-born emigrant; Freud’s “legitimate representative” Marie Bonaparte, the main instigator of the organization (de Mijolla, 1988); and another emigrant of Polish origin, Rudolf Lowenstein, who had trained at 1623 Société PSYCHANALYTIQUE DE PARIS the Berliner Psychoanalytisches Institut (Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute) and would become their main training analyst. Although they were united around projects such as continuing the conferences of Frenchspeaking psychoanalysts, initiated in August of the previous year, the launching of the Revue francaise de psychanalyse in 1927, or the formation of a Linguistic Commission for the unification of French psychoanalytic terminology, there were also a number of points of opposition that were exacerbated over the years. Two clans formed: One was made up of those who were faithful to Freud and to the International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA); the other consisted of those who, like Angélo Hesnard, or following Professor Henri Claude, who brought them together in his ward, were hostile to non-physicians. The latter group wished to invent a psychoanalysis purged of the “Germanic mystique,” adapted to the needs of psychiatry and, tellingly, to the French “mentality”—Edouard Pichon, after all, was a disciple of Charles Maurras of the right-wing Action Frangaise. The two factions nevertheless continued to pull in tandem, for better or for worse, until World War II, ensuring the publication of the Revue, the translation of a number of Freud’s works (many of these thanks to the efforts of Marie Bonaparte), and the introduction into the medical community of Freud’s theories, which had been rendered more than a little suspect by the voguish effects that had accompanied their dissemination in France by way of the literary milieus of the Nouvelle revue francaise and surrealism. When the society was created, René Laforgue was elected president (a post he held until 1930), Eugenie Sokolnicka vice president, and Rudolph Lowenstein secretary-treasurer. The first permanent member to be elected was Dr. Henri Codet, on December 20, 1926; Anne Berman, at the time Marie Bonaparte’s secretary, became the first regular member on January 10, 1927. Ernest Jones came to give a lecture on April 5 (Hanns Sachs was invited to lecture in 1928 and Hanz Prinzhorn in 1929, despite Edouard Pichon’s opposition to those who did not speak French), and in May it was announced that “Messieurs Codet, de Saussure, and Odier will be known as founding members.” In 1927 Sacha Nacht, as a “guest of the society,” presented “Quelques considérations sur une psychanalyse chez une schizophréne” (Some considerations on a psychoanalysis of a schizophrenic woman); he was elected to [membership on January 17, 1928, and to permanent 1624 membership on October 21, 1929. A week later, the Second Congress of French-speaking Psychoanalysts discussed Charles Nodier’s report, “Obsessional Neurosis,” the first official manifestation of the SPP and the first in the long series of these Conferences (later called Congresses) that continue even today to bring together Europe’s French-speaking psychoanalysts and to put on their agenda various theoretical and clinical aspects of Freudian psychoanalysis: “Psychoanalytic Technique” by René Laforgue and Rudolph Lowenstein in 1928 and Eugénie Sokolnicka’s presentation on the same topic, also in 1928; “Les processus de Pautopunition en psychologie des nevroses et des psychoses, en psychologie criminelle et pathologie générale” (The processes of self-punishment in the psychology of the neuroses and the psychoses, in criminal psychology and general pathology) by Angelo Hesnard and René Laforgue in 1930; “L’hystérie de conversion” (Conversion hysteria) by Georges Parcheminey in 1931; “La psychanalyse et le développement intellectuel” (Psychoanalysis and intellectual development) by Jean Piaget in 1933; and “Le masochisme, étude historique, clinique, psychogénétique, prophylactique et therapeutic” (Masochism: a historical, clinical, psychogenetic, prophylactic, and therapeutic study) by Sacha Nacht in 1938, the last lecture before the war. After discussions and revisions, which would often recur over the years, the statutes of the society, whose headquarters had been established at René Laforgue’s home, were officially registered on October 25, 1927. In 1928 the bureau saw Angélo Hesnard become vice president, Marie Bonaparte treasurer, and René Allendy secretary. In 1929, however, there was a crisis, because, as Laforgue wrote to Freud on October 26: “A very active minority of our group is against the International Psychoanalytical Association and against lay analysis.” The conflict was resolved, but at the price of Laforgue’s giving up the presidency. On January 10, 1934, the first Institut de psychanalyse de Paris was inaugurated. Marie Bonaparte, who had made its creation possible, was named director. On July 13, 1937, Daniel Lagache was elected to permanent membership, as Jacques Lacan would be in December 1938. Beginning in 1933 the issue arose of what welcome should be extended to analysts fleeing the threat of Nazism, first from Germany and then from other Central European countries. It was essentially Marie Bonaparte, supported by Anne Berman, René Laforgue, and INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Paul Schiff, who pleaded in favor of these analysts and attempted to integrate them into a society whose nationalistic members—together, moreover, with the French population as a whole—wanted it to be more closed. René Spitz and Heinz Hartmann, among others, passed through Paris before emigrating across the Atlantic. The SPP offered no official welcome to Freud when he passed through Paris on June 5, 1938. The beginning of the war in 1939 did not stop courses at the Institut de psychanalyse, but the German occupation brought all psychoanalytic activity to a halt. The Revue francaise de psychanalyse ceased publication. The society’s activities gradually resumed after 1946 under the presidency of John Leuba. In the wake of Sacha Nacht, wreathed in the laurels of his resistance activities, there appeared newcomers such as Serge Lebovici, the first among those who would soon form the core of his team. Discredited by his attempts at collaboration with Matthias Goring, René Laforgue was excluded, and those who had undergone analysis with him—Juliette Favez-Boutonier, Francoise Dolto—suffered from this discrediting. However, the Revue francaise de psychanalyse, published by the Presses Universitaires de France, was reborn in 1948, the same year that the Eleventh Congress of French-Speaking Psychoanalysts in Brussels saw joint presentations by Sacha Nacht and Jacques Lacan: “L’aggressivité en psychanalyse” (Aggressiveness in psychoanalysis). This theme presaged the conflicts that would crystallize around the issue of the training of new candidates, for Freud had again become fashionable in France, and the prisonlike structures of psychiatric institutions were being called into question by young psychiatrists. The SPP, which no longer knew where to hold meetings, had no library and no means of accepting students (there were seventy of them in 1950), and needed to establish premises for its operations. Sacha Nacht was elected president in 1949 and took in hand the future of the institute of psychoanalysis that everyone was determined to create. Although there was unanimity around the contents of the “Rules and Doctrine of the Commission on Teaching Delegated by the SPP” drafted by Sacha Nacht and Jacques Lacan in September 1949, Daniel Lagache quickly became opposed to its authoritarian views and convinced a number of René Laforgue’s analysands, and then Lacan himself, to take his side. After three years of internecine struggles, Lacan was shown, on June 16, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SOCIETE PSYCHANALYTIQUE DE Paris 1953, to have minority support as president of the SPP and resigned, while Daniel Lagache announced the founding of the Société frangaise de psychanalyse (SFP; French Society of Psychoanalysis). Meanwhile, legal proceedings filed in 1950 against a non-physician colleague, Mrs. Clark-Williams, for the “illegal practice of medicine,” had established that a psychoanalytic society had a the collective responsibility to civil society. There were thus ample arguments to support Nacht’s imposition of strict, medically-oriented standards for training, applying the criteria of co-option defined by the IPA with regard to the number, frequency, and duration of sessions in the “training analysis” or the “supervised treatments” required of candidates. For some thirty years, issues related to training took center stage in French psychoanalysis; at the same time, they stimulated unprecedented emulation in the theoretical, clinical, and institutional creativity of members of an SPP that was spurred on by rivalry with the SFP and later, increasingly, by the renown of Jacques Lacan and the growingnumber of his students. The June 1954 inauguration of the Institut de psychanalyse, headed by Nacht until 1962, created a split that was not transcended until 1986. Although the SPP, in the eyes of the IPA, remained the sole representative of psychoanalysis in France until 1965, it was then reduced to the rank of a mere scientific society, without decision-making powers with regard to training policies or the dissemination of Freud’s theories. To be sure, the society still played a determining role in the organization of “Romance-language congresses” (a new appellation suggested by Lacan before the split, and of which Pierre Luquet became permanent secretary in 1956), on commissions, and in international congresses, but the dynamism of the society was concentrated around the team that directed the Institut de psychanalyse (Serge Lebovici, René Diatkine, Maurice Benassy, Henri Sauget). They formed the core of the “Commission on Teaching,” whose members were co-opted from among the permanent membership, and where choices and decisions were made regarding candidates for various posts. While dual membership in both societies may have been mandatory, the importance given to the criteria for training and selection was such that soon the public no longer spoke of the “Society,” but instead referred to the group as “the Institute.” Sacha Nacht’s leadership style was autocratic, and he implemented a number of changes that remained 1625 Socl€Te PSYCHANALYTIQUE DE PARIS after his departure, such as the professional development seminar for analysts from the provinces. His students and partisans were quickly elected to permanent membership to replace those who had left as a result of the split: Béla Grunberger in November 1953, Michel Fain and René Held in early 1954, and others thereafter. Above all, Nacht created a mindset and a way of conceiving of psychoanalysis that are evident in the works published during his tenure, such as La Psychanalyse d aujourd hui (Psychoanalysis Today, 1956). At the Twentieth Congress of the IPA in Paris at the end of July 1957, he was elected vice president of that organization. His work was a central reference in almost all the scientific papers presented in meetings of the SPP, and he was the preferred target for attacks by his former friend Lacan and his followers, although Maurice Bouvet, before his death in 1960, was another such victim, particularly with regard to his work on object relations. In 1962 a prize was created in memory of this analyst; until 1978, when it went to Micheline Enriquez, a member of the Quatrieme Groupe O.P.L.E, it was awarded only to analysts from the SPP. During the 1960s new names appeared in the ranks of the permanent membership, such as Conrad Stein, Serge Viderman, Robert Barande, and André Green, who would represent the next generation of the SPP and build bridges of scientific communication with psychoanalysts from “enemy” organizations. In 1962 a minor revolution displaced Sacha Nacht from the leadership of the institute in favor of Serge Lebovici, assisted by Michel Fain, with Francis Pasche responsible. for the presidency of the society. The autocracy of Nacht and his restricted Commission on Teaching gave way to an oligarchy, that of the “permanent members” (there were thirty of them in 1963). By way of elections held within the society, this group for a number of years maintained their control over what was always the living part of the society, the institute and its Commission on Teaching, on which they all secured ongoing membership in 1965. This was also the terrain of after-conflicts, since over time the play of politics led to the election of about one-third dissenting voices, which, although they never managed to impose the liberal reforms they wished to promote, gradually caused movement in the ponderousness of this large, two-headed institution. The 1964 election to permanent membership of Evelyne Kestemberg , the first nonphysician since the times of Marie Bonaparte (who had died in 1962), provided proof of the thorough expunging of the poli- 1626 cies of Sacha Nacht, who had always opposed. this. Others followed, such as Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel and Joyce McDougall in 1965, and then Salem Shentoub in 1966, providing the SPP with the openness and diversity that gradually came to characterize it and cause it to lose its monolithic aspect. It was also the year of the rapprochement between the society and the Association psychanalytique de France (APF; Psychoanalytical Association of France), which was recognized by the IPA in July and in 1970 fully participated for the first time in a Congress of Romance-languagespeaking Psychoanalysts, with a presentation by Didier Anzieu entitled “Eléments d’une théorie de Pinterpretation” (Elements of a theory of interpretation). The founding in October 1966 of the European Federation of Psychoanalysis, in which societies’ representation was proportionate to their membership base, led to a broadening of the SPP, the consequences of which were crucial for its development. This was the creation, in November 1967, of the category of “affiliated members,” which was to serve as a screening stage between the completion of the curriculum at the institute and election to full membership in the society upon submission of a clinical thesis, which henceforth was the only path of access to membership. This new category would not be the last thing to agitate the tumultuous meetings of May 1968, where institutional constraints were called into question within the Commission on the Degree Program and Hierarchy—although without immediately producing any spectacular modifications. A January 1969 report by Jean-Luc Donnet on behalf of this commission set forth a proposed degree program, the first in a long series, for discussions, counterproposals, meetings, conflicts, and open letters addressing the problems of training which thereafter took center stage in most of the meetings and general assemblies of the SPP and the institute. A new reform of the statutes promoted by Pierre Marty, who was elected president in 1969, that aimed to create an administrative college was voted in on June 16, 1970, on the condition that the problem of the “affiliated members” be set aside. Indeed, this category considerably changed the numerical ratio of the membership in an association where, by law, each dues-paying member was supposed to have administrative power and the right to vote: there were 43 affiliated members when the category was created and 81 in 1969, but there were 214 by 1986, while during INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS the same time period the ranks of the regular members grew from 44 to 49 and then 79, and the number of permanent members grew from35 to 38 and then to 66. The college thus represented a first step toward expanding institutional responsibilities over the three categories of members, even though initially only the regular members were allowed to play a role, for example, on the candidature commissions and the election of their peers. The area of training analysis (in French, analyse didactique), although the word “didactic” discreetly disappeared from usage, like the election of permanent members, remained a closed field reserved only for members of the Commission on Teaching. Only twenty-four years later, on September 27, 1994, would the permanent members modify the conditions for admission to the degree course and agree to allow any person who had been in analysis for more than three years with a member of the SPP to ask to be received by the Commission on the Degree Program. This measure put an end to the struggle that had underlain all the episodes of administrative turbulence that had beset the society and the institute from 1970. A new attempt to reform the statutes to integrate the affiliated members into the institute failed in 1974 because of a negative vote from the permanent members, among whom a conservative majority continued to prevail. A gentleman’s agreement was nonetheless adopted that provided for a three-year trial of a board of directors made up of the three categories of members, but this was followed by a series of discussions and votes that were aborted because one or several categories did not have a quorum. In 1974, René Major had to resign in a climate of hostility from his post as director of the institute because he was not French and his naturalization remained blocked for an unusually long time. André Green, who succeeded him, proposed in a letter of December 19, 1974, an idea that would run its course, that of the “merger of two associations into a single one, with that society taking responsibility the totality of our psychoanalytic life in the three institutional sectors related to it: the scientific sector, the training sector, and the therapeutic sector, which currently go by the names of the Société psychanalytique de Paris, the Institut de psychanalyse, and the Centre de consultations et traitements psychanalytiques [Center for Psychoanalytic Consultation and Treatment].” This idea was taken up anew by Pierre Luquet, president of the SPP after 1975, but nothing was settled, INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SociéTE PSYCHANALYTIQUE DE PARIS and the conflicts intensified to the point where in 1979 another split might have occurred had the dissidents been united around anything other than their opposition to the majority in place. The proposal for a training program with two tracks, one “classic,” proposed by Serge Lebovici, and the other more “liberal,” supported by Serge Viderman, was presented and in turn buried. The institutions held together only because of “moratoriums” whose end-dates were contested and extended, for no one could come to an agreement. The IPA then intervened, dispatching its president, Edward Joseph, on a visit on October 6, 1980, to attempt to clarify the situation and encourage the SPP to find a solution to the conflicts. Raymond Cahn, elected president of the society, decided on November 25 to create a joint society-institute committee charged with presenting, within four months, a proposal for global revision of the statutes of the society and the institute. This proposed merger was voted in by the SPP on June 23, 1981, but rejected the following week at the level of the institute, essentially by the college of the affiliated members. At the Thirty-second International Congress in Helsinki the following month, the IPA decided to nominate an external committee charged with investigating the SPP’s problems. It proposed a six-month moratorium, but nothing had been resolved as of June 18, 1982, when Adam Limentani, who had become president of the IPA, went to Paris. There had still been no resolution by March 1984, when conflicts between the offices of the SPP, under Michel Fain’s presidency, and the Institut de psychanalyse, headed by Claude Girard, nonetheless precipitated the end of the crisis. In a letter dated May 21, 1984, Adam Limentani noted that no one wanted to succeed Michel Fain, and announced that the SPP had to be placed under oversight, and that the institute had to transfer to the society all of its training activities. Daniel Widlécher was a member of the oversight committee. In October 1984, Augustin Jeanneau was elected president, and he was determined to bring to its conclusion this reform that had been dragging on for ten years. He nevertheless had to wait almost another year and a half before the SPP, on May 6, 1986, voted to accept the new proposal for a merger that he had elaborated with the active help of Michele Perron-Borelli; an extraordinary session of the Institut de psychanalyse on June 3 in turn formally ratified it. 1627 SociéTe PSYCHANALYTIQUE DE PARIS The merger at last took place, and the SPP reclaimed the ground that it had lost with the creation of the Institut de psychanalyse in 1953. The institute remained its “training organ,’ but the autonomous organization that constituted it was dissolved. The price of this compromise was that the problems relating to training analyses were not taken into account in drawing up the statutes, but instead left to the initiative and responsibility of the institute’s Commission on Teaching—that is, the permanent members. The society, meanwhile, was henceforth managed by a general committee made up of all the members, represented by an administrative board of forty-five members elected by the college in a system of parity representation. The society put an end to the unsound, two-headed functioning that was also in violation of French laws on associations. On December 2, 1986, André Green was elected president of the new bureau of the organization whose creation he had set in motion exactly twelve years earlier. Simone Decobert became the first director of the new institute and remained in this post until 1996, when she was replaced by Paul Israél. Suddenly, everything calmed down, or almost. There was an influx of candidates for permanent membership, and the SPP, four hundred and fifty members strong, encouraged the formation of groups in the provinces that brought together former students and attracted new ones: the Groupe lyonnais, the oldest of these (1958), the Groupe toulousain (1980), and the Groupe de travail méditerranean (1984) were followed by other groups in Bordeaux, Brittany, the Loire region, Normandy, Pas-de-Calais-Picardy in the north, Grenoble, and Savoy. The creation of the Journées occitanes de psychanalyse (Occitan Days of Psychoanalysis) in 1978 gave the signal for regional initiatives. Certain personalities, such as Robert Barande, Conrad Stein, or Serge Viderman more or less distanced themselves from the society’s activities, but on the whole the members appeared to be relieved by the outcome and determined to show the outside world that all that these years of dispute had brought much that was ultimately constructive for the discipline. They had been schooled in the exercise of democracy, with its contradictions, but also with the possibility of the confrontation of contradictory opinions, without any new “autocrat” having taken the dominant ideological position, and without another 1628 split occurring to bring a brutal resolution to the apparent incompatibilities. Moreover, work in the field of psychoanalysis had never ceased, even though too much time and energy had been tied up in the endless statutory discussions. The Tuesday evening scientific meetings maintained their monthly schedule and the Saturday Encounters continued to be held twice each month, providing a proving ground for the next generation of analysts. The society’s colloquium, started by René Diatkine in 1964, took place regularly in Deauville every autumn, focusing on theoretical and clinical topics. In March 1998, responsibility for organizing the colloquium was entrusted to André Green, and it was named the Rene Diatkine Colloquium in honor of its founder. The Congresses of French-speaking Psychoanalysts, under the guidance of Augustin Jeanneau, who succeeded Pierre Luquet in 1989, and Pearl Lombard, and then, beginning in 1997, that of Gérard Bayle and Georges Pragier, held in alternating years in Paris and a neighboring region, continued to serve as a forum for annual presentation of reports as a way of taking stock of advances in psychoanalytic theory in France and worldwide. From 1989, Franco-Italian colloquia confirmed the need for meetings between neighboring societies. The precursors of a trend toward openness that would increase over time, the Rencontres psychanalytiques d’Aix-en-Provence (Aix-en-Provence Psychoanalytic Meetings), placed under the aegis of the society by Jacques Cain and Alain de Mijolla, from 1982 to 1991 brought a member of the SPP together with a psychoanalytic personality from another group and a non-psychoanalyst specialist from the field of the chosen common theme, ranging from “Languages” to “The Body and History,’ “Autobiography,” and “Music.” Christian David, Jean Guillaumin, Andre Green, René Diatkine, Francis Pasche, Joyce McDougall, Michel Fain, Jean Cournut, Michel Neyraut, Claude Le Guen, and Conrad Stein thus met with Piera Aulagnier, Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, Pierre Fédida, Olivier Flournoy, Michel Artiéres, Marie Moscovici, and Michel Schneider, and compared their psychoanalytic point of view with the perspectives offered by non-psychoanalysts such as Maurice Olender, Edmond Jabés, Eugene Enriquez, Philippe Lejeune, Isabelle Stengers, Marcel Détienne, Yves Hersant, and Andre Boucourechliev. Begun on a modest scale beginning in the 1960s, when it was handled by Louis Dujarrier and distribu- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ted in the form of galleys duplicated by Roneo ®, information for the membership became a major necessity that was concretized in the creation of a journal, the Bulletin de la S.P.P, the first issue of which was published in 1982, introduced by Michel Fain. Jacqueline Schaeffer took over as head of the journal in 1985. The society’s library, which had a wealth of holdings thanks to the bequest of Marie Bonaparte and the accumulation of other consignments and acquisitions over the years, was housed, under the direction of Roger Perron (who succeeded Gérard Bayle), in new quarters in the Rue Vauquelin in 1994; named the Bibliotheque Sigmund Freud, it became France’s most comprehensive repository of psychoanalytic works. Its computerized catalogue was made available to researchers by means of the Internet under the leadership of Ruth Menahem, who was succeeded by Eva Weil. For several years the library published a bulletin of reviews of works, Lectures, headed by Perel Wilgowicz. Meanwhile, the creation of a Department of Archives and History, decided on in January 1988, and headed by Alain de Mijolla, then by Alexandra Munier, and then, after 2002, by Nicolas Gougoulis, witnessed the constitution of an audiovisual archive devoted to some eminent members of the society. The Archives de France took responsibility for the cataloguing and archiving of all the administrative documents that had accumulated since the 1950s. Relations with the government were marked by intense discussions around the 1982 proposal presented by Maurice Godelier to the minister of Research and Industry with the aim of creating a center for the development of psychoanalytic research. Supported at the SPP by Gérard Mendel and discussed at length, the proposal in the end did not lead anywhere, but the issue of the “status of psychoanalysis” regularly came up in government debates and at the instigation of certain people, such as Serge Leclaire in December 1989; however, this did not lead the SPP to abandon its reserve and go back on its refusal to sanction the official recognition under the label “psychoanalysts” certain, essentially Lacanian, groups whose training criteria it viewed as inadequate. Not that the SPP was excessively rigorous on this matter, as its frays with the IPA had continually shown. The SPP recognized three sessions per week as the minimum for a training analysis, instead of the four sessions required by the international organization. The society, under the leadership of Sacha Nacht, had been one of the first in the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SOCIETE PSYCHANALYTIQUE DE PARIS world to totally exclude a candidate’s analyst from discussions and decisions concerning his or her accreditation. As early as the 1950s the SPP had implemented “collective supervision,” which was unknown in the other IPA member organizations, and, around 1965, the “trial assessment.” In terms of relations with the government, after successfully fighting against the 1981 decision of the Ministry of Finance ,to subject non-physician psychoanalysts, and subsequently those who did not have a degree in psychology, to the valueadded tax (VAT), the society’s only official step was its 1997 request for recognition as a public service organization, a possibility that had been raised as early as 1967—at the time, there were rumors that Jacques Lacan had requested this—but that had been ruled out owing to the society’s desire to remain independent of any control by the state. In the fall of 2003, the tumult occasioned by the threat of an “amendment” intended to regulate the practice of psychotherapy enabled the SPP to state its position clearly: “Psychoanalysis, which includes what is known as ‘psychoanalytic psychotherapy, ° is the purview only of psychoanalytic organizations accredited to guarantee the training and qualification of their members.” Thus, from 1987, under the presidency of Andre Green and his successors, the SPP practiced a policy of communication with the outside, a different image from the slightly outmoded one of a conservative “orthodoxy” that had been associated with the institute. Already, the Thursday lecture series, open to the public simply by registration, had made it possible to transmit the basics of Freudian theory and clinical practice to listeners from all walks of life. The two days for reflection organized on January 14-15, 1989, in the UNESCO building, on the theme of “Psychoanalysis: Questions for Tomorrow,’ under André Green’s presidency, were a major success in this direction, mobilizing the media and making it possible to disseminate to some 950 registered listeners documents that clearly explained the goals and mode of operation of an organization whose previous desire to remain outside of the public realm had resulted in its being misunderstood and misjudged. Two additional days of meetings, organized by Andre Green and Alain Fine on November 23-24, 2002, created a forum for dialogue on the theme of “The Work of Psychoanalysis” between practitioners and the principal French psychoanalytic societies. This was also a way of responding to the media attention garnered by the many groups and micro- 1629 Société PSYCHANALYTIQUE DE PARIS groups born of the dissolution of the Ecole freudienne de Paris. Other colloquia open to the public were organized by Gilbert Diatkine in 1994, on the “Powers and Limits of Psychoanalysis,” and by Marilia Aisenstein in 1996, on “Ill-Being: Anxiety and Violence.” At the same time, internal colloquia were held, such as “The Drives,” organized by André Green in 1995; “The Object in Person,” organized by Paul Denis in 1996; and “Psychotherapeutic interpretation, psychoanalytic interpretation,” organized by Gilbert Diatkine in March 1997. Among the institutions linked to the SPP that continued their work throughout these years, mention must be made of the Centre de consultations et de traitements psychanalytiques, which, from its creation in 1954, made psychoanalytic treatment available free of charge for the most economically disadvantaged. Under the leadership of Michel Cénac and René Diatkine, Jean Favreau and Robert Barande, Jean-Luc Donnet and Monique Cournut, and, from January 2000, Jean-Louis Baldacci, it also provided for the clinical training of several generations of psychoanalysts. It was renamed the Centre Jean-Favreau in December 1993. The Revue francaise de psychanalyse, meanwhile, continued in its efforts to present the work of members of the SPP. The journal made no further changes in publisher after 1947, when it was taken on by the Presses Universitaires de France, and the successive managing and editorial teams, despite not-infrequent conflicts, first and foremost sought to ensure the regular publication of the congresses of the French-speaking psychoanalytic community and the work coming out of the various conferences, colloquia, and other scientific meetings. However, from 1988, under the direction of Claude Le Guen, assisted by Gérard Bayle and Jean Cornut, the journal’s autonomy in relation to the society, which had tried in vain to obtain the previous directorships, intensified, the latter having found a place for expression in its Bulletin, which, from 1991, also published texts from the congresses. The decision henceforth to produce thematic issues led to a clear-cut increase in the readership of the Revue, which was both older and the most widespread of the French psychoanalytic journals. That same year, 1988, Claude Le Guen, assisted by Gilbert Diatkine, created the Monographies de la R.EP. (Monographs of the R.EP.), a series in which each issue, focusing on a specific theoretical or practical point, was an assured publishing success. The series Debats de psychanalyse (Debates in Psychoanalysis), of which Jacqueline 1630 Schaeffer was the assistant director, was created in 1995 with the aim of publishing the proceedings of colloquia and scientific meetings, which the Bulletin alone could no longer handle. In March 1996 Paul Denis took over the direction of the Revue frangaise de psychanalyse and created the series Psychanalystes d’aujourd’hui (Psychoanalysts of today). The Society’s membership in and faithfulness to the IPA were concretized—following the lead of Marie Bonaparte, vice president after the war and honorary president from 1957—by Sacha Nacht, vice president from 1957 to 1969, by André Green from 1975 to 1977, and, above all, by Serge Lebovici, vice president from 1967 to 1973, and up to that point the only Frenchman to have been elected president of the IPA, from 1973 to 1977, and then by Haydée Faimberg and Paul Israél, each of whom served in turn as vice president. The SPP, however, was never subservient to the IPA, as attested to by the numerous disagreements that marked the history of relations between the two institutions, from the criteria for training analysis to the creation of the Chamber of Delegates announced in 1993. The SPP also maintained links with the European Federation of Psychoanalysis, in which a number of its members played important roles, such as Alain Gibeault, who was president from 1995 to 1999 before being named secretary general of the IPA alongside Daniel Widlécher. Citing the names of members of the SPP throughout this article makes it unnecessary to say more about the organization’s scientific resonance and the place that the work of its members ensured within the psychoanalytic landscape in France and internationally. Whether in terms of readings of psychoanalytic texts, reflections on metapsychology, studies on the psychoanalytic process and situation, on psychoanalytic conceptions in the areas of psychopathology or therapeutics, child psychoanalysis, individual or group psychoanalytic psychotherapy, psychodrama, psychosomatics, research on the history of psychoanalysis, or the relationship between science and psychoanalysis, the number of institutional creations or original theoretical contributions by members of the SPP is considerable, as is the list of collections of reference works or journals that they head or in which they participate. André Green’s successors to the presidency of the society, Michéle Perron-Borelli (elected in January 1989, she resigned in February 1990 after a dispute with the board of directors over policies regarding Serge Leclaire’s proposed “ordinal authority”), Paul INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Israél (1990-94), Gilbert Diatkine (1994-96), Marilia Aisenstein (1996-98), Jean Cournut (1998-2002), and Alain Fine (1998-2004) have pursued the policies of openness initiated by the 1986 reforms, in a spirit of rigor attested to by the creation in 1995 of a Commission on Deontology charged with elaborating and enforcing a code of ethics. A report by Paul Denis on behalf of the Socioprofessional Commission, supported by Michéle Perron-Borelli, petitioned beginning in 1989 to ask for recognition as a public service organization; in January 1996 a general assembly of the SPP voted in favor of requesting such recognition. A new modification of the statutes followed to make the necessary adaptations for this change in status, which was granted by a degree published in the Journal officiel of August 20, 1997. With nearly 600 members extensively trained in psychoanalytic theory and practice (109 permanent members, 82 members, and 383 affiliated members), the SPP provides, for the diversity in thinking implicit in such a gathering, an open forum for discussion and developments that nevertheless remain with the strict framework of Freudian thought. Plans are under study for a federation-type organization that would bring together the psychoanalysts in France who would feel linked to such an entity, for the importance of regional groups has only grown over the years, making up for the lag that occurred from the 1960s to the 1980s, to the benefit of other psychoanalytic organizations, particularly those coming out of the Ecole freudienne de Paris. The Institut de psychanalyse de Lyon’s move to become autonomous in 1996, with Francoise Brette as its first director, is a testament to this. Doubtless one of the next tasks of the SPP will be to organize this mode of affiliation on a national scale, since there is such lively demand from those who identify with the currents of thought and the institutional building that have characterized, with the many vicissitudes that are synonymous with life and many democratic debates, its long historic pathway and the place it has been able to take and maintain for almost eighty years in the French psychoanalytic movement. ALAIN DE MYOLLA Bibliography Mijolla, Alain de. (1992). France, 1893-1965, in Psychoanalysis international: A guide to psychoanalysis throughout the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS/SOCIOPSYCHOANALYSIS world, volume 1: Europe. (p. 66-113) Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, . . (1988). Psychoanalysis and psychoanalysts in France between 1939 and 1945. International Forum of Psychoanalysis, 12, 136-156. . (1988). Quelques apercus sur le réle de la princesse Marie Bonaparte dans la création de la Société psychanalytique de Paris. Revue frangaise de psychanalyse, 52 (5), 1197-1214. . (1991). Les congres des psychanalystes de langue fran¢aise des pays romans: Quelques éléments d’histoire. Revue francaise de psychanalyse, 55 (1), 7-36. . (2001). Splits in the French Psychoanalytic movement between 1953 and 1964. In R. Steiner and J. Johns (Eds.), Within Time and Beyond Time (pp. 1-24). London: Karnac. Perron, Roger. (1990). Médecins et non-médecins dans l’histoire de la Sociéte psychanalytique de Paris. Revue internationale @histoire de la psychanalyse, 3, 167-98. SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS/ SOCIOPSYCHOANALYSIS Sociology is the methodological study of social facts, processes, and actions. Depending on the author, it is a general nomothetic science of society (Emile Durkheim), a science of the social forms resulting from the interaction among individuals (Georg Simmel), a discipline that strives to comprehend social activity (Max Weber), or “the living aspect, “the living aspect, the fleeting moment when society, or men, become sentimentally aware of themselves and of their relation to others” (Mauss M., 1923/1990, 80). Psychoanalysis is a method of investigating the individual psychic apparatus and a psychotherapeutic method that uses the transference that occurs during treatment as a powerful means of healing. Sociopsychoanalysis (a term not yet fully accepted) is a discipline that aims to articulate the relationship between the psychic and the social. In this respect, sociopsychoanalysis continues in the tradition of Freud’s sociological and anthropological efforts. The term “sociology” was created by Auguste Comte, who used it in volume 4 of his Cours de philosophie positive (1847). It replaced the term “social physiology,” put forward by Henri de Saint-Simon (1813). Yet it did not take on its modern meaning until Durkheim’s Rules of Sociological Method (1895). The French terms “sociopsychanalyse,” “socioanalyse, ” and 1631 SoclOLOGY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS/SOCIOPSYCHOANALYSIS “sociothérapie” were used by different French authors after World War II (André Amar, Guy Palmade, Max Pagés, Jacques and Maria Van Bockstaele, Gérand Mendel, among others). It seems that the Englishman Eliott Jaques was the first to use the English term “socio-analysis,” in 1947, in his work of rehabilitating soldiers back from the war. The desire to establish a link between psychoanalysis and sociology appears very early on in Freud’s work. The articles “Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices” (1907b) and “ ‘Civilized’ Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness” (1908d) are evidence of this. In 1913 in “The Claims of Psychoanalysis to Scientific Interest,’ Freud stressed the contributions that psychoanalysis could make to all the previously constituted psychological and social sciences, the unconscious often playing a role of primordial importance in all sorts of human behavior. In his later works, from Totem and Taboo (1912-1913a) to Moses and Monotheism (1939a), Freud analyzed the events that presided over the foundation and modification of social links, the advent of civilization, and the rise of its current discontents. Many authors have followed in the path opened up by Freud in an effort to understand the evolution of civilization. Wilhelm Reich, the founder of “Freudo- Marxism,” analyzed the role of the family in the creation of authoritarian behaviors and the role of capitalistpatriarchal society in suppressing the instincts. Herbert Marcuse stressed the excessive suppression engendered by the capitalist system and the capacity of the most alienated classes to fight against the modern state and its tendency to make the individual into a “one-dimensional man.” By studying various types of societies and analyzing many different myths and legends, the anthropologist and psychoanalyst Géza Roheim succeeded in demonstrating that Freud’s fundamental hypotheses (the primitive horde, murder of the father, the Oedipus complex) are pertinent to all cultures, regardless of how different they might be. Other researchers have taken a greater interest in the relations between psychoanalysis and politics and the phenomenon of power in modern societies. Theodor W. Adorno attempted to define the authoritarian personality, the source of all fascisms. Norman Brown tried to demonstrate the role of the life and death instincts in social functioning. Serge Moscovici studied crowds and the role of the leader, thus paying homage to the pioneering character of Freud’s Totem 1632 and Taboo (1912-1913a) and Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921c). Eugene Enriquez found in Freud’s work the elements necessary for his theory of the social link, and Cornelius Castoriadis used this theory to define the primary role of the imaginary in the institution of society. Pierre Legendre highlighted underdogs’ love for superiors, and Pierre Ansart focused on how political passions are managed. Moreover, psychoanalysis has contributed to the creation of an original school of psychology and clinical sociology by analyzing the unconscious processes at work in groups, organizations, and institutions. First British authors (Wilfred R. Bion, Eliott Jaques), then French authors (Max Pagés, Gérard Mendel, Didier Anzieu, René Kaés, Jean-Claude Rouchy, André Lévy, and Eugéne Enriquez), contributed new elements on the fantasies, projections, and identifications constantly at play in these groups, as well as on the organizational imaginary and on the processes of repression, suppression, and idealization at work in organizations. In South America, a school was formed to conduct a “social clinic.” Undergoing particular development since 1990 have been “psycho-sociology,” the science of groups, organizations, and institutions (Kurt Lewin and the French authors mentioned above), and clinical sociology (Louis Wirth), particularly in Quebec and in France. In fact, clinical sociology was recognized as a branch of sociology by the International Sociological Association in 1993. It seeks to create a sociology that is close to lived experience and that makes the subject and the subject’s splitting and contradictions central elements in social construction. Efforts to link sociology and psychoanalysis have yielded varied results. While some authors have defined original approaches, enriched analytic theory, and furthered the comprehension of social phenomena, others in France, intoxicated by the success of analysis, have indiscriminately applied psychoanalytic concepts to social reality and have succeeded only in bastardizing psychoanalysis (making it a management tool) and disfiguring social processes. EUGENE ENRIQUEZ See also: “Claims of Psychoanalysis to Scientific Interest”; Collective psychology; Criminology and psychoanalysis; Ego; Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego; Le Bon, Gustave; Moses and Monotheism; Politics and INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS psychoanalysis; Reich, Wilhelm; Rite and ritual; Taboo; Totem and Taboo. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1907b). Obsessive actions and religious practices. SE, 9: 115-127. . (1908d). “Civilized” sexual morality and modern nervous illness. SE, 9: 177-204. . (1913}). The claims of psychoanalysis to scientific interest. SE, 13: 163-190. . (1912-1913a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1-161. . (1921c). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. SE, 18: 65-143. . (1930a [1929]). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21: 57-145. . (1939a [1934-1938]). Moses and monotheism: three essays. SE, 23: 1-137. Kaés, René. (1993). Le groupe et le sujet du groupe. Paris: Dunod. Marcuse, Herbert. (1964). One dimensional man. Boston: Beacon Press. Mauss, Marcel. (1990). The gift: The form and reason for exchange in archaic societies (W. D. Halls, Trans.) New York: W.W. Norton. (Original work published 1923) Mendel, Gérard. (1968). La révolte contre le pere. Paris: Payot. Roheim, Géza. (1950). Psychoanalysis and anthropology. New York: International Universities Press. SOKOLNICKA-KUTNER, EUGENIE (1884-1934) Eugénie Sokolnicka-Kutner, the Polish psychoanalyst who introduced psychoanalysis to France, was born in Warsaw on June 14, 1884 and died in Paris on May 19, 1934, Eugenia Kutner came from a Jewish bourgeois family that had demonstrated its political attachment to the Polish nation. Having been reared by a French governess, she naturally turned to France at the end of her secondary education with a view to enrolling in the Sorbonne to study biology and majoring in science. She also attended Pierre Janet’s lectures and established friendships in literary circles that she would rediscover fifteen years later. INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SOKOLNICKA-KUTNER, EUGENE (1884-1934) She met M. Sokolnicki there and they got married when she returned to Poland. She devoted herself exclusively to family life until 1911 when she went to study at the Burghdélzli asylum in Zurich, where she met Carl Gustav Jung. At the time of Jung’s break with Freud, she decided to go to Vienna and began her analysis with Freud; this lasted about one year and provoked a rather hostile counter-transference in Freud. She and Sokolnicki divorced at this time. Also at this time she attended a few sessions of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society (Nunberg H., Federn E., 1962-75) before settling in Munich on Freud’s advice. It may have been during this period that she analyzed Felix Boehm. The First World War forced her to return to Warsaw until the threat from the Germans and the Russians caused her to again flee, this time to Zurich in 1916. She became a member of the Zurich Psychoanalytic Society and was also elected to the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society on November 8, 1916. Toward the end of 1917 she returned to Poland, and Freud wrote, in a letter to Sandor Ferenczi dated January 19, 1918 that “Sokolnick seems to be founding a psychoanalytic society in Warsaw.” For six weeks in 1919 she treated a little Jewish boy from Minsk who was suffering from an obsessional neurosis, the cure being classically centered round the transference and the interpretation of dreams, although a pedagogical attitude made its appearance, mainly with regard to sexuality (Ferenczi described it as an example of the “active technique”). It is, however, one of the first examples of a child analysis being conducted under conditions similar to those used for adults. She published the case the following year under the title: “Analysis of a Case of Infantile Obsessional Neurosis.” At the start of 1920 she went to Budapest, and in January she began an analysis lasting about one year with Sandor Ferenczi who, sometimes as if in a kind of supervision, described its progression in his correspondence with Freud. She was not an easy patient, suffering from personality problems, mainly irritability, and describing Ferenczi as incapable compared to Freud, whom she nevertheless accused of putting an end to her analysis because she had no money as a result of her divorce. She also complained that Otto Rank had wounded her. These so-called paranoid characteristics were linked to depressive tendencies and accompanied by disturbing suicide threats. Alongside all of this, Ferenczi stressed her talent as a psychoanalyst and the quality of her interpretations. 1633 Somatic COMPLIANCE In September 1920 she took part in the sixth International Congress at The Hague, presenting a paper on “Diagnosis and symptoms of neuroses in the light of psychoanalytic doctrines” and, in January 1921, expressed her intention of joining her brother in Paris. Ferenczi then asked Freud to recommend her to his Payot editor and his translator Samuel Jankélévitch, a request that Freud deferred granting until later, adding: “Besides, we both don’t like her, whereas you obviously have a weakness for this disagreeable person” (letter dated January 16, 1921). She again visited Freud between February and March and, upon finally receiving his approval, left for Paris. Her relations were then in the literary milieu, particularly around the Nouvelle Revue francaise. There, as soon as she arrived in the fall of 1921, she found a public that was passionate about the “Freud sessions” she organized and which were attended by Jacques Riviére and André Gide. The latter is thought to have had a few analysis sessions with her and have depicted her in 1925 as “Doctoress Sophroniska” in The Counterfeiters. During the winter of 1922-1923 she delivered several lectures at the Ecole des hautes etudes en sciences sociales, meeting Georges Heuyer there through Paul Bourget. Heuyer, who ran the mental illness clinic of the Sainte-Anne hospital before the arrival of Henri Claude, invited her to attend the meetings and case presentations in his department. There she met young psychiatrists who, like René Laforgue for a few months or his friend Edouard Pichon for three years (1923- 1926), were to go through the experience of training analysis with her. She soon either fled the hospital before Georges Dumas’s sarcasm, or was pushed out by Henri Claude who would have nothing to do with non-physician psychoanalysts. She failed to become the leader of a French psychoanalytic movement, abandoning that position to Laforgue and Marie Bonaparte, in spite of her support from Freud, who took her side rather than trust Laforgue, to whom he wrote on January 15, 1924: “We would have very much appreciated your working in cooperation with Mme Sokolnicka because we have known her for a very long time and we cannot help seeing her as our legitimate representative.” She was appointed vice-president at the founding of the Paris Psychoanalytic Society in November 1926 and her teaching activity continued to increase con- 1634 stantly. In June 1929 she presented a report to the fourth Conference of French-Speaking Psychoanalysts on “Some problems in psychoanalytic technique.” She analyzed Paulette Laforgue after her hysterectomy, Blanche Reverchon-Jouve, and Paul Schiff, but her clientele diminished over the years, leading her to practice shortened cures that barely earned her enough to live. Perhaps her turbulent sexual life was to blame, or the manifestations of the quick temper that Ferenczi described to Freud on February 11, 1921: “Actually she has suffered and is suffering not from a typical neurosis but from pathological sensitivity.” It may be that from 1931 onward she progressively came under the influence of a state of depression. Having been announced for the opening of the Paris Psychoanalytic Institute in 1934 as speaking from May 2 to 23 on the “psychoanalysis of the character,” she died of what was probably a deliberate case of gas poisoning on May 19, 1934, less than a month from her fiftieth birthday. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Claude, Henri Charles Jules; Heuyer, Georges; Literature and psychoanalysis; Poland; Technique with children, psychoanalytic; Société psychanalytique de Paris et Institut de psychanalyse de Paris. Bibliography Duhamel, Pascale. (1988). Eugénie Sokolnicka (1884-1934): entre l’oublie et le tragique. Memoire pour le Certificat d études spéciales de psychiatrie. Bordeaux-II. Pichon, Edouard. (1934). Eugenie Sokolnicka. Revue fran- ¢aise de psychanalyse, 9 (4), 559—588. Sokolnicka, Eugénie. (1920). Analysis of an obsessional neurosis in a child. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 3, 306-319. . (1929). Quelques problémes de technique psychoanalytique. Revue frangaise de psychanalyse, 3 (1), 1-91. SOMATIC COMPLIANCE The notion of somatic compliance was introduced by Sigmund Freud within the framework of certain so-called somatic symptoms found exclusively in the hysteric, pointing toward what he calls “conversion phenomena.” INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS “Some PsycHicaL CONSEQUENCES OF THE ANATOMICAL DISTINCTION...” Freud uses this expression for the first time in the case of Dora (“Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria” [1905e]): The hysterical symptom requires input from both sides, and “cannot occur without the presence of a certain degree of somatic compliance offered by some normal or pathological process in or connected with one of the bodily organs” (p. 40). It is this “compliance” at the somatic level which “may afford the unconscious mental processes with a physical outlet” (p. 41) and which, accordingly, becomes a determining factor in the choice of neurosis. Meanwhile, this somewhat enigmatic notion of somatic compliance helps explain the equally enigmatic leap from the mental to the somatic level. “Conversion” is posited as one of the outcomes of unconscious processes, providing a privileged medium for the symbolic expression of unconscious conflict and especially well able to signify the repressed. Conversion is thus part of the framework of symbolization, in contrast to the somatic symptom properly speaking. Freud provides examples of somatic compliance, and thus of the phenomenon of conversion, in the case of Dora. In the same context he mentions “secondary gain from illness” and “flight into illness.” Aside from hysteria, somatic compliance in a more general sense raises the question of the expressive power of a given organ or body area that is in some sense hystericized or erogenized, as indeed of the whole body as a means of expression—as a vicissitude of the narcissistic cathexis of the body. Can the notion be used, as in the conception of Jean-Paul Valabrega, to buttress a theory of psychosomatic phenomena as the outcome of a general process of conversion occurring outside the realm of hysteria, but clearly investing somatic symptoms with meaning? If so, the notion of compliance would take on another dimension altogether. ALAIN FINE See also: Psychosomatic. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1905e [1901]). Fragment of an analysis of a case of hysteria. SE, 7: 7-122. Valabrega, Jean-Paul. (1974). Problemes de theorie psychosomatique. In Encyclopédie médico-chirurgicale ( Vol. Psychiatrie). Paris: EMC. (Original work published 1966) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS “SOME PSYCHICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE ANATOMICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SEXES” This paper, finished by Freud in 1925 and read by his daughter Anna at the International Psycho-Analytical Congress in Hamburg on September 3, first appeared in the Internationale Zeitschrift fiir Psychoanalyse in the same year. Freud began by noting that he could no longer afford, as in his early days when he had no fellow researchers, to put off publication of new discoveries made on the basis of a mere handful of cases, even though they might not as yet have been confirmed. Then, starting out (as usual) from consideration of boys, Freud drew several new conclusions concerning girls. During the phallic phase, he argued, the boy remains attached to his mother and experiences his father as a rival whose place vis-a-vis his mother he wishes to usurp; at the same time, he would like to replace his mother as his father’s love object. The Oedipus complex is thus described as having two forms, active and passive—a duality consonant with the bisexual constitution of humans. When the boy first sees the girl’s genital area, he denies his perception that she has no penis (only later will the threat of castration arouse an emotional storm in him). In contrast, when the girl discovers the penis of the boy, “she has seen it and knows that she is without it and wants to have it” (1925j, p. 252). She falls victim to penis envy and to a masculinity complex. Consequences include a feeling of inferiority, jealousy (1919e), and a loosening of the girl’s tender relationship with her mother, whom she blames for her lack of a penis (1925, p. 254). For Freud, clitoral masturbation is masculine in character, and the mutilated aspect of the organ in question explains why women tolerate masturbation worse than men. The unfolding of femininity is based on a desire to eliminate clitoral sexuality. Under the sway of the Oedipus complex, the girl abandons her desire for a penis and replaces it by the desire for a child, and with this in mind takes her father as love object: “Whereas in boys the Oedipus complex is destroyed by the castration complex, in girls it is made possible and led up to by the castration complex” (1925j, p. 256). Indeed, the Oedipus complex never really disappears in women (1924d). This, according to Freud, accounts for characteristically feminine traits linked to a weaker and less perfectly 1635 SOMNAMBULISM formed superego. In this connection, Freud refused to see the sexes as equal. It should be noted that Freud’s description of women as castrated beings who “refuse to accept the fact of being castrated” is hardly endorsed by all psychoanalysts. COLETTE CHILAND See also: Archaic; Bisexuality; Castration complex; Disavowal; Female sexuality; Feminism and psychoanalysis; Masculinity/femininity; Negative hallucination; Penis envy. Source Citation Freud, Sigmund. (1925j). Some psychical consequences of the anatomical distinction between the sexes. SE, 19: 248— 258. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1919e). “A child is being beaten”: a contribution to the study of the origin of sexual perversions. SE, 17: 175-204. . (1923e). The infantile genital organization. SE 19: 141-145. . (1924d). The dissolution of the Oedipus complex. SE 19: 171-179. SOMNAMBULISM Somnambulism (or sleepwalking) describes an apparently aimless nighttime walking in an unconscious state, accompanied by motor activity of varying degrees of complexity. The next day, the sleeper has no memory of the episode. Sleepwalking episodes, which occur during the first part of the night, last from a few seconds to around thirty minutes. They begin in the latency period and generally stop after puberty. Owing to the amnesia that follows episodes of sleepwalking, no secondary revision can be made by the sleeper. This did not prevent Sigmund Freud from taking an interest in the phenomenon. In 1907 he spoke about it to the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society (Nunberg and Federn): He believed that sleepwalking was related to the fulfillment of sexual wishes and was thus surprised that there could be mobility without 1636 interruption of the dream life. Finally, at that time, he suggested that the essence of this phenomenon was the desire to go to sleep where the individual had slept in childhood. Ten years later, he again speculated about somnambulism in the article “A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams” (1916-17 [1915]). In this essay, where he proposed to clarify and expand his hypothetical ideas on dreams, the dream is a fragile equilibrium that is only partially successful: first, because the repressed unconscious impulses of the unconscious system, which do not obey the wishes of the ego and maintain their countercathexis, mean that “some amount of the expenditure on repression (anticathexis) would have to be maintained throughout the night, in order to meet the instinctual danger” (p. 225); and second, because certain preconscious daytime thoughts can be resistant, and these, too, retain a part of their cathexis. It is thus apparent how unconscious impulses and day residues can come together and result in a conflict. Freud then wondered about the outcome of this wishful impulse, which represents an unconscious instinctual demand and which becomes a dream wish in the preconscious. Further, he envisioned the case in which this unconscious impulse could be expressed as mobility during sleep. This would be what is observed in somnambulism, though what actually makes it possible remains unknown. More recently, based on data from electrophysiological sleep studies showing that sleepwalking episodes occur in the early phases of sleep (phases III and IV), the psychoanalyst Didier Houzel has leaned in the direction of the Freud’s hypotheses, positing that the slow sleep phase, by interfering with the phase of paradoxical sleep that follows and interrupts the latter, prevents the possibility of dream work. Somnambulism thus results from a blocking of the possibilities of mentalization and a diversion of the instinctual energy onto paths of motor discharge. Houzel’s viewpoint posits equivalences between night terrors, sleepwalking, and nocturnal enuresis, all of which have the same relationship to paradoxical sleep. PHILIPPE METELLO See also: Animal magnetism; Hypnosis; Janet, Pierre; Trance. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1916-17f [1915]). A metapsychological supplement to the theory of dreams. SE, 14: 217-235. Houzel, Didier. (1980). Réve et psychopathologie de I’enfant. Neuropsychiatrie de Tenfance et de T adolescence, 28, 155-164. Nunberg, Hermann, and Federn, Ernst. (1962-1975). Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. New York: International Univeristies Press. SPAIN In February and March 1893, one month after its appearance in the Viennese journal Neurologisches Zentralblatt, two Spanish journals, the Revista de ciencias médicas in Barcelona and the Gaceta médica in Granada, published On the Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena by Josef Breuer and Sigmund Freud (1893a). It was, in the words of James Strachey, “the very first publication in the world of a translation of a psychological work by Freud.” In 1911 José Ortega y Gasset, the well-known intellectual, published a long article titled “Psicoanalisis, ciencia problematica” (Psychoanalysis, a problematic science), in which he recognized the importance of a great number of Freud’s contributions. This article provoked the publication of Freud’s works in Spanish. At Ortega’s suggestion, the publisher Ruiz Castillo acquired the rights to publish all existing and future works by Freud and commissioned Lopez Ballesteros to translate them. The publication of the first translation in the world of Freud’s complete works in seventeen volumes appeared over ten years (1922-1932). The most eminent psychiatrists of the time published various works in which they analyzed Freud’s work and assessed the value of his contributions, but they also criticized what they considered “the omnipotent unconscious sexuality in all psychical phenomena” and the subjectivity of the therapeutic method. Psychoanalytic ideas exercised a considerable influence on judges, teachers, and thinkers. Writers and artists also felt attracted by Freud’s discoveries. A group of intellectuals invited Freud to Spain to give conferences, but his illness prevented him from realizing this project. Sandor Ferenczi nevertheless went to Spain in October 1928 and conducted the communication program Learning INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SPAIN Psychoanalysis and Psychoanalytic Transformation of the Character. The discourse on psychoanalysis, already present in Spanish psychiatry, prompted two psychiatrists, Ramon Sarr6é and Angel Garma, to acquire psychoanalytic training. Garma trained at the Vienna Psychoanalytic Institute. He returned to Madrid in November 1931 and left Spain for good in 1936. For the five years between 1931 and 1936, motivated by the desire to create a psychoanalytic movement in Spain, he worked intensely to promote the discipline. The Spanish Civil War broke out in July 1936 and put an end to his hopes. He then emigrated to Argentina, where he participated in the creation of the Asociacion psicoanalitica argentina (Argentine Psychoanalytic Association). The Civil War (1936-1939) and the years of dictatorship imposed silence on many cultural and scientific sectors, particularly psychoanalysis. It was not until the end of the 1940s that two small groups of psychiatrists and intellectuals, one in Madrid and the other in Barcelona, took steps to train as psychoanalysts and to introduce psychoanalysis to Spain. In 1949 the Madrid psychiatrist R. del Portillo turned to the Deutsche psychoanalytische Gesellschaft (German Psychoanalytic Society) for training. He was analyzed by M. Steimback, whom he invited to Madrid to act as a training analyst. Steimback accepted and, until 1954, the year of his death, participated in training such analysts as Drs. R. del Portillo, Ma Teresa Ruiz, Carolina Zamora, J. Pertejo, and Julio Corominas. During this same period Drs. Bofill, Folch, and Nuria Abello from Barcelona turned to the Swiss Psychoanalytical Society for training. There they came into contact with Drs. Rallo from Madrid and FE. Alvin from Lisbon. Drs. Pertejo, Zamora, and Corominas organized the Grupo Luso-Espanol de psicoanalisis (Portuguese-Spanish Group for Psychoanalysis), which, sponsored by the Swiss and Paris societies, was recognized by the International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA) in 1957. In 1958 R. del Portillo and Ma Teresa Ruiz joined the group. During the International Congress in 1959 the International Psychoanalytical Association admitted the group as a member. Following the break with the Portuguese group in 1966, the Sociedad Luso-Espafol de psicoanalisis (Portuguese-Spanish Society for Psychoanalysis) became the Sociedad Espanola de psicoanalisis (Spanish Psychoanalytical Society). 1637 Speciric ACTION In 1973 psychoanalysts practicing in Madrid decided to form an independent group, and in 1979 the International Psychoanalytical Association recognized the Asociacion de psicoanalitica de Madrid (Madrid Psychoanalytical Association) at the thirtyfirst congress. From then on the two IPA-affiliated societies together contributed to the development of psychoanalysis in Spain. The scientific activity of the two societies proved to be intense and prolific throughout the years. Publications by Drs. Leon Grinberg, Folch, Bofill, Coderch, Torres de Bea, Spilka, Cruz Roche, Manuel Pérez Sanchez, Utrilla, Paz, Olmos, Loren, Guimon, congresses, symposia, schools, conferences; the publication of the journals Revista catalana de psicoanalisis and the Revista de psicoandlisis de Madrid—all bear witness to ongoing reflections on psychoanalytic theory and clinical practice. In these and other ways the two societies were active in both the medical and academic spheres, thus contributing to the dissemination of psychoanalytic thought. In 1975 Oscar Masotta, an Argentinean philosopher and member of the Freudian School of Paris, introduced Jacques Lacan’s ideas in Spain. In 1977 the library Biblioteca Freudiana was created in Barcelona, thus embodying the first institutional form of Lacan’s ideas in the country. After Masotta’s death (1979), the dissolution of the Freudian school of psychoanalysis (1980), and the death of Lacan himself (1981), the Lacanian groups broke up and dispersed. In 1990, a group of eminent personalities, among them Jacques-Alain Miller, Eric Laurent, and Colette Soler, founded the European School of Psychoanalysis and the first section of the branch school in Barcelona. Later in the 1990s, different sections have come together in the European School of Psychoanalysis—Spain. Other Lacanian groups also exist and are directly linked to various French groups. One hundred years after the first publication in Spain of a work by Freud, a great many psychoanalytic ideas have taken hold in psychiatry, medicine, psychology, teaching, and ethics, and many psychoanalysts are actively working to relieve psychic pain and contribute to a better knowledge of human development, both normal and pathological. Maria Luisa Munoz 1638 Bibliography Bermejo, Frijole V. (1993). La institucionalizacion del psicoanalisis en Espafia en el marco de la A.P.I. Doctoral thesis, faculty of psychology, University of Valencia. Caries, Egea. (1983). Introduccién al psicoanalisis en Espana, 1893-1922. Doctoral thesis, University of Murcia. Mujfioz, Maria Luisa. (1989, May-November). Contribucion a la historia del movimiento psicoanalitico en Espana. Revista de psicoandlisis. Madrid. Mufioz Gonzalez, J. (1987). Evolucién del psicoanalisis en Espafia (1923-1936). Doctoral thesis, University of Murcia. Pérez Sanchez, Manuel. (1984). Inicios del movimiento psicoanalitico. Revista catalana de psicoanalisis, 1, 1. SPECIFIC ACTION The purpose of specific action is to permit the release of tension in ways comparable with the instinctual aim. This term appeared in Freud’s earliest writings, but he rarely used it afterwards. The term “specific reaction” (spezifische Reaktion) was used by Freud in “Draft E” of his correspondence with Wilhelm Fliess, which dates probably to June 1894, and which he entitled “How Anxiety Originates” (in 1950a). He sketched an answer to this question from the point of view of an energetics of somatic-mental functioning, an approach that went on to play a major role in the development of his thought: anxiety resulted from an accumulation of tension (biological tension, in the sense that need was involved; but also mental tension, for it implied a wish in search of an object), when there was no way for this tension to be released. Tension could be released in two ways: in the form of violent cries, emotional outbursts, destructiveness, and so forth; or in a way adequate to the need—as for example, the ingestion of food for a baby, or engaging in coitus for an adult. Such adequate kinds of releases are what Freud called “specific reactions.” Freud developed these views in other writings of the same period (1894a [1895]), particularly in the “Project for a Scientific Psychology” (1950c [1895]). The notion of “specific action” is sometimes deemed obsolete, or tainted by a naive behaviorism. In fact, as early as 1894, Freud very plainly stressed the need to distinguish between the biological tension of need and the properly psychic level, where specific INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS action presupposes “preparations,” a whole “psychical working-through,” in the framework of the conflictual dynamic specific to the subject (Perron-Borelli). Much later, when Freud reframed his conception of anxiety, he added a “signal of anxiety”—a testimony to, and outcome of those working-through processes—to his earlier “automatic anxiety,” generated by the accumulation of tension. ROGER PERRON See also: Act/action; Anxiety. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1894a). The neuro-psychoses of defence. SE, 3: 41-61. . (1895b). On the grounds for detaching a particular syndrome from neurasthenia under the description “anxiety neurosis.” SE, 3: 85-115. . (1926d [1925]). Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. SE, 20: 75-172. . (1950a [1887—1902]). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173-280. . (1950c [1895]). Project for a scientific psychology. SE, 1: 281-387. Perron-Borelli, Michele. (1997). Dynamique du fantasme. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. SPIELREIN, SABINA (1885-C. 1941) Sabina Spielrein, a Russian psychoanalyst, was born in 1885 in Rostov, and died in the city of her birth, in the Soviet Union, in 1941 or 1942, during World War II. Born into a wealthy Jewish middle-class family, Sabina at age nineteen was taken to Zurich to be treated for severe hysteria. She was hospitalized at Burghélzli, the famous psychiatric university hospital run by Eugen Bleuler. There Carl G. Jung became her physician and succeeded in alleviating most of her symptoms. Within a year, by 1905, she was able to begin medical studies. She continued an analysis with Jung that he described as “Freudian” and that offered him an opportunity to initiate a relationship with Freud, from 1907. The therapeutic relationship between Jung and Spielrein evolved into a personal relationship, probably a brief affair, after which Jung appears to have distanced himself from her and then called for Freud’s INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SPIELREIN, SABINA (1885-c. 1941) help. The two men, who by then had been friends for two years, discussed the relationship in their correspondence, and at Jung’s request Freud wrote to Spielrein’s mother. In spite of what the two men thought, however, Freud’s intervention did not end Sabina’s passion for Jung, a passion documented in her diaries. Nonetheless, in 1911 she finished her studies in psychiatry under Jung’s direction with the thesis “The Psychological Content of a Case of Schizophrenia.” As Freud and Jung moved toward the rupture of their friendship and collaboration, Spielrein went to Vienna, where, in 1911, she presented her paper “Destruction as the Cause of Becoming” (1995), which received a mixed reception in the context of much anti-Jung sentiment. After the break between Freud and Jung, in which she could not clearly decide which side to take, Spielrein’s life and career becomes more difficult to follow. In 1912 she married a Russian physician, Paul Scheftel, with whom she had a daughter in 1913; he returned to Russia in 1915. Spielrein could not settle down, moving successively to Zurich, Munich, Lausanne, and Geneva. She worked as an analyst but appears to have been uncertain whether her real calling was to psychoanalysis, art history, or music. A second daughter was born in 1926. By 1923, with Freud’s encouragement, Spielrein had returned to Soviet Russia. She was admitted to the new Moscow Psychoanalytic Institute and taught psychoanalysis until it was prohibited in 1927. After returning to her birthplace, Rostov, during World War II, Spielrein was murdered by the Nazis, together with all the Jewish inhabitants of the city, in 1941 or 1942. Spielrein published about thirty articles, the best known being her 1995 paper, which develops original ideas on female sexuality and is sometimes said to adumbrate Freud’s concept of the death instinct. It is unfortunate that a love affair and the troubled relationship between Freud and Jung played a role in her early disappearance from the intellectual ferment of psychoanalysis. In spite of more shadow than light, her story retains an indisputable fascination. A series of fortuitous discoveries rescued Spielrein from oblivion. In 1977 a carton was discovered containing her diary and some of the letters she exchanged with Freud and Jung. A second cache, then a third, were recovered. These documents revealed the details of the long-suppressed 1639 SPINOZA AND PSYCHOANALYSIS secret—an analysand seduced and abandoned by her analyst—which would have embarrassed Jung first and foremost, but also Freud, who had helped minimize the affair. An intriguing and original figure in the early years of psychoanalysis, Spielrein subsequently became the object of considerable attention and the subject of several books. NICOLLE Kress-ROSEN See also: Abstinence/rule of abstinence; Ethics; Jung, Carl Gustav; Death instinct (Thanatos); Russia/USSR; Société psychanalytique de Geneve; Switzerland (Germanspeaking); Tranference love. Bibliography Carotenuto, Aldo, and Trombetta, Carlo. (1982). A secret symmetry: Sabina Spielrein between Jung and Freud (Arno Pomerans, John Shepley, and Krishna Winston, Trans.). New York: Pantheon Books. (Original work published 1977) Kerr, John. (1993). A most dangerous method: The story of Jung, Freud, and Sabina Spielrein. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Kress-Rosen, Nicolle. (1993). Trois figures de la passion. Paris: Arcanes. Spielrein, Sabina. (1995). Destruction as a cause of coming into being (S. K. Witt, Trans.). Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought, 18, 85-118. (Original work published 1911) SPINOZA AND PSYCHOANALYSIS In the history of psychoanalysis, several philosophers became subjects of a privileged confrontation with Freud. One such philosopher was Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677). From the 1920s intellectuals noted correspondences between Freudian thought and Spinoza’s philosophy (Smith, 1924; Alexander, 1927). This discussion continues to more recent times (Bodei, 1991; Ogilvie, 1993). Freud himself rarely spoke of Spinoza. Although he referred to Spinoza in Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood (1910c), he did not explicitly mention Spinoza anyplace else. In the work of Jacques Lacan, Spinoza is often present in the background and occasionally cited. For instance, proposition 57 of part 3 of Spinoza’s Ethics appears as an epigraph to Lacan’s medical dissertation (1932). 1640 Authors who have tried to situate Spinoza vis-a-vis psychoanalysis have pondered several different kinds of questions. W. Aron (1977) asked about the overall influence of Spinoza on Freud’s thought. C. Rathbun (1934) noted that the libido, a fundamental concept of psychoanalysis, is adumbrated in Spinoza’s concept of conatus, an inborn drive that leads to striving and persisting. On Walter Bernard’s reading (1946), it is perhaps closer to eros or desire. But what, according to these authors, were Spinoza’s therapeutic principles? These works today appear dated, indicative as much of the intellectual state of psychoanalysis, particularly in Anglo-Saxon countries, as of a poorly informed reading of Spinoza. Some authors, such as Abraham Kaplan (1977) recall that Spinoza’s philosophy was not a proto-psychoanalytic science, but a very knowledgeable metaphysics. Francis Pasche (1981) discusses the idea of “practical psychoanalysis.” Gilles Deleuze’s work on Spinoza, Expression in Philosophy (1992), has opened the way toward a confrontation between Spinozistic and psychoanalytic ethics. Finally, several psychoanalytic authors (Bertrand, 1984; Ogilvie, 1993; Burbage and Chouchan, 1993) have discovered unconscious implications in Spinoza’s philosophy. MICHELE BERTRAND See also: Althusser, Louis; Breuer, Josef; Determinism; Doubt; German romanticism and psychoanalysis; Goethe and psychoanalysis; Kantianism and _ psychoanalysis; Oceanic feeling; Philosophy and psychoanalysis; Pleasure in thinking; Rolland, Romain Edme Paul-Emile. Bibliography Alexander, Bernhard. (1927). Spinoza und Psychoanalyse. Chronicum Spinosanum, 5, 96-103. Bernard, Walter. (1946). Freud and Spinoza. Psychiatry, 5, 99-108. Bertrand, Michéle. (1984). Spinoza et Pimaginaire. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Bodei, Remo. (1991). Geometrica delle passioni. Rome: Feltrinelli. Burbage, Frank, and Chouchan, Nathalie. (1993). Freud et Spinoza: la question de la transformation et le devenir actif du sujet. In Olivier Bloch (Ed.), Spinoza au XXe siécle (pp. 525-545). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Deleuze, Gilles. (1992). Expression in philosophy: Spinoza. Cambridge, MA: Zone Books. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Freud, Sigmund. (1910c). Leonardo da Vinci and a memory of his childhood. SE, 11: 57-137. Kaplan, Abraham. (1977). Spinoza and Freud. Journal of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis, 5, 299-326. Lacan, Jacques. (1932). De la psychose paranoiaque dans ses rapports avec la personnalite. Paris: Le Francois. Ogilvie, Bertrand. (1993). Spinoza dans la psychanalyse. In Olivier Bloch (Ed.), Spinoza au XXe siécle (pp. 549-571). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Pasche, Francis. (1981). Métaphysique et inconscient. Revue Frangaise de PsychanalySE, 45 (1), 9-30. Rathbun, C. (1934). On certain similarities between Spinoza and psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic Review, 21, 1, 1-14. Smith, Maurice Hamblin. (1924). An interesting dream. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 5, 4, 468-446. Spinoza, Benedictus de. (2000). Ethics (G. H. R. Parkinson, Trans.). New York: Oxford University Press. SPITZ, RENE ARPAD (1887-1974) Hungarian psychiatrist and psychoanalyst René Arpad Spitz was born in Vienna, Austria, on January 29, 1887, and died in Denver, Colorado, on September 14, 1974. From a wealthy Jewish family background, Spitz spent most of his childhood in Hungary. While studying medicine in Budapest—he became a physician in 1910—he discovered the works of Freud. During the First World War, he served in the army as a military physician. Encouraged by Sandor Ferenczi, he became one of the first to undergo a training analysis with Freud himself. Between 1924 and 1928, he participated in the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society and, subsequently, worked in Berlin, where he became member of the German Psychoanalytic Society (DPG). Between 1932 and 1938 Spitz lived in Paris, where he taught psychoanalysis and child development at the elite Ecole Normale Supérieure, and he frequently attended conferences of the Paris Psychoanalytic Society. In 1939 he emigrated to the United States and found work as a psychiatrist at Mount Sinai Hospital in New York (1940-1943). He served as a visiting professor at several universities before settling at the University of Colorado, where he conducted much of his research on infant development. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Spitz, René Arpad (1887-1974) He served as president of the Denver Psychoanalytic Society (1962-63). At the end of World War II, Spitz (1945, 1946) published his influential research with infants and young children in various settings, including a foundling home and a penal nursery. Serious developmental pathologies, as he documented with careful research, arose in infants who, though adequately nourished, were deprived of maternal care and emotional sustenance. Through direct observation he developed the diagnoses of “hospitalism” and “anaclitic depression,” two pathologies that led him to further study mental and emotional development from birth to two years of age. Spitz is best known for his books on the infant and the mother-infant dyad, including No and Yes: On the Genesis of Human Communication (1957); A Genetic Field Theory of Ego Formation (1959); and The First Year of Life (1965). According to Spitz, infants pass through three stages corresponding to stepwise developments in object relations: (1) the objectless stage (three first months of life), characterized by “nondifferentiation” between baby and its mother; (2) the stage of “the precursor of the object” (from three to eight months) in which the smiling response indicates the beginning of object relations; and (3) the stage of the libidinal object (from eighth to fifteenth month), by which time the mother is recognized as a real partner and the infant can distinguish her face from strangers’ faces. From the fifteenth month, the child enters into semantic communication with gesture and the use of “no,” indicating the emergence of the autonomous ego. Spitz was the first of a small number of distinguished psychoanalysts to actively pursue research in child development by employing methods commonly used in experimental psychology; his use of films was particularly influential. In contrast to behavioral psychologists, however, Spitz believed that deep psychic process, while not directly observable, may be identified by surface “indicators” such as the smile. These reveal “the organizers of the psyche” that serve as evidence oft he child’s maturation. KATHLEEN KELLEY-LAINE See also: Abandonment; Allergic object relationship; Congress of French-speaking psychoanalysts; Defense; Depravation; Ethology and psychoanalysis; Fear; France; 1641 Split OBJECT Hungarian school; Infant observation (therapeutic); Infant development; International Federation of Psychoanalytic Societies; Masturbation; Maturation; Mothering; Oral stage; Phobias in children; Phobic neurosis; Primary identification; Stranger, fear of; Sucking/thumbsucking; Switzerland (French-speaking); | Symbiosis/symbiotic relation. Bibliography Emde, Robert N. (Ed.). (1984). Rene Spitz: Dialogues from infancy. Madison, CT: International Universities Press. Spitz, René. (1945). Hospitalism: An inquiry into the genesis of psychiatric conditions in early childhood. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 1, 53-74. . (1946). Anaclitic depression. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 2, 313-342. . (1957). No and yes: On the genesis of human communication. New York: International Universities Press. . (1959). A genetic field theory of ego formation. New York: International Universities Press. . (1965). The first year of life. New York: International Universities Press. (1958). On the genesis of superego components. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 13, 375-404. SPLIT OBJECT The concept of the splitting of the object was elaborated by Melanie Klein. This is a defense mechanism deployed by the ego against anxieties concerning the destructiveness of the death drive, and which is directed at maintaining the separation between a good object and a bad object to safeguard the security and integrity of the ego. The object that is split in this way is the internal object; Klein developed this concept of internal object on the basis of the concept of introjection. In fact, according to Freud, the ego introjects external objects that are sources of pleasure, and expels outside of itself that which causes unpleasure. For Melanie Klein, splitting, introjection, and projection constitute the first defense mechanisms. In his “phantasies,’ the child introjects parts of his parents’ bodies (the breast, the penis, and so on), and the parents are split into gratifying good objects and frustrating bad objects. 1642 The infant’s first relationship is a relationship to part-objects, principally to the mother’s breast, which is split into the ideal breast and the persecuting breast. In this relationship, the ego projects the death drive outwards and introjects an ideal object that is the product of the projection of the life drive. Historically speaking, Melanie Klein described the depressive position first, but it was the elaboration of the concept of the paranoid-schizoid position that then enabled her to study the mechanism of projective identification, as the result of primitive projections. Projective identification consists in the identification of the object with the part of the self that has been projected, and it concerns both the good and the bad parts of the self and the object. The paranoid-schizoid position, which is characterized by the fragmentation of the ego and the splitting of the object, is followed by the depressive position, in which the ego is integrated but is in the grip of the conflict between opposed drives; repression then gradually takes over from splitting, and projective anxiety gives way to guilt. In the paranoid- schizoid position, splitting therefore relates to part-objects, whereas in the ensuing depressive position it relates to a total object. The interest in the internal object and its splitting has led Kleinian analysts to develop an entire conceptual apparatus concerning the genesis, evolution, and position of the object in the psychic apparatus and in the dynamics of the object relationship. Also deserving mention here are Wilfred Bion’s beta-elements and alpha-elements and “K” and “O,” Frances Tustin’s sensation-objects and Donald Winnicott’s transitional object, as well as the role of dimensionality in Donald Meltzer’s work. In clinical practice, these concepts provide a better understanding of the way in which the line of the splitting protects and maintains the idealized object, by separating it from the frustrating object that bears the hallmark of castration (particularly in perverse, depressive, or obsessional neurotic structures). The concept of the splitting of the object, based on the concept of the splitting of the ego introduced by Freud, has made it possible to focus attention on the importance of the internal object and of the phantasy, and has opened up some productive perspectives concerning intersubjectivity. PANos ALOUPIS INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS See also: Object; Object, change of/choice of: Splitting; Splitting of the object. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1915c). Instincts and their vicissitudes. SE, 14: 109-140. Klein, Melanie. (1948). Contributions to psychoanalysis, London, Hogarth, 1967. - (1952). The mutual influences in the development of ego and id. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 7, 51-53. Further Reading Bass, Alan. (2001). Difference and disavowal. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press. Grotstein, James. (1981). Splitting and projective identification. New York: Aronson. SPLITS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS Since its beginning, the psychoanalytic movement has been plagued by conflicts and has given rise not only to numerous splinter movements, but also to adversarial sub-groups and internal divisions within its larger institutions. Some see this as an indication of the psychoanalytic movement’s tendency towards dogmatic organizations that practice exclusion and “excommunication.” But others see signs of what they call “heteroglossia,’ noting that with conflict, propositions that were once judged to be inconsistent with the general theory of psychoanalysis are later reincorporated into it. The breakup of Freud’s friendship with Wilhelm Fliess could be called, albeit a bit arbitrarily, the first psychoanalytic “split.” The way they split seems almost paradigmatic: two passionate researchers who seemed similar were able to collaborate in spite of profound contradictions between them that remained hidden until the moment one of them began to assert himself. The 1912 break between Freud and Alfred Adler could be described in just the same way, and likewise that of Freud and Carl Jung in 1913. Neither of the two came to Freud empty-handed. They each had their own theoretical ideas and their own body of research. And their encounters with Freud were for a time more like those between like-minded individuals. They were not waiting for any kind of illumination, which they believed they already possessed, but rather supplemen- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SPLITS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS tal clarifications, or better still, Freud’s approval. Both followed theoretical tendencies that diverged from Preud’s own ideas and personality and that indicated orientations characteristic of their time: Adler emphasized social factors, under the influence of the Marxist movement that unfolded for most of the twentieth century; Jung was preoccupied with mysticism and the esoteric tradition from which Freud, in spite of his curiosity, kept a distance in his theorizing, if not in private life. Each of them founded parallel movements that refused to take any advantage of their connections to psychoanalysis even by virtue of their names: Adler’s “individual psychology” and Jung’s “analytical psychology.” Wilhelm Stekel, who left the psychoanalytic movement after Adler in 1912, remained a marginal figure and only had a few disciples who followed him personally without constituting a group. The first true psychoanalytic split was that of Otto Rank in the aftermath of the publication of his book The Trauma of Birth in 1924. Rank was educated with Freud’s help and even somewhat under Freud’s wing, and he was a crucial player in the conception and the organization of the psychoanalytic movement. On the basis of Freudian premises, and by claiming to be their true inheritor, Rank separated himself from the very person to whom he owed his entire career. In contrast to others who moved up the Freudian ranks for a time and then took a divergent path only to disappear forever after, Rank did not remain alone, and only his early death prevented him from developing a school with successors to carry on his ideas. His ideas on trauma, the primal relation to the mother, and the shortening of the duration of the treatment are some of the themes that later emerged to take an increasingly important place in contemporary psychoanalysis. Sandor Ferenczi’s influence in psychoanalysis followed a similar trajectory, and he only narrowly avoided a break with Freud over the experimental techniques of his late career, as detailed in his article on the “Confusion of Tongues” (1932). His death prevented a break with Freud, which would have been one of the last to have a theoretical cause. The same can be said of Wilhelm Reich, who was thrown out of the psychoanalytic movement in 1934, though his political activism was a precursor of the Freudian-Marxist movements that would appear some decades later. Problems of training increasingly came to overtake theoretical disputes as the primary motive for splits. This shift was signaled in 1926 by the trial of Theodor 1643 SPLITS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS Reik for quackery, by Freud’s commentary on the case in The Question of Lay Analysis, and by the discussion that ensued within the International Psychoanalytic Association in 1927. Training was confirmed as the new topic of debate by the creation of the Swiss Medical Society for Psychoanalysis in Zurich in 1928. The new society excluded non-physicians, a measure aimed specifically at Oskar Pfister. The debate intensified when, in 1938, the American Psychoanalytic Association’s refusal to admit non-physicians to their membership led to the brink of a split with the International Psychoanalytic Association (I.P.A.). But as Ernest Jones said in all seriousness, “the advent of the Second World War altered the whole situation ... and the Americans ... cordially cooperated with [the LP.A.]” (Jones, Vol. 3, p. 300). But it was actually the death of Freud in September 1939, along with the disruptions that accompanied the exodus of Jewish analysts from Europe, that would radically alter relations among analysts (Mijolla). This led to the codification of the qualifications for the status of “psychoanalyst,” which Freud had held the supreme right to confer while he lived. One of the last great theoretical debates was the controversy between the partisans of Anna Freud and those of Melanie Klein from 1941 to 1945. The debate almost provoked a split, with each of the parties considering themselves to be more faithful to Freud’s thought, but in the end the crisis was averted by a compromise that allowed the British Psychoanalytic Society to split into three subdivisions that have managed to coexist as well as could be expected. Meanwhile, in the United States, Karen Horney was kept out of the New York Institute, also for theoretical differences. In 1941, along with others who shared her “culturalist” views, she founded the Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis and the American Institute of Psychoanalysis. A series of splits followed, in Washington, Boston, and Los Angeles, while at the same time a number of associations for lay analysts were founded, such as the National Psychological Association for Psychoanalysis, founded by Theodor Reik in 1948. In 1987, this association was, after a lony struggle, the cause of a reversal! in I.P.A.’s policy on lay analysts. In Germany after the war, theoretical grounds were used to settle scores for the positions that some had taken during the Nazi era. The German Psychoanalytic Society (Deutsche Psychoanalytische Gesellschaft, D.P.G.), which was reestablished in 1945 under the 1644 strict leadership of Carl Miiller-Braunschweig and Harald Schultz-Hencke, was a heterogeneous assembly that had hardly any conceptual or practical relationship with I.P.A.’s conception of psychoanalysis as represented at the Zurich Congress in 1949. Harald Schultz-Hencke advocated a “neo-psychoanalysis,” and several of the group’s members were more Jungian than Freudian. Thus Carl Miiller-Braunschweig, in spite of the fact that his past did not inspire much confidence, was encouraged by those who held more orthodox views to found the German Psychoanalytic Association (Deutsche Psychoanalytische Vereinigung, D.P.V.), which was the only German group to be recognized by the I.P.A. as authorized to train analysts. The two groups would coexist until the German Psychoanalytic Society was eventually readmitted into the international psychoanalytic community. Increasingly, problems of recruitment and training caused crises and splits within the international psychoanalytic movement. After World War II, the growing popularity of psychoanalysis and its geographical expansion linked to the exodus of analysts from Europe led to an increased demand for analysts and trainers in the western world. The example of France is significant in this context. Young psychiatrists were already interested in psychoanalysis, but the creation of a bachelor’s degree in psychology by Daniel Lagache in 1947 broadened this interest considerably. The decision to found a psychoanalytic institute in Paris triggered a struggle both for leadership and for authority over the candidates who began to flock to it. The outcome was the split of 1953, which left the Psychoanalytic Society of Paris (Société psychanalytique de Paris, S.P.P.) under the control of Sacha Nacht and led to the creation of the French Psychoanalytic Society (Société francaise de psychanalyse, S.F.P.) and a “free institute” co-directed by Daniel Lagache and Jacques Lacan. The new group then requested membership in the I.P.A., which, with an unprecedented intensity, took on the role of arbiter and even supreme authority in matters of training. Excluded from the I.P.A. by their own secession, the analysts of the S.RP. fought for twelve years before their credentials as training analysts were granted. This recognition came at the price of excluding Jacques Lacan, who refused to comply with the norms that the I.P.A. imposed on analysts all over the world, such as the quantity and frequency of sessions in a INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS training analysis, the length of sessions, and the rituals concerning the required supervised analyses. But conflicts over training reemerged after the foundation of the Freudian School of Paris (Ecole freudienne de Paris, E.RP.) by Jacques Lacan in 1964. A case in point was the split of 1969, when Piera Aulangier, Frangois Perrier, and Jean-Paul Valabrega left to form the Quatrieme Groupe (“Fourth Group” or O.P.L.EB). After Lacan dissolved the E.EP. in 1980 and died the following year, the Lacanian movement suffered split after split, giving rise, in fact, to a plethora of small groups, most of them not very long-lived. In spite of its violent internal conflicts, the School of the Freudian Cause (Ecole de la Cause freudienne, E.C.E.), the successor to the E.F.P., remained the most stable institution. Its longest lasting contemporary, the Center for Psychoanalytic Training and Research, broke up in 1995. Psychoanalytic splits are often political, like the formation of the Psychoanalytic Seminar of Zurich in 1977, and often emotional, like the divisions over Kleinian theory in the Argentinean Societies. In the end, they are too numerous for a comprehensive overview. It has been impossible to give more than the most significant examples here. Nevertheless, they do have common features, among them emotional breakups, rebelliousness, and ideological schisms. Each split presents a mixture of these features in different proportions. Splits resemble emotional breakups insofar as old friendships are broken, transferential bonds are brutally cut, and choices must be made. “It reminds you of parents who are divorcing,” as Anna Freud said in 1953 (Lacan, p. 72). As for “rebelliousness,” its traces are to be found in the new structures and regulations that arise, with much of the focus being on the functions of training, supervision, and so on. And ideological schisms, though generally masked by administrative operations, are always present. The fact that debates over ideas rarely reflect contrasting theoretical visions does not mean that they are any less vital. This is evident from the fact that every split is followed by a burst of creative activity on both sides. It is possible to see in this last feature the invigorating potential of splits, which might otherwise seem like a kind of destruction. New, often formally unstable ideas can cause a definitive break, yet later they may reemerge in the mainstream of a psychoanalysis that is in perpetual evolution. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SPLITTING See also: Adler, Alfred; American Academy of Psychoanalysis; Belgium; Congrés des psychanalystes de langue francaise des pays romans; Ecole freudienne de Paris (Freudian School of Paris); France;Jahrbuch der Psychoanalyse; Jung, Carl Gustav; Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society; Mouvement lacanien frangais; Netherlands; New York Freudian Society; Psychic causality; Quatriéme Groupe (O.P.L.F.), Fourth group; Rank (Rosenfeld), Otto; Schweizerische Arztegeselléchaft fiir Psychoanalyse; Societé francaise de psychanalyse; Société psychanalytique de Paris and Institut de psychanalyse de Paris; Switzerland (German-speaking; Training analysis; United States. Bibliography Jones, Ernest. (1953-1957). Sigmund Freud. Life and work (Vols. 1-3). London: Hogarth. Lacan, Jacques. (1990). Television: A challenge to the psychoanalytic establishment. (Joan Copjec, Ed., and Denis Hollier, et al., Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton. (Original work published 1974) Lockot, Regine. (1995). Mésusage, disqualification et division au lieu d’expiation. Topique, 57, 245-256. Mijolla, Alain de. (2001). Splits in the French Psychoanalytic movement between 1953 and 1964. In R. Steiner and J. Johns (Eds.), Within Time and Beyond Time (pp. 1-24). London: Karnac. Pines, Malcolm. (1995). La dissension dans son contexte: schismes dans le mouvement psychanalytique. Topique, 57, 191-206. Thompson, Nellie L. (1995). Les schismes dans le mouvement psychanalytique aux Etats-Unis. Topique, 57, 257-270. SPLITTING Splitting is a form of dissociation that results from a conflict that can affect the ego (splitting of the ego) or its objects (splitting of the object). It is a very general intrapsychic process to the extent that it also forms the basis of the capacity in the psychic apparatus for dividing itself into systems (cf. first topography: unconscious, preconscious, conscious) and into agencies (cf. second topography: id, ego, superego). The term “splitting” has some long-established uses in psychiatry and goes back to the general concept of a capacity for psychic splitting in the human being. These usages are precursors of the concept of splitting as defined by Freud. They are found in the nineteenth century in relation to hysteria and hypnosis (splitting 1645 SPLITTING of the personality, multiple personalities, dissociation) and in Pierre Janet’s work, in which the concept of a deficiency of psychological synthesis plays an important role. Freud and Breuer return to the concept of splitting in relation to “splitting of consciousness” and from 1894 (“The Psycho-Neuroses of Defence”), Freud provides a causality for this process: “For these patients whom I analysed had enjoyed good mental health until the moment at which an occurrence of incompatibility took place in their ideational life—that is to say, until their ego was faced with such an experience, an idea or a feeling which aroused such a distressing affect that the subject decided to forget about it because he had no confidence in his power to resolve the contradiction between that incompatible idea and his ego by means of thought-activity” (1894a, p. 47). However, the splitting mentioned here goes back to neurotic repression. Now, Freud, writes, “There is, however, a much more energetic and successful kind of defence. Here, the ego rejects the incompatible idea together with its affect and behaves as if the idea had never occurred to the ego at all” (1894a, p. 58). This describes another form of splitting, that which Jacques Lacan later translates as foreclosure (forclusion—Verwerfung), which is characteristic of the psychoses and results in the foreclosed element returning in the real in the form of a hallucination. With the concept of “denial of reality,’ Freud introduces another form of splitting that demonstrates the proximity of the mechanisms of perversion to psychotic mechanisms without actually conflating them, as is evident from the creation of a substitute for the absent reality (the female penis) that occurs in the fetish, which differs from a hallucination. The concept of splitting does not only concern this possibility of dissociation from reality or internal rift in the ego, but also relates to the object of the drive. Based on Freud’s hypotheses concerning the life drive and the death drive, Melanie Klein demonstrated the force with which the latter operates in generating infantile anxiety when confronted with frustration. The splitting between a “loved good breast” and a “hated bad breast” therefore constitutes a way of simultaneously preserving a good object and constructing a bad object as the receptacle of the destructive drives. This situation corresponds to what the author terms the paranoid-schizoid phase. The support that the ego draws from the good object and the process of repairing the destroyed object subse- 1646 quently allow this splitting to be partly overcome. However, the splitting of the object is inextricable from a splitting of the ego into a “good” and a “bad” ego, according to the introjection of the corresponding split objects. Splitting can prove difficult to overcome when it is established between a very bad object and an idealized object. The entire pathology of idealization opens up here with its multiple clinical facets. Melanie Klein’s successors, Wilfred Bion and Donald Winnicott, amplified and deepened the concept of splitting. For Bion, splitting in the form of dissociation precedes the work of elaboration in loss. For Winnicott, who takes up Helene Deutsch’s concept of “false self,’ a distortion in the initial relationship between the mother-environment and the baby creates a false self that protects the true self but also isolates it from contact with reality. For Winnicott, splitting can also take the form of dissociation or disintegration as responses to being confronted with a psychotic fear of disintegration. SOPHIE DE MyOLLA-MELLOR See also: Alcoholism; Alterations of the ego; Amnesia; Castration complex; Defense mechanisms; Ego; False self; Fetishism; Negative, work of; Perversion; Projective identification; “Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction Between the Sexes”; Splitting of the ego; Splitting of the object; “Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence, The”; Splitting (vertical and horizontal); Transsexualism. Bibliography Bion, Wilfred. (1962). Learning from experience. London: Heinemann. Klein, Melanie. (1935). A contribution to the psychogenesis of manic-depressive states. International Journal of Psycho- Analysis, 16, 145-174. Reprinted 1975 in The writings of Melanie Klein, vol. 1, 262-289. . (1952). The mutual influences in the development of ego and id. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 7, 51-53. Lacan, Jacques. (1966). Commentaires sur la Verwerfung. In Ecrits. Paris: Le Seuil. (Original work published 1956) Winnicott, Donald W. (1953 [1951]). Transitional objects and transitional phenomena. A study of the first not-me possession. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 34, 89-97. Additional material was added to the paper in Playing and reality. London: Tavistock, 1971: 1-30. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SPLITTING OF THE EGO The term “splitting of the ego” refers to a division of the ego into two coexisting parts, one of which satisfies instinctual demands while the other heeds the objection, in the shape of a symptom, which reality raises to that satisfaction. This process, which Freud described as a “ruse,” constitutes a temporary response to the conflict, but the price paid is an inner rent in the ego that can only get worse with time. For Freud the most striking instance of the splitting of the ego was to be observed in the perversion of fetishism, but it was also at work in the psychoses, and to a lesser degree in neurosis. It represents a position with respect to reality more complex than denial (or disavowal [Verleugnung]), for it implies the coexistence of two contradictory attitudes. The notion of the splitting of the ego was probably already present in embryo in Freud’s mind well before his paper on “Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence” (1940e [1938]). Thus the idea of a “plurality of psychical persons,’ identifications, and in a more general sense the institution of the ideal mental agencies (superego, ego ideal) are so many forms of splitting of the ego— although it should be noted that in the last case the outcome is the formation of a new agency rather than the maintenance of a split within the ego itself. It was above all in the context of the psychoses that Freud developed this idea, and especially with regard to paranoia and delusions of reference. Viktor Tausk also worked in this context in his discussion of the genesis of the “influencing machine” in schizophrenia (1919/1949). Similarly, Sandor Ferenczi (1933) pointed out that traumas experienced by the child might give rise to a dissociation of a kind that would enable the adult, later, to present an appearance of perfect adaptation concealing an ego in ruins. In Freud’s view, psychosis implied a break with reality caused by an irreconcilable idea: thanks to the mechanism of delusional projection, what had been abolished within the mind reappeared in the outside world in the shape of a hallucination. The full dynamic complexity of the splitting of the ego emerged, however, only in the context of fetishism. Unlike a hallucination, a fetish was created not by a denial of reality but rather by a subtle avoidance of it, thanks to the symbolic transfer of the absent penis onto some other part of the body. This was the dividing- line between perversion and psychosis. But the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS “SPLITTING OF THE EGO IN THE Process oF DEFENCE”’ splitting of the ego also signaled the ego’s failure to build constructively on reality-testing by interpolating, between the instinctual demand and its gratification, the consequences of the envisaged course of action, whether the repression of the demand or the postponement of its satisfaction. SOPHIE DE MyOLLa-MELLOR See also: Ego; Splitting. Bibliography Ferenczi, Sandor. (1949). Confusion of tongues between adults and the child: The language of tenderness and of passion. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 30, 225— 230. (Original work published 1932) Freud, Sigmund. (1927e). Fetishism. SE, 21: 147-157. . (1940a [1938]). An outline of psycho-analysis. SE, 23: 139-207. . (1940e [1938]). Splitting of the ego in the process of defence. SE, 23: 271-278. . (1950a [1887—1902]). The origins of psycho-analysis. Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173-280. Tausk, Viktor. (1948). On the origin of the “influencing machine” in schizophrenia. In Robert Fliess (Ed.), The psycho-analytic reader. New York: International Universities Press. (Original work published 1919) Further Reading Blum, Harold P. (1983). Splitting of the ego and its relation to parent loss. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 31(S), 301-324. Lichtenberg, Joseph D., and Slap, Joseph W. (1973). Concept of splitting: Defense mechanisms; representations. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 21, 772-787. Pruyser, P.W. (1975). What splits in “splitting”?: Scrutiny of concept. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 39, 1-46. “SPLITTING OF THE EGO IN THE PROCESS OF DEFENCE” This short essay, dating from January 1938, was published after Freud’s death. In this work Freud returned to an issue that he had previously discussed in “Fetishism” (1927e) and that he was to take up again in An Outline of Psychoanalysis (1940a [1938]). 1647 SPLITTING OF THE OBJECT The subject of ego splitting surfaced also in other much earlier texts, particularly those concerned with psychosis, which is why Freud hesitated between “whether what I have to say should be regarded as something long familiar and obvious or as something entirely new and puzzling” (1940e [1938], p. 275). In the paper, Freud described as “cunning” (p. 277) the solution found by the child simultaneously to satisfy his instincts and respect reality. (It is surprising here that what Freud called a “real” danger was just the fact that the child had been threatened with castration.) Through the mechanism of splitting, the child “takes over the fear of that danger as a pathological symptom and tries subsequently to divest himself of the fear” (p. 275). The displacement of confrontation anxiety (onto a phobia, for example) allows for a particular solution, namely the creation of a fetish. Freud goes on to describe how the “reality” of the threat is confused with the reality of the absence of a penis in the woman, falsely interpreted as a castration. Displacing the absent penis onto an object chosen as a fetish allows the child to disbelieve the threat of castration, since a substitute for the penis exists. However, this is only possible at the price of “a turning away from reality” (p. 277), an erroneous conception of female anatomy. Demarcating this mechanism from psychotic functioning is the fact that the substitute is not hallucinated but chosen in a regressive manner— that is, from a pregenital perspective. “Success,” Freud wrote, “is achieved at the price of a rift in the ego which never heals but which increases as time goes on” (p. 276). This text has been much discussed, notably for its innovation in seeing the splitting of the ego as a process involved not only in fetishism and psychoses, but also in neuroses. Freud further developed this idea of ego splitting in An Outline of Psychoanalysis (1940a [1938]), where he described the splitting of the ego as “a universal characteristic of neuroses that there are present in the subject’s mental life, as regards some particular behaviour, two different attitudes, contrary to each other and independent of each other” (p. 204). SOPHIE DE MijoLtaA-MELLOR See also: Splitting. 1648 Source Citation Freud, Sigmund. (1940e [1938]). Die Ichspaltung im Abwehrvorgang. Internationaler Zeitschrift Psychoanaltischer Imago, 25XXV, p. 241-244; GW, XVII, p. 57-62; Splitting of the ego in the process of defence. SE, 23:271= 278. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1927e). Fetishism. SE, 21: 147-157. . (1940a [1938]). An outline of psychoanalysis. SE, 23: 139-207. SPLITTING OF THE OBJECT The early ego relates to its objects in partial ways; that is, it splits the object. This process creates objects characterized by a particular function (feeding, holding, and so on) or objects that frustrate or gratify (“bad” or “good” objects). The notion of splitting of the object appears for the first time in the article “Personification in the play of children” (Klein, 1929). Melanie Klein in her earliest observations noted the wide discrepancies of children’s feelings toward objects in their attention. She was most impressed, and alarmed, by the strength of children’s aggressive and - violent feelings toward objects they played with. Sometimes the child’s mood changed to aggression, anger, or fear very suddenly. In panics or tantrums this reaction could reach a rapid crescendo. Klein interpreted these hangovers from early infancy as the loss of the reality of the object. The object was no longer a person capable of mixed feelings of love and hate, and therefore of mixed intentions, beneficent or harmful. Instead, it became an object that was wholly loved or wholly hated. She regarded the early ego as not fully able to integrate the impressions of its first object. The breast, for example, is a good feeding object, or it is a frustrating one filled with hate and bad intent toward the infant. As the ego matures, it becomes capable of recognizing that one and the same object can have good and bad aspects, as well as multiple functions. This perceptual development may, however, be distorted by emotional factors, with the result that the child, in its ways of relating, retains partial objects into childhood and later. Many prejudicial attitudes of race, class, gender, and so on, rely on distorted perceptions that enhance INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS one or another function, or the “good” or “bad” intent, to the exclusion of others. The capacity to integrate objects in accord with reality brings in powerful new emotional problems for the infant, who must harbor both hatred of a frustrating mother with love and gratitude toward her as a feeding mother. This integration leads to the depressive position and characteristic experiences of insecurity, guilt, pining, and reparation (Klein, 1935, 1940). Melanie Klein derived her notion from Karl Abraham’s concept of partial object-love (1924). A splitting of the object is connected with a splitting of the ego; Klein (1946) thought that both must occur together. Freud’s last important theoretical contribution (1940e [1938]) concerned a splitting of the ego in connection with gross distortion of perceptions of the loved erotic object. Anna Freud (1927) and Edward Glover (1945) have doubted that Klein could accurately describe the very early stages of development prior to the infant’s acquiring language. Klein, however, believed that her extrapolation from the analysis of young children back to infancy was no different from Freud’s extrapolation from the analysis of adults back to childhood. Another dispute concerned the nature of objects. In classical psychoanalysis, objects are represented in the minds of adults and infants alike. However, Melanie Klein followed Karl Abraham in positing a level where objects are related to as real entities in psychic reality, be they concretely within the ego or outside. Rosert D. HINSHELWOOD See also: Envy and gratitude; Internal object; Linking, attacks on; Orality; Paranoid-schizoid position. Bibliography Abraham, Karl. (1927). The process of introjection in melancholia: two stages of the oral phase of the libido. In Douglas Bryan and Alix Strachey (Trans.). Selected papers of Karl Abraham, M.D. (pp. 442-452). London: Hogarth. (Original work published 1924) Freud, Anna. (1928). Introduction to the technic of child analysis (L. Pierce Clark, Trans.). New York: Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Co. (Original work published 1927) Freud, Sigmund. (1940e [1938]). Splitting of the ego in the process of defence. SE, 23: 271-278. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SPLITTING OF THE SUBJECT Glover, Edward. (1945). Examination of the Klein system of child psychology. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 1, 75— 118. Klein, Melanie. (1929). Personification in the play of children. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 10, 171-182. . (1935). A contribution to the psychogenesis of manic-depressive states. International Journal of Psycho- Analysis, 16, 145-174. . (1936). Weaning. In John Rickman (Ed.), On the bringing up of children. London: Kegan Paul. . (1940). Mourning and its relation to manic-depressive states. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 21, 125-153: . (1946). Notes on some schizoid mechanisms. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 27, 99-110. SPLITTING OF THE SUBJECT “Splitting” (in French, “refente”) is one of the translations Jacques Lacan proposed for the German “Spaltung” when he discussed how the subject is divided in subordination to the signifier. In 1958, at the end of Les formations de I'inconscient (1998), book 5 of his seminar, Lacan introduced the written symbol to refer to the effects of the signifier on the subject. He proposed the French term “refente” some time later to translate the English term “splitting,’ itself a translation of the term employed by Freud, “Spaltung,” which, in Lacan’s view, indicated this same dimension. As early as 1953 Lacan emphasized an initial division “that precludes ... any reference to totality in the individual.” This division differentiates the ego from the subject and consciousness from the unconscious. A person does not speak about the subject; the id speaks about it. A signifier represents the subject, but before disappearing under this signifier, the subject is nothing. The signifier represents the subject for the signifier that exists in the Other (the primary caregiver). This operation alienates the subject, and through alienation produces the subject. The second operation is separation. It results in the splitting of the subject. There is no answer in the Other to the question of the subject’s being. Instead, the subject encounters the desire of the Other, that is, its own lack, the juncture where the subject’s fantasy will form. 1649 SPLITTING, VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL The “division of the subject,” the term that Lacan used most frequently to translate “Spaltung,” corresponds to the written notation. Other words have also been proposed for this notion: not only “refente,” but also “coupure” (cut) and “évanouissement” (disappearance, vanishing) in French, as well as “eclipse,” “fading,” and “aphanisis” in English. ALAIN VANIER See also: Alcoholoism; Alteration of the ego; Amnesia; Castration complex; Defense mechanisms; Ego; False self; Fetishism; Perversion; Projective identification; “Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes”; Splitting of the ego; “Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence”; Splitting of the object; Splitting, vertical and horizontal; Transsexualism. Bibliography Lacan, Jacques. (1966). Du sujet enfin en question. Ecrits, pp. 229-236. Paris: Seuil. . (1998). Le séminaire. Book 5: Les formations de I inconscient. Paris: Seuil. (Delivered in 1957-1958) SPLITTING, VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL The psyche is often depicted metaphorically as an image, and this image can be further represented as whole or split. A horizontal splitting is used to bring out a division between upper and lower sectors. A vertical splitting suggests a separation of sectors that lie side by side. There is a psychoanalytic tradition that suggests that the first splitting (horizontal) represents repression, and the second (vertical) can be considered as a representation of denial. A horizontal splitting, the barrier of repression, separates unconscious material from preconscious contents, while a vertical splitting basically partitions material that is more or less accessible to consciousness. While many are familiar with Sigmund Freud’s ideas about repression and the forces that maintain it, the idea of vertical splitting is rather less well known. According to Heinz Kohut (1971), it is characterized by the existence, side by side, of attitudes operating on different levels—different structures of goals, aims, and moral and aesthetic values. Generally speaking, one side of this parallel existence is judged to be more in accord with reality, while the other can be judged infantile or turned towards immediate gratification. 1650 One of the ways of considering these parallel attitudes of the personality consists in saying that the realist attitude is better structured and/or more neutralized, while the infantile attitude is relatively unstructured and/or not neutralized. This less structured sector is sometimes involved in a fantasy, but with even less structure it can issue in manifest action. Such is the case with behavioral disturbances such as addictions, delinquency, and perversions: With horizontal splitting, the infantile and unstructured material is kept at bay. With vertical splitting, it succeeds in expressing itself. Pathological behavior is the manifestation of this split vertical sector. ARNOLD GOLDBERG See also: Sexualization; Splits in psychoanalysis. Bibliography Goldberg, Arnold. (1995). The problem of perversion. New Haven: Yale University Press. Kohut, Heinz. (1971). The analysis of the self. New York: International Universities Press. SQUIGGLE The squiggle was Donald Winnicott’s technique of communicating with children through drawing, in psychotherapeutic consultation. First he would make a “squiggle,” a twisted or wriggly line spontaneously drawn on a piece of paper. The child then adds elements to the drawing, and the analyst and child comment on its meaning. The analyst then transforms the child’s drawing, and the analyst and child further comment on the drawing. This interview diagnostic is based on the idea of testing a therapeutic response. Winnicott described the game first in 1958 and later more fully, with a series of case studies, in 1971. During his career as both pediatrician and psychoanalyst, Winnicott developed techniques in his work with children that were at once diagnostic and frequently therapeutic, based on his view that creative communication and play both occur in the “third area” or “area of experiencin—gth”e space between persons where contributions from each overlap. Winnicott’s concept of the “third area,” “transitional area,’ or “area of experiencing” derives from his thinking about the infant’s.development from the INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS early illusory stage of omnipotence to the stage of recognizing objective reality, and is linked to his ideas about transitional objects and phenomena. An earlier example of communicating with and observing an infant is given in his description of the “spatula game” (Winnicott, 1941). In both games, Winnicott observed the responses of all parties in the interaction: in the spatula game, the responses of mother, baby, himself, and any observer; in the squiggle game, his own and the child’s spontaneous actions and comments. His description of the squiggle game is exquisitely detailed: how he met the child and introduced the game, how he took pains to diminish possible anxiety, and how he allowed the child, if the child wished, to decline this invitation to play. Winnicott discovered that this technique, in the setting provided by him, provided reference to current emotional difficulties and also to their roots in developmental and structural reality. The clinical descriptions given in his writings are detailed and give an insight into the mind and work of this unique psychoanalyst and pediatrician. Winnicott’s widow, Clare, described Winnicott’s own enjoyment of his private squiggles, which he would draw after work each day. A collection of them is held in the Archives of the British Psychoanalytical Society. Winnicott’s description of his technique has inspired other analysts, who have found it useful, although some analysts have leveled the criticism that his spontaneity and his own particular facility for communicating with children were idiosyncratic and are difficult to reproduce. Melanie Klein also made use of play as a technique, though she used her technique in ongoing psychoanalysis rather than in diagnostic or therapeutic consultations. Anna Freud as well made use of play with children. JENNIFER JOHNS See also: Technique with children, psychoanalytic; Winnicott, Donald Woods. Bibliography Winnicott, Donald. (1941). The observation of infants in a set situation. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 22, 229-249. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS STAGE (oR PHASE) . (1958). Symptom tolerance in paediatrics. In his Collected papers: Through paediatrics to psycho-analysis (pp. 101-117). London: Tavistock Publications. (Originally published in 1953) . (1968). The squiggle game. In Voices: The art and science of psychotherapy, 4 (1). . (1971). Therapeutic consultations in child psychiatry. London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho- Analysis. STAGE (OR PHASE) The term “stage” is used to designate a developmental phase that, for Freud, is characterized by a specific organization of the libido, linked to a particular erotogenic zone, and dominated by a particular modality of object relations. Some authors prefer to speak of “phases” or “positions” rather than stages, because these alternatives emphasize the fact that what are referred to here are moments in psychosexual development that partake of the dialectic of the Oedipus complex, rather than a precisely stable stage in the evolution of the libido. Each phase of sexual development corresponds in effect to a distinct type of organization. Thus the psychoanalytic notion of stage does not refer to the structural study of the genesis of cognitive processes, nor does it impinge on the field of developmental psychology (for instance, the theory of Jean Piaget). The Freudian approach concerns itself exclusively with the child’s developing psychosexuality constructed in “stages,” “phases,” or “organizing moments” as the child proceeds through various steps in its maturation. This perspective attempts to account for the constitutive effects, during childhood, of bodily and mental experiences of pleasure and unpleasure, and hence for the role played by the erotogenic zones at two levels: object relationships and narcissism, or love and hate— the basic modes of mental life, which the successive versions of Freud’s theory of the instincts sought to explicate. From this standpoint, the scheme of libidinal stages provides a set of reference points, a grid against which the specific traits of an individual’s mental organization can be plotted and clearly profiled (Brusset, 1992). Both psychopathology and the psychology of the ego have used a scheme of stages as a main axis of reference. In psychopathology, this general model 1651 Stace (or PHASE) makes it possible to relate pathological structures (character types, disease entities) to various fixations or regressions of the libido. One of the most remarkable demonstrations of the consistency of the model is the association between obsessional neurosis and the anal character type. The essential role that anal eroticism plays in obsessional neurosis led Freud to define the anal-sadistic stage as a major moment in the organization of the psyche. This account served as his initial model for a general conception of “stages of organization of the libido.” On the basis of his analysis of the “Rat Man” (1909d), Freud was able to define the dynamic organization and structure of obsessional neurosis by drawing out the close connections between sadomasochism and anal eroticism. Similarly, Freud’s analysis of the autobiography of Daniel Paul Schreber (1911c [1910]) served as the basis for Freud to relate paranoia to a fixation at the narcissistic stage of development and to relate dementia praecox (schizophrenia) to a fixation at the autoerotic stage. In the psychology of the ego (Anna Freud, Reneé Spitz, Otto Fenichel) and ego psychology (Ernst Kris, Heinz Hartmann, and Rudolph Loewenstein), sets of problems are tackled in terms of developmental stages—a development that brings the notions of regression and fixation into their own. These two ideas stand in contrast with those of evolution, process, and change. From the genetic point of view, fixation, as a factor in invariable and repetitious behavior, is a constraint imposed by the instinctual unconscious. Regression may be pathological (as when it becomes fixated, for example), but it may also be purely functional and part of normal development, notably when it occasions narcissistic reinforcement as preparation for resuming the dynamic process of object cathexis (Golse, 1992). When Freud abandoned his theory of seduction, he inevitably gave new weight to fantasy and emphasized psychic over material reality. Fantasies, it should be remembered, are scenarios of action first constructed in an autoerotic period and tending to actualize mnemic traces of the experience of satisfaction. This theoretical step called for a metapsychology, rather than a simple psychology of the lower, normal, and rational forms of human mental activity that confines its scope to conscious phenomena alone. Thus the system of stages could remain a valid theory only if it was integrated into a properly psychoanalytic framework, one that took account, in particular, of the notions of the unconscious and of repression. Early experience 1652 includes the body, but also the unconscious sexuality of the mother (Perron-Borelli, 1997). The object is both a constitutive element of the instinct and a pole of cathexis within external reality. The notion of object relations has tended to enhance the general impact of the model of stages. In particular, it has opened this model up to the diversity and complexity of parent-child interaction, lessening the former emphasis on pressure and source (that is, on the erotogenic zones) and stressing instead the two other defining aspects that make the libidinal instinct into a complete structure, namely the aim and the object (Brusset, 1992). Psychoanalytically speaking, the genetic dimension is necessarily related in a dialectical manner to the structural dimension, that is, the oedipal organization and its different triangulations. Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis (1973) have pointed out that the use of the terms “phase” or “position” instead of “stage” underscores the fact that we are concerned here with intersubjective moments within the oedipal dialectic, rather than mere stages of libidinal development. The concept of deferred action (apres coup) also runs counter to a purely linear view of mental development in which each stage is understood as unfolding in simple opposition to the preceding one. For exam- _ ple, deferred action, operating in conjunction with the diphasic nature of human sexuality, results in a period of latency. In an even more radical sense, the fundamental Freudian ideas of the timeless unconscious and of a compulsion to repeat serve to explain how a past of which the subject has no memory can return in the shape of “a perpetual recurrence of the same thing” (1920g, p. 22). The Freudian model of libidinal development has been vulnerable to simplifying uses that threaten, in particular, to dissolve metapsychology into a naively realistic psychology or else into a psychology of the ego and of development that retains nothing of psychoanalysis. All the same, quite apart from the explanatory value of structural approaches, the practice of psychoanalytic interpretation, founded on a reconstruction of the past, continues to derive inspiration from a genetic point of view: “The task is certainly to account for structures in terms of the processes that have constituted them, and for processes in terms of the stages that make them intelligible” (Brusset, 1992). INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS A model based on stages, if it is to remain pertinent, must therefore remain subordinate to the metapsychology of mental processes, and by extension, it must remain dialectically consonant with the structural perspective. JEAN-FRANCOIS RABAIN See also: Abraham, Karl; Anaclisis/anaclitic; Anal-sadistic stage; Catastrophic change; Cruelty; Disintegration products; Fragmentation; Genital stage; Good-enough mother; Group; Hallucinatory, the; Hatred; Infans; Libidinal stage; Libido; Mirror stage; Organization; Oral stage; “On the Origin of the ‘Influencing Machine’ in Schizophrenia”; Partial drive; Phallic stage; Pregenital; Primary identification; Psychosexual development; Psychotic/ neurotic; Quasi-independence/transitional stage; Self (true/false); Sexuality; Squiggle; Symbiosis/symbiotic relation; Tenderness; Transitional object, space; Violence of Interpretation, The: From Pictogram to Statement. Bibliography Brusset, Bruno. (1992). Le développement libidinal. Paris: Presses universitaires de France. Freud, Sigmund. (1909d). Notes upon a case of obsessional neurosis. SE, 10: 151-318. . (1911c [1910]). Psycho-analytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia (dementia paranoides). SE, 12: 1-82. . (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1—- 64. Golse, Bernard. (1992). Le Développement affectif et intellectuel de l’enfant. Paris: Masson. Laplanche, Jean, and Pontalis, Jean-Bertrand. (1973). The language of psycho-analysis (Donald Nicholson-Smith, Trans.). London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho- Analysis. (Original work published 1967) Perron, Roger, and Perron-Borelli, Michele. (1997). Fantasme, action, pensée. Algiers, Algeria: Editions de la Société algérienne de psychologie. Perron-Borelli, Michéle. (1997). Dynamique du fantasme. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. STAMMERING Stammering is a disorder in the rate of speech delivery. It appears in the communication patterns of children aged between two and five and is characterized by repetitions or blockages that lead to ruptures in the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS STAMMERING rhythm and melody of speech. Three out of four children are destined to overcome it before adolescence. Stammering is a universal complaint and has been documented in the most ancient cultures. Sigmund Freud associated this type of disorder with hysteria, but classified it separately as a fixation neurosis (on an organ [of speech]). Otto Fenichel located this functional speech disorder in the group of pregenital conversion neuroses. The patient’s mental structure was the same as that of an obsessive, whereas the symptomatology was of the conversion type. Speech had acquired an unconscious significance related either to its verbal content or to the general meaning of the function of “speaking” itself, as in severe cases of stammering in which the speech act represents a reprehensible drive. Bernard Barrau draws attention to the frequent presence of situations of oral violence in these cases, and fantasies of “forcible introduction,’ whether in relation to forced food or its metaphorical equivalents (the voice and speech of the mother). Ivan Fonagy stresses the fact that speech is capable of absorbing narcissistic, oral, anal, or genital libido, and reports observations of parallel strategies in the anal and glottal sphincter (stammering when establishing sphincter control), and upward transfers of anal libdinal cathexis (one of Charlotte Balkany’s patients identified resonant air with air emitted by the anal sphincter). René Diatkine points to the absence of a psychic structure specific to stammering subjects, whose symptom, as a disorder in verbal communication, modifies their relational system, particularly the balance between narcissistic- and object-cathexes. Annie Anzieu traces the elements in the neurotic dynamics of stammering subjects. An anal-sadistic relation is often established between the (grasping and abusive) mother and the child, with the child fixating on a dual, merging relation with the mother, excluding all connections to a third object, unless it takes part in the mother-child whole. Stammerers thus have difficulty in engaging oedipal problems. Supervisions must be redoubled in order to integrate oedipal prohibtions into the ego, because what enters the body or comes out of it assumes a new erotic meaning. The speech act permanently alludes to castration anxiety. This relational mode leads to the persistence of what Melanie Klein calls the paranoidschizoid position. Indeed the stammerer is persecuted by a particularly demanding father and mother. All 1653 STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PsyCHOLOGICAL WORKS... verbal emissions are problematic. Like feces, words are experienced as aggressive objects whose true intentions may be to wound or kill. They become the concrete symbols of interiorized aggressive objects. These paranoid characteristics entail a considerable obsessional element as well. Stammerers exhaust their discourse to the point of fragmentation; they remain haunted by the specific words they should be saying. Obsessional cathexis of discourse can be understood in the process of neurotic construction as a superegoic symptom in relation to the hysterical symptom stammering constitutes. The phonetic dysfunction and suffering caused by verbal emission are a form of hysterical conversion, a conversion that lends genital significance to an originally anal-sadistic symptom. The stammerer expresses the conflict he has always experienced through his symptom; the subject hides behind it. The act of speaking conceals what is said. The psychotherapy or psychoanalysis of stammerers always evinces these hysterical, obsessional, and paranoid contents in a more or less typical fashion depending on the moment in treatment and patient in question. For Nicole Fabre, stammering is an archaic difficulty shot through with oral aggressivity and anal sadism, from which the subject has not yet been able to break free in order to fully accede to oedipal triangulation. Although psychoanalytic treament is rarely indicated initially, especially with children, this approach does provide an understanding of the disorder that does not exclude its meaning from the outset. The etiology of stammering is unknown. Constitutional factors interact with environmental ones in addition to factors linked to the personal dynamics of the child in varying proportions depending on the subject in question, thus illustrating the uniqueness of the trouble each stammerer faces. CHRISTIAN PAYAN See also: Tics. Bibliography Anzieu, Annie. (1989). De la chair au verbe. In Psychanalyse et langage: Du corps a la parole (pp. 103-127). Paris: Dunod. (Original work published 1977) Barrau, Bernard. (1989). Begaiement et violence orale. In Psychanalyse et langage: Du corps a la parole. Paris: Dunod. (Original work published 1977) 1654 Fabre, Nicole. (1986). Des cailloux plein la bouche. Paris: Fleurus. Fenichel, Otto. (1953). Respiratory introjection. In The collected papers, first series. New York, W.W. Norton. Fonagy, Ivan. (1983). La Vive Voix: essais de psycho-phonetique. Paris: Payot. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2: 48-106. . STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD This was the title given by James Strachey in 1948, and adopted by the British Psycho-Analytical Society Memorial Appeal, to the English translation of all of Freud’s psychoanalytic works. In accordance with Freud’s wishes, the Standard Edition does not include Freud’s prepsychoanalytic work as a neurologist. The Standard Edition, which consists of twentyfour volumes published between 1943 and 1974, was prepared by James Strachey and his wife, Alix, with the collaboration and supervision of Anna Freud and the help of Alan Tyson. The twenty-fourth volume of the Standard Edition, which includes the “General indexes” and the “Addenda and corrections,” was edited and published in 1974 by Angela Richards, a collaborator of the late James Strachey. In addition to the English translation, the Standard Edition also contains “Notes on some technical terms whose translation calls for comment,” edited by Strachey, who made use of the old Glossary of Psychoanalytical Terms, published in 1924 and edited by Ernest Jones, and of Alix Strachey’s New German-English Psychoanalytical Vocabulary, published in 1943. Furthermore, the Standard Edition has a considerable editorial apparatus: the introduction to each work of Freud’s establishes its various dates of publication in German, English, or other languages; the context in which the text has to be read, in terms of the progression of Freud’s work; the links that can be made with Freud’s earlier and later work; and all the additions or deletions Freud made if a specific text, such as The Interpretation of Dreams, had more than one edition in German. In some instances, Strachey and his coworkers tried to check the various German editions of each text, and Strachey also added explanatory and informative notes at the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS end of each of the texts that he and his colleagues translated. One of the main organizational problems of the Standard Edition concerned the rights of translation into English, which Freud had given to his nephew Edward Bernays and to Abraham Arden Brill in America. For decades this made Strachey’s task of a systematic translation of Freud’s work impossible. For instance, only as late as 1949 was Strachey able to retranslate The Interpretation of Dreams. Ernest Jones first conceived of the project of preparing a standard edition of Freud’s work in English in the early 1920s (Steiner, 1989). Together with Abraham A. Brill, he had already translated many of Freud’s technical terms into English when he was in America at the beginning of the twentieth century (Steiner, 1987). He sent James Strachey and his wife and then Joan Riviere and John Rickman to Vienna to be analyzed by Freud, with the added intention of creating a team of translators who could then systematically translate Freud into English and take over the leadership of Freud’s translations from Abraham Brill. The result of those first systematic attempts were the first four volumes of Freud’s Collected Papers, which were translated by the Stracheys, Joan Riviere, and others, often under the supervision of Jones, and were published in the 1920s and 1930s in London. It is important to remember this, since there is a clear line of continuity between the translations done by Jones and his group of translators in the 1920s and 1930s and the Standard Edition. Strachey did not make many changes to the Glossary of Psychoanalytical Terms, published in 1924 for translators and edited by Ernest Jones, which already contained translations for the most famous and questionable technical terms: “ego” for “Ich, “superego” for “Uber-Ich,’ “instinct” for “Trieb,” and so on. To Strachey in particular are attributed the translations of “cathexis” for “Besetzung” (a term, incidentally, also accepted by Freud) and “anaclitic” for “Anlehnung.” All four volumes of the Collected Papers were republished in the Standard Edition, with corrections and improvements; apart from the papers on metapsychology, which had been badly translated, Strachey did not make many alterations to the translations done in the 1920s. The Standard Edition reflects not only the personal idiosyncrasies of the Stracheys but also Jones’s project to create in English a scientific Freud acceptable to INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS... the medical and scientific psychiatric establishment. Although Jones and the Stracheys in the 1920s disagreed on many aspects of how to translate Freud (Meizel, 1986) Jones and James Strachey consulted each other constantly on technical and interpretative matters even during the 1950s, when they were working on the biography of Freud and on the Standard Edition. The supervision of the translation was also important, particularly by Anna Freud. Like any other translation, the Standard Edition bears the marks of the cultural context in which it was conceived; the complex political, institutional, and financial pressures that surrounded this colossal enterprise; and the personalities and ageing of the translators, James and Alix Strachey. Among the shortcomings of the Standard Edition were that Freud’s polysemous, elegant, and expressive literary vocabulary and style were at times excessively stifled and rendered scientific, and that its editorial apparatus was inevitably restricted by the information, documents, personal letters, and notes of Freud’s life and work available at that time. Yet there is no doubt that the Standard Edition constitutes a unique and irreplaceable instrument for the study of Freud. Perhaps one of the most amazing achievements of the Standard Edition is that other translations and editions of Freud’s work depended on the Standard Edition rather than on the original German texts. RICCARDO STEINER See also: British Psycho-Analytical Society; Great Britain; Second World War: The effect on the development of psychoanalysis; Hogarth Press; Jones, Ernest; Ego; Scoptophilia/ scopophilia; Strachey, James Beaumont; Strachey- Sargent, Alix; Studienausgabe. Bibliography Bettelheim, Bruno. (1983). Freud and man’s soul. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Freud, Sigmund. (1924-1950). Collected papers (5 vols.). London: International Psycho-Analytical Press. Jones, Ernest (Ed.). (1924). Glossary of psychoanalytical terms. Mahony, Patrick. (1980). Toward the understanding of translation in psychoanalysis. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 28, 461-473. . (1982). Freud as a writer. New York: International Universities Press. 1655 STATE OF BEING IN LOVE Ornston, Darius Gray. (1992). Improving Strachey’s Freud. In Darius Gray Ornston (Ed.), Translating Freud. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Steiner, Riccardo. (1987). A world-wide international trademark of genuineness? International Review of Psychoanalysis, 14, 33-102. . (1989). On narcissism: The Kleinian approach. In Otto E. Kernberg (Ed.), Narcissistic personality disorder (pp. 741-770). Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders. . (1991). To explain our point of view to English readers in English words. International Review of Psychoanalysis, 18, 351-392. Strachey, Alix. (1943). New German-English psychoanalytical vocabulary. Strachey, James. (1966). General preface. In Standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 1, pp. 13-26). London: Hogarth. STATE OF BEING IN LOVE The concept of “being in love” was investigated by Christian David in L’Etat amoureux, published in 1971, at a time when his ideas about psychosomatics were changing. David continued to believe in the importance of questioning the fluctuations to which mental processes were exposed, but he now stressed those generated through the encounter with the other rather than those implied by a physical presence. Overall, his study attempts to point out the internal behavior of the subject confronted, through this encounter, with the state of “being in love.” For David this state is characterized by a form of subjectification that has two components: the subjectification of the drive in the face of the specific trauma caused by love, and the ability to integrate the narcissistic release implied by the encounter with the loved one. With respect to the subjectification of the love trauma, Sigmund Freud, who is quoted by David, sees it as similar to the work of mourning or dreaming. The analogy enables him to emphasize the singular quality of this type of activity, where the drive is immobilized at the crossroads of destiny and constantly re-released through the encounter with the other. Through this encounter the subject is constantly forced to confront the necessary death of the ego. “Where love is awakened, ego, that somber despot dies,” writes David, repeating Freud’s quote of Jalal el Din (1911c). One of the basic premises of David’s book is to explain love as a narcissistic disturbance. The conco- 1656 mitant risk of forcing the subject to confront the most primitive dimensions of the drive is one that may restore the condition of narcissism. These aspects are at work in the tragedy of Penthesilea by Heinrich von Kleist, a text for which David provides a psychoanalytic reading. In the myth Penthesilea, queen of the Amazons, is in love with Achilles and loved by him. In the end she kills her lover and devours him with the help of her dogs. However, the violence of the drama underscores the necessity of a two-sided abandonment: abandonment of proximity to the being onto whom the subject projects his ideal, and abandonment of preserving intact the contours and limits of the ego. While the work of mourning flattens the contours of experience, the mental work required by the love trauma restores to it the variety and truth of its nuances. But to do this requires subjectification. At the extreme, this subjectification can assume the aspect of an “affective perversion,” like that expressed by Nathaniel in Gide’s The Fruits of the Earth, when he exclaims, “My desires have given me more than the possession of the object of those desires.” In a sense the work implied by being in love, including “affective perversion” mirrors the effort therapy demands of the patient caught up in transference love. LAURENT DANON-BOILEAU See also: Empathy; Friendship; Racker, Heinrich. Bibliography David, Christian. (1971). L Etat amoureux. Paris: Payot. . (1980). Metapsychological reflections on the state of being in love. In Lebovici, Serge, and Widlocher, Daniel. Psychoanalysis in France. (p. 87-100) New York: International Universities Press. . (1996). Post-scriptum a l’etat amoureux. Revue francaise de psychanalyse, 60, 3, 633-642. Freud, Sigmund. (1911). Psycho-analytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia (dementia paranoides). SE 12: 1-82. . (1921). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. SE 18: 65-143. STEKEL, WILHELM (1868-1940) An Austrian physician and psychoanalyst, Wilhelm Stekel was born on March 18, 1868, at Boyan, Buko- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS vina. He died on June 25, 1940, in London. After matriculating from a German secondary school in Czernowitz, Stekel studied medicine in Vienna. He worked in Richard von Krafft-Ebing’s clinic for a while before defending his thesis in 1893. A certain mystery surrounds the date of Stekel’s first meeting with Freud, as well as that of the analysis (or analyses) that he undertook with him. In his paper “The Aetiology of Hysteria” (1896c), Freud cites Stekel’s “Uber Coitus im Kindesalter” (On infantile sexuality; 1895), and in another article written in 1896 but published in the following year, Stekel mentioned Freud’s report on Paul Julius Mobius’s book on migraine. It was probably Freud who, in 1901, recommended Stekel for a position as medical journalist at the well-known newspaper Neues Wiener Tagblatt, in whose pages, in January 1902, Stekel published a complimentary article on Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams (1900a). In October 1902, Stekel initiated setting up the Wednesday Psychological Society, which in 1908 transformed itself into the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. Judging by the minutes (Nunberg and Federn), Stekel was its most active member during the first ten years. Stekel strongly challenged Freud on such subjects as the harmfulness of masturbation and the existence of the actual neuroses. In 1910 Stekel proposed setting up Zentralblatt fiir Psychoanalyse, of which he was soon sole editor. A dispute about his rights in this office led to Stekel’s resignation from the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society in 1912. The underlying reason, however, was almost certainly Stekel’s refusal to accept Freud’s ideas on the actual neuroses. After World War I, Stekel set up his own school of “active analysis” and founded the Organisation of Independent Medically Qualified Analysts. He also launched and edited a number of psychotherapeutic journals. Stekel was a prolific writer, producing fifty books (many of them for a general readership), hundreds of newspaper articles, and numerous scientific papers. The most important part of Stekel’s psychoanalytical work is contained in his ten-volume Storungen des Trieb- und Affektlebens (Disturbances of the impulses and the emotions). The first volume was Conditions of Nervous Anxiety and Their Treatment (1923). It was followed by volumes on masturbation and homosexuality, frigidity in women, impotence in men, psychosexual infantilism, peculiarities of behavior, fetishism, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS STEKEL, WILHELM (1868-1940) sadism and masochism, and finally two volumes on compulsion and doubt. Other academic books of his deserving special mention are Die Sprache des Traumes (The language of dreams; 1911), Die Traume der Dichter (The Dreams of Poets; 1912), The Interpretation of Dreams (1943), and Technique of Analytical Psychotherapy (1939). The most well-known of his popular books was his Primer for Mothers (1931). Stekel was a popularizer of psychoanalytic ideas, both through his journalistic output and through his books, yet he was also an innovator in technique and theory. He devised a form of short-term therapy called active analysis, which has much in common with some modern forms of counseling and therapy. He argued strongly for the view that all neuroses are psychoneuroses. FRANCIS CLARK- LOWES See also: Wiener psychoanalytische Vereinigung; Zentralblatt fiir Psychoanalyse. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1896c). The aetiology of hysteria. SE, 3: 186-221. Nunberg, Hermann, and Federn, Ernst. (1962-1975). Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. New York: International Universities Press. Stekel, Wilhelm. (1895). Uber coitus im kindesalter: eine hygienische studie. Wiener medizinische Blatter, 16, 247- 249. . (1911). Die sprache des traumes. Wiesbaden, Germany: J. F. Bergmann. . (1912). Die traume der dichter. Wiesbaden, Germany: Bergmann. . (1923). Conditions of nervous anxiety and their treatment (Rosalie Gabler, Trans.). London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co. . (1926). Zur geschichte der analytischen Bewegung. Fortschritte der Sexualwissenschaft und Psychoanalyse, 2, 539-575. . (1931). A primer for mothers (Frida Ilmer, Trans.). New York: Macaulay Co. . (1939). Technique of analytical psychotherapy (Eden and Cedar Paul, Trans.). London: John Lane. . (1943). The interpretation of dreams: New developments and technique (Eden and Cedar Paul, Trans.). New York: Liveright Publishing Corp. 1657 STERBA-RADANOWICZ-HARTMANN, EDITHA (1895-1986) . (1950). The autobiography of Wilhelm Stekel: The life story of a pioneer psychoanalyst. New York: Liveright. STERBA-RADANOWICZ-HARTMANN, EDITHA (1895-1986) Psychoanalyst Editha Sterba was born on May 8, 1895, in Budapest, and died December 2, 1986, in Detroit, Michigan. From a Catholic family, Editha was the daughter of Colonel Heinrich von Radanowicz-Hartmann, a commander in the Austrian army. After secondary education at a humanistic gymnasium ordinarily restricted to boys, she attended the University of Vienna, where she initially studied German language and literature and classical philology before turning, in 1916, to musicology. She graduated in 1921 with a thesis on “Viennese Song from 1789 to 1915.” As secretary to Otto Rank at the Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag (the official psychoanalytic publishing house) and secretary at the training institute, she became familiar with analysis, and by the end of 1925 she was an associate member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. A year later, divorced from her first husband, she married the Viennese physician and analyst, Richard Sterba. In June 1927, she gave a lecture “Blasphemy and the Punishment of Heaven” and in 1930 she became a full member of the Vienna Society. Editha Sterba’s major focus was the emerging field of child psychoanalysis. In 1928, she was placed in charge of the educational services center of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society and, in 1932, of a larger center with August Aichhorn, Anna Freud, and Willi Hotter. With Aichhorn she also served as an adviser and consultant to educational institutions in Vienna and, in October 1934, she directed the introductory seminar on child psychoanalysis. From 1927, she regularly published her works in Zeitschrift fiir psychoanalytische Péidagogik. The Sterbas left Vienna in 1938, first for Switzerland. On Ernest Jones’s advice, they applied for a visa for South Africa with the intention of helping to found a psychoanalytic society there. However, they failed to obtain the necessary visas and instead emigrated to the United States in 1939. Editha became a member of the Detroit Psychoanalytic Society, the American Psychoanalytic Association, the Association for Child Psycho- 1658 analysis and, in 1955, of the Michigan Association for Psychoanalysis. In 1953, she was asked to join the newly opened department of psychiatry at Wayne State University. Her study Beethoven and His Nephew, written in collaboration with her husband, appeared in 1954. With Alexander Grinstein she wrote Understanding Your Family, published in 1957. Editha Sterba played a variety of roles in organizational and research projects over the course of three decades in the United States. She worked at the Children’s Service of the McGregor Center at Wayne State University and the Northeast Guidance Clinic; she also helped found the Roeper City and Country School, a training institution for nurses. She was associated with the University of Michigan, practiced at the Children’s Hospital of Michigan, and for the Jewish Family Service she developed methods for treating young survivors of the Holocaust. Etxe MUHLEITNER See also: Lehrinstitut der Wiener Psychoanalytischen Vereinigung; Sterba, Richard F. Bibliography Miihlleitner, Elke. (1992). Biographisches lexikon der psychoanalyse (die mitglieder der psychologischen Mittwoch- Gesellschaft und der Wiener Psychoanalytischen Vereinigung 1902—1938). Tubingen: Diskord. Sterba, Editha. (1929). Nacktheit und scham. (Nudity and shame). Zeitschriffiti rp sychoanalytische Padagogik, 3. . (1941). The school and child guidance. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 10, 445-467. . (1945). Interpretation and education. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 1, 309-318. Sterba, Editha, and Grinstein, Alexander. (1957). Undertstanding your family. New York: Random House. Sterba, Editha, and Sterba, Richard FE (1954). Beethoven and his nephew; a psychoanalytic study of their relationship. New York: Pantheon. STERBA, RICHARD F. (1898-1989) Richard Sterba, physician and psychoanalyst, was born in Vienna on May 6, 1898, and died on October 24, 1989, in Grosse Pointe, Michigan. His father, Josef Sterba, taught mathematics and physics at the high school level. Conscripted shortly before graduating INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS from the gymnasium in 1916, Richard entered the army and was eventually promoted to lieutenant. While in the military, he became interested psychoanalysis and, after the war, began medical studies at the University of Vienna, graduating in 1923. The next year he started a training analysis with Eduard Hitschmann; without sufficient funds, he paid no fee, on the understanding that in the future he too would analyze some patients for free. His first supervising analyst was the neurologist Robert Hans Jokl, and he began treating patients after six months of analysis. In 1926 Sterba married Editha von Radanowicz— Hartmann, and the couple were among the first students to attend the training institute of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, which opened at the end of 1924. Sterba became an associate member of the society in 1925 and a full member in 1928 (Sterba, 1982, p. 43). Shortly after presenting his 1926 paper, “Uber latent, negative Ubertragung” (On latent negative transference), Wilhelm Reich offered him a residency at a psychoanalytic outpatient clinic (Sterba, 1982, p. 40). Leaving his hospital position, he worked at the clinic with Grete Bibring and Eduard Kronengold. By 1929 Sterba was a training analyst, and in 1931 Adolf Josef Storfer, director of a psychoanalytic publishing house, suggested that he compile a psychoanalytic dictionary. Five fascicles of the lexicon were published (1936) before the coming of the Second World War put an end to the project. Sterba was still in Austria in 1938, when the Nazi takeover of the country immediately disrupted psychoanalysis there. As a member of the board of directors of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, Sterba announced his intention to leave the country, to the relief of Freud and his daughter Anna, who themselves would soon migrate to England. As an “Aryan,” Sterba was welcomed by the Nazis, but he declined a post at the neuropsychiatric clinic of the University of Vienna and also rejected an offer to head the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society under fascist auspices. The Sterbas left Austria on March 16, 1938, first for Switzerland then, in 1939, for the United States. Ernest Jones and Anna Freud suggested that they immigrate to Johannesburg and help found a psychoanalytic society there, but the South African government thwarted these plans by denying them visas. They settled in Detroit, where Richard Sterba founded the Detroit Psychoanalytic Society in 1940 and served as its president from 1946 to 1952. He was appointed INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SToLvter, RoBertJ . (1925-1991) Professor of Psychiatry at the medical college of Wayne State University in Detroit in 1945. Sterba specialized in psychoanalytic profiles of artists and published a study of Michelangelo and, in collaboration with his wife, a biography of Beethoven. In clinical matters, his hypothesis of “a therapeutic split of the ego” was controversial (Sterba, 1982, p. 91). In 1931 he published in German a treatise on the theory of the libido based on a course he taught at the Vienna Psychoanalytic Institute. In 1942 an English translation appeared under the title Introduction to the Psychoanalytic Theory of the Libido. In 1982 he published his memoir, Reminiscences of a Viennese Psychoanalyst. He was the author of about one hundred articles, a number of which appear in Richard Sterba: The Collected Papers (1987). ELKE MUHLLEITNER See also: Sterba-Radanowicz-Hartmann, Editha. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1936b [1932]). Preface to Richard Sterba’s Handworterbuch der psycho-analyse. SE, 22: 253. Sterba, Edith, and Sterba, Richard. (1954). Beethoven and his nephew: A psychoanalytic study of their relationship. New York: Pantheon. Sterba, Richard F. (1936). Handworterbuch der psychoanalyse. Vienna: Internationaler psychoanalytischer Verlag. . (1942). Introduction to the psychoanalytic theory of the libido. New York: Nervous and Mental Disease Monographs. (Original work published 1931) . (1982). Reminiscences of a Viennese psychoanalyst. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. . (1987). Richard Sterba: The collected papers. New York: North River Press. STOLLER, ROBERT J. (1925-1991) American psychoanalyst, professor of psychiatry, UCLA Medical School, was born December 15, 1925, in Crestwood, New York and died on September 6, 1991, in Los Angeles. He was born and raised in suburban New York to Russian-Jewish immigrant parents, attended Columbia University and Stanford Medical School, was married for 43 years, and had four sons. Stoller underwent 1659 Stone, Leo (1904-1997) psychoanalytic training at the Los Angeles Psychoanalytic Society and Institute from 1953 to 1961 with analysis by Hanna Fenichel. He was the author of nine books, co-author of three others, and publisher of over one hundred and fifteen articles. Stoller’s writing is unique in its clarity and accessibility as well as its critical perspective on psychoanalytic methodology. Stoller is known for his theories and research concerning the development of gender and the dynamics of sexual excitement. In Sex and Gender (1968), Stoller articulates a challenge to Freud’s belief in biological bisexuality. Drawing on his extensive research with transsexuals at UCLA’s Gender Identity Clinic and new advances in the science of sex, Stoller, in “Primary Femininity,” advances his belief in the initial orientation of both biological tissue and psychological identification toward feminine development. This early, non-conflictual phase contributes to a feminine core gender identity in both boys and girls unless a masculine force is present to interrupt the symbiotic relationship with mother. Stoller identifies three components in the formation of core gender identity, an innate and immutable sense of maleness or femaleness, usually consolidated by the second year of life: 1) Biological and hormonal influences; 2) Sex assignment at birth; and 3) Environmental and psychological influences with effects similar to imprinting. Stoller asserts that threats to core gender identity are like threats to. the sense of self and result in the defenses known as perversions. In his most notable contribution, Perversion (1975), Stoller attempts to illuminate the dynamics of sexual perversion which he fights valiantly to normalize. Stoller suggests that perversion inevitably entails an expression of unconscious aggression in the form of revenge against a person who, in early years, made some form of threat to the child’s core gender identity, either in the form of overt trauma or through the frustrations of the oedipal conflict. In Sexual Excitement (1979), Stoller finds the same perverse dynamics at work in all sexual excitement on a continuum from overt aggression to subtle fantasy. In focusing on the unconscious fantasy, and not the behavior, Stoller provides a way of analyzing the mental dynamics of sexuality, which he terms “erotics,” while simultaneously de-emphasizing the pathology of any particular form of behavior. Stoller does not consider homosexuality as a monolithic behavior but rather as a range of sexual styles as diverse as heterosexuality. 1660 Less well known is Stoller’s contribution toward making psychoanalysis a legitimate research tool through the publication of the analyst’s data—verbatim notes and transcripts of interviews. Stoller melds the work of the ethnographer and the analyst as a means of producing scientifically valid psychological data. Many of Stoller’s books, like Splitting (1973), are devoted to the documentation of the interviews on which he based his research. CHRISTOPHER GELBER Notion developed: Sexual identity. See also: Homosexuality; Perversion; Principle of identity; Transsexualism; Voyeurism. Bibliography Stoller, Robert J. (1968). Sex and gender: On the development of masculinity and feminity. New York: Science House. . (1973). Splitting: A case of female masculinity. New York: Quadrangle Books. _ (1975). Perversion: The erotic form of hatred. New York: Pantheon. _ (1979). Sexual excitement: dynamics of erotic life. New York: Pantheon. . (1985). Observing the erotic imagination. New Haven, London: Yale University Press. (1985). Presentations of gender. New Haven, London: Yale University Press. STONE, LEO (1904-1997) Leo Stone, American psychoanalyst and teacher, was born on August 11, 1904, in Brooklyn, New York, where he died on July 27, 1997. He was the third of four children born to Ruben and Marcia Stone. His father, a man “with a good heart,” was an avid reader and owned a large library, through which Leo read systematically. His mother was a kind woman with a fine singing voice—a factor in Leo’s love of music. During his childhood the family moved to a farm north of New York City. Seven years later they moved back to Brooklyn. Later in life, Leo purchased from Brooklyn College a tract of land across the state line in New Jersey, an act reflecting his early attachment to nature. He was married twice and was the father of three daughters. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Leo Stone graduated from Erasmus High School in Brooklyn in 1916, from Dartmouth College in 1924, and from Michigan University Medical School in 1928. After a year on call, he studied pathology in Vienna and Berlin in 1930 and then completed a residency in neurology at Montefiore Hospital. He trained in psychiatry at the Menninger Clinic until 1936, after which he started a private practice in New York City, which he continued until his death. He graduated from the New York Psychoanalytic Institute in 1941, having been analyzed by Clara Thompson, an analysand of Sandor Ferenczi. Then he joined the faculty of the institute and was active for many years until late in his life. He was Brill Memorial lecturer and received many honors and awards. He served as president of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute and as president of the New York Psychoanalytic Society. From 1951 to 1957, he also served as medical director of the New York Psychoanalytic Society. Stone first achieved prominence after Anna Freud approvingly discussed his paper “The widening scope of indications for psychoanalysis” (1954), a plea for humanely expanding the use of psychoanalysis to treat a broad range of illnesses. This paper became the basis of his best known book, The Psychoanalytic Situation: An Examination of Its Development and Essential Nature (1961). He also published The Therapeutic Expertience and Its Setting: A Clinical Dialogue with Robert Langs (1980) and Transference and Its Context: Selected Papers in Psychoanalysis (1984). A key participant in the historic 1971 International Psychoanalytic Congress in Vienna, where he spoke on aggression as a reaction to frustrating reality rather than an inborn drive—a view with which Anna Freud concurred. He was an early proponent of a flexible approach. His view was that an analyst who remained too rigid risked damaging his patient and undoing any treatment—a view that was radical at a time when analysts favored giving the silent treatment or acting as a reflecting mirror. Stone was widely respected in the United States for being gentlemanly and courteous, kind and modest, and lucid and thorough in presenting psychoanalytic ideas and concepts. Zv1 LOTHANE See also: Abstinence/rule of abstinence. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Storrer, Avotr Joser (1888-1944) Bibliography Stone, Leo. (1938). Concerning the psychogenesis of somatic illness: Physiological and neurological correlates with the psychological theory. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 19, 63-76. . (1947). Transference sleep in a neurosis with duodenal ulcer. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 28, 86-118. ' . (1954). The widening scope of indications for psychoanalysis. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 2, 567-594. . (1961). The psychoanalytic situation: An examination of its development and essential nature. New York: International Universities Press. . (1980). The therapeutic experience and its setting: A clinical dialogue with Robert Langs. New York: Jason Aronson. . (1984). Transference and its context: Selected papers on psychoanalysis. New York: Jason Aronson. STORFER, ADOLF JOSEF (1888-1944) Adolf Josef Storfer, journalist and publisher, was born in Botoschani, Siebenbiirgen (now in Romania) on January 11, 1888, and died in Melbourne, Australia, on December 2, 1944. He was of Jewish origin and his father was a well-todo wood merchant. He grew up at Klausenburg (Cluj), where he completed his secondary education and began to study law and political science. In 1908 he went to Zurich to continue his studies and became a journalist for the Frankfurter Zeitung and other publications. In 1910 he contacted Sigmund Freud and sent him his manuscript “Zur Sonderstellung des Vatermordes” (“On the Primordial Role of Father Murder”), which Freud published that same year in Schriften zur angewandten Seelenkunde (“Writings of Applied Psychology”). In 1913 Storfer settled in Vienna and attended the meetings of the Wednesday Society. He was mobilized during World War I and in 1919 became a member of the Hungarian Psychoanalytic Society, before moving back to Vienna. From 1921 onward he collaborated with the Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, becoming director in 1925. Until 1932 Storfer left his print on the content and editorial policy of this powerful instrument for the dissemination of psychoanalysis. His solid humanistic 1661 STRACHEY, JAMES BEAUMONT (1887-1967) education and his vast general culture particularly suited him to this task, as did his experience as a journalist. The Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag had its most productive period between 1925 and 1932: three new periodicals were founded and the publication of Freud’s Gesammelte Schriften was completed under Storfer’s directorship, along with his personal contributions to the content. His contacts with the members of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society were somewhat half-hearted, as he never practiced psychoanalysis. His role was essentially to be the intellectual indicator of Sigmund Freud’s editorial policy. As editor of publications and as a result of internal financial crises, Storfer often had to deal with the competing interests of the psychoanalysts, as well as the consequences of the economic crisis. As a leftist liberal intellectual, he frequented one of the most fashionable cafes in Vienna, the Cafe Herrenhof. In 1932 he left the Verlag after bitter disputes, thereafter working as a self-employed journalist, and publishing two works on etymology: Worter und ihre Schicksale (“Words and their Destiny”) and Im Dickicht der Sprache (“In the Thicket of Language’). In 1938 he succeeded in fleeing to Shanghai at the last minute and worked there as an editor for the last time. From 1939 to 1941 he published one of the best German-language newspapers for exiles, the Gelbe Post. As the Japanese advanced, in 1941, he managed to flee to Australia with the help of the British intelligence services. As a result of pneumonia he died in Melbourne in 1944 in extreme poverty. INGRID SCHOLZ-STRASSER See also: Almanach der Psychoanalyse, Gesammelte Schriften; Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag; Mysteries of a Soul; Sterba, Richard F. Bibliography Mihlleitner, Elke. (1992). Biographisches Lexikon der Psychoanalyse (Die Mitglieder der Psychologischen Mittwoch- Gesellschaft und der Wiener Psychoanalytischen Vereinigung 1902-1938). Tibingen: Diskord. Leupold Lowenthal, Harald, Lobner, Hans, and Scholz Strasser, Inge (Eds.). (1995). Sigmund Freud Museum: Berggasse 19, Vienna (Thomas Roberts, Trans.). Corte Madera, CA: Gingko Press. Scholz Strasser, Inge. Newsletter. Sigmund Freud House bulletin 1991, 15 (1), 40-48. 1662 STRACHEY, JAMES BEAUMONT — (1887-1967) James Strachey, British psychoanalyst, was born in London on September 26, 1887, and died there on July 3, 1967. He belonged to a very distinguished uppermiddle- class family. He studied at St. Paul’s School in London, achieving good academic results, and in 1904 went to Trinity College, Cambridge, to study classics. Owing to personal difficulties, he ended up not with a degree in classics but with an unclassified degree in moral sciences (1909). Like many other pioneers of the British Psycho-Analytical Society at Cambridge, Strachey discovered the Society for Psychical Research, where he read Freud’s paper “A Note on the Unconscious in Psycho-Analysis,” published in the society’s journal in 1912. It was this paper that stimulated Strachey’s interest in psychoanalysis. He had a brief career as a journalist working in London for The Spectator and The Athenaeum, during which time he also became part of the Bloomsbury Group, led by his brother Lytton. In 1919 he approached Ernest Jones about becoming a psychoanalyst. He married Alix in 1920. In the same year Jones, having perceived Strachey’s literary talents and wanting to use him to begin the systematic translation of Freud’s work into English, sent him to Vienna to be analyzed by Freud. While in analysis with Freud, who chose him officially as his translator, James, together with Alix, began to translate several of Freud’s works, such as “A Child is Being Beaten” (1919e) and “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego” (1921c). This was done under Freud’s supervision and with the help of Anna Freud, who then became his collaborator and counselor in translating Freud’s works. Strachey returned to London in 1922 and, while practicing as a psychoanalyst, nevertheless dedicated most of his time to translating Freud’s work. Particularly important was the Stracheys’ translation of five of Freud’s case histories, published in 1925 as the third volume of Freud’s Collected Papers. James became an associate member of the British Psycho-Analytical Society in 1922, a full member in 1922, and a training analyst in 1928. As a training analyst, Strachey took an active part in the life of the British Psycho-Analytical Society, then under the rule of Ernest Jones, who as early as the 1920s had already planned what was to become, after the Second World War, the Standard Edition of the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. Strachey helped Melanie Klein to come to London and played an important mediating role in the controversial discussions between Anna Freud and Melanie Klein in the 1940s. In 1948 Strachey became the general editor of the Standard Edition translation of all the psychological works of Freud into English, and after retiring to the country at Marlow with his wife, he dedicated the rest of his life to accomplishing this task, using and revising the translations made in the 1920s by him, Joan Riviere, and others that had appeared in the first four volumes of Freud’s Collected Papers and retranslating other works such as The Interpretation of Dreams and the metapsychological papers. One of the greatest contributions of his work was the editorial apparatus that he added to the translations of the Standard Edition, which has become invaluable in understanding and contextualizing Freud’s work. Strachey was well aware that his translations and editorial apparatus were not definitive and that they would need further revisions and corrections. Particularly important was the glossary of psychoanalytic terms, which he prepared reusing old material and most of the terminology already established in the 1920s and published in 1924 in The Glossary of Psychoanalytical Terms, edited by Ernest Jones. To Strachey we Owe, among other translations, the terms “cathexis” to translate the German “Besetzung” and “anaclitic” to translate “Anlehnung.” Both terms were derived from ancient Greek. Indicating the importance of its translations and editorial apparatus is the fact that the Standard Edition has become the text used by the International Psychoanalytical Association and that it is also the point of reference for other translations of Freud’s works into such major languages as German, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, and French. In 1967 Strachey was awarded the Tieck Prize for his translation of the Standard Edition. Strachey also significantly contributed to clinical psychoanalysis on his own. One paper particularly deserving to be remembered is “The Nature of the Therapeutic Action of Psycho-Analysis” (1934). This paper is considered a landmark for its discussion of problems related to the interpretation and mutative effects of transference. RICCARDO STEINER Notion developed: Transmuting internalization. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS STRACHEY-SARGENT, ALIX (1892-1973) See also: British Psycho-Analytical Society; Controversial Discussions; Empathy; Great Britain; Hogarth Press; International Journal of Psychoanalysis, The; Libido; Maturation; Neutrality/benevolent neutrality; Primary identification; “Project for a Scientific Psychology, A”; Psychoanalytic semiology; Resolution of the transference; Scoptophilia/scopophilia; Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud; Strachey-Sargant, Alix; Studienausgabe; Time. . Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1912g). A note on the unconscious in psycho- analysis. SE, 12: 255-266. Holroyd, Michael. (1973). Lytton Strachey: A critical biography. London: Heinemann. Ornston, Darius Gray. (1992). Improving Strachey’s Freud. In Darius Gray Ornston (Ed.), Translating Freud (pp. 1- 23). New Haven: Yale University Press. Meisel, Perry, and Kendrick, Walter. (1986). Bloomsbury- Freud: The letters of James and Alix Strachey, 1924-1925. London: Chatto and Windus. Steiner, Riccardo. (1987). A world-wide international trademark of genuineness? International Review of Psychoanalysis, 14, 33-102. . (1991). To explain our point of view to English readers in English words. International Review of Psychoanalysis, 18, 351-392. Strachey, James. (1934). The nature of the therapeutic action of psycho-analysis. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 15, 127-159. STRACHEY-SARGENT, ALIX (1892-1973) Alix Strachey, British psychoanalyst was born on June 4, 1892, in Nutley, New Jersey, and died in London on April 28, 1973. She came form a rather complex but highly intellectual family background and her childhood was quite erratic due to family problems. Educated at Bedales School and then at the Slade School of Art in London, she went up to Cambridge in 1911, where she graduated with a degree in modern languages in 1914. Through her brother Philip and other friends she met at Cambridge, Alix took part in the life of the Bloomsbury Group where she met James Strachey, whom she married in 1920. She became an associate member of the British Psycho-Analytical Society in 1922 and a full member in 1923. 1663 STRANGER She had a personal analysis in Vienna with Freud for two years from 1920 to 1922, as did her husband. It was during this period that she began helping her husband to translate Freud’s work into English. She then went to Berlin for further analysis with Karl Abraham in 1924. In Berlin, she continued her translation work and met Melanie Klein. Alix was instrumental in arranging Klein’s first visit to London in 1925 and translated some of her papers into English. Together with her husband, she published the translation of Freud’s Five Case Histories, which were assembled in the third volume of his Collected Papers (1925). She finally returned to England after Abraham’s death in December 1925. She undertook other personal analyses: with Edward Glover in 1926 and later with Sylvia Payne. She took part in the administrative life of the British Psycho-Analytical Society but her main contributions were in the field of translation, helping to translate Freud’s and others’ papers into English. For instance, in collaboration with Douglas Bryan, she translated The Selected Papers of Karl Abraham (1927) and Klein’s Psychoanalyse der Kindes—The Psychoanalysis of Children in 1932. She also translated Freud’s Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety in 1936. In 1943 she published A New German-English Psychoanalytical Vocabulary, a complete index of psychoanalytic terms in English which was instrumental for the Standard Edition. The rest of her time, from the late forties until the late sixties, she was dedicated to helping James publish the Standard Edition. It is sometimes difficult to evaluate Alix’s contribution, which has, nevertheless, been invaluable as far as the Standard Edition is concerned. When the Standard Edition was well advanced, Alix was able to dedicate herself to some more personal work, going back to the interests of her youth: social issues, war, and pacifism. She published The Unconscious Motives of War in 1957 and The Psychology of Nationhood in 1960. RICCARDO STEINER See also: British Psycho-Analytical Society; Great Britain; Hogarth Press; Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety; Klein-Reizes, Melanie; Strachey, James Beaumont. Bibliography Holroyd, Michael. (1973). Lytton Strachey: A critical biography. London: Heinemann. 1664 Meisel, Perry, and Kendrick, Walter. (1986). Bloomsbury- Freud. The letters of James and Alix Strachey 1924-1925. London: Chatto and Windus. STRANGER Fear of strangers (or stranger anxiety) is a normal emotional response that occurs in the second half of the first year of life; the concept was introduced and developed by René Spitz, who called it “eight-month anxiety.” This construction was the result of direct observation from a developmental psychoanalytic perspective. The fear of strangers reaction signals a point where development has encountered a difficulty or even gone off track. According to Spitz’s conceptual framework, as outlined in “Anxiety and Infancy” (1950), eight-month anxiety marks a decisive phase in object relations: the infant’s mental accession to object permanence. This is in contrast to the social smiling of the preceding period, which is addressed indifferently to both unknown and familiar faces, and comes after archaic pre-objectal fears and anxieties. It is referred to as the “first genuine manifestation of anxiety” (Spitz and Cobliner, 1965; Spitz 1968), and thus figures in interpretations and differences of opinion relating to separation anxiety and theories of anxiety in general. Spitz’s principle of “organizers” of mental life places eight-month anxiety as the second organizer. However the embryological metaphor implied by the term “organizer” has been contradicted by demonstrations of early interactive capacities in babies, while fear of strangers has been marginalized within metapsychology by attachment theory, which has attracted many adherents. John Bowlby argues that intrusions upon the primary need for attachment cause the infant to reject the traumatizing face. Serge Lebovici developed the concept of eight-month anxiety into a primary phobia with the proposed name “Stranger’s-Face Phobia.” This is a proto-phobia that unfolds via displacement onto the stranger of the infant’s aggressive impulses against the mother. Thus it both protects her imago and appeals to her return. From the viewpoint of current psychosomatic theories of mental development in France (Pierre Marty), stranger anxiety evinces the emergence of various psychic functions. The absence of stranger anxiety is a symptom of mental deficiencies and is a remarkable indicator of the silence of the mechanisms of inter-relational and INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS intra-psychical defense, which may be discerned from six to twelve months in disorders such as eczema (already observed by Spitz), asthma, anorexia nervosa, and the severe disorders caused by deficiencies in maternal care which are categorized under the name “empty behavior syndrome” (Léon Kreisler). The distinction between separation anxiety and stranger anxiety has been clinically proven by the fact that they appear independently of one another. When it is not experiencing acute sensitivity to separation, the separated child (le petit allergique) is all smiles to whomever it sees, stranger and familiar alike, like the baby described in the first of Spitz’s organizers. As pure affect deprived of representation that repeats the baby’s distress at being separated from the mother, anxiety separation affords a view onto the future development of eight-month anxiety, which is itself a prototype of object-anxieties, and hence the original prototype for mental development itself. LEON KREISLER See also: Infant development. Bibliography Spitz, René A. (1950). Anxiety in infancy. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 31. STRATA/STRATIFICATION In psychoanalysis, the term “stratification” refers to the layers of ideation constructed by the psyche. In Studies on Hysteria (1895d), Freud noted, “Thus it came about that in this, the first full-length analysis of a hysteria undertaken by me, I arrived at a procedure which I later developed into a regular method and employed deliberately. This procedure was one of clearing away the pathogenic psychical material layer by layer, and we liked to compare it with the technique of excavating a buried city” (p. 139). Exploring the theme in greater detail in the chapter entitled “The Psychotherapy of Hysteria,” he stated that his aim was a “dynamics of ideation” (p. 287). “The psychical material,” he explained, “presents itself as a structure in several dimensions which is stratified in at least three different ways” (p. 288). First is a reverse linear chronology, “as though we were examining a dossier that had been kept in good order” (p. 288). Second is a concentric stratification around INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS STRATA/STRATIFICATION the pathogenic nucleus, where resistance increases as one gets closer to the nucleus. Here the strata represent zones of “an equal degree of modification of consciousness” (p, 289). Finally, there is dynamic stratification, which follows thought contents. Dynamic stratification is revealed by trajectories that zigzag from the surface down into the deep strata and back up again, passing through all levels and convergent nexuses of communication. The overdetermination of symptoms results from this type of stratification. The problem of the stratification of the psyche, and thus of a “dynamics of ideation,” remained a constant preoccupation for Freud from then on. Indeed, psychoanalysis itself can be characterized as a psychology of depths. To explore these depths of the psyche, Freud developed topographies in writings spanning from The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a) through “Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence” (1940e [1938]). But the topographies were not enough. Freud also posited different temporalities within the psyche, such as the atemporality of the unconscious. Also playing a part in Freud’s elaboration of the structure of the psyche were phylogenetic traces of an archaic heritage, fixation, regression, and the life and death instincts. Described in “The Ego and the Id” (1923b) as the “precipitate of abandoned object cathexes” (p. 29), the ego too exhibits considerable stratification. What happens at the boundaries between the various strata and among the agencies of the mind can also be characterized as strata dynamics. In mathematics, a stratified set is made by stitching together varieties of different dimensions. Catastrophe theory sheds light on the dynamics capable of generating these stratifications and on modes of passage from one stratum to another. This could be an outstanding tool for linking together the questions raised by Freud. MICHELE PORTE See also: Analyzability; Archaic; Archaeology, metaphor of; Biological bedrock; Fusion/defusion of instincts; History and psychoanalysis; Id; Instinctual impulse; Libidinal stage; Mnemic trace/memory trace; Proton-pseudos; Psychic revision; Studies on Hysteria. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4: 1-338; 5: 339-625. . (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1-66. 1665 STRUCTURAL THEORIES _ (1925a [1924]). A note upon the “mystic writing pad.” SE, 19: 225-232. . (1930a [1929]). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21: 57-145. . (1940e [1938]). Splitting of the ego in the process of defence. SE, 23: 271-278. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2: 48-106. Teissier, Bernard. (1988). Stratifications, finitude et intuition. In Jean Petitot-Cocorda (Ed.), Logos et théorie des catastrophes: a partir de Pceuvre de René Thom; Actes du colloque international de 1982 (pp. 59-65). Geneva: Patino. STRUCTURAL THEORIES A structural theory may be defined as one which tends to organize a set of propositions—and, in the realm of the natural sciences, a set of observations to which they refer—as a whole made up of interdependent parts. A structure may be defined as a functional whole presiding over a system of transformations and governed by self-regulating mechanisms. Such a definition applies equally well to inanimate material systems (self-regulating machines), to constructions of the mind (logico-mathematical wholes, as for instance set theory), to living organisms, or to subsystems of living organisms. This last category would include the psychical apparatus in Freud’s sense, and that apparatus can thus be deemed the object of a structural theory in psychoanalysis. From its earliest formulations, Freudian metapsychology may indeed be looked upon as a structural theory according to the above definition, for it was meant to describe the functioning of a system made up of interdependent elements, namely the psychical apparatus as a whole. This was clear in Freud’s work as early as the “Project for a Scientific Psychology” (1950c [1895]) and his reformulation of the ideas of the “Project” five years later in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a). During this first period in the development of psychoanalysis, Freud was already specifying local aspects of an overall functioning. After describing how ideas are linked together, for instance, he observed that their concatenations crossed at “nodal points” which it was the task of analysis to locate: “The logical chain corresponds not only to a zigzag, twisted line, but rather to a ramifying system of lines and more particularly to a converging one. It 1666 contains nodal points at which two or more threads meet” (1895d, p. 290). Sometimes, even, several interconnected nodes were observable, like those constituting what Freud called a “pathogenic organization.” The whole of Freud’s subsequent work strove for an ever more refined and better articulated description of the operation of the psychical apparatus as a structure, and this at a number of levels. It is thus possible to distinguish those writings in which Freud described partial, local aspects of that operation in terms of a network—as, for example, the breast-feces-penismoney interplay of symbolic equivalents—and indeed the term complex itself denotes such a local organization; those writings concerned with modalities of overall mental functioning characteristic of particular groups of individuals (for example, the obsessional structure); and those writings whose subject was the general laws of mental functioning. Two major stages in Freud’s approach to these laws were represented by the metapsychological papers of 1915 and by his introduction in the 1920-1923 period of a second topography and a second theory of the instincts. The structural view was always paralleled in Freud by a developmental approach to the same issues. If one accepts the idea that any structure may be apprehended in terms of its genesis (the successive stages of its establishment), and that any genetic process presents its own diachronic structure, it would seem that the two perspectives must be inextricably linked. The structural and the developmental have nevertheless often been opposed to each other by psychoanalysts, who have privileged one to the detriment of the other. This separation has been spurred by two currents of thought. The first, within psychoanalysis itself, accompanied the advent of child psychoanalysis and of theoretical options that stressed development. The chief figures here were Anna Freud, Melanie Klein, and their more or less direct heirs, among them Margaret Mahler, Frances Tustin, Donald Meltzer, Donald W. Winnicott, and Serge Lebovici. In the wider general cultural framework, a second contributing factor was the “structure-versus-history” debate that stirred up so many disciplines during the nineteen-seventies (Green, 1963). The origins of that debate may be traced back to linguistics, to the moment around 1910 when Ferdinand de Saussure introduced an avenue of research which treated language as a system of signs each of which derived its meaning from its INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS relationship with the others: in other words, a structural approach to language sharply opposed to the hitherto dominant diachronic one. This orientation was further refined later by many linguists, notably by Roman Jakobsen, who inspired Jacques Lacan. In another area, Claude Levi-Strauss revolutionized traditional cultural anthropology by asserting that the kinship relationships observable in any given society were structures, and added that in all societies the taboo on incest was “the rule of rules.” It is important to note that two major schools of thought, though radically at odds with one another, considered themselves, or were considered by others, to be “structural” psychoanalysis. The first was “ego psychology,” developed above all in the United States under the influence of Heinz Hartmann. The qualifier “structural” refers in this instance to ego psychologys embrace of the second Freudian topography, in which the id-ego-superego system—a set of polarities and complementarities—unquestionably implies a structural conception of psychoanalysis, as envisaged in the latter part of Freud’s work. Inasmuch, however, as the developmental axis was dominant for the ego psychologists, French-speaking authors have tended to characterize their doctrine as “genetic psychoanalysis,’ and in many cases expressed strong reservations about what they deemed an “objectivist realism” which by overvaluing “direct observation” of children’s behavior was liable to water psychoanalysis down into a mere developmental psychology. In any event, Jacques Lacan is thought to stand in diametrical opposition to ego psychology, referring directly as it does to Saussure, Jakobsen, and Lévi- Strauss. For Lacan language constituted the paradigmatic structure of the psyche, and more especially of the unconscious, which he therefore described as “structured like a language.” Language was a system of signs none of which signified anything in itself, for meaning arose solely from the place and function of a given sign within the system as whole. In his later work, however, Lacan distanced himself somewhat from this linguistic orientation and called upon logico-mathematical models borrowed from topology, notably metaphorical uses of the Mobius strip and the Borromean chain. He was led eventually to distinguish three main types of structures in the sense of modalities of the functioning of a whole: the structures of neurosis, marked by repression, the structures of per- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS STRUCTURAL THEORIES version, characterized by disavowal, and the structures of psychosis, produced by foreclosure. ROGER PERRON See also: Actual neurosis/defense neurosis; Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Autism; Autoeroticism; Beyond the Pleasure Principle; Blank/nondelusional neuroses; Brain and psychoanalysis, the; Change; Partial drive; Consciousness; Danger; Determinism; Addiction; Dualism; Ego boundaries; Fear; Group analysis; Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego; Ideology; Infantile, the; Mentalization; Narcissism; Object; Object-relations theory; Operational thinking; Perversion; Phobic neurosis; Primary process/secondary process; Processes of development; Psychanalyse, La; Psychic causality; Psychoses, chronic and delusional; Psychosexual development; Psychosomatic limit/boundary; Representation; Schizophrenia; Symbol; Totem and Taboo; Transference neurosis; United States. Bibliography Beres, David. (1965). Structure and function in psychoanalysis. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 46, 53-63. Blum, Harold P. (1971). Transference and structure. In Mark Kanzer (Ed.), The unconscious today: Essays in honor of Max Schur. New York: International Universities Press. Fédida, Pierre. (1964). Le structuralisme en psychopathologie: histoire, langage et relation. Evolution Pychiatrique, 29, 1, 85-129. Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4-5. . (1950c [1895]). Project for a scientific psychology. SE, 1: 281-387. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2. Green, André. (1963). La psychanalyse devant l’opposition de l’histoire et de la structure. Critique, 194, 649-662. Perron, Roger. (1981). Note sur la notion de structure. Revue frangaise de psychanalyse, 45, 4, 1059-65. Further Reading Brenner, Charles. (2002). Conflict, compromise formation, and structural theory. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 71, 397— 418. Gillett, Eric. (1997). Revising Freud’s structural theory. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought, 20, 471-500. 1667 STRUCTURALISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS Van den Daele, L. (1994). Revision of the topographic and structural theories. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought, 17, 407-446. STRUCTURALISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS Structuralism, a major current of thought in the second half of the twentieth century, developed in France from the 1960s onward in reaction to existentialism and humanism. From a methodological point of view, in the analysis and understanding of “objects” (especially those in the social sciences), it tended to see “structures” as pre-eminent and to see the given and its directly observable features as mere “effects.” [Ed: Quotes indicate jargon terms in structuralism. ] Arising from the linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure and in particular from the Prague and Moscow schools, structuralism counts many representatives in various fields. There are the linguist Roman Jakobson, the socioethnologist Claude Lévi-Strauss, the philosopher and archeologist of knowledge Michel Foucault, the reinterpreter of Marxism Louis Althusser, the writers for the periodical Tel Quel, the literary critic Roland Barthes, and the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan. Gilles Deleuze, in his article “A quoi reconnait-on le structuralisme?” (How to recognize structuralism; 1973), tried to enumerate “formal criteria” for recognizing what is structuralist, in particular, as they apply to the field of psychoanalysis. The criteria are the following: d) The symbolic, which proceeds from a rejection of the mere interplay of opposition and complementarity between the real and the imaginary (Lacan, 1974-1975). In Deleuze’s view, Freud can be interpreted on the basis of two principles: “the reality principle, with its force of disappointment, and the pleasure principle, with its power of hallucinatory satisfaction,’ he writes. Carl Gustav Jung and Gaston Bachelard take the perspective of the “transcendent unity and borderline tension” of the two principles. The symbolic, a structure that has nothing to do with perceptible forms (gestalts and figures of the imagination) or with any intelligible essence, must be understood in Louis Althusser’s fashion, “as the production of an original and specific theoretical object.” 1668 e) Localization and positioning. Any element of a structure has neither extrinsic designation nor intrinsic meaning, and thus has only one sort of meaning, positional meaning (with no real extent nor imaginary extension). Thus, in genetic biology, “genes are part of a structure insofar as they are inseparable from ‘loci, ’ places capable of changing their relations within the chromosome.” The real subjects or objects are thus not what “occupy the places,” since they are determined in a topological and relational way. In his Ecrits (1966), Jacques Lacan defines intersubjectivity as a symbolic structural space, that of the signifier. f) The differential and the singular, which bring into play the positional units that are the symbolic elements of a structure. The phoneme shows this in an exemplary fashion, since it is a relationship that is neither a thing nor an imaginary, but a component of an elementary differentiation of two words with different meanings (“robbing” and “bobbing” differ by the phonemic relation of “r” and “b”). Singularities are assigned by the differential and produce structural particularities (as do names and attitudes for Lévi-Strauss). Lévi-Strauss uncovered “parentemes,” ‘positional units that do not exist outside differential relations (brother/sister, husband/ wife, father/mother, maternal uncle/sister’s son). Serge Leclaire showed in “Counting with Psychoanalysis” that the “libidinal movements” of the body are linked to symbolic elements of the unconscious, “incarnating the singularities of structure in this place or that.” g) The differentiating element, the act of differentiation. “The structure is not actualized unless it differentiates itself in time and space,’ and it does so by its actualization. “The two notions of multiple internal temporality and static ordinal genesis are, in this sense, inseparable from the interplay of structures,” Deleuze wrote. & The serial, in other words, the necessary organization of symbolic elements in their differential relations by means of which a structure arranges itself into different developments that play on and through one another. For instance, a social structure is organized into series: economic, political, juridical, etc. An operative structure has at least two series; for instance, phonemes require the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS second series of morphemes. In Lacan (1966), the unconscious “implies a development in two [variable] series,” as his commentaries on Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Purloined Letter” or Freud’s case of the Rat Man (1955a [1907—1908]) show. i) Finally, the empty square, which is the paradoxical element of structure. It can never be filled without being disabled. This singular object x “is the point of convergence of the divergent series as such.” It is the “handkerchief” referred to by André Green (an associate of Lacan) in his essay “Othello” (1969), which runs through all the series in the play. The empty square is the guarantor and representative of the third party, “which intervenes essentially in the symbolic system.” The object is always displaced in relation to itself, “missing from its own place” according to Lacan, without being distinguished from that place, adds Deleuze. From Deleuze’s article, it is thus clear that structuralism claims that the determinants of reality and those of the imaginary are essentially unconscious structures, because they are in every place and at every time “covered over by their products and their effects.” From this viewpoint, one can regard the second Freudian topography of the psychic apparatus as already a structuralist representation of the psyche, since even consciousness, on the plane of the ego, is an effect of the interplay of different agencies: the id, the ego itself in its different characters, and the superego. By way of contrast, Jean Piaget, in his article “La psychologie” (Psychology; 1972), characterizes psychoanalysis as a “complete reductionism” insofar as it seeks, in his view, to reach mental processes by means of “the direct study of the contents of representations and affects” and does not recognize any autonomy of the ego (Heinz Hartmann) “free of sexual conflicts.” It was Jacques Lacan who radically located psychoanalysis within the domain of structuralism. At the beginning of the twenty-first century we are witnessing a return of the subject, which existentialism, for one, refused to abandon. But because it is difficult to see how an autonomous subject, independent of structure, can again be affirmed without returning to ego psychology or existential psychoanalysis (the most traditional rationalism), there does not seem as yet to be any alternative to structuralism. DOMINIQUE AUFFRET INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS STUDIENAUSGABE See also: Formations of the unconscious; Four discourses; France; Model; Monism; Name-of-the-Father; Object a; Nonverbal communication; Parade of signifiers; Signifier; Signifier/signified; Structural theories; Symbolic, the (Lacan). Bibliography Deleuze, Gilles. (1973). A quoi reconnait-on le structuralisme? In Francois Chatelet (Ed.), Histoire de la philosophie, idées, doctrines, le XXe siécle. (pp. 299-335) Paris: Hachette. Foucault, Michel. (1973). The order of things: An archaeology of the human sciences. New York: Vintage Books. (Original work published 1966) Green, Andre. (1969). Othello, une tragédie de la conversion: Magie noire et magie blanche. In his Un oeil en trop: le complexe d Oedipe dans la tragédie. (pp. 109-164) Paris: Editions de Minuit. Jakobson, Roman. (1963). Essais de linguistique générale. Paris: Minuit. Lacan, Jacques. (1966). Ecrits. Paris: Seuil. . (1974-1975). Le seminaire: Livre XXII, R.S.I. Ornicar?, 2—5. Lévi-Strauss, Claude. (1963). Structural anthropology (Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf, Trans.). New York: Basic Books. (Original work published 1949) Piaget, Jean. (1972). La psychologie. In his Epistémologie des sciences de [homme (pp. 133-250). Paris: Gallimard. STUDIENAUSGABE The Studienausgabe, a critical edition of Freud’s work comprised of ten numbered volumes and a supplementary volume (Ergdnzungsband), is the sole German- language edition offering a broad selection of the writings accompanied by an impressive scholarly apparatus. Edited by Alexander Mitscherlich, Angela Richards, and James Strachey, Volumes 1-10 were published by S. Fischer Verlag between 1969 and 1975. The supplement (Schriften zur Behandlungstechnik), co-edited by Ilse Grubrich-Simitis, which added Freud’s writings on psychoanalytic technique, appeared in 1975. On the fiftieth anniversary of Freud’s death, in 1989, the Studienausgabe were reissued in an updated and revised version. Simultaneously, the Sigmund Freud—Konkordanz und Gesamtbibliographie, originally compiled by Ingeborg Meyer-Palmedo and already associated with the 1669 Srubies ON HYSTERIA Studienausgabe in 1975, was radically reworked, with the assistance of Gerhard Fichtner, and published under the title Freud-Bibliographie mit Werkonkordanz as a companion to the revised Studienausgabe. (A new, corrected edition of the Freud-Bibliographie appeared in 1999.) The ten volumes of the Studienausgabe are arranged thematically. Some contain a single work, as in the case of Volume 1, the Introductory Lectures on Psycho- Analysis, or Volume 2, The Interpretation of Dreams, while those which collect several texts on a single subject are arranged chronologically. The editorial commentary consists essentially, with a few additions, of a translation of James Strachey’s critical apparatus for the Standard Edition. Strachey, who had participated actively in the planning of the Studienausgabe, died in 1967, so it fell to his collaborator Angela Richards to undertake the better part of the editing, with constant assistance from Ilse Grubrich-Simitis and Ingeborg Meyer-Palmedo. All volumes of the Studienausgabe are supplied with substantial bibliographies and detailed indexes to help researchers, teachers, and students. Freud’s numerous revisions in successive editions of his writings, especially in such major works as The Interpretation of Dreams or the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, are clearly identified and dated. More than two-thirds of the Freudian texts assembled in the Standard Edition are to be found in the Studienausgabe. When Freud went into exile in London in 1938, his projects with respect to publishing his work went with him. James Strachey and his group of collaborators then proceeded to build up an editorial culture around their projected Standard Edition which had no equivalent in Austria or in the Federal Republic of Germany of the 1960s. The paradoxical result is that the first, and up to now the only critical edition of Freud’s work in German relies for the most part on the work of English- speaking editors. In conclusion, it may be fairly said that after the brutal stop put by the Nazis to the influence of Freud’s work in the German-speaking countries, the Studienausgabe have effectively promoted it, not only among specialists but also among general readers. ILSE GRUBRICH-SIMITIS See also: Gesammelte Werke; Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. 1670 Bibliography Grubrich-Simitis, Ise. (1996 [1993]). Back to Freud s texts. Making silent documents speak. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. . (1989). Nachtrag 1989 zu den “erlauterungen zur edition.” Studienausgabe (Vol. 1, p. 32). Frankfurtam- Main: Fischer. Richards, Angela. (1969). Erlauterungen zur edition. Studienausgabe (Vol. 1, pp. 27-32). Frankfurt-am-Main: Fischer. STUDIES ON HYSTERIA Beginning in 1892, Sigmund Freud gradually abandoned the technique of hypnosis and began using the “method of cathartic abreaction” that had been described to him by his older colleague, Josef Breuer, ten years earlier. He became increasingly convinced of the sexual origin of neurotic disturbances in his patients and, uneasy over the work Pierre Janet had begun to publish (L’Etat mental des hystériques, 1892— 1894), convinced Breuer to join him in writing a book that, by situating the origin of their research in 1881, would assure them of priority in the world of scientific research. A letter to Wilhelm Fliess on June 28, 1892, referred to Breuer’s agreement. The two authors were going to contribute jointly to the volume. In the autumn of that year Freud began testing his new techniques of concentration on the symptom and placement of his hands on the forehead in an attempt to draw out Elisabeth von R.’s forgotten pathogenic memories, and by December he and Breuer had signed a “Preliminary Communication” that appeared in January 1893 (1893a). They attributed the cause of hysterical symptoms to the forgotten memory of a trigger incident that had not been “abreacted” and acted on the psyche as if it were a foreign body. The symptoms disappeared whenever the memory and its affect were awakened by providing them with a verbal outlet, which led to the famous maxim that “hysterics suffer primarily from reminiscences” (1895d, p. 7). For his part, Breuer insisted on the “tendency to a dissociation of consciousness” (1892—93a, p. 122) caused by daydreams. The “Preliminary Communication” aroused considerable interest in the international scientific community, as shown by a reference from Frederick W. H. Myers in Great Britain, only three months after its appearance. However, the theory of sexual etiology began to appear increasingly convincing to Freud, which INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS created a rift with the reticent Breuer. An 1894 article on the “Psychoneuroses of Defense” (1894a) enabled Freud to distinguish his theory from that of Pierre Janet and describe the concept of “conversion.” At the same time he began to take an interest in dreams and, having written down his observations, in the spring of 1895 he wrote the preface and final chapter of Studies on Hysterta—during a period when he was still experiencing the disastrous consequences of Wilhelm Fliess’s operation on Emma Eckstein. The book appeared in May. The first chapter incorporated the “Preliminary Communication.” The second was devoted to the case studies: Anna O., who was Breuer’s patient, followed by “observations that read like novels and do not bear the stamp of seriousness typical of scientific writings.” These were written by Freud and described his treatment of Emmy von N., Lucy R., Katharina, and Elisabeth von R. (and Frau Cacille M., to whom reference is made throughout the book). A third chapter by Breuer is devoted to theoretical issues. Here he describes the ideogenous nature of hysterical disturbances, the “unconscious or subconscious representations” of a primitive trauma that is primarily associated with sexual matters, and the recognition of mental hyperactivity in hysterics—the same individuals in whom Janet had found a “weakness,” if not a constitutional mental inadequacy. He insisted on the presence of “hypnoidia” and the constancy of hypnoid states. Freud wrote the last chapter, “The Psychotherapy of Hysteria.” In it he describes the overdetermination of symptoms and the value of the cathartic method. The preliminary structure of what will become psychoanalysis is laid out: the patient on the couch, free association, the consideration of “false connections,” and the disjunction mésalliance, which is the transference to the doctor of “the distressing ideas which arise from the content of the analysis” (1895d, p. 302). For Freud the psychic materials of hysteria appear to be arranged in strata, starting from a kernel of traumatic memories. This arrangement can be chronological—in which case, Freud writes, “it [is] as though we were examining a dossier that had been kept in good order”(p. 288)—or thematic, such themes being “stratified concentrically round the pathogenic nucleus” (p. 289). The goal of the analysis is to “penetrate ... to the nucleus of the pathogenic organization” (p. 295), an operation that requires considerable effort on the part INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS STUDIES ON HYSTERIA of the therapist, who must overcome the patient’s resistance in order to unearth the buried memory that is the source of the problem. The means used to overcome this were still rudimentary, gentle, physical pressure applied to the points of the forehead, and an increasing barrage of questions intended to “extort” a patient’s secrets. Even though the method was claimed to be successful, Freud concluded, “No doubt fate would find it easier than I do to relieve you of your illness. But you will be able to convince yourself that much will be gained if we succeed in transforming your hysterical misery into common unhappiness. With a mental life that has been restored to health you will be better armed against that unhappiness” (p. 305). By the following October, Freud would publicly abandon Breuer’s theory of hypnoid states and affirm that hysteria arises from seduction early in life, a “presexual sexual fright” (letter to Fliess, October 15, 1895). But the book went out into the world and Freud, already known for his neurological work, became recognized as a “psychologist.” Although Adolf Triimpell sharply criticized the book (letter to Fliess, February 6, 1896), an event that deeply affected Breuer, Havelock Ellis praised it, as did Theodore Flournoy and a number of French authors. Eugen Bleuler himself wrote, in 1896, that it was “one of the most important recent additions to the field of normal and pathological psychology.” The success of the Studies on Hysteria did come at a price, however. For a number of years the book was considered, by those who did not have access to Freud’s later writings, to contain the essence of his theory and practice. Even Pierre Janet, in his critiques of psychoanalysis in 1907 and 1913, did not appear to look any deeper for an understanding of Freudian theory. Although Sandor Ferenczi, in a letter to Freud on March 2, 1909, described it as the “germ of everything we now know,” Freud had mixed feelings about the book and struggled against the ongoing references to theories he believed to be outdated. As early as 1901 he wrote, “Ever since we wrote the Studies, psychoanalytic technique has undergone a fundamental transformation. The work had symptoms as its point of departure and their successive resolution as its goal. Since then I have abandoned this technique, for I found it unsuited to the delicate structure of the neurosis.” Freud even minimized his contribution to the book in his On the 1671 SUBCONSCIOUS History of the Pyscho-Analytic Movement (1914d) and especially in An Autobiographical Study: “As regards the theory put forward in the book, I was partly responsible, but to an extent which it is to-day no longer possible to determine. That theory was in any case unpretentious and hardly went beyond the direct description of the observations. It did not seek to establish the nature of hysteria but merely to throw light upon the origin of its symptoms. ... The theory of catharsis had not much to say on the subject of sexuality. In the case histories which I contributed to the Studies sexual factors played a certain part, but scarcely more attention was paid to them than to other emotional excitations.... It would have been difficult to guess from the Studies on Hysteria what an importance sexuality has in the aetiology of the neuroses” (1925d, p. 22). Freud did not include the book in the first edition of his collected works, the Gesammelte Schriften. In 1925 Freud added, “The practical results of the cathartic procedure were excellent. Its defects, which became evident later, were those of all forms of hypnotic treatment. There are still a number of psychotherapists who have not gone beyond catharsis as Breuer understood it and who still speak in its favor” (p. 22). At a time when psychoanalytic practice, for reasons of pseudo-efficiency, risks incorporating psychotherapeutic techniques dating from before the Studies on Hysteria, the study of this key work is more relevant than ever. This is undeniably important, if only to situate its ideas as a historical step, simple but important, in the trajectory that would lead Freud, over the next ten years, to modify his theory and practice, thereby defining the framework of psychoanalytic therapy as it has come to be known. ALAIN DE MYOLLA See also: Cathartic method. Source Citation Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studien iiber hysteria. Vienna; GW, 1, 75-312; Studies on hysteria. SE, 2. Bibliography Ellenberger, Henri F. (1970). The discovery of the unconscious: The history and evolution of dynamic psychiatry. New York: Basic Books. 1672 Freud, Sigmund. (1893a). On the psychical mechanism of hysterical phenomena: preliminary communication. SE, 2: 1-17. _ (1914d). On the history of the psycho-analytic movement. SE, 14: 1-66. _ (1925d). An autobiographical study. SE, 20: 1-74. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1950a [1887-1902]). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173-280. Ellenberger, Henri F. (1970). The discovery of the unconscious: The history and evolution of dynamic psychiatry. New York: Basic Books. Grubrich-Simitis, Ilse. (1995). Urbuch der psychoanalyse. Hundert jahre studien iiber hysterie von Josef Breuer und Sigmund Freud. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer. SUBCONSCIOUS. A term that appears rather frequently in the psychological literature of the late 19th century, especially in France, the “subconscious” was used to designate a mental state that is subliminal, diminished, or weak and obscure; in terms of conscious thought it implied a difference a degree not of kind. “Judgment and reasoning, whether conscious, subconscious, or unconscious, remain the same, except for a difference in the degree of clarity of the representation,” wrote Théo- . dule Ribot in La Logique des sentiments (1905, p. 80). The subconscious was most clearly delineated in the work of Pierre Janet. In Automatisme psychologique (1889), he posited two contrasting forms of mental activity, automatism and synthesis. The former corresponded to the primal and archaic; the latter, to creativity and higher levels of consciousness. On the basis of experimental work with hysterics, Janet demonstrated that in morbid states, due to a diminished field of consciousness, automatism took precedence over the activity of synthesis. Janet essentially identified the subconscious with psychic automatism and, in hysteria, he hypothesized profound dissociation and splitting of the personality. He was influenced by the work of Frederick Myers, the British psychical researcher, and the work of American physician Morton Prince on dual and multiple personalities; he also took into account earlier investigations by Jean-Jacques Moreau de Tours on hashish intoxication. In his early writings, including Studies on Hysteria (1895d), Sigmund Freud used “subconscious” as moxe INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS or less equivalent to “unconscious” but he soon abandoned the former and disapproved of usage that conflated the two terms. He characterized the unconscious as actively associated with intrapsychic conflict while viewing Janet’s subconscious as passive and associated with psychological and physiological weakness. To Janet's “dissociation” he opposed the concept of repression and the psychological duality of separate domains of conscious and unconscious mental functioning. ANNICK OHAYON See also: Flournoy, Théodore; France; Great Britain; Janet, Pierre. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2. Janet, Pierre. (1889). L’Automatisme psychologique: essai de psychologie expérimentale sur les formes inférieures de la vie mentale (thesis). Paris: Felix Alcan. . (1937). Les troubles de la personnalité sociale. Annales médico-psychologiques. Ribot, Théodule. (1905). La logique des sentiments. Paris: Alcan. SUBJECT Unable to separate the term subject from the notion of consciousness, Freud placed it in opposition to the external world or the object, or in their reciprocal reversal (1915e). In “New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis” (1933a [1932]) Freud said the ego was “in its proper sense a subject” (p. 58)—not as an essence, but a function to be filled. Jacques Lacan (1966) changed this by referring to the subject as “the subject of the unconscious” in its “unwitting” dimension, its ex-centricity in relation to itself. The subject is the “it” that the “I” speaks of when the I wishes to refer to itself as unconscious. Or rather, the subject is this very split between the “I” and the “it.” The ego, for its part, is not the “I”: a precipitate of identifications, it becomes the locus of misapprehension. How, then, is it possible for “the subject to recognize and name his desire”? The answer is that the truth speaks, even if the words spoken convey both the lie of desire and its truth, and even if “the I that speaks is not the same as the I that is spoken.” INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SUBJECT The Other gives language its sense and the subject is an effect of that sense. The subject of the unconscious is “the subject represented by a signifier for another signifier,’ and the only important thing is the degree of difference between the two signifiers. The Imaginary also enters into its determination through that which is imagined about the object a, the only object that can be transferred for transference into the place-occupied by phallic lack. Thus, “the truth that the I of the unconscious tells us is that only this nothingness sustains it.” Accordingly, for Lacan, the aim of treatment was not to fill this gaping nothingness, but to manifest it and potentially to express it through sublimation ... or by training psychoanalysts. He emphasized that the kind of listening that took place in analysis often took wrong turns, and thus attempted, in his last years, to reequilibrate his system, notably by using the topological figure of the Borromean knot, to give “consistency” to the Real, the Symbolic, and the Imaginary: “The subject is what is determined by the figure in question: Not that he is in any sense its double, the subject is conditioned by the points at which the knot catches and tightens in these points.” The Lacanian subject is thus very different from the one based on Freudian metapsychology. Lacan’s approach upends the theory of subjectivity by making the subject the subject of the drives, who sometimes directs them and at times is directed by them. This subject is alien to itself, split between the Self and itself, though there is a constant reciprocity of relations between the mind’s agencies, and reversibility of the economic and dynamic transformations within the personality as a whole. Among the various modalities of representance, representation appears as the bridge or articulation between the economic dimension and that of meaning, the product of work whose conscious or unconscious quality constitutes modalities that are more or less contingent or necessary, depending on the case, within the figure of tension that is desire. If, for Freud, the lifting of repression produced conscious awareness, today the emphasis has shifted onto whether or not a new, “subjectivable” meaning can possibly emerge, be assumed by the subject, and through the effects of deferred action [apres coup] that constitute psychic reality, itself become a function of both internal constraints and effects of the psychic 1673 SUBJECT OF THE DRIVE reality of the object. Piera Aulagnier’s “I,” the study of the originating conditions of the process of subjectification (Cahn), and the related Aufhebung (sublation, supersession) illuminated by the notion of transitionality (Roussillon) are new approaches centered on the internal and external elements at stake in the splittings and exclusions that oppose this subjective appropriation. Here, in contrast to the problematics of neurosis, where the work of analysand naturally predominates, it is the work of the analyst that is revealed to be determinant, to contain that work, absorb it, and connect its productions. RAYMOND CAHN See also: Alienation; Ego; Ego (analytical psychology); Ego (ego psychology);I; Identity; Imaginary identification/ symbolic identification; Individual; Individuation (analytical psychology); Object; Object a; Other, the; Phenomenology and psychoanalysis; Philosophy and psychoanalysis; Self; Self-consciousness; Subject of the unconscious; Want of being/lack of being. Bibliography Aulagnier, Piera. (2001). The violence of interpretation: From pictogram to statement (Alan Sheridan, Trans.). Hove, East Sussex, and Philadelphia: Brunner Routledg. (Original work published 1975) Cahn, Raymond. (1991). Du sujet. Revue francaise de psychanalySE, 55, 5—6, 1371-1490. Freud, Sigmund. (1915e). The unconscious. SE, 14: 159— 204. . (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho- analysis. SE, 22: 1-182. . (1940a). An outline of psycho-analysis. SE, 23: 139-207. Lacan, Jacques. (1977). Ecrits: A selection Alan Sheridan, Trans.). New York: Norton. (Original work published 1966). Roussillon, René. (1995). La metapsychologie des processus et la transitionnalité. Revue francaise de psychanalyse, LIX. Further Reading Ogden, Thomas. (1994). Subjects of analysis. Northvale, NJ: Aronson, Inc. Renik, Owen. (1998). The analyst’s subjectivity and the analyst’s objectivity. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 79, 487-498. 1674 Smith, Henry. (1999). Subjectivity and objectivity in analytic listening. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 47, 465-484. SUBJECT OF THE DRIVE In his seminar on The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (1964), Jacques Lacan reread Freud’s essay “Drives and their Vicissitudes” (1915c) in order to emphasize that the four components of the drive— pressure, object, aim, and source—are not natural phenomena: the drive is a montage. The constancy of the drive’s pressure differentiates it from vital needs, which vary according to their own rhythms (Lacan, p. 171). Thus hunger is not the same as the oral drive. Satisfaction does not consist in fulfilling a need, but in completing a circuit of three stages. The “mouth that is involved in the drive,” Lacan stated, “is not satisfied by food” (p. 167). The drive begins at an erogenous zone, and then makes a circuit around the object cause of desire, the object a. Thus Lacan saw drives as distinct from vital needs. Lacan reserved the term “drive” for the sexual drives. Instincts of self-preservation—the Ichtriebe, Freud’s ego-drives—were a function of narcissism. The subject of the drive emerged once the three stages of the drive’s circuit were completed. Along with the active and reflexive stages, Lacan emphasized the importance of a third stage, in which, as Freud had said, a new subject would appear. This new subject is an other. When the “I” is, like an object, subjected to this other, it may experience pain and become a subject itself. It will seek to attach itself to the enjoyment of this other, which from then on plays the role of real Other. Only by completing the circuit of the drive does the subject come into contact with the dimension of the Other as the treasure trove of the signifiers. For Lacan, the concept of the drive is the pivot between the body, enjoyment, and language. Clinical work allows us to see infantile autism as the result of a failure at the third stage in the circuit of the drive. Marig-CHRISTINE LAZNIK See also: Castration of the subject; Demand; Drive; Erotogenicity; Fantasy, formula of; Jouissance (Lacan); Perceptual identity; Real, the (Lacan); Subject; Topology. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Bibliography Lacan, Jacques. (1978). The four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis (Alan Sheridan, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton. (Original work published 1964) Laznik, Marie-Christine. (1993).Pour une théorie lacanienne des pulsions. Le Discours psychanalytique, revue de [Association freudienne, 10 Penot, Bernard. (1998). La passion du sujet entre pulsion et signifiance. Bulletin de la Société de psychanalyse de Paris, 51. Further Reading Kernberg, Otto. (2001). Object relations, affects, and drives: Toward a new synthesis. Psychoanalytical Inquiry, 21, 604-619. SUBJECT OF THE UNCONSCIOUS It has often been remarked that Freud hardly ever made use of the term “subject.” The only exception (which is surprising, because it was never noticed) was his respected use of the term in “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes” (1915c). While describing the normal instinctual “vicissitude,” where the drives turn back on the subject’s body and where the mode of satisfaction is reversed from active to passive, Freud wrote of “a new subject,” which he situated outside of the person proper. This subject wants to be watched (or violated) to satisfy the infantile need to be looked at (or treated sadistically). Freud thought that this instinctual subject- agent had been created at the stage where goals became passive—an idea that he took up again four years later with regard to the origin of the fantasy of “A Child is Being Beaten” (1919e). There he declared that the fantasy acquired its full subjective power only when it was being lived through passively: “I am beaten by the father.” Subsequently, when Freud considered the love-hate dyad, he did not think of it as in the same category as instinctual dyads like the sadomasochistic and voyeur-exhibitionistic dyads. Instead, he conceived of it as being determined by narcissism. Then he returned to his former conception of an “ego-subject” after seeming to introduce the notion of an unconscious instinctual object in the first part of his study (Freud, 1915c). Jacques Lacan took up the challenge of developing this concept of the subject of the unconscious in his INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SUBJECT OF THE UNCONSCIOUS teaching. From 1945 on, he worked on defining the different meanings of the term “subject.” He wrote of the Cartesian subject of certainty, the negated subject of science, the personal subject of self-affirmation, and of course the two subjects of a sentence: the grammatical subject and the intentional subject. This duplication is at the basis of his conception of the intrinsically divided subject, $ (barred S), which accounts for his famous definition of the subject as being whatever a signifier represents for another signifier (Lacan, 1966/ 2002). But Lacan was always led back to the “subject of unconscious desire”: the subject of the desires of The Interpretation of Dreams, the subject of the witticism and other expressions of the unconscious, which he saw as structured like a “language.” However, having reduced the subject of human desire to an effect of language (“the speaking being”), he didn’t reduce it any further to a grammatical subject. His subject was either instinctual or empty (like the word). This drive-based vision of the subject prompted Lacan, in his first seminars (1975, 1978), to differentiate it categorically from the ego. On this point he broke openly with Freud’s notion of the global ego. In effect, he saw the ego as an imaginary function whose purpose is to provide the person with a sense of corporeal unity and continuity. Lacan emphasized that the ego was necessarily involved in a struggle against the instinctual registers, and this stance caused him to view the ego, as it reflects the image of the Other, as opposed to the subject (S), which emerges as the id. His interpretation of Freud’s famous statement “Wo Es war, soll Ich werden” (“Where the id was, there I should come to be”) led him to play on the homophony of “S” and “Es.” Lacan viewed the newborn subject, because it was always born prematurely, as implicated in the “demands” through which it makes known its needs. It borrows these demands from the maternal signifying code. In so doing, the subject makes a first effort to attach itself (instinctively) to a desiring maternal Other, thus confirming the incompleteness of the latter. When the young subject observes the lack in the Other, it will disengage from its mother. Lacan said that the signifier of the Other’s lack showed how “all the other signifiers represent the subject,’ but on the other hand he conjectured that “when this signifier is missing, all the other signifiers represent nothing” and no one (1977, p. 316). 1675 Sussect's CASTRATION The subject, in its fantasies, is able to represent itself as maintaining a desire through the partial (real) objects that Lacan called “little a’s.” These little a’s are residues of the operation through which the first Other recognizes itself as being subject to the rules of symbolic exchange. The neurotic in analysis obstinately refuses to imagine the Other as a subject, “the subject who is supposed to know,” and refuses to accept that the Other is animated by a desire toward him. This is what sparks the transference in the cure. BERNARD PENOT See also: Fantasy, formula of; Linguistics and psychoanalysis; Signifier; Signifying chain; Topology; Unary trait. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1915c). Instincts and their vicissitudes. SE, 14: 109-140. Lacan, Jacques. (1988). The seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book 1: Freud’s papers on technique (1953-1954) (John Forrester, Trans.). (Original work published 1975) . (1988). The seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book 2: The ego in Freud’s theory and in the technique of psychoanalysis (1954-1955) (Sylvana Tomaselli, Trans.). (Original work published 1978) . (2002). The subversion of the subject and dialectic of desire in the Freudian unconscious. In his Ecrits: A selection (Bruce Fink, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton. (Original work published 1960) SUBJECT’S CASTRATION Lacanian notions of castration are linked to frustration and deprivation, lacking and giving, and ultimately to object relations. These represent a certain culmination of the history of psychoanalytic thought on the subject. To better define their importance, let us examine their history. Starting in 1905, Freud posited a theory of object relations that would be linked to the stages of libidinal development (Freud, 1905d). He later proposed that the loss of feces should be considered as the precursor of the castration complex (Freud, 1916-1917e). Thus the Freudian concept is “absolutely realist.” It fell to August Starke, in a long and important article published in 1921, to expand this theory by 1676 proposing that the breast no longer be considered the first lost object and the model for castration anxiety. Instead he recommended that masochistic pleasure also be connected with castration anxiety, which is expressed as a desire to receive the penis. In 1928, building on theories advanced by Karl Abraham in 1924 and on thoughts that Freud expressed in 1926 about the peculiarities of the castration complex in the woman (Freud, 1926d), Melanie Klein differentiated between early anxiety in boys and girls. A boy’s anxiety involves castration and a girl’s the good internal functioning of her body. Thus there is a continuous strand of Freudian thought that considers the object as tangible and castration as a reality. Even an author like Bion did not depart from this line (Bion, 1959). For him, links and attacks, the breast and the penis, are always quite real—even if their reality is only fantasmatic. Jacques Lacan revolutionized this tradition. For him, castration fundamentally pertains to the subjectivity of the subject. It derives from a symbolic debt, linked to the prohibition against incest and murder. In the real, the subject observes that a woman lacks a penis. Thus the relation to an object is just as much a relation to the lack of an object, the object existing just as much by its absence as by its presence. Lacan claimed that the necessity of this revolution was justified by what had become the “heteroclite nature of the castration complex” (Lacan, 2002, p. 306). He suggested this in the complete form of his graph of desire, where we find the unconscious and the Other on the one hand and the barred subject on the other. Then, successively, there are the signifier and the voice and then jouissance and castration related to “the drive as the treasure trove of signifiers” (p. 302). Castration means, “that jouissance has to be refused in order to be attained on the inverse scale of the law of desire” (p. 311). For both sexes, the phallus is “the signifier destined to designate meaning effects as a whole” (p. 275) and “the signifier of the Other’s desire” (p. 279). As such, castration is not directly related to the reality of the penis. In fact, this relation is problematic and requires several operations: “It is thus that the erectile organ— not as itself, or even as an image, but as a part that is missing in the desired image—comes to symbolize the place of jouissance,” that is, as “the function of a missing signifier: (—1)” (p. 307). “The shift of (—/) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS (lowercase phi) as phallic image from one side to the other of the equation between the imaginary and the symbolic renders it positive in any case, even if it fills a lack. Although it props up (—1) it becomes ® (capital phi) there, the symbolic phallus that cannot be negated, the signifier of jouissance” (p. 308). The castration complex is “incited” by the object (—/) that designates it in its imaginary function. The Lacanian revolution corresponds to a complete separation of dialectic from intersubjectivity, the very kernel of Freudian thought. This dialectic is expressed in the schema RSI, which represents the real, the symbolic, and the imaginary. Castration is inscribed therein as related to frustration and deprivation, as Lacan showed in his seminar on object relations (Lacan, 1956-57). Luiz EDUARDO PRADO DE OLIVEIRA See also: Castration complex; Disavowal; Fantasy, formula of; Graph of Desire; Object a; Other, the; Phallus; Real, the (Lacan); Real, imaginary, and symbolic father; Sexuation, formulas of; Topology; Want of being/lack of being. Bibliography Bion, Wilfred R. (1959). Attacks on linking. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 40, 5-6, 308-315. Lacan, Jacques. (1994). Le séminaire-livre IV, (1956-57), La relation d objet. Paris: Le Seuil. . (2002). Ecrits: A selection. (Bruce Fink, Trans.) New York: W. W. Norton. Siboni, Jacques. (1996). Les mathemes de Lacan: anthologie des assertions entierement transmissibles et de leurs relations dans les écrits de Jacques Lacan. Paris: Lysimaque. Starcke, August. (1921). The castration complex. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 2, 2, 179-201. Further Reading Rangell, Leo. (1991). Castration. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 39, 3-24. SUBJECT’S DESIRE Although it was introduced into French by Ignace Meyerson’s inaccurate translation of the Freudian term Wunsch (wish), desire went on to become a INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Sussect’s DESIRE major Lacanian concept. For Lacan as well as for Freud, desire is the subject’s yearning for a fundamentally lost object. Thus for Freud, any search for an object is, in fact, an attempt to refind it. For Lacan, however, the object of desire is located prior to desire and functions as its cause. Lacan subverted the Freudian aphorism that «“ “a dream is the fulfillment of a wish” (Freud, 1900a, p. 121): “If Freud accepts, as the reason for a dream that seems to run counter to his thesis, the very desire to contradict him on the part of a subject whom he had tried to convince of his theory, how could he fail to accept the same reason for himself when the law he arrived at is supposed to have come to him from other people?” (Lacan, Ecrits, p. 58). Moreover, in what Freud called the rebus-like structure of the dream, Lacan found support for assimilating condensation ( Verdichtung) and displacement ( Verschiebung) to the tropes of metaphor and metonymy. Thus he was able to conclude that “the unconscious is structured like a language.” Freud used dreams to derive both his first topography and a model of the psychic apparatus that defined desire as the “cathexis” of a mnemic image linked to the satisfaction of need. Thus for Freud desire is satisfied just once, and any subsequent manifestation of desire is only an impulse (Regung) that aims to reestablish, sometimes to the point of (psychotic) hallucination, the image of an irretrievably lost object. This is the “empirical” failure of hallucinatory satisfaction that leads to thought—which, Freud says, “is nothing but a substitute for a hallucinatory wish” (p. 567)— and thus to voluntary activity that aims at the satisfaction of need, not desire. Dreams, which realize desires in the quick, “backward” way, serve as an example of the psychical apparatus’s primary mode of functioning, abandoned because of its inefficacy. Censorship, the guarantor of our mental health, prevents the impulses of unconscious desire from being manifested during the day. Symptoms must be considered as the realization of wholly unconscious desires. Dreams, on the other hand, express the attainment of these desires with the consent and control of the preconscious, which tilts in the end toward the desire to sleep. On the basis of the “burning child dream” (Freud, pp. 509-511), which expressed this desire to sleep, Lacan constructed his graph of desire (Lacan, 1958-59, 1677 SUBLIMATION session of December 10, 1958). The sentence of the dreamer, “His father was dead,” is situated at the lower level, that of the statement. At the upper level, that of the enunciation, Lacan placed the sentence, “He did not know it.” And finally, it is between the statement and the enunciation that Lacan inserted Freud’s interpretation, that is, the desire of the dreamer: “according to his wish.” The sentence “He did not know it” showed the way in which the dreamer protected the paternal function, which he was deprived of by the death of the real father, and that was the origin of the dream. The desire of the dream was to throw a veil of perpetual ignorance over oedipal desire. At the intersection of the imaginary and the symbolic, human desire is established by a loss that can be symbolized by the separation from the placenta at birth. This primal castration gives birth to the subject of an impossible enjoyment sustained by the object a. Later losses, which constitute the possible objects of human desire (the nipple, feces, the phallus), are always manifested more or less by the anxiety that indicates the reappearance of this lost primal enjoyment, that is, the lack of lack. That is why the speaking being can only “symbolize” this lack by the minus phi (—/), which is the image of the capital phi, ®. Likewise, this lack can only be “imagined” in the articulation of the fantasy, $ a, in which the barred S is the subject and the symbol means “desire of.” This is the form that is best suited to defending against the desire of the Other. This desire “is neither the appetite for satisfaction [Need] nor the demand for love [Demand], but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second” (Lacan, Ecrits, p 276). It protects the subject from the enjoyment of the Other by means of the forms that its object takes. In phobia the object is prohibited; in hysteria it is unsatisfying; and in obsession it is merely defended against. In any case, desire remains marked by—and serves as a reminder of—a lost enjoyment. The object of this enjoyment, the phallus, becomes the signifier of the very lack of a signifier, and thus the signifier of castration as imposed by language. And so the object of desire is always a metonymic object, always a desire for “something else.” This Lacanian rereading remains oddly in agreement with Freud on the basis of the analogy that Lacan establishes between desire and dream, and it raises the question of the place of language in their theory. If language for Freud is a kind of superstruc- 1678 ture linked to the life instinct, and thus an ideal to be attained, for Lacan it is also the insurmountable limit and metaphor of being. PATRICK DELAROCHE See also: Fantasy; Formations of the unconscious; Graph of Desire; Wish-fulfillment; Wish/yearning. Bibliography Dor, Joél. (1997). Introduction to the reading of Lacan: The unconscious structured like a language. (Judith Feher Gurewich, Ed., in collaboration with Susan Fairfield). Northvale, NJ: J. Aronson. (Original work published 1985-1992) Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4-5. Lacan, Jacques. (2002). Ecrits: A selection. (Bruce Fink, Trans.) New York: W. W. Norton. . (1958-59). Le séminaire-livre VI, le desir et son interpretation, unpublished. Sédat, Jacques (Ed). (1980). Retour a Lacan? Paris: Fayard. SUBLIMATION Sublimation is a process that diverts the flow of instinctual energy from its immediate sexual aim and subordinates it to cultural endeavors. The idea of sublimation leads back at once to the alchemical metaphor of the transmutation of base metal into gold, and to aesthetics, which from the ancient world (Longinus) to Romanticism (Goethe) saw the sublime as the transcendence of the individual’s limitations. The concept evolved in Freud’s work from the idea of the ennoblement or embellishment of a fantasy (Draft L [1950a (1895)]) to that of a genuine intra-instinctual process, the transformation of object libido into ego libido before it could assume new aims (1923b). The unresolved complexity of the notion of sublimation means, however, that the term designates a set of questions rather than a well-circumscribed concept (Laplanche, 1980). Sublimation would appear to be a very special vicissitude of the instinct, for its diversion of libidinal energy harnesses instinctual impulses in a way congenial to the superego and its society. Retransformation is possible, however, and therein the original instinc- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS tual force may regain the upper hand (resexualization of sublimated homosexual impulses (1911c [1910])). Desexualization alone cannot define the process of sublimation, which is not to be confused with inhibition or reaction formations, even if it plays a fundamental role because of its ability to exchange an originally sexual aim for another, which is its “psychical parent” (1908d). As for the effect of sublimation on the object it valorizes in the eyes of society, Freud took great care to discourage any risk of confusion between sublimation and idealization, the latter implying an overestimation of the supposedly “sublime” object (1914c). The development of the ability to sublimate (“Fahigkeit zur Sublimierung’) was related for Freud both to the individual's constitutional disposition (the initial strength of the sexual instinct) and to the events of childhood (the link between trauma and the intensity of infantile curiosity; cf., the case of Leonardo da Vinci being a good example). Sublimation occurred at the expense of the polymorphously perverse drives of childhood (especially bisexuality), which were diverted and applied to other aims, as witness the sublimation of anal eroticism into an interest in money, or the link between urethral eroticism and ambition. This process contributed to the formation of character traits. The component instincts were of particular significance here: the instinct to see could be sublimated into artistic contemplation and into the instinct to know (1910c), while sublimated aggression could manifest itselfa sc reative and innovative activity. But Freud always emphasized the risks associated with sublimation of the instincts when it takes place at the expense of the sexual and deprives the subject of immediate satisfaction. Although sublimation appears as the guarantor of the social bond and promoter of culture, it is, nonetheless, a dangerous demand, a “ruse of civilization” (Mellor-Picaut, 1979) when it presents individual sublimations as ideal models. For Freud, sublimation is not the core of an axiological approach to psychoanalysis, and the introduction of narcissism represented an important turning point in his theory. Sublimation took place “through the mediation of the ego, which begins by changing sexual object-libido into narcissistic libido, and then perhaps goes on to give it a different aim” (1923b, p. 30). Sublimation no longer occurs at the expense of the object-libido but offers the narcissistic libido a needed extension. However, it does not pro- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Sugiiwation tect the individual, who is left at the mercy of the death instinct. Freud was against making sublimation a privileged goal of the treatment, one that could even be advocated by the analyst (1915a [1914]). In this, he disagreed with Carl G. Jung (1914d), as well as Lou Andreas-Salomé, whom he had also accused of “blabbering about the ideal” in his letters to Jung (January 10, 1912), James J. Putnam (May 4, 1911), and Oskar Pfister (October 9, 1918). In all these cases he was struggling against the temptation of an anagogic approach to psychoanalysis. It may be assumed that this threat of having such a complex concept corrupted contributed to the fact that it has never been thoroughly developed. One thinks in particular of an unpublished draft on sublimation written for Freud's projected book on metapsychology. The concept of sublimation has been discussed by many of Freud’s followers, though without any significant contributions being made to metapsychology. In later years Melanie Klein became one of the most important commentators on sublimation, primarily in connection with epistemophilia. In France, Daniel Lagache (1962) and Jean Laplanche (1980) have both written essays on sublimation. Sublimation, which is often mentioned in the literature, by emphasizing the desexualization of goals and the social valorization of the object, remains both an essential concept and an unresolved question for psychoanalysis. SOPHIE DE Myoris-Mziloz See also: Anality; Analytic psychology; Anthropology and psychoanalysis; Applied psychoanalysis and the imteractions of psychoanalysis; Character; Civilization (Kultur); Defense; Depressive position; Desexualization; Drive, Ego; Ego autonomy; Ego and the Id, The, Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense, The, Eroticism, anal; Eroticism, urethral; Friendship; Group psychology; Healing: Idealization; Identification with the aggressor; Ideology; Intellectualization; Knowledge (instinct for); Latency period; Law of the Father; Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood; Pleasure ego/reality ego; Pleasure of thinking; Psychic apparatus; Reaction formation; Reciprocal paths of influence (libidinal coexcitation); Reparation; Repetition; Rite and ritual; Science and psychoanalysis; Sexuality; Superego; Symbol; Symbolization, process of, Thought; Work (as a psychoanalytic concept); Workingoff mechanisms. 1679 Susstitute/SupstitTutive FORMATION Bibliography Freud. Sigmund. (1908d). “Civilized” sexual morality and modern nervous illness. SE, 9: 177—204. . (1910c). Leonardo da Vinci and a memory of his childhood. SE, 11: 57-137. . (1915a [1914]). Observations on transference love. (Further recommendations on the technique of psychoanalysis III). SE, 12: 157-171. . (1914d). On the history of the psycho-analytic movement. SE, 14: 1-66. . (1930a [1929]). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21: 57-145. . (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1-66. Lagache, Daniel. (1984). La sublimation et les valeurs. In Oeuvres completes 5. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. (Original work published 1962) Laplanche, Jean. (1980). Problematiques III, la sublimation. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Mellor-Picaut, Sophie. (1979). La sublimation ruse de la civilisation. Psychanalyse a [ Universite, 4. Further Reading Arlow, Jacob, rep. (1955). Panel: Sublimation. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 3, 515-527. Kris, Ernst. (1955). Neutralization and sublimation. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 10, 30-46. . Loewald, Hans W. (1988). Sublimation: Inquiries into theoretical psychoanalysis. New Haven: Yale University Press. SUBSTITUTE/SUBSTITUTIVE FORMATION “Substitute” or “substitutive formation” refers to the psyche’s replacement of a fact or mental object through unconscious chains of association. In the substitution, an idea, thought, or object perceived as incompatible with the ego is repressed and exchanged for another. A number of synonyms are found in Sigmund Freud's writings: “ersatz,” “substitutive formation,’ “equivalent,” “stand-in,” and “replacement.” In “The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence” (1894a), Freud described the formation of an obsessional idea as a substitute for an incompatible sexual idea. The ego wishes to deal with the sexual idea as though it had never arisen, and so affect is detached from it. However, since that affect remains “unaltered and 1680 undiminished” (p. 54) in the core of the psyche, it attaches itself to a compatible idea, making it obsessional. Initially limited to obsessional ideas, the notion of substitution was eventually generalized and conceptually modified. For instance, in “Obsessions and Phobias: Their Psychical Mechanism and Their Aetiology” (1895c [1894]), Freud described symptoms as substitutes for ideas of coitus. In “Obsessions and Phobias,” he posited premature sexual climax as the source of reproaches, for which the psyche substitutes ideas, actions, or impulses providing relief and protection. In “Burther Remarks on the Neuro-Psychoses of Defence” (1896b), the object of the substitution is no longer mnemic contents, but rather the reproach associated with them, which is transformed into another unpleasurable substitutive affect that can become conscious (shame; social, religious, or hypochondriacal anxiety; etc.). In later works, the substitute was associated with different metapsychological objects. It was associated with object relations, with maternal and paternal substitutes being associated through family romances and the totem. It was associated with anxiety contents in the case history of Little Hans (1909b), where the paired terms bitten/castrated correspond to the paired objects horse/father. It was associated with dreams in “Some General Remarks on Hysterical Attacks” (1909a ~ [1908]), where the dream is a substitute for the hysterical attack, itself a substitute for an autoerotic satisfaction from childhood. Dreams there became more extensively recognized as substitutive formations. Finally, Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety (1926d [1925]) brought the substitute back to the level of the symptom, in that the substitute represents a return of the repressed. In this sense, symptom formation and substitutive formation have the same upshot: replacing the forbidden satisfaction of instincts and making such satisfaction unrecognizable. Even though the terms are synonymous, the expression “substitutive formation” is preferable to “substitute” because it attests to the dynamic process that forms the substitute: the transformation of gratification in the defensive conflict. MarHiev ZANNOTTI See also: Abstinence/rule of abstinence; Addiction; Adolescence; Alcoholism; Anorexia nervosa; Breastfeeding; Bulimia; Conflict; Displacement; Ego ideal; Erotogenic INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS zone; Fetishism; Maternal; Metaphor; Metonymy; Phallic woman; Signifier/signified; Splitting; “Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence”; Substitutive formation; Symbol; Symbolization, process of; Symptom-formation; Thought; Totem/totemism; Word-presentation. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1894a). The neuro-psychoses of defence. SE, 3: 41-61. . (1895c [1894]). Obsessions and phobias: their psychical mechanism and their aetiology. SE, 3: 69-82. . (1896b). Further remarks on the neuro-psychoses of defence. SE, 3: 157-185. . (1909a [1908]). Some general remarks on hysterical attacks. SE, 9: 227-234. . (1909b). Analysis of a phobia in a five-year-old boy. SE, 10: 1-149. . (1924c). The economic problem of masochism. SE, 19: 155-170. . (1926d [1925]). Inhibitions, symptoms, and anxiety. SE, 20: 75-172. SUBSTITUTIVE FORMATION The name “substitute formation” has been applied to the defensive process by which a symptom—but also, more generally, a failed act, slip of the tongue, or drea—is produced. The result of this process—for example, the act or manifest text of a dream—is that desire can find a way out, and its economic charge find an outlet. The notion of substitute formation appeared in Freud in 1895, in his article on anxiety neurosis (1895b), but it was anticipated in the previous year in his work on “The Neuro-Psychoses of Defense” (1894a). In this, her described a “transposition,” a “displacement” connected with an economic charge (for example, anxiety or sexual excitement) and with a “complex of representations” (in a process of symbolic transposition), these two processes being able to function separately. Freud resorted frequently to this idea in the following years: this was, in fact, a key notion in the metapsychology he was drafting, since he was describing the mechanism by which the repressed element could succeed in returning to conscious life and to behavior. At first, he limited the application of this mechanism INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SucKING/THUMBSUCKING to obsessional neurosis. But the dual function attributed to it (economic discharge and symbolic transposition), the unification of the field of the return of the repressed (including neurotic symptoms, dreams, slips of the tongue, failed actions, and some “normal” behavior), its contiguity with related notions (like those of compromise formation or reactive formation), and the deepening of Freud’s thoughts on mechanisms of defense, all led him to the expression of much wider views on the subject in 1915 (notably in “Repression” [1915d] and “The Unconscious” [1915e]). He revised it even further in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926d), as part of his overall views on symptom formation and his second theory of anxiety. ROGER PERRON See also: Compromise formation; Formations of the unconscious; Psychogenic blindness; Reaction-formation; Repressed, derivative of the, derivative of the unconscious; “Repression,” Substitute/substitutive formation. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1894a). The neuro-psychoses of defence. SE, 3: 41-61. . (1895b [1894]). On the grounds for detaching a particular syndrome from neurasthenia under the description “anxiety neurosis.” SE, 3: 85-115. . (1915d). Repression. SE, 14: 141-158. . (1915e). The unconscious. SE, 14: 159-204. . (1926d). Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. SE, 20: 75-172. SUCKING/THUMBSUCKING In Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d), Sigmund Freud describes thumb-sucking as “rhythmic repetition of a sucking contact by the mouth (or lips). There is no question of the purpose of this procedure being the taking of nourishment” (pp. 178-180). Sucking itself is defined as a sexual autoerotic pleasure, “as a sample of the sexual manifestations of childhood” (p. 179). From this point on, the infant’s sucking activity served for Freud as an exemplary case, enabling him to demonstrate how the sexual instinct seeks satisfaction 1681 SuckinG/THUMBSUCKING through a separate, vital, self-preservative function; it subsequently becomes autonomous and seeks satisfaction through auto-erotism. At the end of his life, in An Outline of Psycho-Analysis (1940e [1938]), Freud reaffirmed its significance: “The baby’s obstinate persistence in sucking gives evidence at an early stage of a need for satisfaction which, though it originates from and is instigated by the taking of nourishment, nevertheless strives to obtain pleasure independently of nourishment and for that reason may and should be termed sexual” (p. 154). Beginning in 1915, Freud described an aggressive “cannibalistic” oral stage that aims at incorporation, with emphasis not only upon the erotogenic zone but also upon the object to be incorporated. A number of analysts have investigated the broader issues surrounding the activity of sucking and the oral stage. Freud suggested that an infant would “pronounce the act of sucking at his mother’s breast by far the most important in his life” (1916—17a [1915-17], p. 314); in fact, the act of sucking can be recognized from the twelfth to the thirteenth week of intrauterine life, as the fetus opens and closes its mouth in a more or less rhythmic manner. From the twenty-second week, the fetus is able to taste amniotic fluid and can suck its thumb. Karl Abraham distinguished the passive sucking of the first stage of oral activity from the sadistic pleasure in the second, after teething, and he developed the concept of a cannibalistic oral stage that Freud discussed after 1915. René Spitz accorded sucking a principal role, which he integrated into his global approach of the genesis of the object. The “primal cavity” (Spitz, 1955) serves as a juncture for activities occurring around the mouth, tongue, and hand; sucking thus occurs at the juncture of inside and outside. Michael Balint, after objectively recording the breast-feeding of about one hundred infants, maintained that rhythmic sucking is one of the most archaic qualities of human life and that each infant has an individual rhythm that adumbrates character traits. John Bowlby (1969) challenged Freud’s concept of “anaclitic” object choice as well as the primacy of sucking, suggesting instead that an innate need for social contact is at the root of attachment-seeking behavior. Sucking is only one of several instinctive behaviors at the child’s disposal; others include grabbing, following with the eyes, crying, smiling, and rooting behavior. Bowlby, while questioning the primacy of the oral 1682 stage and sucking, did not take into consideration intrapsychic processes; new approaches to understanding these issues developed out of work on autism. Frances Tustin, in Autism and Childhood Psychosis (1973), has suggested that the pain endured by autistic children in their experiences of bodily separateness as “amputation” would include an unbearable disjunction of the mouth and nipple. Sucking prevents the intolerable pain of this disjunction and thereby protects infants from anxieties of catastrophic separation. Donald Meltzer believed that the infant may experience the nipple, while sucking at the breast, as an eyebreast, or primitive, archaic superego. Genevieve Haag has suggested that the thumb-inthe- mouth forms part of what she calls the “corporeal identification” with “assembly along the median.” This “self-junction” which infants create via the thumbin- mouth represents a kind of clinging to self that precedes auto-erotic activity. According to her, the eye-to-eye visual exchanges that accompany breastfeeding go on to form the early feeling of being enveloped, the internal center of early attachment. Whether conceived as auto-sensual or autoerotic behavior, bodily symbolization, intracorporal identification, or incorporation, sucking is an activity that the understanding of which, ever since Freud, has been central to attempts at understanding normal and pathological development in the human infant. ANNE-MARIE MAIRESSE See also: Ambivalence; Anaclisis/anaclictic; Autoeroticism; Breastfeeding;Cruelty; Eroticism, oral; Erotogenic zone; Libidinal development; Oral stage; Orality; Organ Pleasure; Psychosexual development; Self-preservation. Bibliography Bowlby, John. (1971). Attachment and loss. London: Hogarth; Penguin Books. (Original work published 1969) Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123-243. . (1916-17a [1915-17). Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. Part I, SE, 15; Part II, SE, 16. . (1940a [1938]). An outline of psycho-analysis. SE, 23: 139-207. Haag, Genevieve. (1991). Nature de quelques identifications dans l'image du corps. Hypotheses. Journal de la psychanalyse de enfant, 10: 73-92. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Spitz, René. (1955). The primal cavity: A contribution to the genesis of perception. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 10, 215-40. Tustin, Frances. (1973). Autism and childhood psychosis. New York: Jason Aronson. SUDDEN INVOLUNTARY IDEA Sudden involuntary ideas (Finfiille) appear at the borderline between images and words; they come to mind without apparent relation to what preceded them and have a quality of certainty linked to their immediacy. This notion appears several times in Sigmund Freud’s writings. It refers to preconscious thought activity as it is found in free association, jokes, or poetic creation that escapes critical reason, allowing the outcome of an earlier development to emerge into consciousness. In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), Freud gave Einfalle a status analogous to that of “involuntary ideas” (p. 102) that are transformed into visual or auditory images. Divided diffuse attention is responsible for these representations, as they are found in a semi-sleeping state or under hypnosis. In this work Freud discussed the associationist hypotheses of Eduard von Hartmann, saying that although Einfalle appear when there has been a renunciation of purposive ideas, this does not mean that they are arbitrary; rather, there are other, unconscious purposive ideas that take over and determine the course of involuntary ideas. The work of analysis thus relies on Einfalle, but attempts to guide them back into the realm of the interpretable and eliminate their “sudden” and “involuntary” quality, which is a result of repression. Einfalle are particularly important in creative thought in general, whether in the discovery of unconscious contents in psychoanalysis, the punch line in a joke, poetic creation, or invention in theoretical or abstract thinking (cf. Archimedes’s “Eureka!”). Nevertheless, their origin, unknown because it is repressed, has something troubling about it—hence Freud’s inclusion, in The Interpretation of Dreams, of the following quotation by Friedrich von Schiller: “‘[W here there is a creative mind, Reason—or so it seems to me—relaxes its watch upon the gates, and the ideas rush in pell-mell, and only then does it look them through and examine them in a mass.—You critics, or whatever else you may call yourselves, are ashamed or INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SUFFERING frightened of the momentary and transient extravagances which are to be found in all truly creative minds and whose longer or shorter duration distinguishes the artist from the dreamer. You complain of your unfruitfulness because you reject too soon and discriminate too severely” (p. 103). SOPHIE DE MijOLLA-MELLOR See also: Free association; Interpretation of Dreams, The; Jokes. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4—5: 1-625. Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie de. Le Plaisir de pensée. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992. Further Reading Epstein, A. (1995). Dreaming and other involuntary mentation. An essay in neuropsychiatry. Madison, CT: International Universities Press. SUFFERING Suffering is the result of a feeling of alienation and insurmountable ambivalence; being a defensive attitude, its aim is the reduction of anxiety. When Sigmund Freud asserts in Civilization and Its Discontents (1930a) that “the three sources from which our suffering comes” are “our own body... the external world... and our relations to other men” (pp. 86, 87), he could not make it clearer that human suffering opens up the entire field of psychopathology. The classical medical tradition has always sought to name the condition that causes the patient to suffer, thus to satisfy the patient’s wish for their suffering to be less mysterious. Psychoanalysis escapes this preoccupation with diagnosis in that it demonstrates the ubiquity of a suffering that is at once undergone and created by the subject. If suffering marks the entry into the treatment, the orientation of the treatment itself is towards a demonstration of how this suffering is provoked by the individual subject, in the name of a particular search for pleasure “in a different place” (Laplanche, Jean, 1976 [1970], p. 104). Suffering is thus not only the source of 1683 SUGGESTION the complaint, but also the necessary lever of its own mobilization and even its own transcendence by the treatment. In the tradition of Freud’s work on “Mourning and Melancholia” (1916-17g [1915]), Melanie Nein (1935) treated accession to the depressive position as a fecund moment in the development of the child’s object-relationships and the harbinger of the processes of symbolization. The same intimate connection between suffering and thought-processes informs Christian David's notion that man is in a sense “destined to suffer”: “We cannot avoid being permanently confronted by separation and loss, by absence, by intersubjective and intrapsychic splits whether fantasied or actual.... If the psyche drew no strength from its own division, it would no doubt be unable to tolerate this state of affairs for long and would be liable to disintegrate at the first jolt” (1983). Interpretation during the treatment depends largely on the effectiveness of a process of working-through, toward the relief of suffering. As arduous as this work may be for those who embark on it, they feel motivated to do so by a wish to live better, even to be “cured.” It is by no means certain that insight leads to cure. Analysts are only too well aware of the effects of the repetition compulsion and of primary masochism, only too familiar with clinical pictures that lie beyond | the reach of the regulatory mechanism of the pleasureunpleasure principle. The “work of the negative” may even become indistinguishable from what is irreducibleo r radically unthinkable due to the opacity of suffering— merging, in effect, with what Jean-Bertrand Pontalis (1981) calls the principle of pain, jouissance, or agony (in the sense of Donald Winnicott’s “primitive agonies” [1974]): “The logic of unpleasure/pleasure seems to give way to, or even to be completely overwhelmed by a logic of despair that reduces our logic, that of the primary as much as that of the secondary processes, to despair.” Drina CANDILIS-HUISMAN See also: Autism; Breakdown; “Confusion of Tongues between Adults and the Child”; Cure; Failure neurosis; Guilt, feeling of; Helplessness; Hypochondria; Masochism; Need for punishment; Negative, work of; Negative therapeutic reaction; Pain; Passion; Pleasure in thinking; Primitive agony; Psychoanalytic treatment; Psychotic potential; Self-mutilation in children; Sadism; Selfpunishment; Traumatic neurosis. 1684 Bibliography David, Christian. (1983). Souffrance, plaisir et pensée, un mixte indissociable. In Souffrance, plaisir et pensee. Paris: Les Belles Lettres. Freud, Sigmund. (1916-17g [1915]). Mourning and melancholia. SE, 14: 237-258. . (1930a). Civilization and its discontents. SEi2e 57-145. Klein, Melanie. (1975). Contribution to the psychogenesis of manic-depressive states. In Love, guilt and reparation and other works, 1921-1945 (The writings of Melanie Klein, vol. 1), London: Hogarth/Institute of Psycho-Analysis; New York: Delacorte/Seymour Lawrence. (Original work published 1935) Laplanche, Jean. (1976 [1970]). Life and death in psychoanalysis. (Jeffrey Mehlman, Trans.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Pontalis, Jean-Bertrand. (1981). Non, deux fois non. Nouvelle Revue de PsychanalySE, 24. Winnicott, Donald W. (1974). Fear of breakdown. International Review of Psycho-Analysis, 1, 103-7. SUGGESTION James Braid, the British doctor who popularized hypnotism, was the first to use the term “suggestion” to describe experiments in which the hypnotist, using a gesture or word, triggers the subject’s automatic obedience. Around 1860 Ambroise Liebeault decided to make use of suggestion for therapeutic purposes: orders, formulated in an authoritarian or well-meaning manner, would help trigger hypnosis and the therapeutic process. Hippolyte Bernheim extended this by claiming that suggestion had explanatory powers. In 1891 he defined suggestion as “the act through which an idea is introduced into the brain and accepted by it.” According to Bernheim, an idea suggested verbally by the operator triggered a representation-adherence on the part of a subject endowed with “crédivité” Unless inhibited, this idea tended to be translated into actions (“ideo-dynamism”). Bernheim noted that some subjects were more susceptible than others and used the term “suggestibility” to describe the ability to respond to suggestion. Contrary to Jean Martin Charcot, he did not see this as pathological, but as a very general psychological phenomenon, present to a varying degree in everyone. Thus, suggestion helps to explain hypnosis as well as INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS the mechanism or process of education, the adherence to a belief, and so on. Gabriel de Tarde in Les Lois de limitation (1890), and Gustav Le Bon, in La Psychologie des foules (1895), used suggestion to describe the connection between two or more people that serves as the basis for a society or a crowd. For Bernheim, however, hypnosis only facilitated therapeutic suggestibility, and suggestive psychotherapies could be practiced in a waking state. This identification of hypnosis with suggestion resulted in criticism from Liebeault, and especially from Charcot and his followers. Originating in the School of Nancy, for which Bernheim was the spokesman, all of Europe took an interest in experiments, therapies, and models of suggestion. Experiments were conducted on “suggested” crimes, which triggered theoretical, ethical, and juridical polemics. Although experiments with suggestion were met with trepidation, its therapeutic use generated tremendous hope. It was believed it would be able to eliminate certain symptoms, like pain, associated with organic illnesses and heal “nervous disorders” such as hysteria, as well as sexual inversion and alcoholism. Suggestion, as a therapy and as a concept, raised questions and criticisms from many of its practitioners. Bernheim remarked that some subjects can present resistance to “direct suggestion.” In such cases it is better not to give a direct order, but rather to tell the patient nothing can be done, and the problem will heal itself. In this context Bernheim also spoke of “indirect suggestion,” an expression used in a similar sense by Charcot and his school. The Belgian Joseph Delboeuf emphasized self-suggestion, the ability to resist, and the will of the patient. The Dutch practitioner Frederik Van Eeden, who was, like Delboeuf, part of the Nancy School, pointed out that suggestive psychotherapy must involve collaboration between the doctor and his patient, respecting the patient’s autonomy to as great an extent as possible. Pierre Janet criticized the overly broad extension given to the concept of suggestion and proposed, in 1889, in L’Automatisme psychologique, a more limited definition: “The influence of one person on another, who carries it out without the intermediary of voluntary consent.” At the same time he reactivated the older notion, associated with animal magnetism, of “rapport.” Auguste Forel, a Swiss practitioner, noted the ambiguity of the word suggestion, which designates both a therapeutic procedure associated with an order from the practitioner INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SUGGESTION and a psychic process that leads the subject to respond to someone else’s influence. The articles Freud wrote in 1895 on hypnosis and suggestion situate him within the critical movement outlined above. He subsequently abandoned suggestion both as a therapeutic practice and as a psychological explanation. Nonetheless, he claimed in the Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1916—17a) that “in our technique we have abandoned hypnosis only to rediscover suggestion in the shape of transference” (p. 446). Although we can do away with suggestion, the problems associated with the process remain and have been shifted toward the transference. In 1921 Freud returned to the question of hypnosis and suggestion, and of suggestion as a model of the social bond. Looking at contemporary techniques of hypnosis, we find that the therapies inspired by Milton Erickson have reactivated the identification of hypnosis with suggestion. The procedures used (the proposal of metaphors, paradoxical orders, or prohibitions) seem less authoritarian than those employed at the end of the nineteenth century, but may still be compared to the “indirect suggestion” used in the past. JACQUELINE CARROY See also: Anticipatory ideas; Autosuggestion; Bernheim, Hippolyte; Cathartic method; Cognitivism and _ psychoanalysis; Congrés international de lhypnotisme expérimental et scientifique, Premier; “Constructions in Analysis;” First World War: The effect on the development of psychoanalysis; Fundamental rule; Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego; Hypnosis; Janet, Pierre; Lie; Liebeault, Ambroise Auguste; “Lines of Advance in Psycho-Analytic Therapy”; Qu’est-ce que la suggestion? (What is suggestion?); Self-consciousness; Transference; Unconscious, the. Bibliography Carroy, Jacqueline. (1991). Hypnose, suggestion et psychologie: [invention de sujets. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Chertok, Léon, and Stengers, Isabelle. (1992). A critique of psychoanalytic reason. Hypnosis as a scientific problem from Lavoisier to Lacan (Martha Noel Evans, Trans.) Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. (Original work published 1989) Ellenberger, Henri. F. (1970). The discovery of the unconscious: The history and evolution of dynamic psychiatry. New York: Basic Books. 1685 SuiciDAL BEHAVIOR Freud, Sigmund. (1921c). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. SE, 18: 65-143. Gauld, Alan. (1992). A history of hypnotism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. SUICIDAL BEHAVIOR The term suicidal behavior is understood to mean both suicidal equivalents not recognized as such (accidents, repeated risk-taking) and repeated suicide attempts whose chronic and unsuccessful nature certainly constitutes a real risk, but which are also acts of essentially relational significance. The idea that accidents can be interpreted as unconscious suicide attempts appeared in Sigmund Freud's The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901b): “[I]n addition to consciously intentional suicide there is such a thing as a half-intention self-destruction [sic] (self-destruction with an unconscious intention), capable of making skillful use of a threat to life and of disguising it as a chance mishap. There is no need to think such self-destruction rare. For the trend to selfdestruction is present to a certain degree in very many more human beings than those in whom it is carried out” (pp. 180-181). This essentially involves the person waiting for the occasion that will divert the forces of personal preservation, and there is thus a “meeting” between the event and the unconscious intention. Involuntary mutilations, which constitute a compromise between the self-destructive tendency and selfpreservation, are also included within the framework of accidental suicidal behaviors. Similarly, with regard to accidents that happen to babies, Melanie Klein spoke of suicide attempts with inadequate means, as if the infant did not yet have the ability to fantasize and premeditate its own death, and that it could only realize by unconsciously putting itself in danger. In a letter to Freud dated 1 June 1911, Ernest Jones proposed a comparison between accidental suicide and “with the way in which the unconscious seizes on unassociated indifferent material in dream making” (1993 [1908-39], p. 105). Systematic risk-taking requires a different psychic disposition. The idea of the possibility of death is present and even hypercathected, but at the same time denied in a megalomaniacal narcissistic affirmation. Death is thus “provoked” in the sense of a challenge 1686 that is also a relational challenge to those whose fantasized omnipotence cannot effectively protect the subject, the idealized parents. These situations are very common, especially during adolescence, and can involve the risk of accidents, but also toxic risks or even anorexia. Such risk-taking has a function similar to that of the ordalia, or trial by ordeal, in the sense that the subject expects to get from it an affirmation, if not of their own innocence, at least of their invulnerability. In the face of this excessiveness, the accident imposes a limit and brings the person into contact with reality, including that of the body’s fragility. Authors such as Philippe Jeammet and Elisabeth Birot who have studied suicide attempts in adolescents have emphasized the fact that the idea of death has an organizing function during adolescence. It can be noted that the idea of death is unavoidable at this age in conjunction with the obligation to renounce childhood, to which there is no possible return. The idea of death is linked to a sense of the ephemeral—hence the ease during this period of identifying with romantic heroes (as seen in Freud’s Manuscript N., 31 May 1897, regarding Goethe’s hero Werther). Beyond gambling with the idea of death, a suicide attempt can represent a way of trying to restore a lost identity (the prepubescent body of the anorexic) or a _ delusional identity. Similarly, the integration of the drives during adolescence, notably with respect to homosexuality, is a factor that can be conducive to suicidal behavior. Such behavior then appears in its relational significance, whether in the form of a threat, or even blackmail against those close to the subject, or a call for help when communication has broken down. Chronic suicidal behavior can have various etiologies; it remains the case that it cannot be dissociated from suicide proper, the potential for which is inherent in it. SOPHIE DE MYyOLLA-MELLOR See also: Suicide. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1901b). The psychopathology of everyday life. SE, 6. Freud, Sigmund, and Jones, Ernest. (1993 [1908-1939]). The complete correspondence of Sigmund Freud and Ernest Jones, 1908-1939 (R.A. Paskauskas Ed.). London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Garfinkel, Barry D.; Froese, A.; and Hood, J. (1982). Suicide attempts in children and adolescents. American Journal of Psychiatry, 139, 10, 1257-1261. Jeammet, Philippe, and Birot, Elisabeth (Eds.). (1994) Etude psychopathologique des tentatives de suicide chez l adolescent et le jeune adulte. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Further Reading Hartmann, H. P., and Milch, W. (2000). Efficacy treatment of suicidal patients: Transference and countertransference. Progress in Self Psychology, 16, 87-102. SUICIDE Suicide is a symptomatic act connected most frequently to the framework of depression and melancholy. Its etiology is varied and complex, since it is characterized by the collapse of the ego, along with self-reproach and a diminution or a loss of selfesteem— and, at the same time, by a magic omnipotence which allows the annihilation of internal persecutors, as well as a manic feeling based on the denial of death itself. While suicide may appear to be a response to persecutory guilt, it is also a projection of this guilt onto objects as well as a liberation from their control through the death the subject has chosen for himself. Suicide was discussed in the psychoanalytic literature as early as 1907, as recorded in the Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society (Nunberg, Hermann, and Federn, Ernst, 1962-75), but it was a rather superficial discussion, centered on the fact that the differing choice of means by men and women reveals a primal sexual symbolism. From this came the formula that “suicide is the climax of negative autoeroticism” (Minutes, Vol. 1, February 13, 1907, p. 114). This should be understood in the context of the opposition between the ego instincts and sexual instincts in Freud’s earliest theorization: “In suicide the life instinct is overwhelmed by the libido” (Vol. 2, April 20, 1910, p. 494). In this approach, suicide, interpreted as a substitute for psychosis, seems linked both to an inability to tolerate reality and to autoerotic regression: “Suicide is an act of defense of the normal ego against psychosis” (June 6, 1907). Drive regression is equally central to Freud’s ideas on the subject of the suicide of high school students; at school “Teachers. .. .must exercise a INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SUICIDE life-maintaining influence. [The function of] school is to give the child, in this stage of his detachment from his parents, a new footing within a larger relationship” (Vol. 2, April 20, 1910, p. 495). This should extend as far as not to “deny them the right to linger even in those phases of their development that seem vexing.” There might well have been some evolution in Freud’s thought here, especially if it is considered that, at the very beginning he insisted on the connection between neurasthenia, masturbation, and the risk of suicide. However, Freud also stressed that “in many cases it is the fear of incest itself that drives [children] to suicide” (p. 494), because of the enormous augmentation of their need for love at puberty; Freud went so far as to suggest, this being the case, that homosexuals make the best teachers, the worst being those whom the repression of their homosexuality has turned into sadists, pushing their students to suicide. Later psychoanalytic thought on suicide followed the main ideas of Freud on the subject. First of all, in the depressive context, suicide was considered selfpunishment for the desire to kill, primally directed toward another, as Freud himself stated in Totem and Taboo: “The law of talion, which is so deeply rooted in human feelings, lays it down that a murder can only be expiated by the sacrifice of another life: self-sacrifice points back to blood-guilt” (1912-13a, p. 154). Since then, the risk of self-mutilation or suicide with infantile or borderline personalities has been much emphasized (Kernberg, Otto, 1984); this risk is especially a factor during fits of rage following disappointments which are blamed on others; or else there is a risk of suicide because of failure to achieve success (guilt), or, even the failure of the cure (negative therapeutic reaction). In fact, the idea that suicide is self-punishment for the desire to kill someone else cannot be understood completely apart from the process of melancholia, whereby the loved/hated object has been introjected within the ego and has become the target of the attack. More even than “self-punishment,” suicide would be murder of the other within oneself. “Probably no one finds the mental energy required to kill himself unless, in the first place, in doing so he is at the same time killing an object with whom he has identified himself, and, in the second place, is turning against himself a death-wish which had been directed against someone else” (1920a, p. 162). Freud explained that “the ego is destroyed by the object.” 1687 Succivan, Harry Stack (1892-1949) The enigma constituted by suicide in relation to the selfpreservative or ego instincts has also been approached in another way, through considering that it is accompanied paradoxically by a tentative intent to reappropriate vital energy, or, indeed, is even prompted by the fantasy of beginning a new lite (Grinberg, Leon, 1983). Accordingly, suicide would result from a state of crisis dominated by the feeling that something must change. The person committing suicide “convokes death imaginally to assure himself paradoxically that life exists” (Triandafillidis, Alexandra, 1991). Ideal images of oneself and others can then survive, at the price of the death of the bad objects cluttering the ego. The vital stakes involved in this symptomatic conduct have inclined authors not only to attempt to understand the suicidal mechanism, but also to describe its advance symptoms, evaluating the risk of suicide in order to decide on a therapeutic approach, especially in a care-giving institutional setting. Leon Grinberg (1983) emphasized suicidal premeditation and the fact that a suicidal plan follows the idea of suicide, which was at first only a way of dealing with anxiety. Continuing to the act of suicide depends on an “encounter,” which might favor tipping the fantasy into reality. This author also examined factors of present or past vulnerability (feeling of culpability, narcissistic wound, loss of loved object, and so forth), Otto Kernberg (1984) emphasized the need for the therapist not to be fooled by an accentuation of the manic element; he stressed the seriousness of cases where “aggressiveness has infiltrated the grandiose Self.” joined to an inability to enter into interpersonal relations and feel emotions. These pair os however, concern psychotherapeutic strategie the etiology of suicide. rather than SOPHIE DE MiOLLA-MELLOR See also: Bettelheim, Bruno: Bjerre, Poul; Great Britain; Morgenstern-Kabatschnik, Sophie: Rosenthal, Tatiana; Secret; Silberer, Herbert; Sokolnicka-Kutner, Eugenie; Stekel, Wilhelm; Tausk, Victor. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1912—13a). 1-161. Totem and taboo. SE 13: Grinberg, Leon. (1983) Belles Lettres. . Culpabilite et depression, Paris: Les 1688 Kernberg, Otto. (1984). Les trouble graves de la personnalite. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Nuberg, Hermann, and Federn, Ernst. (1962-1975). Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. New York: International Universities Press. Triandafillidis, Alexandra. (1991). La dépression et son inquiétante familiarite. Paris: Edition’ Universitaires. . Further Reading Laufer, M. (Ed.). (1995). The suicidal adolescent. Madison, CT: International Universities Press. SULLIVAN, HARRY STACK (1892-1949) American psychiatrist and psychoanalyst, born on February, 21, 1892, in Norwich, New York, and died on January 14, 1949, in Paris. The only son of a farming couple in rural upstate New York, Sullivan had a very lonely childhood and went through a deep psychological crisis upon entering Cornell University. He graduated from medical school in Chicago in 1917, but only in 1921 did he start working in psychiatry, under William Alanson White (1870-1937) at St. Elisabeth’s Hospital, Washington, D.C. Between 1923 and 1930 he worked at Sheppard- Pratt Hospital, Maryland, where he devised a very successful combination of milieu and individual therapy aimed at young schizophrenic patients. A good friend of Abraham Brill and a charter member of the Washington Psychoanalytic Society (1930), Sullivan progressively withdrew from Freudian psychoanalysis in order to concentrate on initiatives like the Washington School of Psychiatry (1936), the journal Psychiatry (1938), and on the development of his own interpersonal theory. In the early 1940s, on the invitation of Dexter Bullard, he worked as teacher and supervisor at Chestnut Lodge Hospital, where he influenced a whole series of colleagues, among them Frieda Fromm-Reichmann (1889-1957). In New York City in 1943, Sullivan, together with Clara Thompson, Erich Fromm, Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, and Janet and David Rioch founded the William Alanson White Institute, which became the major institution committed to the teaching and development of interpersonal psychoanalysis. With the exception of Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry (1940), six of his seven books available in INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS English were published posthumously. The Psychiatric Interview is considered a classic and is still widely read. Marco Conci See also: Dismantling; Object relations theory; Schizophrenia; Second World War: The effect on the development of psychoanalysis. Bibliography Perry, Helen Swick. (1982). Psychiatrist in America. The life of Harry Stack Sullivan. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University. Sullivan, Harry Stack. (1940). Conceptions of modern psychiatry. Washington, DC: W.A. White Psychiatric Foundation. . (1953). Interpersonal theory of psychiatry. New York: W.W. Norton. . (1954). The psychiatric interview. New York: W.W. Norton. . (1962). Schizophrenia as a human process. New York: W.W. Norton. SUM OF EXCITATION In his earliest psychological investigations Freud explored the interface between the psychological and the physical, a context in which a “sum of excitation” had the following connotations: (1) a quantity of energy present in the nervous system and its psychical manifestations: the greater or lesser strength and vividness of ideas and memories and of the affects bound to them; (2) a regulatory dynamic governing that energy: the tendency to establish constancy through abreaction and the failures of this tendency in neurosis; (3) the aggregate of excitations and their limits, in accordance with neurophysiology, in the emergence and overdetermination of symptoms; and (4) the idea that the energetic processes involved here are quantifiable and measurable. As he worked on a proposed joint publication with Josef Breuer in 1892, Freud spoke of “the constancy of the sum of excitation” and “displacements ... of sums of excitation” (1941a, pp. 147, 148; see also 1940a, p. 153-54). In his lecture “On the Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena” (1893h), he introduced the notion as follows: “If a person experiences a psychical impression, something in his nervous system which we INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Sum oF EXciTATION will for the moment call the sum of excitation is increased. Now in every individual there exists a tendency to diminish this sum of excitation once more, in order to preserve his health. ... and when someone cannot get rid of the increase in stimulation by ‘abreacting’ it, we have the possibility of the event in question remaining a psychical trauma” (pp. 36, 37). Freud continued to use this expression until 1897. In its initial context, it was synonymous with “affect” or “amount of affect”; the fate of the sum of excitation in the event of repression was somatic innervation in the shape of hysterical conversion, and in the case of compulsive neurosis it underlay the creation of substitute ideas. But the notion that a principle of constancy affected the sum of excitation led Freud into overarching issues of dynamic and economic neuropsychology; this emerging set of problems was already present in the “quantities” Q and Qg of the “Project for a Scientific Psychology” (1950c [1895]). An intuition in the early days, the idea of the sum of excitation and its attendant problems were bound to evolve. The notion of “cathexis” was soon added to those of affect and amount or quota of affect. The instincts and instinctual impulses refined the energetic model of the psyche, while the tendency toward constancy was broken down into principles of inertia, constancy, pleasure, reality, and eventually even into the death instinct. The vividness of repressed memories led to the notions of the timelessness of the unconscious and of repetition. And, lastly, the economic standpoint became the tool with which to study the centrality of the quantitative factor in the etiology of mental disturbances. This idea was thus a rich theoretical seed, but it remained neurophysiological in character, and ultimately embodied too many other notions to survive in its original form. MICHELE PORTE See also: Conversion; Decathexis; Excitation; Hypercathexis; Principle of constancy; Psychosomatic limit/ boundary; Quantitative/qualitative. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1941a [1892]). Letter to Josef Breuer. SES It . (1950c [1895]). Project for a scientific psychology. SE, 1: 281—387. 1689 SUPEREGO Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1893a). On the psychical mechanism of hysterical phenomena: Preliminary communication. SE, 2: 1-17. _ (1940d [1892]). On the theory of hysterical attacks. SE, 1: 11-154. SUPEREGO The superego is one of the three agencies making up the psychic apparatus in Freud’s second topography, the structural theory (1923b). It results essentially from the internalization of parental authority. From the outset, as psychoanalysis uncovered the defensive conflict that arose from a repressed unconscious (childhood sexuality), it encountered the need to posit a repressing agency, a censor associated with selfesteem. In contrast with hypnosis, which put the censor to sleep, psychoanalysis is essentially aimed at acknowledging and working out of the ego’s resistances. As early as “On Narcissism: An Introduction” (1914c), Freud already deemed the ego ideal to be autonomous. Two works of Freud’s dating from the early 1920s firmly differentiated between the ego and the superego (ego ideal) and integrated this distinction into the whole set of Freud’s metapsychological reworkings of the period. In Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921c), to describe the functioning of groups, Freud developed a generalized conception of identification in which individuals identified their egos by creating a common ideal, incarnated in a leader. The Ego‘and the Id (1923b) went on to link the superego as a mental agency to the recognized fact that the greater portion of the ego was unconscious. Within the psychic apparatus, the superego makes permanent the effects of the infant’s dependence on primary objects, and it is just as insusceptible of complete integration into the ego as the id and its instinctual impulses. The term “superego” itself indicates that the superego dominates the ego; the tension between the two agencies take the form of moral anxiety. Freud did not detach the superego from the ideal (one of its functions). The superego is responsible for transmitting the constraints that culture exercises over the individual, and for imposing the necessary and ultimately excessive sacrifices of instinct demanded by civilization. It is also the carrier of a cultural past that each subject must appropriate and master (the reference being to Goethe’s Faust) through processes of 1690 object idealization and sublimation of the instincts. The main dynamic remains the conflict-laden work of differentiation between the ego and the superego. How the superego is transmitted (it is formed in the image of the parents’ own superegos), establishes itself, and develops entails in the final reckoning that the Freudian superego is an intersubjective and even intergenerational agency. When, in Civilization and Its Discontents (1930a), Freud raised the issue of a (collective) cultural superego, he was revisiting his earlier reflections on the origins of civilization in Totem and Taboo (1912-1913a). There, evoking the myth of the primal horde, he had associated the killing of the primal father with the prohibition on incest. After investigating the genesis of guilt in Civilization and Its Discontents, he attempted, in Moses and Monotheism (1939a), to account for the strength of tradition. With the concept of the superego, Freud tackled the thorny subject of what humankind elevates and makes sublime. Strictly opposed to any kind of spiritual approach, which the theme of the conscience readily encouraged, he focused on the concrete development and instinctual aspects of agency. In seeking to expose the structural dimension of the split between the ego and the superego, Freud based his findings on two pathological phenomena: delusions of observation and manic-depressive psychosis. > In delusions of observation, the monitoring and judging internal agency (the superego) is reprojected outward. Manic-depressive psychosis illustrates the cyclic operation of the moral conscience and the changes that occur in the relationship between the ego and the superego: in melancholic self-reproach, the superego persecutes the ego, and in manic euphoria, the ego and its ideal coincide (as in the ritual festivity of a carnival). From the ontogenetic viewpoint, the superego is “heir to the Oedipus complex.” This means that the advent of the superego prolongs the core affective relationships of childhood by rendering permanent the conditions that brought about its establishment. The identifications that constitute the superego are the bearers at once of parental prohibitions and of instinctual cathexes relating to the parents as objects, cathexes that these identifications replace according to a regressive logic in which the wish to be like dislodges the wish to have (Freud, 1933a, p. 63). Broadly speaking, the identifications of the superego owe their autonomy, their constraining role vis-a-vis the ego, to the INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS child’s crucial dependence on its objects. “At the beginning ... what is bad is whatever causes one to be threatened with loss of love” (Freud, 1930a, p. 124). If establishing the superego through identifications has far-reaching consequences, this is because the relationship of the ego to the superego reproduces the relationship of the child to the all-powerful parents. Real anxiety related to the parents is transformed into moral anxiety arising from the tension between the ego and a superego that draws no distinction between the wish and the act. The superego first appears, therefore, as the upshot of a regressive defensive process that tends to lend permanence in mental reality to a world determined above all by parental desire and parental protection. Freud conceived of religious belief as underpinned by a projection outward of the child’s superego, motivated by a nostalgia for the father. This helps explain why the task of the ego during adolescence is to escape from the authority of the superego. In Freud’s detailed metapsychological description of the genesis and development of the superego, the superego begins to form very early on, and this formation involves permanent rearrangements of identifications and changes in their very nature as they become less narcissistic and more symbolic. There is thus a clear dividing line between a primitive realm of the superego (as described by Melanie Klein) and a distinctly postoedipal realm. The primitive realm is founded on archaic mechanisms (identification with the aggressor and the law of talion [an eye for an eye]). In the postoedipal realm of the superego, a bisexual superego “consisting of these two [paternal and maternal] identifications in some way united with each other” (1923b, p. 34) bears the mark of the subtle mental developments that for Freud are specific to the phallic phase and the “complete” Oedipus complex (love and hate for each parent, identification with both). Under this later configuration, the structuring effects of the castration complex and the integration of the fantasy of the primal scene make it possible for the superego to resolve and protect the ego from what are now incestuous wishes. Successful development of the superego is indicated by the individual’s acquisitions of culture during the latency phase and by an ability of the individual to traverse the reactivation of instinctive desires that occurs in adolescence and to achieve autonomy. Progression along these lines correlates with a reduction of the superego’s demands to essential social rules alone, with its gradual detachment. Such progres- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SUPEREGO sion tends to turn the superego into a more purely symbolic agency. The profoundly paternal character of Freud’s superego has been further developed by Jacques Lacan’s concept of the Name of the Father. A consequence is the possibility of a more personal ego ideal. All these modifications of the superego depend on the desexualization inherent to the identification process, for desexualization allows a secondary narcissism in which the ability to idealize and sublimate buttress the cathexis of new objects and social bonds. At the clinical level, making the superego into a mental agency was one of Freud’s theoretical responses to the difficult practical problems posed by certain kinds of resistance—needs for punishment, negative therapeutic reactions, moral masochism—that represent diverse expressions of unconscious guilt. Freud observed how the superego had a general propensity for cruelty, for a severity out of all proportion to that of the child’s actual upbringing. This was a crucial insight, for it led him to recognize the endogenous, instinctual origin of cruelty and hence to form the hypothesis of the destructive death instincts. Unconscious guilt was thus seen in essence as turning such destructiveness back against oneself. This explains the paradoxical fact that the superego is made stronger by the renunciations it imposes, and that anxiety is increased even by misdeeds never performed (as witness crimes committed out of a sense of guilt). The narcissistic desexualization involved in the process of identification, upon which the superego is founded, permits a diffusion of instincts whereby the superego tends to become the focus of a liberated death instinct (the “pure culture of the death instinct” seen in melancholia). By contrast, the proper functioning of the postoedipal superego, which results in a dynamic of conflict between the ego and the superego, presupposes that the environment allows a balanced apportionment of love and discipline that result in a fusion of instinct. The coherent superego that results makes for a tempered guilt capable of underpinning a sense of responsibility in the subject. JEAN-Luc DONNET See also: Activity/passivity; Agency; Alcoholism; Altruism; Antilibidinal ego/internal saboteur; Anxiety; Castration complex; Censorship; Character; Civilization (Kultur); Cruelty; Defense; Depression; Ethics; Fusion/ 1691 SUPERVISED ANALYSIS (CONTROL Case) defusion; Graph of Desire; Guilt, unconscious sense of; Heroic identification; Humor; Id; Ideal Ego; Identification; Imago; Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety; Latency period; Law and psychoanalysis; Libidinal development; Linking, attacks on; Melancholic depression ; Oedipus complex, early; “Outline of Psychoanalysis, An”; Prohibition; Psychic apparatus; Psychic causality; Self-hatred; Self-punishment; Unconscious, the. Bibliography Amar, Nicole; Le Goues, Gérard; and Pragier, Georges (Eds.). (1995). Surmoi II: les développements post-Freudiens. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Donnet, Jean-Luc. (1995). Surmoi I: le concept Freudien et la regle fondamentale. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Freud, Sigmund. (1912-1913a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1- 161. . (1914c). On narcissism: an introduction. SE, 14: 67-102. . (1921c). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. SE, 18: 65-143. . (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1-66. . (1930a). Civilization and its discontents. SE 2k 57-145. . (1933a). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22: 1-182. . (1939a). Moses and monotheism: Three essays. SE, 23: 1-137. Further Reading Arlow, Jacob. (1982). Problems of the superego concept. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 37, 229-244. Blum, Hans. (1985). Superego formation, adolescent transformation, and adult neurosis. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association. 33, 887-910. Brenner, Charles. (1982). Concept of the superego: A reformulation. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 51, 501-525. Gray, Paul. (1987). On the technique of analysis of the superego: An introduction. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 56, 130-154. Hartmann, Heinz, and Loewenstein, Rudolph. (1962). Notes on the superego. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 17, 42-81. Hoffman, Leon, rep. (1998). Panel: The clinical value of the superego concept. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 46, 885-896. 1692 Loewald, Hans W. (1973). Some instinctual manifestations of superego formation. Annual of Psychoanalysis, 1, 104— 116. Milrod, David. (2002). The superego: Its formation, structure, and functioning. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 57, 131-150. O’Shaughnessy, Edna. (1999). Relating to the superego. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 80, 861-870. Spitz, Rene. (1958). On the genesis of superego components. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 13, 375-404. SUPERVISED ANALYSIS (CONTROL CASE) Control analysis (also known as “supervised analysis” or “analysis under supervision”) is a cure during which the analyst reports back the “material” and progress to an experienced colleague for discussion. Although supervised analysis is a mandatory stage for trainee analysts, it is not exceptional for an analyst to feel the need to discuss a difficult case with an experienced colleague even after the end of the supervised analysis. The practice dates from the origins of psychoanalysis and we may even consider that it was present when psychoanalysis came into being, because Freud laid down the bases for it in his correspondence with Wilhelm Fleiss and in the course of their periodic “congresses.” He then went on to institute the practice of open discussion with the analysts he trained, enabling them to discuss their cases during the Wednesday meetings of the Psychological Society, later the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society (cf. The Minutes of the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society 1962, 1967, 1975), and in the course of private conversations. These new analysts themselves continued this practice with their own students. However, it was quite frequent in those early days for the same person to act as analyst and supervisor within a limited circle. The obvious drawbacks of such a confusion of roles precipitated a call for better regulation of the process. A first directive was adopted during the congress of the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA) in Bad Homburg, Germany, in 1925. It was agreed that the training process, regulated and supervised by the societies comprising the IPA, or their training institutes, should include at least two supervised analyses, the supervisor being distinct from the analyst. (An earlier congress in 1918 had already INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS established the necessity of personal analysis for candidates.) These principles still apply. The IPA rules stipulate that only the body of training analysts of a regional society can authorize supervised analyses; that two adult analyses must be conducted, and that at least one child analysis is desirable in addition; that the supervisors must themselves be accredited by their society; that the supervision must be weekly; and that each of these supervisions must last at least two years (the analysis itself may obviously extend beyond this period). Those are the general rules. They are compatible with differing approaches depending on the country or psychoanalytic group. In practice, admission to supervised treatment generally coincides with admission to training as a psychoanalyst (including, in addition, lectures, attending work groups, and seminars). Candidates may be admitted following personal interviews with several training analysts whose mission is to assess the state of progress of their personal analysis (whether applicable), as well as their potential as future analysts, and who report back to a commission in charge of making the actual decision. Several IPA societies exclude the candidate’s analyst from this procedure (the Paris Psychoanalytic Society preferring to extend this exclusion to all stages of the training process, including final certification). Supervision can have two formats: the weekly meeting may be personal, limited to the candidate and the supervisor; or a “group meeting,” comprising several candidates (but never more than five or six) who may meet with a shared supervisor. Both systems have advantages and drawbacks. It is often stressed that group supervision has the great advantage of enabling candidates to compare their experiences and thus to avoid a too closely dyadic relationship with their supervisor. Individual meetings, on the other hand, facilitate more open discussion, free from the reserve and self-conscious attitudes to be expected in groups; also they facilitate discussion of counter-transference issues, more difficult in a group setting. There is a risk here, however, of reviving and importing transference effects from the candidate’s personal analysis (which is often ongoing during supervision). Generally speaking, the idea in supervisions is not to dictate to trainee analysts what they should do and say, even less to equip them with theoretical precepts INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SUPPRESSION or technical recipes. The aim is to help them detect the meaning of the material that is presented to them, its instinctual and affective charges, as well as the patient’s defenses, all this with reference to the transference and counter-transference. This consideration is especially vital to the training of analysts. The supervisor’s task is therefore a difficult one, because he or she must draw the attention of the supervised analysts to their own counter-transference without ever transforming the supervision into an analytic session. The procedure raises many delicate questions, calling for continual work on the part of psychoanalytic institutions (Lebovici, Solnit, 1982). This has led certain groups to work out original formulas, such as the “fourth analysis,” proposed by the Quatriéme Groupe OPLF (France) as its foundation. ROGER PERRON See also: “Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy” (Little Hans ); Association psychanalytique de France; Berliner Psychoanalytisches Institut; Fourth analysis; Hungarian School; Pass, the; Psychoanalytic filiations; Societé psychanalytique de Paris and Institut de psychanalyse de Paris; Training of the psychoanalyst. Bibliography Fleming, Joan, and Benedek, Terese F. (1983). Psychoanalytic supervision: A method of clinical teaching. New York : Basic Books. Lebovici, Serge, and Solnit, Albert J. (Eds.). (1982). La formation du psychanalyste. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Monographies de l’Association psychanalytique internationale. Nunberg, Hermann, and Federn, Ernst. (1962-1975). Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. New York: International Universities Press. SUPPRESSION Suppression is a defense mechanism aimed specifically at affect, which intends to abolish it from consciousness without allowing its re-entry into the unconscious. The term “suppression” in its broadest sense was used by Sigmund Freud (1900a) to describe a conscious mechanism intended to eliminate undesirable psychical content from consciousness. The difference between suppression and repression (1915d) lies in the 1693 SUPPRESSION fact that this latter defense mechanism is unconscious and under its influence repressed content becomes or remains unconscious. Repression is concerned essentially with the “ideational representatives” of the drive/instinct, which are distinct in that they may remain unconscious. In Freud’s early theorizing of affects, though, affects are suppressed and do not pass into the unconscious. Throughout the metapsychology, however, this distinction between suppression and repression is not quite 50 clear-cut: “We know, too, that to suppress the development of affect is the true aim of repression and that its work is incomplete if this aim is not achieved” (1915e, p. 178). In this passage from “The Unconscious,” the suppression of affect appears as a specific mode of repression destined to eradicate affect from consciousness. Moreover, in the same essay, Freud devotes a chapter to “unconscious feelings” in which affects begin to find a definite position within the unconscious. This notion of “unconscious feelings” was progressively elaborated on, and in “The Ego and The Id” (1923b), Freud wrote: where feelings are concerned “the Pcs, here drops out—and feelings are either conscious or unconscious” (1923b, p. 23). With the introduction of the second topography the affects described by Freud typically become complexes. An unconscious sense of guilt, anxiety as signal, grief, sorrow, etc., are all affects that are articulated through various fantasies, notably around the loss of the object. The signal of anxiety that the threat of the loss of the mother represents for the child is the paradigmatic example of this new conception of affects associated intimately with fantasies (from Freud’s second theory of anxiety). Since affect and representation are thus considered to be closely imbricated with fantasies, the defense mechanisms relating to affects are not differentiated in any specific way, and as a result the affects themselves are also likely to become unconscious. Melanie Klein, who had adopted Freud’s second theory of anxiety from the outset, considered affects subject to the same defensive vicissitudes as fantasies. Anxiety, however, very quickly became central to her technique; thus interpretation, for example, inevitably has a bearing on the fantasies of the subject in analysis, when anxiety is at its height. As her theoretical system developed, affects would progressively come to occupy a crucial site in the functioning of mental life (1948). In a conception bound up with the “positions” of the two general modes of organization of psychic life, the 1694 type of anxiety, either paranoid or depressive, constitutes a key concept beside the modality of the object, whether partial or total, and alongside mechanisms of defense, whether psychotic or neurotic. The type of defense mechanism to which the ego might have recourse is dependent on the intensity of depressive anxieties, revealed through the fantasies that manifest them. When they are too intense—in sorrow, but in guilt above all—they are expressed in fantasies involving the catastrophic destruction of objects. The ego will have to mobilize extreme and even psychotic defense mechanisms. Between these, massive disavowal will attack, very specifically, these depressive affects in order to annihilate and erase them; however, other psychotic defense mechanisms such as splitting, projective identification, or projection also contribute to their eradication. Furthermore, their action will give rise to other affects, notably persecution anxiety. Where depressive anxieties are not too extreme, and in instances where considerable fantasies of injury, of death (and thus of the loss of objects) prevail, more or less intense disavowal permits the alleviation or even the transformation of these anxieties, with the help of obsessive defenses, into their opposite—euphoria. Where depressive anxieties are limited and where fantasies of the loss of the love object and exclusion predominate, the depressive conflictual situation opens up the way to the neurotic problematic and the conflictual affects are repressed. When the repression of affects, the neurotic defense mechanism par excellence, becomes more extensive, its effect seems closer to that of disavowal. The analysis of severe neurotic disorders with serious depressive conflicts reveals the interchange between these two defensive modes in the treatment of the conflictual affects: repression and disavowal. When the repression of conflictual affects is too forceful, the intense pressure on the repressed content towards the internal world of the individual seems to transform those aspects of the external world that arouse or recall these affects into denial. ALAIN DE MiOLLA See also: Repression. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1915e). The unconscious. SE, 14: 159-204. . (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1-66. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Further Reading Werman, D.S. (1983). Suppression as a defense. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 31 (S), 405-415. SURREALISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS Begun as an investigation of poetic images and language, their sources, their nature, and specific features, surrealism is a movement of ideas, of artistic creation and action based explicitly on Freudian discoveries, which were used to develop an original theory of language and creativity. In later years it adopted Hegelian dialectics and Marxist-Leninist historical materialism. The “social and martial cataclysm” (Breton, 1934) provoked a revolt by an entire generation. The movement was founded in Paris in 1924 by French poet André Breton, with the support of a group of poets and painters. The presence of Max Ernst, from Germany, Man Ray, from the United States, and Joan Miro, a Catalan, gave the group its international flavor. Surrealism’s goal was to “change life” (Arthur Rimbaud) by freeing humanity from the constraints of mental or social censorship as well as economic oppression: “Poetry is made by everyone. Not by one” (Lautréamont). The project made little sense to Freud, who refused his patronage (Freud to Breton, 1933e [1932]; to Zweig, July 20, 1938 (1960a [1873—1939])). Breton visited Freud in Vienna in 1921 and corresponded with him in 1932 about The Interpretation of Dreams. In 1937 he asked him to contribute to a planned anthology ( Trajectoire du réve, 1938). Freud answered: “A collection of dreams without their associations, without understanding the circumstances in which someone dreamed, doesn’t mean anything to me, and I have a hard time understanding what it might mean to others” (Breton, 1938, I). These associations were generally omitted by the surrealists when they narrated their dreams. They appear in André Breton’s The Communicating Vases (1932), but there the author, denying the “dream navel” for the sake of Marxist-Leninist materialism, felt he could use them to bring into focus all his dream thoughts. He claimed, contrary to Freud, that the dream was a creator, an instigator to action, and capable of dialectically resolving the contradiction between desire and reality. Surrealism ignored therapy. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SURREALISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS There are several periods to the history of surrealism. Its “prehistory” dates from 1916 (Breton discovers Freud) to 1924. This was the period of the review Litterature (1919). Together with Breton, a group of young artists invented surrealist techniques intended to liberate the unconscious: automatic writing and drawing, hypnotic sleep, hypnagogic visions, dream narratives, group creation, oral and written games, collage, rubbings, decals, experimental photography and theater. The publication of the first Surrealist Manifesto (Breton, 1924) ushered in Surrealism’s formative period. The group had a journal of its own, La Revolution surréaliste. “We must be thankful for Freud’s discoveries,” wrote Breton, “the imagination may be on the point of winning back its rights.” In 1927 André Breton, Louis Aragon, Paul Eluard, and Benjamin Peret joined the Communist Party. Breton did not, however, abandon Freud: “The Surrealism that, as we have seen, has adopted Marxist beliefs does not intend to treat lightly the Freudian critique of ideas” (Breton, 1930). Breton soon quit the Communist Party, which reproached him for his Freudianism. Surrealism embraced cinema (Luis Bunuel), the construction of objects (“Situation surrealiste de lobjet,’ Breton, 1935), and produced important works of art in every field. But in 1930, in his Second Manifesto of Surrealism, Breton acknowledged the existence of a profound crisis. The third period of Surrealism was about to begin. A new review was introduced, Le Surréalisme au service de la Révolution. In 1930 the review published two articles by the French-American psychoanalyst Jean Frois- Wittmann, in 1933 the Breton-Freud correspondence of 1932, a favorable critique of Jacques Lacan’s doctoral dissertation by René Crevel, and, also by Crevel, an attack on an article in the Revue francaise de psychanalyse. The review also published the first texts by Salvador Dali, where he developed the idea of “critical- paranoia,” the use of the interpretative processes of paranoia for creative ends, and the exploration of the unconscious. In 1933 Minotaure appeared. Although it was not the official voice of the group, it was strongly influenced by it. The first issue included articles on the “contributions of psychoanalysis.” Lacan and Dali explained their conceptions of paranoia as an active psychic phenomenon, which Dali compared with the passivity he associated with dreams and automatic writing. Several large-scale international exhibitions 1695 SURREALISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS confirmed the growth of surrealism around the world, a phenomenon that accelerated during the Second World War following the exile of Breton, André Masson, and Max Ernst in the United States, and Benjamin Péret in Mexico, and continued after the war. Breton, the principal theorist of the group, maintained a close association with Freudian thought throughout his career. He was most interested in the logic of the unconscious, in conflicts between the ego, the id, and the superego, relating them to the process of artistic creation, to Freudian ideas of sexuality, fantasy, desire, repression, the death instinct, whose opposition to Eros he assumed to be dialectical (Breton, 1930), and especially to ideas about representation and perception (Breton, 1933). Beginning with his concept of “pure mental representation,” situated “beyond true perception,” he examined, in the context of the Essais de psychanalyse (1927), how the transition from the unconscious to the perception-consciousness system takes place in the creative individual. For Breton, as a reader of Freud, it was at the preconscious level that language and the traces of acoustic and visual perceptions were united and charged with affect. But Breton went further: he saw in these preconscious elements the raw material of creation, obtained by the removal of repression with the help of automatic writing and drawing. In creating a work of art, the artist would » make the individual universal (Breton, 1935). In a letter to Stefan Zweig, Freud, who had met Salvador Dali in London, also associated the fundamental elements of the work of the artist with the preconscious, but he added a principle of economy: “From the critical point of view it could still be maintained that the notion of art defies expansion as long as the quantitative proportion of unconscious material and preconscious treatment does not remain within definite limits” (July 20, 1938). The specific task of the creative individual, the result of his “initiative” (Breton) is to manipulate the relation between unconscious and preconscious elements, and objectify them in a work of art. Repression would have to be removed using “surrealist techniques” (Breton). Freud’s meeting with Dali seems to be the only time when Freud made an effort to understand the surrealist use of psychoanalysis and compare it with his own beliefs. There were other points of contact between surrealism and psychoanalysis: Adrien Borel discussed his 1696 surrealist experiences (1925); Salvador Dali and Rene Crevel interviewed Jacques Lacan; Crevel, Antonin Artaud, and Robert Desnos were analyzed by René Allendy, which they later wrote about. André Embiricos, a surrealist poet and theoretician as well as a psychoanalyst, founded, together with Marie Bonaparte, the Greek Psychoanalytic Society. © Lacanian thought developed throughout the nineteen-sixties, and, although it has a number of affinities with surrealism, it has always remained distinct. In 1971 the surrealist painter and philosopher René Passeron, with his research team at the C.N.R.S., founded Etudes poiétiques, which analyzed the creative process and made use of Freudian theory. A number of psychoanalysts (Andre Berge, Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, Guy Rosolato) were interested in the surrealists. As Breton found in 1934, the scope of surrealism, through the upheaval of sensibility it entails, “is socially incalculable.” As a movement it has frequently helped the spread of psychoanalysis. NICOLE GEBLESCO See also: Breton, André; Choisy, Maryse; Held, René; Lacan, Jacques-Marie Emile; Literature and psychoanalysis. Bibliography Biro, Adam, Passeron, René. (1982). Dictionnaire général du surréalisme et de ses environs. Freiberg, Switzerland: Office du Livre. Breton, André. (1988). GEuvres completes. Edition établie par Marguerite Bonnet. Paris: Gallimard, La Pleiade. Freud, Sigmund. (1927). Essais de psychanalys (Samuel Jankelevitch, Trans.). Paris: Payot. . (1960a [1873-1939]). Letters of Sigmund Freud, 1873-1939 (Ernst L. Freud, Ed.; Tania and James Stern, Trans.). London, Hogarth Press, 1970. Hulak, Fabienne, and Bonnet, Marguerite. (1992). Folie et psychanalyse dans [ experience surreéaliste. Nice: Z’Editions. Meélusine. (1992). Cahiers du Centre de recherches sur le surrealisme, XIII, Le surréaliste et son psy. Paris. Revues surréalistes (1919-1939); Littérature (1919-1921, 1922-1924); La Revolution surréaliste (1924-1929); Le Surrealisme au service de la. Révolution (1930-1933); Minotaure (1930-1933, 1933-1939). Paris: Jean-Michel Place, 1975, 1976, 1981. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SWEDEN Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the Swedish writer August Strindberg, wrote several plays, novels, and short stories dealing in a pertinent fashion with religion and doubt, the relations between men and women, the father and his position in the family. He described the hypocrisy and the destructive forces, the unconscious motivations, the representations and specific conflicts of man at the turn of the century. In 1893 the name of his contemporary, Sigmund Freud, was mentioned in Sweden for the first time in a medical review, along with those of Josef Breuer, Pierre Janet, and Jean Martin Charcot. The article, dealing with traumatic neuroses, was written by Frithiof Lennmalm, a professor of nervous pathology. Freud wrote On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement in 1914. Nine years later, in 1923, he felt obliged to specify in a note: “At the present time the Scandinavian countries are still the least receptive.” Psychoanalysis was introduced to Sweden in a manner that was at least unique. The two pioneers, Emanuel af Geijerstam, installed in Goteborg from 1898 to 1928, and Poul Bjerre, who worked in Stockholm and its surroundings for almost half a century, shared a similar attitude: they were both interested in psychoanalysis but were keenly critical of it. Geijerstam, a researcher and psychotherapist, approved of the theses of Alfred Adler and Carl Gustav Jung, without however being hostile to psychoanalysis. He wrote about Freud in 1902 but, from 1916 until his death, he persistently stressed that “anagogic analysis” constituted a progression on Freudian psychoanalysis. And when Geijerstam went on a study trip it was not to Vienna but to Zurich. Poul Bjerre met Freud in December 1910. At a conference of the Swedish medical association the following year he introduced a part of Freudian theory. He went on to translate and in 1924 to publish some articles by Freud. From the time of his first encounter with the founder of psychoanalysis, and particularly after 1912, he was convinced that his own work was more important. For Bjerre, Freud had become bogged down in a mechanistic science that specifically prevented him from understanding the scope of psychosynthesis. Thus, for thirty years Freud was represented in Sweden by two physicians specializing in nervous diseases, having different points of view, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SWEDEN but who shared their refusal to take on board the totality of Freud’s theory. In the bulletins of the Swedish medical association we find criticism of Freud as early as 1910. The tone was set by two eminent physicians, Bror Gadelius (1862-1938) and Olof Kinberg (1873-1960). Gadelius, a psychiatrist, adopted the following stance: “Freud has overestimated the importance of sexuality; this is because of the nature of his clientele who, in a cosmopolitan city like Vienna, have a particular propensity for exaggeration. We cannot never overstress the fact that alongside the sexual complexes— whose role in the appearance of hysteria I in no way wish to underestimate—there exist other complexes charged with affect that can give birth to neuroses and hysteria, and how much these complexes go hand in hand with the “Ich Triebe [ego-instincts].” However, this point of view did not prevent Gadelius from acknowledging the merits of Freud’s theory. In his important work on psychiatry, Det manskliga Sjalsivet (The Human Soul), he specifically wrote that “in recent years, largely thanks to Freud and his school, much more attention has been accorded than previously to the importance of the sexual instinct in psychic life.” To sum up, Giejerstam and Bjerre, who are generally considered to have introduced psychoanalysis to Sweden, and Gadelius, the greatest critic and opponent of the discipline, adopted a similar position. Simultaneous with the growing interest in psychoanalysis in Sweden at the end of the 1920s, we find the increasing hostility of several influential physicians and academics. This resistance had already made its appearance in 1911 when Poul Bjerre tried to publish his conference, “The Psychoanalytic Method,” in which he gave the most positive presentation of psychoanalysis and met with what he considered to be unjustified criticism. Presentations delivered within the framework of the Swedish medical association were normally published in the review Hygiea. Bjerre’s was refused on the pretext that it was too long. In addition, Gadelius indulged in a methodical criticism of psychoanalysis in his work Tro och helbragdagorelse. Jamte en kritisk studie av psykoanalysen (Faith and Healing. A Critical Study of Psychoanalysis), published in 1934. The review Clarté, which had socialist leanings, was a branch of the international Clarte movement and acted as a platform for psychoanalysis. In the latter 1697 SWEDEN half of the twenties it published the texts of the Swedish pioneers of Freudianism. A few intellectuals believed that psychoanalysis could perhaps be used to formulate a radical theory of society. Interest in psychoanalysis was essentially linked to this aspect and was marked by its pragmatism. In the thirties literary circles little by little began to take an interest in psychoanalysis. This interest took many forms, including the creation of the review Spektrum, which published modernist poetry and translations of psychoanalysts like Anna Freud, Erich Fromm, and Wilhelm Reich. One of the Swedish pioneers, Per Henrik Torngren, who went into analysis with Ludwig Jekels a few years later, was part of the editing committee and published his own texts in the review. During this same period Sweden saw the publication of considerable extracts from The Interpretation of Dreams, as well as, in their entirety, The Future of an Illusion and Civilization and Its Discontents. In August 1931 the pioneers of psychoanalysis in the Scandinavian countries met to discuss for the first time the formation of a psychoanalytic society. Among the participants were Sigurd Naesgaard, a Dane; Harald Schjelderup, a Norwegian; Vrid Kulovesi, a Finn, and Alfhild Tamm, a Swede. Tamm, who organized the meeting, had international experience and had been a member since 1926 of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. The Scandinavian group then split into two societies, a Danish-Norwegian society and a Finnish- Swedish society, for which she became the spokesperson. Tamm was the first woman psychiatrist in Sweden. Her theoretical work was of minimal importance. She invoked the tradition of the Enlightenment to combat prejudice with regard to masturbation and sought to understand the mechanisms of aphasia. Tamm was too much on her own for the first ten years to enable the society to become influential and the activities of the pioneers of psychoanalysis were somewhat limited. The early thirties saw the arrival in Scandinavian countries of psychoanalysts who had been trained in Central Europe, particularly Vienna and Berlin. The Viennese Ludwig Jekels, a student of Freud’s, settled in Sweden from 1934 to 1937. He saw his work as a training analyst in Stockholm as a difficult and thankless task and he finally left Sweden with the feeling that he had failed in his mission. As was common at the time, some Nordic pioneers made the journey to Vienna, Berlin, or Zurich to be analyzed by August Aichhorn, 1698 Helene Deutsch, Paul Federn, Eduard Hitschmann, Oskar Pfister, or Harald Schultz-Hencke. The Nordic psychoanalysts were looking for more competent colleagues than themselves who would be capable of training them, and from 1926 onward they began to organize themselves along the lines of the model fixed by the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA). Scandinavian countries simultaneously witnessed the creation of new psychotherapy societies based on an eclectic concept of psychotherapy and the exclusion of some of the bases of psychoanalysis, such as the theory of infantile sexuality and dream theory. In 1932 Norway saw the formation of the Nordisk Psykoanalytisk Samfund (Nordic Psychoanalytic Society) under the presidency of Alfhild Tamm with, among its most notable members, Poul Bjerre and Sugurd Naesgaard. In Denmark the Psykoanalytisk Samfund was founded in December 1933, with Swedish Poul Bjerre, Danish Sigurd Naesgaard, and Norwegian Irgens Stromme playing the leading roles. During World War II the Dutch psychoanalyst René de Moncy, a personal friend of Freud, went to live in Sweden as a result of his encounter in Vienna with the Jewish Swedish psychoanalyst Vera Palmstierna, who had been in analysis with Freud. The couple settled in Stockholm. René de Moncy had played a major role in the Dutch Society and was to play an equally important role in Sweden during the eight years that he lived there. He was psychoanalyst to Ola Andersson (1919-1990) and the Hungarian psychologist Lajos Székely (1904-1995) who was practicing in Sweden. Székely was a Jewish émigré who had arrived in 1944 with his wife Edith, a physician and psychoanalyst. He had trained as an analyst firstly in Hungary, then in Germany and Holland during the 1930s, and finally in Sweden. He was to play a major role in the 1950s by providing analytic training for Swedish physicians and psychologists. He wrote on a variety of subjects, among them the links between the unconscious and creativity. Szekely spoke several languages and published articles in English, French, Swedish, German, and Hungarian. Stefi Pedersen (1908-1980) began her analytic training in the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute. She was first analyzed by Otto Fenichel in Berlin and later joined him in Oslo. In Sweden—where she arrived with a group of Jewish children after a stay in Norway— she worked in the Swedish Psychoanalytic INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Society (Svenska Psykoanalytiska Féreringen). She did a second analysis, this time as trainee, with René de Monchy. Her status as a member of the Society did not prevent her from adopting an independent and critical position. She was rather radical in her thinking and was attracted by Alexander Mitscherlich’s theses. She wrote articles on vulnerability and the effects of the Nazi terror on psychoanalysts and clinical work. She published texts in English, German, Norwegian, and Swedish. In August 1943, Tore Ekman (1887-1971) returned to Sweden after practicing for nearly twenty years in Berlin and Leipzig, as well as working as “Lektor” in Leipzig University. He trained under Therese Benedek, a close friend of Alfhild Tamm, and went on to play a role of capital importance in the Swedish Psychoanalytic Society, although he published very little. The psychoanalyst and theorist of science, Carl Lesche (1920-1993), a Finnish émigré in Sweden in the early 1950s, was also to occupy an important position in the Swedish Society between the 1960s and the 1980s. Among his influences were philosophers Wilhelm Dilthey, Edmund Husserl, and Karl-Otto Apel. The question of the classification of psychoanalysis was to take on a new dimension with him. He claimed that it was essential to define what made psychoanalysis more of a hermeneutic discipline than a natural science and to point out where it differed from psychotherapy. However, the influence of Lesche has not extended beyond the borders of Sweden. Swedish psychoanalysts have done little research work and have made few important contributions to the history and theory of psychoanalysis. Ola Andersson’s thesis, “Freud before Freud. The Prehistory of Psychoanalysis” (1962) constitutes a remarkable exception, as does academic Gunnar Brandell’s more substantial essay, “Freud a Child of his Century” (1961). Ola Andersson wrote an in-depth study of the context in the history of ideas that saw the birth and evolution of Freud’s thinking up to 1896, the time when he formulated the concept of psychoanalysis. Andersson stressed the importance of the influence of Herbart on Freud and conducted original research into the true identity of Emmy von N. Andersson and Brandell. Both took part in Uppsala University seminars conducted by Wilhelm Sjéstrand, a pedagogue and history enthusiast who organized seminars at the end of the 1950s, during the time Michel Foucault was teaching at this university. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SWEDEN Few psychoanalysts in Sweden have taken an interest in philosophy, the theory of science, or the history of ideas, just as few Swedish philosophers and academics have studied Freudian theory, with one exception: researchers in the psychology department of Lund University have taken an interest in psychoanalysis since the 1940s. The Swedish Psychoanalytic Society now numbers more than one hundred and ninety members and there is ever growing interest in its training program. Toward the middle of the 1960s, voices were nevertheless raised in criticism of this training. In 1963 one of the society’s psychoanalysts, Margit Norell, secretary to the training group, founded a work group with some of the analysands. This work resulted in 1968 in the formal creation of the Swedish Society for Holistic Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis (SSHPP), which joined the International Federation of Psychoanalytic Societies (IFPS) in 1972. The SSHPP was initially supported by neo-Freudians, Erich Fromm, Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, and Harry Stack Sullivan. Harold Kelman, an American closely allied with Karen Horney, greatly contributed to its development. He organized seminars and was thesis director for many teachers. Toward the end of the 1970s, the SSHPP took an increasing interest in the theory of object relations, particularly in the work of theoreticians like Melanie Klein, Ronald Fairbairn, Donald Winnicott, and even Wilfred Bion. This same period saw intensified relations between the Swedish Psychoanalytic Society and the Swedish Society for Holistic Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis, which began to study Freud more than ever. In May 1992 it was decided in agreement with the majority of the members to request affiliation with the IPA. Since then the IPA has never ceased to grow and it now numbers about seventy-five members. In the 1970s, Swedes began to take an interest in Jacques Lacan and French psychoanalysis. This interest coincided with the publication in Swedish of the works of the French structuralists. A first translation of Lacan’s work appeared, entitled Ecrits, but containing less than 15 percent of the French edition of Ecrits, and was followed by pirate publications of other translations of texts by Lacan. Inspired by Lacan’s work, a few rare researchers in human sciences were seduced by the idea of establishing links between psychoanalysis and modern linguistics. For a short period during the 1970s and 1980s, psychoanalysts from South America and the United States trained psychologists and physicians at 1699 Swiss PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY Goteborg. In 1974 the Géteborg Institute for Psychotherapy (Goteborg Psykoterapi Institut) was founded, its founders, the Argentinean psychoanalysts Angel and Dora Fiasché, having been trained in their own country by the IPA. Dora Fiasché is a philosopher and still a member of the IPA. Angel Fiascheé is a physician and has since left the IPA. The Fiaschés, who consider themselves to be socialists, are close to Kleinian psychoanalysis in terms of theory. They have worked with, among others, Len Grinberg, Maria Langer, and Enrique Pichon-Riviére. They regularly return to Goteborg and several members of the Institute have been to Buenos Aires for professional reasons. In terms of its orientation the Géteborg Institute for Psychotherapy is eclectic and pragmatic and adopts a radical position on social questions. It now has more than forty members. Just as in Goteborg, the interest in the theoretical works of Melanie Klein has also increased elsewhere. In Sweden the dawn of the twenty-first century has seen renewed criticism of psychoanalysis, coming in equal parts from academic psychology and biological psychiatry. This has not prevented psychoanalysts and researchers from all quarters from taking part in a joint project: the publication in Swedish by a major publishing house of the complete works of Sigmund Freud. In 2002, the review Psykoanalytisk tid/Skrifr began publication in Géteborg; it is mainly orientated toward French psychoanalysis and thought. PER MAGNUS JOHANSSON, Davip TITELMAN Bibliography Gadelius, Bror. (1934). Tro och helbragdagorelse jamte en kritisk studie av psykoanalysen. Stockholm: Hugo Gebers. Johansson, Per Magnus. (1999). Freuds psykoanalys, utgangspunkter/ arvtagare i Sverige. Goteborg: Daidalos. (2003). Freuds psykoanalys, arvtagare i Sverige. Goteborg: Daidalos. Luttenberger, Franz. (1989). Freud i Sverige. Stockholm: Carlsson Bokforlag. Torngren, Pehr Henrik. (1936). Striden om Freud. Stockholm: Albert Bonniers Forlag. SWISS PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY See Schweizerische Arztegesellschaft fiir psychoanalyse 1700 SWITZERLAND (FRENCH-SPEAKING) Freud’s ideas found their first echo in Geneva, a psychological milieu infused with scientific tradition and thus offering a more favorable reception in French-speaking Switzerland than in France. As early as 1900 Théodore Flournoy and his student and successor Edouard Claparéde, professors of psychology in the science faculty of the University of Geneva, enthusiastically welcomed these new ideas and contributed to spreading them. The psychoanalytic movement began in Frenchspeaking Switzerland in the 1920s when the first French-speaking psychoanalysts joined the Société suisse de psychanalyse (Swiss Psychoanalytic Society), founded in Zurich on March 24, 1919, by Emil and Mira Oberholzer and Oskar Pfister. At approximately the same time, in September 1920, physician and nonphysician psychoanalysts created the Geneva Psychoanalytic Society. This short-lived society, which was never enrolled with the International Psychoanalytical Association, disappeared at the end of the 1920s. During the first period (1919-1952), the first psychoanalysts, for example, Charles Odier and Raymond de Saussure, worked to make Freud’s ideas known not only in French-speaking Switzerland but also in Paris, . where they helped found the Sociéte psychanalytique de Paris (Paris Psychoanalytic Society), the Revue francaise de psychanalyse, and the Conference des psychanalystes de langue francaise (Conference of French- Speaking Psychoanalysts). During the 1920s contacts with Swiss German psychoanlaysts were rare, but came to be strengthened after the departure of the Oberholzer group in 1928 and under the presidency of Philipp Sarasin, who instituted the Swiss society’s teaching commission. Psychoanalytic life in Geneva was initially dominated by Henri Flournoy, Charles Odier, and Raymond de Saussure, along with Charles Baudouin, who later founded his own school of psychoanalysis. Henri Flournoy (1886-1955), physician and psychoanalyst and son of Theodore Flournoy, trained with Johan H. W. Van Ophuijsen in Holland, then with Freud and Hermann Nunberg in Vienna. His teaching played an important role, and along with Odier, he introduced training analysis to French-speaking Switzerland. Odier set up in Paris in 1922, and Saussure followed suit in 1937. Marguerite A. Sechehaye (1887-1964) developed symbolic realization, a method of psychoanalytic therapy for schizophrenics. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Prior to the Second World War, psychoanalysis began to spread through French-speaking Switzerland outside of Geneva. In the Valais canton its development was linked to Dr. André Repond (1886-1973), director of the Hopital de Malévoz psychiatric clinic, as well as Dr. Norbert Benoziglio and Germaine Guex, who helped create the first psychoanalytically informed medical-psychological consultations. The outbreak of World War II saw the return of Odier to Switzerland to settle in Lausanne, whereas Saussure left for the United States in 1940, where he remained until 1952. As soon as he returned to Geneva in 1952, Saussure gave a distinct impetus to psychoanalysis in Frenchspeaking Switzerland by organizing training. In Geneva he was assisted by Michel Gressot, physician and psychoanalyst, then in 1956 by Marcelle Spira, a Swiss psychoanalyst trained in the Melanie Klein school in Argentina, and in Lausanne he was assisted by Germaine Guex, Marcel Roth (1911-1992), Etiennette Roch-Meyerhof (1914-1989), and Madeleine Rambert (1900-1973), child psychoanalyst. These psychoanalysts had a lasting influence by virtue of their scientific accomplishments and the training they provided for many psychoanalysts from various parts of the world. They were later joined in Geneva by Olivier Flournoy, son of Henri, who trained in Paris and the United States, and in Lausanne by René Henny, child and adult psychoanalyst and professor of child psychiatry, and by Christian Miiller and Pierre-Bernard Schneider, who were psychoanalysts and directors of psychiatric institutions. René A. Spitz stayed in Geneva for six years during the 1960s and contributed to training there. Julian de Ajuriaguerra, director of the psychiatric institutions at the University of Geneva from 1959 to 1973, and René Diatkine, on regular visits from Paris, also stimulated the development of child and adult psychoanalysis. In the Tessin canton, the Swiss Italian region under the authority of the teaching commission of French-speaking Switzerland, Pier Mario Masciangelo organized psychoanalytic training from 1959 onward. The Centre Raymond de Saussure (Raymond de Saussure Center) was inaugurated in Geneva in 1973. This equipped French-speaking Switzerland with premises specifically for psychoanalytic seminars, conferences, and a library. Prior to that, meetings were organized in university psychiatric institutions. From this point onward psychoanalysis developed considerably, particularly in Geneva, around Janice INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SWITZERLAND (FRENCH-SPEAKING) de Saussure, Raymond’s wife, an active member and vice president of the International Psychoanalytical Association, as well as around Marcelle Spira, Olivier Flournoy, and Claire Degoumois. In Lausanne psychoanalysis developed around Marcel Roch, Etiennette Roch, and René Henny. In the 1990s there were too many French-speaking Swiss training analysts to mantion them all, yet it may be helpful to cite those who have made names for themselves through their psychoanalytic publications. Some of them practice as psychoanalysts while occupying positions in university psychiatric institutions for adults, like André Haynal and Antonio Andreoli; in institutions for children, like Bertrand Cramer, Juan Manzano, and Paco Palacio; and in institutions for adolescents, like Francois Ladame. Others engage mainly in private psychoanalytic practice, like Georges Abraham, Graziella Nicolaidis, Nicos Nicolaidis, Daniele Quinidoz, and Jean-Michel Quinodoz, all based in Geneva. Pyschoanalysis in Switzerland is characterized by pluralism, a fact reflected in the variety of schools of thought, French-speaking psychoanalysts being influenced by French psychoanalysis, as well as British, mainly Kleinian, psychoanalysis, and Germanspeaking analysts being influenced mainly by ego psychology. Psychoanalytic institutions have adopted a federalist structure that reflects Swiss trilingualism (German, French, and Italian) and its cultural diversity. For this reason the activities of psychoanalysts in Frenchspeaking Switzerland are centered around institutions that are both national (monthly meetings of the Société suisse de psychanalyse with simultaneous translations, generally held in Berne) and regional (meetings in the Centre Raymond de Saussure in Geneva). Daisy de Saugy, historian and psychoanalyst, is responsible for keeping the archives. The entirely bilingual German-French Bulletin de la Société suisse de psychanalyse appeared from 1965 to 1969 and then appeared regularly twice a year from 1979 onward. In French-speaking Switzerland other trends now claim to represent psychoanalysis, but their practice and technique is closer to psychotherapy than to the psychoanalysis instituted by Freud. Geneva has a Charles Baudouin center for psychoanalysis and psychotherapy, as well as a Jungian group, and a Freudian study group unites Lacanians around Mario and Mireille Cifali in Geneva and around Francois Ansermet 1701 SwitzeRLand (GERMAN-SPEAKING) in Lausanne. This group has published the journal Le Bloc—Notes de la psychanalyse since 1980. JEAN-MICHEL QuUINODOZ Bibliography Ellenberger, Henri F. (1952). La psychiatrie suisse. Evolution psychiatrique, 17, 139-158, 719-723. Meerwein, Fritz. (1979). Reflexionen zur geschichte der Schweizerischen gesellschaft fiir psychoanalyse in der deutschen Schweiz. Bulletin de la Société suisse de psychanalySE, 9, 25-40. (With French translation: Reflexions sur Vhistoire de la Société suisse de psychanalyse en Suisse alemanique.) Roch, Marcel. (1980). A propos de histoire de la psychanalyse en Suisse romande. Bulletin de la Société suisse de psychanalySE, 10, 17-30. Saussure, Raymond de. (1967-1968). L*histoire de la psychanalyse en Suisse romande. Bulletin de la Société suisse de psychanalySE, 6, 1-4. SWITZERLAND (GERMAN-SPEAKING) Switzerland was the first country, and Zurich and Geneva the first cities outside of Vienna, where psychoanalysis found a corresponding echo. From Zurich it went on to find its way into academic psychiatry, which developed modern psychodynamic psychiatry. As elsewhere, German-speaking Switzerland had its rifts and defections. Some particularities of the country helped contribute to this evolution: Switzerland is a federation of small states (cantons) professing different religions, speaking different languages, and asserting their own autonomy. Individualism and _ particularities, alongside tendencies toward pragmatic egalitarianism, are part of the national tradition. There are also great class differences. The two psychiatrists from Freud’s generation who paved the way for the introduction of psychoanalysis in Switzerland represent this tradition in a particular manner: Auguste Forel (1848-1931), a French-speaking Swiss who directed the Burgh6lzli university asylum in Zurich, and his successor from 1898, Eugen Bleuler (1857-1939). They were both close to the patients through daily contact and were socially very committed. Forel devoted a lot of time to hypnosis and sexual education, but kept his distance from psychoanalysis, while Bleuler greeted Freud’s book on 1702 aphasia (1891b) with enthusiasm and recognized the global significance of Studies on Hysteria (1895d). “My personal experience with schizophrenics confirmed Freud is right, much to my surprise,” he wrote in 1910, when successfully defending psychoanalysis against attacks from every quarter. His book on schizophrenia (1911) is influenced by psychoanalysis and in 1901 he encouraged his new assistant, Carl Gustav Jung (1875- 1961), to study The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), which had just been published, and to apply the “test of free association” to patients suffering from dementia praecox. Psychoanalysis thus acquired new certainties and Jung met Freud in 1907. Led by Jung, a group of his young colleagues, among them Franz Riklin, Alphonse Maeder, Johann Jakob Honegger, and Ludwig Binswanger, were fired with enthusiasm for psychoanalysis. “The nucleus of the small band who were fighting for the recognition of analysis,” as Freud described it (1914d), consisted of foreigners who were attracted by the worldwide reputation of Bleuler’s clinic and who came there to train. This was the case of Karl Abraham, Max Eitingon, Hermann Nunberg, Johan H. W. Van Ophuijsen, Abraham A. Brill, Sabina Spielrein, and many more. The essential contribution of the Zurich group consisted of its in-depth research into the psychoses. In Jung, Freud found an expert partner who was gifted with a creative imagination and interested in the history of cultures and religions. The publication of the five volumes of the Jahrbuch between 1909 and 1913, the creation of a psychoanalytic association in Zurich in 1907 and its transformation into a regional group of the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA), founded in 1910, were very largely due to Jung’s exuberant activity. In 1908 the Zurich pastor Oskar Pfister discovered the extent to which psychoanalysis could contribute to spiritual directorship and teaching. He became a zealous propagator, especially in teaching circles, for example with Ernst Schneider, director of a seminary, and his student Hans Zulliger in Bern, whereas theologian Paul Haberlin, a pedagogue and an influential professor of philosophy, came into contact with psychoanalysis through Ludwig Binswanger. This whole flowering was quickly swept away by the split between Jung and Freud in 1913, when the majority of the Swiss followed Jung. The theoretical differences centered around Jung's “dilution” of the theory of the libido, but the difficulty of the Swiss in separating themselves from the outside world through INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS principles also had a role to play in it. “Jung was Freud’s great disciple who tried by diplomatic means to reconcile the world to psychoanalysis,” as L. Marcuse wrote with much insight (1956). The Swiss Psychoanalytic Society (SGPsa) was founded in Zurich on March 21, 1919, and still exists to this day. Pioneering member Oskar Pfister worked there with younger colleagues such as Emil Oberholzer and his wife Mira Gincburg, Hermann Rorschach, Hans Zulliger, and many more. What changed was the growing professionalism; candidates were progressively required to have really experienced analysis. Eminent members like Ernst Blum (Bern), Philipp Sarasin (Basel), Henri Flournoy, Charles Odier, Raymond de Saussure (Geneva), and the two Oberholzers (Zurich) had been analyzed by Freud himself. This fact had a stabilizing and unifying influence until the middle of the twentieth century. But conflict grew rapidly; it was triggered by technical questions, such as short analyses without elaboration of the transference and resistance, a technique introduced by Oskar Pfister in the heroic period. Emil Oberholzer, the president, hit on a summary solution in 1928 by founding a new society, the Schweizerische Arztegesellschaft fiir Psychoanalyse (Swiss Medical Society for Psychoanalysis), from which “lay” members, like Oskar Pfister, were automatically excluded, but also Zulliger. The IPA did not recognize his group and after a few years it had no more than a token existence. With fewer members (forty members in 1927, five of them residents of French-speaking Switzerland, thirty-three members in 1929) the SGPsa enjoyed a peaceful existence until 1961 under the judicious presidency of Philipp Sarasin. Training requirements and conditions of membership had become stricter. The SGPsa did not have many representation activities, but some of its members were known for their publications and local actions that helped spread psychoanalysis. Basel became particularly important when Heinrich Meng moved there from Frankfurt and was appointed professor of “psychic hygiene” at the university. In a collection devoted to this subject he published not only his own works, but also important works by members of the SGPsa, for example, Rudolf Brun’s General Treatise on the Neuroses in 1942 and, in 1944, Trieb und Kultur (Instinct and Culture) by Hans Christoffel, a native of Basel. This collection enabled the representatives of the different trends in the intense INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SWITZERLAND (GERMAN-SPEAKING) intellectual life of Basel to familiarize themselves with the treasures of psychoanalytic thought. The first edition of Oskar Pfister’s work, Das Christentum und die Angst (Christianity and Fear) appeared in 1944. A new split appeared after World War II with the creation of “Daseinsanalyse” (“existential analysis”; Ludwig Binswanger and Maeder Boss), an attempt to base psychoanalysis on the philosophy of Husserl and Heidegger. A few analysts, who generally remained true to Freud, found elements there, for example, Gustav Bally and Ernst Blum. Rudolf Brun, of Zurich, violently opposed his strictly biological approach to this trend. But the real split took place in Germany with Alexander Mitscherlich in relation to a clinical case (1950). In the meantime, the next generation, the “descendants of Freud,” were actively engaged with two of Brun’s students: Paul Parin (born in 1916) and Fritz Morgenthaler (1919-1984). Parin (1949) appealed for greater consideration for the social criticism function of psychoanalysis, and Morgenthaler (1951) illustrated by means of a case history his virtuosity at picking up on unconscious intentions. Both of them represented a renewal of analytic thinking with the same unusual intensity and radicalism that we can also detect in their work in ethnopsychoanalysis (1963, 1971). For two decades they represented the center of gravity of psychoanalysis in German-speaking Switzerland. They were relentless guardians of the SGPsa training institute until, in the wake of May 1968, they demanded greater participation for candidates at the Zurich seminat of the SGPsa. As a result of the activism of extreme-left candidates this led, after long discussions in 1977, to the secession of the Zurich Psychoanalytic Seminar (PSZ), which declared itself autonomous and in which members became psychoanalysts upon their own authorization. For this reason, and also because an eminent group of analysts, primarily Parin and Morgenthaler, declared themselves in sympathy with the PSZ, there was a massive influx of analysts (about eight hundred participants in the eighties with a delegation at Bern and branches in Germany [cf. Luzifer- Amor, 1993]). The SGPsa had to be reconstituted in 1977 as the Freud-Institut Ziirich. The situation stabilized again, and the Basel and Bern groups, which were growing in importance, played a major role in this. One consequence of the crisis, however, is that psychoanalysis in Switzerland is, as of 2004, mainly concentrated in the 1703 Swosopa, HERMANN (1873-1963) French-speaking part of the country. As of 2003 lists members in the SGPsa. In 2004 there were 45 training analysts who bore the main responsibility for passing psychoanalysis along to Swiss students. Twenty-seven of them worked in Francophone Switzerland (including a few in the Italian-speaking parts); 18 worked in the German-speaking areas. KASPAR WEBER Bibliography Bleuler, Eugen (1910). Die psychoanalyse Freuds. Verteidigung und kritische Bemerkungen. Jahrbuch fiir psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen, 2, 623—730. Meerwein, Fritz (1979). Reflexionen zur geschichte der Schweizerischen gesellschaft fiir psychoanalyse in der deutschen Schweiz. (With French translation: Reéflexions sur histoire de la Société suisse de psychanalyse en Suisse alémanique). Bulletin de la Société suisse de psychanalySE, 9, 25-40. Moser, Alexander (1992). Psychoanalysis in Switzerland. In Paul Kutter (Ed.), Psychoanalysis international, a guide to psychoanalysis throughout the world (Vol. 1, Europe). Stuttgart- Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog. Walser, Hans H. (1976). Psychoanalyse in der Schweiz. In D. Eicke (Ed.): Die psychologie des 20. jahrhunderts (Vol. 2, pp. 1192-1218) Ziirich: Kindler. SWOBODA, HERMANN (1873-1963) Hermann Swoboda, professor of law and philosophy, was born on November 23, 1873, in Vienna, where he died on June 18, 1963. The son of a pharmacist, he attended the University of Vienna, where he also spent his career. After receiving a doctorate in law in 1897 and in philosophy in 1901, Swoboda was appointed privatdocent in psychology four years later. He was named professor extraordinarius (full professor without chair) in 1925. By his wife, Marie Felgel von Farmholz, he had three children. Passionate about music, Swoboda became intrigued with studies of the periodic rhythms in human life. He seems to have experienced financial difficulties during the course of his career. His last publication dates to 1940. Swoboda’s encounter with psychoanalysis was short but explosive. In correspondence with Otto Weininger 1704 from 1899 to 1902, he exchanged numerous ideas that helped Weininger to develop his monograph Sex and character (1906), published in German in 1903. Several years after Weininger’s suicide in 1903, Swoboda wrote a book about his friend, Otto Weiningers Tod (The death of Otto Weininger), published in 1911. Meanwhile, in 1900 Swoboda began an analysis with Freud that lasted only a few months. During one of their sessions, Swoboda remarked on contrasting fantasies of “overcoming” and “succumbing,” as he later explained, “now incubus, now succubus toward the events.” Freud explained the contrast by reference to the “bisexual disposition of each human” (Swoboda 1906, p. 7; quoted in Schroter, p. 151). Swoboda immediately conveyed this information to Weininger, who incorporated it into Sex and Character. This chain of events would become one of the arguments by which, in 1906, Wilhelm Fliess accused Freud of having transmitted ideas to those he characterized as plagiarists of his work: Weininger (on bisexuality) and Swoboda (on periodicity). In addition, in August 1901 Swoboda advised Weininger to visit Freud to seek his help in finding a publisher for his manuscript. In 1904 Swoboda published Die Perioden des menschlichen Organismus (Periodicity in the life of the,human organism) and sent a copy to Fliess, who at the time received it with pleasure. (Extracts can be found in Porge, 1994.) Only after reading Sex and Character and learning from Freud that Swoboda was his pupil did Fliess initiate accusations of plagiarism. Swoboda reacted by suing for defamation and lost; he also published the pamphlet Die gemeinniitzige Forschung und der eigenniitzige Forscher (Research of interest to the public and the researcher’s own self-interest; 1906). (Again, extracts can be found in Porge, 1994.) In Die Perioden Swoboda presents his psychological experiments on the spontaneous recurrence of memory representations after 18-hour, 23-hour, and 23-day periods. He included an adulatory chapter on Fliess’s work but did not mention Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams (1900a). These works stand against Wundt’s associative psychology. In 1917, in Siebenjahr (Septenary periods), Swoboda suggested that there are seven-year rhythms. Freud discusses Swoboda’s theses in the revised editions of The Interpretation of Dreams. Erk PORGE INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS See also: Fliess, Wilhelm; Sex and Character; Weininger, Otto. Bibliography Le Rider, Jacques. (1982). L’affaire Otto Weininger. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Porge, Erik. (1994). Vol didées? Paris: Denoél. Rodlauer, Hannelore. (1990), Otto Weiningers Eros und Psyche. Vienna: Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Schroter, Michael. (2003). Fliess versus Weininger, Swoboda, and Freud: the plagiarism conflict of 1906 assessed in the light of the documents. Psychoanalysis and History, 5, 2, 147-173. Swoboda, Hermann. (1904). Die perioden des menschlichen organismus in threr psychologischen und biologischen Bedeutung. Leipzig: Deuticke. . (1906). Die gemeinniitzige Forschung und der eigenniitzige Forscher: Antworten auf die von Wilhelm Flief erhobenen Beschuldigungen. Vienna: Braiimiller. . (1911). Otto Weiningers Tod. Vienna: F. Deuticke. . (1917). Das Siebenjahr. Leipzig: Orion. Weininger, Otto. (1906). Sex and character. London: W. Heinemann. (Original work published 1903) SYMBIOSIS/SYMBIOTIC RELATION In Margaret Mahler’s theory of the mother/child relationship, the symbiotic relation is a very early phase of development that follows the phase of normal primary autism and precedes the separation/individualization phase. The symbiotic relation is characterized by an omnipotent sense of the total enmeshing of mother and child, who thus form a “unity of two.” The concept of symbiosis and symbiotic relation came out of Margaret Mahler’s observations of the mother-baby relationship, and was later applied to clinical practice. Although a psychological concept, it is also part of the phenomenology of object relations. Its origins can be found in the description of the “purified ego-pleasure” (1915c) and the “oceanic feeling” of Freud (1930a [1929]), what Margaret Mahler considered as the experience of a baby who has not yet differentiated its identity from that of its object. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SymsBiosis/SymBiotic RELATION The specific features of symbiosis can best be seen against the description of the phase that precedes it as well as those that follow it: as Margaret Mahler points out, symbiosis overlaps the other phases. In the very first phase of life, that of normal primary autism, narcissism is absolutely primary and under the sway of physiological rather than psychological processes. There is a prolongation of the fetal state as Freud described it in 1911; its aim is the homeostatic equilibrium of the organism with the environment (1911b). The shell surrounding this egg forms a protective barrier that is not positively cathected. With symptoms, the shell begins to crack and—an essential point for Mahler—cathexis passes from the center to the periphery. This marks the beginning of a displacement from the self to the object that is still only obscurely perceived. The object exists in a partial state: that is, it is only apprehended through parts of the body that are experienced as having an object nature. The fully external character of the object is not yet constituted. From the point of view of energy, while the primary autistic phase is characterized by the existence of an “undifferentiated” energy, differences start to appear in the symbiotic phase between the “good” or “bad” qualities of experience, making of this phase a “quasi-ontogenetic basis for splitting,’ long before the separation between the ego and the object occurs. This phase starts around the second month of life, and reaches its peak at around four or five months, just at the time when the phase of separation- individuation is filtering into the symbiotic relation. The relation between the inside and the outside of the body emerges progressively from what Margaret Mahler calls a “hallucination” or a “somato-psychic fusion.” Although Margaret Mahler is here describing a state rather than a defense enabling one to reach that state, she thinks that projective mechanisms play a role in maintaining, thanks to a displacement outwards of anything that disrupts or disturbs the symbiotic relation. In her view, failure in the development of the processes of individuation makes the child regress to the stage of symbiotic relation with the mother, thus running the risk of shutting it off in a psychotic disorganization, a “symbiotic psychosis” characterized by a delirious state of undifferentation between the ego and the object. Leaving the symbiotic phase entails the risk of depression. 1705 SYMBOL Even if Margaret Mahler sees it as closer to secondary narcissism (Freud), the concept of symbiosis can constitute a bridge between primary and secondary narcissism. It corresponds to what René Spitz calls the “pre-objectal stage” (1965), which in his view partly covers that of the symbiotic phase. But René Spitz links these processes to those of primary identification with the mother. Donald Winnicott also comes close to the description of the mother-baby symbiosis with his concept of “primary maternal preoccupation,” in which the state of maternal hypersensitivity leads the primitive mother-baby couple to live in a particular environment, a prolongation of the uterine environment in which communication between mother and child is immediate and not subject to the vagaries of separation. Wilfred Bion (1970), in his work on bonding, takes up the idea of a so-called “symbiotic” relation being set up between the leader of a group and the group in question. In this case, the encounter is beneficial for both parties, as opposed to the indifference of the commensal bond and the destructivity of the parasitic bond. Margaret Mahler did not sufficiently develop the link with psychoanalytical clinical practice and in consequence, left to one side the active role played by the processes of identification. Unlike Melanie Klein, who considers the role of anxiety right from the start of life, in the act of introjection-projection on the basis of narcissistic and secondary identifications, Mahler wants to separate the early infantile problematic from the necessary perception of separation—whatever form it might take—between the ego and the object. We can say that the idea of a fundamental “transitionality,’ as developed by Winnicott, leading from the fetal state to the individuation of the human being, is very influential in Mahler’s thinking on the concept of symbiosis. In spite of the deep truth that it contains, insofar as it presides over all psychological development, in Margaret Mahler and those who place it at the center of their theorizing, this idea tends to evade the question of the suffering of mourning, which presides over any passage towards individuation, or towards “psychological birth,” as Mahler calls it. CLBOPATRE ATHANASSIOU-POPESCO See also: Framework of the psychoanalytical treatment; Gender identity; Individual; Individuation (analytical 1706 psychology); Infantile psychosis; Mahler-Schénberger, Margaret; Maternal; Primary identification; Principle of identity preservation; Purified-pleasure-ego; Relations (commensalism, symbiosis, parasitism); Self (true/false); Self-mutilation in children. Bibliography Bion, Wilfred R. (1970). Attention and interpretation. London: Tavistock. ; Freud, Sigmund. (1911b). Formulations on the two principles of mental functioning. SE, 12: 213-226. . (1915c). Instincts and their vicissitudes. SE, 14: 109-140. . (1930a [1929]). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21: 57-145. Mahler, Margaret S.; Pine, Fred; and Bergman, Anni. (1975). The psychological birth of the human infant. New York, Basic Books. Spitz, René A., and Coblinger, W. G. (1965). The first year of life. A psychoanalytic study of normal and deviant development of object relations. New York: International Universities Press. Winnicott, Donald W. (1958). Through paediatrics to psycho- analysis. London: Tavistock. Further Reading Gergely, Gyorgy. (2000). Reapproching Mahler: New perspectives on normal autism, symbiosis, splitting and libidinal object constancy from cognitive developmental theory. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 48, 1197-1228. SYMBOL From a psychoanalytic perspective, the symbol refers to all indirect and figurative representations of unconscious desire (symptoms, dreams, slips of the tongue, parapraxes, etc.). This conception of the unconscious symbol depends on a relation of general substitution where one thing takes the place of another; but unlike the term’s conventional meaning, defined by the conjunction between the symbol and what is symbolized, the unconscious symbol is defined by a disjunction between symbol and symbolized. Freud clarified this conception of the symbol following the “Project for a Scientific Psychology” (1950c [1895]), describing it as a mnemic symbol subsequent INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS to his research into hysterical symptoms. In the case of a “standard” symbol, the connection between the symbol and what is symbolized remains, as in the example that Freud gives of the knight who fights for his lady’s glove but who knows full well that the glove owes its importance to her. In this synecdoche of part for whole the conjunction of meaning is clear. With hysteria however, it is the loss of the connection between the symbol and what is symbolized that is noteworthy: “The hysteric, who weeps at A,.is quite unaware that he is doing so on account of the association A-B, and B itself plays no part at all in his psychical life. The symbol has in this case taken the place of the thing entirely” (1950c, p. 349). As a result of this disjunction of meaning, the affect that was bound to what is symbolized attaches itself to the symbol. In both instances the substitution assumes a similarity between the symbol and what is symbolized (A/B), and thus emerges the tension at the very heart of symbolic substitution between a nonsensical literal interpretation and a symbolic interpretation that supports a surplus of meaning because of the very denial or negation [négation] precluding the pure and simple assimilation of the two terms in question. In the case of the hysterica! symbol, it is the impossibility of invoking denial that would explain the symptom’s apparent absurdity. What might appear here as a simple relation of substitution between two terms —the symbol and what is symbolized—allows, in fact, for an interpretation where meaning might attributed according to context. The symbol’s abundance derives from its polysemy, but only reference to a regulated system of interpretation can lend precision to the symbol, hence the requirement to define the system and determine what it is that permits this regulation. Freud hesitated between two rules of interpretation. Either it depends on individual context—specifically, a person’s individual associations, which permit them to discover hidden meaning, as in the hysterical symptom or in dreams—or on collective context—specifically, a work of transindividual culture that clarifies meaning, as in “symbolic dream-interpreting” (1900a, p. 97). On the subject of the dream, he depicted sexual symbols that did not arouse associations for the dreamer but that the analysis would supply by referring to the symbolism of collective compositions (myths, tales, proverbs, songs, etc.); this enabled him to rediscover the correlation between the manifest and latent symbol. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SYMBOL This obscure and concealed comparability appeared to be based on a relationship of equivalence (a tree for the male sex organs, a cave for the female sex organs), but also occasionally on a relationship of proximity (nudity symbolized by clothes and uniforms). If symbols are multiple, the field of what is symbolized is highly limited, relating ultimately to the domain of sexual instinct. The theory of a predetermined and stereotyped sexual symbolic, in the service of an oneiric representability, corresponds with Freud’s wish to contest Jung’s theory of symbolism, whose conception of the “libido-symbol” ends up denying the importance of the sexual instinct in psychic behavior. Ernest Jones’s key paper, “The Theory of Symbolism” (1916), seeks moreover to reinforce the Freudian theory of “symbolic dream-interpretation”; for Jones all true symbolism is the substitute for repressed drives/instincts: “Only that which is repressed is symbolized and only that which is repressed requires symbolization.” It is a question then of finding a rule of interpretation that can substantiate the discovery of the unconscious. To back up his theory Freud adopted the linguist Hans Sperber’s theory of a primitive language [langue] parallel to the primitive language system [langage] of sexuality in which all symbolic connections would appear as traces and relics: “That which today is linked symbolically was in all probability formerly linked conceptually and linguistically.” Freud is thus compelled to set out from a real anteriority, in a proximate association, or identity even, that belongs, through a similar association, to language and to a process of symbolization that is inseparable from the work of instinct. Thus, the theory of the symbolic designates more of a structural demand than a clinical truth. In clinical terms, Freud always mistrusted instant symbolic interpretations and preferred to rely on individual associations that allowed him to uncover a linguistic usage that would justify the use of a symbolic representation. Freud’s theory of the symbol cannot therefore be separated from a conception of symbolization, which bears out the fact that the psychoanalytic approach is more a tripartite theory of interpretation, where it is necessary to consider the subject who symbolizes, than a theory of translation seeking to proceed via the simple substitution of one term for another. Freud’s 1707 SymBoLic EQUATION uncertainty demonstrates the difficulty of constructing a theory of the symbol while making allowances for the symbol both as a motivated sign (the symbol for Ferdinand de Saussure, corresponding to a natural analogy between symbol and symbolized) and as an arbitrary sign (the symbol for Charles Sanders Pierce, corresponding to the standard rule governing the signifier and signified, in other words to the arbitrary linguistic sign). What is problematic with this theory of the symbolic is the conception of symbolization as a failure of sublimation rather than as its accomplishment. This opposition marks a return in too radical a fashion to the opposition between a symbolism of the unconscious and a symbolism of language. Post-Freudian theorists have sought to reconcile these different aspects of the symbol, whether through a semantic perspective associated with the image, as in the case of Melanie Klein and post-Kleinian theorists, or through a syntactic approach associated with language, as in the case of Jacques Lacan. It is a question in both cases of reviving the Freudian intuition of the symbol as the result of a process of symbolization. To Klein’s interpretation of the imaginary, which retains a certain psychological realism, Lacan opposed reference to the symbolic order that represents an intellectualization of the unconscious. The approach to symbolization as a process presupposes the preservation of that which Freud, rather awkwardly, wished always to have prevail: namely, the necessity for a dualism, for the articulation of a viable distinction between the symbolism of the image and the symbolism of language. The truth of Freudian empiricism in the theory of primitive language, like the original proximity of the symbol, is no doubt to mark the importance of this fundamental proximity of the psyche with the body as the juncture between representation and affect, between meaning and primitive animism, characteristic of the hallucinatory satisfaction of desire. ALAIN GIBEAULT See also: Anagogical interpretation; Archetype (analytical psychology); “Claims of Psycho-Analysis to Scientific Interest”; Compensation (analytical psychology); Complex (analytical psychology); Dream symbolism; Idea/ representation; Infantile psychosis; Negation; Psychology of the Unconscious, The; “Project for a Scientific Psychology, A”; Self (analytical psychology); Symptom- 1708 formation; Mnemic symbol; Symbolic, the (Lacan); Symbolism; Thought-thinking apparatus; Visual arts and psychoanalysis. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. Part I, SE, 4: 1-338; Part II, SE, 5, 339-625. _ (1950c [1895]). Project for a scientific psychology. SE, 1: 281-387. Jones, Ernest. (1916). The theory of symbolism. Papers on psychoanalysis. Boston: Beacon. Further Reading Segal, Hanna. (1978). On symbolism. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 59, 315-320. SYMBOLIC EQUATION The concept of symbolic equation appears for the first time in Hanna Segal’s first paper, “Some Aspects of the Analysis of a Schizophrenic” (1950), in connection with her schizophrenic patient’s difficulty with symbolizing. The patient made no distinction between symbols and the objects they symbolized. For him, being like something and being something were the same. Symbols were equivalent to the things symbolized. There was an unconscious equation between the two. In her second paper, “A Psycho-Analytic Contribution to Aesthetics” (1952), Segal describes symbol formation as a precipitate of mourning. In “Notes on Symbol Formation” (1957), Segal formulates a theory of the dynamics of symbol formation and the role played by projective identification. Symbolism as a tripartite relation among self, object, and symbol. When projective identification is excessive, part of the ego becomes identified with the object, and the symbol, a creation and function of the ego, becomes identified with the object symbolized. In the depressive position, the object is given up, and a symbolic representation of the object is formed in the ego in the process of mourning. Segal offers the differentiations in Figure 1. In normal repression, there is communication between the unconscious and the conscious through symbols. In the kind of repression that Freud called excessive, the unconscious is -split off from the con- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FIGURE 1 Symbolic Equations Arise in the paranoid-schizoid position through projective identification. The symbol's own characteristics are not recognized. They are treated as though they were the original object. The symbolic equation is used to deny the loss of the object. It is the basis of acting out and symptoms. SYMBOLIC REALIZATION Symbols Symbols are formed when projective identification is withdrawn in the depressive position, and they are the precipitate of mourning. The symbol is not felt to be the object, but represents the object. Its own characteristics are recognized and respected. The symbol is used, not to deny, but to overcome the loss. Symbolism is at the basis of sublimation and it governs communication both external and internal. scious, and in the return of the repressed, consciousness is invaded by concrete symbols, as in hallucinations. Under stress, there may be a regression from symbolic functioning to symbolic equation. For instance, in the schizophrenic patient described in Segal’s first paper, thoughts and words formed in the depressive position became concretized, so that the patient could not, for instance, use names, because he experienced a name as biting into the person named. In “Depression in the Schizophrenic” (1956), Segal cites the example of a girl who wrote a story about Lancashire witches and in a breakdown felt herself persecuted by Lancashire witches. In her later papers, Segal, following Wilfred Bion, views pathological projective identification, not excessive projective identification, as responsible for disturbances in symbol formation. She made connections between her work on symbol formation and Bion’s alpha- and beta-elements. HANNA SEGAL See also: Neurosis; Infantile psychosis; Schizophrenia; Symbolism; Symbolization, process of. Bibliography Segal, Hanna. (1950). Some aspects of the analysis of a schizophrenic. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 31, 268-278. . (1952). A psycho-analytic contribution to aesthetics. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 33, 196-207. . (1956). Depression in the schizophrenic. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 37, 339-343. . (1957). Notes on symbol formation. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 38, 391-397. . (1978). On symbolism. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 59, 303-314. (1991). Dream, phantasy, and art. London: Routledge. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SYMBOLIC REALIZATION Symbolic realization is a psychoanalytically-inspired technique that is used in psychotherapy with schizophrenic patients. In 1947, in a supplement to the Revue Suisse de psychologie et de psychologie appliqué, Marguerite A. Sechehaye (1887-1964), a psychoanalyst in Geneva, described the technique in the article: “La realization symbolique: Nouvelle méthode de psychothérapie appliquée a un cas de schizophrénie (Symbolic realization: A new method of psychotherapy applied to a case of schizophrenia). In 1950 the patient’s own account of her illness and treatment was published, as she described them to her therapist. It was accompanied by a psychoanalytic interpretation of how the therapy developed (Sechehaye, Journal dune schizophrene [Autobiography of a Schizophrenic Girl]). Symbolic realization is a psychotherapeutic technique that combines the active support of the psychotherapist for the psychotic patient (this implies adjusting the frame) with interpretations of the patient’s unconscious fantasies in terms of libidinal development. This approach is based on the importance Sechehaye accords to real frustration in the disintegration of the ego, which lies at the root of schizophrenic psychosis. It follows from this perspective that the role of the therapist is to seek to satisfy the fundamental needs of the patient and repair the initial frustrations not only by interpreting the patient’s fantasies but also by establishing a real, even a physical, contact with the patient. This attitude is considered to help the patient to regress in order to be able to progress, resume the interrupted course of infantile development, and thus recover the sense of reality. This notion, which is akin to that of therapeutic regression (Donald W. Winnicott, Michael Balint), represents a pioneering and original approach to psychotic disorders. However, the active intervention of 1709 SymBoLic, THE (LACAN) the therapist in the patient’s life in order to satisfy her needs constituted an acting out that was not interpreted as such in a transference the importance of which was underestimated. JEAN-MICHEL QUINODOZ See also: Sechehaye-Burdet, Marguerite; Switzerland (French-speaking). Bibliography Laplanche, Jean, and Pontalis, Jean-Bertrand. (1967). Vocabulaire de la psychanalyse. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Sechehaye, Marguerite A. (1951). Autobiography of a schizophrenic girl; with analytic interpretation by Marguerite Sechehaye (Grace Rubin-Rabson, Trans.). New York: Grune and Stratton. . (1954). Introduction a la psychothérapie des schizophrenes. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. . (1957). La réalisation symbolique, un catalyseur de la structuration du moi schizophrene. In Acta psychotherapeutica, psychosomatica et orthopedagologica. Basel. . (1970). Symbolic realization; a new method of psychotherapy applied to a case of schizophrenia (Barbro Wiirsten and Helmut Wiirsten, Trans.). New York: International Universities Press. (Original work published 1947) SYMBOLIC, THE (LACAN) For Jacques Lacan, the symbolic, or the symbolic order, is a universal structure encompassing the entire field of human action and existence. It involves the function of speech and language, and more precisely that of the signifier. It appears as an essentially unconscious, latent apparatus. The idea of the symbolic is contemporaneous with the birth of psychoanalysis since the traces linked to repressed infantile sexual experiences are symbolically reactualized in adulthood as defensive symptoms. The fact that Freud emphasized memory and reminiscence in his earliest theoretical work is enough to indicate the primacy of symbolic traces in psychopathology. The Oedipus complex, the avatars of the primal relationship with the mother, and the function of the dead father all take on their importance because they function on the same axis where the signifier emerges as 1710 the mainspring of the symbolic. As Lacan wrote in the “Function and Field” essay, “Freud’s discovery was that of the field of effects, in man’s nature, of his relations to the symbolic order” (2002, p. 63). Further, Lacan’s entire body of work testifies to the fact that he was trying to restore the symbolic to its full status in psychoanalysis. . The impact of the symbolic is felt on several levels: first in limits placed on social alliances and relationships by a certain number of mechanisms, for which the traditional model is the pact. At another level, the symbolic intervenes in the form of discrete elements, namely signifiers, that are overdetermined as the prevalent forms of the imaginary, affective relations, and the choice of sexual objects. Lacan repeatedly referred to the canonical example of the “child with the reel” from Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Freud, 1920g) in order to emphasize that the mark of the absence of the beloved object is realized by the fort-da game of phonetic opposition that represented the appearance and disappearance of the mother. This correlation between the missing object and a symbolic signifying mark inscribed in language removes the object’s concrete features and grants it a level of conceptual force. The emergence of the signifier in the symbolic is best shown by the infant’s initiation into the dialectical field of demand and desire, for it is in the experience of vital distress and the appeal to a caretaker that a split occurs. Even if this caretaker satisfies a vital need, there is still a gaping lack of being. This equivocal division is brought about by the signifier of the first demand. It brings with it consequences beyond the frontiers of infancy and perpetuates a radical division in subjectivity. It also grants to the unconscious Other its symbolic place because the ultimate meaning of this signifier is assumed by the subject to reside in this other scene. In the demand, the inexpressible, originally repressed part of the signifier becomes the cause of desire by the process of repetition. Later, the Oedipus complex normalizes the structure by assigning a definitive meaning to a lack previously put in place— namely that the mother, as primordial Other, is assumed to possess the phallus, and the father, by prohibiting incest, reinforces the fact that the phallus is absent by conferring on it a symbolic function. Thus the father’s prohibition makes the phallic signifier cause desire in the very place where repression had left INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS a hole. From that point on, this operation links the lack (symbolic castration) to the law of language, in order to make it reappear as symbolic debt. The symbolic order is thus constituted as an autonomous system of signifiers, a system that is governed from the Other and to which the subject is subjugated. The primary character of the symbolic led Lacan to conceive of it as one of the dimensions constituting the Borromean knot, a formalized structural schema that also includes the imaginary and the real. JEAN-PauL HItTENBRAND See also: Blank/nondelusional psychosis; Castration of the subject; Child analysis; Death instinct (Thanatos); Demand; Ethics; Fantasy, formula of; Female sexuality; Feminism and psychoanalysis; Foreclosure; Fort-Da; Ego ideal/ideal ego; Imaginary identification/symbolic identification; Imaginary, the; Imago; Knot; L and R schemas; Matheme; Mirror stage; Name-of-the-Father; Neurosis; Object; Object a; Optical schema; Phallus; Privation; Psychoses, chronic and delusional; Real, the; Real, Imaginary, and Symbolic father; Sexuation, formulas of; Signifier; Structuralism and psychoanalysis; Subject; Subject’s desire; Symbol; Symbolization, process of; Symptom/ sinthome; Thalassa: A Theory of Genitality,; Topology; Unary trait; Want of being/lack of being. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1-64. Lacan, Jacques. (2002). The function and field of speech and language in psychoanalysis. In his Ecrits: A selection (Bruce Fink, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton (Original work published 1953) SYMBOLISM The evolution of representational capacities and symbolic expression has contributed essentially to human thought, language, and culture. There are different symbolic processes, and the symbolism particularly described and interpreted in psychoanalysis differs, in many respects, from what is designated by the same term in other disciplines. While psychoanalysis is interested in language and other forms of symbolism, psychoanalytic or unconscious symbols were early recognized as universal and ubiquitous expressions of the dynamic unconscious mind. In ordinary linguistic usage, a flag may represent a country, and a cross may INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SYMBOLISM represent a Christian religious reference. In the case of the flag and the cross and other emblems or pictorial metaphors, the relationship between the signifier and its referent is both within conscious awareness and in accord with social and cultural convention. In contrast to psychoanalytic symbols, these symbols are consciously understood by the individuals within a society in which they are used. They are not disguised, and they serve conscious communication. In contrast, psychoanalytic symbols are usually disguised by and from the individual who uses them and may not serve any conscious or intended internal or external communication. The meanings of psychoanalysis symbols are relatively independent of social, cultural, and historical settings and are neither taught nor learned. Psychoanalytic symbolism is not a product of education and evolves spontaneously in human development. Given the fact that these symbols are universal in individuals as well as cross-cultural, the capacity for such symbols is innate, though their development depends upon human development and experience. Psychoanalytic symbols emerge as a result of the interaction of the instinctual drives, defenses, and other ego functions with the developmental experience of the infant and child. Although psychoanalytic symbols may take on additional meanings in later phases of development and may become linked to metaphor, they are essentially products of archaic, infantile processes. These symbols emerge in conjunction with the development of the body ego and object relations, so that there are symbols of both body parts and of the parents and siblings. Spontaneous in origin and typically sensorial, the symbols create a concrete bridge between the body and the primary object world. In a “symbolic equation” (Segal, 1978), the person cannot distinguish between the symbol and the thing symbolized. The symbolic equation denies separateness between self and object, whereas symbolic representation bridges prior loss. Psychoanalytic symbols are typically linked to external, perceptual reality, manifest in the closesness of the symbol perceptually toward what is signified. Thus, sticks, swords, and wands resemble the phallus; tunnels, caves, houses, boxes have a perceptual similarity to the female genitalia. The body image and body surface are the locus of initial, symbolic representation of self and object, which are then extended or projected to other surfaces. Symbols thus arise in the potential to other surfaces. Symbols thus arise in the potential space between the “I” and the “non-I,” more 1711 SYMBOLIZATION, PROCESS OF closely related to the primary process rather than to verbal language and rational thought. As Freud (1900a) noted, psychoanalytic symbolism is ubiquitous in myths, legends, art, literature, slang, jokes, obscenities, etc. Psychoanalytic symbols unconsciously represent, in addition to aspects of the self and childhood objects, coitus, pregnancy, birth, rebirth, castration, and death. Symbolism is utilized in symptom-formation, for example, a paralyzed limb representing impotence or castration. The name Oedipus or “swollen foot,’ unconsciously represents erection and mutilation-castration. Ernest Jones (1916) summarized that only what is repressed is symbolized and needs symbolic expression as a psychoanalytic or unconscious symbol. The symbol condenses unconscious wish and defense, a compromise formation permitting disguised “symbolic gratification.” The most frequent symbols are probably those of the male and female genitals, and these symbols more commonly appear in regressive states such as daydreams and dreams. Psychoanalytic symbols, however, may be found in association with all developmental phases. There are symbols referring to the breast as well as to the mouth, tongue, and teeth; similarly, feces may represent money, gifts, and denigrated aspects of the self or object. Psychoanalytic symbols are often overdetermined as in the bisexual and biparental symbolism of animals, exemplified in the many meanings of rats for the “Rat Man” (Freud, 1909d). The rat was interpreted to mean penis, feces, money (rates), baby, as well as despised greed, rate, etc. Psychoanalytic symbols may have multiple stratified meanings and, in contemporary analysis, there is appreciation of overdetermination and _ possible change of function. For example, the “pit and the pendulum” may symbolically represent the vagina and the penis but also castration and the threat of castration. In oral terms, the pit may represent the mouth, and the pendulum the tongue. That symbols may acquire cultural and religious significance and take on other metaphorical meanings does not alter the original and primary meaning of the symbol (Blum, 1978). A cave may represent a grave without losing its earlier meaning of a womb or female genital, with the earth having acquired the meaning of mother. Clinically, symbols are not pursued as an end in itself and are not the primary locus of psychoanalytic 1712 interpretation. There are no rigid formulas for symbolic decoding or interpretation, and patients may not directly associate to symbolic expressions. Symbols are interpreted in the context of the psychoanalytic process. Comparable to an ancient language, symbolism may be adaptively appropriated in linguistic communication inside and outside psychoanalysis (Blum, 1995). Haro p P. BLUM See also: Cinema criticism; “Dreams and myths”; Disque vert, Le; Functional phenomenon; Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego; Obsessional neurosis; Psychoanalysis of Children, The; Psychoanalyse des nevroses et des psychoses; Symbol. Bibliography Blum, Harold P. (1978). Symbolic process and symbol formation. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 59, 455— 471. . (1995). Symbolism. In B. Moore and B. Fine (Eds.), Psychoanalysis. The Major Concepts. (pp. 149-154). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4-5. Jones, Ernest. (1916). The theory of symbolism. In Papers on Psychoanalysis. Boston: Beacon Press. Segal, Hanna. (1978). On symbolism. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 59, 303-314. SYMBOLIZATION, PROCESS OF The term symbolization is hardly discussed by Freud, although the process is fundamental to mental activity. We can define symbolization as the operation by which something comes to represent something else for someone. While it may appear as the substitution of one object for another, it is primarily the result of a process that assumes both the ability to represent an absent object and a subject capable of knowing that the symbol is not the symbolized object. In this sense it promotes the ability to fantasize and the organization of mental space. From this point of view it is primarily a mechanism enabling the subject to fight against the depression associated with object loss and to limit the flow of affects. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Aside from allowing one term to substitute for another, symbolization designates back and forth flow of meaning between subject and object, between mental reality and external reality, between past and present. This is the effect of the symbolization process, which makes possible a system of intra- and intersubjective exchanges. This can be verified in analytic therapy, which, in the standard model, assumes a relation between two centers of meaning, the analyst and the patient, whose work is possible only on condition that it is referred to an outside agency, which is the “frame” of analysis. The analytic situation thereby appears as both symbolic and symbolizing, in that its mode of operation is based on a structure with three points of reference. The experience of satisfaction—that of the infant at the breast, as described by Freud in terms of images and memory traces—is a prototypical model that delimits the scope of the symbolization process in the transition from need to drive. Freud defined the drive as a borderline concept between the psychic and the somatic, formed by reworking the hallucination of satisfaction at the breast, and whose constant thrust (as distinct from the momentary or periodic nature of the satisfaction of organic need) relates to the permanence of the object during perception of the total object. It is, as we know, a postulate also found in the experience of the dream and unverifiable by experience, according to which hallucination is a form of satisfaction. Into this Freud introduced a temporal dimension by distinguishing the period during which the sexual drives are attached to functions of selfpreservation (corresponding to the hallucination of satisfaction and the increase in automatic traumatic anxiety) from the period of object-formation, and hallucination of the object, when the mother is perceived as a total object. The structure so described occurs in two stages, which the anaclisis or propping of the drive on organic self-preservation enables us to comprehend as a retroactive reorganization. The symbolization process thus emerges during the split between the framework of need (ingesting milk) and the framework of the drive (incorporating the breast). It is this difference that Jean Laplanche (1980) described in great detail, noting that the displacement from need to drive was simultaneously metonymic with respect to the object (from milk to breast) and metaphoric with respect to the aim (from ingesting to incorporating). INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SYMBOLIZATION, PROCESS OF Between narcissistic cathexis (I am the breast) and object cathexis (I have it, that is, I am not it) the dimensions of a psychic space—a topological space— and time are organized. Psychic time evolves through acceptance of a delay, a waiting period, the succession from the time of being to, as Freud himself said, only after the fact, the time of having. Beneath these abstractions, at a more concrete level, we find: analyses of symbolic assimilation (Melanie Klein), symbolic equation (Hanna Segal), and pathological projective identification. From this viewpoint the hallucinatory experience of satisfaction designates the dialectic between the nonoptative (I am) and the optative (I want, I am not), which is articulated only on condition that enough time is allocated to the non-optative dimension. This is probably one of the major contributions of Donald Winnicott (1951), namely, to have insisted on the importance of duration during this period of nonoptative illusion so that the optative period, the period of disillusion, might become possible. Thus the experience of object loss results in different outcomes for symbolization given the possibility of forming a dialectic between the time of being and the time of having. This essential difference and the dialectic it involves can be terminated by the illusory wish to unite, at the “same time,’ subject and object, memory and perception, in the effort to exclude the object as well as the effort intended to include it. In this way different modalities of symbolization are designated. The symbolic assimilation controlled by the search for sameness seeks to implicate projection, leaving nothing but the search for immediate satisfaction through action and degrading the symbol, which represents the object, to the status of a signal. Symbolic assimilation can, on the contrary, seek to include the object in the act of projection, which, although it dehumanizes the world by transforming it into abstract entities, nevertheless maintains a link to a universe of indexical signs, where the categories of certainty, foreseeability, and univocity prevail. There are, therefore, two different economies which, depending on the use of the object, can lead in one case to a repression of affects and a splitting of the body through the exclusion of all symbolization (this is the register of non-delusional psychoses and psychosomatic disorganization); and in the other to the preservation of those affects in the psyche through symbolic efflorescence, which, although it seeks to eliminate 1713 Symptom difference and distance, nonetheless indicates an attempt at a solution through representation (as shown by delusional psychoses). As Wilfred Bion noted (1970), we cannot say that the psychotic patient is incapable of symbol formation, but that he symbolizes excessively and prevents himself from learning through knowledge of the world. From this point of view the interiorization of psychic bisexuality becomes the source of unfettered symbolization and creativity. The essential point is to be able to confront maternal invisibility and the terror of the unlimited or the infinite. This assumes the organization of the dialectic of conservation and loss inherent in anal eroticism, which contributes to the differentiation of the inside and outside of the body and ensures that the control of mental activity and sphincter control are cathected in the same way. The fort-da game (Freud, 1920g) is often considered to be the key experience revealing the formation of symbolization. However, this activity of symbolic substitution through gestures and speech that bear witness to the development of object loss, assumes the manipulation of a simultaneously preserved and expelled internal object, which defines anal eroticism. The experience of mastery demonstrates that the anxiety of destruction by the object associated with orality (to consume or be consumed) is here contained within limits through a third possibility, the external object. The fault lines in this mediatory function of the third object determine the recourse to variant techniques (face-to-face psychotherapy, psychoanalytic psychodrama) compared to the usual therapeutic situation on the couch. From this viewpoint the analytic framework can be considered a genuine “intermediate region of experience,’ to use Winnicott’s phrase, the crucible or matrix of all symbolization, which triggers the operation of the intermediary intrapsychic region known as the preconscious. The movement is of course asymptotic. Accordingly, the semantic function of the symbol as content is inseparable from its mediatory function, intra- and intersubjective, providing we realize it is less a universal and univocal function (the archetype for Carl G. Jung or the symbolic order for Jacques Lacan) than a personal and polysemic one, making possible processes of sublimation and creation. Rather than being enclosed in a private dimension, true symbolization reveals, on the contrary, as Bion (1970) suggested, 1714 its essentially social dimension. This assumes symbolization is capable of being instructed by the body and the world so it is able to produce other figures, while leaving room for the indeterminate, the uncertain, and the unexpected. ALAIN GIBEAULT See also: Act, action; Alcoholism; Asthma; Cacilie M., case of; Dream symbolism; Disavowal; Displacement; Ethology and psychoanalysis; Hysteria; Object; Representation; Somatic compliance; Suffering; Symbol; Symptom formation; Working through. Bibliography Bion, Wilfred R. (1970). Attention and interpretation. London: Tavistock Publications. Freud, Sigmund. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1-64. Laplanche, Jean. (1980). Problématiques III, la sublimation. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Further Reading Blum, Harold P. (1978). Symbolic processes and symbol formation. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 59, 455— 472. Bucci, Wilma. (1997). Symptoms and symbols: A multiple code theory of somatization. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 17, 151-172. Coen, Stanley. (2000). Affect, somatisation and symbolisation. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 81, 159-161. Kubie, Lawrence S. (1978). Distortion of the symbolic process in neurosis and psychosis. Psychological Issues, 44, 87-114. Slade, Arietta. (1999). Representation, symbolization, affect regulation, mother and child. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 19, 797-830. SYMPTOM Freud created psychoanalysis by giving meaning to symptoms. In his writings following Studies on Hysteria (1895d), he continued to investigate the symptom. At that time, psychiatry reduced the symptom to an opaque and incongruous phenomenon of psychic life. Freud focused on the salient and unusual features of the symptom to understand the dynamics of the unconscious and the development of conflicts. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS The symptom cannot be considered equivalent to a defense, since the mechanism of defense is more general and its role less obvious. Moreover, defenses function effectively when repression is successful, when projection is obvious, and when the effects of projection are natural. Similarly, insofar as neurotic behavior and parapraxes prove useful to the subject, their unconscious causes are not apparent and are ignored. The symptom is also distinct from anxiety. Anxiety is far noisier than the symptom, though it is also closely related. Anxiety sounds the alarm that leads from a sense of urgency to the symptom. In fact, the symptom appears to be extinguishing the fires of anxiety, but it does not possess the means to accomplish this. More precisely, the symptom puts an end to anxiety by organizing a new situation different from the one that triggered the anxiety. Thus the symptom corrects the inadequate internal discharge of anxiety by offering the psyche other possibilities for linking and representation. The new situation defines the nature of the symptom and indicates its scope. In the end, it is the drive that constitutes the symptom, and this is why Freud distinguished between symptom and inhibition (1926d [1925]). When repression fails, the drive can break through, but repression has sufficient power to divert it. Thus, the symptom is formed as a compromise. At one level, the compromise concerns the censorship between the unconscious or preconscious and consciousness. At another level, there is a conflict between the different agencies, with the superego taking the organizing role. Later Freud argued that the conflict between the ego and the id defines neurosis, while that between the ego and reality characterizes psychosis (1924b [1923]). Thus the course that the symptom takes always depends on the unconscious. Eventually, the play of affect and representation get the better of repression. This happens with the conversion hysteric, who suffers from quasi innervation because she marks her own body with an affect that has regressed to its original state as action. Thereafter, every fantasy is converted into a symptom that is incapacitating, but comfortable. Soon this same process is projected by a phobia and frozen in a representation, which leaves a gap in affect that is filled by anxiety (Freud, 1915d, 1915e). Because of the ambivalence of desire and defense, the symptom that the ego has established in a state of “extraterritoriality” (1926d [1925], p. 97) gains ground bit by bit, just like a foreign army, by extending its surveillance beyond the phobic object to any fantas- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Symptom matic object that can resonate with it. The defensive rituals of the obsessional become similarly eroticized by invading thought. Finally, beyond the borders of the ego, the symptom may bring a relative gain, and the individual and other people may derive from it what Freud called a “secondary gain” (1926d [1925], pp. 99-100). For instance, the symptom may establish an internal equilibrium in the structural field from which it arises or that it organizes. Such is the diversity of pathology that it may also perform a preventive or reparative function outside of itself, as when an obsession precedes or follows a depressive episode or a hallucination makes real what mental life can no longer accept. AUGUSTIN JEANNEAU See also: Amnesia; Anorexia nervosa; Autosuggestion; Bulimia; Cathartic method; Change; Claustrophobia; Cure; Dipsomania; “Dostoyevsky and Parricide”; Doubt; Encopresis; Enuresis (bedwetting); Five Lectures on Psycho- Analysis, Flight into illness; Forgetting; Hypochondria; Hysteria; Hysterical paralysis; Indications and contraindications for psychoanalysis for an adult; Infantile neurosis; Inhibition; Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, Interpretation; Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, Mythomania; Narcissistic neurosis; Obsession; Omnipotence of thought; Pain; Persecution; Psychic reality; Psychoanalytical nosography; Psychoanalytic semiology; Psychotherapy; Reactionformation; Resolution of the transference; Schizophrenia; Self-mutilation in children; Slips of the tongue; Stammering; Studies on Hysteria; Substitutive formation; Symbol; Symbolic equation; Symptom-formation; Tics; Ulcerative colitis; War neurosis. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1915d). Repression. SE, 14: 141-158. . (1915e). The unconscious. SE, 14: 159-204. . (1924b [1923]). Neurosis and psychosis. SE, 19: 147-153. . (1926d [1925]). Inhibitions, symptoms, and anxiety. aSH, 20: 75-172. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2. Further Reading Luborsky, Lester. (1996). The symptom-context method: Symptoms as opportunities in psychotherapy. Washington DC: American Psychological Association. 1715 SYMPTOM-FORMATION SYMPTOM-FORMATION Symptom-formation is the process leading to the production of a symptom—the production, that is to say, ofa “sign” or “indication” of a functional disturbance, The word symptom was borrowed by psychoanalysis from medical language. Even its etymology (Greek, “that which is held together”) suggests a link between the symptom and what it indicates (and it is worth noting, too, that syndrome, a set of symptoms, is likewise derived from Greek elements, meaning, in this case, “that which proceeds together”). That having been said, it is important to bear in mind that there is a broad difference between a sign (implying an intentional designation) and a mere indication (implying merely coincidence, without intentionality). As early as his first psychoanalytical writings, Freud plumbed for the former sense, arguing that to produce a symptom was to produce a sign, that a symptom always had a meaning, even if that meaning were lost on the patient himself. Studies on Hysteria (1895d), or at any rate Freud's contribution to it, is largely dedicated to the illustration of this thesis: “I have examples at my disposal,” he wrote, “which seem to prove the genesis of hysterical symptoms through symbolization alone” (p. 179). Indeed, for Freud, the symptom, like the dream, was a compromise-formation via which a. wish struggled to achieve fulfillment, albeit merely a partial one: “A symptom arises,” he wrote to Wilhelm Fliess on February 19, 1899, “where the repressed and the repressing thought can come together in the wishfulfillment” (SE, 1, p. 278). Like dream-images, the symptom was overdetermined, and its formation relied on the processes of condensation and displacement. Unlike the dream-work, however, which led to the creation of images, symptom-formation resulted in the kind of bodily expression of which hysterical conversion was the paradigm; in the emergence of obsessive ideas as in obsessional neurosis (in which case secondary symptoms might arise also as defenses against the primary ones); in phobic avoidances; and so on. More generally, the work of symptom-formation gave rise to mental processes and types of behavior that were repetitive and relatively “isolated”—that were not, in other words, integrated into other aspects of the patient's personality. The patient would usually recognize these as pathological in nature, and seek 1716 treatment, a fact which distinguished such symptoms from fixed “character traits.” The fact is that Freud’s entire work, in its attempt to elucidate the neuroses, continually strove for a better understanding of the processes of symptomformation. Thus in ‘a letter to Jung dated June 15, 1911, distancing himself from his first theory of the trauma, he made the following essential correction: “symptoms spring not directly from the memories but from the fantasies built on them” (1970a, p. 260). He would later review the whole problem once more in the light of his second topography (structural theory) and his second theory of the instincts, in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926d). To summarize, Freud's theory viewed the formation of symptoms from the standpoint of “semiology” in both the medical and the linguistic senses of the term (a fact pointed up notably by Jacques Lacan, whose position is famously encapsulated in the claim that “the unconscious is structured like a language”). This view did not hold good, however, beyond the sphere of neurosis proper: in the “actual neuroses,” the manifest symptoms had no psychic meaning (Freud, 1916- 17a). Absent the mentalization of fantasies, libidinal energy flowed directly into somatic processes—a mechanism that has been studied in more recent times by the Paris school of psychosomatic medicine (Marty, 1976, 1980). Inasmuch as the symptom expressed a compromise between instinctual satisfaction and defense, its motor was a dynamic that in all cases sought to reestablish an equilibrium, but that also determined the form of individual symptoms as well as the place each would occupy within a specific clinical entity. It was unpleasure, first and foremost, that triggered the mechanism of symptom-formation—an unpleasure that derived from pleasure and that could not be accounted for save in terms of the confrontation between the internal pressure exerted by fantasy and the idea of the external danger that depended directly upon it. Hitherto, this calculus of pleasure has been the responsibility of repression, along with the other defenses that either collaborated with repression or ensured mastery over the instincts by their own efforts. The formation of a symptom was invariably necessitated by a strengthening of the instinct, whether this increased pressure was attributable to biology, to fantasy, to reality, or to external events. The failure of detense in all cases resulted inthe first instance in the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS emergence of anxiety. Whereas in the actual neuroses anxiety was nothing more than an almost reflexive return to the pathways of discharge of the first great traumas, the situation here made it into a signal of _ danger and a call for the symptom to arise. The interplay between affects and ideas—the components of the instinct, whose reciprocal links and independence from each other constituted the dynamic of mental life—was thus the crucible of the symptom (Freud, 1894a). Repression functioned by dissociating the two, working on the idea in order to contain the affect and the action that the affect prefigured. The symptom, for its part, was effective because it operated in the interstice, restoring the rights of the instincts by creating new links, more acceptable to the ego, between affect and idea. The simplest instance of this in the context of neurotic repression was doubtless displacement, which was a function of the instinctual shift with respect to the symbol and the resulting decline in the symbol’s significance, but other more complex defensive ploys were the locus of the same dynamic: thus the “Wolf Man” used displacement to transform his homosexual desire into a phobic fear of wolves (1918b [1914]), while Schreber was well able to handle fantasy by means of a similarly discrete action of the component instincts, but one which relied not on repression or displacement, but rather on the projection of the idea and the turning of the affect into its opposite, so producing the symptom of feelings of persecution (1911c). This amounted to an introduction of differences with respect to the formation and the form of the symptom. Both clearly depended on the nature of the conflict: the threat of castration, the loss of the object, narcissism at risk, or alienation; neurosis, depression, borderline state, or psychosis. It has rightly been pointed out that in this account no symptom can exist independently of a corresponding clinical entity. Two caveats apply in this connection. The first concerns the specificity of defensive modes to given pathological structuzes, so that each mode is perforce related to a corresponding symptomatic form of decompensation: whether object-dependency is defended against external reality by disavowal, idealization, projection, or some other means, will serve to explain why breakdown occurs in a particular subject, delusion in another, and so on. Within a single neurosis, to take the case of the obsessional, the oedipal situation is the starting-point of a regression to the INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Syurtow-Foewation anal level of fixation which will determine the compulsiveness and mental retentiveness characterizing the symptoms (Freud, 1926d). Apropos of phobia, however, Freud describes three different phases of symptom-formation: preconscious decathexis, anticathexis of the substitutive idea, and an expansion of this idea’s associations and of the vigilance it cota (1915e, pp. 181ff). The second difficulty is related to the strength of the symptom with respect to the point reached in a particular clinical development. Thus in schizophrenics phobia may rapidly be overwhelmed by the haziness of the dividing-line between inside and outside, so that all projection becomes ineffective. Projection is scarcely more functional in agoraphobics, whose narcissistic inadequacy precludes the establishment of any external protective focus. Cancerophobics, on the other hand, being mentally more obsessional and more objective in their verification procedures, can keep the conflict out of the clutches of depression for some time before it eventually succeeds in bringing the struggle back within the ego. It should be noted, though, that while the neurotic conflict between the ego and the id confines phobia, in its exclusiveness, to a single line of defense, it nevertheless confers on the symptom, not efficacity, for that remains limited, but durability and solidity. AUGUSTIN JEANNEAU AND ROGER PERRON See also: Actual neurosis/neurosis of defense; Allergy; “Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-year-Old Boy”; Choice of neurosis; Compromise-formation; Conflict; Constitution; Conversion; Daydream; Defense; Displacement; Ego; Eros; Event; Fantasy; Fixation; Hypnoid states; Identification; Identification fantasies; Instinctual impulse; Need for punishment; Overdetermination; Paranoid position; Phobias in children; Principle of constancy; Psychosomatic; Regression; Repression; “Repression”; Reversal into the opposite; Self-punishment; Somatic compliance; Splitting of the ego; Symptom; Unpleasure; Wish fulfillment. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1894a). The neuro-psychoses of defense. SE, 3: 41-61. . (1911c). Psycho-analytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia (dementia paranoides). SE, 12: 1-82. . (1915e). The unconscious. SE, 14: 159-204. 1717 Symptom/SINTHOME . (1916-17a). Introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. SE, 15-16. . (1918b [1914]). From the history of an infantile neurosis. SE, 17: 1-122. . (1926d). Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. SE, 20: 75-172. Freud, Sigmund, and Josef Breuer. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2: 48-106. Freud, Sigmund, and C. G. Jung. (1970a). The Freud/Jung letters: The correspondence between Sigmund Freud and C. G. Jung (Ralph Manheim and R. F. C. Hull, Trans.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Marty, Pierre. (1976). Les mouvements individuels de vie et de mort I: Essai d économie psychosomatique. Paris: Payot. . (1980). Les mouvements individuels de vie et de mort II: L ordre psychosomatique. Paris: Payot. Further Reading Arlow, Jacob A. (1964). Symptom formation and character formation. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 45, 167-170. Loewenstein, Rudolph M. (1964). Symptom formation and character formation. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 45, 155-157. SYMPTOM/SINTHOME Lacan defined the symptom in several ways: as a metaphor, as “that which comes from the real,’ as “that which doesn’t work,” and at the end of his teaching, as a structural fact, whose necessity must be questioned. In 1953 (2002a) Lacan emphasized that the analytic symptom—a neurotic, perverse, or even psychotic symptom; a dream; a slip; and so on—was sustained by a linguistic structure, by signifiers, and by the letters that serve as their material element. In contrast to medical symptoms, the meaning of which is determined in relation to a referent, the neurotic symptom is blocked speech wanting to be heard and deciphered. Lacan saw the mechanism of metaphor at work in the symptom: when a traumainducing signifier is substituted for an element of the current signifying chain, it fixes the symptom and produces its meaning (2002b, p. 158). But interpreting its meaning is not enough. Interpretation works only by focusing on the articulation of the signifiers connected to the symptom; signifiers in themselves are meaningless (1995, p. 270). 1718 FIGURE 1 symptom The flattening of the knot. La troisiéme (Oct. 31, 1974) Still, these signifiers must be addressed to an analyst. Because the symptom is a self-sufficient source of jouissance (enjoyment), the subject must be made to feel that behind the symptom is unknown knowledge and a related cause, and that the analyst has become the one who maintains it. The analyst has the responsibility for half of the symptom, Lacan said. He added that analytic training shows how the symptom completes itself. Starting in 1974 with the Borromean knot with three rings, Lacan envisioned the relationship of the symptom with the real (R), the symbolic (S), and the imaginary (I). The symptom became “that which comes from the real” (1975, p. 185). It is marginally imaginary, while it unfolds in the symbolic (Figure 1). The symptom, what is going wrong, uses speech to search for meaning. If we respond to it in this register, we can cause it to develop in the imaginary. Equivocal symbolic intervention can undo the certainties of the symptom and cause it to recede. Lacan makes the function of the symptom specific by starting with a knot with four rings. Freud showed that the formation of symptoms is determined by psychic reality, which is organized by the Oedipus complex. Lacan called this reality “religious,” because it is founded on the belief that the father castrates, even though the laws of language require a renunciation of reality and an assumption of the phallus. Thus the symptom seems to maintain a link with the father, which sustains identification and sexual jouissance. In this knot, the symptom ring knots the real, the symbolic, and the imaginary together (Figure 2). An unresolved case is that of a subject unsustained by his symptom. This case is represented by a Borromean knot with three rings (Figure 3). INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FIGURE 2 » Rs symptom S Borromean knot with four rings (S goes over R at two points), from the seminar R.S./. (1974-1975). FIGURE 3 ey Borromean knot with three rings (R goes over S at two points). Lacan also asked what would happen if there were an error in the knotting of the three rings. Such an error would be fixed in a non-Borromean fashion by a fourth ring, that of the sinthome. In his study of James Joyce (2001), he used Joyce as his example of such a case (Figure 4). For Lacan, the symptom is the fixed manner in which subjects enjoy their unconscious. Thus, the path that leads to oedipal normalization, even if it is neurotic, is also clearly marked. Treatment aims not at such a normalization but rather at learning “what to do with the symptom” instead of enjoying it. VALENTIN NUSINOVICI See also: Aimée, case of; Formations of the unconscious; Four discourses; Imaginary identification/symbolic identification; Metaphor; Real, the (Lacan); Signifier/signified; Subject’s desire; Topology. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS SYNCHRONICITY (ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY) FIGURE 4 symptom Fag ee Se R $ A pseudo-Borromean knot with four rings. The symptom fixes the error in the knotting of R, S, and | (R goes over S at one point). From the seminar, The Sinthome (1975-1976). Bibliography Lacan, Jacques. (1974-1975). Le séminaire. Book 22: R.S.I. Ornicar?, 2-5. (1975) sala troisieme, intervention de J. Lacan le 31 octobre 1974. Lettres de [ Ecole Freudienne, 16, 178-203. . (1975-1976). Le séminaire. Book 23: Le sinthome. Ornicar?, 6-11. . (1995). The position of the unconscious (Bruce Fink, Trans.). In Richard Feldstein, Bruce Fink, and Maire Jaanus (Eds.), Reading “Seminar XI”: Lacan’s four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis. New York: W. W. Norton. (Original work published 1960) . (2001). Joyce: Le symptome. In his Autres écrits. Paris: Seuil. . (2002a). The function and field of speech and language in psychoanalysis. In his Ecrits: A selection (Bruce Fink, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton. (Original work published 1953) . (2002b). The instance of the letter in the unconscious, or reason since Freud. In his Ecrits: A selection (Bruce Fink, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton. (Original work published 1957) SYNCHRONICITY (ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY) Carl Jung offered synchronicity as an acausal “principle of explanation” to account for “certain remarkable manifestations of the unconscious.” He saw the principle of synchronicity as an addition to the principle of psychic causality, which Freud had emphasized so strongly. T7193 SystemM/SYSTEMIC Jung “found that there are psychic parallelisms which simply cannot be related to each other causally,” such as “the simultaneous occurrence of identical thoughts, symbolism or psychic states” in analyst and analysand. In cultural history, one can also observe uncanny parallels, such as the coincidence of Chinese and European periods of style pointed out by Jung’s friend Richard Wilhelm, the German translator of the Confucian classic I Ching (Book of changes; also romanized as Yijing). This ancient book of wisdom has been used throughout its history as an oracle. Jung tested Wilhelm’s translation by counting out yarrow stalks and tossing coins—the traditional chance operations of Chinese divination—to locate specific chapters and verses in the I Ching, which he found would speak, like well-timed analytic interpretations, to his psychological situation at the time. In his memorial to Wilhelm in 1930, Jung enunciated the synchronistic principle as an explanation. But it was not until the 1951 Eranos Conference that he fully described the “meaningful coincidence” and other sorts of facts that the concept “is intended to cover.” “Synchronicity: An Acausal connecting principle” Jung’s full-blown development of the notion, appeared, together with an article by Nobel Prize— winning physicist Wolfgang Pauli, in German in 1952. There Jung offers synchronicity as a law of nature as important as the laws of causality and chance, which it supplements in governing the connections of events. - Jung quotes Schopenhauer (2000): “All the events in a man’s life would accordingly stand in two fundamentally different kinds of connection: firstly, in the objective, causal connection of the natural process; secondly, in a subjective connection which exists only in relation to the individual who experiences it, and which is thus as subjective as his own dreams.” Jung understood this “subjective connection” to be the significance a subject finds in the linkage of events, but he located this meaning beyond the subject experiencing it in the psychoid nature of the archetypes themselves. An archetype, for Jung, is a field of meaning in the unconscious that may be registered simultaneously as a psychic event in the mind and as a physical reality in the outer world. As Robert Aziz (1990) has noted, such “simultaneity” need not mean occurring at the exact same moment of time; it is enough that events having a common meaning be linked without a plausible causal sequence. One of Jung’s favorite examples of such a meaningful coincidence occurred while he was analyzing a young woman patient. She was telling a dream in which she was given a golden scarab. Jung 1720 heard a flying insect knocking against the windowpane, opened the window, and caught the creature—a scarabaeid beetle. This unexpected concretization of her fantasy helped his patient give up an intellectual defense against psychic reality that had kept her analysis from becoming a transformative experience, the scarab being, in Egyptian mythology, a classic symbol of rebirth. For a synchronicity to enhance consciousness rather than merely build up superstitiousness, it is important that the individual grasp its compensatory meaning. JOHN BEEBE See also: Archetype (analytical psychology); Need for causality; Psychic causality. Bibliography Aziz, Robert. (1990). C. G. Jung’s psychology of religion and synchronicity. Albany: State University of New York Press. Jung, Carl Gustav. (1930). Richard Wilhelm: In memoriam. In his Collected works (Vol. 15). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. . (1950). Foreword to the I Ching. In his Collected works (Vol. 11). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. . (1952b). Synchronicity: An acausal connecting principle. In his Collected works (Vol. 8). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Schopenhauer, Arthur. (2000). Die Transzendentale Spekulation iiber die anscheinende Absichtlichkeit im Schicksal des Einzelnen In Parerga and paralipomena: Short philosophical essays (E. F. J. Payne, Trans.). New York: Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1851) SYSTEM/SYSTEMIC A system is a self-regulating complex of interactive elements. It is a general model. Applied to the group or family as a unit, this notion is the basis for the systemic perspective. In the United States the Palo Alto researchers (Gregory Bateson, Paul Watzlawick), using cybernetic and systems theory, studied the modalities of communications in the families of schizophrenics. They created notions such as the double bind, the paradox, and the existence of the “identified patient” (IP; the family member in whom the family’s symptom has emerged or is most apparent) necessary to the maintenance of family homeostasis. These new concepts have been INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS used in treating dysfunctional families using various “systemic family therapies.” The first-generation systems theorists who used and developed the ideas of the Palo Alto group challenged psychoanalytic theories. Implementing a logic that is circular rather than linear, sessions relied on positive connotations, counter-paradoxes, and behavioral prescriptions. In this treatment option, intrapsychic phenomena were not denied but were deliberately disregarded. The emphasis was placed on information seen as “input” to and “output” from the “black box,” whose contents and workings were intentionally ignored. Further developments in theory and practice in this area have led to a taking into account of the effects produced by the presence and personality of the practitioner. FRANCOISE DIOT AND JOSEPH VILLIER See also: Science and psychoanalysis. Bibliography Bertalanffy, Ludwig von. (1973). General system theory: Foundations, development, applications. New York: G. Braziller. (Original work published 1947) Le Moigne, Jean-Louis. (1977). La théorie du systeme general: Théorie de la modélisation. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Miermont, Jacques. (1985). Mythes et modeles scientifiques en psychothérapie individuelle et en thérapie familiale. Actualités psychiatriques, 9. Selvini-Palazzoli, Mara, Boscolo, Luigi, Cecchin, Gianfranco, et al. (1975). Paradox and counterparadox: A new model in the therapy of the family in schizophrenic transaction (Elisabeth V. Burt, Trans.). New York: J. Aronson. Wiener, Norbert. (1950). The human use of human beings: Cybernetics and society. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. SZONDI, LEOPOLD (1893-1986) The Hungarian physician, psychopathologist, and psychoanalyst Leopold (or Lipot) Szondi was born in the Slovakian city of Nitra (then in Hungary) on March 11, 1893, and died on January 24, 1986 in Kiisnacht, near Zurich. In 1898, Szondi’s family moved to Budapest, where Leopold was an excellent student, first in Greek and Latin and subsequently in medical school at the Uni- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Szonbd!, Leopoto (1893-1986) versity of Budapest. He was fascinated by Dostoevsky and Freud, and The Interpretation of Dreams became his vade mecum at the front during World War I. In 1919, as neuropsychiatrist and assistant to Paul Ranschburg, he published a series of analyses of personality based on constitutional and genetic factors; from 1921, he worked in private practice. In charge of the state orthopedagogy program for secondary education from 1924 to 1927, Szondi served as professor of psychopathology at Pazmany-Peter University Medical School and also served as director of the Royal Hungarian Institute for Psychopathology and Psychotherapy. A decade of research followed together with self-analysis in which Szondi developed his method as an extension of psychoanalysis. That and regular contact with Imre Hermann moved Szondi beyond his earlier work on the constitutional and genetic bases of personality and destiny to psychoanalysis and the concept of the “familial unconscious.” Shortly after publication of an investigation of marriage in 1937, which won Freud’s stamp of approval, anti-Semitic legislation enacted by the pro-Nazi Hungarian government doomed Szondi’s laboratory. Dismissed from his state appointments in 1941, Szondi was eventually banned from practicing privately; in 1944 he was deported with his wife and two children to Bergen-Belsen; eventually released, he found refuge in Switzerland. He spent some months as a psychotherapist at the Forel Clinic in Prangins before settling in Zurich in 1946. Excluded from academic psychiatry, he continued his practice, wrote, and trained students from Switzerland and abroad through analysis and supervision. An international research association was created, today known as the Szondi Society; beginning in Zurich in 1957, it organized triennial symposiums. Funding enabled foundation of the Szondi Institute in 1969. The recipient of honorary degrees from the University of Louvain in 1970 and the University of Paris in 1979, Szondi continued to work as long as his health permitted, dying in 1986 in a nursing home near Zurich. Although remembered as inventor of a simple and controversial projective test, Szondi always conceived of his technique as an adjuvant to Shicksalanalyse (Fate Analysis) which was inspired by depth analysis. Five large volumes formed the discipline’s basic program. Shicksalanalyse (1944) presented results of laboratory 1721 Sronot, Leororo (1893-1986) research that aimed to reveal how people are motivated to make the “choices in love, friendship, professions, illness and death” that determine personal destiny. The test that was developed from this work was published in 1947, and translated into English in 1952 as Experimental Diagnostics of Drives. Freud’s influence, already present in Szondi’s thinking, would be further manifest in subsequent work in Zurich, Triebpathologie (Drive pathology; 1952), aimed to move classical descriptive psychiatry in a psychoanalytic direction. Triebpathologie II appeared in 1956, dedicated to Freud on the occasion of the centenary of his birth, fulfilling his wish that one day successors would carry on an analysis much as he had done with sexuality. Finally, Schickalanalytische Therapie (Rate Analysis Therapy), published in 1963, used a Freudian cast to investigate problems associated with active techniques (such as Ferenczi had employed) and the application of analysis to psychosis and mood disorders. Szondi’s work in later years included articles in various reviews and Szondiana, and, most memorably, the complementary volumes in which he reprised his theme of paroxysmality as clarified by the contrasting figures of the murderer Kain (Cain; 1969) and the lawgiver Mose (Moses; 1973). For a variety of reasons, Szondian analysis has remained fairly obscure. To the effects of war and relocation in Switzerland, which occurred just as his — research was moving him toward a radical shift in perspective, must be added the occultation of the work due to reception of the test and some difficulty on Szondi’s part in clearly describing that change, together with its new foundation. Finally, Szondi’s 1722 clinical genius and the effective range of his work were obvious only to patients and disciples with whom he had a close relationship in Zurich. Some followers took it upon themselves to lay a new foundation for his work; with a presence at university centers in Louvain and Liége, Szondian analysis at last found indispensable ground for further development and the opportunity to better explain and propagate the core of his teaching—paradoxically, primarily in francophone and Latin countries. Szondi, by moving beyond his own test, brings us to a broad view of his work as constituting the most significant attempt yet to create a global psychiatry undergirded by the spirit of psychoanalytic thought. JACQUES SCHOTTE See also: Psychological tests. Bibliography Lekeuche, Philippe, and Mélon, Jean. (1990). Dialectique des pulsions. Bruxelles: De Boeck-Universite. Schotte, Jacques. (1990). Szondi avec Freud: Sur la voie d’une psychiatrie pulsionnelle. Bruxelles: De Boeck-Universite. Szondi, Leopold. (1965). Schicksanalyse. Basel and Stuttgart: Benno Schwabe, five volumes, 1965; Bern: Hans Hubert, 1952, 1956, 1960, 1963. . (1969). Kain. Gestalten des Bésen. Bern: Hans Huber. —. (1973). Moses: Antwort auf Kain. Bern: Hans Huber. Szondi, Lipot. (1952). Experimental diagnostics of drives. New York: Grune and Stratton. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS one: Poster for film Psychoanalyse. The subtitle "Ratsel des Unbewussten" translates to “Riddle of the Unconscious.” Mary Evans Picture Library. Reproduced by permission. two: Oskar Pfister (1873-1956), Swiss pastor, teacher, and psychoanalyst. Pfister was one of the first lay analysts, and his impact on the field has been recognized by the American Psychiatric Society, which awards the Oskar Pfister Prize for outstanding contributions to the psychology of religion. Public Domain. Courtesy of New York Psychoanalytic Institute and Society. three: James Putnam (1846-1918), American neurologist. Putnam, at Freud's insistence, initiated the establishment of both the American Psychoanalytic Association and the Boston Psychoanalytic Society. Courtesy of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute and Society. Reproduced by permission. four: Otto Rank (1884-1939), Austrian psychologist and psychoanalyst. Second only to Freud in the number of published works on psychoanalysis, Rank was the author of The Trauma of Birth, and the first person to be awarded a PhD based on a psychoanalytic thesis. Photo by Hulton Archive/Getty Images. Reproduced by permission. five: Wilhelm Reich (1897-1957), Austrian physician and psychoanalyst. Reich discovered “orgone energy,” which he considered life energy, closely related to the function of orgasm. Reich also authored The Mass Psychology of Fascism and Character Analysis—his most important works. Courtesy of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute and Society. Reproduced by permission. six: Theodor Reik (1888-1969), Austrian psychologist and lay psychoanalyst, founder of the National Psychological Association for Psychoanalysis. Public Domain. Courtesy of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute and Society. seven: Hermann’ Rorschach (1884-1922), Swiss psychoanalyst and creator of the Rorschach inkblot projective test. Public Domain. Courtesy of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute and Society. eight: Hanns Sachs (1881-1947), Austrian lawyer and psychoanalyst. Sachs was a loyal disciple of Freud as well as co-founder of Imago. He chose the name for the journal. Sachs invested much effort in trying to popularize psychoanalysis. Public Domain. Courtesy of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute and Society. nine: The "Secret Committee." Back row from left: Otto Rank, Karl Abraham, Max Eitingon, and Ernest Jones. Front row from left: Freud, Sandor Ferenczi, and Hanns Sachs. © Bettmann/ Corbis. Reproduced by permission. ten: Freud's office, complete with couch, as it has been preserved in the Sigmund Freud Museum, which was the Freud family's home at Berggasse 19 in Vienna. © Peter Aprahamian/Corbis. Reproduced by permission. eleven: Leo Stone (1904-1997), American psychoanalyst and teacher. Stone advocated using psychoanalysis to treat a wide variety of illnesses and was a proponent of the "flexible approach" by analysts, an idea that was, at one time, considered a radical concept. Courtesy of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute and Society. Reproduced by permission. twelve: Alix Strachey (1892-1973), British psychoanalyst. Strachey assisted her husband James in the translation of Freud's works. She also translated the work of other psychoanalytic pioneers such as Karl Abraham and Melanie Klein. Photo by Frances Partridge/Getty Images. thirteen: James Strachey (1887-1967), British psychoanalyst and translator and editor of The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud. Photograph of James Strachey, Int. J. Psycho-Anal. (1969), 50: 132. © Institute of Psychoanalysis, London, UK. Reproduced by permission. fourteen: Harry Stack Sullivan (1892- 1949), American psychiatrist. Sullivan was a charter member of the Washington Psychoanalytic Society who later left psychoanalysis to establish the Washington School of Psychiatry and the journal Psychiatry. The Library of Congress. Reproduced by permission. fifteen: Leopold Szondi (1893-1986), Hungarian psychoanalyst and inventor of Shicksanalyse and the Szondi projective test. Photo by Yale Joel/Time Life Pictures/ Getty Images. Reproduced by permission. sixteen: Julius Wagner-Jauregg (1857- 1940), front row center, Austrian psychiatry professor and 1927 Nobel Laureate in physiology and medicine with his staff in 1927. Public Domain. Courtesy of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute and Society. S€Venteen: Fritz Wittels (1880-1950), Austrian physician and psychoanalyst. Wittels spent a good part of his psychoanalytic career in the United States where he taught at the New School, became a member of the American Psychoanalytic Association, and was associated with Bellevue Hospital and Columbia University in New York City. Public Domain. Courtesy of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute and Society. eighteen: Donald Woods Winnicott (1896-1971), British pediatrician and psychoanalyst. Winnicott was a cofounder of the "British Object Relations School." Courtesy of the International Association for the History of Psychoanalysis. Reproduced by permission. TABOO The word taboo was borrowed by Captain Cook, in 1769, from the Polynesian language spoken in the Hawaiian Islands. A report of his voyage was published in 1884 but the word appeared earlier in Europe in the narratives of expeditions by Adam J. von Krusenstern, 1802, and by Otto von Kotzebue, 1817. They reported on the number and variety of prohibitions the word taboo refers to. Cook further specified that taboo was applied to anything forbidden to the touch. British anthropology took over the term, subsequently reworked by the German schools on the psychologies of various peoples, and the French schools of sociology. Freud later made use of this work to define taboo as an adjective with opposite meanings—simultaneously sacred and consecrated, as well as dangerous, forbidden, impure. Taboo was the name for prohibitions that were self-imposed along with their sanctions in the event of transgression, and which lacked meaning or any obvious referent. Anyone who violated a taboo was also taboo, which illustrates the taboo’s power of contagion. The term taboo appears in a short text of Freud’s entitled “The Significance of Sequences of Vowels” (1911d), which discusses the names of God in Hebrew. “Taboo and Emotional Ambivalence,” the second chapter of Totem and Taboo (1912-13a), was published in 1912. This work continues an earlier investigation into obsessional neurosis, the analogy between its symptoms and religious rites, and the psychology of religion (“Obsessive Actions and Religious Rites,” 1907b). Freud also published “The Antithetical Meaning of Primal Words” (1910e), with taboo being one such example. Thus Freud’s studies on taboo are limited in scope, inserted into a broader investigation that was to be further elaborated in Freud’s larger works on collecitve psychology, especially The Future of an Illusion (1927c), Civilization and Its Discontents (1930a [1929]), and Moses and Monotheism (1939a [1934—38]). Freud associated taboo with ambivalence from the start. As early as the preface to Totem and Taboo, he writes that “the analysis of taboos is put forward as an assured and exhaustive attempt at the solution of the problem” (1912-13a, p. xiv) (as opposed to the totem), whose differences with taboo he goes on to point out. “The difference is related to the fact that taboos still exist among us.... They do not differ in their psychological nature from Kant’s ‘categorical imperative, which operates in a compulsive fashion and rejects any conscious motives” (p. xiv). However Freud introduces fresh complications into this idea by postulating for the first time, in the chapter “Taboo and Emotional Ambivalence,” the existence of a primal ambivalence of emotions which the taboo’s prohibitions express. Freud then relates their existence to totemism: “The most ancient and important taboo prohibitions are the two basic laws of totemism: not to kill the totem animal and to avoid sexual intercourse with members of the totem clan of the opposite sex” (p. 31-32). Still this ambivalence becomes apparent as totemism only after the murder of the primal father, in the first acts of mourning and the transition to the totemic clan. The hypothesis of life and death drives could be used to make the taboo autonomous, which Freud does not do. Therefore, the taboo’s existence is secondary, and follows upon that of the totem: given the thesis of totemism and the persistence of unconscious wishes, the “must not” is really a form of “must no longer.” “The basis of taboo is a prohibited action, 1723 “TaB00 OF VIRGINITY, THE’ the performing of which a strong inclination exists in the unconscious.... There is no need to prohibit what no one desires to do” (p. 32). The analogy with obsessional neurosis enabled Freud to clarify the dynamics of conflict and the topographical structure that gives rise to the existence of taboos: “I will now sum up the respects in which light has been thrown on the nature of taboo by comparing it with the obsessional prohibitions of neurotics. Taboo is a primaeval prohibition forcibly imposed (by some authority) from outside, and directed against the most powerful longings to which human beings are subject. The desire to violate it persists in their unconscious; those who obey the taboo have an ambivalent attitude to what the taboo prohibits. The magical power that is attributed to taboo is based on the capacity for arousing temptation; and it acts like a contagion because examples are contagious and because the prohibited desire in the unconscious shifts from one thing to another. The fact that the violation of a taboo can be atoned for by a renunciation shows that renunciation lies at the basis of obedience to taboo” (pp. 34— 35). Therefore, “taboo conscience is probably the earliest form in which the phenomenon of conscience is met with” (p. 67). The analysis of taboos touches on a number of themes. As psychic formations actualizing a dynamic of unconscious conflict amongst drive-impulses, they make use of primary processes; the propagation of this dynamism based on representations of contiguity and similarity—touch for the Unconscious—is clear and further elucidates the contagion, the “mana” of taboo as well as “delusions of touching.” At the same time these psychic formations attribute hatred and dangerousness to taboo objects and enable us to analyze projection. Moreover the conviction the taboo entails, owing to its dependence on the Unconscious, points toward animism, magic, and the omnipotence of thought—in short, to a study of narcissism. And the analogy, almost the identity, between the forms and dynamics of individual rites and rituals and those associated with taboos makes them a key element in the connection Freud creates between individual and collective psychology. The primal conflict of ambivalence that taboo allows us to postulate relates it to the hypothesis of the life and death drives, and the troubles encountered by moral conscience: anxiety, guilt, the superego, as well as their genesis via the primal murder. Even if Totem and Taboo “exhausts the problem” of taboo, Freud’s later work modified our viewpoint of it. Freud’s proposed analysis of the feminine in “The 1724 Taboo of Virginity” (1918a) transforms the concept of taboo. Whereas the ambivalence of those subject to the taboo was in general the cause for prohibitions and prescriptions; in the case of the young girl to be deflowered, it is the real danger she represents (penis envy, revenge) that makes her taboo for others. When anthropologists rejected the universalist perspective Freud invoked, the concept of taboo became subject to criticism. The structuralist viewpoint interpreted all taboos for each society as a single global symbolic system of classification, organization, and interpretation of the real, independently of any possibility for dynamic change—a claim taken up by the structuralist movement in psychoanalysis. The renewal of studies into dynamic change in the exact sciences may renew interest in Freud’s works on this subject. MICHELE PORTE See also: Abel, Carl; Animistic thought; Anthropology and psychoanalysis; Childhood; Isolation (defense mechanism); Narcissism of minor differences; Obsessional neurosis; Rite and ritual; Smell, sense of; Structural theories; “Taboo of Virginity, The”; Totem/totemism; Totem and Taboo; Transgression. Bibliography Frazer, James G. (1951). The golden bough; a study in comparative religion. London: Macmillan. (Original work published 1890-1915) Freud, Sigmund. (1907b). Obsessive actions and religious practices. SE, 9: 115-127. . (1910e). The antithetical meaning of primal words. SE, 11: 153-161. . (1911d). The significance of sequences of vowels. SE, 122341: —. (1912—13a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1-161. . (1918a [1917]). The taboo of virginity. SE, 11: 191-208. “TABOO OF VIRGINITY, THE” Freud presented “The Taboo of Virginity” to the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society on December 12, 1917. He published it in 1918 as the third of three INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS essays entitled “Contributions to the Psychology of Love” (Beitrage zur Psychologie des Liebeslebens), the first two of which were revisions of his earlier papers, “A Special Type of Choice of Object Made by Men” (1910h) and “On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love” (1912d). By regrouping these papers under a common title, Freud wanted to express the continuity of his thought concerning love, including sexual attitudes and conduct. The 1910 article, appearing about the same time as his first explicit formulation of the Oedipus complex, is concerned principally with male conquest and rivalry with other men; two years later, the second essay addresses the problem of male impotence, with specific reference to the psychological dissociation of tender from sexual feelings. “The Taboo of Virginity” in certain respects complements the first two. Freud begins by asking why a young women’s virginity is so highly valued in so many societies. He turns to anthropology to show that, in some groups, defloration is carried out just before the wedding ceremony by a third party officially charged with that duty. Such practices form part of the constraints that continue to regulate sexual life of all civilizations. In fact, “it cannot be disputed that a generalized dread of women is expressed in all these rules of avoidance.... The man is afraid of being weakened by the woman, infected with her femininity and of then showing himself incapable” (pp. 198-199). This fear is due to castration anxiety, from which arises the idea that women are “a source of such dangers, and the first act of sexual intercourse with a woman stands out as a danger of particular intensity” (p. 200). Women contribute to such dread by the persistence of their own oedipal and castration complexes, from which arise the burdens of sexual prohibition, penis envy, and “hostile embitterment” towards men, together with the fact that their desire remains fixated on the father, for which “[t]he husband is almost always so to speak only a substitute, never the right man” (p. 203). Defloration by a third party serves such conflicts in women as much as it wards off men’s fears. When such conflicts are particularly severe, they can help explain frigidity in women. “The Taboo of Virginity” is thus an integral part of Freud’s work on the Oedipus complex and castration. As a text particularly concerned with the psychoanalytic view of female sexuality, it has occasioned much critical discussion (for example, Laplanche). ROGER PERRON INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TACT See also: Castration complex; “Contributions to the Psychology of Love”; Fascination. Source Citation Freud, Sigmund. (1918a [1917]). Das Tabu der Virginitat (Beitrage zur Psychologie des Liebeslebens, III.). In Sammlung kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre (Vol. IV, p. 229- 251). Leipzig and Vienna: F. Deuticke; The taboo of virginity. SE, 11: 191-208. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1908d). “Civilized” sexual morality and modern nervous illness. SE, 9: 177-204. . (1910h). A special type of choice of object made by men. SE, 11: 163-175. . (1912d). On the universal tendency to debasement in the sphere of love. SE, 11: 177-190. Laplanche, Jean. (1980). Problématiques III, La Sublimation. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. TACT The notion of tact is basic to psychoanalytic knowhow, implicit in the work of Sigmund Freud, and explicit in that of Sandor Ferenczi. In France, for example, it was developed by Sacha Nacht under the category of “presence of the psychoanalyst.” This deceptively simple notion, to which Ferenczi returned a number of times in articles he wrote near the end of his life, deserves to be discussed, as he himself did in his article of 1928, “The Elasticity of Psychoanalytic Technique”: When and how should something be communicated to the analysand? “It is above all a question of psychological tact,” he replied. “But what is ‘tact’? The answer is not very difficult. It is the capacity for empathy. If, with the aid of knowledge we have obtained from the dissection of many minds, but above all from the dissection of our own, we have succeeded in forming a picture of possible or probable associations of the patient’s of which he is still completely unaware, we, not having the patient’s resistances to contend with, are able to conjecture, not only his withheld thoughts, but trends of his of which he is unconscious” (p. 89). Ferenczi supplemented the general import of this formulation, making it more widely applicable, because he had been treating patients, who, as a consequence 1725 Tausk, Viktor (1879-1919) of early traumatism, were affected by a narcissistic split of the self. He postulated the parent-child interactions as the elements “which make the trauma pathogenic,” speaking particularly of parental disavowal: “Probably the worst way of dealing with such situations is to deny their existence, to assert that nothing has happened and that nothing is hurting the child. Sometimes he is actually beaten or scolded when he manifests traumatic paralysis of thought and movement. These are the kinds of treatment which make the trauma pathogenic” (1931, p. 138). In 1932 Ferenczi wrote a corrosive little article whose title alone expressed clearly his insistence on not harming his patients who were in a state of regression: “Repetition in Analysis Worse than Original Trauma.” In such patients there is “self-sacrifice of one’s own mind’s integrity in order to save the parents!” (p. 268); the whole problematic of the idealization and sacrificial function of the mistreated and sexually abused child was again presented; but he insisted: “much encouragement is needed” (p. 138), much tact. PIERRE SABOURIN See also: Elasticity; Nacht, Sacha Emanoel; Technique with adults, psychoanalytic; Tenderness; ““Wild’ Psycho- Analysis.” Bibliography Ferenczi, Sandor. (1928). The elasticity of psycho-analytic ‘technique. In The selected papers of Sandor Ferenczi, Vol. 3. (pp. 87-101) (Michael Balint, Ed.; Eric Mosbacher, et al, Trans.). New York: Basic Books. . (1931). Child analysis in the analysis of adults. In The selected papers of Sandor Ferenczi, Vol. 3 (pp. 126-42). (Michael Balint, Ed.; Eric Mosbacher, et al, Trans.). New York: Basic Books. . (1932). Repetition in analysis worse than original trauma. In The selected papers of Sandor Ferenczi, Vol. 3. (Michael Balint, Ed.; Eric Mosbacher, et al, Trans.). New York: Basic Books, 268. TAUSK, VIKTOR (1879-1919) Psychiatrist and psychoanalyst Viktor Tausk was born on March 12, 1879, in Zsilina, Slovakia, and committed suicide on July 3, 1919, in Vienna. 1726 The eldest of nine children, Tausk came from a German-speaking, non-religious Jewish family that, soon after his birth, moved to Croatia. His parents had an unsuccessful marriage. His father, Hermann, was a bright, ambitious, and popular newspaperman, who at one point managed the press office of the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Tausk would oppose his father’s attachment to the Austro-Hungarian Empire by supporting the Yugoslavian nationalist movement and by becoming fluent in Serbo-Croatian. Tausk, in fact, grew up hating his father while maintaining strong affection for his mother, Emilie. Brilliant in school and multilingual, he initially chose to study law rather than costly medical studies. At Mostar, where he practiced for a time as a lawyer's assistant, he preferred to defend impoverished clients, not excepting accused murderers. Tausk visited Vienna for the first time in 1897, and there in 1898 met Martha Frisch, a distant relation of Martin Buber, the theologian-philosopher and social activist. Jewish by birth and Marxist by persuasion, she was also a Christian, and Tausk was baptized in order to marry her in 1900. Their first child was stillborn, but a son, Marius, was born in 1902; a second son, Victor-Hugo, followed in 1904. They returned to Yugoslavia, where they separated in 1905 and divorced three years later. Resettled in Berlin by 1906, Tausk began working as a journalist while writing poetry and plays and immersing himself in artistic endeavors. In 1907 his health, already precarious while a student, worsened with both physical illness (including weak lungs) and depression. He entered a sanatorium and during his stay was apparently impressed by an article by Freud, wrote to him, and received an invitation to study psychoanalysis in Vienna. There he moved in 1908 and began analytic training. He became interested in the psychoses just about the time of Carl Jung’s rupture with Freud; the former had published The Psychology of Dementia Praecox in 1907. At the same time, Tausk began medical studies, due to financial help he received from Freud and other Viennese analysts. He worked both at the outpatient neurological department directed by Frankl von Hochwart and at the psychiatric clinic at the University of Vienna, presided over by Wagner von Jauregg, the psychiatrist and neurologist who would later win a Nobel Prize. Tausk obtained his medical degree in 1913. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Lou Andreas-Salomé, highly reputed among intellectuals, met Tausk in 1912; she admired his brilliance while perceiving the extent of his psychological conflicts. (Kurt R. Eissler suggested a retrospective diagnosis of manic-depressive illness.) Analysts at the time were not required to undergo a personal psychoanalysis, which in any event was more often didactic than therapeutic. The facts concerning the presumed affair between Tausk and Andrea-Salomé are controversial. In 1915 Tausk was mobilized and served as a psychiatrist in Lublin. Although he continued to attend psychoanalytic meetings, the dreadful economic conditions in Europe at the end of World War I found Tausk living like an impoverished student. He had opportunities for work in Belgrade and Zagreb but did not want to leave Vienna. Freud declined to accept Tausk as an analysand and referred him to Helene Deutsch. But Deutsch found that treating Tausk contaminated her own sessions with Freud, who instructed her to choose between himself and Tausk (Roazen, Paul, 1972, p 31). Three months later, in 1918, she terminated Tausk’s analysis. On the question of Tausk’s suicide, Paul Roazen has stressed the impact of his conflicts with Freud, which he viewed as based on deep-seated rivalries, including issues of plagiarism and intellectual priority of ideas. Eissler by contrast emphasized Tausk‘s “severe” psychopathology, qualifying him as “talented” but no “genius.” However disturbed he may have been, he impressed Melanie Klein when she met him at the Budapest Congress in 1918. Tausk, in any event, ended his own life by shooting himself in the head after wrapping a curtain cord around his neck, so that he strangled himself as he fell. He had been drinking, but a rumor of his prior emasculation was unfounded. Though attractive to women, Tausk’s affairs had often ended in failure and abandonment. Before his death he had become engaged to Hilde Loewi, a young concert pianist whom he seduced while his patient. She may have been pregnant with his child when he committed suicide. Tausk’s fourteen published articles are remarkable for adumbrating certain psychoanalytic concepts. The best known is “On the Origin of the ‘Influencing Machine’ in Schizophrenia” (1919), the last of his writings to be published during his lifetime. Indeed, after his death Tausk curiously disappeared from the psychoanalytic horizon, only to return in the 1970s. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TAvistock CLINIC Tausk’s actual influence has been indirect and often gone unattributed, consonant with his posthumous occultation in the history of psychoanalysis. Marie- THERESE NEYRAUT-SUTTERMAN See also: Hungary; Suicide. Bibliography Eissler, Kurt R. (1971). Talent and genius. New York: Quadrangle Books. Kanzer, Mark. (1972). Victor Tausk—The creativity and suicide of a psychoanalyst. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 41, 556-584. Roazen, Paul. (1969). Brother animal. The story of Freud and Tausk. New York: Alfred Knopf. . (1969). Victor Tausk’s contribution to psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 38, 349-353. Tausk, Marius. (1973). Viktor Tausk as seen by his son. American Imago, 30 (4), 323-335. Tausk, Viktor. (1991), Sexuality, war, and schizophrenia: Collected psychoanalytic papers. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. TAVISTOCK CLINIC The Tavistock Clinic, also called the “Tavi,” is the premier psycho-dynamic psychiatric out-patient clinic in the British Isles, with Health Service departments for adults, adolescents, and children and families. It provides consultations to other institutions. The Academic Services Directorate provides post-graduate trainings. Human development, inter-personal relationships within families and social structures are researched. The chief executive in 2005 was Nicholas Temple. The Tavistock Clinic was opened in 1920 at No. 51, Tavistock Square, Bloomsbury, London, by Hugh Crichton-Miller, who had used Freud’s theory of neurosis in the treatment of soldiers suffering “shell shock” from the First World War. Crichton-Miller was a Christian influenced by Jung and Freud. The clinic embraced a wide range of psychological approaches, and applied psychoanalysis and eclectic training, which resulted in a mutual antipathy with Ernest Jones, who officially banned psychoanalysts from staffing the clinic. 1727 TECHNIQUE WITH ADULTS, PSYCHOANALYTIC Staff and trainees undertaking psychoanalytic training later were Wilfred Bion, Margaret Little, Clara Thompson, C. Phillip Wilson, and Eric Wittkower. Michael Fordham trained with the Jungians. A few psychoanalysts, including Susan Isaacs and Karin Stephen, took part in the clinic’s training. During the World War Two, several staff members served in the Armed Forces; J. R. Rees becoming chief of Army psychiatric services, G. R. Hargreaves Assistant Director of Army Psychiatry. They brought together Bion, John Bowlby, Bridger, Dicks, Foulkes, Kelnar, MacKeith, Main, Morris, Phillipson, Rickman, Rodger, Trist, Wilson, and Wittkower, forming an “invisible college” working on officer selection, training, morale, civil resettlement, therapeutic communities, and group therapy. In 1946 some of these formed the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations (TIHR), an interdisciplinary group interested in the problems of organizational and societal change. This group established a journal, Human Relations, and Tavistock Publications Ltd. With the Family Welfare Association (Enid Eicholz, later Balint) they created the Family Discussion Bureau (Tavistock Marital Studies Institute). In the clinic they established a unit for adolescents, developed the School of Family Psychiatry and Community Mental Health (Academic Services Directorate) and the joint Library. The relationship between the clinic and psychoanalysis improved after the war, due to the work of John Rickman and Sylvia Payne. Bowlby headed the children’s department and John Sutherland became medical director. Michael Balint joined in 1949. Many staff and trainees were in psychoanalytic training. The adult department focused on group-analytic therapy and the children’s department on the total family. Bion wrote on groups, Dicks on marital difficulties, Malan on short-term psychotherapy, Sandler on the psychodynamic personality inventory, Parkes on bereavement, Laing on pathological family processes, Ainsworth on attachment, Bowlby on attachment and loss, and the Robertsons made films on separation. Training for lay child-psychotherapists was set up by Bowlby with Esther Bick and Martha Harris. The clinic, with TIHR, moved to new premises in 1967, also housing the Child Guidance Training Center. The adolescent unit incorporated the Young People’s Consultation Service headed by Walter Joffe. 1728 The present-day clinic provides service, training, and research, complementary to psychoanalysis, and attracts visitors and trainees from afar. Marcus JOHNS See also: Balint group; Bick, Esther; Bion, Wilfred Ruprecht; Bowlby, Edward John Mostyn; British Psycho- Analytical Society; Great Britain; Infant. observation (therapeutic); Laing, Ronald David; Rees, John Rawlings; Rickman, John; Robertson, James; Technique with children, psychoanalytic; Tustin, Frances. Bibliography King, Pearl H. M. (1989). British analysts during World War II. Inter-disciplinary collaboration. International Review of Psychoanalysis, 16, 15-34. Trist, Eric; et al. (1982). The Tavistock Institute: origin and early years. Personal communication (pp. 1-30). New York: Pearl King, Academy of Management. TECHNIQUE WITH ADULTS, PSYCHOANALYTIC The difficulties Freud experienced in writing the General Method of Psychoanalysis (“Allgemeine Methodik der Psychoanalyse”), which he had announced in 1908 to Carl G. Jung, Sandor Ferenczi, Karl Abraham, and Ernest Jones, are well known. The need for such a manual had become more urgent by 1906, as more students and colleagues showed interest in being initiated into the new method of treatment. Scattered in cities across the world—Zurich, Budapest, London, New York, and Toronto—these followers were busy with their professional responsibilities, and so were unable to complete an apprenticeship under the personal tutelage of the sole master of psychoanalysis. Freud did not get much past page 36, and it was only after 1910 that he decided to publish the few articles that, until 1915, were generally grouped under his “technical writings.” These involved merely a few recommendations, generally of the nature of what should not be done during treatment, lessons learned from years of slow and progressive elaboration of the psychoanalytic method. The history of Freud’s method was marked by some important turning points, especially the progressive abandonment of hypnosis, the substitution of free INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS association for the technique of concentration (1898a), the stress on the interpretation of dreams (1900a), and the emphasis on the analysis of resistance rather than the forced search for “primal scenes,” in addition to the primordial role eventually accorded to transference neurosis. Although the framework of the treatment was in place from 1903, at least in its formal aspect (1904a [1903], 1905a [1904]), it was only in October 1907, with the treatment of the “Rat Man” (1909d) that the last great technical recommendation was announced: “The technique of analysis has changed to the extent that the psychoanalyst no longer seeks to elicit material in which he is interested, but permits the patient to follow his natural and spontaneous trains of thought” (Nunberg and Federn, p. 227). While questions were raised concerning possible modifications of technique to include psychotic patients, the First World War and its social implications led Freud to anticipate the need to mix the practical aspects of psychotherapy with the ideals of classical psychoanalysis (1919a [1918]), paving the way for multiple modifications in technique, which appeared one after another in the years to come. Salient among the first modifications were Ferenczi’s experiments with “active technique,’ which, following Freud’s example, he pushed at first to an extreme, in opposition to what he denounced as the “fanaticism of interpretation.” The work which he published in 1924 with Otto Rank, Perspectives de la psychanalyse (Perspectives on psychoanalysis), was less shocking for the public than the theory that Rank espoused shortly afterwards in The Trauma of Birth, but both Rank and Ferenczi aimed at reducing the length of treatments, and bringing to greater prominence the maternal role of the analyst in the transference. In April, 1926, Rank distanced himself even further from Freud with his book Technik der Psychoanalyse (Technique of psychoanalysis), and in the 1930s, Ferenczi did likewise, especially with his emphasis on [sexually] gratifying behavior, and his experiments with “reciprocal analysis.” On the other hand, Abraham, Ernst Simmel, and Max Eitingon, at the Berlin Polyclinic and Institute, which they created in 1920, codified the technical rules that were to be taught to candidates in psychoanalytic training, based on a “didactic analysis” and supervision. These continue to constitute the basis of teaching at most psychoanalytic institutes. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TECHNIQUE WITH AbuLts, PSYCHOANALYTIC Among the significant technical “innovations” was doubtless “character analysis,” which Wilhelm Reich developed in 1933, and which marked the last great discussions contemporaneous with Freud, apart from the debates concerning analytical technique with children that took place between the disciples of Anna Freud and Melanie Klein. After the war, Jacques Lacan’s suggestion to permit sessions varying in length was severely censured by the members of the International Psychoanalytic Association, without discussion, its originator not having supplied sufficient supporting materials for such a proposal. In the area of classic analytic treatment, modifications multiplied, along with the creation of new techniques loosely connected with psychoanalysis: “psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy,’ psychodrama, group psychoanalysis, and so forth. Freud himself never established rules that were fixed and absolute, commenting even, in introducing his “Recommendations”: “The technical rules that I am putting forward here have been arrived at from my own experience in the course of many years, after unfortunate results had led me to abandon other methods.... I must however make it clear that what I am asserting is that this technique is the only one suited to my individuality; I do not venture to deny that a physician quite differently constituted might find himself driven to adopt a different attitude to his patients and to the task before him” (1912e, p. 111). A reading of the memoirs of his analysands well illustrates the liberties he constantly allowed himself in the analysis of his daughter and that of Ferenczi, whom he advised, on June, 1, 1916: “As you’ve wanted, if your fates allow, I'll save two sessions for you every day. I hope to see you a lot otherwise, and would like you to dine with us at least once a day. Technical rules demand, however, that, outside of the sessions nothing personal be mentioned.” In 1928, at the Hague Conference, Ferenczi, in his presentation on tact, mentioned that “Freud had said ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ things about ‘tact’; with the result that obedient subjects did not understand how elastic the conventions were, submitting to them as if they were written in stone.” In fact, the technical rules that Freud initially wanted to make more flexible gradually became rigid; his early flexibility was shown by his remark recorded in the Minutes of February 8, 1910: “It is inconsistent bri29 TECHNIQUE WITH ADULTS, PSYCHOANALYTIC to say: I must not impart this or that. This simply cannot be said in such a general way. It is evident that the technique can be practiced with understanding and tact, or otherwise” (Nunberg and Federn, p. 417). Smiley Blanton, his patient, recalls that Freud said, in March 1930: “Now in the matter of papers on technique, I feel that they are entirely inadequate. I do not believe that one can give the methods of technique through papers. It must be done by personal teaching. Of course, beginners probably need something to start with. Otherwise they would have nothing to go on. But if they follow the directions conscientiously, they will soon find themselves in trouble. Then they must learn to develop their own technique” (p. 48). All the same, freedom is not license, and Freud was clear about this in a letter to René Laforgue, dated July 2, 1928: “If you want to give the beginner the feeling of being a free man, of not being obliged to stick submissively to the rule, to trust his intuition and give free rein to his humanity, I fear that the results will be quite disappointing. His intuition will lead him, unfailingly, in the wrong direction, and as far as his humanity is concerned, any position is closer to this than the analytic position” (1977h [1923-33]). Since then, hundreds of articles and many books have been published on this subject; among them Edward Glover’s (1955) and Ralph Greenson’s (1967). The variety and the diversity of their positions show the need to distinguish, in psychoanalytic practice, between a simple “procedure,” whether on a trial basis or in an emergency, and a “method” that qualifies as properly psychoanalytic, within which such a procedure will find a place, or not (Mijolla). Processes recognized as effective, along with the theoretical goals that structured them when they were initiated, as well as the definitions of the goals and means of psychoanalysis, all changed as Freud continued to discover things, and were subject to further modification after his death. There is no “method,” except one based on a theory of analysis. Method and theory enrich each other in a permanent process of evolution, one that absorbs the lessons of experiments with sometimes ephemeral procedures, together with particular attention to their favorable or unfavorable consequences. ALAIN DE MYoOLLa See also: Action-language; Analyzability; Analysand; Fourth analysis; “Analysis Terminable and Interminable”; 1730 Analytic psychodrama; Anticipatory ideas; Attention; Balint, Michael (Balint [Bergsmann], Mihaly); Bion, Wilfred Ruprecht; Character Analysis, Construction/ reconstruction; “Constructions in Analysis”; Cryptomnesia; Evenly-suspended attention; Face-to-face situation; Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, Free association; Fundamental rule; Glover, Edward; Interpretation; “Lines of Advance in Psycho-Analytic Therapy”; Money in the psychoanalytic treatment; Narcissistic injury; Neutrality/ benevolent neutrality; Psychoanalyst; Psychotherapy; Racker, Heinrich; “Recommendations to Physicians Practicing Psychoanalysis”; Reich, Wilhelm; “Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through”; Supervised analysis (control case); Termination of treatment; Therapeutic alliance; Tomasi di Palma di Lampedusa-Wolff Somersee, Alessandra; Training analysis; Training of the psychoanalyst; “Wild ’ Psycho-Analysis”; Word association. Bibliography Blanton, Smiley. (1971). Diary of my analysis with Freud. New York: Hawthorn. Ferenczi, Sandor. (1955). The elasticity of psycho-analytic technique. In Final contributions to the problems and methods of psycho-analysis. London: Hogarth and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis. (Original work published 1928) Freud, Sigmund. (1898a). Sexuality in the aetiology of the neuroses. SE, 3: 259-285. . (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. Parts I and II. SE, 4-5. . (1904a [1903]). Freud’s psycho-analytic procedure. SE, 7: 247-254. . (1905a [1904]). On psychotherapy. SE, 7: 255-268. . (1909d). Notes upon a case of obsessional neurosis. SE, 10: 151-318. . (1912e). Recommendations to physicians practising psycho-analysis. SE, 12: 109-120. . (1919a [1918]). Lines of advance in psycho-analytic therapy. SE, 17: 157-168. Freud, Sigmund, and Laforgue, René. (1977h [1923-33]). Correspondance Freud-Laforgue, préface d’Andre Bourguignon. Nouvelle Revue de psychanalyse, 15, 235-314. Glover, Edward. (1955). The technique of psycho-analysis. London: Bailliere, Tindall & Cox. Greenson, Ralph. (1967). The technique and practice of psychoanalysis. New York: International Universities Press. Mijolla, Alain de. (1987). Unconscious identification fantasies and family prehistory. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 68, 397-403. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Nunberg, Hermann, and Federn, Ernst. (1962-1975). Minutes of the Vienna Psych. Society (Vol. 1: 1906-1908). New York: International Universities Press. TECHNIQUE WITH CHILDREN, PSYCHOANALYTIC The psychoanalysis of children represents an area of research and practice whose definition and progressive formation, through the twentieth century, were not established without clashes, conflict, and polemics. There have been successive waves of interest, with competing views, sometimes resulting in fixed oppositional positions, depending on the period. The psychoanalysis of children is perceived by some as heretical, difficult to practice, even fundamentally utopian or impossible; by others, it is seen as an informative and reflexive paradigm, capable of enriching the theory and the technique of adult psychoanalysis. On one hand, it has been presented as intrinsically impure, on the other, much more rarely, it has seemed to be a kind of unrealizable ideal, fecund but somewhat vague. These debates relate of course to the status accorded the mind of the child viewed on its own terms, and not only insofar as it is evolving into the mind of an adult, but also involve inevitable modifications in technique, since it is obvious that the framework defined by Sigmund Freud for the adult (with the couch, the basic rule of free association, absolute priority accorded to language and so forth) cannot be applied as such to children, especially to very young ones. In this connection, two remarks should be made: first of all, one must be very careful to distinguish the psychoanalysis of the child from various applications of psychoanalysis to the domain of childhood (psychoanalytically inspired psychotherapies, combined parent-child therapies, analytic observation of newborns, so-called psychoanalytic family therapies, psychodrama, group therapies—with analytical overtones—or even the application of psychoanalytic concepts in education, pedagogy, and social fields). Of concern here will be only the psychoanalysis of the child, in its strictest sense, and not any of its looser applications. Furthermore, any science—and psychoanalysis has a legitimate claim to this status, scientific pretensions, even if that is not its only possible definition—defines INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TECHNIQUE WITH CHILDREN, PSYCHOANALYTIC itself at once by the presence of a framework, and also by its epistemological field. For psychoanalysis, there is a strict framework, and not only the formal appearance of one. In other words, as important as it is, merely having a framework is not enough to entitle something to be named a science; and the definition of psychoanalysis cannot be reduced to this feature. The essence of psychoanalysis is centered, at the minimum, on the dynamics of transference and countertransference, on the concept of resistance and the function of interpretation, and it is reasonable to judge that there is no effective analysis possible, without real work on these different planes. All the same it is quite possible to imagine that this work can be conducted in different settings and, notably, in settings adapted to the various ages of the children. The whole purpose of the psychoanalysis of children is to succeed in developing these different aspects; for so long as these are not addressed fully, the risk of conflict and misunderstanding between those who treat adults and those who treat children will remain, a risk that René Diatkine evidently was trying to parry when he said: “I am not a psychoanalyst of children, I am a psychoanalyst who treats children.” Regarded historically, the evolution of ideas concerning the technique of analysis of children has been marked by a some significant turning-points, linked to the work of the pioneers in this domain. Concurrently with the recommendations of Freud, who, from 1905, advised psychoanalysts to observe the psychosexual development of their own children, in an attempt to verify the reconstructed findings of the first adult treatments (Freud following his own advice, Karl Abraham observing his daughter Hilda, and Melanie Klein her youngest son), Herminie von Hug-Hellmuth was doubtless the first to undertake an authentic analysis of a child, in Berlin, during the First World War, recognizing the existence of transference and already utilizing, although in an unsystematic manner, games and drawings. Next was Eugenia Sokolnicka, in Warsaw, in 1919. In 1921, Klein settled in Berlin to practice the psychoanalysis of children, and Didier Houzel and Gilles Catoire remarked that “what can be considered as the prehistory of the psychoanalysis of children ended at the beginning oft he 1920’s” (1986). Subsequently, one of the great debates in the history of psychoanalysis occurred between Anna Freud and Klein, precisely on technical aspects that were due to a basic theoretical-clinical divergence. Donald W. 1731 TECHNIQUE WITH CHILDREN, PSYCHOANALYTIC Winnicott eventually assumed an intermediary position in this debate, fairly close to the positions of Klein, especially on the question of the place of games in technique, but reproaching her, nevertheless, for what he saw as her insufficient attention, to the child’s environment and particularly to the role of the real mother. In France, a number of names should be mentioned, dividing, during the second half of the twentieth century, along the line of scission between Lacanian psychoanalysts and the non-Lacanian: Serge Lebovici, René Diatkine, Michel Soulé, among the latter; Frangoise Dolto, Jenny Aubry, Rosine and Robert Lefort, among the former. These differences concerned theoretical references that were also reflected on the level of technique (the importance accorded to the child’s wishes, and to the place of language, in particular), In the early twenty-first century the influence of the post-Kleinian movement is dominant in many countries in the conception and technical choices of child psychoanalysis (importance of counter-transference, exploration of archaic or primal levels of mental functioning, work on psychic boundaries, and so forth). In 1926, in four lectures she gave at the Psychoanalytic Institute of Vienna, Anna Freud described an intermediary technique between the analytical and educational approaches. The limits she placed on the analysis of children were calculated on the basis of the following arguments: no transference neurosis is possible with the child (too great dependence on real parents); modification of the framework is required, having nothing in common with the free association technique of adults (absence of symbolic associations with games and drawings); there is need for a so-called preparatory phase during which the analyst “induces” the child by way of a certain charm to become involved in the treatment, by establishing a positive transference with the child, an educative role that is necessary if the analyst is to avoid the consequence of the lifting of repression and liberation of the drives. In 1927, at a colloquium of the British Society, Klein refuted the propositions of Anna Freud, point by point. For her, analysis was incompatible with any educative attitude; the preparatory phase was in no way justified, because it was the interpretation of the anxieties in the transference which allowed the child to enter into the analytical process, the child being quite capable of developing an authentic transference neurosis. 1732 Progressively, Anna Freud drew closer to the Kleinian positions, but for a long time there remained serious differences between the two schools as a legacy of this early opposition. It wasn’t until 1990 that the first joint colloquium took place, between the Anna- Freudian Hampstead Clinic and the Kleinian Tavistock Clinic (this colloquium was to havé been presided over by John Bowlby, who, in fact, died a few months before the event). These two institutions have remained, through 2005, very important centers for reflection on the subject of child psychoanalysis, certain names deserving mention, among many others: Anne-Marie and Joseph Sandler, Peter Fonagy, Hansi Kennedy, _Géorge Morane, of the Hampstead Clinic; Hanna . Segal, Esther Bick, Martha Harris, Donald Meltzer, and Juliet Hopkins, of the Tavistock Clinic. Given that there is no such thing as a purely technical problem, but that technical problems always refer to underlying theoretical-clinical issues (hence, the historical survey, above), it can be said that the question of psychoanalytic technique with children is based on four main elements: the place of parents in the process, the framework, the transference—countertransference dynamic, and the function of interpretation. Working with parents should be distinguished from the treatment, properly speaking, but it conditions it, in great part. Depending on the age of the child and the technique of each practitioner, positions vary as to the analyst’s role in the family. In most cases, the work is effectuated by a consultant, not by the child’s analyst, so that the child’s “mental space” is better respected, but some technical variations are possible in this respect. As far as the framework is concerned, a point in common with adult analysis concerns the number of sessions per week, which should be enough for a veritable analytical process to be begun (all the more so with psychotic, as opposed to neurotic children). Three visits a week seems to be the generally accepted frequency, alas not very often realized in practice. The question of payment has been also the source of much reflection, the notion of “symbolic payment” having been particularly developed by Francoise Dolto, in France, and by other authors influenced by her. In addition, the place of the body and of preverbal communication, have attracted much attention, and have caused some changes in the way children are INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS treated, compared to adults. In the early twenty-first century, means such as games, drawings, or modeling clay are in very wide use, and usually considered as analogous to the adult’s words, and as a basis for the practice of free association. The counter-transference and corporal involvement of the child analyst is often more intense than that of the analyst of adults, which is why, unfortunately, analysts rarely continue until an advanced age to treat children, as Donald W. Winnicott was able to do. The difficulty of the task should not, however, be reduced to rationalizations as to its basic impossibility. The child, just like the adult, is living in “deferred action” from the very beginning, even if current developments in psychoanalysis of the very young might cause some modifications in the Freudian theory of deferred action; for example, by diffraction over a number of generations. The major difficulty connected to the framework of analysis of children has to do with the role of the analyst himself, who has to find a balance between the freedom children are given to express themselves and the limits one must at the same time impose on them to avoid colliding with infantile omnipotence. As to transference, particular attention deserves to be paid to the therapeutic alliance, already mentioned, which lies at the very heart of the controversy between Anna Freud and Klein. This is a particularly difficult notion when it comes to children: some authors see it as a precondition for the later development of the transference dynamic; others as a preliminary but conscious and ego-like version of the transference, properly speaking. It is clear, in any case, that with the child, in most cases, the therapeutic alliance depends in large measure on what kind of bond has or has not been established with the parents. Interpretations can be metonymical, metaphorical, historical, or flatly transferential, as with adults, but should have, over time, a containing effect, which gives them their therapeutic value, and this because the children treated are, mostly, those whose capacity for containing is defective, and whose psychic boundaries are still in the process of being formed. The kernel of this problem is knowing how to create for such children, while their internal framework is still in formation, an external structuring framework, one specifically derived and internalized from the framework of the treatment. The analysis of children’s resistance has proven to be wholly indissociable from the analysis of the fantasy-contents and of the transference. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TECHNIQUE WITH CHILDREN, PSYCHOANALYTIC As with adults, many positions, often quite opposed to each other, have been taken regarding the conclusion of the child’s analysis, it being understood that ideally the child should be the one to decide, even beyond the eventual disappearance of the symptoms that motivated the analysis—which would make sense, obviously, only in relation to the existence of suffering and intrapsychic conflicts obstructing the development of the child. Following authors such as Hanna Segal and Donald Meltzer, the post-Kleinian movement has contributed much to the discussion of the technique of analyzing children. Meltzer (1967) even suggested describing the therapeutic process in five successive phases: gathering the elements of transference, sorting through confusions of place, sorting through confusions of bodily zones and modalities, [passing] the threshold of the depressive position, and, finally, the process of separation. Such a description, of course, risks being overly schematic, but it has had the virtue of being able to account for the dynamic of the process, as well as to allow the articulation of a certain number of technical approaches. At the end of this introduction, it is fitting to recall, with Antonino Ferro (1997), that psychoanalysis is basically a single entity; and that there is really nothing to be gained by dividing the psychoanalysis of the child from that of the adult. Each is in a position to enrich the other, notably by way of a calm, comparative meditation on the various technical problems that are posed in the two fields. BERNARD GOLSE See also: Child analysis; Children’s play; Controversial discussions; Flower Doll: Essays in Child Psychotherapy; Psychoanalytical Treatment of Children; Richard, case of; Squiggle; Transference in children; Transitional phenomena. Bibliography Freud, Anna. (1946). The psychoanalytical treatment of children. Technical lectures and essays. London: Imago. Houzel, Didier, and Catoire, Gilles. (1986). La psychanalyse des enfants. Encyclopédie médico-chirurgicale. Psychiatrie. Paris: E.M.-C. King, Pearl H. M., and Steiner, Riccardo. (1991). The Freud-Klein controversies, 1941—45. London and New York: Tavistock-Routledge. 1733 Teer (ScHLoss TEGEL) Meltzer, Donald. (1967). The psychoanalytic process. London: Heinemann Medical. Sandler, Joseph, Kennedy, Hansi, and Tyson. Robert L. (1980). The technique of child analysis. Discussions with Anna Freud. London: Hogarth and the Institute of Psychoanalysis. TEGEL (SCHLOSS TEGEL) The Schloss Tegel was the first establishment in the world to provide psychoanalytic treatment in an institutional framework. It was inaugurated on April 10, 1927 at Berlin-Tegel by neurologist Ernst Simmel, who directed it until its economic collapse in August 1931. Convinced by his experience treating war neuroses acquired in the course of World War I, Simmel first sought the financial support of the state for his project to open a clinic. Having failed to obtain this support in spite of his efforts and pleading, he founded, with the help of three administrators (Dr. Nussbrecher, director of the Phénix insurance company; Dr. Ludwig Jekels; and Prof. Julius Hirsch, state minister) a SARL (private limited company), the Sanatorium Schloss Tegel, as a psychoanalytic clinic. On November 6, 1926 a lease was signed with the owner of the castle, state councilor Reinhold von Heinz, concerning a “treatment center with accommodation for physicians, a pleasure garden and a park ... for use as a sanatorium, authorizing the reception and treatment of patients suffering from various illnesses with the exception of physical deformities, sexually transmissible diseases, and mental patients.” (Schultz-Venrath, 1995). Unfortunately, the clinic was never free of financial difficulties and had to be permanently supported by Sigmund Freud, who instituted a help fund for it, to which Marie Bonaparte, Dorothy Burlingham, René Spitz, Franz Alexander, Max Eitingon, Raymond de Saussure, and Hugo Staub contributed. In spite of this the closure of the clinic in August 1931 became inevitable in the economic crisis of the declining Weimar Republic, because patients could no longer afford to pay the hospitalization costs. The clientele that Ernst Simmel treated in his seventy-four-bed clinic consisted of seriously ill neurotics; addicts of various kinds, including inveterate gamblers; children and adolescents presenting deficits in character development (kleptomania, for example); patients in acute life crises; and chronic patients with complications. The Schloss Tegel Sanatorium was destined to become a center for systematic psychotherapy 1734 for patients suffering from organic illnesses. Among the collaborators having received analytic training we find Rudolf Bilz, Ludwig Fries, Alfred Gross, Irene Haenel-Guttmann, Karl Maria Herold, Hellmuth Kaiser, Eva-Maria Rosenfeld, Francis Deri, Ilja Schalit, Edith Weigert-Vowinkel and Moshe Wulff. In order to deal with multiple transference situations in a therapeutic fashion, the nursing personnel, who had received analytic training, had to function as an extension of the psychoanalysts. Simmel was the first to introduce the concept of psychoanalytic treatment for patients suffering from organic illnesses, a concept with a dyadic orientation. There were as yet no examples of group psychoanalysis. The therapeutic technique stressed the importance of avoiding regression by, on the one hand, taking social reality into account and, on the other, by offering timely analytic interpretations. Three case histories were published from this clinic, two of them being posthumous: the spectacular treatment of a case of heart failure with pulmonary edema (Simmel, 1931b), a feminine perversion (Simmel, 1990) and a young pyromaniac (Simmel, 1949). With the exception of two patients who were paid for by a charitable organization, all the others were private patients. LUuDGER M. HERMANNS AND ULRICH SCHULTZ- VENRATH See also: Freud, Ernst; Germany; Simmel, Ernst; Thomas Woodrow Wilson, Twenty-eighth President of the United States. A Psychological Study. Bibliography Simmel, Ernst. (1931b). Uber die Psychogenese von Organstérungen und ihre psychoanalytische Behandlung. In E. Kretschmer and W. Cimbal (Eds.), Bericht iiber den VI. Allgemeinen arztlichen Kongress fiir Psychotherapie in Dresden, 14-17 Mai 1931 (pp. 56-65). Leipzig: Hirzel. . (1949). Incendiarism. In K. R. Eissler (Ed.), Searchlights on Delinquency. New Psychoanalytic Studies Dedicated to Prof. Aichhorn on the Occasion of His 70th Birthday July 1948. New York: International Universities Press, 90-101. . (1990). Neurotische Kriminalitat und Lustmord. Eingeleitet und kommentiert von Schultz U., Hermanns L.M., Kiitemeyer M.: die psychoanalytische Behandlung einer Lustmorderin im Jahre 1930. Psyche, 44, 71-99. Schultz-Venrath, Ulrich. (1995). Ernst Simmels psychoanalytische Klinik Sanatorium Schloss Tegel GmbH (1927-1931). Frankfurt am Main-Washington: Deutsche Hochschulschriften 2081, Mikroedition. INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TELEPATHY “The process of telepathy is said to occur when a psychic act by one person results in the same psychic act in another person” (1933a [1932]). Sigmund Freud developed several hypotheses about the direct transmission of thought, or telepathy, seeing it as an archaic mode of communication between individuals and possibly a physical process that had become mental at the two ends of the communications sequence. Carl Jung and, later, Sandor Ferenczi, were, along with Freud, interested in the question of telepathy. Freud’s attitude toward it was simultaneously one of openness, because of its proximity to the unconscious, and reserve, fearing that psychoanalysis might find itself compared to occultism. His interest was essentially personal and longstanding, since he believed that he was able to communicate remotely with his fiancée Martha by thought alone when he was in Paris (Jones, 1957, vol. 3). Later, he attempted to conduct experiments of this kind, which is reflected in his correspondence with Ferenczi in 1910 and with his daughter Anna in 1925. But Freud maintained that the notion of telepathy was outside psychoanalysis, which was only interested in using a scientific, not a mystical, approach in the investigation of psychic activity. In fact, in discussing the telepathy performed by mediums, he recommended that we investigate their psychology, as well as that of their customers. Nonetheless, he felt that the phenomenon in question, namely the transmission of thought, was at least probable even if it was not demonstrable. Freud advised Jung, and especially Ferenczi, to be cautious about revealing their attitudes about telepathy, which might have risked jeopardizing the status of psychoanalysis. He expressed this sentiment publicly on several occasions, the first time in 1921, in a short text entitled “Psychoanalysis and Telepathy,” which was read during a scientific meeting with his followers (1941d [1921]), the second time in an essay, “Dreams and Telepathy” (1922a), and then in 1925 in a note on “The Occult Meaning of Dreams” (19251), published in the New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1933a). In fact Freud couched his own interest in the occult, in the form of a critique of a skeptical and limited rationalism, in rather sharp terms: “Not for the first time would [psychoanalysis] be offering its help to the obscure but indestructible surmises of the common people against the obscurantism of educated opinion” INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TENDERNESS (1941d [1921], p. 178). However, this interest did not lead him to accept telepathy as such, but to examine with greater attention the examples of premonitions or of premonitory dreams, which led him to question the after-the-fact reconstruction of narratives of partially falsified acts. The value of Freud’s investigation, therefore, extends well beyond telepathy, touching upon the epistemological justification of the interpretative process used for dreams and analytic constructions. At the same time, as a question, telepathy is most certainly related to that of the unconscious through the hypothesis of telepathic communication in primitives and animals. Animism, the occult, and the uncanny, therefore, form a field that is neither inside nor outside psychoanalysis, but which psychoanalysis attempts to approach using its own methods. SOPHIE DE MijOLLA-MELLOR See also: Latent; New Introductory Lectures on Psycho- Analysis; Occultism; Omnipotence of thought; “Recommendations to Physicians Practicing Psychoanalysis”; “Uncanny’, The.” Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1922a). Dreams and telepathy. SE, 18: 195-220. . (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22: 1-182. . (1941d [1921]). Psycho-analysis and telepathy. SE, 18: 173-193. Granoff, Wladimir, and Rey, Jean-Michel. (1983). L’Occulte, objet de la pensée freudienne. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Jones, Ernest. (1953-1957). Sigmund Freud. Life and work, London: Hogarth Press. TENDERNESS The term tenderness is derived from the Latin tener, which expresses the idea of a young life filled with freshness. By extension it can apply to a person who is soft, easily wounded morally, and sensitive to altruistic feelings. Freud distinguished between “the affectionate and the sensual current” (1912d, p. 180): the older of the 1735 TENDERNESS two is tenderness, which corresponds to the choice of the primary infantile object, which is based on the drive for self-preservation and directed toward those who care for the infant. “These affectionate fixations of the child persist throught childhood, and continually carry along with them erotism, which is consequently diverted from its sexual aims” (p. 181). It is only at puberty that the “powerful sensual current that no longer fails to recognize its aims” (p. 181) is added. The objects of the primary infantile choice are then invested with powerful libidinal forces that conflict with the prohibition against incest. It is by displacement toward a new object with which sexual fulfillment is possible that the current of tenderness and the current of sensuality are reunited in the love relationship. Tenderness emits from an aim-inhibited sex drive (libido). It is parental, and in particular maternal, tenderness that “rous[es] her child’s sexual instinct and prepar[es] for its later intensity” (1905d, p. 223). If it is excessive, it will lead to “a precocious sensuality that will spoil the child” and lead to a predisposition to neurosis. Using this as his starting point, Sandor Ferenczi distinguished a tenderness stage, or passive object love stage, and a passion stage (1933). Michael Balint, his student and follower, developed the concept of archaic or primary object relation (Primary Love and Psychoanalytic Technique, 1952). The most precocious phase of psychic life “is not narcissistic in nature: it is directed toward objects, but this precocious object relationship is a passive relationship—I must be loved and satisfied without having anything to give in return.” “This form of object relation is not associated with any erogenous zone’; mother and child do not have separate identities, their reciprocal instinctual goals are interdependent. This results in active infantile behaviors where the impulse to cling plays a preponderant role. Paul-Claude Racamier summarized these issues and developed them further. Primary love “is a relation that unites by separating: uniting to the extent that it differentiates and distinguishing to the extent that it reunites; this is the primal paradox of narcissistic seduction” (1995). Tenderness is used to convey this relation: “It is both a mode of cathexis and an affective tone.” It is not directly sexual but it is not without sensuality; well-being—a developed form of self-preservation—is sought instead of a push toward discharge. “Its special feature is to envelop; its specific site, the skin.” Maternal 1736 gestures consist of gentle caresses, based on continuity and tact within a climate of “temperate warmth.” During the 1950s, John Bowlby, relying on the direct observation of babies interacting with their mothers and on ethological data, hypothesized the existence of a primary and fundamental need for attachment. This was manifest very early in the newborn’s archaic behavior (crying, glances, holding) and became more diversified as the infant grew. This work had considerable impact and led to additional research in the field of precocious interaction. These authors identify the need for attachment as based on physical contact, primarily through the skin. In 1968 Esther Bick proposed the concept of a first psychic skin whose aim was to keep the parts of the personality together “as experienced by them passively.” In 1974 Didier Anzieu developed the concept of the “skin ego,” “an original parchment that preserved the marks of a ‘primal’ preverbal writing made of cutaneous traces,” which culminated in the idea of the psychic envelope. After birth the skin fulfills functions that were formerly provided in utero by the maternal envelope. Julian de Ajuriaguerra studied the constitution of the clinging-hugging gesture in children. Initially it is an extension of the arm toward the selected person, then the closing of the arm in an embrace. This gesture, in its complexity, is only fully realized after the age of nine months. Prior to this, one can observe, early in the life of the child, the use of clinging (Moro) and gripping reflexes. Then, around the age of two to three months, the child attempts to open and extend its arms. At around six months, the baby can coordinate the gesture with speech intonation mimicry. At around nine months, an organized pattern of clinging is established, and will develop, around one year of age, into more elaborate forms of related behavior. Hugging, squeezing, caressing, kissing, and other gestures of skin-to-skin contact are the most frequent manifestations of tenderness in mother-child interactions. This “tonic dialogue” forms a secure foundation for emotional development. REGINE PRAT See also: Aggressiveness/aggression; Body image; “Confusion of Tongues between Adults and the Child”; Friendship; Latency period; Love; Maternal; Narcissism, primary. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Bibliography Ajuriaguerra, Julian de, and Casati, Iréne. (1985). Ontogenése des comportements de tendresse: I. Etude de l’embrassement- étreinte, a partir du pattern “tendre les bras.” Psychiatrie de I enfant, 28 (2), 325-402. Balint, Michael. (1952). Primary love, and psycho-analytic technique. London: Hogarth. Bowlby, John. (1969). Attachment and loss (Vol. 1). London: Hogarth. Ferenczi, Sandor. (1949). Confusion of tongues between adults and the child. The language of tenderness and of passion. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 30, 225— 230. (Original work published 1933 [1932]) Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123-243. . (1912d). On the universal tendency to debasement in the sphere ofl ove. SE, 11: 177-190. Racamier, Paul-Claude. (1995). L’Inceste et l’Incestuel. Paris: Editions du College de psychanalyse groupale et familiale. TERMINATION OF TREATMENT Very early on Sigmund Freud determined what for him was the sign of the end of a psychoanalytic treatment, that is to say that it is complete with the “practical recovery of the patient, the restoration of his ability to lead an active life and of his capacity for enjoyment” (1904a, p. 253), criteria that he repeated in the Lecture 28 of the Introduction to Psychoanalysis (1916—17a). But almost as soon, noticing the unpredictability of the resolution of the transference, he remarked: “In the early years of my psycho-analytic practice I used to have the greatest difficulty in prevailing on my patients to continue their analysis. This difficulty has long since been shifted, and I now have to take the greatest pains to induce them to give it up (1913c, p. 130). In “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” (1937c) he specified the ideal conditions for termination of treatment: “An analysis is ended when the analyst and the patient cease to meet each other for the analytic session. This happens when two conditions have been approximately fulfilled: first, that the patient shall no longer be suffering from his symptoms and shall have overcome his anxieties and his inhibitions; and secondly, that the analyst shall judge that so much repressed material has been made conscious, so much that was unintelligible has been explained, and so INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TERMINATION OF TREATMENT much internal resistance conquered, that there is no need to fear a repetition of the pathological processes concerned” (1937c, p. 219). Eight years earlier Sandor Ferenczi suggested: “The proper ending of an analysis is when neither the physician nor the patient puts an end to it, but when it dies of exhaustion, so to speak, though even when this occurs the physician must be the more suspicious of the two and must think of the possibility that behind the patient’s wish to take his departure some neurotic factor may still be concealed. A truly cured patient frees himself from analysis slowly but surely; so long as he wishes to come to analysis, he should continue to do so” (“Termination of Analysis,” p. 85). He also indicated the “ideal goal” to aim for: “The far sharper severance between the world of fantasy and that of reality which is the result of analysis gives them an almost unlimited inner freedom and simultaneously a much surer grip in acting and making decisions; in other words it gives them more economic and more effective control” (p. 81). Extending the duration of treatment and the perennial problem of the “interminable analysis” have always been issues of concern to the psychoanalytical community and have been ceaselessly discussed in many articles, congresses, and seminars Multiple and disparate criteria to judge when a treatment may be considered ended have consequently been proposed, in accordance with changing theory and practice. On the analysand’s side the following has been recommended: behavior adapted to reality, an ability to handle suffering and depression, overcoming of penis envy and castration anxiety, access to genitality in psychosexual behavior, reinforcement of sublimations, diminution of guilt, and the like. Sacha Nacht (1965) recommended taking account of the “lessening of the fear of suffering, the acceptance of the patient of himself, his ability to satisfy his desires, compatible at once with his ideals and his milieu, and the possibility of his engaging in action, while avoiding submission to the automatism of repetition” (Lebovici, 1980). Attachment to a new external libidinal object was regarded with suspicion by Wilhelm Reich (1949) and especially by Annie Reich, who saw therein a defensive acting-out, like the divorces that occur at the end of an analysis. On the analyst’s side there is an “intuition” by unconscious perceptions that termination is necessary, 1737 THALASSA. A THEORY OF GENITALITY that the transference neurosis is on the way to being “liquidated.” Melitta Schmideberg (1938) has even recommended that the analysis be systematically interrupted after six years so that the bond with the analyst won’t make separation impossible. With the “Wolf Man” case (1918b), Freud used the technique of fixing a date of termination to the analysis, but the results led him to rarely ever repeat this, nor to recommend it. Sandor Ferenczi, with the “active technique,” like Otto Rank, with the application to treatment of the principles of The Birth Trauma (1924), both aimed at shortening the duration of the treatment, but their attempts were criticized by most of their contemporaries and by Freud himself. Franz Alexander suggested experimental interruptions (1963), while, in France, Sacha Nacht (1965) recommended breaking “the closed world” of the transference by making the analyst more “present,’ to “demythify” him, so as to favor “integration, by successive, nuanced phases into external, objective reality’—suggestions that have since been severely criticized. A process based on progressive severance, consisting in diminishing gradually the frequency of sessions is doubtless the easiest and the most often employed. Whatever the criteria utilized to recognize that an analysis is in process of termination, they can only be based on the evolving conception that the protagonists of the situation have been maintaining of the goals of the treatment, as their special relation proceeds, and as they analyze the conscious and unconscious motivations inciting them to conclude it. Freud’s realist positions on the two “rocks,” which any psychoanalytic pretension to omnipotence will come up against, should not be forgotten either: the male “refusal of femininity” and the “penis envy” of the female. The end of the analysis is also a recognition of the unanalyzable, even if every treatment should involve an attempt to gain on a little bit of its territory. Generally there has been agreement that the traditional framework of the treatment should be maintained until the very last session, while a few face-to-face sessions have been recommended in some cases where working through the separation was particularly difficult. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Psychoanalytic treatment. 1738 Bibliography Ferenczi, Sandor. (1955). The problem of the termination of the analysis. In The selected papers of Sandor Ferenczi. Vol. [lI (Final contributions to the problems and methods of psychoanalysis. (Michael Balint, Ed.; Eric Mosbacher, et al, Trans.). New York: Basic Books. (Original work published 1927) ; Firestein,. Stephen K. (1974). Terminasion de lanalyse. Revue frangaise de psychanalyse, 44, 2. ; Freud, Sigmund. (1937c). Analysis terminable and interminable. SE, 23: 209-253. Lebovici, Serge. (1980). L’expérience du psychanalyste chez enfant et chez l’adulte devant le modéle de la névrose infantile et de la névrose de transfert (The experience of the psychoanalyst of children and adults with the models of infantile neurosis and transference neurosis). Revue francaise de psychanalyse, 44, 5-6. Nacht, Sacha. (1965). Le transfert (Transference). In Guerir avec Freud. Paris: Payot, 1971. THALASSA. A THEORY OF GENITALITY Freud described Ferenczi’s Thalassa. A Theory of Genttality as “the boldest application of psycho-analysis that was ever attempted” (1933a, p. 228). It is worth noting that the Hungarian edition of the work (Budapest, 1929) bore a different title: “Catastrophes in the Development of the Genital Function: A Psychoanalytic Study.” Ferenczi takes as his first axis of reference the parallelism between catastrophic moments in the development of the embryo (or ontogenesis) on the one hand, and in the evolution of the species (or phylogenesis) on the other. Proposing a vast fresco, summarized in a synoptic table of presumed parallels (p. 69) and based on Lamarck’s evolutionary theories and on Haeckel’s fundamental rule of recapitulation, which it rounds out, he brings together two seemingly distinct temporal perspectives: the time of the germ cell, when the human was a mere monoblast destined by fertilization to become an egg, then an embryo, and after birth to continue living in an extended dependency on the environment; and the time that begins with the emergence of organic life on earth, and which can be described by reference to the various ice ages of the Quaternary era. How many tens of thousands of years were thus recapitulated in the transformation of the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ovum into the newborn? As Nicolas Abraham (1962) notes, this “cosmogonic epic seeks its meaning in the automatism of repetition itself.” The second yardstick introduced by Ferenczi in his interpretation of the erotic meaning of reality, of coitus, of sleep, or of sexual impotence is regression. For the adult man, coitus embodies a striving on the part of the ego toward a threefold identification: a symbolic identification of the whole organism with the phallic function; a hallucinatory (or specular) identification with the feminine partner; and a real identification, effected as “the genital secretion [does] in very truth penetrate into the uterus” (p. 74), as the biology of pleasure makes the regeneration of the human being into a material reality. Ferenczi ascribes a traumatolytic function to the orgasm. To buttress these analogies, he takes as a model the fusion of sexual cells familiar to embryology, extrapolating the notion of “amphimixis” to account for the partial erotisms of different organs. By analogy with disturbances of language, he describes erectile dysfunction as “a kind of genital stuttering” (p. 9). He dubs his working method “utraquism,” meaning that a single phenomenon may be viewed in two complementary perspectives, so that technique and theory have a recursive relationship. The ramifications of this text of Ferenczi’s were considerable. In Totem and Taboo (1912-13a), Freud had constructed a myth of the origin of civilization on the basis of an animal, human, and/or divine parricide, reparation for which was due “out of love for the father” and not just “in the name of the father” (fraternal alliances, codification of the prohibition against incest); in Thalassa, Ferenczi evokes a carnival of bodily organs whose regressions serve to actualize symbolic remnants (marriage bonds, the search for the child within the adult after post-traumatic fragmentation, and so on). With respect to later psychoanalysts, it is clear that Thalassa is an anticipation of Jacques Lacan’s thinking on the logic of the unconscious and of his topography of the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real. The work also foreshadows future psychosomatic studies (which Ferenczi calls bioanalysis). It is worth noting that such authors as Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, André Leroi-Gourhan, Konrad Lorenz, Yves Coppens, and René Thom have arrived in this connection at equally original hypotheses. PIERRE SABOURIN INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ““THEME OF THE THREE CASKETS, THE”’ See also: Amphimixia/amphimixis; Archaic mother; Ferenczi, Sandor; Psychic causality. Source Citation Ferenczi, Sandor. (1924). Thalassa. Versuch einer Genitaltheorie. Leipzig and Vienna: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag. Thalassa: A Theory of Genitality (Henry Alden Bunker, Trans.). Albany, NY: Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 1938. Bibliography Abraham, Nicolas. (1962). Preface to Sandor Ferenczi, Thalassa. Psychanalyse des origines de la vie sexuelle. (Translated into French by J. Dupont and S. Samama). Paris: Payot. Freud, Sigmund. (1912—13a). Totem and Taboo. SE, 13: 1-161. . (1933c). Sandor Ferenczi. SE, 22: 225-229. Pragier, Georges. (1955). Un Inédit de Ferenczi. In Sandor Ferenczi. Monographies of the Revue Francaise de Psychanalyse. Paris: PUF. Sabourin, Pierre. (1985). Ferenczi. Paladin et grand vizir secret. Paris: Editions Universitaires. “THEME OF THE THREE CASKETS, THE” In “The Theme of the Three Caskets,” Sigmund Freud presents a wealth of extremely complex thoughts in just a few short pages. At the beginning are two scenes from Shakespeare, in which the number three plays an essential role: First, the choice of three pretenders to Portia’s hand between three metal caskets in The Merchant of Venice; and second, in King Lear the dying King’s partition of his kingdom between his three daughters, according to the love they show for him. In both these two plots, the humblest thing is shown to be the most precious: plain lead on one side, the mute love of Cordelia on the other. Although Freud initially draws on Shakespeare as his source for the choice between caskets; he ends up relying on myths that deal with the choice a woman must make between three pretenders, but which is inverted (as in the case of the choice between the three caskets and in the logic of the dream) into the choice a man makes between three caskets, that is, three women. This leads Freud to evoke other scenes that turn on the number three in myths, folklore and literature, for instance constellations of three sisters where the choice always fall upon the third one who is the most unique. Freud identifies this uniqueness of the third as her 1739 THERAPEUTIC ALLIANCE “muteness.” and then recalls how muteness in psychic life is typically a representation of death. The third daughter, seen from this perspective, may be viewed as Death, the Goddess of Death. The sisters appear, consequently, as the three daughters of Fate—according to mythological tradition, the three Moirai, Parcae, or Norns. Freud’s detour through mythology makes the goddesses of fate represent the inexorable Law of Nature, and thus of the passing of time and the ineluctability of death as well. Returning to the choice between three sisters, Freud seeks to soften any resultant contradictions between this detour through mythology and the specific choice itself by reminding us that fantasy activity typically inverts what is disagreeable into its contrary. Fatality, the inexorability of death, is transformed into a free choice. In King Lear the old man appears at the end carrying the dead Cordelia in his arms. Freud refers the powerful effect this produces to the latent message transpiring behind the manifest representation of the scene: in fact it is Cordelia, Goddess of Death, who carries the dead king off the battlefield. Although a minor work, this magisterial essay demonstrates concretely, even in its use of free association, the fecundity of the analytical method when applied to literature, myths, and folklore; while at the same time illustrating the laws of psychical functioning, such as the inversion of a wish into its opposite. In a letter to Sandor Ferenczi dated July 9, 1913, Freud revealed that the “subjective condition” he was in when writing this essay was occasioned by the fact that his third child, Anna, was beginning to occupy a very unique place in his life. ILSE GRUBRICH-SIMITIS See also: Literature and psychoanalysis; Mother goddess; Silence. Source Citation Freud, Sigmund. (1913f). Das Motiv der Kastchenwahl. Imago 2, 257-266; GW, 10, 24-37; The theme of the three caskets. SE, 12: 291-301. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund, and Ferenczi, Sandor (1992-2000). The correspondence of Sigmund Freud and Sandor Ferenczi. (Eva Brabant, Ernst Falzeder, and Patrizia Giampieri-Deutsch, 1740 Eds.; Peter T. Hoffer, Trans.).; Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. THERAPEUTIC ALLIANCE Therapeutic alliance refers to the mutual collaboration established between a psychoanalyst and a patient to overcome the neurotic or psychotic resistance that blocks change and the healing process. Freud provided a clear description of this in his Outline of Psychoanalysis, “The analytic physician and the patient's weakened ego, basing themselves on the real external world, have to band themselves together into a party against the enemies, the instinctual demands of the id and the conscientious demands of the super-ego. We form a pact with each other. The sick ego promises us the most complete candor—promises, that is, to put at our disposal all the material which its self-perception yields it; we assure the patient of the strictest discretion and place at his service our experience in interpreting material that has been influenced by the unconscious. Our knowledge is to make up for his ignorance and to give his ego back its mastery over lost provinces of his mental life. This pact constitutes the analytic situation” (1940a {1938]). Following his theorization of “resistance, Freud abandoned contemporary psychotherapeutic thinking to begin developing “psychoanalysis.” The discovery that his patients unconsciously refused to provide themselves with the means for improvement, no matter how much they asked for it, was to lead him to his description of the “secondary benefit” of the illness and his understanding of the need to support the work of therapy through positive transference in order to overcome the unconscious obstacles represented by negative transference or the resistance to change. “Healing is achieved through love,” he wrote on December 6, 1906, in a letter to Carl Gustav Jung. This belief was often repeated and led Freud, during his therapeutic work—as exemplified in his work with the “Rat Man” (1909d)—to encourage, through words or signs, the confidence of his patients and their attachment to him. On several occasions Freud mentioned this “analytic pact” concluded between the conscious ego of the patient and the therapist. Freud did not fail to point out the constant shortcomings, the most important of INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS which has to do with the transference neurosis, which, if it is not recognized and analyzed, risks blocking the patient’s associative process. The patient then “behaves as if he were not in treatment, as if he had not concluded a pact with the doctor.” (1916-17) Subsequently, a number of analysts have described the modalities of an alliance that is essential to overcoming the inherent difficulties associated with therapy. Richard Sterba, in 1934, described the split in the ego that would allow the analyst to appeal to his patient’s powers of reasoning to fight against his impulses and repression. But it was Edward Bibring who first referred to the “therapeutic alliance” (1937) between the analyst and the “healthy” part of the patient’s ego. In this he was faithful to Freud, who wrote that same year in Analysis Terminable and Interminable: “The analytic situation consists, as we know, in our alliance with the ego of the person-object to conquer the unconquered parts of his id and therefore to integrate them in the synthesis of the ego. The fact that such a collaboration often fails in the psychotic provides, in our judgment, an initial point of support. The ego with which we are able to conclude such a pact must be a normal ego” (1937c). After the Second World War the concept of a therapeutic alliance enjoyed considerable success in the United States when Elisabeth Zetzel, in 1956, made it a component of psychoanalytic technique, especially during the initial stages of therapy. She compared the therapist’s attitude to the mother’s intuition toward her infant and made this alliance the condition for the emergence and resolution of the transference neurosis (1965). This approach, felt to be too thoroughly infiltrated with Kleinian thought, was criticized by Ralph Greenson, who, the same year, proposed the notion of a working alliance. The term was used for subjects capable of object relations (thereby excluding overly narcissistic personalities) and is described as “a relatively rational, desexualized transference phenomenon,” capable of controlling aggressive impulses (1965). But Greenson also insisted on the fact that this working alliance, based on the “mature and rational” ego, was established outside the analysis of transference and necessitated actions or comments by the psychoanalyst on the reality of the relationship (for example, recognizing that the patient’s criticism is justified rather than interpreting the need to criticize the analyst). Several authors judged Greenson’s concept to be outside INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS THING-PRESENTATION the framework of analytic neutrality and abstinence (Jacob A. Arlow and Charles Brenner, 1964; Mark Kanzer, 1975, for example). The question arises of the limits of action for the psychoanalyst, a question presented in terms of the weight of his reality in the therapeutic relationship. Just how far can the maintenance of positive transference, or the appeal to the rational by a split part of the ego—which in its theorization is very similar to the concept of the “conflict free ego” integral to ego psychology—get, before outside factors present the emergence of, or submerge, the psychic reality that the psychoanalytic situation is in fact supposed to promote? It was Joseph Sandler (1973) who insisted on this distinction when he emphasized the necessity of a therapeutic alliance sustained by interpretation alone. ALAIN DE MIjOLLA See also: Greenson, Ralph; “Outline of Psychoanalysis, An”; Psychoanalytic treatment; Technique with adults, psychoanalytic; Transference in children; Transference relationship. Bibliography Bibring, Edward. (1937). Contribution to the symposium on the theory of the therapeutic results of psycho-analysis. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 18, 170-189. Greenson, Ralph R. (1965). The working alliance and the transference neurosis. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 34, 155-181. Sandler, Joseph, Dare, Christopher, and Holder, Alex. (1973). The Patient and the analyst: The basis of the psychoanalytic process. New York: International Universities Press. Zetzel, Elisabeth R. (1956). Current concepts of transference. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 37, 369. . (1965). The theory of therapy in relation to a developmental model of the psychic apparatus. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 46, 39. THING-PRESENTATION In many of Freud’s writings, “thing-presentation” means solely what it means for empiricist psychology, as his concept of the mnemic image or trace would suggest. In his paper “The Unconscious” (1915e), however, Freud defined “thing-presentation” as “the 1741 THING-PRESENTATION cathexis, if not of the memory-images of the thing, at least of remoter memory-traces derived from these” (p. 201). This definition refers to the theory that Freud had worked out on the contrast between perception and memory and on the sequence of mnemic systems. The psychic apparatus, he had concluded, has a spatial structure in which presentations are related to one another as a function of different types of associations. This means that a thing-presentation is significant less by virtue of its individual character than by virtue of its being coded as a link in a network. Rather than being a direct duplication of an object, a thingpresentation is an inscription in the systems of the mind of certain aspects of the object relative to an instinctual cathexis. In his monograph on aphasia (1891b) Freud first drew the distinction between the presentation of a thing (which at that time he called an “objectpresentation”) and the presentation of a word. In this neurological work, he classified the different forms of aphasia on the basis of a psychology of mental representations independent of the nervous system, thus parting company with his predecessors, who_ had constructed associationist models based on the search for cerebral localization. Freud defined the link between a thing-presentation and a word-presentation as the result of an association (which in terms of the theory of signs might be called arbitrary) between a sound image specifically representing the word and the visual image that of all possible mnemic images is especially representative of the thing. There is an inescapable connection here with the signifier/signified relationship that Ferdinand de Saussure would later be the first to describe, for Freud explicitly asserted in his work on aphasia that “a word ... acquires its meaning by being linked to an ‘object-presentation,” and not by reference to the thing itself (SE 14, p. 213). By embracing this account of meaning, Freud preserved differences internal to language and differences external to it, for thing-presentations, on this view, still refer to things in the outside world. The compounds “thing-presentation” and “wordpresentation” thus acquired a double sense, depending on how the relationship between the two component terms was understood. On the one hand, one could take the thing or word concerned to be represented by the corresponding thing- or word-presentation, that is, by mental visual images and sound images that can 1742 be assimilated to the linguistic concepts of the signified and the signifier respectively. On the other hand, one could understand thing-presentations and wordpresentations as referential signs, in which case these terms would denote representatives of things and words in the outside world. As a mnemic image, a presentation in a sense indicates the referential or denotative function, and thus restores the sign-thing relationship that the signifier/signified opposition, immanent to the sign, excluded. More than twenty years later, Freud, in his article “The Unconscious” (1915e), called once more on the distinction between thing- and word-presentations, this time to help overcome the difficulties inherent in topographical and economic hypotheses advanced to explain the differences between actual experience and what was heard during analysis. His aim was to relate such differences, not to varied forms of aphasia, but rather to distinct mental systems: “The conscious presentation comprises the presentation of the thing plus the presentation of the word belonging to it, while the unconscious presentation is the presentation of the thing alone” (p. 201). This hypothesis once again raised the vexing question of the relationship between thought and language. It promoted the idea that a thought precedes language: thought is initially unconscious and concerned with the sense impressions left by objects; when it later becomes conscious, it does so only by means of wordpresentations. The question of thought thus led back to a realm prior to language, a realm that Freud occasionally compared to Kant’s noumenal realm, the realm of the thing-in-itself. On this view, thing-presentations correspond less to images than to thoughts or ideas of things that have lost all the sensory vividness of perception. These thing-presentations are incorporated into an associative process along with other presentations, thus constituting a thought process that, by definition, is devoid of quality or feel. Hence there is an essential need for word-presentations, which reendow thing-presentations with their former sensory vividness. Freud did not exclude the possibility of thing-presentations directly becoming conscious; dream images and hallucinations were evidence of such a process. But he stressed that nonverbal thought is a very imperfect means of bringing items into consciousness—witness how we picture topographical relationships in dreams (1923b, p. 21). INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS The specificity of the notion of thing-presentation in psychoanalysis lies in the difference between cathected external objects and internal objects resulting from the processes of introjection and projection directed at external objects. In the primitive splitting of ego and object that occurs when the object relationship is established, when the mother is first perceived as a whole object, it is possible to discern the origin of a topographical distinction between psychic systems, and thus the origin of the unconscious. This moment, which correlates with the defense mechanism of primal repression, is the starting point of representation. ALAIN GIBEAULT See also: Action-(re)presentation; Ego; Fantasy, formula of; Ideational representation; Infans; Multilingualism and psychoanalysis; Preconscious, the; “Unconscious, The”; Visual; Word-presentation. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1891b). On aphasia: A critical study (E. Stengel, Trans.). New York: International Universities Press, 1953. Extracts in Freud (1915e), SE 14. . (1915e). The unconscious. SE, 14: 159-204. . (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1-66. Gibeault, Alain. (1985). Travail de la pulsion et representations: Représentation de chose et representation de mot. Revue francaise de psychanalyse, 49 (3), 753-772. Further Reading Tesone, J. E. (1996). Multi-lingualism, word, thing presentations and psychic reality. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 77, 871-883. THING, THE In the apparatus of the psyche, the Thing represents the secret center of human desire, the nucleus of pleasure/unpleasure. This nucleus is opposed to the reality principle, which it threatens to undermine. The Thing, also called the “lost object,” acts as the cause of desire and a sign of longing for an impossible reunion with the object. Sigmund Freud first referred to the Thing in 1895, in “A Project for a Scientific Psychology” (1950a). He used the term again in 1925 in his essay “Negation. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS THomAS WoopRow WILSON, TWENTY-EIGHTH PRESIDENT. . . Jacques Lacan fully elaborated this Freudian notion in his seminar The Ethics of Psychoanalysis (1992). An instance of the Thing develops from a complex set of cathected perceptions and memory images that have given pleasure in the past. This set includes a stable kernel, called the Thing, and a variable element, or predicate. The Thing arises in the primordial relation between the infant seeking fulfillment of its vital needs and the primary caregiver, the “fellow being,” who is also the first hostile object. The kernel or nucleus is inaccessible to judgment, while the predicate is the object of a judgment that must verify whether the memory image corresponds to reality. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, this process of judging forms the basis for the ego. The Thing is situated in the unconscious articulation of desire. In its origin, it posits the Other as unconscious, as the force withholding the signifier of satisfaction, while reality is subverted by the symbolic function of memory traces of the lost object, from which the subject’s desire is alienated. JEAN-PAUL HILTENBRAND See also: “Negation”; Other, the; Subject’s desire; Unary trait. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1925h). Negation. SE, 19: 233-239. . (1950c [1895]). A project for a scientific psychology. SE, 1: 281-387. Lacan, Jacques. (1992). The seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book 7: The ethics of psychoanalysis, 1959-1960 (Dennis Porter, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton. THOMAS WOODROW WILSON, TWENTY-EIGHTH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY The Freud bibliography by Ingeborg Meyer-Palmedo and Gerhard Fichtner attributes to Freud the preface of Thomas Woodrow Wilson, Twenty-Eighth President of the United States: A Psychological Study—a hybrid work; it has remained one of the most ignored of all the works to which Freud has contributed. Peter Gay, who scrupulously reconstructed the genesis of the text (1988), noted, quoting William C. Bullitt, how 1743 THomas Wooprow WILSON, TWENTY-EIGHTH PRESIDENT... Freud’s “eyes brightened” when, in May 1930, during a visit to the clinic at Schloss Tegel in Berlin, Bullitt spoke to him about a book he wanted to write on the Treaty of Versailles (p. v). Haunted by death and having just gone through another operation, Freud at once suggested that he contribute a study of President Wilson. Although—or because—Wilson’s personality and actions had been “from the beginning unsympathetic to me” (p. xi), Freud immediately began writing. His steps can be traced up to August 1931, when Ambassador Bullitt informed Colonel House, a former adviser of Wilson, who was growing impatient, that “the first version of the book is almost complete,” then, at the end of April 1932, that “the book is finally finished.” The only thing remaining was for the text to be revised, so, at the end of November, Freud told Max Eitingon he had learned from “his collaborator ... when it would be possible to publish the Wilson book.” It is important to remember that the situation at the Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag was dire at this time and Freud was counting on the success of the book, as he did the New Introductory Lectures (1933a [1932]), then being printed, to restore the firm to solvency. Nothing happened however. There were disagreements; Freud wanted to add new material that Bullitt rejected. The day after his arrival in London in June 1938, which owed a great deal to the ambassador’s intervention, Bullitt finally obtained from Freud the authorization to publish the text. According to Max Schur (1972), Freud’s notes and letters were supposedly burned by an absent-minded butler during Bullitt’s hurried departure from Paris in 1940. “Why did my father agree, after a repeated (and quite understandable) refusal?” asked Anna Freud when the book finally made its appearance in 1966—“after the death of Mrs. Wilson” noted Bullitt. While it is easy to understand the extent to which this text was part of Freud’s preoccupation with the dangers of a personality impregnated with religious illusions and the political and economic fallout caused by the misinterpretation of external reality by the “world’s leading idealist,” the final result is perplexing and Freud’s style comes through only in short bursts. The subtitle, “A Psychological Study,” is clear, and Freud explains that it “expresses our conviction that psychoanalysis is nothing but psychology, one of the parts of psychology, and that one does not need to apologize for employing analytic methods in a psycho- 1744 logical study which is concerned with the deeper psychic facts” (p. xiv). This could not have been done during Wilson’s lifetime, but “when ... an individual whose life and works are of significance to the present and future has died, he becomes by common consent a proper subject for biography and previous limitations no longer exist” (p. xiv). : After an introduction written by Bullitt—“Digest of Data on the Childhood and Youth of Thomas Woodrow Wilson”—there follows the “Psychological Study” signed by both authors. The book contains thirty-five short chapters of commentary on the principal episodes of Wilson’s life, from his rise to power until his paralysis in September 1919 and death on February 3, 1924. Like a pale caricature of certain essays on “psychohistory,” the book is a heteroclite patchwork of simplified psychoanalytic concepts for an ignorant public, remarks that are not without finesse, and reductive and repetitive interpretations. It is easy to see why so many readers have refused to see this as Freud’s work. This can be explained by the connection between Wilson’s masochistic submissiveness and his “overpowering father” (p. 59), the Reverend J. R. Wilson. A “paternal complex,” the repression of a hostility that was impossible to bear, since the father was assimilated to the supreme Being, the identification of the son with Jesus Christ and his mission as Savior of the world, the creation of an “tremendously powerful and exalted Super-Ego”(p. 60), a libido that found release in his speeches—the list of explanations is not all that long and each chapter could be concluded with the quod erat demonstrandum that Freud had grown fond of using during his friendship with Fliess. But there was a fundamental difference with the cases he had discussed until then, something both authors recognized, in fact: “We shall never be able to achieve a full analysis of his character. About many parts of his life and nature we know nothing. The facts we know seem less important than those we do not know. All the facts we should like to know could be discovered only if he were alive and would submit to psychoanalysis.... It is a psychological study based upon such material as is now available, nothing more” (pes5)s In fact this work, unlike that on Leonardo da Vinci and the Memoirs of Justice Schreber, cannot be considered a truly “psychoanalytic” work because not only is it not based on clinical experience but it makes no INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS attempt to illustrate a theoretical premise based on other examples taken from clinical practice. It is purely descriptive in nature, journalistic in a sense, and, like any work of this nature—although it bears Freud’s signature—the book is not an example of applied but of superficial psychoanalysis. The concluding sentence of Freud’s preface is worth repeating, however: “We cannot, however, deny that, in this case as in all cases, a more intimate knowledge of a man may lead to a more exact estimate of his achievements” (p. xvii). ALAIN DE MYOLLA See also: Bullitt, William C.; Ego-libido/object-libido; Group psychology; History and psychoanalysis; Politics and psychoanalysis; Psychohistory; “Why War?” Source Citation Freud, Sigmund, and Bullitt, William C. (1966b [1939]). Thomas Woodrow Wilson, Twenty-eighth president of the United States: A psychological study. London and New York: Weidenfeld and Nicholson. Bibliography Bolzinger, Andre. (1991). Portrait psychologique et psychanalyse sauvage. A propos de “Le président T. W. Wilson.” LEvolution psychiatrique, 56 (1), 189-200. Gay, Peter. (1988). Freud: A life for our time. London and Melbourne: Dent. Miller, Gérard. (1990). Préface. In Bullitt, William C., and Freud, Sigmund, Le président T. W. Wilson. Paris: Payot, “Petite Bibliotheque.” Schur, Max. (1972). Freud: Living and dying. New York: International Universities Press. THOMPSON, CLARA M. (1893-1958) American physician and psychoanalyst Clara M. Thompson was born in Providence, Rhode Island on October 3, 1893, and died in New York City on December 20, 1958. Thompson grew up in a religious, middle class family. She was closer to her father, while her brother Frank, nine years her junior, was closer to her mother. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS THomPSON, CLARA M. (1893-1958) Thompson was a serious student and a tomboy in elementary and high school where her goal was to be a medical missionary. In 1912 Thompson enrolled at the Women’s College of Brown University. College was a difficult time for her; she is described as quiet and lonely. A formative experience occurred in her sophomore year when she read George Eliot’s Mill on the Floss. Thompson deeply identified with its rebellious protagonist, Maggie. She stopped going to church and decided not to be a missionary. This precipitated a twenty-year rupture with her mother. In her senior year Thompson was engaged to be married, but her boyfriend insisted that she chose between him and medical school. She chose medical school and never married. In 1916 Thompson began medical training at Johns Hopkins University, where she also completed her internship. She worked at St. Elizabeth Hospital under Edward Kempf and William Alanson White, and had a psychiatric residency at the Phipps Clinic where she studied under Adolph Meyer. In 1923 Harry Stack Sullivan heard Thompson give her first scientific paper. He was very taken by her work and thus began a friendship of twenty-five years. Sullivan encouraged Thompson to go into treatment with Sandor Ferenczi, whom she first met in the spring of 1927, while he was lecturing at the New School. She went to Budapest in the summers of 1928 and 1929 and then moved to Budapest in June of 1931 where she stayed until Ferenczi’s death in 1933. Prior to moving to Budapest, in 1930, she had become the first president of the Washington-Baltimore Psychoanalytic Society. Thompson’s treatment deeply affected her. People felt that she was deeply changed by this analysis. Ferenczi’s ideas about the impact of the real relationship between patient and analyst and the importance of real events in childhood were compatible with Sullivan’s Interpersonal Theory, but Thompson strongly disagreed with Ferenczi’s ideas about regression. After Ferenczi’s death Thompson moved to New York where she, Sullivan, Karen Horney, William Silverberg, and later Erich Fromm met to discuss their work. Thompson taught at the New York Psychoanalytic Institute from 1934 until 1941, when she left after Horney was forced to resign. She joined with Horney, Silverberg, Robbins, and Fromm in forming the Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis, but 1745 THOUGHT she left two years later after Horney insisted on only including medical doctors, and excluded Fromm. Thompson, Fromm, and Janet Rioch, with the help of Sullivan and Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, then started the New York Branch of the Washington School of Psychiatry, later to become the William Alanson White Institute. Thompson was co-founder and director of the William Alanson White Institute, from its creation as the New York branch of the Washington School of Psychiatry in 1943, until her death in 1958. Thompson wrote over fifty articles, many of which are reprinted by Maurice Green in Interpersonal Psychoanalysis. The Selected Papers of Clara Thompson (1964). These include: “Notes on the Psychoanalytic Significance of the Choice of Analyst,” (1938) “The Role of Women in This Culture,” (1941) “Some Effects of the Derogatory Attitude toward Female Sexuality,” (1950) “Transference as a Therapeutic Instrument,” (1945) and “Counter-Transference” (1952). Thompson was a central force in the creation of the interpersonal school of psychiatry. Thompson analyzed or supervised many of the most influential members of the second generation of interpersonal analysts who greatly expanded and extended her ideas on transference and counter-transference. Her understanding of the unique difficulties facing professional women led her to be the analyst of choice for many groundbreaking women. In addition, T hompson’s dedication to training lay analysts set an important precedent in the United States. Sug A. SHAPIRO See also: Counter-transference, Interpersonal analysis. Bibliography Moulton, Ruth. (1986). Clara Thompson: Unassuming leader. In L. Dickstein and C. Nadelson (Eds.), Women physicians in leadership roles. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Press. Shapiro, Sue A. (1993). Clara Thompson, Ferenczi’s messenger with half a message. In L. Aron and A. Harris (Eds.), Legacy of Sandor Ferenczi. Hillsdale, NJ, and London: Analytic Press. Thompson, Clara. (1950). Psychoanalysis: Evolution and development. New York: Hermitage House. . (1964). Interpersonal psychoanalysis. The selected papers of Clara Thompson (Maurice Green, Ed.). New York: Basic. 1746 THOUGHT Thought may be defined in general as mental activity, conscious or unconscious, based on the various modes of representation, including the most archaic. More narrowly, the meaning of thought may be confined to ideational activity, dependent om the faculty of judgment and on the faculty that brings into conjunction images of things and images of words. The discussion here will be restricted to the narrower conception of thought as ideational activity, but always bear in mind that the narrower meaning is deeply rooted in the more general one. Freud approached ideational thought from three different angles, which did not necessarily overlap. The first was the “psychological” approach, as outlined in the “Project for a Scientific Psychology” (1950c [1895]) and further developed in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), “Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning” (1911b), and “Negation” (1925h). In this perspective, Freud analyzed the thought process in relation to perception, language, memory traces, and action, for which, in Freud’s view, thought was a substitute. The second approach, a “genetic” one, was a response, in essence, to the question of the origins of thought as a search for knowledge. This line of enquiry was concerned primarily with the child’s urge to find things out and sought the libidinal origins of this drive and the circumstances that set it in motion. The four main Freudian works pertinent here are Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d), “On the Sexual Theories of Children” (1908c), the case history of “little Hans” (1909b), and the analysis of Leonardo da Vinci (1910c), which situate thought activity relative to the instinctual realm and describe the various fates for which thoughts may be destined: inhibition, obsessive intellectualization, or sublimation. Freud’s third approach to thought was an original way of looking, not at the actual activity of thought, but at what is expected of it. This was the “anthropological” approach, to be found notably in Totem and Taboo (1912-1913a), which developed the concepts of magical thought and animistic thought in relation to thought activity during childhood and in pathology. In the “Project for a Scientific Psychology” (1950c [1895]), Freud argued that thought processes are provoked by dissonance between a memory imprinted by a wish and a cathexis that seems to belong to the wish. When the two do not coincide, a biological signal trig- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS gers thought; when they do, another signal terminates such activity and precipitates a discharge (action). Sixteen years later, in “Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning” (1911b), Freud proposed a similar account of the act of judgment, which “had to decide whether a given idea was true or false—that is, whether it was in agreement with reality or not— the decision being determined by making a comparison with the memory-traces of reality” (p. 221). Already in the “Project for a Scientific Psychology,” he had stressed that it was possible for judgment to have no objective beyond itself, such as mnemonic activity, which is self-sufficient, or the examination of new perceptual elements. In Freud’s theory, the role of judgment is in fact circumscribed both by recollection and by investigation. In “Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning,” Freud defined thought as an activity that enabled the psychic apparatus to postpone discharge (action) when it would be inappropriate, and that brought together the impressions left by objects (“presentations”) and their linguistic designators (words). Freud also set off a “species of thought-activity ... kept free from reality-testing and ... subordinated to the pleasure principle alone,” namely fantasizing, which began with children’s play and survived in daydreams (1911b, p. 222). Here Freud was broadening the concept of thought in a way also met with in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), where Freud divided the notion of “dream-thoughts” into “essential dreamthoughts” (the dream itself, uncensored) and “latent dream thoughts.” The latter comprise the much broader set of thoughts originating in the multiple channels linking the latent to the manifest and of associations arising from contiguity and resemblance and produced during the work of interpretation. Even though an intellectual activity, such as calculation or deduction, may appear in a dream, “an act of judgment in a dream is only a repetition of some prototype in the dream-thoughts,” a repetition that may be “so neatly employed that to begin with it may give the impression of independent intellectual activity in the dream” (1900a, p. 459). Whereas the psychological approach offered a description of thought activity, the genetic approach raised an entirely different question: What makes us think? The question calls for identifying causes sufficient to account for the large quantities of libidinal energy devoted to thought activity. Freud posited an “instinct for knowledge or research” (1905d, p. 194). INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS THOUGHT This independent and atypical instinct was not bound to any erogenous zone but drew pleasure from other socalled component instincts, namely the instinct to see and the instinct for mastery. Freud needed the difficult concept of sublimation here to explain this diversion of the instinct’s aim and the change of its object. As early as the “Project for a Scientific Psychology” (1950c [1895]), Freud had pointed up the importance ‘of the visual function for understanding. He stressed it even more in his essay on Leonardo da Vinci, who famously observed that the eyes are “the window to the soul.” Freud’s logical progression from the desire to look (Schaulust) to the instinct for knowledge ( Wisstrieb) was based primarily on the fact that the wish to see was not satisfied with contemplating or even scrutinizing, but strove to compare. The perception of difference and the comparison of several variants of what is recognized as the same thing are steps toward the abstraction that enables us to think and classify. According to Freud, the instinct for knowledge is awakened when children become interested in birth—a practical interest aimed at coping with the arrival of younger siblings (1908c). This curiosity, not satisfied by the parents’ answers, leads the child to engage in intense theorizing and to devise answers, sometimes the classical ones, sometimes not, to unanswered questions. This theorizing is associated with masturbation and, like it, remains unfulfilled. Freud considered this lack of fulfillment as one of the sources of intellectual inhibition. In his write-up of the case of “little Hans” (1909b), his write-up of the case of the “Wolf Man” (1918b [1914]), and his analysis of Leonardo da Vinci (1910c), Freud explores the fate of this instinct for knowledge, which may either fall prey to inhibition, in tandem with a violent surge of sexual repression, or overcome inhibitory forces and re-emerge from the depths of the unconscious in the form of an obsessive thought. Or again, in the “rarest and most perfect” cases, the instinct may escape both fates: “The libido evades the fate of repression by being sublimated from the very beginning into curiosity and by becoming attached to the powerful instinct for research as a reinforcement” (1910c, p. 80). Melanie Klein continued this line of investigation by developing the notion of an epistemophilic instinct, a very early curiosity concerning the inside of the mother’s body and the babies presumably found there. Beginning with a consideration of the sadistic and destructive dimension of this curiosity, she pointed out that one of the sources of intellectual inhibition was the 1747 THOUGHT IDENTITY inability to obtain clarity of thought because of anxiety over what might be found (Klein, 1931). After its fashion, Freud’s third approach to thought, the anthropological approach, also addressed the question of the origin of the human desire to know. Freud felt that primitive thought was characterized by a belief in the “omnipotence of thoughts,” a term that he had originally used in connection with an obsessional neurotic, the “Rat Man” (1909d, pp. 233-235), and that denoted an overestimation of the power of thought, resulting in things being erased by their representations. In such cases, intellectual processes are strongly sexualized, and this formed the basis of the belief in the omnipotence of ideas, which led primitive man to attempt to control the world with magic (1912—1913a, p. 89). But if Freud believed that the question of the origin of life sparked the instinct for knowledge in children, by contrast, “the survivors’ position in relation to the dead first caused primitive man to reflect” (1912— 1913a, p. 93). He added, however, that this was not a purely intellectual problem, but rather an emotional conflict that had to be resolved. For children, just as for primitive humans, Freud thus rejected the notion of a primary need for causality; practical ends always predominate: “It is not to be supposed that men were inspired to create their first system of the universe by pure speculative curiosity. The practical need for controlling the world around them must have played its part” (1912—1913a, p. 78). Whether Freud is concerned with the connection between the thought of the obsessive neurotic and that of primitive people, or with how the philosopher resembles the schizophrenic in mistaking words for things, his wide-ranging reflections on thought and its origins raise a multitude of issues, including that of psychoanalytic thought itself. For, as Freud himself wrote, “When we think in abstractions, there is a danger that we may neglect the relations of words to unconscious thing-presentations, and it must be confessed that the expression and content of our philosophizing then begins to acquire an unwelcome resemblance to the mode of operation of schizophrenics” (1915e, p. 204). SOPHIE DE MyoLLA-MELLOR See also: Action-thought (H. Kohut); Alpha-elements; Animistic (thought); Certainty; Civilization (Kultur); “Claims of Psychoanalysis to Scientific Interest”; Con- 1748 cept; Contradiction; Doubt; Hermeneutics; Ideology; Intellectualization; Jokes; Logic(s)5 Magical thinking; Need for causality; Omnipotence of thought; Operational thinking; Philosophy and psychoanalysis; Pleasure in thinking; Psychic energy; Rationalization; Sense/ nonsense; Symbolism; Telepathy; Thought identity; Thought-thinking apparatus; Unconscious concept; Working-through. Bibliography Anzieu, Didier. (1994). Le penser: Du moi-peau au moipensant. Paris: Dunod. Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4: 1-338; 5: 339-625. _ (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123-243. . (1908c). On the sexual theories of children. SE, 9: 205-226. _ (1909b). Analysis of a phobia in a five-year-old boy. SE, 10: 1-149. _ (1909d). Notes upon a case of obsessional neurosis. SE, 10: 151-318. . (1910c). Leonardo da Vinci and a memory of his childhood. SE, 11: 57-137. . (1911b). Formulations on the two principles of mental functioning. SE, 12: 213-226. . (1912-1913a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1-161. . (1915e). The unconscious. SE, 14: 159-204. . (1918b [1914]). From the history of an infantile neurosis. SE, 17: 1-122. . (1925h). Negation. SE, 19: 233-239. . (1950c [1895]). Project for a scientific psychology. SE, 1: 281-387. Klein, Melanie. (1931). A contribution to the theory of intellectual inhibition. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 12, 206-218. Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie de. (1992). Le plaisir de pensée. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. THOUGHT IDENTITY Thought pursues identity in order to unify its causality; the term thought identity designates the process of cognitive determination that it forms with its object, even if the latter is of an imaginary order. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS With Sigmund Freud’s work in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), the problem of identity saw a radically new approach in relation to the notion of perceptual identity and the respective aims of the primary and secondary processes. Formal logic, a legacy from Aristotle, establishes identity as the criterion of unity of the thinkable, as the condition of possibility of thought itself, independent of its “matter.” Practical thought makes effectiveness—that is, the successful transformation of the object—the criterion for appropriate, pragmatic thought. Imaginary or fantasmatic thought seeks its “thought identity” in independence—a direct source of pleasure—relative to practical or theoretical ends. Philosophy, especially speculative philosophy (Hegel) sees the idea, the absolute determination of the concept, as the attainment of the goal of thought, in which an identity relation exists among the relative and exclusive practical, theoretical, and imaginary identities, as absolute knowledge. In this view, “ideological” thought identity represents the alienated current of the goal of identity pursued by a mode of thinking whose method is always and everywhere the active immobilization of thought, resulting in dogmatism, exclusivism, negation of the thought of the other, “group think,” and the like. Freud’s distinction between the primary and secondary processes makes it possible to differentiate between thought identity, which is the aim pursued by thought by means of the secondary process, and perceptual identity, which is the aim pursued by hallucination by means of the primary process. In Freud’s view, the aim is “practical” in that it always involves passing from one situation to another in accordance with desire. Hallucination short-circuits the detour necessitated in the effort of thinking, meaning that pleasure is not its condition even though it may remain its aim, and it takes the route of the death instinct rather than that of the life instinct; this explains the connection between thought identity and Eros. As Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor showed in Le Plaisir de pensée (1992), Freud distinguished practical and fantasmatic thought from thought in the form of true research or critical thinking; the latter do not make pleasure and its production the criteria for thought identity. For this reason, critical thinking and pure research alone are capable of producing a cogitative determination that is independent of perceptual identity. DOMINIQUE AUFFRET INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS THOUGHT- THINKING APPARATUS See also: Experience of satisfaction; Perceptual identity. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. Parts I and II. SE, 4-5. Lagache, Daniel. (1961). La psychanalyse et la structure de la personnalite. Colloque de Royaumont, 1958. La Psychanalyse, 6. Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie de. (1992). Le plaisir de pensée. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. THOUGHT-THINKING APPARATUS The term thought-thinking apparatus, used by Wilfred R. Bion, emphasizes, from a psychoanalytic standpoint, the distinction between representational aspects (elements of thought such as conceptions and concepts) and operational aspects (discharge and elaboration of thoughts). It is to this latter aspect that Bion refers when he speaks of the “thinking apparatus” (or “thought-thinking apparatus”) that develops for manipulating thoughts. In his 1962 article “A Theory of Thinking,’ where he first articulated the theory he was to further develop in four volumes published from 1962 to 1967, Bion draws a distinction between the creation of thoughts and their use for reducing tensions and deferring action (both functions that Freud had already attributed to thought). Bion posits that thoughts are anterior in origin to the work of thinking (produced by the thought-thinking apparatus). This approach can be contrasted to the truism of nineteenth-century materialist and physiological psychology that held that the brain secretes thoughts, just as the liver secretes bile. According to Bion, the infant’s first sensory or affective data correspond to a state of frustration, a sensation of the absence of the breast, a sensation of a “hole.” To get out of this state, the baby must eject or modify this sensation, which corresponds to a primitive thought or protothought. At this stage, according to Bion, there is no clear distinction between mental representation and emotional or sensory experience. In a second stage the capacity for thinking appears, dependent upon the infant’s ability to withstand frustration, endure delay, and transform the emptiness left by the absence of the breast into a thought. In Bion’s 1749 “THOUGHTS FOR THE TIMES ON WAR AND DEATH” view, in the course of development the “non-thing” or “non-object” becomes a thought. The breast that is present is not a thought, but will finally become the thing-in-itself (which is not “phenomenal” because it is seemingly “known”). This theory of the origins of thought is slightly different from that of Sigmund Freud. Thought is no longer considered as a “hallucinatory substitute for desire” (SE 22, p. 221) It is not the absent breast that is “thought” in order to appease hunger, but rather the “non-breast,’ which is the first thought and which can then be the object of “thinking.” In Bion’s theory, thought is partly objectified instead of being deobjectified, as in the theory of the autonomous ego. Bion’s model is close to Freud’s model of the fortda game involving the wooden reel: The experience of frustration leads to the creation of other possibilities (fantasies, symbols, actions) that provide a new means to achieve satisfaction in reality. Once the earliest thoughts relating to the “non-object” have been established, the psyche must develop a thinking apparatus to rid itself of thoughts linked to frustration. This development necessarily occurs through contact with the mother, by means of projective identification mechanisms that take the form of a satisfying container-contained relationship, and through a dynamic interplay between paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions. In the earliest case of a container-contained relation (symbolized 23), the mother’s repeated positive experiences with the child, along with the points of contact between the child’s projections and the “reverie” of the mother, produce the model that the child can then introject as part of the thinking apparatus. The interplay between paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions (symbolized PS D) develops the thinking apparatus. The earliest splitting operations in the structuring of the psyche, the necessary separation between “good object” and “bad object,” and the choices made in what Henri Poincaré conceptualized as “selection of facts” (but which Bion prefers to call “selected facts”) are dependent upon the paranoidschizoid position. The depressive position plays a role in the acceptance of the loss that is implicit in all thought, and is also fundamental to progressive integration at the level of thought; that integration process is also dependent upon the container-contained mechanism. 1750 One might also wonder: What can one do with thoughts, besides thinking them? Bion describes several types of thought disturbances linked to the difficulty of maintaining disciplined and cohesive thought. These disturbances are the result of a collapse either at the level of the representational elements of thought (in schizophrenia) or at the level of the activity of thinking, or the thinking apparatus itself (in hysteria or obsessional neurosis). PEDRO LUZES See also: Attention; Bion, Wilfred Ruprecht; Container- Contained; Maternal reverie, capacity for; Protothoughts; Thought. Bibliography Bion, Wilfred Ruprecht. (1962). Learning from experience. London: Heinemann; New York: Basic Books. . (1962). A theory of thinking. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 43, 4-5; reprinted in Second thoughts. London: Heinemann, 1967. (1963). Elements of psycho-analysis. London: Heinemann. . (1965). Transformations: Change from learning to growth. London: Heinemann. ————. (1970). Attention and interpretation. London: Tavistock Publications. “THOUGHTS FOR THE TIMES ON WAR AND DEATH” There are two essays in Sigmund Freud’s “Thoughts for the Times on War and Death,” one on disillusionment and the other on our relation to death as revealed or modified by war. Freud wrote them in March and April 1915, six months after war was declared. Although he did not hide his nationalism, the tone is that of a “European” of the Enlightenment more than that of a partisan, especially in the first essay. The theme of disillusionment is one Freud returns to often. It features in The Future of an Illusion (1927c) and in Civilization and Its Discontents (1930a). Here, it is the ideals of the community of mankind, or at least of Europeans, that are damaged and unsettled by war. Freud emphasizes that psychoanalysis has always maintained that behind the civilization we have struggled so hard to create (“Civilized Sexual Morality and INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Modern Nervous Illness,” 1908d), there exist drives that are neither good nor bad in themselves but are classified as such because of their relation to the needs and requirements of the human community. As a result regression is always possible and the reshaping of drives on which the inclination to civilization is based can cause reversion to a previous stage, permanently or temporarily, through various events, primarily war. However, Freud concluded with a question: “Why do individual peoples despise themselves, hate themselves, abhor themselves and others, even during times of peace, and why does every nation treat the others in this way? This is certainly an enigma.” Bernd Nitzschke discovered the text on which the second essay is based. It appeared in a speech given at the Jewish Masonic lodge of B’nai B’rith in Vienna on February 15, 1915. It discusses our relationship to death and, in reality, has little to say about war, even though this was the pretext for the article. Freud reminds us that individual death cannot be represented unless it appears in a fantasy that negates its terror because we appear in it as a spectator. “In the unconscious each of us is convinced of our immortality.” Consequently, the interpretation given of the causes of death has always tended to treat death as an unfortunate accident rather than a necessity. However, having exposed the way thought distances us from the inevitability of death, Freud then goes on to show how it is eroticized in two areas: the taking of risks in our active life and relating the death of others with which we identify in literature. He goes on to say that “in fiction we find this plurality of lives that we need.” Civilized man therefore has a contradictory attitude toward death since he denies it for himself and considers it as something that makes life valuable. The same is true of primitive man, who treats death as real in murder and unreal as far as it affects him personally. However, Freud shows that “it is not the intellectual enigma or each particular instance of death but the conflict of feelings experienced during the death of people who are loved and at the same time strangers and hated that has given rise to the spirit of research in humankind.” He then adds that the moral commandments also come into being at this time, the most important of them being the interdiction of murder. This leads him to conclude: “If we are judged according to our impulses of unconscious desire, we are ourselves like primitive men, a band of assassins.” SOPHIE DE MyOLLA-MELLOR INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY See also: Aggressiveness/aggression; Altruism; First World War: The effect on the development of psychoanalysis; “On Transience”; Reaction formation; “Why War?” Source Citation Freud, Sigmund. (1915b). Zeitgemasses tiber Krieg und Tod. Imago, 4: 1-21; GW, 8, 324-355; Thoughts for the times on war and death. SE, 14: 273-300. Bibliography Le Rider, Jacques. (1992). Un texte retrouvé: La premiere version d*Actuelles sur la guerre et sur la mort’ (part 2). Revue internationale @histoire de la psychanalyse, 5, 599-611. Nitzschke, Bernd. (1991). Freuds vortrag vor dem israelitischen humanitatsverein “wie” des Orden B’nai Brrith: “Wir und der Tod” (1915). Ein wiedergefundenes document. Psyche, 2, 97-131. THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY According to James Strachey, the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality should be considered, after The Interpretation of Dreams, to be Sigmund Freud’s “most momentous and original contributions to human knowledge” (Freud, 1905d, p. 126). In general, most psychoanalysts would agree. The immediate influence of the Three Essays was profound, and fostered change in the way that people thought, behaved, and learned about sexuality; this influence abides today. Published soon after the turn of the twentieth century, the book’s somewhat scandalous profile heightened its impact. Its contentious reputation was not due, in all likelihood, to the first of Freud’s three essays, which concerned perversions. Havelock Ellis had discussed sexual aberrations and Freud cited and praised his work; Richard von Krafft-Ebing and others had strived diligently to create a literature concerned with sexual deviations. The medical context of these publications justified their sexual content, and they were received with approbation. Nor did the last of the Three Essays, on “The Transformations of Puberty” seem to provoke much controversy at a time when personal needs, desires, and social practices only underscored the omnipresence of sexuality. Rather, the controversy (and enthusiasm) that greeted Freud’s brief volume was primarily due to the 1751 Turee ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY second essay, in which he discussed sexuality in infancy and childhood. From a present-day perspective, it is difficult to imagine the vehement reactions provoked by suggesting the existence of infantile sexuality. Indeed, sexuality in infancy and childhood is the central theme of the book. Freud’s discussion of adult sexual aberrations links them to unexpected or abnormal events during childhood. He similarly understands puberty as the sum of modifications acting upon infantile sexuality. These ideas were clearly spelled out in the first edition of the Three Essays in 1905: The first essay concerns “The Sexual Aberrations.” In his treatment of homosexuality (for which he used the term inversion), Freud disputed and refuted common wisdom that invoked theories of degeneracy or offered innate or “constitutional” factors as explanatory. He acknowledged that such factors may be at the root of the perversions in some cases, but to those must be added the decisive participation of accidental causes—that is, childhood events that affected sexuality. Such events comprise the only available material for psychoanalytic work. In effect, the etiology of neurosis that Freud had previously proposed, as early as 1896 with reference to hysteria, was here reasserted and further developed. Starting from two basic concepts, instinct and object, Freud stated that “it seems probable that the sexual instinct is in the first instance independent of its object” (p. 148). He stressed that one must distinguish between types of perversion, according to whether the sexual anomaly is related to the object (as with homosexuality or zoophilia) or to the aim, that is, to the activities that lead to sexual gratification. Freud discussed homosexuality in this general theoretical context—that is, how, from a developmental standpoint, a person would make either a homosexual or heterosexual object choice, the latter representing as much of a problem as the former. Either path might be taken in consequence of the anatomo-physiologic and psychic bisexuality that characterizes every human being, a hypothesis that Freud explicitly attributed to Wilhelm Fliess. Freud sustained his argument with the concept of component instincts—several independent impulses, each related to an erotogenic zone or somatic source without being integrated with each other. One can thus better understand why numerous perversions are characterized by sexual behavior that preferentially involves the oral, and especially the anal, 1752 erotogenic zones—they are, that is to say, the result of psychic functions controlled by component instincts. (Component instincts and normal gratifications of childhood would be further discussed in the second essay.) Whereas neurotics repress the desire for instinctual gratification, the anomaly of perversion in adults resides in the fact that théir sexual practices are permanently and predominantly based on satisfying component instincts. From this reasoning emerged Freud’s concept that “neuroses are, so to say, the negative of perversions” (p. 165, Freud’s italics), an idea which he had previously taken up in a letter to Fliess (January 24, 1897; 1950a). Ideas developed in the first essay led logically to the second, which focused on sexuality in infancy and childhood. Freud pointed to the lack of knowledge on this subject while noting, at the same time, that it would be sufficient to carefully observe young children without hastening to declare sexual manifestations as abnormal. Every adult was once a child and should in principle be able to recall childhood in more than a fragmentary way, but most do not. Freud added two important observations. First, infantile amnesia affects everything concerning sexuality in childhood. Second, the strong moral condemnation that impacts all manifestations of sexuality leads to repression or gratification through sublimation. Freud went on to advance a highly audacious and fertile idea that would lead to many further developments in psychoanalysis, both theoretical and clinical, and which would influence both his own later thought and that of his successors. He stated, in effect, that sucking activity observed in the infant should be considered as the prototype for all future sexual gratification. Thumb-sucking (or “sensual sucking”) “consists in the rhythmic repetition of a sucking contact by the mouth (or lips). There is no question of the purpose of this procedure being the taking of nourishment” (pp. 179-180). Thumb-sucking has no other aim but pleasure and is separate from, but attached to or initially dependent upon, the need for nourishment. “To begin with, sexual activity attaches itself to functions serving the purpose of self-preservation and does not become independent of them until later” (p. 182). Herewith emerges implicitly the notion of anaclisis, which would later play a major role in developmental theory. Freud explicitly states that oral gratification is a prototype for every sexual gratification, is pleasurable in itself, and is autoerotic inasmuch as it does not INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS require any other object than the infant itself. He writes that the infant seems to be saying, “It’s a pity I can’t kiss myself” (p. 182). Here we find one of the major sources of discomfort provoked by the second of the Three Essays. Freud, like most psychoanalysts after him, would view any controversy that emerged around the notion of infantile sexuality to be the result of a misunderstanding. If sucking is to be considered sexual and to lie at the root of all later sexuality, this should be understood in the context of an extended definition of the concept of sexuality itself, not confounded with, or reduced to, genital sexuality. However, objections to the idea of infantile sexuality would grow still more vehement with Freud’s further declaration that sensual sucking is masturbatory in nature and serves as a prototype for such gratification which, in addition, shifts from the labial zone to the anal zone, and lastly to the genital zone. In addition, in a highly rational argument, Freud presented a further fundamental concept. The infant, due to the diverse and polyvalent character of erotogenic zones as invested by instinct and by the various means of gratification, may be characterized as possessing a “polymorphously perverse disposition.” Obviously, this is not to say that the child will become perverse as an adult; quite the contrary, this is merely the foundation of the normal trajectory of psychosexual development. By contrast, adult perversion is characterized by the abnormal persistence of infantile characteristics. In socalled normal development, the genitals become the dominant erotogenic zone, other erotogenic zones become subordinate to it, and there follows integration of the sources of sexual excitation and modes of sexual satisfaction. In the last of the three essays, Freud described the “The Transformations of Puberty.” In the 1905 edition, this essay might have seemed less original than the previous section. Nevertheless, Freud examined three central themes in psychoanalysis—the libidinal economy of the onset of puberty, female and male sexuality, and object relations. Again, Freud raised the notion of the integration, “ander the primacy of the genital zones” (p. 208), of component instincts and erotogenic zones which serve as gateways to preliminary gratification preceding complete sexual intercourse through coitus and orgasm. But then, Freud faced a problem, the solution INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY to which he found difficult to accept. He had long reasoned that pleasure lowers tension while unpleasure raises it, writing that “I must insist that a feeling of tension necessarily involves unpleasure” (p. 209). But if the very activity that seeks to decrease tension is perceived as a pleasure, how then to understand the search for sexual excitement, which commonly characterizes every sexual act (including foreplay) before culminating in orgasm and relaxation? Confronting the issue, Freud pursued it in connection with sexual chemistry, largely speculative at the time. In fact, the problem remained without a solution in the 1905 edition; it would only be much later, in such works as “The Economic Problem of Masochism” (1924c), that Freud returned to it in a more satisfactory way. Freud discussed a second theme in the third essay in a section titled “The Differentiation between Men and Women,” in which he asserted rather baldly that “The sexuality of little girls is of a wholly masculine character” (p. 219), and that “it would even be possible to maintain that libido is invariably and necessarily of a masculine nature, whether it occurs in men or in women” (p. 219). The clitoris, which Freud viewed as the distaff equivalent of the penis, is the site of masturbatory pleasure for little girls. In the woman, the clitoris may be viewed as the organ of forepleasure that transmits excitement to the “adjacent female parts,” writes Freud, “just as—to use a simile—pine shavings can be kindled in order to set a log of harder wood on fire” (p. 221). Freud’s subsequent discussion of these ideas, particularly in New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1933a [1932]), would eventually incite considerable and lively controversy regarding the nature of female sexuality. Still another theme in the third essay concerned “The Finding of an Object” during the transformations of puberty and (as we would say today) adolescence. In 1905, Freud still subscribed to an overly simplistic theory that he would later modify in fundamental ways. To infantile sexuality, which he supposed to be essentially auto-erotic, he opposed object-directed sexuality developed during puberty. The primal object, the mother’s breast, has by then been long lost, so that libidinal investment in the sexual partner after puberty is in fact a “rediscovery,” Freud notes. He adds, “The finding of an object is in fact a refinding ofi t” (p. 222). This was a proposition that spawned fruitful and interesting developments. In effect, from this point on, Freud acknowledged the object-relations nature of 1753 THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY infantile sexuality. He went on to consider infantile anxiety and the “barrier against incest” (p. 225) that forbids sexual relations between child and parent. Freud clearly established here what, beginning in 1910, he would call the “Oedipus complex.” The Three Essays ends with Freud’s summary of the major themes of the book. This in brief reprise is Freud’s rich and provocative Three Essays as the book was published in 1905, But to understand its place in terms of Freud’s later work, it is important to realize that he revised the text with each new edition, of which there were six in his lifetime. He is not known to have considered publishing an entirely new edition, such as might have seemed necessary in light of all the developments in psychoanalytic theory. In any event, from 1910 to 1924 Freud made a host of emendations, some of which were quite significant yet difficult to reconcile with the original text to which they were attached. Freud himself admitted that this could create difficulties for the reader. In a later paper, “The Infantile Genital Organization” (1923e), he wrote, “Readers of my Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality will be aware that I have never undertaken any thorough remodeling of that work in its later editions, but have retained the original arrangement and have kept abreast of the advances made in our knowledge by means of interpolations and alterations in the text. In doing this, it may often have happened that what was old and what was more recent did not admit of being merged into an entirely uncontradictory whole” (p. 141). ~ The Standard Edition accurately indicates all the modifications, suppressions, and additions to the text as Freud revised it in 1910, 1915, 1920, and also 1924; the 1915 emendations are particularly important, appearing as they do during the period that he wrote his papers on metapsychology; so too those of 1920, which came during the transition to the second theory of instincts and what is sometimes referred to as the “second topography” or structural theory. All these emendations appear either as notes at the bottom of the page, sometimes numerous and often quite long, or are included as extensions within the text itself. Three of these extended interpolations are of particular importance. In the second essay, a section added in 1915, on “The Sexual Researches of Childhood” fundamentally reprises the Freud’s work in “On the Sexual Theories of Children” (1908c) and in “Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy” (1909b). 1754 Another section, also added to the second essay in 1915, discusses “The Phases of Development of the Sexual Organization” (p. 197ff). This represented a major departure inasmuch as Freud introduced the notion of pregenital organizations—oral and anal stages—preceding the genital organization. In 1923, he added a note to the emendation itself in which he mentioned that he had advanced that same year (1923e) the idea of an intermediary stage, called infantile genital organization. “This phase, which already deserves to be described as genital, presents a sexual object and some degree of convergence of the sexual impulses upon that object; but it is differentiated from the final organization of sexual maturity in one essential respect. For it knows only one kind of genital: the male one. For this reason I have named it the ‘phallic’ stage of organization” (pp. 199-200). This idea implies, importantly, that the development of object choice arises in two periods separated by latency. First, from the first stage of infantile genital organization, then once again, after the final genital organization that emerges at puberty. In the third essay, a section added in 1920 concerning libido theory largely summarizes Freud’s seminal article on narcissism (1914c), in the context of the economic problem (pleasure/unpleasure) of sexual excitation and discharge. In sum, the Three Essays is indeed one of Freud’s major works. However, it would be a mistake to imagine that, at first publication in 1905, it was entirely novel in terms of Freud’s own thinking. So far as infantile sexuality is concerned, the text represents a key moment on a long path, pursued over the course of at least a decade and marked by progress and reversal, doubt and hesitation. In fact, the question of infantile sexuality arose with Freud’s theoretical efforts to create an etiology of neurosis, and can be traced to Studies on Hysteria (1895d). In Freud’s early view, hysteria, and neuroses more generally, are pathological conditions triggered by a sexual “seduction” sustained in childhood. But “sexual” for whom? The adult “seducer,” clearly; but, for the child “seduced,” what do we mean by “sexual”? Freud wrote to Fliess on October 8, 1895, (letter 29) that he suspected “that hysteria is conditioned by a primary sexual experience (before puberty) accompanied by revulsion and fright; and that obsessional neurosis is conditioned by the same accompanied by pleasure” (1950a, p. 126). Just a week later, on October 15, 1895, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS (letter 30) Freud wrote Fliess with some excitement, “Have I revealed the great clinical secret to you, either in writing or by word of mouth? Hysteria is the consequence of a presexual sexual shock. Obsessional neurosis is the consequence of presexual sexual pleasure later transformed into guilt (p. 127). One can sense Freud’s dilemma. Is “presexual” sexual? Does infantile sexuality exist? No, if the incident only arises later as a memory. Yes, if it incites “pleasure” in the child—but this occurs only in those who will later develop obsessional neurosis, and these are, in fact, boys. “In [cases of obsessional neurosis] the primary experience has been accompanied by pleasure. It is either an active one (in boys) or a passive one (in girls)” (“Manuscript K” in Freud 1950a, p. 149). He adds that hysteria “necessarily presupposes a primary unpleasurable experience—that is, one of a passive kind. The natural sexual passivity of women accounts for their being more inclined to hysteria (p. 154). Thus, at this stage, some ten years before the Three Essays, Freud was far from seeing infantile sexuality as part of every child’s experience; he believed it might only in boys, some of whom, taking pleasure in being “seduced,” would later suffer from obsessional neurosis. This early state of affairs clearly did not satisfy Freud. On one hand, he was tempted to assert the universality of infantile sexuality, while on the other, he hesitated before the audacity of it. Soon thereafter, in “Further Remarks on the Neuro-Psychoses of Defence” (1896b), he tried a kind of compromise, suggesting that pathogenic trauma acts in two stages, that “it is not the experiences themselves which act traumatically but their revival as a memory after the subject has entered on sexual maturity” (p. 164, Freud’s italics). In other words, the childhood trauma (which is traumatic, stressed Freud, because the child suffers a frightening assault, the nature of which he or she does not understand) will become sexual only in puberty. By this view, there is no infantile sexuality strictly speaking, And yet, one must admit “[E]ven the age of childhood is not wanting in slight sexual excitations” (“The Aetiology of Hysteria,” 1896c, p. 202). If infantile sexuality were universal, however, does the trauma theory collapse? Freud noted that, “It is true that if infantile sexual activity were an almost universal occurrence the demonstration of its presence in every case would carry no weight” (pp. 209-210). Facing these theoretical difficulties, with direct implications for clinical practice, and also perhaps INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Tics facing his own resistances, Freud would need another ten years to develop a coherent theory of infantile sexuality. Understanding the progression of his thought can produce a better appreciation of the audacity and novelty of the Three Essays. ROGER PERRON See also: Autoeroticism; Childhood; Libidinal stage; Perversion; Psychosexual development; Puberty; Sexuality. Source Citation Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Drei abhandlungen sur sexualtheorie, GW, 5: 29-145; Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123-243. Bibliography Brusset, Bernard. (1992). Le developpement libidinal. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Freud, Sigmund. (1896b). Further remarks on the neuropsychoses of defence. SE, 3: 157-185. . (1896c). The aetiology of hysteria. SE, 3: 186-221. . (1908c). On the sexual theories of children. SE, 9: 205-226. . (1909b). Analysis of a phobia in a five-year-old boy. SE, 10: 1-149. . (1914c). On narcissism: An introduction. SE, 14: 67-102. . (1923e). The infantile genital organization (An interpolation into the theory of sexuality). SE, 19: 141-145. . (1924c). The economic problem of masochism. SE, 19: 155-170. . (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22: 1-182. ———., (1950a [1887-1902]) Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173-280. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE 2. Laplanche, Jean. (1990). Life and death in psychoanalysis. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. TICS Tics can be described as abnormal movements characterized by suddenness, inopportune occurrence, 1755 TIME nonproductivity, and variability. They can affect the muscles of the face, neck, or shoulders, and are sometimes generalized. We distinguish between simple tics, which are often transient, multiple tics, and the chronic tics found in Gilles de la Tourette’s syndrome. In Studies on Hysteria (1895), Sigmund Freud posited that tics are a compromise between an idea and its counter-idea (countercathexis) and constitute a particular mode of expression of neurotic conflicts. In the view of Sandor Ferenczi, subjects with tics, owing to the very fact of their strong narcissism or a fixation at this stage, have an increased tendency toward discharge and a reduced capacity for psychic binding. A traumatic memory that affects the body-ego spontaneously comes to the fore each time it has the opportunity to do so: Tics are thus the hysteria of the ego. Noting that tics have a veritable muscular eroticism, Ferenczi considered them the equivalent of repressed masturbation. He also drew attention to the importance of anal-sadistic components in tics and to the connection between them and coprolalia. According to Melanie Klein, tics are based on genital, anal-sadistic, and oral tendencies directed against the object; her uncovering of these original object relations upon which tics are based led her to consider them as a secondary narcissistic symptom. She confirmed Ferenczi’s conclusion—equating tics with masturbation—but added that masturbatory fantasies are closely linked to them. Analysis of these masturbatory fantasies appears as the key to understanding the tic. Behind the homosexual content of these fantasies can be discerned the child’s identification with the father, that is, the heterosexual fantasy of sexual relations with the mother. The sublimation of these fantasies in other interests leads to the disappearance of the tic. Margaret Mahler discussed “organ neurosis.” Subjects with tics experience the drives as mechanical events that are in a sense foreign to the ego. Otto Fenichel viewed tics as a pregenital conversion comparable to stuttering, which Karl Abraham had noted; for Abraham, the tic was a symptom of conversion to the anal-sadistic stage. Serge Lebovici proposed a psychosomatic explanation: Unrepresented excitation can lead to uncontrolled psychomotor discharges. Tics have the weight of an unelaborated discharge, but on the therapeutic level, the latent meaning can be sought by means of construction. He noted the fairly close relationship between isolated or complex tics and the structured 1756 completedness of obsessional neuroses, but at the same time mentioned that they are also found with conversion hysteria or in psychotic organizations. According to Bernard Golse, obsessive traits with fixation on the aggressive tendencies of the anal-sadistic stage are discernible in the subject with a tic; but whereas with obsessional neurosis the aggressive content is not apparent because it is repressed by the visible ritual, with tics, the aggressiveness is directly externalized in motricity, without prior mental working over of the conflicts. The etiology of tics is complex. The difficulties described occur in children who show a neurobiological predisposition, and are registered within an intersubjective relational economy that contributes to their persistence. CHRISTINE PAYAN See also: Emmy von N., case of; Mahler-Schénberger, Margaret; Repetition. Bibliography Abraham, Karl. (1954). Contribution to a discussion on tic. In Selected papers of Karl Abraham, M.D. (pp. 323-325; Douglas Bryan and Alix Strachey, Trans.). London and New York: Basic. (Original work published 1921) Ferenczi, Sandor. (1926). Psycho-analytical observations on tic. In The selected papers of Sandor Ferenczi, M.D., vol. 2: Further contributions to the theory and technique of psychoanalysis (John Rickman, Comp.; Jane Isabel Suttie et al., Trans.). New York: Basic. (Original work published 1921) Golse, Bernard. (1983). Pour une psychopathologie ou une psychogenése des tics de l’enfant: Une revue de la littérature. Actualités psychiatriques, 1, 51-56. Klein, Melanie. (1948). Contributions to psychoanalysis 1921-1945. London: Hogarth Press. Mahler, Margaret. (1949). A psychoanalytical evaluation of tics in a psychopathology of children. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 3 (4), 279-310. TIME The notion of time in psychoanalysis intersects several other concepts such as repetition, regression, fixation, and rhythm, though Freud also discussed the idea of INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS time directly. He began by emphasizing the atemporality of unconscious processes: The unconscious ignores time, and he suggested that the origin of the representation of time could be found in the discontinuous relation the preconscious-conscious system maintained with the external world, the time dimension then being associated with acts of consciousness. He related the representation of time to the representation of space, in that space could replace time in unconscious processes. Finally, pathology shows how temporal progression is ignored, a characteristic which is also seen in fantasy, where past, present, and future are united in one representation, and in the transference neurosis, which is based on the anachrony of affect. The atemporality of unconscious processes is present in Freud’s earliest writings. In Manuscript M (1950a [1892-99]), James Strachey refers to a sentence in which Freud points out that the chronological information ignored in fantasy is dependent on the conscious system. But it is in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a) that the indestructibility of unconscious processes is proposed, along with its corollary—the impossibility of recognizing the passage of time that would bring about the end of something; its belonging to the past; and eventually its forgetting. In a note added in 1907 to The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901b), concerning the indestructibility of memory traces, Freud wrote that “the unconscious is completely atemporal.” Freud continued to repeat the same ideas, devoting considerable space to it in his essay on the metapsychology of the unconscious. “The processes of the system Ucs. are timeless; i.e. they are not ordered temporally, are not altered by the passage of time; they have no reference to time at all. Reference to time is bound up, once again, with the work of the system Cs.” (1915e, p. 187). In the November 8, 1911, session of the Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society (Nunberg and Federn, 1962-75), Stekel and Meinhold were rapporteurs for the topic under discussion, “the supposed timelessness of the unconscious,” (Vol. 3, pp. 299-310) and during the discussion there arose a number of difficulties concerning the definition of time. In his conclusion Freud pointed out five arguments in favor of the atemporality of unconscious processes: the incorrect temporal orientation of dreams; the fact that condensation is possible; the lack of effects of temporal transition; the attachment to INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TIME objects; the characteristic tendency of neuroses to become fixed. He concludes: “If the philosophers maintain that the concepts of time and space are the necessary forms of our thinking, forethought tells us that the individual masters the world by means of two systems, one of which functions only in terms of time and the other only in terms of space” (p. 308). While the processes of the unconscious are atemporal, Freud continued to remind us of the importance of the temporal factor as an element of reality. This is true of the process of maturation, which is the central element of the theory of libidinal states, but which also distinguishes normal from pathological mourning. (Time appears to be inevitable, to the extent that it seems endowed with intrinsic action while it is, in fact, the duration necessary to establish a process, work of some kind.) Conversely, time as experienced, the feeling of time, is shown to be relatively independent of the objective reality of the time shown on clocks and watches. We see this in the painful acceleration of duration constituted by the feeling of the ephemeral (1916a [1915]), but also, and in reverse, in the interminable extension of the boredom or impatience of the child who wants to “grow up,” that is, who wants to abolish the time that separates him from the age of his parents. Passion and the illumination or rush of the drug addict reduce duration to a point, the instant when the alpha and the omega meet. Freud believed that the temporal dimension is accessible to us only as a function of acts of consciousness. Because these acts are not continuous but, like the “mystic writing pad,” depend on the innervation of the cathexes directed from the interior by rapid, periodic bursts into the preconscious-conscious system, this perception of time is also discontinuous. “I assumed,” Freud wrote, “I further had a suspicion that this discontinuous method of functioning of the system Pcpt.-Cs. lies at the bottom of the origin of the concept of time” (1925a, p. 231). Although time is ignored by unconscious processes, this does not mean it can’t be represented in unconscious formations, which translate it as they see fit. This corresponds to what could be called “psychic temporality.” After Freud other authors returned to the question of time in analysis and in psychopathology. Piera Aulagnier has shown the importance of anticipation in the relation between mother and child and in the process by which a subject identifies with it, a process 1757 Tomasi v1 PALMA D| LAMPEDUSA-WOLFF STOMERSEE, ALESSANDRA (1895-1982) that, as it turns out, the psychotic is unable to complete (1975), being condemned to repeat the same thing over and over again. SOPHIE DE MyoLLa~MELLOR See also: Psychic temporality. Bibliography Aulagnier, Piera. (1975). La violence de l’interprétation. Du pictogramme a Ténoncé. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4-5: 1-625. . (1915e). The unconscious. SE, 14: 159-204. . (1925a). A note upon the “mystic writing pad.” SE, 19: 225-232. Nunberg, Hermann, and Federn, Ernst. (1962-75). Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. New York: International Universities Press. Further Reading Loewald, Hans W. (1962). Superego and time. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 43, 264-268. TOMAS! DI PALMA DI LAMPEDUSA-WOLFF STOMERSEE, ALESSANDRA (1895-1982) Alessandra Tomasi, an Italian psychoanalyst, was born in Nice in 1895 and died in Rome in 1982. She spent the first twenty years of her life in St. Petersburg, where her father, the Baltic Baron Wolff Stomersee, was a high dignitary at the czar’s court. In 1917, at the start of the Russian revolution, she moved to Riga, then to Berlin. There, during the 1920s, she was analyzed by Felix Boehm and attended courses and seminars at the Berlin Institute; her supervised analysis was monitored by Max Eitingon and H. Liebermann. In 1927, during a brief stay in Vienna, she had the opportunity to “see” Freud. That same year she joined her Italian-born mother in London, where she was about to marry (this was her second marriage) the Italian ambassador to the court of S. Giacomo. At the home of her father-in-law, she met his nephew, Giuseppe Tomasi, Duke of Palma and Prince of Lampedusa, the future author of The Leopard, who 1758 became her husband in 1932. After their marriage she settled in Sicily. In 1934 she met Edoardo Weiss in Rome. They had corresponded with one another since 1929 and it was Weiss who sponsored her entry in the Italian Psychoanalytic Society. Through the society she became friends with Emilio Servadio, Nicola Perrotti, and Cesare Musatti. ; Once her value as a teacher and trainer became recognized, she was asked, in 1946, to help with the reorganization of the SPI and, that same year, helped organize the historic First National Congress on Psychoanalysis, which marked the official resumption of psychoanalysis in Italy. At this time, and during the next national congress (Rome, 1950), she presented two important essays: Sviluppi della diagnostica e tecnica psicoanalitica and L’Aggressivita nelle perversion. She was president of the SPI from 1955 to 1959. It was through her assistance, and hers alone, that Freud and psychoanalysis penetrated Sicily, where she initially encountered strong resistance from prejudice arising from the region’s inherent conservatism. Of the first core group of people that formed around her, it was Francesco Corrao, following the departure of the princess for Rome in 1957, who assumed the psychoanalytic mantle and continued the work she had begun in Sicily. In Rome she lived in a state of partial isolation, but was very active as a psychoanalyst, and increased her efforts to popularize the work of her husband, who became one of the most important writers on the Italian landscape following the posthumous publication of The Leopard in 1958. According to Michael David (1966), the work of Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa contains the traces of an awareness of Freudian theories—easily understandable for a writer whose wife had devoted her life to psychoanalysis. For David the fact that “the Lampedusa apartment, and even their library, was filled with neurotic patients—to the point that the author preferred to take refuge among friends or in a café to write—gave rise to the husband’s ambivalence concerning psychoanalysis.” Alessandra di Lampedusa’s most important articles include the following, all of which appeared in the Rivista di psicoanalisi: “Le componenti preedipicihe del- Pisteria di angoscia” (1956), “Necrofilia e istinto di morte” (1956), and “La spersonalizzazione” (1960). In one of her last seminars, she analyzed a case of lycanthropy, referring to the Kleinian notion of projective INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS identification, for which she coined the neologism, identificatory introjection. ANNA Maria ACCERBONI See also: Italy. Bibliography David, Michael. (1966). La psicoanalisi nella cultura italiana. Turin: Boringhieri. Petacchi, Giancarlo. (1987). Vita di pionieri. In A. M. Accerboni (Ed.), La cultura psicoanalitica (p. 168-173). Pordenone: Studio Tesi. Tomasi di Palma, Alessandra. (1960) La spersonalizzazione. Rivista di psicoanalisi, 6 (1), 5-10. TOPIQUE A French Freudian review founded in 1969 by Piera Aulagnier, who directed it until her death in 1990, Topique is, as of 2005, co-directed by Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor and Jean-Paul Valabrega, who continue its work and pursue its objectives in the spirit that has animated this review since its beginnings. Topique was born in 1969, the same year that saw the creation of the Quatrieme Groupe O.P.L.E, following what was the third scission in the psychoanalytic movement in France. The founder of Topique played a central role in this scission as well as in establishing the principles of the new group presenting itself both as an alternative to the International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA) as well as to the Lacanian group. However, from the very beginning, the review emphasized that Topique would belong to no particular school nor be tied to any group. Its goal was exclusively to participate in the advancement of psychoanalysis, with an intention of being open, both towards psychoanalysis itself and other disciplines too, notably psychiatry. The review has been published successively by the Presses Universitaires de France (from 1969 to 1974, 12 numbers), Desclée de Brouwer (L’Epi; from 1974 to 1987, 28 numbers), Dunod (from 1987 to 1996, 22 numbers) and by L’Esprit du Temps (since 1996), three times a year. Topique is independent, and is not the official organ of the Quatriéme Groupe; however it is close to it, because its founder belonged to it, as well as those who INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TOPIQUE continue to edit the review. The first numbers had published the “Principles and Modalities of Functioning” (of the Quatriéme Groupe), and the following issues took cognizance of its organizational modifications, as well as printing texts from its scientific conferences. As Topique has been developing for more than thirty years, a retrospective view seems in order, involving at once a historical approach to the development of psychoanalysis in France, as well as a consideration of issues that were of special interest to the review. Especially noteworthy is the attention Topique has paid to the theory and technique of psychoanalysis in many texts, particularly in its early years—when it was anxious to construct an original perspective both regarding Lacanism and the norms of the IPA. However, Topique has always been a review of confrontation between different theoretical currents and their practitioners, publishing authors belonging to diverse psychoanalytical societies. Additionally, works representing psychoanalytical groups have always been welcome; as well as research centered on the practice of analysis, its clinical experiences and impasses; and challenges that psychosis continues to pose for Freudian metapsychology, in spite of the advances in current research and the new conceptual tools available because of it. Finally, there have been special numbers involving psychoanalytical perspectives on cultural and social issues, with contributions from specialists from other domains, as well as psychoanalysts, who were interested in confronting psychoanalysis as a heuristic method. This was the case with the juridical domain in Number 52 (“To Have the Right” [Avoir droit], with art in Number 53 (“Powers of the Image” [Pouvoirs de lImage]), anthropology in Number 43 (“Birth” [La naissance]), or Number 50 (“Twins and the Double” [Les jumeaux et le double]). This diversity does not constitute a diversion in rapport to the central purpose, which remains linked to clinical practice and the theoretical elaboration rising out of it; it aims instead to restore to psychoanalysis the place Freud provided for it from the beginning, that is to say not that of a simple therapeutic process, but also as an adventure in human thought. SOPHIE DE MyOLLA-MELLOR See also: Aulagnier-Spairani, Piera; Quatrieme Groupe O. P. L. FE, Fourth group; France. 1759 TOPOGRAPHICAL POINT OF VIEW Bibliography Valabrega, Jean-Paul. (1999). Trente an apres...Entretien avec Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor. Topique, 69. TOPOGRAPHICAL POINT OF VIEW Like the economic and the dynamic points of view, the topographical point of view is one of the three main dimensions of Freud’s metapsychology. It introduced the idea that the mental apparatus was composed of different areas of the mind, different “territories” governed by different processes. The idea of a mental topography was present in Freud’s thought as early as the “Project for a Scientific Psychology” of 1895 (1950c), where it arose as a direct consequence of his conception of the history and successive stages of construction of the psychical apparatus. In Freud’s first topographical approach, three mental regions were distinguished: the conscious, the location of ideas that had direct access to consciousness; the preconscious, the location of material susceptible of becoming conscious fairly easily; and the unconscious, the location of whatever had been repressed from consciousness and was thus inaccessible to it. This initial spatial organization of the mind, known as the first topography, later proved inadequate for deal-' ing with the clinical view of pathological narcissism, for it failed to locate the ego or the internalization of values and principles acquired in the course of the individual’s development. Beginning with Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g) and especially in The Ego and the Id (1923b), Freud proposed a new topography of the mental personality and apparatus in terms of the id, the ego, and the superego. The unconscious per se could no longer be treated as a single location in the psyche, for there were in fact several unconscious realms, and of different kinds. From then on, the term unconscious was used only as a qualifier applicable to mental processes, irrespective of their topographical location. A portion of the ego and of the superego were thus said to be unconscious, while components of the id could not become conscious without being transformed into representations, their original forms remaining unconscious. The second topography did not replace the first, however. Rather, it remained in a dialectical relationship with it, thus complicating the model as a whole. 1760 Some French psychoanalysts have taken the view that the two topographies are not merely metapsychological constructs but also correspond to specific organizational modes of the psyche. Different ways of mental functioning could thus be described in terms of the first or second topography, and the metapsychological account remained closely bound up with clinical practice. - RENE ROUSSILLON See also: Agency; Censorship; Consciousness; Ego; Ego and the Id, The; Excitation; Id; Metapsychology; Model; New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, Perception- Consciousness (Pcpt.-Cs.); Preconscious, the; Psychic apparatus; Regression; Structural theories; Superego; The Unconscious, Unconscious, the; Wish, hallucinatory satisfaction of a. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1915d). Repression. SE, 14: 141-158. . (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1-64. . (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1-66. . (1950c [1895]). Project for a scientific psychology. SE, 1: 281-387. Roussillon, René. (1995). La metapsychologie des processus et la transitionnalité. Revue francaise de psychanalyse, 59, 1351-1519. Further Reading Paniagua, Cecilio. (2001). The attraction of topographical technique. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 82, 671-684. TOPOLOGY Topology refers primarily to the branch of mathematics that rigorously treats questions of neighborhoods, limits, and continuity. Psychoanalysts have applied it to the study of unconscious structures. In what have been called his two “topographies” (the first dating from 1900 and the second from 1923), Freud resorted to schemas to represent the various parts of the psychic apparatus and their interrelations. These schemas implicitly posited an equivalence between psychic and Euclidean space. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FIGURE 1 The Double Loop Early on, Jacques Lacan noted that the limitations of such a naive topology had restricted Freudian theory, not only in the description of the psychic apparatus (a description that in the end required an appeal to the economic point of view), but also in the specificity of clinical structures. The hypothesis that the unconscious is structured like a language, that is, in two dimensions, led Lacan to the topology of surfaces. The concept of foreclosure, for example, which he constructed on the basis of this topology, confirmed the heuristic value of his approach. In his seminar “Identification” (1961-1962), Lacan unveiled a collection of topological objects—such as the torus, the Mobius strip, and the cross-cap—that served pedagogical aims. But already he saw them as more than just models. With the Borromean knot, introduced in 1973, he took the position that these objects were a real presentation of the subject and not just a representation. Below are several of Lacan’s topological objects. 1. The Cut and the Signifier Far from being given a priori, every space is organized on the basis of cuts and can actually be considered as a cut in the space of a higher dimension. We are familiar with the subjective impact of this: The events of our lives only become history through the castration complex, which organizes our reality at the price of an imaginary cutting off of the penis. According to Freud, by introjecting a single trait of another, the subject identifies with the other (at the price of losing this person as a love object). In the single trait Lacan found the very structure of the signifier: A cut allows the lost object to fall away. He called this cut the “unary trait.” The linguist Ferdinand de Saussure insisted on the fundamentally negative, purely differential character of the signifier. Lacan formalized this property in the double loop, or “interior eight,’ in which the gap INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TOPOLOGY created by the cut is closed after a second trip around a fictional axis. The difference of the signifier from itself is indicated by the difference between the two trips around the loop (Figure 1). 2. The Mobius Strip and Interpretation If a signifier represents the subject for another signifier, then the subject would be supported by a surface whose edge would be a signifying cut. Note that the plane—the usual screen for the subject’s images, figures, and dreams, that is, plans—is a surface that does not meet these conditions. The double loop cannot be drawn on a plane without showing a cut. The same is true of a sphere, a simple representation of the universe. The Mobius strip, on the other hand, can represent this cut and symbolize the subject of the unconscious. Since a Mobius strip only has one surface, it is possible to pass from one side to the other without crossing over any edge—an apt representation of the return of the repressed. The Mobius strip also has certain other peculiarities. A cut that runs one-third from the edge and parallel to the edge divides the strip into a two-sided strip linked to what remains of the original Mobius strip. But if this cut is made in the center, it does not divide the Mobius strip in two. Instead, the entire strip is transformed into a strip with two sides. This characteristic illustrates the equivalence between the Mobius strip (the subject) and the medial cut that transforms it, and also provides a model of how interpretation functions. Interpretation does not abolish the unconscious. On the contrary, it makes the unconscious real for the subject by its transformed appearance as another (an Other) surface (figure 2). FIGURE 2 ik 2nd cut (interpretation) 1st cut The Mobius Strip 1761 TOPOLOGY FIGURE 3 Identity Intersection Non-identity A#-A ANB AVB Aand B either A or B but not both Venn Diagrams FIGURE 5 D=demand d=desire FIGURE 6 Torus of the Other Torus of the subject Two complimentary toruses: The subject takes the other’s demands as the object of his or her desire. 3. The Torus Lacan made different uses of the torus. By drawing Venn diagrams, traditionally used to illustrate basic logical operations, on the surface of the torus, he demonstrated the extent to which our thinking depends upon the plane surface, and he also provided another possible basis for the logic of the unconscious (Figure 3). By inscribing the same circles on the surface of the torus, Lacan revealed the logic of the unconscious discovered by Freud (Figure 4). 1762 The trajectory of demand, D. FIGURE 4 on at po ty D> q MAIN \ A Intersection Symmetrical AnB Difference AVB# -|AVB| The same operations on the torus. Only symmetrical difference is preserved. The double loop on the torus. On the torus, only symmetrical difference is consistent. Thus we have a demonstration of how the signifier can be different from all other signifiers and also from itself. Lacan also used the torus to represent the subject as the subject of demand. In this sense, the torus can be conceived as the surface created by the iteration of the trajectory of the subject's demand. This trajectory turns around two different empty spaces, one that is “internal,” D, the lack created in the real by speech, and one that is “central,” d, corresponding to the place of the elusive object of desire that the drive goes around before completing the loop (Figure 5). For every torus, there is a complementary torus, and the empty spaces of the two are the inverse of each other. Lacan made this structure of complementary toruses the support of the neurotic illusion that makes the demand of the Other the object of subject’s desire and, conversely, makes the desire of the Other the object of subject’s demand. This structure also arises from the fact that on a torus, the signifying cut (the double loop) does not detach any fragment. Neurotic subjects, insofar as they give in to neurosis, insofar as they are “in the torus,” are not organized around their INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FIGURE 7 On a cross-cap a cut with two openings own castration, but instead excuse themselves by substituting the Other’s demand for the object of their fantasy (figure 6). 4. The Cross-Cap The cross-cap, or more precisely, the projective plane, can represent the subject of desire in relation to the lost object. A double loop drawn on its surface in effect divides this single-sided surface into two heterogeneous parts: a Mobius strip representing the subject and a disk representing object a, the cause of desire. The disk is centered on a point that is related to the irreducible singularity of this surface, which Lacan identified with the phallus. Unlike the representation of the subject produced on the torus, here a single cut, which symbolizes castration, produces both the subject and the object in its divisions (figure 7). 5. The Borromean Knot Introduced by Lacan in 1973, the Borromean knot is the solution to a problem perceivable only in Lacanian theory but having extremely practical clinical applications. The problem is: How are the three registers posited as making up subjectivity—the real (R), the symbolic (S), and the imaginary (I)—held together? Indeed, the symbolic (the signifier) and the imaginary (meaning) seem to have hardly anything in common— a fact demonstrated by the abundance and heterogeneity of languages. Moreover, the real, by definition, escapes the symbolic and the imaginary, since its resistance to them is precisely what makes it real. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS JO9 TOPOLOGY produces a single-sided and a disk. surface (=a Mobius strip) FIGURE 8 (This is why Lacan identified the real with the impossible.) In psychoanalysis, the real resists, and thus is distinct from, the imaginary defenses that the ego uses specifically to misrecognize the impossible and its consequences. If each of the three registers R, S, and I that make up the Borromean knot is recognized to be toric in structure and the knot is constructed in three-dimensional space, it constitutes the perfect answer to the problem above, because it realizes a three-way joining of all three toruses, while none of them is actually linked to any other: If any one of them is cut, the other two are set free. Reciprocally, any knot that meets these conditions is called Borromean. Note that the subject is now defined by such a knot and not merely, as with the cross-cap, as the effect of a cut (figure 8). 1763 Torok, Maria (1925-1998) FIGURE 9 > = the fourth ring (the sinthome) Unfortunately, this ideal solution, which could be considered normal (without symptoms), seems to lead to paranoia. Lacan considered this to be the result of failure to distinguish among the three registers, as if they were continuous, which indeed occurs in clinical work. Being identical, R, S, and I are only differentiated by means of a “complication,” a fourth ring that Lacan called the “sinthome.” By making a ring with the three others, the sinthome (symptom) differentiates the three others by assuring their knotting (figure 9). In this arrangement, the sinthome has the function of determining one of the rings. If it is attached to the symbolic, it plays the role of the paternal metaphor and its corollary, a neurotic symptom. Lacan also drew upon non-Borromean knots, generated by “slips,” or mistakes, in tying the knots. These allowed him to represent the status of subjects who are unattached to the imaginary or the real and who compensate for this with supplements (Lacan, 2001). In such cases the sinthome is maintained. By using knots, Lacan was able to reveal his ongoing research without hiding its uncertainties. The value of the knots, which resist imaginary representation, is that they advance research that is not mere speculation and that they can grasp—at the cost of abandoning a grand synthesis—a few “bits of the real” (Lacan, 1976-1977, session of March 16, 1976). Even though he knew something about topology as practiced by mathematicians, Lacan advised his students “to use it stupidly” (Lacan, 1974-1975, session of December 17, 1974) as a remedy for our imaginary simpleminded- 1764 ness. He also recommended manually working with the knots by cutting surfaces and tying knots. Finally, for Lacan, topology had not only heuristic value but also valuable implications for psychoanalytic practice. BERNARD VANDERMERSCH See also: Knot; L and R schemas; Seminar, Lacan’s; Signifier/ signified; Structural theories; Symptom/sinthome; Thalassa. A Theory of Genitality; Unary trait. Bibliography Bourbaki, Nicolas. (1994). Elements of the history of mathematics (John Meldrum, Trans.). Berlin: Springer-Verlag. Darmon, Marc. (1990). Essais sur la topologie Lacanienne. Paris: Editions de l’Association Freudienne Internationale. Lacan, Jacques. (1975). La troisieme, intervention de J. Lacan, le 31 octobre 1974. Lettres de l’Ecole Freudienne, 16, 178-203. . (1974-1975). Le seminaire, livre XXII, R.S.I. Ornicar? 2—5. . (1976-1977). Le séminaire XXIII, 1975-76: Le sinthome. Ornicar? 6-11. . (2001). Joyce: Le symptome. In his Autres écrits. Paris: Seuil. Pont, Jean-Claude. (1974). La topologie algébrique des origines a Poincaré. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. TOROK, MARIA (1925-1998) A French psychoanalyst of Hungarian birth, Maria Torok was born on November 10, 1925, in Budapest and died in New York on March 25, 1998. She trained as a psychologist at the Sorbonne in the early 1950s; there she met Nicolas Abraham, a philosopher interested in the phenomenology of Husserl and a psychoanalyst, and she became his companion. She was initially a psychological counselor in nursery schools when she went into analysis with Béla Grunberger and later with Margaret Clark-Williams, an American-born psychoanalyst. Torok went on to become an analyst and a member of the Société psychanalytique de Paris (Paris Psychoanalytic Society). In Torok’s work together with Abraham as well as in their individual work, both were concerned with INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS differentiating the “shell” from the “kernel” of any theory, a concern that is articulated in their book The Shell and the Kernel: Renewals in Psychoanalysis (1978; trans. 1994): “[I]f Freud’s theories form the protective shell around his intuition, simultaneously concealing and revealing it, what of the actual kernel? For it is the kernel which, invisible but active, confers its meaning upon the whole construction. This kernel, the active principle of psychoanalytic theory, will not show through unless all the apparent contradictions have found their explanation of the unity I ascribe hypothetically to Freud’s intuition” (p. 82). In her 1968 article “The Illness of Mourning and the Fantasy of the Exquisite Corpse,’ Torok reexamined the problems of introjection and incorporation, as presented from the works of Sandor Ferenczi through those of Melanie Klein. She distinguished introjection, as a process that allows the ego to be enriched with the instinctual traits of the pleasureobject, from incorporation, a fantasmatic mechanism that positions the forbidden or prohibited object within the self in secret. “Installed in place of the lost object, the incorporated object continues to recall the fact that something else was lost: the desires quelled by repression” (p. 114). She developed a theory of the crypt and the phantom that haunts the subject and begins to speak in the subject’s place. The phenomenon of the phantom results not from the return of the repressed, but from the cryptic inclusion of an Other, in the face of which the illness of mourning and the work of mourning have not been able to take effect. Torok thus took on the work of a patient and critical rereading of Freud, Ferenczi, and Klein, in an attempt to identify all that remained unanalyzed and “encrypted” in the systems of psychoanalysis. After Nicolas Abraham’s death in 1985, she continued this line of inquiry into psychoanalysis with Abraham’s nephew, Nicholas Rand. JACQUES SEDAT See also: Abraham, Nicolas; Introjection. Bibliography Abraham, Nicolas, and Torok, Maria. (1986). The Wolf Mazn’s magic word: A cryptonomy (Nicholas Rand, Trans.). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (Original work published 1976) INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TOSQUELLES, FRANCcols (1912-1994) . (1994). The shell and the kernel: Renewals of psychoanalysis (Nicholas T. Rand, Ed. and Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1978) . (1995). Questions for Freud: The secret history of psychoanalysis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Torok, Maria. (1968). Maladie du deuil et fantasme du cadavre exquis. Revue francaise de psychanalyse, 32, 4. (Reprinted in translation as “The illness of mourning and the fantasy of the exquisite corpse,’ in Abraham and Torok, The shell and the kernel: Renewals of psychoanalysis.) TOSQUELLES, FRANCOIS (1912-1994) Francois Tosquelles, a French physician, hospital psychiatrist, psychoanalyst, and founder of the movement for institutional psychotherapy, was born on August 12, 1912, in Reus (Catalonia, Spain) and died on September 24, 1994, in Granges-sur-Lot (France). He was reared in Reus in a progressive and culture-loving environment until he sat for his baccalaureate at the age of fifteen. He then enrolled in the medical school of Barcelona University, where he met Sandor Eiminder, an Austrian refugee fleeing Nazism, who became his psychoanalyst. As early as 1934 he was appointed to work as a physician in the Instituto Pere Mata and enjoyed the benefits of being psychoanalytically monitored by Werner Wolf, a German refugee who had settled in Barcelona. In 1936 Spain elected the Popular Front and rapidly found itself facing down fascism. Tosquelles was appointed psychiatric head of the republican army. He implemented group techniques derived directly from psychoanalysis to treat psychological decompensation in soldiers, as Wilfrid Bion and John Rickman were to do in Great Britain during World War II. Forced to flee Spain after the defeat of the republicans, he arrived in France and settled in Saint-Albansur- Limagnole (in the Lozere department) in 1940. As a result of his work with Lucien Bonnafe, Andre Chaurand, and many others during the period of Resistance, the Saint-Alban-sur-Limagnole psychiatric hospital became the crucible of a unique experiment based on the discoveries of psychoanalysis and aimed at treating the most seriously ill mental patients from a psychodynamic perspective. He worked with a large number of psychiatrists and psychoanalysts, the best known among them being Jean Oury, Helene 1765 Totem AND TABOO Chaigneau, Jean Ayme, Horace Torrubia, Roger Gentis, Philippe Rappard, and Yves Racine. Georges Daumézon and Philippe Koechlin later referred to this system as “institutional psychotherapy.” It greatly contributed to changing the face of French psychiatry by developing the system of “sector psychiatry” set up in the 1960s and 1970s. In this innovative practice of psychiatry, ongoing treatment made it possible to take the psychoanalytic concept of the transference relation into account. We find echoes of this system in Tosquelles’s book Education et psychothérapie institutionelle (Education and institutional psychotherapy; 1984). Tosquelles was very attached to a global conception of the human being. In his psychoanalytic practice he treated children and adults, individuals and groups, using the techniques of classical treatment and psychodrama. A polyglot possessing vast knowledge, he never ceased to establish links between the world of psychiatry and the discoveries of psychoanalysis, phenomenology, and anthropology. The quality of his presence for the other, his clinical intuition, his lively personality, and his indefatigable search to improve conditions for mental patients made him a unique figure in the history of psychoanalysis. In the domain of psychoanalysis he was mainly responsible for introducing an in-depth approach to the study of psychopathology and the psychoses. Whether in the psychoanalytic study and comprehension of delusional manifestations and other elements in the behavior of schizophrenic and autistic patients or in reflection on the transference relations that come into play in their treatment, both for the patient and the therapist Tosquelles had the capacity to render complex psychoanalytic problems accessible and crystal-clear, irrespective of the status of his listeners. Tosquelles instituted a movement of institutional psychotherapy that was furthered by Jean Oury, and continued by many psychiatrists and psychoanalysts. Moreover, he greatly contributed to demonstrating the importance of the nursing team. These contributions responded in part to the wish that Freud expressed at the Budapest Congress in 1918: “When this happens, institutions or out-patient clinics will be started, to which analytically-trained physicians will be appointed, so that men who would otherwise give way to drink, women for whom there is no choice between running wild or neurosis, may be made capable, by analysis, of resistance and of efficient work” (1919a [1918]). 1766 A collection of papers, Actualité de la psychothérapie institutionelle (The current state of institutional psychotherapy; 1994), includes Tosquelles’s last publication. PIERRE DELION See also: Fanon, Frantz; France. Bibliography Delion, Pierre (Ed.). (1994). Actualité de la psychothérapie institutionnelle. Vigneux, France: Editions Matrice. Ellul, Jacques, Tosquelles, Frangois, Corbin, Jean-Francois, et al. (1987). La Genése aujourd’ hui. Nantes, France: Arefpi. Freud, Sigmund. (1919a [1918]). Lines of advance in psycho-analytic therapy. SE, 17: 157-168. Tosquelles, Francois. (1967). Structure et reéducation thérapeutique. Paris: Editions Universitaires. . (1984). Education et psychothérapie institutionelle. Mantes, France: Hiatus. . (1986). Le vécu de la fin du monde dans la folie. Nantes, France: Arefpi. . (1992). Denseignement de la folie. Toulouse, France: Privat. TOTEM AND TABOO Totem and Taboo is Sigmund Freud’s first work on group psychology. The foundation of the work’s ideas first appears in 1911, in his correspondence with Sandor Ferenczi, through which it is possible to trace the development of Freud’s thought. Two topics appear in the letters: “tragic guilt” and the “libidinal origin of religion.” His competition with Carl Jung, who was writing the Metamorphoses of the Soul and its Symbols (1912), is mentioned, and their break in fact occurred while the book was being written. The work presents a classic and sweeping analogy between two terms: on the one hand, savages, on the other, neurotics and children—us, in other words. The analogy unfolds in three parts, starting in the first essay where the resemblance between the two is related to the horror of incest that Freud identified in savages by analyzing totemic systems as laws of exogamy. The second essay interprets taboo as a manifestation of the ambivalence of emotions. Freud INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS postulates the primal existence of emotional currents, distinguishes between savages and the rest of us based on the intensity of emotion, and provides the first in-depth investigation of this conception of emotion. The third essay, cutting across similarities and differences, offers, among other things, the first detailed investigation of narcissism (animism). But there is more to the analogy, which Freud develops at the end of the third essay and in the fourth. He establishes the existence of the concepts he examines, the dynamic that governs them, as well as their bearing on his own work, on the following hypotheses: the existence of a primitive horde whose father is omnipotent; the murder of the father by the group of brothers, leading to the growth of the totemic clan, and the conditions for this possibility of thought. The work is made difficult because of its complex construction, the manner in which Freud uses analogy, the extreme interpretative power of his analysis, the conceptual richness of the book—projection, ontogenesis of moral conscience, the reality-ego and pleasure-ego— and finally because of the “spiny hedge of literature and reference” included (letter to Ferenczi, May 13, 1913). This work also traces the Oedipus complex to a scientific myth that is found, in modified form, in the work of the majority of later psychoanalysts. Although schematic and structural, Totem and Taboo was the basis for Freud’s work on group psychology. Like most of his work, it is more frequently reduced to a simple formula (the murder of the father by the horde) than studied or understood as a whole. The only valid criticism concerns the hypothesis of the phylogenetic transmission of precise memory traces. But the forms assumed by the primal horde and the totemic clan, as well as the foundational moment of rupture that they share, remain pertinent. The libidinal dynamics that constitute such groups were later elaborated in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921c), along with the status of the “poet” who invents the myth of origin. MICHELE PORTE See also: Act/action; Ambivalence; Animistic thought; Anthropology and psychoanalysis; Castration complex; Cultural transmission; Darwin, Darwinism and psychoanalysis; Ethics; Father complex; Gift; Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego; Heredity of acquired char- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TOTEM AND TABOO acters; Identification; Incest; Magical thinking; Myth of origins; Mythology and psychoanalysis; Oedipus complex; Omnipotence of thoughts; Organic repression; Parricide/murder of the father; Phylogenesis; Phylogenetic Fantasy, A: Overview of the Transference Neuroses; Primitive; Primitive horde; Projection; Taboo; Thalassa: A Theory of Genitality; Totem/totemism; “Uncanny, The.” , Source Citation Freud, Sigmund (1912-13a), Totem und Tabu. Einige Ubereinstimmungen im Seelenleben der Wilden und der Neurotiker, Leipzig-Vienna, Hugo Heller; GW, IX; appeared with the title “Uber einige Ubereinstimmungen im Seelenleben der Wilden und der Neurotiker” as a series of four essays in Imago; first essay: “Die Inzestscheu,” I, 1, Vienna, 1912, 17-33; second essay: “Das Tabu und die Ambivalenz der Gefihlsregungen,” I, 3, Vienna, 1912, 213-227, I, 4, 301-333; third essay: “Animismus, Magie und Allmacht der Gedanken,” II, 1, Vienna, 1913, 1-21; fourth essay: “Die infantile Widerkehr des Totemismus,” II, 4, Vienna, 1913, 357-408; Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1-161. Bibliography Frazer, James G. (1910). Totemism and exogamy. New York. Freud, Sigmund. (1921c). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. SE, 18: 65-143. Freud, Sigmund, and Ferenczi, Sandor. (1993-2000). The correspondence of Sigmund Freud and Sandor Ferenczi (Eds. Eva Brabant, Ernst Falzeder, and Patrizia Giampieri- Deutsch, Peter T. Hoffer, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Jung, Carl Gustav. (1911-12). Psychology of the unconscious: A study of the transformation and symbolism of the libido: A contribution to the history of the evolution of the thought. Coll. Works, Vol. 5. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Smith, William Robertson. (1889). Lectures on the religion of the Semites. New York: Schocken Books, 1972. Further Reading Mead, Margaret. (1963). Totem and taboo reconsidered with respect. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 27, 185-199. Muensterberger, Warren. (Ed.) (1969). Man and his culture: Psychoanalytic anthropology after Totem and Taboo. London: Rapp and Whiting. Whiting, J. W. M. (1960). Totem and taboo—A reevaluation. Science and Psychoanalysis, 3, 150-154. 1767 Totem/TOTEMISM TOTEM/TOTEMISM The word totem is derived from the Ojibwa language of North America, where it refers to kinship relations between siblings and the exogamous clan. In the nineteenth century, British anthropologists suggested that totemism, characterized by the existence of a fetish, exogamy, and matrilineal descent, was the fundamental institution of primitive societies and the essential basis of their beliefs, as distinct from the religious and scientific thought of western culture. This universalizing, comparative, and evolutionist attitude reached its apogee in James G. Frazer. It disappeared for methodological reasons. Ethnologists abandoned universalism to conduct local research, emphasizing the differences between cultures. In Freud’s work the word totem appears in a supplement (1912a), prepared for the Weimar Congress, September 21 and 22, 1911, describing his analysis of Justice Schreber’s book (1911). After working for four months on Totem and Taboo (1912—13a), Freud announced his intentions as follows: “The assumption underlying these trials [proving the authenticity of childrens lineage from a clan’s totem] leads us deep into the totemic habits of thought of primitive peoples. The totem ... spares the members of the tribe as being its own children, just as it itself is honoured by them as being their ancestor and is spared by them. We have here arrived at the considerations of matters which, as it seems to me, may make it possible to arrive at a psycho-analytic explanation of the origins of religion” (1911c, p. 81). Totem and Taboo advanced the thesis that Freud developed in all his writing on group psychology, through Moses and Monotheism (1939a [1934-38)]— and he indicates that he is aware of the criticism of the literature on totemism and undisturbed by it. Initially there was agreement between the two taboo prohibitions of totemism—killing the totem and marrying within the clan—were found to coincide with the two oedipal wishes—killing the father and marrying the mother. Psychoanalysis provided two other findings: childhood phobias showing the animal could function as a paternal substitute, and Ferenczi’s observation of a child who identified with a cock (1913), which Freud associated with an “infantile return of totemism.” He went on to describe the murder of the archaic father as the nucleus of totemism and point of departure for the formation of religion. The work of William Robertson Smith (1889) analyzing the “totemic meal” confirmed 1768 the hypothesis: Once a year the totem animal was sacrificed and consumed by the members of the tribe. This was followed by a period of mourning and feasting. By adding the Darwinian assumption of primitive hordes, each under the domination of a single male who was powerful, violent, and jealous, the following scientific hypothesis or myth was set forth. The allpowerful and “absolutely narcissistic” father of the primal horde seized all the women and killed, subjugated, or chased away the sons. “One day, however, the sons came together and united to overwhelm, kill, and devour their father, who had been their enemy but also their ideal” (1925d [1924], p. 68). Afterward, none of the sons could take the place of the father. “Under the influence of failure and regret ... they banded themselves into a clan of brothers by the help of the ordinances of totemism, which aimed at preventing a repetition of such a deed, and they jointly undertook to forego the possession of the women on whose account they had killed their father.... this was the origin of the exogamy which is so closely bound up with totemism. The totem-feast was the commemoration of the fearful dead from which sprang man’s sense of guilt (or ‘original sin’) and which was the beginning at once of social organization, of religion, and of ethical restrictions. Now whether we suppose that such a possibility was a historical event or not, it brings the formation of religion within the circle of the fathercomplex and bases it upon the ambivalence which dominates that complex” (p. 60). By assigning a collective prehistory to the Oedipus complex, while making an intrinsic connection between individual and collective psychology via the family, the totem hypothesis also bases the possibility of human thought on the murder of the father of the horde. The fulfillment of this act (i.e., murder of the father), studied throughout Freud’s work on group psychology, is what leads to the formation of distinct psychic agencies—ego, ego ideal, and superego— along with the development of ambivalence and the appearance of the feeling of guilt, including unconscious guilt. The concept of the taboo depends on the thesis of totemism. Freud also attributed the susceptibility to hypnotism to the phylogenetic memory traces of the horde. Likewise, group psychology and religion are based on the premise of totemism. From this Freud deduced three paradigmatic forms and dynamics of group existence: the horde, matriarchy, and the totemic clan, and three paradigmatic forms of INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS religion that are related to them: the worship of mother-goddesses, of the son-hero, and of the father. The latter reveals the return of the repressed created by the murder of the father. Modern ethnology has challenged the universality of Freud’s claim and that of the Oedipus complex. The transmission of phylogenetic traces that are valid for the entire human species is problematic, even if Freud defends this idea with a form of Lamarckism. Nonetheless, Freud’s arguments have.continued to generate interest (Juillerat, 1991). In Totem and Taboo and Moses and Monotheism, Freud explicitly analyzed the libidinal forms and dynamics of western culture, with its monotheistic religions, its customs, its morality, its science, and its social and state institutions. MICHELE PORTE See also: Animistic thought; Double; Erotogenic masochism; Ethics; Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego; Group psychotherapies; Identification; Myth of origins; Mythology and psychoanalysis; Oral eroticism; Oral-sadistic stage; Orality; Parricide, murder of the father; Primitive; Primitive horde; Rite and ritual; Roheim, Géza; Substitute/substitutive formation; Taboo; Totem and Taboo. Bibliography Ferenczi, Sandor. (1913). Arpad: Un petit homme-cogq [Ein kleiner Hahnemann]. OC, Psychanalyse, 2, 1913-1918. Paris: Payot. Freud, Sigmund. (1912—13a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1— 161. . (1925d [1924]). An autobiographical study. SE, 20: 1-74. Juillerat, Bernard. (1991). CEdipe chasseur: Une mythologie du sujet en Nouvelle-Guinée. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Lévi-Strauss, Claude. (1964). Totemism. (Rodney Needham, Trans.) London: Merlin. (Original work published 1962) TRAINING ANALYSIS The training analysis is the personal course of psychoanalytical treatment that every psychoanalyst must undergo with a certified analyst prior to, or in parallel with, his or her theoretical training, and before beginning to practice. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TRAINING ANALYSIS As late as 1909, Freud’s answer to the hypothetical question “How can one become a psycho-analyst?” was still: “by studying one’s own dreams” (1910a, p. 33). This was a shibboleth that he mentioned several times, but by the following year he widened the requirements: “no psycho-analyst goes further than his own complexes and internal resistances permit; and we consequently require that he shall begin his activity with a self-analysis and continually carry it deeper while he is making his observations on his patients. Anyone who fails to produce results in a self-analysis of this kind may at once give up any idea of being able to treat patients by analysis” (1910d, p. 145). Freud continued to use the term Selbstanalyse (self-analysis, or analysis of oneself) to include the procedure of being analyzed by a senior and more experienced person; Max Eitingon’s analysis with Freud (1909-1909), conducted during evening strolls on the Ring, was the first instance of a training analysis. Freud later considered it “one of the many merits of the Zurich school of analysis that they have laid increased emphasis on this requirement, and have embodied it in the demand that everyone who wishes to carry out analyses on other people shall first himself undergo an analysis by someone with expert knowledge” (1912e, p. 116). In 1918, with Freud’s agreement, Hermann Nunberg proposed at the Fifth Congress of the International Psycho-Analytical Association that training analysis be made obligatory. Otto Rank and Viktor Tausk were opposed. The rule became official only in 1926. Rank and Sandor Ferenczi (1923/1925) made it clear, however, that “the correct didactic analysis is one that does not in the least differ from the curative treatment”; nor, in their view, should it be confined to physicians. Ferenczi described the necessity for training analysis as “the second fundamental rule of psycho-analysis” (1928/1955, pp. 88-89). The adoption of the principle by the International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA) was the result, chiefly, of the efforts of Eitingon and of the initiative of the Berlin Institute, which had set up a training protocol as early as 1920. The training analysis was a cornerstone of that protocol, and Hanns Sachs was one of the first official training analysts. Writing to Franz Alexander on May 13, 1928, Freud once again raised the bar: “One ought to demand guarantees from the candidates which are not necessary with patients, since regular analytic work has deleterious effects on one’s psyche just as work with Roentgen 1769 TRAINING ANALYSIS rays has on one’s tissues; it needs to be countered by steady hard work” (Jones, p. 478). A few years later, at a time when the received wisdom was to extend analysis to the limit, Freud even suggested that “Every analyst should periodically—at intervals of five years or so—submit himself to analysis once more, without feeling ashamed of taking this step” (1937c, p. 249). During the years when psychoanalysis was expanding, thanks both to the dispersal of émigrés in flight from Nazism and to the strengthening of the movement’s institutions, training analysis became the subject of innumerable papers, reports, and debates, and the rules governing it were continually changing. A letter from Rudolph Loewenstein to Marie Bonaparte dated February 22, 1953, is eloquent on the prevailing norms: “Here [in New York], as in the American Association, there is a rule requiring training analysis to be conducted on the basis of at least four sessions per week, of between three-quarters of an hour and fifty-five minutes in length. Even the people in Chicago support this. The worst, though, are the Washington lot.” Regulations of this sort were at the root and core of a good many splits in the psychoanalytic movement, notably in France in 1953 and 1963, where Jacques Lacan’s short sessions and his relationship with his analysands were challenged by the IPA authorities, who eventually barred him as a training analyst. Lacan retaliated by decreeing in the founding statement of his Ecole freudienne de Paris that training analysis was the purest form of analysis, and by proposing (October 9, 1967) the institution of the system of induction of analysts that he called “Ja passe.” Critics of required training analyses variously underscore the antithesis between a professional project and the request for a personal analysis, the possibility of external rivalries corrupting the transference and/or counter-transference in such analyses, the hierarchical medical model implied by the title of training analyst, and even the danger of creating a “restricted transference zone” (Stein). There has been a tendency for the term training analysis to fade from use in training programs: the Paris Psychoanalytical Society, for example, under the influence of Sacha Nacht, prohibited any participation of a candidate’s analyst in his or her training. The function of the training analyst, however, has shown remarkable staying power, and the international guidelines that the IPA’s member societies are bound by in this connection are still the object of much debate and negotiation. Each group 1770 strives by its own lights to settle on what Freud called “the training most suitable for an analyst” (1926e, p. 252), but the necessity of a preparatory personal analysis is universally acknowledged. Under what conditions, and with whom, are still open questions. ALAIN DE MYOLLA See also: Association psychanalytique de France; Berliner Psychoanalytisches Institut; Berliner Psychoanalytische Poliklinik; Cure; Development of Psycho-Analysis; Ecole freudienne de Paris; Eitingon, Max; Fourth analysis; France; International Psychoanalytic Association; Lay analysis; Psychoanalytic filiations; Pass, the; Psychoanalyst; Quatriéme groupe (O.P.L.F.), Fourth group; Real, the (Lacan); “Recommendations to Physicians Practicing Psychoanalysis”; Société francaise de psychanalyse; Société psychanalytique de Paris and Institut de psychanalyse de Paris; Training of the psychoanalyst; United States. Bibliography Donnet, Jean-Luc. (1973). Le divan bien tempéreé. Nouvelle Revue de psychanalyse, 8 (Autumn), 23-49. Ferenczi, Sandor. (1955). The elasticity of psycho-analytic technique. In Final contributions to the problems and methods of psycho-analysis. London: Hogarth and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis. (Original work published 1928) Ferenczi, Sandor, and Rank, Otto. (1925). The development of psycho-analysis (Caroline Weston, Trans.). New York and Washington: Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing. (Original work published 1923) Freud, Sigmund. (1910a [1909]). Five lectures on psychoanalysis. SE, 11: 7-55. . (1910d). The future prospects of psycho-analytic therapy. SE, 11: 139-151. . (1912e). Recommendations to physicians practising psycho-analysis. SE, 12: 109-120. . (1926e). The question of lay analysis. SE, 20: 177- 250. . (1937c). Analysis terminable and interminable. SE, 23: 209-253. Girard, Claude. (1984). La part transmise. XLIIIe Congres des psychanalystes de langues romanes. Revue francaise de psychanalyse, 48, 1. Jones, Ernest. (1957). Sigmund Freud: Life and work. London: Hogarth. Mannoni, Maud. (1970). Le psychiatrie, son fou et la psychanalyse. Paris: Seuil. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Stein, Conrad. (1972). Notes relatives au statut scientifique et au statut social de la psychanalyse. Etudes freudiennes, 5—6. (Original work published 1968) TRAINING OF THE PSYCHOANALYST Psychoanalytic training is the process that enables a student to be recognized as a psychoanalyst by the psychoanalytic community and serves as a prelude to psychoanalytic practice. Many attempts have been made to define the optimum conditions for training since the early years of psychoanalysis. Following the creation of the Berlin Institute for Psychoanalysis in 1920, there came into being a number of organizations designed to provide training based initially on individual psychoanalysis. At present there is no official degree or certification for psychoanalysts. Because of the excesses and pretenses that have inevitably accompanied the success of psychoanalysis, the issue often arises of the need to protect not only patients but also properly trained psychoanalysts, and ultimately psychoanalysis itself. However, the private institutions that represent psychoanalysis do not want the certification they provide to be part of any official legislation. There is a fundamental reason for this. Psychoanalytic training involves, first and foremost, personal experience of the analytic situation, and this experience is valid only if it is a subjective adventure freely undertaken. How could analysts in training reveal the most intimate aspects of their beings if the experience served as a means of obtaining a state-authorized degree or certificate? Freud himself was aware of the problem early in his career. In a 1926 article (1926e), Freud argued against the idea of restricting analytic practice to medical doctors alone and pointed out the near impossibility of defining criteria for the “illegal practice” of psychoanalysis. His wish was that psychoanalysis be “neither permitted nor forbidden,” and thereby be free of government regulation. At the same time, he felt that organizations like the association he had created could regulate psychoanalysis and thereby resolve, to the extent possible, the problem of integrating psychoanalysis into society. Such an institution could establish methods of training and procedures for certification. In spite of various crises and criticisms, this model and its variants appears to have remained the most pertinent. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TRAINING OF THE PSYCHOANALYST It is easier to describe the tripartite model that is generally a part of an analyst’s training than to summarize the contradictions that have arisen with the question of accreditation. There are three components to training, all of which are necessary. In the United States the analyst in training undertakes the three parts of training concomitantly. It is considered essential that a candidate undergo analytic treatment while conducting a supervised analysis so that problems that arise through the counter-transference can be analyzed. The first component of training is the analysis of the candidate. In France, this requires a commitment to analysis prior to training and ensures that the analysis, when it occurs, calls into question the unconscious sources of the desire to be an analyst. If the candidate is not committed, or is incompletely committed, the candidate should draw the appropriate conclusion and withdraw from the field. Experience shows that this does not always happen, and in such cases the position assumed by the analyst is rarely compatible with the analyst’s performance. It is appropriate to refer such cases to a third party—an organization, for example— for adjudication. The personal experience of analysis is so important that it has been referred to as the second fundamental rule. This requirement follows from the demands made on the analyst in practice: evenly suspended attention, benevolent neutrality, the ability to analyze one’s own mental responses to the patient, identification and de-identification with the patient, and so on. The conclusion of analysis and the criteria for success have been the subject of much spirited debate within the psychoanalytic community. Originally, the analysand was involved in only an aspect of the full potential of psychoanalysis: acknowledging the existence of the unconscious, which provides the subject with greater understanding and conviction. But with advances in the technique of analysis and the emergence of the concept of counter-transference, training analysis moved in the direction of the most complete analysis possible, with each of the major theoretical trends proposing a definition of a satisfactory conclusion in terms of its own criteria. The paradox is that defined criteria of a satisfactory conclusion engenders a normative reference that contradicts the very spirit of the analytic process. It is important to stress, therefore, that the analysis of the candidate has a greater chance of success if its didactic dimension is ignored, 1771 TRAINING OF THE PSYCHOANALYST if the ever-present real or imaginary requirements of the collective ideal are abandoned, and if the analysis finds its own modus operandi. The process requires only—but this is already asking quite a bit—that candidates, starting from an adequate intellectual base, engage in self-analysis and be able to identify and make use of the effects of counter-transference on themselves. As can be imagined, such a process of analysis exceeds the scope of training. Because of the risks associated with practice of the profession, the analyst should be prepared to undertake additional therapy when needed: one’s own analysis being, by definition, open-ended. The second component of training involves supervised analysis. The novice analyst speaks to a more experienced colleague on a regular basis about a current patient in analysis. This report can assume various forms and involve different kinds of comments and exchanges. What is essential is that the junior analyst talk about what takes place between his patient and himself in terms of transference and counter-transference. When he does so, he will necessarily reveal the unconscious counter-transference, which then can be pointed out and elaborated. One of the goals of supervision is to enable the beginning analyst to transcend identification with his own analyst and develop his own style. The supervisory situation, typically involving two people, can also be conducted in small groups, in which case it resembles a seminar for clinical discussion. The controlled environment that supervision affords is so vital that all analysts should make use of it whenever problems occur in their practices. Supervision must therefore be considered a separate form of analysis, a process that occurs alongside therapy and serves as the basis for analyzing oneself while analyzing the patient. The third component involves training in analytic knowledge and metapsychology. Naturally, it is desirable that the analyst be familiar with the key texts in psychoanalysis and be as well educated as possible. Study groups and seminars requiring the trainee’s active participation and interaction with older colleagues will contribute to the trainee’s education. Below are some additional points about education: ¢ Possessing knowledge is of limited value for practical competence. For the analyst, knowledge assumes value when a given concept, author, or clinical description arouses his interest, mobilizes his defenses, and encourages his identifications, 1772 allowing him to access the truth at a given moment. And this process is entirely subjective. A theoretical overview intersects with the insights of self-analysis. Because psychoanalysis seeks knowledge of the unconscious, everyone must follow the road of Freudian discovery for himself. Studying Freud is a central part of training. This study is justified not only because Freud originated modern psychoanalysis and his depth and scope form an intellectual matrix for the discipline, but also because identification with the inventor of psychoanalysis shifts over time as a result of rejections and contradictions and multiple models. Critical study can weed out defensive adherence to a dogmatic and closed theoretical model. Finally, in view of the pluralism of post- Freudian thought, shared knowledge of Freud’s work can be used to identify areas where differences, divisions, and revision occur. A century after Freud’s discovery, an analyst’s metapsychological grounding must involve some historical awareness, which is indispensable for orienting oneself within the immense body of psychoanalytic writing. Training in psychoanalysis also involves initiation into a range of fields opened up by the extension of psychoanalysis (child, psychosomatic, family, group psychoanalysis) and its application (care institutions, education). In all of these fields, what is important is that psychotherapeutic practices more or less follow the analytic model. In the ideal program of a psychoanalytic institute, Freud included the teaching of fields that he felt were essential for analytic thinking: anthropology, prehistory, mythology, history of religion, biology, linguistics, as well as others that have been added since, such as the arts. For the well-trained analyst, nothing human is foreign. In pursuit of this ideal the well-trained analyst will undergo continuous education. In a more immediately practical sense, the question of appropriate prior training has often been discussed. It is advisable that the analyst have at least a college education, have adequate experience of living and working, and have seen something of human suffering. In the early twenty-first century, the great majority of analysts came from the fields of medicine, especially psychiatry, and psychology, and indeed, knowledge of serious psychopathol- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ogy is indispensable in modern psychoanalytic practice. For these professionals, the encounter with their unconscious and access to metapsychological ways of thinking will still call their training into question, but it is not a bad thing if analytic training is primarily conceived as a form of undoing. To ensure that a psychoanalytic body is responsible in certifying its members, it must explicitly define the principles on which training is based and the regulatory procedures to which trainers and trainees are subject. The most difficult aspect of this process is ensuring quality analysis of the psychoanalytic candidate while respecting the candidate’s extrainstitutional space and time. For this reason and for purposes of maintaining confidentiality, every institutional discussion or decision concerning a candidate must explicitly exclude any interference by his analyst. Interactions between applicants and _ institutions (such as offers of employment) reflect the options available and the views held by the various parties regarding the ethics of training and certification. Models range from selection prior to any commitment to analysis (as in the United States), a model that requires a highly organized course of study at an institution, all the way to certification after the fact, which makes candidate analysts fully responsible for the various aspects of their training. In intermediate models, supervised analysis serves as an introduction to the institution and thus as a preliminary form of certification. Logically, candidates’ requests to move from couch to chair should coincide with affirmation of their desire to make the move. However, this connection cannot be made a requirement even though the institution requires it, because the affirmation ultimately lies with the subject. In France, evaluation of a request for admission to a society generally takes place over the course of three meetings with three analysts assigned by the institution. In these meetings the candidate speaks about himself and his analysis. This is an awkward situation, for the candidate needs to transpose, in a conversation with an analyst who is also an examiner, what has until then been his intimate and private experience of the analytic situation. What the examining analysts seek in the candidate is not greater benefits from the analytic work but a display of the necessary distance that reflects the self-analytic ability required of an analyst. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TRAINING OF THE PSYCHOANALYST In successful interviews, the candidate clarifies the truth of the dialogue of the meetings, and the examining analysts can consider whether the candidate is qualified for the work of analysis. From the personal nature of these meetings, it is easy to see that they require absolute confidentiality. The outcome of the meetings should be a collective response made on behalf of the institution. Ultimately, the most difficult problem is that of rejecting the candidate. Further training and certification can assume very different forms. New analysts can be further evaluated in supervised analysis and seminars. Since an institution is defined as much by those it accepts as those it rejects, the problem of rejecting candidates remains. Flexible and controlled modulation of where to draw the line between admission and rejection makes for internal dynamism in scientific exchange, fertile tension between the individual and the group, as well as conflict between generations. Institutional certification acquires meaning only in relation to the duration of training, when supported by older colleagues, and in seeking the transmission of knowledge from one generation to the next. JEAN-Luc DONNET See also: American Psychoanalytic Association; Fourth Analysis Berliner Psychoanalytisches Institut; Berliner Psychoanalytische Poliklinik; Development of Psycho- Analysis; Lehrinstitut der Wiener psychoanalytischen Vereinigung; New York Psychoanalytic Institute; Pass, the; Real, the (Lacan); “Recommendations to Physicians Practicing Psychoanalysis”; Splits in psychoanalysis; Supervised analysis (control case); Technique with adults, psychoanalytic; Technique with children, psychoanalytic; Training analysis. Bibliography Arfouilloux, Jean-Claude. (1989). La formation dans la S.EP. et dans I’A.P.E: Mlaise dans la culture analytique. Revue internationale d’histoire de la psychanalyse, 2, 343— 368. Freud, Sigmund. (1926e). The question of lay analysis. SE, 20: 177-250. Further Reading Balint, Michael. (1954). Analytic training and training analysis. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 35, 157-162. 1773 TRANCE Fenichel, Otto. (1982). Reflections on training and theory (1942). International Review of Psychoanalysis, 9, 155-162. Freud, Anna. (1976). Remarks on problems of psychoanalytic training. Writings (of Anna Freud), 8, 186-192. Greenacre, Phyllis. (1966). Problems of training analysis. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 35, 540-567. Kernberg, Otto. (1996). Thirty methods to destroy the creativity of psychoanalytic candidates. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 77, 1031-1040. Knight, Robert P. (1945). Training in psychotherapy and psychoanalysis. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 9, 54-59. Wallerstein, Robert. (1998). Lay analysis: Life inside the controversy. Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press. TRANCE According to Gilbert Rouget (1980), a trance is a “temporary state of altered consciousness that obeys a cultural model.” In the Middle Ages this term was applied to the agonies of death and the Passion of Christ. The word trance appeared in connection with the fakirs in a supplement to the first edition of the book Neurhypnologie by James Braid, the British doctor who popularized hypnotism. It was also used at the end of the nineteenth century to refer to the state of depersonalized mediums embodying the spirits of other people. From the perspective of physicians and psychologists of that era, exotic, spiritualistic, or Catholic trances could be explained in terms of provoked somnambulism, hypnosis, hysteria, or neurosis, notions that seemed to give a scientific explanation for these phenomena. Sigmund Freud associated himself with this tradition to some degree when he entitled one of his articles “A Seventeenth-Century Demonological Neurosis” (1923). This perspective was reversed when ethnologists such as Alfred Métraux, Michel Leiris, or Roger Bastide began to use this term, which in their view was less ethnocentric, less psychologizing, or less psychiatric in tone than the words hypnosis or hysteria. Trance became the general term for experiences, rites, and beliefs relating to possession, shamanism, ecstasy, or divination observed in other cultures. From then on, magnetic somnambulism, hypnosis, and even psychoanalysis were seen as coming out of an Occidental trance culture. Thus, in The Elementary Structures of Kinship (1949/1969), Claude Lévi-Strauss described psychoanalysis as a “modern form of shamanism.” 1774 While the question of a psychology or a psychoanalysis of the trance continues to be raised, it has been given away, in many contemporary studies, to that of the relationship between the individual and the cultural realms. JACQUELINE CARROY See also: Animal magnetism; Benign/malignant regression; Hypnosis; Jouissance (Lacan); Relaxation principle and neocatharsis. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1923d [1922]). A seventeenth-century demonological neurosis. SE, 19: 67-105. Lapassade, Georges. (1990). La Transe. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Lévi-Strauss, Claude. (1969). The elementary structures of kinship (James Harle Bell, John Richard von Sturmer, and Rodney Needham, Trans.) Boston: Beacon Press. (Original work published 1949) Michaux, Didier (Ed.). (1995). La transe et lhypnose. Paris: Imago. Rouget, Gilbert. (1980). La musique et la transe. Paris: Gallimard. TRANSCULTURAL For a long time the question of alterity (Julia Kristeva), and in particular cultural alterity, has been raised by psychoanalysis (Sigmund Freud, Sandor Ferenczi, Géza Roheim): psychic alterity and its avatars, working within the analytic framework, and the transformation of this alterity, which can be painful or difficult to come to terms with, into human creative potential. New ways of shedding light on this question are being found in the areas of both epistemology (Isabelle Stengers) and clinical work (adaptation of the analytic framework to non-Western populations, migrants, and so forth). There are several modalities of integration of cultural representations into our clinical systems. Advances in anthropology have required practitioners to consider the two-way interactions between outside (culture) and inside (the individual’s psychic functioning). Two different currents of thinking have emerged: those that hold that the therapeutic relationship is constituted from the outset by elements inferred to be INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS universal, and those that hold that the detour through the particular with its own specific coding, including cultural coding, is necessary. And yet, even among those who accept the presence of cultural presuppositions in the therapeutic relationship, two different epistemological positions can be noted, and regrettably, these have led to heated debates, more ideological than clinical, in many Western countries. Some thinkers have adopted an essentially comparatist perspective: What are the invariant features that are found in our patients’ culture and our own? This view leads to the construction of equivalencies and parallelisms between cultural elements of different worlds, but also between the cultural elements of one group and pathological behaviors of individuals belonging to other groups. This option was present in some of Freud’s texts, such as Totem and Taboo (1912-1913a). On the clinical level, this choice leads to inserting the patient’s language into certain mechanisms, and even becoming familiar with his or her cultural representations. But all of these elements are posited as a particular coloration of the clinical relationship, its nucleus (the effective part) being the same as what would be established in an intracultural situation. The approach here can be psychological (in France, Hélene Stork or Blandine Bril), psychiatric (this is especially the case in Englishspeaking countries, such as in the United States, with Arthur Kleinman), or, more rarely, psychoanalytic (the field called psychoanalytic anthropology). Others, following Georges Devereux, have adopted a perspective based on complementarity and make requisite but not simultaneous use of psychoanalysis and anthropology. This complementary approach differs from the comparatist one in that cultural logics are explored as such and are used to support associations. The tool of anthropology makes it possible to establish and explore the framework of the relationship and to co-construct cultural meanings with the patient, to which individual meanings will be linked. This perspective, ethnopsychoanalysis, is the most developed one in France. It is represented by the works of Tobie Nathan (1986), for the first generation, and those of Marie- Rose Moro (1994) for the second. In “L’Ethnopsychiatrie’ (1978; Ethnopsychiatry), Devereux proposed a classification that recognizes three types of therapies that take into account the cultural dimension of mental disorders: “1. Intracultural, where the therapist and the patient belong to the same culture, but the therapist takes sociocultural dimensions into account.... INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TRANSCULTURAL 2. Intercultural (or transcultural, as it was first defined), where although the patient and the therapist do not belong to the same culture, the therapist is well acquainted with the culture of the patient’s ethnic group and uses this knowledge as a therapeutic tool... 3. Metacultural: the therapist and the patient belong to two different cultures. The therapist is not familiar with the culture of the patient’s ethnic group, but nevertheless has a thorough understanding of the concept of culture and uses it in establishing the diagnosis and carrying out the treatment.” In English-speaking countries, working from Devereux’s Classification, a distinction is made between crosscultural psychiatry or psychology (intercultural) and transcultural psychiatry or psychology (transcultural or metacultural). The term transcultural is used in an imprecise way to refer in the broadest sense to the inter-, intra-, and metacultural perspectives. In a more restricted and precise sense, it refers to the metacultural form, which presupposes a perfect understanding of the concept of culture. Thus, in clinical practice the issue of the transcultural takes on very different forms depending on country and on theories relating to intellectual history, and psychoanalysis in a given context. Marie-Rose Moro See also: Anthropology and psychoanalysis; Basic Problems of Ethnopsychiatry; Devereux, Georges; Ethnopsychoanalysis; Totem and Taboo. Bibliography Devereux, Georges. (1978). L’Ethnopsychiatrie. Ethnopsychiatrica, 1 (1), 7-13. Freud, Sigmund. (1912—13a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1-161. Kleinman, Arthur. (1988). Rethinking psychiatry: From cultural category to personal experience. New York: Free Press. Moro, Marie-Rose. (1994). Parents en exil. Psychopathologie et migration. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Further Reading Chrzanowski, G. (1979). Editorial: Cultural and transcultural dimensions of Psychoanalysis. Journal of the Amertcan Academy of Psychoanalysis, 7, 331-334. 1775 TRANSFERENCE Davidson, L. (1980). Ethnic roots, transcultural methodology and psychoanalysis. Journal of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis, 8, 273-278. Okano, K.-I. (1994). Shame and social phobia: A transcultural viewpoint. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 58, 323— 338. Taketomo, Y. (1986). Toward the discovery of self: A transcultural perspective. Journal of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis, 14, 69-84. TRANSFERENCE The term transference denotes a shift onto another person—usually the psychoanalyst—of _ feelings, desires, and modes of relating formerly organized or experienced in connection with persons in the subject’s past whom the subject was highly invested in. Transference (Ubertragung; literally, “carrying over”) was first used in Studies on Hysteria (Freud and Breuer, 1895d), and it gradually developed a more precise meaning over time with progress in the understanding of psychoanalytic treatment in its different dimensions. As of 2005, the term covers all the transference phenomena met with in analytic practice, more specifically, transference love, the transference relationship, transference neurosis, narcissistic transference, negative transference, and so on. Transference involves transferring libidinal cathexis from one person to the form, personality, or characteristics of another. The quantity of libidinal energy deployed in such transfers varies and may be considerable, comparable in strength even to the original cathexes. There are two important points to note in this connection. First, what is mobilized here is libido; the other forms of instinctual energy evoked by Freud are not involved. Self-preservation, for example, plays no part in transference. Second, the withdrawal of libido from one object and the cathexis of another with it, as in states of mourning, is not a transference phenomenon. Transference implies maintenance of a particular relational form and fidelity to a past relationship that have been preserved in the unconscious. The experience of psychoanalysis supports the conclusion that transference phenomena occur naturally in the course of ordinary life, especially with love relationships. Such “wild” transferences usually structure new relationships with outcomes very different from what happens during psychoanalytic treatment. As 1776 Freud put it, “Psycho-analysis does not create [transference], but merely reveals it to consciousness and gains control of it in order to guide psychical processes towards the desired goal” (1910a [1909], p. 51). In its full meaning, transference is what is observed in the course of the treatment and what constitutes an essential precondition of the effectiveness of treatment. A subject incapable of any kind of transference is unsusceptible to treatment by analysis. At first, in Studies on Hysteria, Freud viewed transference in terms of the hypnotic analyst-patient relationship, that is to say, solely in its relational, emotional, and amorous aspects. Freud considered establishing such a relationship to be a prerequisite of success with the cathartic method, just as establishing a hypnotic state is a prerequisite for hypnotic suggestion. For patients who put their trust in the analyst, Freud wrote, it is “almost inevitable that their personal relation to him will force itself, at least for a time, unduly into the foreground. It seems, indeed, as though an influence of this kind on the part of the doctor is a sine qua non to a solution of the problem” (1895d, p. 266). On several subsequent occasions Freud again related transference and suggestion, reiterating that transference was a precondition of suggestion. At the same time, he connected the intensity of the patient’s relationship with the analyst with what he called a meésalliance (false connection) between a memory from the subject’s past and the therapeutic situation: The content of a past wish arises “in the patient’s consciousness unaccompanied by any memories of the surrounding circumstances which would have assigned it to a past time.” The wish is then linked to the analyst, with whom the patient is already legitimately connected. “As the result of this mesalliance— which I describe as a ‘false connection-—the same affect is produced which had forced the patient long before to repudiate this forbidden wish. Since I have discovered this, I have been able, whenever I have been similarly involved personally, to presume that a transference and a false connection have once more taken place” (p. 303). Thus a transference is not only the patient's love of the analyst but also the transposition of an old relation onto him. Once Freud had reached this conclusion, he perceived that this second aspect of the transference took the form of a new illness, and that it could derive from very ancient relationships indeed. In “Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria” (1905e [1901]), INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS for instance, he writes, “But the productive powers of the neurosis are by no means extinguished; they are occupied in the creation of a special class of mental structures, for the most part unconscious, to which the name of “transferences’ may be given” (p. 116). Gradually the notion of transference neurosis came into relief for Freud: “Provided only that the patient shows compliance enough to respect the necessary conditions of the analysis, we regularly succeed in giving all the symptoms of the illness a new transference meaning and in replacing his ordinary neurosis by a ‘transference-neurosis’ of which he can be cured by the therapeutic work. The transference thus creates an intermediate region between illness and real life through which the transition from the one to the other is made. The new condition has taken over all the features of the illness; but it represents an artificial illness which is at every point accessible to our intervention” (1914g, p. 154). Repetition in the transference becomes the means whereby the patient remembers forgotten, unconscious mental attitudes: “The part of the patent’s emotional life which he can no longer recall to memory is re-experienced by him in his relation to the physician” (1910a [1909], p. 51). Thus transference is the motor of the psychoanalytic cure, in more than one sense. For one, the transference introduces a new element into the patient’s mental situation, a “piece of real experience” (1914g, p. 154). For another, the transference is a necessary precondition of the patient’s acceptance of interpretations: “When is the moment for disclosing to [the patient] the hidden meaning of the ideas that occur to him? ... Not until an effective transference has been established in [him], a proper rapport with him. It remains the first aim of the treatment to attach him to it and to the person of the doctor. To ensure this, nothing need be done but to give him time” (1913c, p. 139). Lastly, it is the energy of the transferred affects that supplies the force needed to remove resistances. At the same time, transference is also responsible for resistance: “In analysis transference emerges as the most powerful resistance to the treatment, whereas outside analysis it must be regarded as the vehicle of cure and the condition of success” (1912b, p. 101). A kind of collusion may be struck up between resistance and transference if transference serves the aims of resistance or if a “distortion through transference” (p. 104) is used to mask a conflict. Thus analysis of the transference takes center stage, becoming the very heart, and a INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TRANSFERENCE defining part, of the treatment. “The decisive part of the work is achieved by creating in the patient’s relation to the doctor—in the ‘transference’-—new editions of the old conflicts; in these the patient would like to behave in the same way as he did in the past, while we, by summoning every available mental force [in the patient], compel him to come to a fresh decision. Thus the transference becomes the battlefield on which all the mutually struggling forces should meet one another” (1916-1917a [1915-1917], p. 454). Freud described two forms of transference, negative and positive. Positive transference covers all aspects of attachment to, and confidence in, the analyst; it is essential to successful treatment. Negative transference denotes hostile cathexes or excess cathexis, which may lead the patient to break off the therapeutic relationship. The treatment, as it progresses, may be accompanied by such ancillary transference phenomena as lJateral transferences. Lateral transferences are cathexes, parallel with the cathexis of the analyst, of some figure capable of focusing that portion of the subject’s libido and wishes that cannot be directly expressed to the analyst. Such transferences escape the sphere of transference proper, which is intermediate between the inner world and outside reality, and thus are inaccessible to analysis. But the relations they create may in reality be of great value in other ways to the patient. The erotic dimension of the transference can constitute an obstacle to psychoanalytic cure in patients in whom disparate arguments connected by a nebulous logic prevents any shift in mental processes of the amorous cathexis of the analyst (1915a, pp. 166-167). Concerned by Ferenczi’s experimentation in this regard, Freud warned against offering any direct satisfaction to the patient; the danger was, he felt, that the analyst would find himself in the position of the pastor who attempted the death-bed conversion of an insurance salesman, only to leave with an insurance policy but no convert (p. 165). PauL DENIS See also: Counter-transference; Displacement of the transference; Idealizing transference; Identification; Narcissistic transference; Negative therapeutic reaction; Negative transference; Psychotic transference; Resistance; Resolution of the transference; Therapeutic alliance; Transference/counter-transference (analytical psychology); Transference depression; Transference hatred; 1777 TRANSFERENCE AND COUNTERTRANSFERENCE Transference in children; Transference love; Transference neurosis; Transference relationship; Twinship transference/alter ego transference; Working-through. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1905e [1901]). Fragment of an analysis of a case of hysteria. SE, 7: 1-122. —_——.. (1910a [1909]). Five lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 11: 5-55. ——. (1912b). The dynamics of transference, SE, 12: 97-108. —_——.. (1913c). On beginning the treatment (further recommendations on the technique of psycho-analysis I). SE, 12: 121-144. . (1914g). Remembering, repeating, and workingthrough (further recommendations on the technique of psycho-analysis IT), SE, 12: 145-156. . (1915a). Observations on transference love (further recommendations on the technique of psycho-analysis Ill). SE, 12: 157-171. ——. (1916-1917a [1915-1917]). Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 15-16. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2: 48-106. Further Reading Esman, Aaron H. (1990). Essential papers on transference. New York/London: New York University Press. Frank, George. (2000). Transference revisited/transference revisioned. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought, 23, 459-478. TRANSFERENCE AND COUNTERTRANSFERENCE Heinrich Racker (1910-1961) became a member of the Asociacion Psicoanalitica Argentina (Psychoanalytic Association of Argentina) in 1947. The appearance of his book Transference and Countertransference, whose central theme is counter-transference, had considerable impact in Latin America, and also aroused interest and confirmation in other psychoanalytic centers of North America and Europe. Racker argued that transference and countertransference are the two components of a unity that 1778 reciprocally give life to one another and create the interpersonal relationship in the analytic setting. The counter-transference encompasses the analyst’s total response to the transferences of the patient and to his or her own transferential reactions to the person of the analysand. It is a decisive factor for the understanding and interpretation of the patient's psychological processes. In the establishment of the counter-transference, Racker distinguished between a “concordant identification,” which results from the analyst's identification with the analysand’s ego, superego, and id, and a “complementary identification,” produced by the analyst’s identification with the analysand’s internal objects. These identifications configure transference-countertransference neurosis. There thus exists a bipathy. Within this bipathy, while negative or sexual transference disrupts the patient’s collaboration in the analysis, the analyst's negative or sexual countertransference interferes with his or her comprehension of the analysand, and, consequently, his or her interpretive abilities. To successfully dissolve these resistances, the therapist must undertake constant _ self-analysis throughout the treatment of his or her patients. Paradoxically, counter-transference neurosis can play a positive role when the therapist uses it to understand the patient’s neurosis. Racker showed how the analyst's affective position—dependent upon his or her archaic objects—appears as a response to that of the analysand, signaling psychological facts about it. From another viewpoint, the analyst also unconsciously communicates his or her affective contents to the patient. Racker particularly emphasized positive countertransference, love, as a basic force for understanding that makes possible the development of a positive analytic process. He assigned three meanings to countertransference, viewing it manifestations as a “danger,” an “instrument” for understanding and interpretation, and a “reliving that is simultaneously a new slice of life.” Fipias CEsIo See also: Argentina; Empathy; Racker, Heinrich. Source Citation Racker, Heinrich. (1960). Estudios sobre tecnica psicoanalitica, Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidos; (1968). Transference INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS and countertransference. New York: International Universities Press. Bibliography Cesio, Fidias. (1985). Heinrich Racker. Revista de psicoanalisis de la Asociacion psicoanalitica argentina, 42, 2. TRANSFERENCE/COUNTER-TRANSFERENCE (ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY) Transference is the projection of unconscious contents. Jung’s Studies in Word Association (1906) provided evidence for and referred to Freud’s concept of transference, published the previous year. In 1912 Jung noted that the analysand’s perception of the analyst’s more mature personality forms an empathic bridge between his infantile relationship to reality and adult adaptation. He insisted that an analyst undergo analysis himself, and also saw the importance of analyzing the transference, which both hinders and facilitates psychological growth. By 1913 Jung had extended Freud’s definition, saying transference was also the basis for normal human relatedness. After breaking with Freud, he analyzed his own projections, resolved them to achieve emotional, intellectual, and spiritual/moral autonomy, and concurrently set forth the elements of his opus. A survey of early work shows recognition of counter-transference, the reciprocal arousal of unconscious content in the analyst in response to patient projections. In 1929 he stated his view that the personality of the analyst contributes to analytic process, and that transformation is mutual. He also observed instances of unconscious identity between doctor and patient, giving it the anthropological term participation mystique; later it was recognized by psychoanalysts and called projective identification. So convinced was Jung that this unconscious reciprocal influence distorted all analytic discourse that he drew upon another projective system, alchemy, in Psychology of the Transference (1946) to demonstrate the ubiquity of transference and to identify stages in its evolution and resolution. For some students this represents an incomprehensible departure from rational scientific method. To appreciate its logic one must first accept the role of metaphor in psychological theory building and, second, understand Jung’s theory of archetypes and INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TRANSFERENCE/COUNTER- TRANSFERENCE (ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY) his model of the psyche, which includes a personal and a collective unconscious. Although the concept of archetype has not been accepted by psychoanalysts, the idea has arisen independently in the fields of anthropology, linguistics, behavioral biology, and evolutional psychiatry. Briefly, the capacity to perceive certain forms and processes is inherent, and these ancient, typical potentials are released, to acquire specific psychological content when, in the course of development, the individual encounters external reality. The collective unconscious contains all realizable human potential. The analytic process itself is unconsciously directed by the archetype of individuation, the impulse to grow in psychological depth and complexity, and is an inherent property of the self, the archetype that embraces and comprises all other archetypes. Transference thereby acquires a teleological dimension, the symbolic intent and meaning of which is revealed and experienced as analysis unfolds; this is its prospective aspect, in contrast to the regressive projection of unconscious material from infantile or other past experience. Jung recognized two universal, diametric archetypal urges in the individual psyche: to be separate, complete, and autonomous; and to be intimately bonded to the other, both coupled and enfolded in a group. These longings are primary motivating forces at the root of transference and resistance, constituting a fundamental paradox to be apprehended and resolved in individuation and analysis. Having this profound insight, he sought a metaphor to convey its universal, timeless, and impersonal meaning, to point analysands away from the average dependent/omnipotent transference fantasy. The mythology of medieval alchemy provided an unconscious projective system congenial enough to Western mentality to be accessible, but distant enough to reflect projections made in an analytic process that structures imaginative associations for the purpose of self examination. He chose a sixteenthcentury treatise, the Rosarium Philosophorum, to reflect evolving transference/counter-transference fantasies in the analytic process. All analytical psychologists view transference as a multileveled web of transecting relationships, interpersonal and intrapsychic, conscious and unconscious, occurring simultaneously within and between analyst and patient. Since the spiritual urge was regarded by Jung as an archetypal force equal to sexuality, his con- THTS TRANSFERENCE DEPRESSION cept of transference extends into transpersonal realms. For some analytical psychologists this is the major thrust of Jungian theory, whereas others seek to correct theoretical and methodological gaps, (for example, in the areas of child development and transference) through links to the work of psychoanalysts whose constructions are compatible with Jung’s basic concepts (Kirsch, 1995). Modern psychoanalytic theories of self, projective identification, mutuality, and intersubjectivity all have antecedents in work Jung completed before 1946. JEAN KirscH See also: Alchemy (analytical psychology); Amplification (analytical psychology); Analytical psychology; Complex (analytical psychology); Counter-transference; Negative therapeutic reaction; Projection and “participation mystique” (analytical psychology); Transference. Bibliography Jung, Carl Gustav. (1914a). On the importance of the unconscious in psychopathology, in Coll. Works, Tl. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. . (1916). The structure of the unconscious, Coll. Works, VIL. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. . (1946). The psychology of the transference, Coll. Works, XVI. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Kirsch, Jean (1995). Transference. In M. Stein (Ed.), Jungian . Analysis (pp. 170-209). Chicago-La Salle: Open Court. Further Reading Abend, Sander. (1989). Countertransference and psychoanalytic technique. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 58, 374-395. Gabbard, Glen. (1995). Countertransference: The emerging common ground. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 76, 475-486. Jacobs, Theodore. (1991). The use of the self: Countertransference and communication in the analytic situation. Madison, CT: International Universities Press. . (1999). Countertransference past and present: A review of the concept. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 80, 575-594. Loewald, Hans W. (1986). Transference-countertransference. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 34, Ss 7c FO. 275-288. Poland, Warren S. (1984). The analyst’s words: Empathy and countertransference. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 53, 421- 424. 1780 Searles, Harold. (1979). Countertransference and related subjects. New York: International Universities Press. TRANSFERENCE DEPRESSION | Transference itself reveals transference depression. Transference depression, which is a repetition of an infantile depression marked by narcissistic elements that is expressed within the transference relationship, usually after several years of analysis. Its symptoms are atypical of the depressive series. The difficulties raised by narcissism, on the other hand, concern the considerable demands made by the ideal ego, in addition to feelings of powerlessness and dissatisfaction. Basing himself on Winnicott’s work, André Green describes some of the more striking causes of this infantile depression in “The Dead Mother” (1983/ 1999). It is often a consequence of the mother brutally withdrawing emotional investment in the child because of a state of mourning before or after the child’s birth, often caused by the death of another child or a close relative, or some other major narcissistic wound. The most serious case involves the death of a very young child. This produces a profound alteration in the maternal imago. The latter, which is constituted in the child’s psyche, “brutally transforms the internal object, a source of vitality, into a distant, atonal quasi-inanimate figure that profoundly impregnates the cathexes of its subjects and weighs upon the fate of their object-libidinal and narcissistic development.” (Green, 1983) This narcissistic trauma, which the child experiences as a catastrophe, brings with it not only the loss of love but also the loss of meaning, since the child has no explanation or understanding of what has taken place. The consequences of this catastrophe are decathexis from the maternal object and the constitution within the psyche of a “dead” zone full of “holes” and, in addition, identification in the mirror with the “dead mother,” which can lead the child to organize a pathology that aims to bring the mother back to life fantasmatically. Finally, the loss of meaning experienced by the child structures the early development of the ego’s fantasmatic and intellectual capabilities; a development which does not take place in the context of freedom to imagine and create, but as compulsive thinking instead. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Sandor Ferenczi’s ambivalent relationship to Sigmund Freud provides a particularly apt illustration of this notion. The “insatiable need for support” Ferenczi felt during his analysis with Freud can be considered as a manifestation of transference depression—the repetition of a childhood depression that has not been psychically worked through. Transference depression, expressed through the emergence of an eroticized appeal addressed to the analyst, reveals a deprived child in a state of helpless distress, marked by a primary depression that has not been psychically worked through (Bokanowski, 1994). Behind the exacerbated demand for love and reparation deficienciesevident in cases transferencelove, there are often developmental deficiencies and failures in the primary environment. The transference is thus eroticized as a defense against the fear of collapse, linked to the primary depression experienced by these patients in the very earliest stages of their development. In their interactions with the analyst they relive their despair and distress, as well as their deficiencies in primary symbolization. The erotic demand is thus an attempt to reconnect in the face of the anguish of the void and a deficit in the function of symbolizing. JEAN-FRANCOIS RABAIN See also: Dead mother complex; Basic depression; Transference hatred. Bibliography Bokanowski, Thierry. (1994). Ensuite survient un trouble. In Collectif: Ferenczi, patient et psychanalyste. Paris: L’Harmattan. Green, André. (2001). The dead mother. In Life narcissism, death narcissism (Andrew Weller, Trans.). London: Free Association Books. (Original work published 1983) TRANSFERENCE HATRED Transference hatred represents the negative pole of the transference relationship determined by the analytic situation. Negative affects are expressed by means of ambivalent impulses within the transference neurosis (negative transference) and destructive impulses more characteristic of borderline states and transference psychoses, notably in passionate psychoses. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TRANSFERENCE HATRED In “The Dynamics of Transference” (1912b), Sigmund Freud proposed “to distinguish a ‘positive’ transference from a ‘negative’ one, the transference of affectionate feelings from that of hostile ones” (p. 105), the object in both cases being one and the same person, the doctor. Reminding readers that Eugen Bleuler was to be credited for the notion of “ambivalence” that characterizes these impulses, he gave the example of obsessional neurotics, in whom “an early separation of the ‘pairs of opposites’ seems to be characteristic of ... instinctual life” (p. 107). While positive transference is classically used “in order to” interpret, throughout treatment (distinguishing it from transference “to be interpreted,” in the case of resistance; Jean-Luc Donnet), the idea, by contrast, is to “defuse” negative transference before it is possible subsequently to analyze it. In fact, it is in borderline structures and transference psychoses that hateful and destructive impulses are the strongest, though they are sometimes masked by the apparent features of love. This is especially true with passionate transference. Feelings of love and psychic flooding can invade the transference situation and be expressed in ways that undermine the analytic framework. They attest to mnemic traces that have not been successfully integrated into the psyche. Passionate transferences express the violence of the unfulfilled need for love and of the need for reparation. Eroticization of the transference masks the impulses of hate linked to profound developmental deficiencies and failings in the early environment. These patients then make their analyst relive their despair and helplessness. They want to make the analyst feel the powerlessness and despair that they were unable to symbolize in infancy—that is, their deprivation of primary symbolization. Sandor Ferenczi’s ambivalent hatred toward Freud, his analyst, is an example of this phenomenon. Ferenczi’s insatiable need for support during his analysis can be considered as the expression of a transference depression, itself linked to a childhood depression that had not been worked over, either by Ferenczi himself or by Freud; Ferenczi’s Clinical Diary can be read as his eroticized complaint, the culmination of a negative and idealizing transference. According to Thierry Bokanowski’s interpretation (1994), Ferenczi, through his innovations in technique, was demanding reparation, maternal in origin, from his analyst, for he had 1781 TRANSFERENCE IN CHILDREN managed to “freeze” in Freud the mother he was incapable of being. This is what borderline analysands sometimes do with their analyst: they “feed” him or her with the analysis in order to prolong it into an endless process. After the second topography, in describing the negative therapeutic reaction, Freud emphasized the need for self-punishment, the severity of the superego, and the masochism of the ego. All the self-hatred in these subjects inhabited by what Andre Green described as a logic of despair (1990) reflects a compromise between the inextinguishable desire for revenge and concern for protecting the object from the hostile desires directed against it. Here, the conflict between love and hate is dominant. The desire for revenge is liked to the wounded narcissism of these subjects, who can no longer differentiate between the harm they want to inflict upon themselves and the harm they want to inflict on their object. From this perspective, “love is always uncertain, hate is always sure,” wrote Green. Thus these subjects arrange to perpetuate their chosen form of sadomasochistic relationship as long as possible. However, it is possible for the intolerable nature of negative transference not to appear, remaining unconscious for both the patient and the analyst. The only symptoms: a quality of “gloominess” in the treatment (Cournut), disconnected thinking, decathexis or noncathexis— that is, the “aphanisis” of the transference. Other patients seek to “weld” their fragile narcissistic position back together again around an opposition to the object (Couvreur). In the transference and their complaints, they repeat early environmental deprivations. In them there is a fundamental hostility against the object, and the latter is thus loved in hate. Negative transference becomes a particular modality of the bond. In “Hate in the Counter-Transference” (1949) Donald Winnicott showed the importance of the effects of this transference hatred. In the neurotic structures, the patient will tend to project his or her ambivalence onto the analyst and will believe that the analyst needs to negotiate his or her own ambivalence. By contrast, psychotic patients project their confusion onto the analyst. For them, love and hate coincide, and “should the analyst show love, he will surely at the same moment kill the patient” (p. 70). In certain cases, the patient seeks the analyst’s hatred. In Winnicott’s view, this hatred must be reached and experienced 1782 bilaterally in treatment, “or else the patient cannot feel he can reach objective love” (p. 72). JEAN-FRANCOIS RABAIN See also: Counter-transference; Negative therapeutic reaction; Transference. Bibliography Bokanowski, Thierry. (1994). Ensuite survient un trouble. .. Sandor Ferenczi, le transfert négatif et la depression de transfertin. In Michéle Bertrand, et al., Ferenczi, patient et psychanalyste (pp. 9-52). Paris: LHarmattan. Cournut, Jean. (2000). Le transfert negatif. Acceptions diverses plus ou moins pessimistes. Revue francaise de psychanalyse, 64, 2, 361-365. Couvreur, Catherine. (2000). Un mouvement qui est toujours le méme, négatif. Revue francaise de psychanalyse, 64, 2, 367-381. Ferenczi, Sandor. (1988). The clinical diary of Sandor Ferenczi. January—October 1932 (Judith Dupont, Ed.; Michael Balint and Nicola Zarday Jackson, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Original work published 1985 [1932]) Freud, Sigmund. (1912b). The dynamics of transference. SE, 12: 97-108. Roussillon, René.,(1991). Paradoxes et Situations limites de la psychanalyse. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Winnicott, Donald. (1949). Hate in the counter-transference. International Journal of Psycho-Analyisis, 30, 69-74. Further Reading Gabbard, Glen O. (1991). Technical approaches to transference hate: Borderline patients. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 72, 625-638. TRANSFERENCE IN CHILDREN After about a century of psychoanalysis, there is no longer any doubt that children are capable of transference. On the other hand, the characteristics of transference and its themes of love and idealization are the very elements that can cause parents to have reservations about their child undergoing analysis, particularly—but not only—if they have not been sufficiently informed about this type of phenomena. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Moreover, this is what led Anna Freud to believe that the psychoanalysis of children was only possible in families that had already been genuinely won over by the ideas of psychoanalysis. Be this as it may, Donald Meltzer, in The Psycho-Analytical Process, went so far as to present child analysis as a much more pure situation than that of adult analysis, describing it in terms of a process divided into five successive phases, the first of which he called, precisely, “bringing together the elements of transference.” From a historical point of view, it is interesting to note that the first analysis of a child was that of “Little Hans”—related in “Analysis of a Phobia in a Five- Year-Old Boy” (1909) and involving the child’s phobia to horses—and that Sigmund Freud conducted this analysis indirectly, based on the reports and notes of the boy’s father, himself one of Freud’s students. In other words, this analysis poses complex problems from the point of view of transference because it involved analysis of the child’s transference onto the image of his father, against the background of the more or less idealizing transference of the boy’s father himself onto Freud. This is something that is found, more or less, throughout the history of ideas relating to transference in children, particularly with regard to the question of whether or not children can form a joint transference onto their parents and onto their therapist. It is thought that the child analyst’s main difficulty is not the absence of transference but instead the very opposite: seeing the development of a transference of unusual intensity, with archaic components that are sometimes so massive and so violent that they become difficult for the analyst to tolerate. This massive, archaic transference, mainly linked to the mechanism of projective identification described by Melanie Klein, is a splitting transference that often corresponds to a type of part-object relationship. The controversy between Anna Freud and Klein must be recalled here, in those aspects that touch upon the issue of transference. One of the arguments that Anna Freud initially made against the possibility of transference in children was the fact of the child’s dependency in relation to his or her real objects, the parents. Klein countered this by arguing that the psychic structures were organized very early on, from the second semester of the child’s life, that the problems for which the child needed analysis were already linked to repetitions of earlier organizations, and that because of this, the child’s relationship with his or her real INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TRANSFERENCE IN CHILDREN objects was already, in itself, a mixture of real and imaginary objects, or, to put things differently, of objective and subjective elements. Whether or not the parents were alive, and whether or not they intervene in the child’s external reality, does not prevent the child from transferring onto the analyst the fantasmatic dimension of the relation to his or her internal parental objects. The second, Kleinian point of view gradually became the dominant one and as of 2005 is commonly accepted among child analysts. Moreover, after 1926 Anna Freud herself moved perceptibly closer to Klein’s positions on this point. As Didier Houzel and Gilles Catoire wrote in an encyclopedia article on child analysis: “Repetition, in the relationship with the analyst, of these early psychic structures, that is, the relation of the self to its internal objects, is what constitutes the transference.” This transference must be thought, understood, interpreted, and worked over with the child, but often, initially, it must only be tolerated and contained by the analyst, all the more so in that transference in children is often split—for example, between outside of treatment (the relationship with the parents) and inside treatment (the relationship with the analyst). If the analyst does not accept the extratransferential roles that the child wishes to make him or her play, and if, on the contrary, the analyst is willing to contain in him- or herself all the aspects of the transference (including its negative and destructive aspects), this splitting can then gradually be reduced. By means of “bringing together the elements of the transference” and analysis of these transferential repetitions, the child’s ego is reinforced, anxieties are modified, and the major psychic functions are differentiated. This process is nevertheless long, often difficult, punctuated by the child’s attempts at avoidance, and lastly, capable of triggering a whole series of different counter-transferential impulses in the analyst. It can be noted that with children, even more so than with adults, the establishment of the transference can produce changes in symptoms that may make it seem, superficially, that the child has been cured. Care should be taken to warn parents about this, to prevent them from falling into the trap of interrupting their child’s analysis prematurely. This attests to the importance of the therapeutic alliance with the parents, which is an integral part of 1783 TRANSFERENCE IN CHILDREN psychoanalytic technique with children, as a vouchsafe for the possibility of continuity in the therapeutic process. As with adults, the idea of the therapeutic alliance benefits from being differentiated from transference properly speaking, although this concept of therapeutic alliance, even in 2005, remains controversial. But there is no transference without countertransference, with children as with adults. The idea of counter-transference encompasses both unconscious elements of the analyst’s psychic functioning that pose an obstacle to the course of the treatment, which must be kept from the patient, and alterations of the analyst’s psyche under the influence of the child’s projections, which, as is well known, are the basis of a certain very primitive, preverbal level of his or her communication. Only by means of working at self-analysis can the analyst become aware of these different phenomena and sort out these two very different aspects of his counter-transference. At this cost, the counter-transference is an irreplaceable tool in child analysis (in fact, in analysis in general), and the entire Kleinian and post-Neinian movement has strongly emphasized it. Indeed, with mute or psychotic children, or with very young children prior to language acquisition (infans), analysis of the countertransference is sometimes the only means of giving meaning to the infraverbal material provided by the child, on the understanding that the dynamics of . transference and countertransference are in fact indissociable and that in a way, they are one and the same. The management of the counter-transference as a means of perceiving a part of the child’s communication in fact requires some delicacy, owing, in part, to the closely interwoven relationship between what the child’s projections induce in the analyst and what in turn is reactivated in the child by the analyst’s countertransference (which can be caught in the trap of a neutralizing projective counter-identification), all the more so in that it is possible that the child’s projections may correspond to real aspects of the analyst’s personality. In such cases, the analysis can only progress if the analyst truly gives herself the means to become aware of these aspects of her own personality and at the same time preserve herself from the child’s projections, or rather, contain them and work them over. Antonino Ferro, in L’Enfant et le Psychanalyste: La question de la technique dans la psychanalyse des enfants (1997; The child and the psychoanalyst: the question of 1784 technique in child analysis), distinguishes among the three levels of listening among which the analyst must oscillate—the level of events, the level of fantasies, and the level inherent in the two-person field deployed within the analyst/analysand pair—and clearly shows how transference in children is an eminently dynamic process that “speaks”. just as much about the present, against the background of the past, as it does about the past against the background of the present. Finally, with regard to babies, their ability (or lack thereof) to transfer has for several years been at the center of a certain number of debates (Serge Lebovici, Bertrand Cramer, and others) about what has come to be known as joint parent/infant therapies, generally conducted by analysts. What has come out of this is that babies appear to be able to incite in their new relational partners interactive modalities that they have had the occasion to try out with their first objects of attachment, but whether or not it is possible, within this framework, really to talk about transference remains an entirely open question, even though these interactive repetitions can occur without significant intervals of time passing between the different experiences in question. BERNARD GOLSE See also: Child analysis; Counter-transference; Negative therapeutic reaction; Psychoanalytical Treatment of Children; Technique with children, — psychoanalytic; Transference. Bibliography Ferro, Antonino. (1997). L’Enfant et le Psychanalyste: La question de la technique dans la psychanalyse des enfants. Ramonville-Saint-Agne, France: Erés. Freud, Sigmund. (1909). Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year- Old Boy. SE, 10: 1-149. Houzel, Didier, and Catoire, Gilles. (1986). La psychanalyse des enfants. Encyclopédie meédico-chirurgicale, Psychiatrie. Paris: Encyclopédie médicale-chirurgicale. Fasc. 37-812-A- 10. Meltzer, Donald. (1967). The psycho-analytical process. London: Heinemann Medical. Further Reading Furman, Erna. (2002). Transference and countertransference in child analysis. Child Analysis, 13, 113-188. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TRANSFERENCE LOVE The term transference love designates an emotional relationship, determined by the analytic situation, of which the manifest object is the analyst; the task of the analyst in this circumstance is to trace the relationship back, without either satisfying or smothering it, to its infantile roots. Transference love is a defining feature of the psychoanalytic method. Psychoanalysis does not cure by love, but love and the analyst play a mediating role therein (Oppenheimer, Agnés, 1996). The set of inner problems generated by transference love, inasmuch as no direct satisfaction is forthcoming, eventually frees love from repression: The truly intermediary role of transference love thus makes love possible. The transference follows the vicissitudes of love. When it is negative, hostile, or governed by repressed erotic impulses it constitutes resistance. According to Sigmund Freud, the “transference of friendly or affectionate feelings” which are “unobjectionable and admissible to consciousness” can contribute to a successful cure (1912b, p.105). Transference love allows the patient to become attached to the aims of the treatment as well as to the person of the analyst. Even as resistance, transference love is thus a prerequisite to cure: it “represents an artificial illness which is at every point accessible to our intervention. It is a piece of real experience, but one which has been made possible by especially favorable conditions” (1914¢, p. 154). One of the difficulties, or impossibilities, confronting the treatment is that some patients refuse to resign themselves to the fact that the material fulfillment of this surrogate love is not an option; such patients are “accessible only to ‘the logic of soup, with dumplings for arguments” (1915a, p. 167). But can this still be considered love? It is clear that the manifest demand for love covers up latent considerations of another kind. The patient’s explicit demand for recognition also reflects a both demand for reparation, and shortcomings in their symbolizing capacity. Where affectionate feelings are transformed into an erotic demand, Freud compares what happens to an outbreak of fire during a theatrical performance. The analyst’s interpretation is what then allows the patient to grasp that they are mistaken as to time and object. In “Observations on Transference-Love” (1915a), Freud promoted an attitude with respect to the com- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TRANSFERENCE Love plex phenomenon of transference love that would later be characterized by Michael Balint as “prudent.” Discussing the analyst’s difficulties when faced by transference love, and confining his remarks to the situation of a male analyst and a female patient, he called for prudence on the part of the doctor and warned, apropos of manifestations of transference love, “against any tendency to a counter-transference which may be present in his own mind” (p. 160). A patient’s passionate attachment to the analyst should indeed never be treated as evidence of the physician’s personal irresistibility, but rather as an effect of the analytic situation itself. For Freud, transference was a mesalliance, a “false connection” (1895d, p- 303), and although the conduct of the cure required the analyst to maintain the transference love, they should nevertheless look upon it as “something unreal, as a situation which has to be gone through in the treatment and traced back to its unconscious origins” (1915a, p. 166). At the same time, despite this “unreality,” despite his emphasis on the inauthenticity, as it were, of the transference, Freud acknowledged that “We have no right to dispute that the state of being in love which makes its appearance in the course of analytic treatment has the character of a ‘genuine’ love.” In fact transference love was no different from any other kind of love, for “There is no such state [of being in love] which does not reproduce infantile prototypes” (p. 168). For Freud, it was this infantile aspect which gave love in general, and transference love in particular, “its compulsive character, verging as it does on the pathological” (p. 168). What is repeated in transference love is frustration, a demand not heard, never answered, which leads the patient to reassume the position of a child with respect to the analyst. A love transference is usually capable of being analyzed and pressed into the service of the treatment, especially when it is moderate, as is most often the case, and when it is first manifested as defensive maneuvers. Sometimes, however, the demand for love takes on a querulous character in passionate transferences: the patient’s grievance concerning this frustration becomes aggressive and exacting. An insistence on reparation emerges, stressful for the analytic setting and challenging to the analyst’s control over the counter-transference. The handling of the treatment is particularly difficult with patients who come close to erotomania or indeed sink into it. In such cases, as described by Freud, the 1785 TRANSFERENCE NEUROSIS situation may have an incendiary character. Behind the exacerbated demand for love and reparation that is seen in passionate transferences lie developmental deficits and failures of the primary environment that have distorted the patient's self. The eroticization of the transference serves as a defense against a fear of disintegration, which in turn derives from the primary depression that such a patient will have experienced in the earliest stages of their development. The analyst's primary position in the face of transference love is that of the interpreter. As Freud wrote, transference love must be traced back to its unconscious roots. For this reason abstinence must be the rule during the treatment. Considerations both technical and ethical prohibit the analyst from gratifying the solicitations of transference love. Like the physician bound by the Hippocratic oath, they must not draw personal profit from the analytic situation. But they must also never lose sight of the fact that the patient is suffering from a limited capacity to love for which infantile fixations are responsible. The analytic cure should make possible the restoration of a function that is of “inestimable importance” to the patient, one that they should not “dissipate in the treatment, but keep ... ready for the time when, after [his or] her treatment, the demands of real life make themselves felt” (1915a, p. 169). Likewise, “If the patient's advances were returned it would be a great triumph for her’—and for the resistance—“but a complete defeat for the treatment. She would have succeeded... in acting out, in repeating in real life, what she ought only to have remembered, to have reproduced as psychical material.” This “distressing episode would end in remorse and a great strengthening of her propensity to repression” (p. 166). Clearly, the analysis of the counter-transference is necessary so as to prevent the analyst’s personal feelings, complexes or inner resistances from hindering the progress of the treatment. The excitation provoked in the analyst by the patient’s demands and transferential projections, and notably the erotization of the transference, certainly put the analyst's superego to the test, but at a more fundamental level they challenge their relational skills and capacity for symbolization as well as mastery over their own desire for reparation. Typically, acting-out by the practitioner, in response to the patient’s transference love, signals a lack of professional maturity in dealing with the countertransferential anxiety aroused by the interpersonal 1786 situation, as well as a failure to deal with personal narcissistic shortcomings or masochistic tendencies. JEAN-FRANCOIS RABAIN See also: Abstinence/rule of abstinence; Counter-transference; Negative therapeutic reaction; Transference. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund, (1912b). The dynamics of transference. SE, 12: 97-108. ——. (1914g). Remembering, repeating and workingthrough (Further recommendations on the technique of psycho-analysis IT). SE, 12: 145-156. —_ . (1915a [1914]). Observations on transference love (Further recommendations on the technique of psychoanalysis III). SE, 12: 157-171. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2. Oppenheimer, Agnés (1996). Kohut et la psychologie du self. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. TRANSFERENCE NEUROSIS Transference neurosis is a phenomenon of the analytic _ process in certain patients with adequately integrated egos and superegos in which the analysand’s perception of the analyst becomes more and more recognizably entwined with core, organizing unconscious fantasy/ memory complexes from childhood. These bear the stamp of oedipal conflict, its precursors and latency and adolescent sequelae. Freud first elaborated the concept in “Remembering, Repeating and Working Through,” in 1914. There he stressed the analyst’s aggressive pursuit of disease. Three years later, he emphasized the insidious disease process itself, then elaborated on the power that the positive transference afforded the analyst to “divest” the patient’s symptoms of libido. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920a), he added that what was repeated in the transference neurosis was “some portion of infantile sexual life—of the Oedipus complex and its derivatives” (p. 18). That is, the transference neurosis was then seen to recapitulate an infantile neurosis. As he began to concern himself with impediments to cure, however, the concept dropped from his writings. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS The concept appears in Freud in conjunction with the concepts of analysability and cure. Freud considered that only patients with transference neuroses were treatable by analysis. He designated the transference neurosis as an artificial symptomatic illness that expanded in the “playground” of the transference while the patient’s other symptoms and external difficulties disappeared. The transference neurosis constituted an “intermediate region between illness and real life” (1914g, p. 154). Cure then involved the annihilation by interpretation of the artificial illness. Freud did not use the term after 1926. This silence, the increasing interest in character pathology on the part of contemporary analysts, and the greater reliance in some quarters on the structural theory have led to confusion, equivocation, and controversy. Manifest criteria that have been mistakenly offered as definitions such as the patient’s conscious focusing on his or her relationship to the analyst, or the cessation of all extra-transference difficulties, have either not been borne out by clinical data or raise other valid objections. Severed from its role as exclusive means to cure, however, in its modern definition, the transference neurosis continues to capture the essence of clinical psychoanalytic experience. The broader and more modern definition is the following: During the analytic process of certain patients with adequately integrated egos and superegos, a distillation occurs in which the analysand’s perception of the analyst becomes more and more recognizably entwined with core, organizing unconscious fantasy/memory complexes from childhood. These bear the stamp of oedipal conflict, its precursors and latency and adolescent sequelae. The analytic work takes on an intimacy prepared by the working through of narcissistic versions of these core conflicts so that the patient is able to experience a greater degree of libidinal involvement with the analyst. The autonomous willingness of the patient to reveal, explore, and work with the analyst also increases. The discovery of this crystallizing organization occurs simultaneously with the gradual disengagement of the object representation of the analyst from these same core fantasies. Galt S. REED See also: Change; Counter-transference; Framework of the psychoanalytic treatment; Infantile, the; Negative therapeutic reaction; Negative, work of the; Psychoanalytical nosography; Time; Transference. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TRANSFERENCE OF CREATIVITY Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1914g) Remembering, repeating and working-through (Further recommendations on the technique of psycho-analysis II). SE, 12, 145-156. . (1916-17a [1915-17]) Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. Parts I and II. SE, 15-16. . (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1-64. , . (1926e) The question of lay analysis. SE, 20: 177-250. Reed, Gail S. (1994) Transference neurosis and psychoanalytic experience: Perspectives on contemporary clinical practice. London and New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Further Reading Blum, Harold P. (1971). On the conception and development of the transference neurosis. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 19, 41-53. Jacobs, Theodore J. (1987). Analytic secrets and the transference neurosis. Psychoanalytical Inquiry, 7, 485-510. Loewald, Hans W. (1971). The transference neurosis: Comments on the concept, phenomenon. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 19, 54-66. Reed, Gail S. (1994). Transference neurosis and psychoanalytic experience: Perspectives on contemporary clinical practice. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Renik, Owen. (1990). Concept of transference neurosis and psychoanalytic methodology. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 71, 197-204. TRANSFERENCE OF CREATIVITY The transference of creativity, whose defining example is Sigmund Freud’s transference onto Wilhelm Fliess, is a form of transference whose role is to accompany the fluctuations of creativity in the creator. Initially implicit in Heinz Kohut’s work, this notion was explicitly mentioned by him from 1966 on. The correlative of the importance given to creativity, and a therapeutic factor or the effect of treatment that is not interpreted, it indicates a transformation of narcissism. Starting with Freud’s self-analysis, Kohut stipulated in “Selected Problems of Self Psychological Theory” (1980) that Freud’s relationship with Fliess was not 1787 TRANSFERENCE RELATIONSHIP transference in the classical sense—there was no dissolution through insight—but rather a transference of creativity that disappeared at the same time as the narcissistic need. Fliess was a function that filled a void and facilitated Freud’s creativity. During certain creative periods, creators need self-objects in one sector of the self or another, without this necessarily indicating weaknesses in the self. The creator’s narcissistic contigurations are more fluid at certain times, and the other person makes possible regulation of self-esteem and confidence possible. Transference of creativity, a form of narcissistic transference outside of treatment, brings into play all the notions that come out of Kohut’s theory. AGNES OPPENHEIMER See also: Fliess, Wilhelm; Kohut, Heinz. Bibliography Kohut, Heinz. (1955). Review of Beethoven and His Nephew. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 24, 453-455. . (1955). Review of The Haunting Melody. Psychoanalytic Experiences in Life and Music. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 24, 134-137. . (1957). Death in Venice by Mann: Disintegration of artistic sublimation. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 26, 206-228. . (1957). Observations on the psychological functions of music. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 5, 389-407. . (1957). Review of The Arrow and the Lyre. A Study of the Role of Love in the Works of Thomas Mann. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 26, 273-275. . (1966). Forms and Transformations of Narcissism. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 14, 243-272. . (1971) The Analysis of the Self. New York: International Universities Press. . (1980). Selected problems of self psychological theory. The Search for the Self (Vol. 4; pp. 489-523). New York: International Universities Press. TRANSFERENCE RELATIONSHIP The term transference relationship designates those aspects of the patient-analyst relationship involving the patient’s previous object-relationships transposed 1788 onto the analyst (that is, the transference). The transference relationship thus constitutes the heart of the analytic situation, encompassing all aspects of the relationship between the patient and the analyst: the analytic contract, the setting of the analysis, countertransference, and so on. This notion was implicitly present as soon as transference was discovered, as early as Freud and Josef Breuer’s Studies on Hysteria (1895d). Anna ‘O., plagued by the fantasy of giving birth to a child of Dr. Breuer’s, was entangled in a perfect instance of the transference relationship. The term itself, however, appeared very late in Freud’s work, in “Constructions in Analysis” (1937d): “Our experience has shown that the relation of transference, which becomes established towards the analyst, is particularly calculated to favor the return of these emotional connections” (p. 258). This remark demonstrates that for Freud the transference was a melting pot into which the analysand’s earlier affective relations were drawn prior to being recast. Seen in this light, the transference relationship, determined first and foremost by transference love, has two aspects: first, a “piece of real experience” (1914g, p. 154), whose novelty is most important; and second, an element of repetition, for the transference also embodies the replaying of infantile sexual and affective relations. Sandor Ferenczi (1916) emphasized - the link between the transference relationship and introjection: in the transference, the analyst is introjected by the patient as a new internal object. The newness of the transference relationship is a significant factor in effecting change. The transference involves more than the patient’s reliving an earlier relationship. The analyst's attitude and interpretations modify the patient's attempts exactly to repeat the past in the transference, thus allowing something else to take place. In some respects, the analyst plays the part of a new object, an object anchored in reality. The gulf between this “real relationship” and the “false connection of the transference” helps the patient to perceive his own mental impulses. What many authors have described as a “real relationship” with the analyst thus stands opposed to the transference relationship. Ralph Greenson, for example, wrote, “I intend to use the term ‘real’ to refer to the realistic and genuine relationship between analyst and patient—as opposed, that is, to unrealistic and inappropriate, albeit genuine, transference reactions” INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS (p. 217). “In adults,” Greenson added, “all relationships to people consist of a varying mixture of transference and reality. There is no transference reaction, no matter how fantastic, without a germ of truth, and there is no realistic relationship without some trace of a transference fantasy” (p. 219). So the real and transference relationships are somewhat interdependent. Similar considerations apply to the “therapeutic alliance” described by many authors, to Otto Fenichel’s “rational transference,” and to the “basic transference” evoked by Catherine Parat. Elizabeth Zetzel’s notion of the “therapeutic alliance,’ like Greenson’s “working alliance,’ denotes a component of the analytic relationship, yet properly conceived, it should not be brought under the heading of the transference relationship, even though for many authors such an alliance is a necessary precondition of the development of the transference relationship. The transference relationship is predicated on the patient’s ego being reasonable. The patient must be capable of working with the analyst to conquer the neurosis and the negative aspects of the transference. From a different perspective, Richard Sterba (1940) based the therapeutic alliance on the patient’s identification with the analyst, thus giving it a fully transferential sense. For Fenichel (1941), the transference relationship implies what he called a “rational,” positive transference, which brings inhibited drives into play with the aim of the transference relationship. Fenichel’s approach has much in common with Parat’s conception of basic transference. The transference relationship, for Parat, “corresponds to the patient’s cathexis of the person of the analyst, and is colored by feelings of trust. ... This cathexis is founded on subjective elements which I have elsewhere described as projective, using the term “basic transference’ to designate a spontaneous, interhuman link with positive overtones which derives from the earliest attachments, as subsequently enriched by secondary experiences, as well as from objective elements perceived by the patient beginning with his first contacts with the analyst, be they gross or subtle.... The basic positive transference has a narcissistic libidinal origin” (1995). Parat stressed the kinship between such a transference cathexis and Freud’s “narcissistic objectchoice,” thus more closely assimilating it to narcissistic transferences properly so called. The capacity of the transference relationship to evolve is what makes it analyzable. In contrast to what occurs in everyday interpersonal relationships, where INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TRANSFERENCE RELATIONSHIP transferences tend to jell into more or less stable compromises, in the transference relationship the attitude of the analyst, who does not respond in kind to the patient’s erotic solicitations but instead relates them to their oedipal prototypes, separately exposes the various avatars of the transference—paternal, maternal, fraternal, and so on, corresponding to different periods of the patient’s life. The analyst does not allow himself to be locked into one specific relational mode: he behaves at once as an object, drawing the patient’s cathexis toward him, and as an antiobject, by interpreting the patient’s transference onto him so that the transference image may unfold (Denis, 1988). To paraphrase Freud’s metaphor (1915a, p. 169), the practitioner comports himself like the mechanical rabbit in a greyhound coursing: it is continually moving out of reach, thus ensuring the continuation of the race; were a real rabbit thrown amid the dogs, it would immediately be devoured, and the race abandoned. Paut Denis See also: Counter-transference; Negative therapeutic reaction; Object relations theory; Relaxation psychotherapy; Transference; Transgression. Bibliography Denis, Paul. (1988). L’avenir d’une désillusion: Le contretransfert, destin du transfert. Revue francaise de psychanalyse, 52 (4), 829-842. Fenichel, Otto. (1941). Problems of psychoanalytic technique (David Brunswick, Trans.). New York: Psychoanalytic Quarterly. Ferenczi, Sandor. (1916). Introjection and transference. In his Contributions to Psycho-Analysis (Ernest Jones, Trans.). Boston: Richard Badger. (Later U.S. editions titled Sex in psychoanalysis) Freud, Sigmund. (1914g). Remembering, repeating, and working-through (further recommendations on the technique of psycho-analysis, I). SE, 12: 145-156. . (1915a [1914]). Observations on transference love (further recommendations on the technique of psychoanalysis, III). SE, 12: 157-171. . (1937d). Constructions in analysis. SE, 23: 255— 269. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2: 48-106. Greenson, Ralph R. (1967). The technique and practice of psychoanalysis. New York: International Universities Press. 1789 TRANSFORMATIONS Parat, Catherine. (1995). L’affect partagé. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Sterba, Richard F. (1940). Dynamics of dissolution of the transference resistance. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 9, 363— 380. Zetzel, Elizabeth R. (1956). Current concepts of transference. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 37, 369-376. Further Reading Ogden, Thomas H. (1991). Analysing the matrix of transference. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 72, 593-606. Poland, Warren S. (1992). Transference: “An original creation.” Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 61, 185-205. TRANSFORMATIONS Wilfred R. Bion conceived of transformations as the changes that the analysand’s sense impressions of emotional experience undergo to become a progressive series of mental realizations. They are akin to the transformations that food undergoes in the digestive system to become protoplasm. The concept also belongs to the mathematical concepts that Bion employed to bring more rigor to psychoanalytic understanding. In this way, he was attempting to make psychoanalysis more scientific. This period in his work overlaps with the next period in his work, developing psychoanalysis as an “intuitionistic science.” Briefly put, Bion envisions psychoanalytic transformations as the psychoanalyst’s attempt to help the analysand transform that part of an emotional experience of which he is unconscious into an emotional experience of which he is conscious. Transforming here would be changing the form but not the fundamental nature or invariant aspect of the emotional experience. In this way the analyst helps the analysand achieve private or personal knowledge about his emotional life. Bion states his theory in a rigorous mathematical notation in which his symbols have the following meanings: O = the symptom or analytic object; T = transformation; t = the representation of the transformation; K = knowledge link; B = beta elements, sense impressions of emotional experience; a = alpha elements, elements suitable for further mental processing; p = patient; a = analyst. Bion states, “T shall regard only those aspects of the patient’s beha- 1790 vior which are significant as representing his view of O; I shall understand what he says or does as if it were an artist’s painting. In the session the facts of his behavior are like facts of a painting and from them I must find the nature of his representations (or, in terms of my notation, the nature of that which I denote by the sign T(patient)B). From the analytic treatment as a whole I hope to discover from the invariants in this material what O is, what he does to transform O (that is to say, the nature of T(patient)a) and, consequently, the nature of T(patient). This last point is the set of transformations in the group of transformations, to which his particular transformation (T(patient)) is to be assigned. As I am concerned with the nature (or... meaning) of these phenomena, my problem is to determine the relationship between the unknowns: T(patient), T(patient)a, and T(patient)B. Only in the last of these have I any facts on which to work. ... I shall make three assumptions: (i) that the patient is talking about something (O); (ii) that something, O, has impressed him and that he has transformed the impression by the process represented by Tpa and (iii) that his representation tpB is comprehensible” (Bion, 1965). Bion considers the emotional experience of the analysand and of the analyst to be O (the symptom or analytic object) but each has his distinct experience of O: Op (patient), and Oa (analyst). The analyst must, with his alpha function, deduce the transformation O +Tpa —Tpf, which is then translated by the analyst as O > Taa Taf. Bion considers there to be four kinds of transformations in clinical practice: (a) “rigid-motion transformations,’ which involve little alteration and which correspond directly to past events that may now be relived in the (classical) transference; (b) “projective transformations,” which correspond to Melanie Klein’s concept of projective identification; (c) “transformations in hallucinosis,” which occur only in psychosis, and (d) “transformation in O,” by which Bion seems to mean a transformation both from the ineffable nature of the analytic object, the analysand’s symptom, and through K (the knowledge link), to yet another state, that of Absolute Truth or Ultimate Reality, the Godhead. Bion states, “The bearing on psycho-analysis and interpretation of what I have said may seem obscure; it is this: The beginning of a session has the configuration already formulated in the concept of the God- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS head. From this there evolves a pattern and at the same time the analyst seeks to establish contact with the evolving pattern. This is subject to his Transformation and culminates in his interpretation Taf. I am aware of the problems I have left without attempting an approach to their solution. ... In this book I draw attention to a few of the problems which present themselves in analytic material and offer suggestions for clarifying, first observation and then, assessment of what has been observed” (1965). Transformations (1965) seems to represent Bion’s last venture in employing mathematical notation to bring scientific rigor to clinical psychoanalytic phenomena. Transformations in O constitute “a bridge to a new science,” the intuitionistic, to which he thereafter bent his efforts. Though mathematical, Transformations was the third in a series of foundational works that was gradually to alter how analysts regarded clinical material and their personal (T(analyst)) relationship to it. Having already defined the mind that had to develop in order to think “the thoughts without a thinker” (beta elements, emotional experiences in themselves), he then undertook to define how these thoughts evolve from sense impressions of emotional experience (beta elements) to alpha elements suitable for further mental processing. From there he defined the steps of “mentally digestive transformation” that these beta, and then alpha, elements must undergo in the analysand and in the analyst in order to qualify for status in a scientific deductive system or fall by the wayside because of invidious K. O is the beginning and the end of the transformational cycle. Bion’s epistemological transformation of psychoanalytic metapsychology was then in place. JAMES S. GROTSTEIN See also: Catastrophic change; Dream-like memory; Grid; Hallucinosis; Invariant; Love-Hate-Knowledge (L/H/K links); Vertex. Bibliography Bion, Wilfred R. (1965). Transformations: Change from learning to growth. London: Heinemann. TRANSGENERATIONAL. Sec Intergenerational INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TRANSGRESSION TRANSGRESSION The notion of transgression entered psychoanalysis only gradually. In fact, the word already had a wellestablished meaning in ethnology, a science from which Sigmund Freud drew inspiration. Its definition was to some extent a negative one, in opposition to taboo (a term that was itself borrowed from the Polynesian language), prohibition, and law. Transgression is anything that involves the contravention of explicit or implicit rules, both in the course of the treatment and in conflictual unconscious functioning, not to mention within the psychoanalytic process itself. Thus, real and fantasized transgression is at the heart of all psychological mechanisms, as the result, or source, of a conflict. We also encounter it, during a psychoanalytic treatment, in everything that goes against the framework imposed by the fundamental rule. But it is also found, and this time positively, in the wish of Freud and other psychoanalysts to get to the bottom of secrets that seem to be self-evident. This is what drives all scientific research—the longing to understand and master the laws of human functioning, especially when they are obscure. Thus it is difficult to date the first appearance of the notion, because only a posteriori can its implicit presence can be discerned in Freud’s first writings and in his wish to become an extraordinary hero. As early as The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a, ch. 3), the idea of transgression is contrasted with that of an unsatisfied desire able to reach satisfaction in spite of everything that might restrain and prohibit it, via the detour of the dream. Like sociologists, psychoanalysts find that every law is accompanied by criminal infractions of that law—infractions which the law highlights and describes. Like ethnologists, psychoanalysts also find that the strictest laws are always accompanied by rituals. It was perfectly natural that, in a dialectical movement, the interest shown in everything that can prevent a desire from being fulfilled—and in particular the formalized, absolute, and non-negotiable limits represented by laws and taboos—should shift to what can corrupt them, deviate them, or violate them, in other words, to the mechanisms of transgression. It is obvious that, given our need for an order in which ethics would have its proper place, transgression 1791 TRANSGRESSION should at first have been experienced and presented in its negative or pathological aspects—even though Freud insisted right from the start on the inescapable complementarity of desire and law, of law and transgression. Clinical discussions of perversion, as a pathological manifestation or as a neurotic outlet, all turn on the moral status of transgression, just as the current socio-cultural malaise gets to be played out in various disciplines, including within the psychoanalytical community, with the focus on ethical debates. The conflictual model that lies at the basis of psychoanalytical thought can be observed from different points of view. One can focus on the place, whether this be the unconscious scene, the framework of the psychoanalytical session, or the huge wealth of psychoanalytical theory. One can focus on the model of representation chosen, essentially the oedipal model or that of the father’s murder. Or one can focus on a given level—on the oscillation between the individual intrapsychic level and the more or less specific collective level that makes the performance of forbidden actions possible within certain defined areas, of which carnivel is one example. Myths have the same role as dreams with regard to internal prohibitive laws. “The legend of Oedipus sprang from some _ primaeval dream-material” (1900a, p. 263). Finally, we can focus on the model of functioning chosen: pleasure principle against reality principle, life instinct against death drive, or the relative potency of the superego. Transgression can be found everywhere in the milieu of the unconscious. Psychological functioning is based on the way conflicts between different agencies are dealt with. One's character is formed by rules of behavior that are based on authorizations and prohibitions. Over the course of each individual's evolution, certain critical moments or moments of transition favor the temptation of transgression. These are the critical periods of one’s development; at these times, evolution is rapid, and behavior is particularly active. During early childhood, the anal period, the “age of no,” is a stage at which the child is forever defying parental law. During adolescence, or more precisely at certain moments during the slow evolution of adolescence, the sense of expansion, of new power, and the desire for discovery, can lead to provocative behavior and the deliberate violation of moral and social rules. During every session of psychoanalysis, a conflict is set up and staged between the law of repression on one 1792 hand, armed with the patient’s resistances and defenses and the law of silence which they entail, and on the other the desire shared by the psychoanalyst and the patient to break through that law. Thus the internal conflict is projected and embodied in the transferential relation. It can be said that all psychoanalytical thinking is built on a transgressive epistemological curiosity. Psychoanalysis as a scientific corpus comes up against the laws of inner repression, but also against the universal or western ethic of sexual repression, the rejection of aggressive desires and, finally, the norms of a rudimentary and reductive scientific logic. The oedipal model is the summit of psychoanalytic construction. The child’s violent desire for the parent of the opposite sex implies the aggressive wish to take the place of the parent of the same sex. This wish is in its turn strongly repressed, due to the love and fear felt by the child for this same parent. To get beyond this conflict requires a means of transgressing the dual prohibition of incest and rejection. The aggressive violence repressed at the time of the oedipal conflict doubtless has an earlier and more archaic origin: it comes from the wish for the father’s murder by the horde of brothers, a wish that aims at possessing, interiorizing, and questioning authoritarian paternal powers, however vague and imaginary they may be. It goes without saying that the manifestations of transgression in the psychoanalytical sense essentially lie on the individual and intrapsychic level. But Freud saw how important this sector of the structural conflict of human thought is for collective phenomena. From Totem and Taboo (1912-13a) to The Future of an Illusion (1927c) or Civilization and Its Discontents (1930a [1929]), he shows that there is a constant oscillation between repressive cultural forces and “the dangerous attribute [...] the quality of exciting men’s ambivalence and tempting them to transgress the prohibition” (1912—13a, p. 32). The more authoritarian society is, the more organized repression impels one to interiorize transgressive yearnings—and Freud remarks that socalled primitive societies make more room for transgressive possibilities, even when these might affect an apparently immutable order, if necessary by organizing festivals at which people can shed their inhibitions. If the pleasure principle leads to the (potentially repeated) satisfaction of desires, the reality principle opposes it as an obstacle on the path to these INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS satisfactions. From this conflict between the two structures is born a sense of unease: unsatisfied desires seek an outlet. This may be found in dreams, of course, and transgression is there a sort of compromise; these desires may also try to realize themselves to a greater or lesser degree in criminal and perverse acts—at the cost of incurring guilt. In one way, there is transgression whenever there is a refusal to compromise. The idea of conquering reality is a dream of omnipotence which can degenerate into delirium, this in turn explains both the fanatical dedication of scientists and the fascination for taboos. The same duality (the same intrapsychic duality) is found in the opposition proposed by some theorists between the life instincts and the death drive. Conflict shifts from the need to fulfill desires when faced with obstacles to the need to fulfill contradictory objectives. Ambivalence rules. These two approaches, however, are still dualistic, and they describe a conflict against an authority such that, whatever the result, a sense of guilt is generated. “Thus we know of two origins of the sense of guilt: one arising from fear of an authority, and the other, later on, arising from fear of the superego” (1930a, p. 127), wrote Freud. In fact, it is with the advent of the superego that the problem of transgression reaches its apogee, even if it was perceptible beforehand. As Freud put it, “Conscience is the internal perception of the rejection of a particular wish operating within us” (1912-13a, p. 68). Forbidden desires are at the center of neurotic patterns of behavior, and the prohibitions against these are all the stronger as they are more powerfully interiorized, inter alia under the influence of culture, and bolstered by family habits and rules. Whether limits to the emergence of desires impose themselves subtly (as taboos) or whether they are explicit and socially recognized, transgression or the temptation to transgress are part and parcel of the same trend, against which the superego takes shape as an inner law. To see the truth of this, one needs only to recall that the rules of taboos always anticipate a punishment for transgression, and thus anticipate the transgression itself. Much has been said about the revolution in thought which led to, or accompanied, psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis has also been associated—either to support it or to denigrate it—with the so-called sexual revolution, which enabled people to think and say things that, until that period, had been kept in silence or INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TRANSITIONAL OBJECT suppressed. Another revolution, less spectacular but just as important, lay in accepting and even giving a positive evaluation to drives that had hitherto been considered as sins, pathological symptoms, or antisocial types of behavior: violence, aggression, and the whole list of transgressions that go with them. This revolution questions, through the unconscious forces it reveals, the ethical norms of the majority in any given society. Transgression is no longer a residue or a deplorable side effect of psychological functioning. It is an inescapable part of it and, what is more, by favoring inventiveness and complexity of thought, it becomes something positive. SIMON- DANIEL KIPMAN See also: Megalomania; Moral masochism; Neurosis; Parricide/ murder of the father; Primitive horde; Taboo; “Uncanny, The”. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. Part I, SE, 4: 1-338; Part II, SE, 5: 339-625. . (1912—13a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1-161. . (1927c). The future of an illusion. SE, 21: 1-56. . (1930a [1929]). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21: 57-145. TRANSITIONAL OBJECT The term transitional object was coined in 1951 by Donald Winnicott as a designation for any material object (typically something soft—a piece of cloth, say, or part of a plush toy) to which an infant attributes a special value and by means of which the child is able to make the necessary shift from the earliest oral relationship with the mother to genuine objectrelationships. Winnicott first spoke of the transitional object on May 30, 1951, in a paper read before the British Psycho- Analytical Society and published in 1953 under the title “Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena. A Study of the First Not-Me Possession.” This article was recast twenty years later and incorporated into Winnicott’s Playing and Reality, a book concerned entirely with transitional phenomena. 1793 TRANSITIONAL OBJECT In his observation of infants, Winnicott noted that between the ages of four and twelve months children would often become attached to a particular object that they invested with a primordial significance. This object would be manipulated, sucked, or stroked, and often became an indispensable aid for falling asleep. Parents recognized its value, taking it along everywhere and allowing it to get dirty in the realization that washing would introduce a break in continuity in the infant’s experience and destroy the object’s meaning and special worth. Such objects in fact constituted a defense against depressive anxiety. As early as 1951 Winnicott warned against the risk of his thinking being reified. What interested him was this “first not-me possession” and the zone it occupied between the sucked thumb and the teddy bear, between early oral erotism and a true object-relationship, between subjectivity and objectivity, between primary creativity and the projection outwards of what had been introjected. In 1971, in his introduction to Playing and Reality, Winnicott wrote that “what I am referring to ... is not so much the object used as the use of the object” (1971, p. xii). To explain the origin of the transitional object, Winnicott went back to the first connection with the mother’s breast. The mother, he argued, puts the actual breast in a place where the infant is ready to create it and experience an illusory omnipotence in consequence. Later on, the establishment of the reality principle and the inevitable disillusion associated with this will be tolerated by virtue of the transitional object, which allows the child to exercise its feelings of omnipotence in a playful manner. The child arrogates rights over this object, which, though loved passionately, is also expected to resist and triumph over hate. In libidinal terms, the activity involved here is of an oral kind. The object is just as highly cathected with narcissistic libido as with object-libido. It is not recognized as part of either external or inner reality. There is thus an essential paradox at the heart of this conceptual framework: the baby creates the object, yet the object was already there, waiting to be created and cathected. This paradox will never be resolved: in the course of normal development, the object is destined to be gradually decathected, losing its significance as diffuse transitional phenomena spread over the entire intermediate realm between subjective inner reality and common external reality, until the whole sphere of 1794 culture is included (art, religion, imaginative life, scientific invention, and so on). The transitional object and transitional phenomena may be conceived of in three ways: as typifying a phase in the child’s normal emotional development; as a defense against separation anxiety; and, lastly, as a neutral sphere in which experience is not challenged— an area of play and illusion. For Winnicott the transitional object could sometimes be part of abnormal development and become associated with some types of pathology. The child could not make use of such an object unless “the internal object is alive and real and good enough” (1917, p. 11), and this depended on the quality of the maternal care received. Should the external object be bad or absent, the internal object could take on a persecutory character. And should the failure of the external object persist, the internal object would be meaningless and the transitional object would likewise lose all significance and possibly take on a fetishistic character. Winnicott also mentioned drug addiction, lying, and theft as ultimately linked in some cases to a pathology of transitional phenomena. Several authors have criticized Winnicott’s view of the transitional object. Melitta Sperling feels that such objects are pathological manifestations of a specific disturbance of object-relationships. Esther Bick (as cited by Michel Haag) evokes an adhesive clinging that results from a defective introjection of the mother’s containing function. And in Francoise Dolto’s view, children with “enough words of love and opportunities for play of a motor kind” available have no need of transitional objects, which should therefore be treated from the outset as fetishistic. Nora SCHEIMBERG See also: Object; Transitional object; Transitional object, space. Bibliography Dolto, Frangoise. (1984). L’Image inconsciente du corps. Paris: Seuil. Haag, Michel. (1984). A propos des premiéres applications frangaises de l’observation réguliére et prolongée d’un bébé dans sa famille selon la méthode de Mrs. Esther Bick: Des surprises profitables. Privately published. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Sperling, Melitta. (1963). Fetishism in children, Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 32, 374-92. Winnicott, Donald W. (1953 [1951]). Transitional objects and transitional phenomena. A study of the first not-me possession. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 34, 89-97. . (1971). Playing and reality. London: Tavistock. Further Reading Brody, Sylvia. (1980). Transitional objects: Idealization of a phenomenon. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 49, 561-605. Giovacchini, Peter L. (1984). The psychoanalytic paradox: The self as a transitional object. Psychoanalytic Review, 71, 81-104. Greenacre, Phyllis. (1969). The fetish and the transitional object. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 24, 144-164. TRANSITIONAL OBJECT, SPACE Transitional objects (Donald Winnicott) originate in that phase of an infant’s development when inner and outer reality begin to become apparent. They are at once “me” and “not-me,” and are transitional in that they facilitate the transition from the omnipotence of the tiny baby for whom external objects have not yet separated out, to the capacity to relate to “objectively perceived” objects. Transitional space (intermediate area, third area) is that space of experiencing, between the inner and outer worlds, and contributed to by both, in which primary creativity (illusion) exists and can develop (“Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena,’ Winnicott, 1951; further developed in Winnicott, 1971). From as early as 1945, Winnicott, from within his own concepts of object-relations, approached the infant’s developing capacity to discover and adapt to reality. He described first the common patterns of infancy in which a very young baby first finds a thumb, or a fist, to suck, and may stroke his own face, gather a piece of material and suck or stroke it, or make babbling noises; Winnicott assumed accompanying fantasy and used the term transitional for these phenomena. Later in infancy it may happen that both the activity and the object become necessary when the baby is going to sleep, or anxious. Babies may discover a particular object, perhaps a soft toy or a blanket, or a sound, or INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TRANSITIONAL OBJECT, SPACE piece of behavior, that fulfils the purpose, and this, the transitional object, becomes important and is recognized to be so by the parents, who unconsciously know that it represents a continuity of experience that the baby needs. For this reason parents know that it is not to be changed, or even washed, but must accompany the infant, to be loved or attacked as the baby fancies. This “transitional object” becomes the first “not-me” possession, and while it is symbolic of a part-object, is important in that it is neither the baby nor that object. Winnicott listed the special qualities of the relationship with the object, which must survive; must, from the baby’s point of view, come from neither without nor within; will become decathected—lose its significance, not forgotten, not mourned, but losing meaning, at that stage when a wider cultural field has come into being. In early infancy the “good-enough mother” provides a near-perfect environment, allowing the baby the illusion of unity and omnipotence—Winnicott stated that the infant “creates” the breast—“primary creativity,’ which is known as a “subjective object.” The disillusion necessary to permit awareness of outside reality must be dosed to the infant in such a way that the infant’s creativity survives the passage to the recognition of objective reality. Winnicott used the term transitional to describe the “intermediate” or “third area,’ “between the thumb and the teddy bear, between the oral erotism and the true object-relationship, between primary creative activity and projection of what has already been introduced, between primary unawareness of indebtedness and the acknowledgment of indebtedness (‘Say ta’)” (Winnicott, 1951). It is in this area, where fantasy and reality overlap, that creativity, including the basis for adult cultural life, and play originate (Winnicott, 1971). Winnicott compared this with the therapeutic situation, where the worlds of the patient and analyst overlap, echoing Freud’s concept of the analytic playground. Related subjects include: ¢ Fetishistic objects—one possible fate of the transitional object, according to Winnicott. e Illusion of unity within a framework—Milner. e Autistic object—Tustin. ¢ Self-object—Kohut. e Transformational object—Bollas. * Transitional stage/quasi-independence—Fairbairn. 1795 TRANSITIONAL PHENOMENA Possibly the most widely known of Winnicott’s contributions, especially in the worlds of paediatrics and child care, the concepts of transitional phenomena and the thinking about illusion are firmly rooted in his object-related developmental viewpoint and underlie Winnicott’s ideas about creativity, which according to him is a primary human element. The popular acceptance of the idea should not be allowed to disguise the importance of this line of Winnicott’s thinking, which, despite the incorporation of his concept of paradox into his style of writing, eventually provides the foundation for his theories of play with its relationship to creative analytic work, and also his late, subtle, and important paper “The Use of an Object and Relating Through Identifications” (1971), in which he charts a further stage of change from that of “object-relating,” when the object, while separate, is felt to be still under the omnipotent control of the infant, to that of “object-usage,” when the object is allowed reality and autonomy. JENNIFER JOHNS See also: Transitional object; Transitional phenomena. Bibliography Winnicott, Donald. (1953). Transitional objects and transitional phenomena. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 34, 89-97; and in Collected papers, through paediatrics to psychoanalysis (p. 229-242). London: Tavistock, 1958. Additional material was added to the paper in his Playing and reality. (pp. 1-30) London: Tavistock, 1971. . (1958). Primitive emotional development. In Collected papers, through paediatrics to psychoanalysis (pp. 145-156). London: Tavistock. (Original work published 1945) . (1971). The use of an object and relating through identifications. In his Playing and reality (pp. 101-121). London: Tavistock. Further Reading Brody, Sylvia. (1980). Transitional objects: Idealization of a phenomenon. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 49, 561-605. Giovacchini, Peter L. (1984). The psychoanalytic paradox: The self as a transitional object. Psychoanalytic Review, 71, 81-104. Greenacre, Phyllis. (1969). The fetish and the transitional object. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 24, 144-164. 1796 TRANSITIONALPHENOMENA ts The original concept of transitional phenomena was used by Donald Winnicott to describe the intermediate area of human experience between inner reality and the outside world. The prototypical example is that of the transitional object, the first not-me possession of the baby. Thus a real, usually soft object is found by the baby and used as a defense against anxiety. The transitional object represents a real paradox in that it is not an internal object; it is a possession yet it is not an external object either. It grows out of the baby’s relationship with the breast (which represents the whole technique of mothering) and his own body. For example, while sucking on his thumb he weaves not-me objects into his own autoerotic experience and personal pattern. Thus the transitional object allows for the illusion of infantile omnipotence at the same time as it forms a bridge to the outside world and the process of disillusion and the development of a shared reality. The ordinary care of the mother closely adapting to and meeting her infant’s immediate needs fosters in the infant the illusion that what he desires he actually creates. Transitional phenomena as a class of experiences also represent the use of illusion in allowing the creative co-existence of primary creativity and objective perception based on reality. Winnicott presented his formulation of transitional phenomena to the British Psycho-Analytic Society in 1951, and this was published in 1952 in a paper, “Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena’— subtitled “A study of the first not-me possession.” The paper was republished in his collected works, Through Paediatrics to Psychoanalysis (1958), and is the key paper in his influential and popular book Playing and Reality (1971). The notion of transitional phenomena is central to the framework of ideas which Winnicott uses to chart the course of the development of self, locating the self firmly and inextricably in the context of maternal care, the family and the wider world. Winnicott used his thousands of observations of infants and parents together to build up his idea of the baby’s inner world of fantasy, illusion, and omnipotence. The mother, by intuitively anticipating and adapting to the baby’s immediate physical needs, allows the infant to build up the illusion that he creates that which his mother provides. Between the age of four to eighteen months INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS there may then emerge some thing or phenomenon (which may be a sound, mannerism, or the mother herself) which the baby uses to defend himself against anxiety, especially when falling asleep. Winnicott says the transitional object has specific properties: the infant creates it himself, he can be both affectionate and aggressive to it; it must not change, unless changed by the infant; it must survive loving, hating, and aggression; it must seem to have vitality or reality of its own; it is neither a hallucination nor comes from within the baby; it is gradually decathected, but not lost and forms the basis of play, culture, and dreaming. The patient’s use of transitional phenomena can help in understanding psychopathological conditions such as fetishism, lying, stealing, and drug addiction. Winnicott (1971) describes a case of a boy with anxiety and obsessional symptoms where the boy’s use of string is central to understanding both these inner and outer experiences. By providing the illusion of omnipotence and gradual disillusionment, parents set up a transitional space within which develop the child’s creativity and capacity to play: “on the basis of play is built the whole of man’s experiential existence” (1971). Play is a serious and necessary component of psychic life which forms part of adult life and culture. Playfulness and the use of transitional space and transitional phenomena form the foundation of much of Winnicott’s psychoanalytic technique. The transitional object is a concept that has entered the popular culture as the apparently ubiquitous security blanket or the teddy bear. There can be a misapprehension that such physical objects are necessary for healthy psychological development. Winnicott did not imply this but, like many of his concepts, transitional phenomena remain enigmatic and hard to define. This elusive sense seems to be just what he seeks to describe in the child’s approach to the “relationship between what is objectively perceived and what is subjectively conceived of.” This is indicative of Winnicott’s imaginative and at times idiosyncratic metapsychology. PauL CAMPBELL AND ANN MORGAN See also: Addiction; Child’s play (the); Negative, work of; Object; Omnipotence, infantile; Primary object; Psychosomatic limit/boundary; Representation; Squiggle; Transitional object; Transitional object, space; Wish, hallucinatory satisfaction of a. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TRANSLATION Bibliography Hamilton, Victoria. (1982). Narcissus and Oedipus—The children of psychoanalysis. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd. Winnicott, Donald. (1975). Transitional objects and transitional phenomena. In: Through paediatrics to psycho-analysis (p. 229-242). London: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1953) . (1980). Playing and reality. Harmondsworth: Penguin. (Original work published 1971) TRANSLATION There are a large number of occurrences of the verb iibersetzen (“to translate”) and the noun Ubersetzung (“translation”) in Freud’s work, indicative of his interest in translation, although the terms had no specific conceptual value for him within the field of psychoanalysis. However, non-German readers should bear in mind the proximity in German of Ubersetzung and Ubertragung (“transference”). What psychoanalysts refer to as “transference” is, in German, also a translation, a carrying over. Freud’s interest in translation was manifest early in his career: while doing his military service he translated an essay by John Stuart Mill and, on his return from his stay at the Salpétriére, impressed by Charcot’s clinical method, he translated two of the Charcot’s main works, as well as two works by Bernheim, which he felt were essential for a scientific understanding of hysteria and the use of therapeutic methods in hypnosis. For Freud the experience of translation was contemporary with his discovery of psychoanalysis as a therapeutic practice. Ernest Jones emphasized Freud’s gifts as a translator (Pollak Cornillot, 1990), It should come as no surprise, therefore, to find that translation infiltrated his thought as a metaphor for a large number of psychic processes. In his earliest writings and with the appearance of the concept of repression, translation, in its primary sense of “to bring over,’ became a way of picturing the transformation of those psychic contents reaching consciousness, repression being thus defined (Freud to Fliess, December 6, 1896) as a “defect of translation,” an absence of conscious expression. The work of dream interpretation likewise resembles a translation of the language of the unconscious into the language 1797 TRANSMUTING INTERNALIZATION of consciousness, of the remembered dream content into its hidden sense: “Interpreting a dream consists in translating the manifest content of the dream into the latent dream-thoughts, in undoing the distortion which the dream-thoughts have had to submit to from the censorship of the resistance” (1907a, p. 59). But at the same time Freud cautioned against the tendency to overestimate the importance of symbols and reduce the work of dream translation to the mere decoding of symbols, and to ignore the ideas that present themselves to the mind of the dreamer during analysis. Finding the hidden meaning was more complex than the simple transliteration of the signs of the unconscious system into the signs of the conscious one. Elsewhere (1918b [1914]), Freud uses the term translation more generically, to designate the psychoanalyst’s interpretation of a psychic phenomenon: for example, the fear of being eaten by the wolf “is translated” into the fear of being raped by the father. More recently André Green (1997/2000) has rediscovered the richness of the “hypothesis of translation” present throughout Freud’s work. MICHELE POLLAK CORNILLOT See also: Biblioteca Nueva de Madrid (Freud, S., Obras completas); France; Interpretation; Opere (writings of Sigmund Freud); Standard Edition of the Complete a gical Works of Sigmund Freud; Symbol. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1907a). Delusions and dreams in Jensen’s “Gradiva.” SE, 9: 1-95. . (1918b [1914]). From the history of an infantile neurosis. SE, 17: 1-122. Green, André. (2000). The chains of eros: The sexual in psychoanalysis (Luke Thurston, Trans.). London: Rebus. (Original work published 1997) Mahony, Patrick. (1980). Toward the understanding of translation in psychoanalysis. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 28, 461-473. Mijolla, Alain de. (1991). Lédition en francais des “CEuvres” de Freud avant 1940. Autour de quelques documents nouveaux. Revue internationale d histoire de la psychanalyse, 4, 209-270. Pollak Cornillot, Michéle. (1990). Freud traducteur. Introduction a la traduction des ceuvres de Freud. Doctoral dissertation, Université René-Descartes, Paris. 1798 Further Reading Amati-Mehler, Jacqueline, et al. (1993). The babel of the unconscious. Mother tongue and foreign languages in the psychoanalytic dimension. Madison, CT: International Universities Press. TRANSMUTING INTERNALIZATION | Transmuting internalization is a process that participates in the formation of psychic structure, as postulated by Heinz Kohut. It is an extension of Freud’s concept of mourning. For Freud, the loss of an object causes mourning to establish a presence within the psyche. If this model is seen as the basis of all losses, including nontraumatic and phase-specific losses, then it follows that any failure or absence of a sustaining object can lead to the establishment in the psyche of whatever function that object has served. Minute losses or absences lead, not to wholesale identification with the object, but to internal structures that need bear no resemblance to the lost object but merely capture the function served by the object. Nontraumatic loss and internalization, called optimal frustration, is an essential feature of normal development. Parental absences, disappointments, failures, and age-appropriate responsibilities help children gradually develop psychological structure. Psychological structure refers to an enduring function, a function that results from the progressive neutralization occupying the area of the psyche not represented by repression. Psychoanalytic treatment parallels normal development when the analyst causes transmuting internalizations by initiating similar phase-specific failures. ARNOLD GOLDBERG See also: Action-thought neutralization. (H. Kohut); Progressive Bibliography Kohut, Heinz. (1971). The analysis of the self. New York: International Universities Press. . (1977). The restoration of the self. New York: International Universities Press. TRANSSEXUALISM Transsexualism is characterized by the desire to belong to the sex opposite one’s assigned, biological sex, and by the demand for a reassignment of one’s sex with the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS help of hormones and surgery—all this in the absence of any biological anomaly that is detectable with current means of investigation. This distinguishes transsexualism from intersex states and pseudo-hermaphrodites. With transexualism, people speak of an unshakeable conviction of belonging to the other sex. It would be more appropriate to speak of an indomitable desire to live as a member of the other sex, as well as the desire to bear a corporal sign of this belonging, which is what makes transsexualism historically unique. In 1953 the endocrinologist and sexologist Harry Benjamin was the first to name the syndrome that had previously been confused with transvestism. Perhaps he had retained the expression “Psychopathia transsexualis” used by D. O. Cauldwell in 1949, although he claimed he had no conscious memory of it, or “seelischer Transsexualismus” the expression used by Magnus Hirschfeld in 1923, although he makes no mention of it. It took more than ten years for the term transsexualism to become accepted. In the same year, 1953, the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) published the observations of C. Hamburger, G. K. Stiirup, and E. Dahl- Iversen concerning the case of George, operated on in Denmark, who became Christine Jorgensen. Benjamin declared that psychotherapy was powerless to treat transsexualism and that the only possible treatment was sex conversion surgery along with hormone replacement therapy for life. A large number of specialized centers opened in the United States for treating the sexual identity disorders that Norman Fisk called “gender dysphoria” in 1973. However, some of those subsequently closed down. Hormono-surgical sex reassignment hardly deserves to be called a treatment. A palliative at best, it consists in transforming a healthy, hormonally wellbalanced, and functioning organism into an artificial intersex, a mutilated organism that requires hormone replacement therapy. In order to justify such an unusual treatment it would be necessary to prove that although they may be compromising their physical health, patients derive benefits from it in terms of their mental health. However, existing follow-up studies are incomplete and insufficient. Not all subjects continue to be seen. Those who are seen are generally satisfied. With few exceptions they do not regret their operation but they end up realizing that that their dearest wish, to really be changed into a human being of the opposite sex, has remained unrealizable. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TRANSSEXUALISM Compared to female transsexuals becoming male, male transsexuals becoming female constitute a larger group (three biological males for every biological female demanding reassignment) that is more heterogeneous, suffers from more serious pathologies, and is characterized by very mediocre social integration (prostitution, public assistance). Many patients request sex reassignment after a period of their lives spent as transvestites or homosexuals. The most cautious physicians defending hormono-surgical sex reassignment make a point of identifying patients who essentially suffer from identity disorders, whom they refer to as true or primary transsexuals, which they consider to be the only indication for hormonosurgical sex reassignment. An effort has been made to present primary transsexuals (male to female) as normal subjects who, by reversing their identity, inform their mothers of the truth of their primary identification (Robert Stoller). It is difficult to consider that transsexuals do not suffer from serious psychic disorders at the narcissistic level. Psychoanalysis has extended its field of application from the neuroses to borderline cases, and in this respect it may be possible to try to treat transsexuals. The difficulty is great because denial and splitting dominate the mental organization. They put everything on the corporal level and nothing on the psychic. The availability of medical hormono-surgical sex reassignment makes it more difficult to reach them through psychoanalytic psychotherapy. Interesting attempts have nevertheless been made, often by psychoanalysts from the school of self-psychology (particularly Lothstein). Treatment of children suffering from sexual identity disorders shows promise if the parents are treated at the same time, and in this way observing how the children respond to their parents’ problems by thinking that they should belong to the opposite sex in order to be loved by them. COLETTE CHILAND See also: Gender identity; Masculine protest (individual psychology); Self-representation. Bibliography Benjamin, Harry. (1953). Transvestism and transsexualism international. Journal of Sexology, 7 (1), 12-14. Chiland, Colette. (1997). Changer de sexe? Paris: Odile Jacob. 1799 TRATTATO DI PSICOANALISI Stoller, Robert J. (1968). Sex and gender: On the development of masculinity and feminity. New York: Science House. . (1985). Observing the erotic imagination. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Zucker, Kenneth J., and Bradley, Susan J. (1995). Gender identity disorder and psychosexual problems in children and adolescents. New York: Guilford Press. TRATTATO DI PSICOANALISI Cesare Musatti’s Trattato di psicoanalisi (Treatise on psychoanalysis) was written in the 1930s, when the first generation of Italian psychoanalysts were active and when psychoanalysis was first beginning to reach the public. Unfortunately, its publication was hampered by an idealist, fascist culture that resisted the challenges of psychoanalysis. The treatise was based on lectures in experimental psychology that Musatti gave from 1933 to 1935 at the University of Padua. He attempted to provide a solid foundation for young physicians who were interested in the new methods of psychotherapy and were considering using them professionally. At the same time he wanted to offer the Italian public a solid popular work about psychoanalysis that would sweep away the prejudices and falsehoods then prevalent about the field. Although the book was completed in 1938, the pollitical and cultural situation in Italy presented an obstacle to its publication for over a decade. At the time Nazi racism, which existed in Italy in diluted form, considered psychoanalysis a Jewish science and sought to destroy the work of Freud and his followers— physically and in spirit. For years the manuscript remained in Musatti’s desk. It was finally published in 1949 by Boringhieri. The work was subsequently reprinted several times, first by Einaudi. Musatti’s Trattato consists of six parts. He retraced the origins of Freud’s discovery, from dreams to free association, from fantasy to the arts, being careful to define mental pathology as well as the structure of human personality. His goal was to introduce psychoanalysis to scientists and academicians, and thereby win their support. Ironically, errors like the “doctrine of instincts,” the name given by Musatti to a section of his book, could have been the source of a certain resistance to his work. This turned out not to be the case, and the confusion remained between drive and instinct—a key Freudian distinction that is ignored in 1800 the Standard Edition of Freud’s works. Notwithstanding its limitations, the Trattato, known as the “freudino” (the little Freud) by students, has the merit of having been the first essay to describe Freud’s work systematically without excessive distortion, at least in comparison with earlier Italian-language summaries. GIANCARLO GRAMAGLIA See also: Musatti, Cesare. Source Citation Musatti, Cesare. (1949). Trattato di psicoanalisi. Turin, Italy: Boringhieri-Einaudi. Bibliography Gramaglia, Giancarlo. (1995). Discorsi/scritti di psicoanalisi. Turin, Italy: Il Laboratorio. TRAUMA In its psychoanalytical sense, trauma denotes an event of such violence and suddenness that it occasions an inflow of excitation sufficiently strong to defeat normally successful defense mechanisms; as a general rule trauma stuns the subject and, sooner or later, brings about a disorganization of the psychic economy. Trauma (a wound), a term borrowed from ancient Greek, was at first used in surgery to denote a violent injury from an external cause that breached the body’s integrity. (Traumatism is used occasionally as a synonym, and occasionally to refer to any condition resulting from trauma.) The term eventually made its way into common usage, its psychological sense coming to the fore as its employment spread from medicine to psychoanalysis. In the context of late-nineteenth-century causation, the notion of trauma was inseparably linked to the ideas of shock and physical breach, and it was regularly invoked to explain a variety of syndromes, among them traumatic neurosis. Freud was part of this current of thought, and, following Charcot, assigned trauma a determining role in the etiology of hysteria; then, along with Breuer (1893a), he moved from the idea of real, physical trauma to that of a “psychical INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY oF PSYCHOANALYSIS trauma” (pp. 5-6), with the stress laid no longer on the reality of the event but rather on its mental representation, experienced as an internal “foreign body,” which is the source of the excitation. This was a radical shift relative to the theories of the time, and an epistemological leap of great import, for it was the foundation stone of psychoanalysis. What made an experience traumatic for Freud was indeed the incapacity of the psychical apparatus to discharge the excessive excitation in accordance with the principle of constancy, whether that excitation arose from the pathogenic action of a single brutal event or of a series of incidents having a cumulative effect. This economic view of things was part of psychoanalysis from the beginning, and it is crucial to the understanding of the psychoanalytical notion of trauma. Even at this early period, Freud distinguished two models: the first, evidenced by hysteria, involved the absence of discharge, whereas in the second, operative in the actual neuroses, discharge took place but did so at the wrong time and place, and independently of the object. The economic perspective provided the connection and continuity between the successive theories proposed by Freud as he considered trauma in terms of a causal relationship: the first of these theories was modeled on Charcot’s hystero-trauma, but this traumatic theory was very soon replaced by the theory of seduction. Founded on clinical observation, this theory led Freud to assert that the trauma was always of a sexual nature and that it had two moments: the first, the moment of fright, confronted the child prematurely with the sexual conduct of an adult seducer; this the child experienced uncomprehendingly, and _ its meaning and traumatic effect came into play only after puberty, on the occasion of a second scene that served to reactualize the repressed memory of the earlier one. When the frequency with which his patients produced accounts of such early events obliged Freud to question their reality and treat them instead as products of fantasy, the theory of seduction lost a good deal of its interest; at the same time, its temporal aspect—the process of “deferred action” (apres coup) of which the case of Emma provided the archetypal instance— remained essential to Freud’s explanation of the trauma, whose importance in the triggering of neuroses, however, he now qualified by taking into account such factors as individual predisposition, the trauma’s place in the subject’s history and mental organization, and the circumstances of the event. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TRAUMA The thinking sparked by the war neuroses gave the notion of trauma a new lease on life, while so reinforcing the energetic point of view that in 1916 Freud did not hesitate to say that “the term ‘traumatic’ has no other sense than an economic one” (1916-17a [1915— 17], p. 275). Thus a trauma, by its simple intensity, could produce an instinctual hypercathexis capable of breaching the protective shield against stimuli. In order to stem this influx, which the ego, not having been prepared by anxiety to confront the danger, was all the more incapable of neutralizing, the psychical apparatus would mobilize all available energy and establish countervailing charges. Should these defensive strategies be insufficient, the apparatus would have to bind the excitation compulsively, “beyond the pleasure principle,” so as to lower it gradually to a tolerable threshold (1920g, p. 31). In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, where the importance assigned to the compulsion to repeat led Freud into speculation about the death instinct, the question arose of what principle governed repetition. Was it Thanatos, striving for absolute discharge, as in certain behaviors analogous to the traumatophilia described by Karl Abraham in 1907? Or Eros, aiming to attain mastery through the gradual resolution of tension and thence accede to the power of symbolization, as well illustrated by repetitive dreams recounted in the analytic session and by reproductions in the transference? In fact, where the work of analysis made it possible for the subject to recover and work through repressed material, the binding function could triumph over death-oriented repetition. In that case, deferred effects, by making reorganizations possible, would have been the motor of change. Finally, in the context of Freud’s revised theory of anxiety (1926d), the stress fell on the state of helplessness: what the baby experiences, subjected without recourse to a state of tension in the absence of its mother, was taken as the prototype of all traumatic situations. In this instance with the signal function of anxiety as yet not developed, the ego is overwhelmed by an eruption of instinctual forces it is powerless to contain. Freud’s reflections of 1926 have given rise to the present-day notion of narcissistic trauma, which refers to the ego’s inability to bind excitation resulting from a loss, whether the loss of an object or a loss of a narcissistic kind. This classification is justified in terms of the symptomatology often presented by patients (rumination, repetitive dreams), who may thus be 1801 TRAUMA OF BirtH, THE thought to be expressing a pathological mourning under the influence of deferred effects (aprés coup). This category has led to a questionable broadening of the concept, for it tends to water down the specificity assigned to trauma in Freud’s early works: Systematically treating all and every physical or psychic injury as a trauma runs counter to the psychoanalytic view, for which a trauma cannot be reduced to the level of events alone; at the same time, this level should always be taken into account, precisely because not to do so is to court the danger of further pathological development in a traumatic mode. FRANCOISE BRETTE See also: Activity/Passivity; Actual; Amnesia; Annihilation anxiety; Anxiety dream; Arpad the Little Chanticleer (case of); Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Breakdown; Choice of neurosis; Complementary series; Deferred action; Deprivation; Disorganization; Dream of the Wise Baby; Fixation; Fright; Helplessness; Incompleteness; Memory; Mnemic symbol; Narcissistic injury; Negative therapeutic reaction; Nightmare; Pain; Phylogenesis; Pleasure in thinking; Protective shield, breach of; Proton-Pseudos; Psychic causality; Psychic reality; Real trauma; Real, the; Reminiscence; Repetition compulsion; Sexual trauma; Tact; Trauma of Birth, The; Traumatic neurosis; War neurosis. Bibliography Abraham, Karl. (1979). The experiencing of sexual traumas as a form of sexual activity. In Selected papers on psychoanalysis. New York: Brunner/Mazel. (Original work published 1907) Brette, Francoise. (1988). Le traumatisme et ses theories. Revue francaise de psychanalyse, 52 (6), 1259-84. Freud, Sigmund. (1916—17a [1915-17]). Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 15-16. . (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1-64. . (1926d). Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. SE, 20: 87-172. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1893a). On the psychical mechanism ofh ysterical phenomena: Preliminary communication. SE, 2: 1-17. ——.. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2. Further Reading Levine, Howard (Ed.). (1990). Adult analysis and childhood sexual abuse. Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press. 1802 Sandler, Joseph, et al. (1991). Conceptual research in psychoanalysis: Psychic trauma. International Review of Psychoanalysis, 18, 133-142. Terr, Lenore. (1990). Too scared to cry: Psychic trauma in childhood. New York: Harper and Row. Van Der Kolk, Bessel, et al. (1996). Traumatic stress: The effects of overwhelming experience on mind, body, and society. New York: Guilford. TRAUMA OF BIRTH, THE First published in 1924, Otto Rank’s The Trauma of Birth took as its starting point a note that Freud added to his The Interpretation of Dreams in 1909: “Moreover, the act of birth is the first experience of anxiety, and thus the source and prototype of the affect of anxiety” (1900a, pp. 400—-401n). Rank set out to identify “the ultimate biological basis of the psychical,” the very “nucleus of the unconscious” (p. xxiii). For him this was the physical event of birth, whereby the infant passes from a state of perfectly contented union with the mother to a state of parlous separation via an oppressive experience of asphyxiation, constriction, confinement in the vaginal canal, and so on—all feelings recognizable in anxiety states of every kind. It was the struggle against this ' traumatic experience of birth, in Rank’s account, that structured the fantasy life of the child, including the disavowal of the difference between the sexes, infantile sexual theories, and oedipal scenarios. Castration anxiety was a defensive derivative of the anxiety associated with the birth trauma. Rank supported his thesis with case notes, notably concerned with terminations which according to him always brought up fantasies of a “second birth.” But for the most part he relied on data derived from social myths and rites exemplifying what he called “heroic compensation,” religious sublimation, artistic idealization, or philosophical speculation. The very abundance of the material thus adduced, and the author’s stated aim of accounting for all processes of hominization and all cultural evolution in terms solely of the trauma of birth, were bound to leave the reader perplexed. Rank’s evidence nevertheless warrants more attention than contemporary psychoanalysts were willing to accord it. Indeed a multitude of themes— falling, constriction within a narrow space, feelings of INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS being lost in limitless space, the importance of very early relations with the mother, or primitive anxieties foreshadowing castration anxiety—were distinctly novel in the psychoanalytic literature as of 1924. The clumsy presentation of these ideas, however, along with the author’s overreaching ambition, the lack of method in his argument, and the failure to buttress his thesis with analytical clinical material, all contributed to the rejection not only of his work but also of Rank himself, who broke with the psychoanalytic movement in 1926 after Freud’s condemnation of his ideas in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926d). Beyond the question of the weaknesses of Rank’s book, it is reasonable to consider what psychoanalytic reasons might have occasioned this rejection of his ideas in favor of the primacy of oedipal conflict as crucial to the organization of neurotic pathology, or of castration anxiety as the prototype under which all other forms of anxiety were subsumed. In a postscript to the French edition of The Trauma of Birth, Claude Girard points out that the position defended by Freud and his followers tended to exclude non-neurotic pathologies as legitimate objects of psychoanalytic exploration, whereas Rank’s propositions encouraged the investigation of very early forms of pathology, along with that of the baby’s earliest relations with its mother. Both these avenues of inquiry were further explored subsequently by American psychoanalysts (Greenacre, 1945; Fodor, 1949; Alexander and French, 1946). More recently, Rank’s main theme has been picked up with renewed vigor in the wake of object-relations theory, albeit without Rank’s reductionism. Thus Wilfred R. Bion (1977) has used the term caesura in theorizing about the experience of a discontinuity in objectrelations of which birth is the paradigm case. And Frances Tustin (1981) has described a premature psychological birth in autistic children corresponding to a consciousness of the bodily separation from the object that arises at a stage when the psyche is still unable to form symbols. DipieR HOouZzeEL See also: Anaclisis; Anxiety as signal; Asthma; Birth; Castration complex; Cinema and psychoanalysis; Dream of birth; Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety; Lines of Advance in Psycho-Analytic Therapy; Psychic causality; Psychoanalytic splits; Psychoanalytic technique (adults); Termination of psychoanalytic treatment; Trauma. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TRAUMATIC NEUROSIS Source Citation Rank, Otto. (1924) Das Trauma der Geburt und seine Bedeutung fiir die Psychoanalyse. Leipzig/Vienna/Zurich: Internat. psychoanal. Verlag. English translation: The Trauma of Birth. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1929; reprinted, with an introduction by E. James Lieberman, New York: Dover, 1993. Bibliography Alexander, Franz, and French, Thomas M. (1946). Psychogenic factors in bronchial asthma. Washington, DC: National Research Council. Bion, Wilfred R. (1977). Two papers: The grid and caesura. Rio de Janeiro: Imago Editora; reprint, London: Karnac, 1989. Fodor, N. (1949). The search for the beloved: A clinical investigation of the trauma of birth and prenatal conditioning. New York: Hermitage. Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4—5. . (1926d [1925]). Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. SE, 20: 75-172. Greenacre, Phyllis. (1952). The biological economy of birth. In Greenacre, Trauma, growth and personality. New York: Norton. (Original work published 1945) Tustin, Frances. (1981) Autistic states in children. London: Routledge. Further Reading Mintz, I. L. (1975). Evolution of Otto Rank’s theory of the birth trauma. International Review of Psychoanalysis, 2, 245-246. TRAUMATIC NEUROSIS The term traumatic neurosis designates a psychopathological state characterized by various disturbances arising soon or long after an intense emotional shock. In the second half of the nineteenth century, a number of observations corresponding to a clinical picture of this kind were reported, typically in the wake of military action or railroad disasters, and related either to hysteria or to neurasthenia. Yet it was Hermann Oppenheimer who, in 1889, introduced the term itself into the lexicon of psychiatry. Freud was to construct his theory of the neuroses on the model of traumatic neurosis. However, by stres- 1803 TRUTH sing the sexual character of the precipitating factor and the possibility that the action of traumatic neurosis could be deferred, rather than the fright occasioned by an accident’s actual threat to life, he jettisoned what had hitherto constituted the specificity of the category. Furthermore, by taking into account predisposition for and tolerance of trauma, as well as the trauma’s significance in the subject’s history and mental organization, Freud relativized and reduced the notion of shock and its etiological import. The whole issue was destined to achieve its full immediacy only when historical events brought the war neuroses to the fore, prompting Freud to reconsider traumatic neurosis, first in 1916 in his Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis and once again in the context of his great theoretical revision of 1920. For Freud, the economic point of view then became predominant. He accentuated the character of the trauma as at once somatic (the “disturbance” freed up the flow of excitations) and psychic (“fright”). In Freud’s words, “The symptomatic picture presented by traumatic neurosis approaches that of hysteria in the wealth of its similar motor symptoms, but surpasses it as a rule in its strongly marked signs of subjective ailment ... , as well as in the evidence it gives of a far more general enfeeblement and disturbance of the mental capacities” (1920g, p. 12). Traumatic neurosis does not have the same meaning for psychoanalysts as it does for psychiatric clinical practice. The psychoanalytic characterization includes repetition: The patient relives the initial trauma, and this manifests itself in every situation, whether transference-related or not. The function of nightmares is to express the anxiety that was absent at the time of the original incident. Such repetitive manifestations reveal a fixation on the trauma as well as an attempt to discharge excessive tension in incremental fashion (that is, to work through it). Clinically and theoretically, it is important to eschew the mistaken application of the term traumatic neurosis to the posttraumatic state (or syndrome), since posttraumatic syndrome refers to a physical (usually cranial) trauma and to disorders related to an emotional shock. Such states cannot in fact be brought under the heading of neurosis in a psychoanalytic sense. Here Freud himself ran into perplexities that led him to assign traumatic neuroses first to the class of the actual neuroses and then to that of the narcissistic neuroses. Traditional psychiatry, as reflected in the 1804 third edition of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III), has renamed traumatic neurosis as “posttraumatic stress disorder,” and while one might question its objectivizing use of stress, this approach does have the merits of avoiding the nosological trap of the neurosis/psychosis dichotomy and of viewing the issue from an_ interdisciplinary standpoint. FRANCOISE BRETTE See also: Trauma. Bibliography Barrois, Claude. (1988). Les névroses traumatiques. Paris: Dunod. Ferenczi, Sandor, et al. (1921). Psycho-analysis and the war neuroses. Vienna: International Psycho-Analytical Press. Freud, Sigmund. (1916-1917a [1915-1917]). Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 15-16. . (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1— 64. Oppenheim, Hermann. (1889). Die traumatischen Neurosen. Berlin: A. Hirschwald. Further Reading Casoni, D. (2002). ‘Never twice without thrice’: Outline for traumatic neurosis. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 83, 137-160. TRUTH Sigmund Freud’s notion of truth evolved from a factual conception into a relativistic method where the true and the false are defined both in relation to a conventional and bounded space (that of the cure) and the dynamic effects that “plausible” constructions might have on the psyche. Truth as an objective no longer remains “the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis” (1914g, pp. 147, 150). It inclines towards the notion of reality testing that demands that the subject partially abandon their illusions. Truth as an ideal is inseparable from psychoanalytic inquiry and is unattainable, except partially in the “nuclei” of truth present within individual and collective distortions. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS The search for factors that cause psychic suffering can be confused with the search for truth inasmuch as they are both repressed, misrepresented, displaced, represented by their opposite, and the like. Initially Freud imagined rediscovering the traumatic events in the histories of his patients themselves, but promptly noticing “that there are no indications of reality in the unconscious, so that one cannot distinguish between the truth and fiction that is cathected with affect” (letter to Wilhelm Fleiss, 21 September 1897), he ended up privileging the psychical reality of the subject, wherein a dynamic verisimilitude was elaborated which would take on the value of truth. This relativization of truth seems to coincide with a Pirandellian conception of it (Each in His Own Way). In fact, truth as a value has not disappeared from the Freudian purview but it has become subtler. Thus interpretation is not about the exhumation of truth but rather construction through the adoption of a coherent paradigm (Viderman, 1970), originating from the unperceived formulations of the subject’s free associations or dreams. Thus for Jacques Lacan, truth extricates itself from reality: “In psychoanalytic anamnesis, it is not a question of reality, but of truth, because the effect of full speech is to reorder past contingencies by conferring on them the sense of necessities to come” (1956, p. 48). Truth is not precisely being true to reality, rather it speaks and stutters through its symptomatic distortions. The analyst has to engage with these “nuclei” of truth, then; Freud, for instance, defined them in relation to the sexual theories of children, which despite being untrue nonetheless each contain “a fragment of real truth” (1908c, p. 215). This is an adult, intellectual mode of investigation whose results, because they are limited to the possibilities of human understanding, would have been false in relation to a broader perspective, but which include nevertheless “inspired” partial but significant interpretations. The quest for truth proceeds from a “truth fantasy” (Mijolla-Mellor, 1985), which relates to an image of lost harmony (transparency, luminosity) within the J, the others, and one’s self. Truth, in terms of the demand for truthfulness, is central to the fundamental rule that requires the abandonment of secrecy; however, it also guides the behavior of the analyst in their relationship with the patient, in their vision of the world, and in their research, requiring them to relin- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TRUTH quish personal illusions for the construction of a coherent schema. Challenging illusion and narcissistic comfort, truth, according to Freud, is a force in its own right: “The hardest truths are heard and recognized at last, after the interests they have injured and the emotions they have roused have exhausted their fury” (1910d, p. 215). Piera Aulagnier gives truth a central place in relation to the identity of the subject. It is the object of a “battle never definitively won nor lost to which periodically the I must surrender in order to modify and defend its positions, failing which it would be unable to turn towards or invest in its own identificatory space” (1984, p. 147). The notion of truth in psychoanalysis is tied to the history the subject, in the same way as it is to humanity, because it is not simply a case of a balance between understanding and the thing, but of a narrative that is reconstructed using the residues left behind by legend. ALAIN DE MIOLLA See also: History and psychoanalysis. Bibliography Aulagnier, Piera. (1984). L’Apprenti-historien et le maitresorcier. Du discours identifiant au discours délirant. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. . (1914g). Remembering, repeating and workingthrough (Further recommendations on the technique of psycho-analysis II). SE, 12: 145-156. Freud, Sigmund. (1908c). On the sexual theories of children. SE, 9: 205-226. . 1910d). The future prospects of psycho-analytic therapy. SE,.11:139-151-. . (1950a [1887—-1902]). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173-280. Lacan, Jacques. (1989). Ecrits: A Selection. (Alan Sheridan, Trans.) 5th ed. London: Tavistock/Routledge. Further Reading Reed, Gail S. (1995). Clinical truth and contemporary relativism: Meaning, narration. Journal of the American Psycho- Analytic Association, 43, 713-740. Sass, L. A., and Woolfolk, R. L. (1988). Psychoanalysis and the hermeneutic turn: On “Narrative truth.” Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 36, 429-454. 1805 TusBe-Eco Schafer, Roy. (1992). Retelling a life. In Narration and dialogue in psychoanalysis. New York: Basic Books. Spence, Donald. (1982). Narrative truth and historical truth. Meaning and interpretation in psychoanalysis. New York: W. W. Norton and Co. Spezzano, Charles. (1993). A relational model of inquiry and truth: Conversation. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 3, 177-208. TUBE-EGO David Rosenfeld, the Argentinean psychoanalyst, introduced the notion of the “tube-ego” in an article written in 1981. Frances Tustin makes several references to it, particularly in chapter 10 of Autistic Barriers in Neurotic Patients (1986). Based on convincing clinical material coming from adult patients, David Rosenfeld shows that in very regressive states they experienced their body image as a system of tubes controlling their bodily fluids. He suggests that this image of the body as a system of tubes seeming to contain the bodily fluids is more elementary than the image described in Esther Bick’s 1968 account of the skin as container. Frances Tustin seems to agree when she says: “My own clinical work confirms that the body image as a system of pipes is more elementary than the image of the whole body being contained by the skin. However, the ‘system of pipes’ body image implies awareness of ‘insides,’ and also awareness of outside situations and identifications with them. It isa movement away from undifferentiated autism to a transitional awareness of ‘me’ and ‘not-me’” (1986, p. 228). She uses this concept not only to describe infantile autism but also to describe ancient levels of representation of the image of the body in relation to certain anorexic pathologies during adolescence. Like Frances Tustin, Genevieve Haag in France also relies heavily on this concept in her work with autistic children. BERNARD GOLSE See also: Autism; Body image; Ego. Bibliography Bick, Esther. (1968). The experience of the skin in early object relations. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 49, 558-566. 1806 Rosenfeld, David D. (1981). The notion of a psychotic body image in neurotic and psychotic patients. Finland: Congres psychanalytique international. Tustin, Frances. (1986). Autistic barriers in neurotic patients. London: Karnac Books. TURNING AROUND Turning around is a process that affects the vicissitudes of the instinct in terms of its affective expression (for example, love turning into hate), its aim (for example, active turning into passive), or its object (in particular, the shift from being directed toward another person to being turned back onto the self). These three types of processes are closely related. Freud gave his essential description of this dynamic in “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes” (1915c). He defined four vicissitudes of the instincts: repression, sublimation, reversal into the opposite, and turning around upon the subject’s own self. Freud also used the term reversal in this article in a different sense involving the transformation of psychic “contents,” that is, an idea, a representation, a dream image, a symptom, or the like, into its opposite. With regard to the instinct itself, or rather its expression as an affect, this dynamic “is found in the single instance of the tranformation of love into hate”(1915c, p. 127); moreover, these two affects can coexist, which is the definition of ambivalence. However, it is appropriate to nuance Freud’s statement here, because reversal in the opposite direction, from hate into love, can also occur through reaction formation. In the same article, Freud discusses two types of turning around onto the self: sadism turning into masochism and voyeurism turning into exhibitionism. The former involves the transformation of sadism (the pleasure of violence being directed toward another person) into masochism (the subject derives pleasure from violence being directed against himself or herself and solicits it from someone else). In this 1915 article, Freud posited sadism as being primary and masochism as being secondary, that is, resulting from turning around, which necessarily implies a reversal inversion of agent and object positions (the relationship in which the subject directs aggression against another person turns into one where the other person directs aggression against the subject) and a reversal inversion INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS of the aim (the active aim, to direct aggression against the other, becomes passive, to be the object of the other’s aggression). Previously, in “Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning” (1911b), Freud had upheld that at the beginning of life only the pleasure principle holds sway; the instinct knows only autoerotic satisfaction. During the narcissistic phase, the nascent ego, once it begins to distinguish between inside and outside, takes into itself from the outside that which is pleasurable and expels that which is painful, thus constituting itself as “purified pleasure-ego” (1915c, p. 136). As a result, “the external world, objects and what is hated are identical” (p. 136); the object is born in hatred. As we know, this was to become the basis for the theories of Melanie Klein. However, this thesis, which lacks clarity, seemed somewhat forced even to Freud himself. In “The Economic Problem of Masochism” (1924c), he reconsidered this trajectory and proposed to reverse it, by positing masochism as being primary and sadism as being secondarily produced through turning around and projection onto the external object. (These issues have been discussed, in particular, by Benno Rosenberg in Masochisme mortifere et Masochisme gardien de la vie (1991; Destructive masochism and masochism as preserver of life.) Whatever the case may be, the dynamic of suppressing aggressive impulses and turning them against the self and a transformation with regard to the aim of the instinct, which changes from active to passive (the instinct itself, we must recall, is always active) is routinely encountered in clinical practice. The same is true of the reversal of voyeurism into exhibitionism. Here Freud distinguished three “stages” corresponding to the successive modes of the search for pleasure: looking at the body of another person, looking at one’s own body, and displaying one’s body so that it will be looked at. Here again, the change from active aim to passive aim and turning around onto the self are closely linked, and the narcissistic phase plays an essential role in this developmental process. In clinical terms “the turning round upon the subject’s self and the transformation from activity to passivity converge or coincide”(1915c, p. 127 pri nevertheless remains useful, on a theoretical level, to distinguish these modalities which is what Andre Green does, notably, in Life Narcissism, Death Narcissism (1983/2001) has proposed with the idea of “a double return.” INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TURNING AROUND UPON THE SuBJecT’s Own SELF To these two types of turning around analyzed by Freud (sadism-masochism and _ voyeurismexhibitionism), it would be possible to add the opposition he defined during the same period between ego libido and object libido, or, in terms of cathexis, between the ego’s cathexis of the object or of itself. This opposition, described in “On Narcissism: An Introduction” (1914c), is within the context of the first theory of the instincts (opposition between the sexual instincts and the self-preservation or ego instincts). Freud later revisited this opposition in light of his topographical and economic theories of the 1920s, in particular within the framework of his thinking on the psychoses. However, throughout these successive versions, these same figures of turning around appear, with regard to affect (love-hate), the instinctual aim (active-passive), and the object (self-other). ROGER PERRON See also: Reversal. Bibliography Freud, Anna. (1936). The ego and the mechanisms of defence. London: Hogarth. Freud, Sigmund. (1911b). Formulations on the two principles of mental functioning. SE, 12: 213-26. . (1915c). Instincts and their vicissitudes. SE, 14: 109—40. Green, André. (2001). Life narcissism, death narcissism (Andrew Weller, Trans.). London and New York: Free Association Books. (Original work published 1983) Rosenberg, Benno. (1991). Masochisme mortifére, Masochisme gardien de la vie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. TURNING AROUND UPON THE SUBJECT’S OWN SELF The notion of turning around upon the subject’s own self refers to the process that substitutes the subject’s own self in place of the external object of an instinct. This term appeared in Sigmund Freud’s writings in “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes” (1915c), where it is discussed as one of the four vicissitudes of the instincts: repression, sublimation, reversal into the opposite, or “turning round upon the subject’s own self” (p. 126). Freud described this latter process as 1807 Tustin, Frances (1913-1994) being closely linked to reversal into the opposite and used the study of two clinical models to understand its effects: sadism-masochism and voyeurism-exhibitionism. In sadism there is a manifestation of aggression toward another person, who is treated as an object. If the object of the instinct becomes the subject’s own self, the initial instinctual aim simultaneously changes from active to passive, because the sadism is then directed against the subject. Turning against the self is demonstrably at work even though the subject has not yet subjugated himself to another person. Obsessional neurosis is representative of this intermediary stage, which Freud described as self-punitive rather than masochistic. A final stage consists in the search for another person to play the active role that the subject renounces, thereby submitting to masochistic control. One can see how, over the entire trajectory from sadism to masochism, turning around upon the subject’s own self occurs alongside the transformation of activity into passivity, in this inversion of roles between the person who exercises sadism and the person subjected to it. Another pair of opposites, voyeurism-exhibitionism, provides a clear example of the same mechanisms. The three successive stages played out in the previous example can be found again here. Thus, there is initially “looking” as an activity that the subject directs against an unknown object, followed by the subject’s submission to a turning around of the scopic drive onto a part > of his or her own body. Finally, the introduction of a third element allows the subject to become the object of another person’s gaze. Freud emphasized that these operations as a whole do not exhaust all the energy of the instinct and that once again, the psyche prefers to work upon small quantities of energy. Moreover, it seems that the three stages previously described as unfolding in a linear fashion are in fact all present in varying degrees and that they develop in conjunction with one another. Anna Freud included turning against the self in the list of defense mechanisms enlisted by the ego in its struggle against guilt-inducing instinctual impulses. In The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense (1936), she cited this process as one of the most primitive ones, “as old as the conflict between the instinctual impulses and whatever obstacle may be erected against them.” However, she revised her attempt to chronologically situate this defense mechanism, as well as others, for lack of confirmation during her clinical work. Thus, in 1808 terms of the mechanism in question, she acknowledged the rarity, in very young children, of true masochistic manifestations resulting from a turning around of the instinct back onto the self. In the psychoanalytic literature, this notion is at the crossroads of numerous avenues of thought. Freud, for example, let it be understood that the manifestation of the instinctual vicissitude described here depended on the subject’s narcissistic organization. JeEAN-BapTIsTE DETHIEUX See also: Drive/instinct; Identification with the aggressor; “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”; Reversal into the opposite; Self-hatred; Turning around. Bibliography Freud, Anna. (1936). The ego and the mechanisms of defence. London: Hogarth; New York: International Universities Press. Freud, Sigmund. (1915c). Instincts and their vicissitudes. SE, 14: 109-140. Further Reading Davison, W., Bristol, C., and Pray, M. (1986). Turning aggression on the self: Study of psychoanalytic process. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 55, 273-295. Levin, Fred M. rep. (1990). Panel: Sadism and masochism in neurosis and symptom formation. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 38, 789-804. TUSTIN, FRANCES (1913-1994) Child analyst Frances Tustin was born on October 15, 1913, in Darlington, northern England, and died on November 11, 1994, outside of London. She was the only child of parents who separated in 1926. Traumatic memories of this separation remained with her, especially because she had been very close to her father and would not see him again for some fifteen years. Married for the first time in 1938, she divorced in 1946, and two years later she married Professor Arnold Tustin, an eminent physician who took a close interest in her work and greatly encouraged her in her research. She at first focused on the teaching profession and worked in that field for several years. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS In 1943 she had the opportunity to attend courses in child development taught by the Kleinian psychoanalyst Susan Isaacs at the University of London. She was fascinated by this approach to children, which was entirely new to her. Six years later, in 1949, after the death of her first baby, she felt a calling to become a child psychotherapist. She learned of a nascent training program at the Tavistock Clinic and enrolled. As a part of her training, she had to enter into analysis with Wilfred Bion. She decided to end her analysis after fourteen years (with two interriptions, once for an internship in the United States and once for her second pregnancy, which ended, yet again, in the death of the baby at birth). After stopping treatment, she was beset with terrors, which she later understood as an expression of autistic anxieties. Because Bion had returned to the United States, she had to call upon another analyst, Stanley Leigh. At the Tavistock Clinic, Tustin first heard about autistic children by way of a lecture given by Marion Putnam at the invitation of the clinic’s then director John Bowlby. She was fascinated by what she heard. In 1953, her husband having accepted a one-year appointment as visiting associate professor in the United States, she had the opportunity of doing an internship at the James Putnam Center in Boston, one of the first treatment centers for autistic children. Back in London she wanted to apply the Kleinian method of analysis to autistic children. She soon realized that Melanie Klein’s theories had to be expanded to account for this new pathology. Her treatment of her first autistic patient revealed to her the anxiety that is at the heart of this disorder and that is due to the trauma associated with the emerging awareness of bodily separation from the object at a stage when the ego cannot yet form symbols. The child feels as if it were experiencing not just loss of the object but also the sensation of being bodily uprooted. She showed that this uprooted feeling is usually localized in the mouth. It is as if the autistic child felt brutally exposed to a series of discontinuities along the mouth-tongue-nipple-breast axis. These discontinuities not only lead to loss of the illusion of controlling the object of instinctual satisfaction, but also give the child the intolerable anxiety of feeling amputated, emptied, and annihilated, and of feeling that the object too is amputated and emptied. The child then erects defense mechanisms against the anxiety of this traumatic experience. These defense mechanisms consist INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Tustin, Frances (1913-1994) of autistic forms (impressions that the autistic subject procures for itself with its own bodily secretions, stereotyped movements, or interoceptive sensations), autistic objects (concrete objects that the child manipulates not for their conventional uses or their symbolic values, but rather for the sensations that they cause against the skin or the mucous membranes, and that procure autistic forms), and the autistic shell (a world of pure sensations made of up autistic forms and objects, without otherness; a two-dimensional world in which the only possible relationship is an adhesive one of “sticking”). Tustin’s work broadened and updated the understanding of childhood autism and made possible an effective therapeutic approach to it, but her influence went beyond the realm of autism itself. In effect, she described autistic pockets or barriers present in personalities affected by various disorders: phobias, melancholia, mental anorexia, psychopathy, psychosomatic pathologies, and severe childhood functional disorders (enuresis, encopresia). These autistic pockets are parts of a personality caught in a system of autistic defenses, and they must be analyzed to avoid interminable analyses and negative therapeutic reactions. An honorary member of the British Psychoanalytical Society, Tustin taught at the Tavistock Clinic, where she trained many students. In addition, many child psychotherapists and psychoanalysts from around the world went to London, and later to Amersham, in the greater London suburbs, where she lived at the end of her life, to benefit from her supervision. She was invited to deliver lectures in numerous European countries and in the United States. She published some thirty articles and four books. In addition, there are videos recordings of three interviews with Tustin. Nearly all of her publications and research focused on childhood autism. From her first contact with children afflicted with this disorder at the beginning of the 1950s until her death, she continuously strove to promote deeper understanding and better treatment of this condition. Diprer Houzet Notions developed: Autistic capsule/nucleus; Black hole. See also: Autism; Autistic defenses; Breakdown; Dismantling; Infantile psychosis; Lack of differentiation; Psychic envelopes; Self-mutilation in children; Sucking/thumbsucking; Trauma of Birth, The; Tube-ego. 1809 TWINSHIP TRANSFERENCE/ALTER EGO TRANSFERENCE Bibliography Spensley, Sheila. (1995). Frances Tustin. London: Routledge. Tustin, Frances. (1972). Autism and childhood psychosis. London: Hogarth. (1981). Autistic states in children. London: Routledge. . (1986). Autistic barriers in neurotic patients. London: Karnac Books. . (1990). The protective shell in children and adults. London: Karnac Books. TWINSHIP TRANSFERENCE/ALTER EGO TRANSFERENCE Twinship or alter ego transference is a form of narcissistic transference defined by Heinz Kohut as expressing the analysand’s need to rely on the analyst as a narcissistic function possessing characteristics like herself. Kohut first defined the concept in The Analysis of the Self (1971) as one of the possible forms of mirror transference. In How Does Analysis Cure? (1984) he made alter ego transference a type of transference unto itself, corresponding to the existence of an autonomous narcissistic need, the alter ego. It is often in relation to the analyst being experienced as identical or similar that narcissistic tendencies are pinpointed. Kohut believed that oedipal interpretations are often understood by patients as being a repetition of the parents’ negation of narcissistic needs, which means that such interpretations are premature. Interpretation of the narcissistic needs of the alter ego, when it is appropriate, causes memories to emerge that can be worked through. Alter ego transference relates to mirroring and idealizing narcissistic transference, to the grandiose self, and to the idealized parental imago. This conceptualization has been criticized both in terms of narcissistic transferences and the priority given to narcissism over instinctual conflicts, and as an attempt to replace Freudian metapyschology with a metapsychology of the self, understood as being made up of sectors. AGNES OPPENHEIMER 1810 See also: Alter ego. Bibliography Kohut, Heinz. (1971). The analysis of the self. New York: International Univwversity Press. . (1984). How does analysis cure? Chicago: University of Chicago Press. . Further Reading Burlingham, Dorothy T. (1946). Twins. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 2, 61-74. Gorney, J. (1998). Twinship, vitality, pleasure. Progress in Self Psychology, 14, 85-106. Simon, Bennett. (1988). The imaginary twins: The case of Beckett and Bion. International Review of Psychoanalysis, 15, 331-352. TYPICAL DREAMS A typical dream is a dream that, in its content and form, is very much alike for a great many people. Freud devoted a long section to typical dreams in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a): these are “dreams which almost everyone has dreamt alike and which we are accustomed to assume must have the same meaning for everyone” (p. 241). These dreams could be considered to be an exception to the rule that the meaning of a dream can only be deciphered through the dreamer’s own interpretation; furthermore, Freud added, associations connected with such dreams are in general weak and vague. He was interested primarily in four kinds of typical dream. e dreams of nudity, gratifying an exhibitionist desire dating from childhood; e dreams of the death of loved ones, of which there are two varieties: death of a brother or a sister, an expression of infantile jealousy, and death of a parent, the direct expression of oedipal hatred for a parent of the same sex (it was in this passage that Freud gave for the first time a closely reasoned description of that which he later was to call the Oedipus complex). Any dream of the death of a loved person would therefore be an INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS expression of a death wish, Freud commenting that in this case, contrary to what has been observed in most dreams, the result of the wish— disguised as a fear—is represented without displacement: it really is the death of the loved person that is represented. Freud specified that in these dreams of infantile satisfaction, death does not have the meaning it has for the adult; it is simply absence, which is why the dream is often not very painful; e dreams of flying. A note added in 1925 suggested that this could be a representation of the primal scene (sexual rapports between parents); e dreams of being obliged to retake an examination, as an adult, that has been taken and passed successfully at a younger age. The meaning of this is frequently reassurance before a difficult moment (“you have passed this examination before, therefore you will succeed again ...”). Freud returned to this subject later in the same book, where he maintained that typical dreams deploy symbolic representations rooted in the culture and found in tales, folklore, and myths: “the question is bound to arise of whether many of these symbols do not occur with a permanently fixed meaning, like the ‘grammalogues’ in shorthand” (p. 351). Yet, in most cases, something personal to the dreamer is added to the “universal” symbol. Freud illustrated this proposition with a great number. of examples of dreams of stairways, tooth extractions, theft, birth, etc., where, however, this distinction seems to be a little vague. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TYPICAL DREAMS Thereafter, the subject of typical dreams did not come up much in Freud’s work. It has been discussed by Denise Braunschweig and Michel Fain (1975) from the perspective of castration, these kinds of dreams appearing to them to bear witness to a “hysterical kernel,” which they describe as “a capacity to turn something into its opposite, so creating a double meaning susceptible of satisfying the demands of bisexuality.” | ROGER PERRON See also: Death (representation of) in psychoanalysis; Dream; Dream of birth; Dream of mourning; Dream of nakedness; “Dream of the wise baby, The”; Dream symbolism; Examination dreams; Myth of the Birth of the Hero, The; Silence. Bibliography Braunschweig, Denise and Michel Fain. (1975). La nuit, le jour. Essai psychanalytique sur le functionnement mental [Night and day: psychoanalytical essay on mental functioning]. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4—5. Further Reading Myers, Wayne A. (1989). The traumatic element in the typical dream of feeling embarrassed at being naked. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 37, 117-130. Renik, Owen. (1981). Typical examination dreams, “superego dreams” and traumatic dreams. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 50, 159-189. 1811 Pup = “ : oy : Soe Ce Ss > ae 1G eee 7 = ae eet tf Se Ses ey pacar ~~ fabio Mis aww Nee ) pect ad ay ‘ si Ree —— 4 ihe = nee Spe hates os Cert ) ie aoe, ait ae wie gee Wi BAST hele: eR ‘< ° = S Le 4 OP Abed) ‘ c a eA toto 98 T i ee i? - a —~ — Est => . fel enehn : me A» é a Mnvetate H 4 wi ea aed hs rn > a ola eS ¥ Fe¥y ‘| wok a Z : kbgt eCiibve bh OF fi aT ODALLY. (| i ULCERATIVE COLITIS Organic in its etiology, ulcerative colitis remains an enigmatic disease, although current understanding puts it in the group of autoimmune disorders, thus increasing its interest for those involved in psychosomatic medicine. It involves continuous damage to the mucous lining of the colon but can also affect the rectal mucosa. The latter are eroded, sometimes abscessed, and can rupture, making this a serious condition. It progresses through a series of attacks of varying degrees of severity and can occasionally necessitate a colectomy with a colostomy. Its main symptom, bleeding (the mucosa “weep” blood), the psychological profile often associated with it (depression, regression), and its evolution, which is variable and unpredictable but is often correlated with a psychoaffective trauma, have put this disease under the spotlight among psychoanalysts specializing in psychosomatic disorders. The circumstances that trigger the onset of the disease or attacks have been identified by the majority of authors. These appear to be fortuitous during the early stages of investigation but may become more defined in the course of psychotherapy with the gradual emergence of latent content. Often, although not always, the following are found: experiences of object-loss, experiences of wounded narcissism with feelings of worthlessness, self-depreciation, and a sense of the impossibility of taking on new responsibilities. These experiences may result from new real-life situations (with a traumatic valence) or situations that are fantasized and retroactively reconstructed. In “Etude psychosomatique de dix-huit cas de recto-colite hémorragique” (Psychoanalytic study of eighteen cases of ulcerative colitis; 1958), Michel de M’Uzan and his collaborators wrote: “The common element in these factors is their ability to provoke in the patient a loss of self-esteem, along with the belief that he is unloved or incapable of overcoming a difficulty.” Thus, to a greater degree than with other organic pathologies, these causes point toward a narcissistic destabilization along with a certain degree of melancholia. Inspired by the bleeding mucosa, certain authors have speculated a “melancholia of the organ”—a theoretical fantasy on the part of the analyst or a structural reality? The fact remains that a somewhat mechanistic approach would posit the existence of: an affective block or immaturity; strong ambivalence (the depressive pole of which is deeply repressed) toward persons close to the patient as well as toward the therapist; and a depressive tendency different from the reactive depression of the disorder. This depression, sometimes carried along on the tide of a massive regression, has even led to indications for treatment with antidepressants (see Guy Besancon’s article “Le corps présent, reflexions sur une série de recto-colites hemorragiques” [The body as presence; reflections on a series of cases of ulcerative colitis]; 1977). This correlation between ulcerative colitis and a narcissistic axis of depression remains a pivotal element in attempts at a psychoanalytic interpretation. Some authors have thus invoked the idea of a somatic dramatization of melancholia and have sought its source in the mother-child relationship, thereby suggesting that this disorder may be part of a psychogenetic given. 1813 Unary TRAIT Kleinians see this disease in terms of incorporation of a bad maternal imago: According to Melitta Sperling (1946), “As the object is incorporated sadistically, it is a hostile inner danger and has to be eliminated immediately. The faeces and blood (in severe attacks, only blood and mucus) represent the devaluated and dangerous objects.... The severe form of ulcerative colitis shows a great resemblance in behavior, personality structure and dynamics to melancholia, and seems to represent the somatic dramatization of the same conflict, with relatively little mental pain, that in depression is expressed psychologically” (p. 326). There is no consensus on this approach. However, it seems probable that these patients have been unable to constitute and develop a mental space wherein they could find themselves by finding objects other than the primary object to which they felt and feel extremely bound, in an inexorable and often conflicted way. See also: Psychosomatics. Bibliography Besancon, Guy. (1977). Le corps présent, reflexions sur une série de recto-colites hémorragiques. Revue frangaise de psychosomatique, 19 (2). Cain, Jacques, R. Sarles, and F. Berretti. (1984). Aspects psychosomatiques de la recto-colite hemorrhagique. Encéphale, 44. Fine, Alain. (1984). Quelques reflexions et interrogations autour de la recto-colite hemorragique. In M. Fain and C. Dejours (Eds.), Corps malade et Corps érotique (pp. 59-76). Paris: Masson. Sperling, Melitta. (1946). Psychoanalytic study of ulcerative colitis in children. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 15 (3), 302-329. M’Uzan, Michel de, S. Bonfils, and A. Lambling. Etude psychosomatique de dix-huit cas de recto-colite hémorragique. Semaine des Hopitaux de Paris, 34 (15), 1-7. Further Reading Cushing, M. (1953). Psychoanalytic treatment of man with ulcerative colitis. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 1, 510-518. Lefebvre, P. (1988). The psychoanalysis of a patient with ulcerative colitis. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 69, 43-54. Sperling, Melitta. (1957). The psychoanalytic treatment of ulcerative colitis. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 38, 341-349. 1814 UNARY TRAIT According to Jacques Lacan, the unary trait is the elementary form of the signifier as pure difference that supports symbolic identification. In the second of the three forms of identification described by Freud, the subject identifies regressively with a love object or rival by adopting a “single trait” of the other person (einziger Zug) (1921c, p. 107). Dora's cough, for example, was an imitation of her father’s. Lacan recognized this single trait as a signifier. Or more precisely, insofar as this signifier is isolated and is not part of a chain of signifiers, it is first a sign or an “insignia of the Other” (cf. Lacan, 1957-58, p. 304; 2002, p. 253). This insignia of the Other constitutes the nucleus of the ego-ideal. In his seminar on Identification (1961-62), Lacan used Saussure’s linguistics, to compare the einziger Zug with the signifier as a distinct element. Thus he translated it as “unary trait” to emphasize its mathematical sense, comparing it with a binary number. Ferdinand de Saussure defined the signifier negatively. It is not the same, but is different from the other signifiers in a given structure. This implies that a signifier is also different from itself. This pure difference characterizes the unary trait. As an example of the first primitive indication of the existence of the signifier, Lacan referred to a prehistoric hunter carving notches into a piece of bone. One notch signifies each kill, with no reference to the different types of prey or the particular events of each hunt. Each animal killed counts as one, and that is the only aspect of the hunt marked by the trait. Of course, the traits in a series need not resemble each other. They do not need to be identical in order to be the same. In fact, the contrary is true. Because no simple trait is recognizable as a thing itself, once it becomes part of a series you cannot tell which was the first mark. When the thing is erased, the unary trait remains as symbolic of its absence. Thus the trait transforms the absent thing into an object of desire. A second mark, indistinguishable from the first, creates a hole in which this object is lost. Thus the unary trait merges with the phallic mark and the castration threat, insofar as it forever prohibits access to the incestuous Thing. The existence of the subject of the enunciation is suspended by the trait that names it, but this subject immediately INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS disappears in the trait that fixes it, such that the subject only exists between two traits. To formalize the unary trait, Lacan relied on the topology of the torus, insofar as the unary trait is the mark of a double loss, the loss of an object, which corresponds to the central hole of the torus, and the absence of the subject of the unconscious, which is the uncounted turn of the repeated demand. A single cut that makes a Mobius strip, where the two surfaces are one, corresponds to the structure of the unary trait, identical neither to itself nor to the structure of the subject. Marc DaRMON See also: Identification; Imaginary identification/symbolic identification; Infans; Topology. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1921c). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. SE, 18: 65-143. Lacan, Jacques. (1958). The direction of the treatment and the principles of its power. In Bruce Fink (Trans.), Ecrits: A selection. New York: W. W. Norton, 2002. . (1964). The four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis (Alan Sheridan, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton, 1978. . (1957-58). Le Séminaire-Livre V, Les Formations de l'Inconscient. Paris: Seuil, 1998. . (1961-62). Le Séminaire-Livre IX, Lidentification (unpublished seminar). “UNCANNY,” THE” When Sigmund Freud’s essay “The Uncanny” appeared in 1919, he had already made a reference to the Unheimliche, in Totem and Taboo (1912~1913a), as well as bringing up the “omnipotence of thought.” This shows that the question had interested Freud for some time. Here there are passages on repetition compulsion as well that foreshadow Beyond the Pleasure Principle, which was published a year later (1920g). A forum for intersecting propositions, the essay is also a compendium of references (Ernst Jentsch, Friedrich von Schiller, Ernst Theodor Amadeus Hoffmann) and yet, Freud does not reference the psychoanalytic literature on related topics, such as Pierre Janet’s deja-vu, or Joseph Capgras’s illusion of the double. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS “UNCANNY, THE’’ To establish his evasive concept, Freud follows two approaches at the same time: etymology and linguistic variants, and observations or fantasies that appear in novels. The French, English, and Spanish translations of unheimlich all fail to recapitulate the principal reference to the familiar, or family (heim, or home), which defines and limits the notion of the uncanny. Das Unheimliche is defined as “that particular variety of terror that relates to what has been known for a long time, has been familiar for a long time.” We are presented at once with a paradox that Freud does nothing to alleviate since the familiar should not be disquieting. This proposition is at the heart of Freud’s ideas about the original pleasure-ego that coincides with the good and rejects the bad. In “Instincts and their Vicissitudes” (1915c), we find the same opposition between ego/non-ego, just as we do in “Negation” (1925h). Still, it is not clear why the familiar should be threatening and therefore, a second element is needed, namely, the secret, the hidden, which gives rise to the notion of hostility and danger. For danger is associated with penetrating what is sealed off, and strangeness— based on an idea Freud borrowed from von Schilling— with the revelation of what should by rights remain hidden because it is the bearer of transgression. To these linguistic and fantasy associations, Freud, in the second part of the essay, introduces a number of literary examples (many from Hoffmann), centered primarily on the intellectual uncertainty over whether something is living or not (from Jentsch). There it is shown how the repetition compulsion manifests itself through the return of the repressed. This is true even in situations where we expect the new and with it the return of the dead to life. The theme of the double, developed by Otto Rank, whom Freud quotes, is a source of ambivalence: the assurance of survival and a harbinger of death. Consequently, the Unheimliche is connected with the anxiety associated with the return of the repressed and with this the concept receives considerable scope: “With animism, magic, sorcery, the omnipotence of thought, unintentional repetition, and the castration complex, we have for the most part examined all the factors that transform anxiety into the uncanny.” This essay is certainly one of the most fecund, if not one of the most confused, written by Freud. It represents an exemplary effort at combining literature and psychoanalysis, for Freud helps establish his thesis on the basis 1815 Unconscious As INFINITE SETS: AN Essay In Bi-Loaic, THE of the study of works of literature. The concepts of anxiety associated with the foreign (René Spitz) and the secret (Piera Aulagnier) have been the subject of research that does not directly extend Freud’s work. However, examination of the supernatural (telepathy, for example) and the analysis of literature based on the “anxiety of fiction” (Mijolla-Mellor) are directly related to Freud’s study of the uncanny. SOPHIE DE MijoLLA-MELLOR See also: Double, the; Fear. Source Citation Freud, Sigmund. (1919h). Das Unheimliche. Imago, 5: 297— 324; GW, 12: 229-268; The “uncanny,” SE, 17: 217-256. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1912-1913a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1-161. Rank, Otto. (1914). The double: A psychoanalytic study. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1971. UNCONSCIOUS AS INFINITE SETS: AN ESSAY IN BI-LOGIC, THE In The Unconscious as Infinite Sets: An Essay in Bi- Logic, a major work published in 1975, Ignacio Matte- Blanco introduced an important modification of Freud’s notion of the unconscious. His purpose was to save the notion from being progressively forgotten in contemporary psychoanalytic developments. The author refused to consider the unconscious as chaotic (Freud, 1933a [1932]). Ifa characteristic form of functioning, like the primary process (the processes of the id), may be described as belonging to the unconscious system, then, he thought, one can discover a different organization for it than the one ruling the conscious system. Grounded in this idea, Matte-Blanco studied the logical principles that would allow systematic unconscious violations of classical, asymmetric logic, the basis of consciousness. Unconscious logic rises from two principles: the principle of generalization and the principle of symmetry. The principle of generalization, also present in classical logic, postulates that in the unconscious each 1816 entity is treated as part of a set with other elements, this set being treated in turn as a subset of a greater set, and so forth. Entities are distinguished one from the other and grouped together again through abstraction of their similarities. The second principle is that in the unconscious, asymmetrical relations are selectively treated as if they were symmetrical (Rayner, 1995), with the result that relations of succession and contiguity, like time and three-dimensional space, disappear. A part can equal the whole, and similarities can be transformed into identities. The unconscious is conceptualized as an aggregate of infinite sets. According to the definition of the mathematician Richard Dedekind (1831-1916), infinite sets are those in which a specific subset, for example, the even numbers, can be placed in a one-to-one correspondence with the whole set—for example, the set of natural numbers. The part is equal to the whole. Symmetrical logic is the expression of a symmetrical system, according to which reality is a homogenous and indivisible whole. Asymmetrical logic is the manifestation of an asymmetrical system, where reality divides into parts. In states of intense emotion, the experience and logic of the symmetrical system are dominant, so for the mind, the emotional object is infinite and isa lso part of an infinite set. Matte-Blanco succeeded in formalizing (or mathematizing) the study of the unconscious. He discovered a startling isomorphism among the emotional, the unconscious, and infinite logic (Bria and Durst, 1992). JUAN FRANCISCO JORDAN Moore See also: 1d; Logic(s); Matte-Blanco, Ignacio. Source Citation Matte-Blanco, Ignacio. (1975). The unconscious as infinite sets: An essay in bi-logic. London: Duckworth. Bibliography Bria, Pietro, and Durst, Margarete. (1992). Ignacio Matte Blanco (Portrait). In A. Negri (Ed.), Novecento filosofico e scientifico. Protagonisti (Vol. 3, pp. 409-443). Marzorati: Milano. Freud, Sigmund. (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22: 1-182. Rayner, Eric. (1995). Unconscious logic: An introduction to Matte Blanco’s bi-logic and its uses. London: Routledge. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS UNCONSCIOUS CONCEPT Freud defined the term unconscious concept in “From the History of an Infantile Neurosis”: “Feces, ‘baby’ and ‘penis’ thus form a unity, an unconscious concept (sit venia verbo)—the concept, namely, of ‘a little one’ [une petite choses] that can be separated from one’s body” (1918b [1914], p. 84). In philosophy, a concept is an idea that is abstract and susceptible to generalization and that allows for the apprehension of content a priori (Kant). It also refers to the grouping of objects of experience into classes. It is this latter, empirical aspect that Freud retains, since it is the equivalence of objects within a certain relationship that allows him to speak of a concept. The notion presented by Freud is complicated by the fact that the concepts under discussion are “unconscious.” In other words, they are not the result of a process of judgment. Unconscious concepts as defined by Freud come very close to the notion of symbolic equivalence, which is fundamental to the symptom. They also illustrate the unconscious origin of thought in its connections with (anal) sensation and the related fantasy elaboration that arises from it. SOPHIE DE MiyJOLLA-MELLOR See also: Demand; Feces; Infantile psychosis; Phallus; Phallic stage; Symbolic equation; Symbolism; Symbolization, process of. Bibliography Sigmund, Freud. (1918b [1914]). From the history of an infantile neurosis. SE, 17: 1-122. Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie de. (1992). Le plaisir de pensée. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Neyraut, Michel. (1978). Les logiques de l’inconscient. Paris: Hachette. UNCONSCIOUS FANTASY Kleinian psychoanalysts regard the unconscious as made up of fantasies of relations with objects. These fantasies are the mental representation of instincts, and hence are thought of as primary (Isaacs, 1948). INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS UNCONSCIOUS FANTASY When Freud (1900a) stressed the psychological meaning of childhood trauma, rather than its reality, he moved from a physiological way of thinking to a psychological one, thereby giving priority to the internal world. His paradigm of the psychological world was the unconscious fantasy of the three-person constellation that he named the Oedipus complex. Freud contrasted such internal libidinal fantasizing (the Oedipus complex) with the desexualized fantasy that serves as the basis for launching new sorts of sublimated activity in a wide domain. The role of fantasy in sublimating libido in such activities as daydreaming and aesthetic creation is quite different from the primary unconscious fantasies that provoke the conflicts of the early Oedipus complex. Suzan Isaacs (1948) defined unconscious fantasy as the mental representation of instinct. In other words, the libido, from the outset, is an activity of mind, despite its physiological origins and functions. It takes the form of a fantasy of performing an (oral, anal, or genital) activity with an object. On the basis of such fantasies as the raw expression of instinct, the primitive mind of the infant can start to reorder itself through further primitive fantasies of projection, introjection, splitting, and denial, and in this way it may relieve itself of the experiences and terrors of primitive conflicts. One developmental sequence starts with the unconscious fantasies of the Oedipus complex in its early stages and evolves, through fear (for example, castration anxiety), into a desexualized form: daydreaming (Freud, 1919e). Daydreaming, expressed by children in their relentless playing (Freud, 1908c), is an important activity. Classical psychoanalysis emphasizes daydreaming and its sublimatory opportunities, while Kleinian psychoanalysis emphasizes the roots of fantasy life in the unconscious. Child analysis as developed by Melanie Klein (1955) demonstrated the workings of the unconscious in the fantasies of play. Klein developed her technique on the basis of how figures are repositioned in play. This led to a theory of how objects are positioned in relation to each other and to the child’s self. Klein recognized in the details of play the child’s defensiveness as well as the child’s primary and conflicting impulses. The unconscious roots of impulses and defenses are expressed in relations with objects. The nature of the very early primary fantasies was hotly debated. Anna Freud disputed Melanie Klein’s claim that the infant has coherent fantasies from such an early age. She regarded the unconscious fantasies 1817 Unconscious, THE that Klein and her colleagues reported as secondary elaboration at later stages of development. For Anna Freud, the infant develops cognitively by establishing representations of reality and the objects in it, but these representations do not cohere into meaningful, motivating fantasies until after phases of autoeroticism and primary narcissism. Jean Piaget (1954) and Margaret Mahler et al. (1975) have plotted the emergence of representations of reality from these early objectless phases. Other infant psychologists, such as Daniel Stern (1985), tend to see the infant as possessing a sophisticated mind early on, as Klein described. Rosert D. HINSHELWOOD See also: Archetype (analytical psychology); Controversial discussions; Isaacs-Sutherland, Susan; Imago; Logic(s); Primal, the. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4: 1-338; 5: 339-625. . (1908c). On the sexual theories of children. SE, 9: 205-226. . (1919). ‘A child is being beaten’: A contribution to the study of the origin of sexual perversions. SE, 17: 175-204. Isaacs, Suzan. (1948). On the nature and function of phantasy. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 29, 73-97. Klein, Melanie. (1955). The psycho-analytic play technique: Its history and significance. In Klein, Melanie, Heimann, Paula, and Money-Kyrle, Roger E. (Eds.), New directions in psycho-analysis. London: Tavistock Publications. Mahler, Margaret S., Pine, Fred, and Bergman, Anni. (1975). The psychological birth of the human infant. New York: Basic Books. Piaget, Jean. (1954). The construction of reality in the child (Margaret Cook, Trans.). New York: Basic Books. (Original work published 1937) Segal, Hanna. (1991). Dreams, Phantasy, and Art. London: Institute of Psycho-Analysis/Routledge. Stern, Daniel N. (1985). The interpersonal world of the infant: A view from psychoanalysis and developmental psychology. New York: Basic Books. UNCONSCIOUS, THE “The division of the psychical into what is conscious and what is unconscious is the fundamental premise of 1818 psychoanalysis” (1923b, _p. 19). The unconscious emerged from practical treatments, from the theory of repression, and from the theory of sexuality. The adjective qualifies localized formations in a state of repression, various processes, and later on, agencies as well. The noun describes the “locality” that, according to the first. topography, is set against the preconsciousconscious system. Both the adjective and the noun imply that psychical life is in conflict (the dynamic point of view); that memory exists without interest, that the energetics, indeed, the structure of psychic processes is determined, on the whole, beyond consciousness (the economic point of view); and that finally inaccessibility to consciousness is undeniable (the descriptive point of view). Freud transformed philosophical and psychiatric tradition with these ideas and his refinement of the terms (Hartmann, 1931; Whithe, 1961). When he advanced the theory of repression and the psychoneurosis of defense in 1894, Freud managed without the word unconscious. Thus ideas (or representations) that intolerable, irreconcilable, repressed, durable, and pathogenic were beyond association, forgotten, outside of consciousness. Freud then made use of the term unconscious three times in Studies on Hysteria and called for research: “The ideas which are derived from the greatest depth and which form the nucleus of the pathogenic organization are also those which are acknowledged as memories by the patient with greatest difficulty. Even when [...] the patients themselves accept the fact that they thought this or that, they often add: “But I can’t remember having thought it’ It is easy to come to terms with them by telling them that the thoughts were unconscious. But how is this state of affairs to be fitted into our own psychological views? [...] It is clearly impossible to say anything about this [...] until we have arrived at a thorough clarification of our basic psychological views” (1895d, p. 300). The advances made during 1895—childhood trauma, afterwardsness (deferred action), the dream as wish-fulfilment, and finally the “Project for a Scientific Psychology” (1950c [1895]), where the “system of impermeable neurones [w]” figures as a precursor to the unconscious—allow Freud to describe as unconscious pre-sexual sexual childhood traumas and the psychical work that they lead to, which he further constructed through practice and via theory from 1896 onwards (1896b). The discovery of unconscious fantasies and their efficacy (letters to Wilhelm Fleiss from September 21 and October 3 were INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS and 15, 1897) contributed to the creation of the unconscious in 1899 in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a). The close and fundamental correlation between the unconscious, the infantile, and the sexual was affirmed. Freud defined psychoanalysis as the science of the unconscious-soul (unbewusst-seelisch) and the psychology of the unconscious (Ucs.), which evolved according to the advances of psychoanalysis. Via the local aetiology of neurotic symptoms, he discovered that the dream was similarly constructed and that the Ucs. becomes the generic psychic system. It contains wishes—unconscious and indestructible—and the repressed, cathected by the libido through free energy and regulated by the pleasure principle. The primary processes (displacement, condensation) preside over the Ucs. The conflict between repressed instinctual motion and censuring force creates the dream, the paradigmatic compromise-formation. “If we look at unconscious wishes reduced to their most fundamental and truest shape, we shall have to conclude, no doubt, that psychical reality is a particular form of existence not to be confused with material reality” (1900a, p. 620). The reality of the Ucs. reveals itself in other localized processes such as joking, in the forgetting of words, and other symptomatic activities. Freud’s investigations into the “second step in the theory of the instincts” are continued in “The Unconscious” (1915e). The dependence of the Ucs. on the instincts and repression is stressed. It is primal repression that creates the Ucs. that above all “contains the thing-cathexes of the objects, the first and true objectcathexes” (p. 201) while “the nucleus of the Ucs. consists of instinctual representatives which seek to discharge their cathexis; that is to say, it consists of wishful impulses” (1915e, p. 186). Freud notes, in 1917, that the Ucs. is the missing link (“chainon manquant”) between soma and psyche (in 1960a). The life and death instincts, as well as the agencies id, ego, and superego, the “third step in the theory of the instincts” (1920g), do not destroy a single previous experience. The id incorporates the Ucs. and inherits its characteristics, while the assets of the adjective “unconscious” accrue from the id and to a large extent from the ego, hence its resistance to the sense of guilt, to most of the processes of the superego, and to the conflicts between agencies. There is no psychoanalytic notion that does not have some connection to the unconsciousness that the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS UNCONSCIOUS, THE dynamic point of view imposes universally. The more or less localized ideas moving beyond the first topography exist in relation to the Ucs. and are included in the id. The “Mystic Writing Pad” delighted Freud (1925a) because it represented the system Ucs./Pcs.-Cs. The repository for memory traces, as well as a place of fixation, the Ucs. is even assumed to retain an instinctual foundation analogous to animal knowledge, as in inherited psychic formations and the traces of human history. Having often clarified his views, Freud was always careful to separate the essentially dynamic unconscious from the latent, which was susceptible to becoming conscious. By arguing for posthypnotic suggestion, the dream, and other experiences associated with the first topography, he refuted the philosophers’ view of the unconscious as paradoxical, and taking up this question of the ambiguity of the “Unconscious,” he noted: “no one has a right to complain because the actual phenomenon expresses the dynamic factor ambiguously” (1923b, p. 16) (an intuition verified through the qualitative dynamic). In 1938 he criticized a presentation of the ego and the id as follows: “What is unsatisfactory in this picture—and I am aware of it as clearly as anyone—is due to our complete ignorance of the dynamic nature of the mental processes. We tell ourselves that what distinguishes a conscious idea from a preconscious one, and the latter from an unconscious one, can only be a modification, or perhaps a different distribution, of psychical energy. We talk of cathexes and hypercathexes, but beyond this we are without any knowledge on the subject or even any starting-point for a serviceable working hypothesis” (1939a). The qualitative dynamic, which endorses Freudian stylization, permits some working hypotheses. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Psychic apparatus; Splitting; “Claims of Psycho- Analysis to Scientific Interest”; Collective unconscious (analytical psychology); Colloque sur linconscient; Consciousness; Formations of the unconscious; Graph of Desire; Idea/representation; Instance; Interpretation; Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis; Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious; Kantianism and psychoanalysis; Knot; Letter, the; Linguistics and psychoanalysis; Matheme; Metaphor; Metapsychology; Metonymy; Myth of origins; Object a; Parade of the signifier; Subject’s desire; Philosophy and psychoanalysis; Preconscious, the; “Recommendations to Physicians Practicing Psychoanalysis”; Science and psychoanalysis; Seminar, Lacan’s; Signifier; Signifier/signified; Splitting of the subject; Subconscious; Subject; Subject of the unconscious; 1819 “UNCONSCIOUS, THE”’ Symptom/sinthome; Topographical point of view; Topology; Word-presentation. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1896b). Further remarks on the neuropsychoses of defence. SE, 3: 157-185. . (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. Parts I and II. SE, 4-5. . (1915e). The unconscious. SE, 14: 159-204. . (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1-64. . (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1-66. . (1925a [1924]). A note upon the “mystic writing pad.” SE, 19: 225-232. . (1939a [1934—38]). Moses and monotheism: Three essays. SE, 23: 1-137. . (1950a [1887—-1902]). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173-280. . (1950c [1895]). Project for a scientific psychology. SE, 1: 281-387. . (1960a [1873-1939]). Letters of Sigmund Freud, 1873-1939 (Ernst L. Freud, Ed.; Tania and James Stern, Trans.). London: Hogarth. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2: 48-106. Hartmann, Eduard von. (1931). Philosophy of the unconscious. Speculative results according to the inductive method of physical science (W. C. Coupland, Trans.). London: Routledge. (Original work published 1869) Whithe, Lancelot. (1961). LInconscient avant Freud. Paris: Payot. Further Reading Opatow, Barry. (1997). The real unconscious: Psychoanalysis as a theory of consciousness. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 45, 865-890. “UNCONSCIOUS, THE” “The Unconscious,” a highly structured essay of 1915, is the most important of Freud’s papers of that period on metapsychology. Freud made the unconscious the keystone of psychoanalysis. Written over a period of three weeks in 1915, “The Unconscious” is the culmination of his topographical theory (or “first topogra- 1820 phy”). Freud musters several arguments and points discussed or established earlier, especially in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a). The work is divided into seven parts, the last being the most original. After reminding the reader that the unconscious encompasses more than just repressed material, which is only one element of it, Freud goes on to justify the hypothesis of the unconscious—that is, to show that it is necessary and legitimate since there are multiple proofs of its existence. To do this he attempts to show that the assimilation of psychic and conscious is unacceptable: “It disrupts psychical continuities, plunges us into the insoluble difficulties of psycho-physical parallelism” (1915e, p. 168); most importantly, it closes off any possibility of effective psychological research. Freud then indicates that the unconscious is not a second, foreign consciousness within us, but that there are “mental processes [that] are in themselves unconscious” (p. 171), an important distinction that emphasized acts rather than reflexes. In this connection Freud did not hesitate to invoke the Kantian view that perceptions are “identical with what is perceived though unknowable” (p. 171). In part 2, taking it that the hypothesis of the unconscious has been accepted, Freud discusses different meanings of the term unconscious, reprising previously discussed material concerning the distinction between the unconscious and the preconscious. He notes in passing that these distinctions do not, “for the present,” imply any claims concerning anatomical areas of the brain; they refer only to “regions in the mental apparatus, wherever they may be situated in the body” (p. 175); the term regions should thus be taken in the sense of a fiction (p. 175). Part 3 refers in part to the second of Freud’s metapsychological papers, “Repression” (1915d), which discusses the instincts. Freud draws an important distinction here: “ideas are cathexes—basically of memory-traces—while affects and emotions correspond to processes of discharge, the final manifestations of which are perceived as feelings” (p. 178). “Affectivity,’ he adds in a note, “manifests itself essentially in motor (secretory and vasomotor) discharge resulting in an (internal) alteration of the subject’s own body without reference to the external world” (p. 179n). This clearly raises the issue of the actual neuroses, though Freud does not address it here. Part 4 deals with the topography and dynamics of repression, and it is here that Freud provides his well-known definition of metapsychology: “It will not be INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS unreasonable to give a special name to this whole way of regarding our subject-matter, for it is the consummation of psycho-analytic research. I propose that when we have succeeded in describing a psychical process in its dynamic, topographical and economic aspects, we should speak of it as a metapsychological presentation” (p. 181). As in “Repression” (1915d), Freud specifies repression relative to anxiety hysteria, to phobia in conversion hysteria, and to obsessional neurosis. Part 5, which covers the specific properties of the unconscious system, includes some very important thoughts on time: “The processes of the system Ucs are timeless—i.e., they are not ordered temporally, are not altered by the passage of time; they have no reference to time at all. Reference to time is bound up, once again, with the work of the system Cs” (p. 187). But this is only one aspect of the characteristics of the unconscious system, which Freud lists as follows: “exemption from mutual contradiction, primary process (mobility of cathexes), timelessness, and replacement of external by psychical reality” (p. 187). After discussing the preconscious, Freud goes on in part 6 to examine the relations between the two systems, which are distinct but whose respective impulses may cooperate if they happen to be tending in the same direction. “The content of the Ucs,’ Freud concludes, “may be compared with an aboriginal population in the mind. If inherited mental formations exist in the human being—something analogous to instinct in animals—these constitute the nucleus of the Ucs. Later there is added to them what is discarded during childhood development as unserviceable; and this need not differ in its nature from what is inherited. A sharp and final division between the content of the two systems does not, as a rule, take place till puberty” (p. 195). The seventh and last part of Freud’s paper is the most audacious; Freud asserts that only the analysis of narcissistic psychoneuroses (what we would now call psychoses), can “furnish us with conceptions through which the enigmatic Ucs will be brought more within our reach and, as it were, made tangible” (p. 196). He cites Karl Abraham on dementia praecox and Victor Tausk on schizophrenia, and he develops a number of important themes about the speech of schizophrenics. Using Tausk’s clinical observations, Freud notes that “the schizophrenic utterance exhibits a hypochondriac trait: it has become ‘organ-speech” (p. 198). Discussing Eugen Bleuler and Carl Jung, he writes that “in schizophrenia words are subjected to the same process as INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS UNDOING that which makes the dream-images out of latent dream-thoughts—to what we have called the primary psychical process” (p. 199). The relationship to words thus takes precedence over thing-presentations, and substitutions are made based on verbal identity rather than on similarity between the things designated, which is what makes schizophrenic speech so disconcerting. In this way Freud introduces a more, general analysis of the thought process, evoking cathexes far removed from perception which “attain their capacity to become conscious only through being linked with the residues of perceptions of words” (p. 202). Freud concludes this most brilliant and profound of his papers on metapsychology as follows: “When we think in abstractions there is a danger that we may neglect the relations of words to unconscious thingpresentations” (p. 204). SOPHIE DE MioLLA-MELLOR See also: Metapsychology; Thing-presentation; Unconscious, the; Word-presentation. Source Citation Freud, Sigmund. (1915e). Das Unbewusste. Internationale Zeitschrift fiir arztliche Psychoanalyse, 3, 189-203, 257-269; GW, 10: 264-303; SE, 14: 166-204. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4—5, . (1915d). Repression. SE, 14: 141-158. UNDOING The mechanism of undoing is characteristic of obsessional neurosis, along with isolation. It involves a process of “negative magic” that, according to Freud, tends to undo what has been done. When an action is undone by a second action, it is as if neither had occurred, whereas in reality both have taken place. In a letter to Fliess written on December 22, 1897, Freud already foresees what he defines at that time as the ambiguity or imprecise meaning characteristic of obsessional neurosis. He would Jater describe this as an action that occurs in a second moment, and which seeks to 1821 UniteD STATES undo an action that precedes it. “Obsessional ideas are often clothed in a remarkable verbal vagueness in order to permit of this multiple employment” (1950a, p. 273). In the “Rat Man” (1909d), Freud describes compulsive acts as unfolding in two moments, during which the first is undone by the second. According to him in obsessional thought “the patient’s consciousness naturally misunderstands them [the compulsive acts] and puts forward a set of secondary motives to account for them—rationalizes them, in short” (p. 192). In reality there is an opposition between love and hate. In Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926d), he defines more specifically the “magical” nature of this defense that “no longer [has] any resemblance to the process of ‘repression” (p. 164). Thus the obsessive ceremony strives not only to prevent the appearance of an event but to undo it, which is irrational and magical and most likely arises from an animist attitude toward the environment. Anna Freud (1936) included undoing in her repertory of ego defenses. The concept of undoing has today acquired a certain psychological connotation. It is often confused with the concept of ambivalent behavior or attitude. It is probably also necessary to distinguish it, because of the “magical” character of the defense, from the series of mechanisms discovered by Freud—repression, foreclosure, negation (or denegation), disavowal (or denial)—a series that is commonly referred to today as the work of negativization. ELsa SCHMID-KITSIKIS See also: Anxiety; Defense mechanisms; Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety; Obsessional neurosis; Rite and ritual; Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense, The. Bibliography Freud, Anna. (1909d). Notes upon a case of obsessional neurosis. SE, 10: 155-249. . (1936). The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence. London: Hogarth Press; New York: International Universities Press, 1966. . (1950a [1887—1902]). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173-280. UNITED STATES Psychoanalysis came to North America in two major waves, the first one following Freud’s visit in 1909, 1822 and the second one following the Nazi takeover in Germany and Austria. Each wave stimulated the exploration of psychoanalysis’ scientific and curative potentials while encouraging popularizations by the American public. However, this dual, though separate, reception engendered ambiguities and misunderstandings, and built up unwarranted expectations that led to inevitable disappointments. American physicians had been seeking to cure neurasthenia, which, already in 1869, George M. Beard (1840-1883) had called “the American disease” arising from so-called “civilized morality’—hidden conflicts due to hypocrisy. According to Beard, upwardly mobile citizens professing continence, religious purity, and even married celibacy, were having illicit affairs with “loose” women, which often created “mental problems.” Around the turn of the century, American neurologists such as Morton Prince (1854-1929), James Jackson Putnam (1842-1918) and S. E. Jelliffe (1866-1945) had been investigating the “French school” of Charcot, Bernheim, and Janet, and were practicing suggestion and (occasionally) hypnosis in order to cure these neuroses. So were psychologists, among them Stanley Hall (1844-1924), William James (1842-1910), and Boris Sidis (1867-1933). When they read that Freud’s patients by talking about previously repressed fantasies had lost their hysterical symptoms, and that this had happened by bringing forth unconscious memories, they wanted to learn about his method, and about the relation between his patients’ symptoms and sexual repression. Consequently, philosophers, psychologists, and the educated public were as interested in what Freud had to say as were American psychiatrists—who were caring for psychotic patients in institutions and did not know how to cure neuroses—and clergymen who were no longer able to help people by instilling a fear of God. For these reasons, Freud’s visit to Clark University attracted diverse listeners: the psychologists William James and Edward Bradford Titchener, the anthropologist Franz Boas, the revolutionary anarchist Emma Goldman, and many Protestant clergymen, psychiatrists, and neurologists—among them Abraham Arden Brill (1874-1948), Adolph Meyer (1866-1950), and James Jackson Putnam. Freud’s lectures, which for the first time synthesized his discoveries, turned out to be tailor-made for this audience. He spoke extemporaneously. He stressed his hopes for the scientific exploration of the laws governing the unconscious; the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS liberating benefits psychoanalysis would bring to individuals and humanity; the role of sublimation, of trauma and catharsis; and the efficacy and benefits of psychoanalytic intervention. The American press gave him wide, even sensationalist, coverage, so that he was met with an enthusiasm usually accorded entertainers and charismatic heads of state. Then, general physicians and neurologists wanted to understand more about the influence of the unconscious on illness; feminists and other radicals foresaw the end of sexual and social repression; and mind healers perceived answers to troubling questions. To them all, psychoanalysis promised to resolve theoretical dilemmas, while offering a method to help ailing, malingering patients: it became a pivot for disparate intellectual endeavors and disciplines, aims, and interests. Since the analysis of dreams caught the imagination of the larger American public, psychoanalysis started being cast as the new road to happiness. Broad applications ensued, not only by doctors and clergymen but by social workers, experts in child rearing, and in criminology. And zealous charlatans called themselves psychoanalysts. Freud was dismayed by these facile applications that bypassed the laborious efforts required to reach the deepest unconscious of patients. As he stated in “On the Question of Lay Analysis” (1926a), “Americans came too easily by truths others had struggled to discover ... and were too easily satisfied with superficial appearances.” However, Freud kept in touch with a number of Americans. On November 9, 1909, for instance, Putnam wrote: “Your visit to America was of deep significance to me, and I now work and read with constantly growing interest on your lines.” Less than a month later, he informed Freud that “the real psychoanalysis begins where the primary ‘confessional’ ends.” Freud urged his American correspondents to organize and to affiliate with the International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA)—which had been launched to facilitate communication among followers wanting to exchange scientific information. By 1911, twelve persons, mostly physicians, set up the American Psychoanalytic Association (APA). In the same year, fifteen physicians, under the leadership of A. A. Brill, established the New York Psychoanalytic Society (NYPS). By 1914, they founded the Boston Psychoanalytic Society, appointing Putnam as president, and soon formed groups in the Washington-Baltimore area and INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS UNITED STATES in Chicago. But despite these organizational setups, the first wave of American Freudians was too geographically and/or intellectually dispersed to make many scientific contributions, and thus crested after a few years. By then, psychoanalysis was expected to explain nearly every individual and social phenomenon in the culture at large: the American propensity to overgeneralize was casting psychoanalysis as a cure-all. As Nathan Hale summarized, “between 1915 and 1918 psychoanalysis received three-fifths as much attention as birth control, more attention than divorce, and nearly four times more than mental hygiene.... The unconscious had become a Darwinian Titan and dream analysis the road to its taming” (Hale, 1971, p. 397). Proselytizing practitioners bragged to journalists of miracle cures, and reporters wedded clichés to exaggerations and heightened enthusiasm. During these years, Freud wrote to Putnam about the impending splits with Alfred Adler and Carl Jung. But he did not yet realize that the American ambiance would engender other sorts of splits. Since the American groups, mostly, were started by self-selected and self-trained doctors, they differentiated themselves— professionally—from the growing numbers of social workers, clergymen and charlatans who were also doing “psychoanalysis.” This disjuncture between psychoanalysis’ public acclaim and its (flagging) clinical success was unique to North America and, ultimately, created a storm within the movement. By 1924, due to a mixture of professional responsibility and self-interest, and to desperation, the APA voted to keep out all lay analysts. At the IPA meetings in Innsbruck, in 1927, twenty-eight papers were presented on the question of lay analysis. Wanting to distance themselves from “impostors,” American Freudians remained adamant and insisted on breaking IPA rules against lay analysts by restricting access to physicians alone. They even referred to Freud as the “Pope in Vienna.” Freud expressed his disagreement with the Americans in “On the Question on Lay Analysis” (1926a). Nevertheless, American psychoanalysts realized that they were not keeping up with scientific advances and that they needed more training. Therefore they invited a number of Europeans as training analysts (including Freud, who refused for reasons of health). By 1930, they formed the Chicago Institute under the aegis of Franz Alexander (1891-1964), and in 1931, the New York Psychoanalytic Institute under the aegis of Sandor Rado (1890-1972). But the rift between European 1823 UNITED STATES and American Freudians continued to widen over training lay analysts. In 1936, the APA declared that it would veto any resolution by the IPA addressing American issues, and by 1938 had set up its own criteria for “minimal training of physicians” at its affiliated institutes, spelled out proper conduct of members, and reaffirmed the ban against laymen. They also put the IPA on notice not to train Americans who had not already been “approved” by the APA. In a way, Freud had described some of these dilemmas as arising from the fact that psychoanalysis was a social and intellectual movement, a clinical therapy, and a theory of mind. He maintained that these major thrusts were bound to come into conflict from time to time. But he could not foresee that the Nazis would come to power, that most of his disciples would move to America, and that World War II would nearly abolish psychoanalysis on the European continent. America’s second major wave of psychoanalysis arrived with the émigrés. From the start, Freud had referred to his disciples as pioneers into the workings of the unconscious. After the majority of these disciples arrived in the country of pioneers they, literally, were cast as pioneers for their cause. At first, their reception was mixed. American psychoanalysts had sent affidavits, and Lawrence Kubie (1896-1973) had organized an extremely efficient Emergency Committee to help them get into the country. But members of the American Medical Association were afraid that the Europeans would compete for their jobs and patients. Legally, immigrants had to become American citizens before practicing medicine in all but five states; and they had to pass medical boards before becoming psychoanalysts. They also had to prove that they would be self-supporting within a year before they entered the country, and they were branded as Jews. They already had to adapt to their delegitimation as psychoanalysts and human beings, to overcome the shock of brutal ostracism. Now, they had to learn English in order to establish themselves in their (still) struggling profession. Many emigre Freudians worked in hospitals. There, they could demonstrate the efficacy of the “talking cure” to colleagues. By 1942, every medical student learned about the unconscious factors that might influence their patients’ behavior. Many of these students later became psychoanalysts. Under the circumstances, the organizational feuds receded. The émigrés became a resource for American 1824 colleagues. They offered training analyses and held the most prestigious positions in the new institutes that, mostly under their leadership, were springing up around the country. The former disagreements were not settled, but Freud’s death in September 1939 and the war overshadowed IPA concerns. What would have happened to psychoanalysis had most of its proponents not come to America after the Nazis took power (a much smaller contingent went to South America and England) is a moot question. In North America, the organizational repercussions of the split between medical and lay analysts at first determined who among the émigrés would be allowed into the APA and its affiliates, but later on this differentiation led to the formation of “deviant” associations. Still, some prominent psychologists who had been close to Freud, such as Ernst Kris (1906-1957), Siegfried Bernfeld (1892-1953), Erik Erikson (1902- 1994), Otto Fenichel (1897-1946), and Theodore Reik (1888-1970), were accepted as “honorary members.” But Reik, for instance, did not appreciate this distinction and, by 1948, started his own society—to train psychologists in psychoanalysis. His graduates, in turn, taught others. Similar situations arose in cities throughout the country, especially on the two coasts. Already in 1941, Karen Horney (1895-1952) had left the New York Psychoanalytic Institute (NYPI) after a heated controversy over theoretical priorities which would determine, also, what type of psychoanalysis candidates were going to learn and then to practice. Basically, she argued that her colleagues’ ego-oriented psychoanalysis was culture-bound rather than universal, and that they ought to address a patient’s present circumstances in order to understand his or her past rather than to begin by eliciting insights into this past. By then, Karen Horney’s books, (1937, 1939), as well as Erich Fromm’s (1942) were introducing psychoanalytic concepts to a broad public—which was not all that interested in the theoretical disputes among psychoanalysts, but found their writings more accessible than the works of the “classical Freudians.” In fact, Horney and Fromm were addressing social issues, and, though far from simplistic, were appealing to the American habit of believing in quick fixes, and to the native optimism about the malleability of human nature. But they were only the forerunners of what would become some of the “cultural” or “applied” psychoanalyses and psychotherapies which subsequently flooded the country. In other words, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Freud’s influence on the culture—whether appreciated or rejected—from then on became ubiquitous. Still, the theories based on Freud’s postulates in The Ego and the Id (1923b) would dominate the profession for a long time. The division into id, ego, and superego as structural components of psychic life converged with the American scientific bent, and with the language of medicine. But other proliferations of psychoanalysis occurred via the social sciences. For instance, anthropologists such as Margaret Mead, Gregory Bateson, and Ruth Benedict, and psychoanalysts such as Sandor Rad6 and Abram Kardiner, in the Columbia University Institute for Psychoanalytic Training, were doing research on tribal societies; the Harvard sociologist Talcott Parsons postulated psychoanalysis as a mainstay of his social system, to incorporate the unconscious elements of human motivation into social institutions; and the political scientist Harold Laswell explored the behavior and ambitions of political figures in terms of their psychic make-up. Like Freud, the emigrés were steeped in the classics. They were products of the Enlightenment, and they foresaw that the future of civilization would be dominated by discoveries science alone could further. But they also kept reading classical and contemporary literature in order to enrich their theories. And they explained human psychology—the typical patterns of mind being formed in response to early experiences that later guide behavior—via literature. They continued to attempt analyzing literary works in relation to the personalities of their authors, and to be particularly interested in having creative individuals on their couches. Therefore, they cooperated with literary scholars such as Lionel Trilling, and art critics such as Ernst Hans Gombrich and Clement Greenberg who, themselves, enriched the studies of literature, art, and criticism by responding to the challenges posed by psychoanalysis. They warmly welcomed psychoanalysts, and arranged meetings and symposia with them, thereby furthering the acceptance of psychoanalytic insights by the intelligentsia. Because Freud’s European disciples had come to psychoanalysis not only from medicine but from art (Erik Erikson and Ernst Kris), education (Anna Freud [1895-1982]), philosophy (Robert Waelder [1900- 1967]), and literature (Henry Lowenfeld [1900-— 1985]), they were attuned to the preoccupations of INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Unitep States American intellectuals. And the self-assurance they had gained from their work with Freud, as well as their range, helped propel them into the maelstrom of American intellectual life. Heinz Hartmann, for instance, a central figure among the so-called “scientific ego psychologists,” already in Vienna, had addressed questions of adaptation. Now, he investigated individuals’ relations with and adaptation to reality as indicators of mental health which, he held, was emotional and biological. He maintained that “instinct” has a double meaning: the genetic relations between animal instinct and human drive, and between animal instinct and human ego-function. This brought him back to addressing cultural issues. Together with Ernst Kris and Rudolph Loewenstein (1946), he wrote the definitive paper summarizing the clinical theories Freudians had derived from their (recent) America-based research. These findings were syntheses on a highly abstract, theoretical plane. The general and cultural questions they were addressing, along with the clinical ones, would set the Freudians’ extensive research agendas for the coming years. This acceptance in America, at least in part, is what made their work so appealing after the war, when they reconvened on the European continent, and why their theories were referred to as “American” psychoanalysis. In 1947, David M. Levy, in New Fields of Psychoanalysis, delineated the astounding influence psychoanalysis had gained in every sphere. He noted that psychoanalytic terminology in child guidance, such as maternal overprotection, maternal rejection, etc., had become ubiquitous; that psychoanalysis could predict criminals’ recidivism; and he outlined collaborations among psychoanalysts, social workers, educators, industrial and military psychiatrists. Clearly, Freud’s disciples had become pillars of the American establishment. Inevitably, prestige and research moneys accrued to the profession. Ego-psychology remained the leading theory well into the 1970s. By then, however, the members of groups outside the APA were increasingly discontent: they resented being peripheral. Their own successes with patients, and their work in hospitals, went nearly unrecognized outside the country. At home, they were analyzing psychologists and social workers who, sooner or later, formed associations and networks—which gave them a certain amount of clout. Belonging to the IPA would allow them, too, to mix and exchange information with European and Latin American colleagues, and to set up collaborative research projects. In 1985, this situation came to a head in a lawsuit by non-medical 1825 UNPLEASURE American Freudians—some of whose institutes have since then been accepted by the IPA and the APA. Altogether, by the time Philip Reiff published The Triumph of the Therapeutic (1966), America had become the therapeutic society par excellence. But the patients who expected psychoanalysts to cure their neurotic symptoms, or their general malaise, were very different from Freud’s repressed, hysterical ones. And the analyses by his many descendants were initiating more and more discussions about changing clinical pictures and problems, and possible solutions to them. Gradually, the clinical techniques based on the “structural theory” (the division of the personality into id, ego, and superego) were being questioned, and no longer seemed to be as efficacious as they had been before. And many people argued that psychoanalysis took too long and was too expensive. By 1971, Heinz Kohut (1913-1981), a member of both the APA and the IPA, had been dissatisfied enough to have explored, and then moved, Freud’s theories of narcissism to the center. He had noted that children tend to make up for the “unavoidable shortcomings” of maternal care, and the concomitant primary narcissism, either by evolving a grandiose and exhibitionist self-image, or by creating an idealized parental image. As the gleam in the mother’s eye mirrors the child’s exhibitionist display, he found, the child’s self-esteem and grandiosity became inflated. This necessitated, he said, more empathic and demanding interactions with patients, rather than the classical analyst’s technique of abstinence. His so-called selfpsychology, which focuses on the interactions between mother and child, became more integrated into the classical Freudians’ practices. Soon thereafter objectrelations theory (based primarily on the relationship between mother and infant), which originally had been advanced by Melanie Nein (1882-1960), in London, was being furthered by Otto Kernberg. Whether or not these approaches were due to changing symptomatology alone, or to the fact that the acceptance of psychoanalysis itself had made promises for cures it could not achieve, is a debatable issue. Certainly, contact with psychoanalysts from Europe and South America, and changing cultural trends, were playing their part as well. (In academic circles, beginning in departments of English and French, Lacanian psychoanalysis made large inroads.) But psychoanalvsts, themselves (Kurzweil, 1989, 1995) were both products and shapers of their culture. In sum, in the 1826 United States psychoanalysis has evolved in line with cultural prerogatives and advances in psychoanalytic knowledge. What aspects of psychoanalysis are being stressed or denied keeps changing, and its first and second major waves undoubtedly will be followed by others. On the one hand, Freudian ideas are permeating American society, which, in turn, influences the practice of psychoanalysis itself. On the other hand, there has been a proliferation of therapies. But the popularization has encouraged simplifications and quick modes of treatment at the expense of analyzing the unconscious. Thereby, what Freud called the “gold of psychoanalysis,” that is, the mining of the unconscious, has been lost. However, many of his contributions live on in the culture at large, and are applied by many social scientists, especially psychologists. EpitH KuRZWEIL Bibliography Hale, Nathan G., Jr. (1971). Freud and the Americans: The beginnings of psychoanalysis in the United States, 1976— 1917. New York: Oxford University Press. 4 Horney, Karen. (1939). New ways in psychoanalysis. New York: W. W. Norton. Kurzweil, Edith. (1989). The Freudians: A comparative perspective. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. . (1995). Freudians and feminists. Boulder, CO: Westview. UNPLEASURE From the beginning of psychoanalysis, the term unpleasure, in the ordinary sense of a disagreeable impression, was chosen by Sigmund Freud for its dynamic dimension in psychic functioning. He noted the role of “feelings of unpleasure” in the speech of his patients and their defenses against the painful contents of their thoughts. In “On the Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena: Preliminary Communication” (1893a) by Freud and Josef Breuer, these painful affects—fear, anxiety, shame, physical pain—are enumerated and their contribution to the formation of hysterical symptoms is explained: The unpleasure they elicit triggers forgetting, repression. In Freud's position of the primitive psychic apparatus in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), an economic INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS perspective predominates: Unpleasure, engendered by the increase in tensions due to excitation, sets in motion the functioning of the psychic apparatus. “The psychical apparatus is intolerant of unpleasure; it has to fend it off at all costs, and if the perception of reality entails unpleasure, that perception—that is, the truth—must be sacrificed” (p. 237), he writes in “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” (1937c). Unpleasure is a broader category than anxiety, although anxiety is certainly unpleasurable. Other affective states such as tension, pain, or grief are also unpleasurable; so, too, is inhibition. Unpleasure is thus not only an affective state, it is set up as a principle that regulates psychic functioning. MICHELE POLLAK CORNILLOT See also: Automatism; Basic Neurosis (the)-Oral regression and psychic masochism; Defense; Discharge; Dualism; Ego; Excitation; Hatred; Historical reality; Hypochondria; Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety; “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes”; Jouissance (Lacan); Metapsychology; Moral masochism; Negative transference; Nirvana; Pain; Pleasure ego/reality ego; Pleasure/unpleasure principle; Principle of constancy; Principle of mental functioning; “Project for a Scientific Psychology, A”; Protective Shield; Purifiedpleasure- ego; Reality principle; “Repression”; Suffering; Symptom-formation; Thing, The. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. Part I, SE, 4: 1-338; Part II, SE, 5: 339-625. . (1937c). Analysis terminable and interminable. SE, 23: 209-253. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1893a). On the psychical mechanism of hysterical phenomena: Preliminary communication. SE, 2: 1-17. Further Reading Villele, L. (1997). From the sway of the pleasure principle: Ghost of a tiger. Psychoanalytic Review, 84, 281-294. Wise, I. (2000). Pleasure in phantasy and reality. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 81, 156-158. UNVALIDATED UNCONSCIOUS The term unvalidated unconscious refers to childhood experiences that could not be consciously articulated because they never evoked sufficient validating responses INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS URBANTSCHITSCH (URBAN), RUDOLF von (1879-1964) from caregivers. The idea was introduced by Robert Stolorow and George E. Atwood in 1989. In their theory of intersubjectivity, the child’s conscious experience is pictured as becoming progressively articulated through the validating attunement of caregivers. Features of the child’s experience may remain unconscious, not because they have been repressed, but because, in the absence of a validating intersubjective context, they were never articulated in the first place. The concept of the unvalidated unconscious sheds light on certain psychosomatic conditions in which affects fail to evolve from bodily states to symbolically integrated feelings because, without validating symbolic (verbal) responses from caregivers, they were never symbolically articulated. These conditions can be distinguished from other conditions that develop when symbolic articulation of affect is defensively aborted. The concept of the unvalidated unconscious has features in common with Freud’s notion of a primal unconscious and Bion’s discussion of undigested experience. Analytic attention to the unvalidated unconscious is especially important in the treatment of patients for whom broad areas of early experience failed to evoke validating attunement in caregivers and, consequently, whose perceptions remain ill defined and precariously held and whose affects tend to be felt as diffuse bodily states. In such cases, analytic investigation serves to articulate and crystallize the patient’s subjective reality. RoBERT D. STOLOROW See also: Prereflective unconscious. Bibliography Stolorow, Robert D., and Atwood, George E. (1989). The unconscious and unconscious fantasy: An intersubjectivedevelopmental perspective. Psychoanalytical Inquiry, 9, 364-374. (1992). Contexts of being: The intersubjective foundations of psychological life. Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press. URBANTSCHITSCH (URBAN), RUDOLF VON (1879-1964) Rudolf von Urbantschitsch, an Austrian physician, was born in Vienna on April 28, 1879, and died on December 18, 1964, in Carmel, California. 1827 URUGUAY He was born into a Catholic and aristocratic family that enjoyed a good reputation in the days of the Hapsburg monarchy. His father, Victor Urbantschitsch, was one of the founders of modern ENT medicine. Rudolf was a student at the Vienna Theresianum, from which he graduated in 1898. In 1914, having finished his medical studies, he became the assistant of Karl von Noordens and directed his clinic. With the support of Noordens, of influential circles in Vienna, and protected by Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the throne, he was able to realize his project of creating a clinic for the Viennese aristocracy. The Wiener Cottage Sanatorium was opened under his directorship in 1908 and became one of the most prestigious institutions in Europe. The Viennese medical profession cared for its most well-to-do patients there. At the end of 1907, Fritz Wittels, who practiced as a physician in the Cottage Sanatorium, introduced Urbantschitsch to the group of Viennese psychoanalysts. In January 1908 he presented a paper, “Meine Entwicklungsjahre bis zur Ehe” (From my puberty to my marriage), and went on to become a member of the Wednesday psychology society. He remained a member until 1914. Sigmund Freud hospitalized some of his patients in the Cottage Sanatorium, Sergei Pankejeff (the “Wolf Man”) for one. In 1920, Urbantschitsch lost his position as sole director of the Cottage Sanatorium and the institution was sold in 1922. Following this loss and on Freud’s recommendation he began to train as an analyst, first with Paul Federn and then with Sandor Ferenczi in Budapest. As a Catholic, an aristocrat, and a monarchist, Urbantschitsch was an exception in the social makeup of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. Through his intense lecturing activity both in Austria and abroad he contributed to vulgarizing the discoveries of psychoanalysis but ran up against the criticism of his Viennese colleagues, particularly the younger ones, for presenting psychoanalysis in a simplistic fashion and according pride of place to his personal publicity. This criticism, and also his love affairs, two of which resulted in suicide, contributed to the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society’s rejecting his request to renew his membership and in 1924 he was even refused the status of a guest. At the end of 1936 Urbantschitsch left for the United States and first settled in Los Angeles as a psy- 1828 chotherapist. He moved to San Francisco during the summer of 1937 and to Carmel in 1941. These peregrinations were not unconnected to the fact that he had fallen foul of Ernst Simmel and the Los Angeles group of psychoanalysts, who considered his therapeutic work and his theoretical conceptions to be nonpsychoanalytical in the Freudian sense of the term. In 1944 Urbantschitsch, who still insisted on considering himself as a psychoanalyst and a disciple of Freud, was accused of practicing medicine illegally. Apart from his many vulgarizing publications, Urbantschitsch also published plays and novels under the pseudonym Georg Gorgone. His autobiography appeared in 1958 entitled Myself Not Least: A Confessional Autobiography of a Psychoanalyst and Some Explanatory History Cases. ELKE MUHLLEITNER See also: Wittels, Fritz (Siegfried). Bibliography Mihlleitner, Elke. (1992). Biographisches lexikon der psychoanalyse (die mitglieder der psychologischen Mittwoch- Gesellschaft und der Wiener Psychoanalytischen Vereinigung 1902-1938). Tubingen: Diskord. Reichmayr, Johannes. (1991). Rudolf von Urbantschitsch (Rudolf von Urban), 1879-1964. Revue internationale d histoire de la psychanalyse, 4, 647-658. Urbantschitsch, Rudolf von. (1924). Psychoanalyse: Ihre bedeutung und ihr einfluss auf jugenderziehung, kinderaufklarung, berufs- und liebeswahl. Vienna-Leipzig: M. Perles. . (1928). Psychoanalysis for all. London: C. S. Daniel. . (1958). Myself not least; a confessional autobiography of a psychoanalyst and some explanatory history cases. London: Jarrolds. URUGUAY The early days of psychoanalysis in Uruguay date back to the 1940s when Valentin Pérez Pastorini, a psychiatrist, began traveling to Buenos Aires to be analyzed by Pichon-Riviére. Pérez Pastorini trained with the Argentinean Psychoanalytic Association. Miguel Sesser then followed his example. Pérez Pastorini analyzed Roberto Agorio and Gilberto Koolhaas, and the group grew to include Jean Carlos Rey, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Héctor Garbarino, Juan Pereira Anavitarte and professors Laura Achard, Marta Lacava, and Mercedes Freire de Garbarino. In 1950 it was proposed to form an institute, a project that required the presence of a training analyst. In 1954 Willy and Madeleine Baranger, French teachers who were members of the Argentinean Psychoanalytic Association, set up in the country and began to work as training analysts. Argentinean analysts traveled each week for supervisions. The group began to take shape, and from 1955 to 1956 it established bylaws and acquired legal status. It was recognized as a study group at the Twentieth Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Paris in 1957 and was admitted as an affiliate association of the International Psychoanalytical Association at the twenty-second congress, held in Edinburgh in 1961. This expansion of psychoanalysis initially met with opposition from a group of physicians who accused the psychoanalysts of illegally practicing medicine. The Sindicato médico del Uruguay (Medical Association of Uruguay) finally ruled on the question in favor of the group of analysts. Psychoanalysis then experienced a period of rapid growth. It was taught at the graduate level as part of medical and psychiatric studies, as well as in bachelor courses in psychology in the faculty of arts and human sciences. Luis E. Prego Silva introduced psychoanalytic knowledge into pediatric departments in hospitals. In 1965 the Barangers returned to Buenos Aires after a ten-year stay in Montevideo, but by this time the Uruguay Psychoanalytic Association already had three training analysts: Héctor Garbarino, Laura Achard, and Mercedes Freire de Garbarino. In 1966 the Twelfth Congress of Latin American Psychoanalysis was held in Montevideo. The psychoanalytic movement went into a noticeably slow period during the “de facto government” from 1973 to 1985, the period of military dictatorship that forced eminent analysts to emigrate, imposed rigorous controls on meetings of the Uruguay Psychoanalytic Association, restricted the appointment of its directors, and monitored publications. All the ground that had been gained at the level of universities, hospitals, and public health was lost. In 1985, with the advent of democracy, the Uruguay Psychoanalytic Association nevertheless rapidly made up for lost time. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS URUGUAY Among the founding members of psychoanalysis in Uruguay the following stand out for their contributions to the field in terms of theory and practice: Rodolfo Agorio, Gilberto Koolhaas, Héctor Gabarino, Mercedes Freire de Gabarino, Laura Achard, Juan Carlos Rey, and Willy and Madeleine Baranger. Also worthy of note for their contributions are Luis E. Prego Silva, Vida Maberino de Prego, Marta Nieto, Carlos Mendilaharsu, Sélika Acevedo de Mendilaharsu, Gloria Mieres de Pizzolanti, Isabel Plosa, Alberto Pereda, Myrta Casas de Peredo, Ricardo Bernardi, Marcelo Vihar, Maren Ulriksen de Vifiar, Fanny Schkolnik, and Marcos Lijtenstein. The Uruguay Psychoanalytic Association is the only organization in the country that is a member of the International Psychoanalytical Association. It is also affiliated with the Latin American Psychoanalytic Federation. There have been no splits in the organization. The Executive Committee is elected every two years at a general assembly. The Training Commission is in charge of the study program. The Scientific Commission coordinates activities within and outside the association and organizes meetings, roundtables, and domestic and international conferences. The title “training analyst” has been replaced by “analyst in didactic function,” a title that includes training, supervision, and teaching. Admission is by interview, since one of the criteria governing training is that personal analysis cannot be formally associated with the association in any way. To apply, candidates must have completed three and a half years of personal analysis. Supervised practice consists of three analyses of two years each, two of adults and one of a child. Various laboratories operate under the aegis of the Uruguay Psychoanalytic Association: laboratories that study children, adolescents, psychosis, couples and families, as well as laboratories that take research and group psychoanalytic approaches. The Centro de intercambio (Exchange Center) is responsible for spreading psychoanalysis to neighboring domains of knowledge and culture. It also provides psychoanalytic treatment for low-income patients. The Publications Commission, in addition to publishing books, has published the Revista uruguaya de psicoandalisis since 1956 and the journal Temas since 1983. In July 2003 the president of the republic and the minister of education and culture approved the reform of the bylaws of the Uruguay Psychoanalytic Association and the foundation of the University Postgraduate 1829 Uruguay Institute of Psychoanalysis under the auspices of the association. From then on, training by the association led to a university-level master’s degree in psychoanalysis. In the same year a commission was set up whose goal it was to have the Uruguay Psychoanalytic Association recognized by the Graduate School of the Faculty of Medicine of the University of the Republic as an institution entitled to organize adult training programs. SELIKA ACEVEDO DE MENDILAHARSU 1830 Bibliography Freire de Garbarino, Mercedes. (1988). Breve historia de la Asociacion psicoanalitica del Uruguay. Revista uruguaya de psicoanalisis, 68, 3-10. Freire de Garbarino, Mercedes, et al. (1995). Uruguay. In Peter Kutter (Ed.), Psychoanalysis international: A guide to psychoanalysis throughout the world, vol. 2 (pp. 174-185). Stuttgart, Germany: Frommann-Holzboog. Prego Silva, Luis E. (1996). Notas y comentarios sobre los origenes del psicoandlisis de nifios en el Uruguay. In Psicoandlisis de nifios y adolescentes en América latina (Vol. 2, pp. 51-56). Lima, Peru: Fe.P.A.L. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS “VAGINA DENTATA,” FANTASY OF The fantasy of “vagina dentata” (teeth in the vagina) is a horrifying image of the female genitals that derives from the sexual theories of children. It displaces from the oral cavity to the vagina a threat that children believe to come from women. The equation of mouth and vagina was introduced by Freud (1899a, 1905d) and was advanced by Karl Abraham (1916) as central to the oral-sadistic or cannibalistic stage of the infantile libido (devouring versus being devoured). Fear of women and the great terror that they inspire, which for men is linked to castration anxiety, encompasses several other fears: a fearful representation of the all-powerful mother, in which men project outside of themselves an oral-aggressive component; fear of punishment for a desire for fusion with the archaic mother, for an incestuous bond with the mother, or for a return to the mother’s womb at the moment of coitus (Sandor Ferenczi); fear of a parent’s sadistic redirection of the sexual aim of the primal scene; a fearful infantile fantasy of incorporation in coitus (Melanie Klein); a fear of a woman’s desire for revenge for her own castration (René de Monchy). This dread of a woman’s mysterious cavity transforms it into a persecutory object that no longer inspires envy (Hanna Segal). In its passive form, the fantasy of being bitten or eaten by the genitals of a woman includes an element of bisexual desire. More often implied than stated, this fantasy turns up in various forms in dreams, stories, legends, and films. The fantasy of teeth in the vagina must be carefully distinguished from a woman’s vaginismus (an involuntary spasm of the muscles surrounding the vagina that closes the vagina), from the fantasy of a penis with teeth, from fear of incorporation linked to mourning, and from any nonoccidental anthropological data. See also: Fantasy. Bibliography Abraham, Karl. (1927). The first pregenital stage of the libido. In Selected papers of Karl Abraham (Douglas Bryan and Alix Strachey, Trans.). London: Hogarth. (Original work published 1916) Andre, Jacques. (1994). Sur la sexualité féminine. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Freud, Sigmund. (1899a). Screen memories. SE, 3: 299-322. . (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123-243. Gessain, Robert. (1957). “Vagina dentata” dans la clinique et la mythologie. Psychanalyse, 3, 247-295. Lewin, Bertram D. (1933). The body as phallus. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 2, 24-47. VALDIZAN, HERMILIO (1885-1929) Hermilio Valdizan, a Peruvian psychiatrist, was born at Huanuco on November 20, 1885, and died in Lima on December 25, 1929. Valdizan’s childhood was a difficult time: at the age of eight, following the death of his father, he went to Lima where he entered a charitable institution. Having enrolled for medical studies in the University of San Marcos in 1901, he worked as a teacher and journalist 1831 VENEZUELA while still a student. He graduated as a surgeon after presenting his thesis on “Delinquency in Peru” (1910). He went to Europe to study psychiatry and presented his doctoral thesis on “Mental alienation in primitives in Peru” (1915). Valdizan was the first Peruvian psychiatrist, strictly speaking. He began his European studies essentially in Rome, where he encountered Sante De Sanctis, whose ideas were close to psychoanalysis. De Sanctis was particularly interested in the study of childhood and although he taught experimental psychology before obtaining the chair of neuropsychiatry, he integrated psychoanalytic ideas into his vision of clinical psychiatry. Back in Lima, Valdizan began to lecture on nervous and mental illnesses in the University of San Marcos. Javier Mariategui wrote that in his lectures, “the stamp of psychoanalysis was everywhere manifest.” From 1918 he directed the Asilo-colonia de Magdalena—later renamed the Victor-Larco-Herrera Hospital—where he organized psychiatric treatment in accordance with modern criteria. This hospital was long a pioneering arena in terms of psychiatric therapeutics and remained receptive to psychoanalytic ideas, particularly under Honorio Delgado. Although not a psychoanalytic practitioner in the strict sense of the term, Valdizan deserves credit for initially giving great scope to the official teaching of psychiatry and for introducing into his courses on medical psychology the theme of psychotherapy, “as useful to today’s practitioner as any of the classic disciplines in vocational training.” His most noteworthy contribution to psychoanalysis was the creation in 1918, with Honorio Delgado, of the Revista de psiquiatria y disciplinas conexas (Review of psychiatry and associated disciplines), which was the virtual mouthpiece for psychoanalytic thinking in Peru until 1924. Freud mentions it in “A Short Account of Psychoanalysis” (1924f [1923]) and in a 1924 addition to the note on chapter 2 of The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901b) where he quotes from Paul Wilson’s article “The Imperceptible Obvious” (1922). Of Valdizan’s publications, those closest to psychoanalysis are “Extrapsychiatric Psychotherapy” (1918) and two articles written with Honorio Delgado: “Psychological Factors in Dementia Praecox” and “The Revolt of the Sexual Libido in Old Age.” Valdizan’s main contribution to psychoanalysis is that he contributed to spreading the discipline at a 1832 time and in a place where it gave rise to lively controversy. In 1930, after his death at the age of forty-four, the only chair of psychiatry in the country was taken by Honorio Delgado, who had by then become a fierce opponent of psychoanalysis. It is no idle speculation that Valdizan’s open-mindedness and tolerance with regard to psychoanalytic ideas would have favored their greater development. ALVARO REY DE CASTRO See also: Peru; Revista de psiquiatria y disciplinas conexas. Bibliography Mariategui, Javier. (1981). Hermilio Valdizan. El proyecto de una psiquiatria peruana. Lima: Libreria Minerva. Valdizan, Hermilio. (1918). La psicoterapia extrapsiquiatrica. Anales, Facultad de medicina de Lima, 250-271. . (1920). Ensayo de psicologia del enfermo. Revista de psiquiatria y disciplinas conexas, 3, 1-2, 19-38. . (1923). Factores psicologicos de la demencia precoz. Revista de psiquiatria y disciplinas conexas, 4, 4, 263— 286. . (1926). La rebelién de la libido sexual en la vejez. Mercurio Peruano, 9, 338-355. VENEZUELA At the end of the 1950s there were two psychoanalysts in Caracas: Hernan Quijada, trained in Paris, and Guillermo Teruel, analyzed in London. The first reactions of associated groups (psychiatrists, psychologists) were varied, ranging from an attitude of refusal for some to curiosity and affiliation for others. Quijada’s important position in the Ministry for Health made it easier to receive state support. Quijada, Teruel, Manuel Kizer, Antonio Garcia, Fernando Acuna, Cesar Augusto Ottalagano, Julio Aray, Antonio Briceno, Nicolas Cupello, Hugo Dominguez, Juan Antonio Olivares, Hans Voss, and W. Hobaica formed a work group that was officially recognized by the International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA) at the Copenhagen congress in 1965. Between 1966 and 1969 an IPA committee comprising Leén Grinberg INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS and Maria Langer from Buenos Aires, Alfredo Nannum from Mexico, Luiz Guimaraes Dalheim and Adelheid Lucy Koch from Brazil, worked at improving the group’s training by revising theory and conducting group controls. In 1969 the international committee appointed Teruel as the first training analyst. That same year, at the international Congress in Rome, the work group was transformed into a definitive association (Asociacion Venezolana de Psicoanilisis; ASOVEP), prior to being affiliated to the International Psychoanalytical Association in 1971, at the Vienna Congress. The first group of candidates commenced training in 1969. In May 1975 power struggles and exclusion anxiety gave rise to conflicts within the association between the oldest analysts and new arrivals. Two groups were formed with their respective orientations, calling for the intervention of the International Psychoanalytical Association at the London Congress in the same year. In 1976 a committee directed by Maxwell Gitelson and comprising Serge Lebovici, Daniel Widlécher, Edward Joseph, and David Zimmermann went to Caracas to visit the association. Thanks to their intervention, the dissensions were soothed and a joint agreement was signed in 1977. In 1983 Manuel Kizer, one of the founding members, left the ASOVEP to create a Lacanian group. In May 1989, after more quarrels, fifteen other members decided to constitute a separate group and received recognition as a work group from the International Psychoanalytical Association. This group went on to be recognized at the San Francisco Congress of 1995 as the Caracas Psychoanalytic Association. The most noteworthy contributions from the ASOVEP includes J. Aray’s work on the fetal psychism and abortion; Hugo Dominguez’s study of the dynamics of communication; Alfonso Gisbert’s work on the identity of the psychoanalyst; Rafael E. Lopez-Corvo’s study of femininity, addictions, and auto-envidia ( “self-envy’’); and Guillermo Teruel’s work on the interaction between couples and the death instinct. From the Caracas Psychoanalytic Association, Addys Attias stands out for work on adolescent pathology, and A. Torres for work on feminine identification and neurosis. There are therefore two associations in Caracas, each equipped with a training institute. In terms of publications, the ASOVEP review Psicoanalisis appears at irregular intervals, as well as a few monographs. The INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS VERTEX Caracas Association publishes a twice-yearly review, Tropicos. RAFAEL E. LOPEZ-Corvo Bibliography Olivares, Juan Antonio. (1984). Breve resena histérica de la Asociacion venezolana de psicoanilisis. Psicoandlisis, 1, 117-124. VERTEX The term vertex, in Wilfred R. Bion’s terminology, refers to the psychic place from which an emotional experience can be represented with the support of data from a sensory modality, which he called the “mental counterpart” (1965, p. 90) of the sense involved. In common English, vertex has the more general meaning of “top.” Bion introduced it into his terminology in 1965 in his book Transformations: Change from Learning to Growth. He was seeking an abstract definition of the “point of view” from which the mind, through a system of transformations, can bring emotional experiences linked to the absence of the object together into a “constant conjunction” (p. 96) and give them meaning. He thus used the geometric term vertex, “clothing” the abstract geometric concept in imaginary flesh. In so doing, he sought to avoid two pitfalls: that of using a term with strong metaphoric connotations such as point of view, which privileges the sense of sight, and that of reducing the libidinal objects and their processes of intrapsychic transformation to purely formal entities. He nevertheless recognized the primacy of the sense of sight in these processes of transformation, notably, that it leads more readily to verbal description than the other senses. While he emphasized this primacy, he nonetheless showed that a change of vertex, or the mental equivalent of a sensory modality, can be necessary to represent certain psychic experiences. He also described the reversal of a vertex; for example, the reversal of the visual vertex that leads to hallucinations. Bion used the concept of the vertex to describe the relationship between patient and analyst and to propose a theory of interpretation. In the analytic rela- 1833 VipERMAN, Serce (1916-1991) tionship, patient and analyst share the same experience, but each has a different vertex. The patient’s vertex is linked to his or her unconscious motivations and their corresponding emotional bonds, the H (hatred) bond or the L (love) bond. The analyst must strive to adopt a vertex that is linked only to the K (knowledge) bond, the emotional bond corresponding to the psychic tension that must be tolerated until meaning emerges. Interpretation for the analyst consists of formulating, when the time comes, his or her experience of the situation based on this vertex. The vertices of the patient and the analyst must be neither too close nor too far apart from one another. This produces a “binocular vision” that enables the patient to take a step back from his or her original vertex, bringing a sort of perspective into the patient’s psyche. DipigR HouzeL See also: Bion, Wilfred Ruprecht; Invariant; Transformations. Bibliography Bion, Wilfred R. (1965). Transformations: Change from learning to growth. London: Heinemann. (1970). Attention and interpretation. London: Tavistock. Grinberg, Léon, Sor, Dario, and Tabak de Bianchedi, Elizabeth. (1977). Introduction to the work of Bion: Groups, knowledge, psychosis, thought, transformations, psychoanalytic practice (Alberto Hahn, Trans.). Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson. (Original work publushed 1973) VIDERMAN, SERGE (1916-1991) The Romanian-born French physician, psychiatrist, and psychoanalyst Serge Viderman was born on September 15, 1916 in Rimnic-Sarat, near Bucharest, and died in Paris on November 3, 1991. The third of four brothers, he was born into a relatively affluent family; his father was a forestry agent. After his secondary education, without prospects owing to the numerus clausus against Jews, he decided to go to France to join his eldest brother, who had established himself as a doctor there. He arrived in Rouen in 1934, at the age of eighteen, and entered medical school, perhaps less out of any sense of vocation than of lack of interest in the second career option then available to gifted Jews: the legal profession. 1834 With the outbreak of the war, he finished his studies and, after escaping imprisonment for resistance activities, he took refuge in Grenoble, in the free zone, where he rejoined his brother and his family and enrolled in the bachelor’s program in philosophy at the university. In 1943 he was forced to flee again, this time to Paris, where he lived under a false identity until the Liberation. After the Liberation he became a naturalized French citizen, but, in need of money, he accepted a job in Fribourg (Switzerland) at the National Office of Immigration. Based on the conclusions of his medical examination, “displaced persons” were directed toward either France or the United States. It was here that he met his future wife, Michéle, who came from Burgundy; the couple had three daughters. As soon as he was able, Viderman returned to France and settled near Poitiers, where the mayor of a small administrative district was in need of a doctor and was offering lodging. Unenthusiastic about being a country doctor, he then moved to settle near Rouen as a generalist in order to be closer to Paris and the practice of psychiatry. He came into renewed contact with his compatriot Bela Grunberger, who recommended his own psychoanalyst, Sacha Nacht; like both of the other men, Nacht was a Romanian Jew. Viderman entered analysis with Nacht in the spring of 1952, and after another move, this time to the Paris suburbs, in 1955 he found a job as a psychiatrist at Villa-des-Pages clinic, in Le Vésinet, which was headed by two doctors named Leulier; this enabled him to cut his first teeth as a practicing psychiatrist. His name did not appear on any of the lists of “students in training” that were fought over by the two rival factions of the schism of 1953, but his performance in his degree course was brilliant enough for him to be entrusted, in 1956, with writing, under Nacht’s direction, an important article entitled “Apercu sur Phistoire de la littérature psychanalytique” (Outline of the history of the psychoanalytic literature) for the second volume of La Psychanalyse d’aujourd’hui (Psychoanalysis today), published by the Presses Universitaires de France. In this article he painted a broad historical picture that equally embraced child analysis and psychosomatic theories, and he showed no hesitation in approaching the contemporary era, with Nacht (“Nacht’s work stands out INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS for its precision and clear organization”), Maurice Bouvet (whose report on object relations he cited as one of the “studies full of promise that have been published in France in recently years”), Daniel Lagache, whose “substantial report” on transference was noted, and Jacques Lacan, “who has published works written in a singular style, the obscurity and preciosity of which are detrimental to his thinking” (Viderman also rebuked Lacan for failing to cite Henri Wallon, in whose works “he had nevertheless found the clearest part of his inspiration”). Esteem for Viderman was confirmed by his election to membership in the Société psychanalytique de Paris (SPP; Paris Psychoanalytical Society) in December 1957. After Bouvet’s death in 1960, Viderman was immediately accredited to take over his training analyses; unsurprisingly, he was elected to permanent membership in the society on October 18, 1960. At this time he left the clinic at Le Vésinet and settled definitively in Paris as a psychoanalyst. Viderman’s position within the institution was always that of a “critic” in the true sense—a position, moreover, that was congruent with the theoretical and clinical views he elaborated over time. He felt close to those who were attempting to open up the SPP to the outside, particularly to the analysts of the Société francaise de psychanalyse (French Society of Psychoanalysis), which would become the Association psychanalytique de France (Psychoanalytic Association of France), but also, whatever reservations he may have harbored about Lacan, with regard to what he perceived to be lively elements within the Lacanian movement. For example, in 1967 he wrote for L’Inconscient, the revue founded by Piera Aulagnier, Jean Clavreul, and Conrad Stein. Although he was one of the founders and, from 1973, codirectors, along with Christian David and Michel de M’Uzan, of the general section of the collection “Le fil rouge” (The red thread) published by the Presses Universitaires de France, he also long maintained close ties with René Major and Dominique Geahchan in the meetings organized by their group, Confrontation, from 1974. In 1978-1979 he tried, although in vain, to promote a “second degree program,” known as Cursus B, alongside the traditional curriculum for the training of analysts within the Institut de psychanalyse de Paris (Paris Institute of Psychoanalysis). In 1979 he cosigned the summons issued to the institute by Robert Barande, Dominique Geahchan, René Major, Michel Neyraut INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS VIDERMAN, Serce (1916-1991) and Conrad Stein to try to annul expulsion orders judged to be illegal and voted for in June, against members who refused to pay their membership fees in protest. Finally, in 1980 he found himself alongside Geahchan, Francois Roustang, Jacques Sédat, and Stein, among the promoters of the foundation of the College des psychanalystes (Collegium of psychoanalysts), which aimed to situate itself “outside of the traditional structures of psychoanalytic societies.” These stands taken in relation to institutions were not arbitrary, but rather closely linked to the ideas Viderman promoted; these ideas first appeared in fully developed form in his book, La Construction de l’espace analytique (Construction of the analytic space; 1970), which marked a real turning point in the thinking of many analysts in the French psychoanalytic community. His ideas incited lively discussions that for a time seemed to take precedence over the usual administrative quarrels. They were viewed as subversive by adherents to a dogmatic psychoanalysis that was dependent upon a certain Freudian scientistic ideal, and conducive to the exercise of a will to codify, whose sterility and absurdity Viderman underscored. His description of the space in which an analytic relationship (which is always an invention in partnership) is born, flourishes, and fades away, is based on a radical putting into doubt of the existence of any external “truth” that could be found in its integrity and could transcend the protagonists in the relationship. The person of the analyst and the counter-transference here have a dimension that renders practice less assured and less reassuring. Interpretations do not “construct” the subject’s history, but rather “construct” a probability that cannot pretend to be an “objective historical truth.” Needless to say, this calling into question of pseudo-certainties was taken for what it was: a relativization of the “power” of those who pretended to legislate in their own name, a caution against the abuses of force in producing meaning. Book after book, Viderman deepened his explorations, for example with Le Celeste et le Sublunaire (The celestial and the sublunar; 1977), or Le Disseminaire (The disseminary; 1987), where he pursued his task by dismantling the illusions—extremely similar illusions, in the last analysis, because they are linked to the same sociocultural sources—that inspired the thinking of Freud, Marx, and Einstein, all of whom believed in the existence of a rigorous determinism, a law that orders the tangible world and the psyche alike. For him, the 1835 VIENNA, FREUD'S SECONDARY SCHOOL IN path was cleared in process, with the passage of the person who walked it. Viderman did not live to see the publication of his last book, De l’argent en psychanalyse et au-dela (Money in psychoanalysis and beyond). It could not be fitted into the publication schedule at the Presses Universitaires de France until shortly after his death, on November 3, 1991, of a cancer that had gradually distanced him from all activity other than writing. It is an incomplete book, not revised with Viderman’s characteristic meticulousness, for those close to him had tried, in vain, to get it printed before time ran out, as they knew it was fated to do. Death, moreover, is a constant presence in this work, which gives the sense of a testament, but in reality completed the approach Viderman had begun twenty years earlier. His way of emphasizing our fear of nothingness and the “illusory conjuration” of it represented by money reveals the contours of a meditation on human destiny as well as on the psychoanalyst’s place in this process; the book attests to the abiding presence of the philosophical reflection that filled the first years of his training. As Michel Neyraut wrote in his 1991 obituary for Viderman, printed in Le Monde: “Out of the humanist, the thinker, the linguist, the gourmet, the sage, and finally, the psychoanalyst, which was dominant in him? It depended on whether you were asking about a passage from Homer, the bouquet of a Médoc, a translation of Vialatte, or simply the meaning of a word— he, who came from Romania and had learned his French out of Anatole France!” ALAIN DE MYOLLA See also: Nacht, Sacha; Société psychanalytique de Paris et Institut de psychanalyse de Paris. Bibliography Neyraut, Michel. (1991, November 7). Neécrologie de Serge Viderman. Le Monde. Viderman, Serge. (1970). La construction de l’espace analytique. Paris: Denoél. . (1977). Le céleste et le sublunaire. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. . (1987). Le disséminaire. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. . (1992). De l’argent in psychanalyse et au-dela. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1836 VIENNA, FREUD’S SECONDARY SCHOOL IN" After home-schooling and studies at a private primary school during his elementary school years, in 1865 Sigmund Freud enrolled in the first class of the newly constructed Leopoldstadter Kommunalrealgymnasium, and later (1868-1869) at the Obergymnasium, located at Taborstrasse 24 in the second district in Vienna. He completed the degree course, earning high praise, received the school prize in his third year, and in 1873, in his eighth year, received the Matura (highschool diploma) with honors after passing his qualifying exams. These included: composition, in German, on the theme “What considerations should guide us in choosing a profession?”; Latin exam: Virgil, Book IX, 176-223; Oskar Seyffert, book XIII”; Greek exam: Sophocles, Oedipus Rex, v. 14-573 and mathematics. The ratio of Catholics to Jews in the second-year class was thirty to twenty-eight; in the eighth-year class it was six to five. As to anti-Semitism in the upper classes, from Freud’s fifth year, the name “Sigmund” appears on school documents instead of “Sigismund,” probably because of ridicule; otherwise there are no traces of an administrative change of his first name. There are numerous allusions to Freud’s secondaryschool years in his scientific works, particularly in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), for example, the dream of the botanical monograph. His esteem for his high school teachers never diminished: Samuel Hammerschlag, who taught religion and was also librarian to the Jewish community and a friend of Freud’s father; Viktor Ritter von Kraus, who taught German, history, and philosophy. During his eighth year (university preparation), Freud was at the head of his class. His friends included Heinrich Braun, Wolf Knopfmacher, Salomon Lipiner, Siegmund Lustgarten, Ignaz Rosanes, Eduard Silberstein, Julius Wagner, and Richard Wahle. Freud contributed to the school’s fiftieth anniversary celebration, in 1914, with an article, “Some Reflections on Schoolboy Psychology,” that appeared in the commemorative brochure. For the fiftieth anniversary of Freud’s death in 1989, the Erzherzog Rainer Realgymnasium was renamed the Sigmund Freud Gymnasium. Eva LAIBLE See also: Adolescence; Darwin, Darwinism, and psychoanalysis; Psychology and psychoanalysis; Silberstein, Eduard; Suicide. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4—5. . (1914f). Some reflections on schoolboy psychology. SE, 13, 239-244. Laible, Eva. (1989). Uber Sigmund Freuds Gymnasialzeit, 125 Jahre Bg./ B.R.G. Wien II. Festschrift Sigmund Freud, dem beriihmtesten Schiiler unseres Gymnasiums zur 50. Wiederkehr seines Todestages gewidmet (pp. 19-30). Vienna: Festschrift Sigmund Freud. Pokorny, Alois. (1865). Jarhesberichte des Leopoldstéidter Kommunal-Real- und Obergymnasiums in Wien. Wien 1865-1874. Vienna: Verlag des Leopoldstadter Real- und Obergymnasiums. VIENNA GENERAL HOSPITAL Originally a hospice for the poor, Vienna General Hospital (Allemeines Krankenhaus) was dedicated by Emperor Joseph II in 1784. With about two thousand beds and a design with courtyards and open spaces, the hospital by the 1870s had become one of Europe’s leading teaching hospitals. with new and expanding departments and clinics. After receiving his medical degree in March 1881, Freud was able for a time to continue his research in Ernst Briicke’s physiology laboratory, where he also worked as a demonstrator for several semesters. But because Freud had limited financial resources, his hopes of building a career in research were misplaced, and Briicke’s attempts to obtain a research position for him in laboratories in Graz and Prague proved fruitless. After becoming engaged to Martha Bernays in June 1882, Freud accepted Briicke’s advice to give up research in favor of a more remunerative career as a physician. A month later Freud began his clinical training at the Vienna General Hospital. Freud spent three years at the hospital and trained in many of its different departments. He worked in surgery (July to September 1882) and studied internal medicine under Hermann Nothnagel (October 1882 to March 1883). His early training in psychiatry was under Theodor Meynert (April to October 1883). Freud subsequently trained in the dermatology clinic and was assigned to the ward for syphilitic patients. At first an unpaid trainee, Freud was appointed assistant physician (Sekundararzt) while under Meynert, and in early 1885 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS VIENNA, UNIVERSITY OF he temporarily replaced Franz Scholz as head of the department of nervous diseases and the liver. At the same time, he continued his researches in brain anatomy and pathology in Meynert’s laboratory. He published numerous articles in clinical neurology, on brain pathologies, and on cocaine, and for extra income he wrote abstracts of articles in international medical journals. Freud specialized in nervous diseases on the advice of Josef Breuer, and in June 1885 he was appointed privatdozent in neuropathology. About the same time, with Briicke’s support, he obtained a postgraduate travel grant to study in Paris at Salpétriere Hospital with Jean Martin Charcot. He subsequently concluded his clinical training in Berlin at Adolf Baginsky’s pediatric clinic. After his return to Vienna, he established a private practice as a neurologist in April 1886 and married in September of the same year. EvA LAIBLE See also: “Autobiographical Study, An’; Breuer, Josef; Briicke, Ernst Wilhelm von; Meynert, Theodor; Vienna, University of. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1960). Letters. New York: McGraw-Hill. . (1960b [1885]). Curriculum vitae. In Josef Gicklhorn and René Gicklhorn, Sigmund Freuds akademische laufbahn im lichte der dokumente. Vienna: Urban und Schwarzenberg. Hirschmiiller, Albrecht. (1991). Freuds begegnung mit der psychiatrie. Tubingen, Germany: Diskord. VIENNA PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY. see Wiener Psychoanalytische Vereinigung VIENNA, UNIVERSITY OF After a series of lectures on Darwin by Carl Brihl (1820-1899), an eminent professor of zoology at the University of Vienna, Freud decided to study medicine rather than law and to become a researcher in order to “understand something about the enigmas of nature 1837 VIOLENCE, INSTINCT OF and perhaps even contribute to solving them.” His decision was also inspired by “Nature,” a text that has been attributed to Goethe. In the absence of faculties in the natural sciences, medicine substituted as basic training for biologists, zoologists, and physiologists. Freud, however, had no wish to become a physician. The freedom in organizing studies accorded by the edicts of 1872 suited his theoretical penchants. Prepared by exercises with the microscope, he engaged for six semesters in intensive studies of zoology with Carl Claus (1835-1899), a Darwinian. Claus twice sent him on a university grant to the zoological station at Trieste, Italy, to study the sexual organs of the eel. Although Freud himself underestimated the value of this research, his description of the bisexual disposition of the fresh-water eel is considered a fundamental study in this domain. His studies of Aristotle with Franz von Brentano (1838-1917) caused him to nurture for some time the notion of doing a double doctorate in zoology and philosophy. In the course of his seventh semester he moved away from Claus, an exceptional though not very directive master, and joined the laboratory of the physiologist Ernst Wilhelm von Briicke (1819-1892), who was assisted by Ernst Fleischl von Marxow (1846-1891) and Siegmund Exner (1846-1926). This was “the inexhaustible center that drove all Viennese medicine in the second half of the century,’ where Freud finally found “tranquility and total satisfaction,” as well as individuals that he could “respect and take as models.” Briicke was an outstanding figure whom Freud could identify with, like Jean Martin Charcot later. Being more of a researcher than a student, Freud published five articles on neurophysiology before his doctorate. With “Uber den Bau der Nervenfasern und Nervenzellen beim Flusskrebs” (On the structure of nerve fibers and cells in the crayfish) in 1882, he became a pioneer in neurological research. He nevertheless experienced failures in his work in the Institute for Experimental Pathology, headed by Salomon Stricker (1834-1898), and in the Chemistry Institute, run by Ernst Ludwig (1842-1915). In 1879 and 1880 he translated works of John Stuart Mill, published in volume 12 of Mill’s Gesammelte Werke (Complete works), in order to earn his living, since he found himself in a difficult financial situation in spite of grants from two Jewish organizations. At this time he did his military service while preparing for his doctorate. In the oral examinations for his doctorate he received 1838 grades of “excellent” for the first and third examinations and a grade of “good enough” in the second. He sat for a recapitulation exam in law for physicians and received his medical doctorate on March 31, 1881. Among his friends while he was a student were Carl Koller, Siegmund Lustgarten, and Eduard Silberstein. Eva LAIBLE See also: Amentia; Brentano, Franz von; Breuer, Josef; Briicke, Ernst Wilhelm von; Darwin, Darwinism, and psychoanalysis; Goethe and psychoanalysis; Hard science and psychoanalysis; Institut Max-Kassowitz; Internal/ external reality; Philosophy and psychoanalysis; Science and psychoanalysis; Silberstein, Eduard; Wagner-Jauregg, Julius (Julius Wagner Ritter von Jauregg). Bibliography Hemecker, Wilhelm. (1991). Vor Freud: philosophiegeschichtliche voraussetzungen der psychoanalyse. Munich, Germany: Philosophia. Laible, Eva. (1993). Through privation to knowledge: unknown documents from Freud’s university years. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 74, 4, 775—790. Lesky, Erna. (1976). The Vienna medical school of the 19th century (L. Williams and I. S. Levij, Trans.). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. (Original work published 1965) VIOLENCE, INSTINCT OF The word violence derives from an Indo-European root that refers to life. The natural instinct of violence is thus not a destructive instinct, much less a death instinct, but a natural life and survival instinct that corresponds to the instinct of self-preservation in Sigmund Freud’s first theory of the instincts. It involves what Freud saw as a sort of natural “imaginary cruelty” in 1897 and described in “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes” (1915c) as being common to humans and animals. This instinct’s goal is above all to protect life and the narcissistic integrity of the subject. This holds regardless of the potential effects caused secondarily to an object that as yet has only a narcissistic status in the subject’s imagination. Instinctual violence has nothing to do with aggressiveness, sadism, or hatred, whose libidinal components Freud showed to be aimed at an object that had otherwise attained an oedipal genital status. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS In Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905), Freud very clearly showed that this brutal instinct can attract to itself a part of the sexual instincts, producing aggressive components. In 1915 he attributed a narcissistic and phallic character to violent dynamism and advanced the hypothesis of a logically necessary anaclisis of the sexual instincts on the brutal self-preservation instincts, so as to reinforce the energy of the sexual instincts in the direction of love and creativity. The role of the instinct of violence was gradually specified in European and American psychoanalytic studies that since 1960 have focused on a veritable metapsychology of narcissism. In La Violence fondamentale (Fundamental violence; 1984) Jean Bergeret, based on such studies and Freud’s first hypotheses, proposed an attempted synthesis, forming a theory of instinctual violence. He gave special emphasis to the difficulties Freud encountered in trying to account for the stage of primitive violence within the totality of the Oedipus myth. The first acts of the drama (the oracle of Apollo and the episode of Mount Cithaeron in particular) bear witness to human beings’ deep intuitive awareness of their fundamental instinct of brutality in the service of self-preservation. Freud was never satisfied with his successive theories about the instincts. Rather, he decided to focus on the synchronic aspect of a conflict arising between tendencies within the same psychogenetic generation. His theory of instinctual anaclisis, however, would have enabled him to conceptualize a diachronic conflict pitting the violent pregenital tendencies against the sexual tendencies, with all the possible configurations linked to fusion, defusion, and the different modes of articulation of these two fundamental groups of instincts. His choice of a synchronic model of conflict prevented Freud from better integrating into his psychodynamic and economic conception this brutal instinct of violence and defense, which he had nevertheless clearly described. JEAN BERGERET See also: Aggressiveness/aggression; Catastrophic change; Combined parent figure; Criminology and psychoanalysis; Cruelty; Envy and Gratitude; Fort-Da; Mastery, instinct for; Phobias in children; Primal scene; Sadism; Stammering; Transgression. Bibliography Bergeret, Jean. (1984). La violence fondamentale. Paris: Dunod. . (1994). La violence et la vie. Paris: Payot. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS VIOLENCE OF INTERPRETATION, THE: FROM PICTOGRAM TO STATEMENT Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123-243. . (1915c). Instincts and their vicissitudes. SE, 14: 109-140. VIOLENCE OF INTERPRETATION, THE: FROM PICTOGRAM TO STATEMENT The Violence of Interpretation, originally published in 1975 by the Presses Universitaires de France, was Piera Castoriadis-Aulagnier’s first book, although she had already published a number of important articles beginning in 1961, and her research (seminar at the Hopital Sainte-Anne), institutional involvement (creation of the Quatrieme Groupe of the O.P.L.E. in 1969), and editorial work (as head of the revue L’Inconscient and, then, Topique beginning in 1969) were already widely known. This book marked an important step in psychoanalysis in France, especially with regard to psychosis. It attracted a huge readership immediately, and has been translated into Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, and English. Aulagnier’s project sought to reexamine the Freudian metapsychological model on the basis of the psychoanalyst’s obligation, in therapeutic work with psychotic patients, to rethink the mind and its models. The magnitude of the task and the systematic organization of the new theories presented explain why this book was published relatively late in her career. The Violence of Interpretation, according to Aulagnier, attests to the “prodigious work of reinterpretation carried out by psychosis” (p. xxviii) and thus makes it possible to catch a glimpse of an unthinkable “before” that has been shared by all. Aulagnier did not base her work on the idea of a “psychotic kernel” common to all, a theory she rejected, but rather believed that the psychotic succumbs to the attraction of a mode of representation that has normally been surpassed, even though it remains latent in all subjects. The author’s analysis thus culminated in a theory of representation, and more specifically of what she called a “primal” stage of representation, which “ignores word-presentations and has as its exclusive material the image of the physical thing” (p. xxix). Hence Aulagnier’s definition of psychosis: “Psychosis is characterized by the force of attraction exerted by the primal, an attraction to which it opposes that ‘addition’ represented by the creation of a ‘delusional’ interpretation that makes ‘sayable’ the effects of that violence” (p. xxx). 1839 VISUAL Aulagnier innovated a number of new concepts based on this precept, in particular “primary violence,” which is the effect of anticipation imposed by the discourse of the mother (“word-bearer”) upon an infans from whom a response is anticipated that the preverbal infant is unable to give, and the “secondary violence” that “leans on” the first. For Aulagnier psychic activity is subdivided into three modes of functioning, none of which necessarily silence one another: primal process (pictographic representation), primary process (fantasy representation), and secondary process (ideational representation). The phenomenon of specularization (Jacques Lacan) and the psyche’s “borrowing” from sensory models are characteristic of the primal process. The “pictogram” is defined as “the formation of a relational schema, in which the representative is reflected as a totality identical with the world” (p. 25). This “representative background” does not disappear from the subject, but is “foreclosed to the power of the Is knowledge” (p. 37), except in psychosis where it is manifest. The primary process is comprised of fantasy activity, but Aulagnier emphasized that pleasure and unpleasure are always experienced here as being dependent upon an Other’s desire to give or refuse it. Finally we have the secondary process, which is linked to the appearance of word-presentations. Nomination, once it involves affect, means naming not just the object, but also the relation that links the I to the object: “to name the other with the term beloved is to designate the subject who is naming as lover” (p. 97). The I’s self-naming, with the linguistic signs proper to affect and the kinship system, enable it to come into being. Aulagnier wrote: “The I is simply the I’s knowledge of the I” (p. 5), but the I is also constructed: in relation to its past in “self-historization” and to its future in the “identificatory project.” The conditions that make it impossible for an I to come into being other than by passing through delusional identification are the topic of the second part of the book, where the author defines what she means by the “psychotic potentiality” or “primary delusional thinking” that can (or cannot) give way to actual psychosis. Aulagnier developed the two major categories of schizophrenia and paranoia and, based on the hypothesis of secondary violence and delusional theories of 1840 origination, proposed a new psychoanalytic approach to these pathologies. SOPHIE DE MyOLLA-MELLOR See also: Aulagnier-Spairani, Piera, France; Infans; Object; Pictogram; Psychotic potential; Sense/nonsense. Source Citation Aulagnier, Piera. (2001) The violence of interpretation: From pictogram to statement (Alan Sheridan, Trans.). Hove, UK, and Philadelphia: Brunner-Routledge. VISUAL As an adjective, the term visual designates what is perceptible in the field that presents itself to the eye. As a noun, the visual involves the way in which the psychical apparatus organizes this perceptual data. As early as his study on aphasia (1891b), Freud empha- — sized the importance of the visual in the representation of things in order to understand its complicated relationship with representation by words. In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), he both provided an optical model for the psychical apparatus and also noted that the dream material, as well as that of memory traces, are most often presented visually. Thus, modes of representation must fulfill requirements of visual representations. The subsequent recognition of visual component drives provided Freud with the opportunity to verify that their vicissitudes are not homologous to those of the other drives. Finally, in Moses and Monotheism (1939a), he insisted that it was necessary to set aside visual stimuli, especially those caused by the maternal body, in order to name the father. He connected this “advance in intellectuality” (1939a, p. 111) to the impact of monotheistic religion on mental life, especially when it prohibits representations. In Freud’s work, the visual shows the privileged connection between the sexual and the sensorial. Jacques Lacan discussed this in his article on the “Mirror Stage” (1949), where he expanded Freud’s observations of the visual dimension of narcissism. Lacan stressed the importance of the mirror image for the infant held up to the mirror by its mother. When the baby recognizes itself in the mirror, it achieves an identity by assuming the mirror image. But this is also a trap, because once the subject is captured, he confuses himself with the mirror image and thus becomes alie- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS nated by a visual definition of self. He is caught in the succession of images. In a study relating psychotic discourse to the mirror stage, Piera Aulagnier proposed that in the psyche’s primal activity of visual representation its invested object should be called a pictogram. In doing so, she emphasized the prevalence of the visual in unconscious representations. It is worthwhile to make another distinction between the visible image and the visual image. Vision exhausts only the empirical reality of a phenomenon, which can become a psychic representation, that is, a visual image, only by passing through the primary and secondary processes. The difference between what is visible and the visual of the image explains how dream images are never confused with things seen by the dreamer. Because it is incongruous with the desire to see, the visual image assures the perpetual thrust of the scopic drive. The impossibility of reducing the visual to the visible prevents the image from showing the object of desire and orients vision towards another image. If we grant Freud’s assertion that the desire to see is related to seeing the genital organs, the notion of the visual allows us to specify what is involved in the attempt to see, namely the female genitalia that eludes sight. The only way to represent it is by the visual image, which is a fetish that only exposes its unreal opposite, the maternal penis. Why is the visual the predominant sense? This question can be answered by considering that the visual is overdetermined because there is no penis on the female body. When the child fails to see a penis on a female body, his single sex wavers and he begins to think that there is another sex, which exists even though it is “invisible.” Other elements of the visual deserve further attention. For example, the central role that psychoanalysis grants the visual is justified by the fact that there must be a visual reference, a virtual psychical mirror (certain moments in the treatment) or a visual fantasy. The determining function of the visual might be related to the timelessness of the unconscious, because only the visual is in a position to prevent the representation of the fantasy from being eternalized. JEAN-MICHEL Hirt See also: Alpha elements; Amphimixia/amphimixis; Dream screen; Dream work; Fort-Da; Functional phenomena; Hallucinosis; Look/gaze; Mnemic trace/memory trace; Organic repression; Perception-consciousness (Pcpt.-Cs.); Psychic envelope; Psychic temporality; INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ViSUAL ARTS AND PSYCHOANALYSIS Representability; Secondary elaboration; Screen memory; Smell, sense of; Sudden involuntary idea; Thing-presentation; Thought; Voyeurism. Bibliography Aulagnier, Piera. (1975). La violence de |’interprétation. Du pictogramme a I’énoncé. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4—5: 1-751. . (1939a [1934-38]). Moses and monotheism: Three essays. SE, 23: 1-137. Lacan, Jacques. (2002). The mirror stage as formative of the I function as revealed in psychoanalytic experience. In Ecrits: A selection (Bruce Fink, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton. (Original work published 1949) VISUAL ARTS AND PSYCHOANALYSIS The visual arts make use of nonverbal representation and therefore require a different psychoanalytic approach than the language arts. The work of art can be considered as a compromise solution between impulses and defenses. Psychoanalysis can then try to reveal the unconscious ideas behind the creative work. But in the visual arts, even more so than in the language arts, it is form itself, more than the represented subject, that must be interpreted. The first psychoanalytic text to examine the visual arts was Freud’s Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood (1910c). Freud opened the way for psychobiography by demonstrating the impact of instinctual and infantile life on the artist’s creative work. In his analysis of La Gioconda and Saint Anne, he approached the analysis of formal elements: the Gioconda’s enigmatic smile owes its existence to Leonardo’s infantile life; the confusion of the bodies of Anne and Mary in the London drawing is said to be a form of condensation. In 1911 Karl Abraham published an essay on Giovanni Segantini. His goal was to show that psychoanalysis can be applied to the analysis of mental processes other than neurosis. He demonstrated the role of the practice of making art in the psychic economy of the artist, the importance of infantile experience, real or imagined, and the antagonistic interplay of love and hate in the genesis of the work. Unfortunately, his analysis of the paintings themselves does not deepen the interpretation of the manifest subject of the representation. 1841 VOYEURISM In 1913 Otto Rank and Hanns Sachs published in Die Bedeutung der Psychoanalyse fiir die Geiteswissenschaften (Psychoanalysis and the humanities) a chapter on the aesthetics and psychology of art, centered on the affects of pleasure and unpleasure of the work of art. They argued that the economy of affect governs the development of the formal aspects of the work of art. Freud published “The Moses of Michelangelo” (1914b) but did not sign it, proof of his prudence in using psychoanalysis for the interpretation of artistic phenomena. Freud based his interpretation of the statue on his own feelings. Since he identified with the subject of the representation, he understood the statue in terms of his own emotional investment, thus opening a path to an approach to artistic phenomena that was little used by later psychoanalysts, who were primarily interested in an analysis of the process of artistic creation. There were a number of important contributions to this field aside from the work of Freud: Otto Rank, Melanie Klein, Hanna Segal, Ernst Kris, Donald Winnicott, and Didier Anzieu. Children’s drawings and the work of psychotics have been used as nonverbal material, but strangely they have had little influence on the psychoanalysis of the visual arts. This field owes a great deal to the work of artists and art historians like Anton Ehrenzweig, Meyer Schapiro, Jean Clair, and René Demoris, who have made use of psychoanalytic theory. Along with the approach taken by psychobiography and interpretations of the creative process, both of which are focused on the artist, psychoanalysis can also help us understand the work of art itself, providing it can avoid using verbal language as the only source of reference. When Freud wrote that the lack of expression of the visual arts was due to the material used by those arts, he was referring to this. The image is not only a metaphor or symbol; it signifies, through its materiality, the setting aside of its metaphoric or symbolic meaning and the context in which our perceptual field has classified it. It comes to prominence through the brilliance of its materiality as a new external perception that we nonetheless are able to recognize. For the visual arts much more than for literature, meaning is hidden in form, the result of the conscious and unconscious intentions of the author. It is in the formal specifics of the work—that is, its style—that the process of figuration unique to the author is found. This is what Freud called, referring to the dream work, “pictorial language,” our first mode of 1842 expression. The painted or sculpted image should not be considered only the transcription of verbal thought but the expression of a visual unconscious that preserves our earliest impressions. The artist uses a sensory material that bears the traces of his first affective perceptions and experiences, producing a figurative representation that balances desire with external reality, actual perception with what has been irremediably lost. The psychoanalytic approach to the arts requires a methodology first used by Freud in “The Moses of Michelangelo.” The effect the work has on the spectator is the object of analysis. The image must be considered a libidinal object of investment that is offered to the spectator and apprehended on the basis of the effects it provokes in him. The work of art reactivates the spectator’s unconscious desire and awakens, step by step, the representations he has used as a support. Through this associative process, the spectator-analyst juxtaposes the resonances the work provokes in him and the formal aspects that can be considered traces of the unconscious life of its author. It is through this chain of association that he will be able to reconstruct the fantasies that generated the work of art. MICHEL ARTIERES See also: Baudouin, Charles; “Claims of Psychoanalysis to Scientific Interest”; Literary and artistic creation; Illusion; Kris, Ernst; Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood; “Moses of Michelangelo, The”; Rank (Rosenfeld), Otto; Representability; Sublimation. Bibliography Anzieu, Didier. (1981). Le corps de l’ceuvre, essais psychanalytiques sur le travail créateur. Paris: Gallimard. Artieres, Michel. (1995). Cézanne ou l’inconscient maitre d ’ceuvre. Lausanne: Delachaux and Niestleé. Freud, Sigmund. (1914b). The Moses of Michelangelo. SE, 13: 209-238. Kris, Ernst. (1952). Psychoanalytic explorations in art. New York: International Universities Press. Schapiro, Meyer. (1994). Theory and philosophy of art: Style, artist, and society. New York: George Braziller. VOYEURISM Voyeurism is a deviant manifestation of sexuality that involves looking without being seen in order to obtain INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS sexual pleasure. In Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d), Freud examines sexual perversion and indicates the circumstances under which “the pleasure of looking [scopophilia] becomes a perversion (a) if it is restricted exclusively to the genitals, or (b) if it is connected with the overriding of disgust (as in the case of voyeurs or people who look on at excretory functions), or (c) if, instead of being preparatory to the normal sexual aim, it supplants it.” Later, in “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes” (1915c), he provided a metapsychological explanation for the instinct of looking, which involved the voyeurexhibitionist pair and the reversal of activity into passivity in connection with a precise object: “the sexual member.” The different instinctual currents of seeing are inflected by the voyeur, who tries to see the other’s genitals while hiding his own, but who also tries to be seen looking, in order to respond to what he believes is the other’s desire to see. Jacques Lacan would later say that the voyeur wants to be seen as a seer. Freud continued to emphasize the visual component of the perversions, but for him the specificity of voyeurism is important because of the vicissitude of the instinct of looking rather than its role in perversions. Rather than allowing the evolution of the instinct (component) of looking to develop in different directions, the voyeur reduces the sexual and the visual in sex to a narrow, stereotypical sexual situation. He appears to do away with the sexual, the multiplicity of objects and choices, by wrapping them in a rigid fantasy. He tries to block the aggression in the instinct in order to obtain pleasure, to the detriment of the other. By splitting the ego, he uses sex for the purpose of discharging instinctual violence. By appropriating the other as image, the voyeur makes it an object of pleasure, while remaining uninvolved in the other's intimacy. The voyeur does not seek any form of exchange or relationship, but obtains pleasure by seizing the other’s image against its will. The goal is not only the sight of parts of the body that are concealed out of modesty or cultural opprobrium, but also to dismember the body of the other. The voyeur watches what is forbidden in order to destroy the physical integrity of the person by substituting a dismembered body for the unified image. Several circumstances can lead to the occurrence of voyeurism. The instinct to see is used through dis- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS VOYEURISM avowal and fetish formation to deny castration. The fantasy of the phallic mother and the split of awareness of the lack of a penis leads to rage and need for revenge towards her. For Masud Khan, the pervert does not succeed in creating a transitional object when reacting against the encroachment of the maternal unconscious, but manages to fabricate an “internal collageobject,” which he then tries to discover in external reality. The voyeur engages in this type of theatricalization of the sexual relation by manipulation, submission, and humiliation of the object. Robert Stoller has insisted on the cultural necessity of the perversion “forged by society and the family so that they are not harmed further” by instinctual cruelty. Because voyeurism turns the other into an image, an object of envy and covetousness, it appears to also bear witness to the visual focus of Western society. Seeing at any cost is an imperative that is often confused with science’s objective of mastery. In an “omnivisual world,” according to Jacques Lacan’s expression, the voyeur becomes the one who does not allow himself to be blinded by sexual difference but cannot support the truth. He knows exactly what his mother is like, but tries to save his phallic image through some visual sleight-of-hand. More than anyone, he denies what he sees: the rift between the sexes, the fracture of bodies. JEAN-MICHEL Hirt See also: Activity/passivity; Exhibitionism; Face-to-face situation; Infantile sexual curiosity; “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes”; Libidinal development; Prohibition; Scoptophilia/ scopophilia; Turning around upon the subject’s own self; Visual. Bibliography Bonnet, Gérard. (1996). La violence du voir. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Freud, Sigmund. (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123-243. . (1915c). Instincts and their vicissitudes. SE, 14: 109-140. Khan, Masud. (1981). Alienation in perversions. London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis. Stoller, Robert. (1975). Perversion: The erotic form of hatred. New York: Pantheon. 1843 me ey aits e nue om 7 => ~ aes at jas: Pap " soar ta ee ee Soni cromnatiaives “ere n| k toe caunnter on <} aealiees ie csinanead ts a8 2 | rep diaeniniene a eid waned att ) bee, a igen ili e ares — ge : “eon At “sat:e t Wl :s e iseo > a OR pub avey 7h). ait . ate cel ey parr sspebnyec ey a panei Jt 4 sent nd Ea iets wear cae ea es, f ay tens ats Lh te rot eee a oie ‘on ae. - Ale: ; > cb‘s Lata de ME ie (ese eaeM e nape _ ar ; an io ee oh kes eeack | fine : | : ortbepetle basdhae ; . isa 3S Si a tee dle eae ; hat wo eo aoe eg | a? Vii Caer ite taal ae! mers a Geo ya MA, (oie Wy o% bean : i pyatianata snare Caeht sine Gen Ma" -2 0 ee Torre Slate ei eat Bi ee wait 38 " 3 nl : ag ‘ i Tals heey di IDG 4A PT nls e yh Were ora eae ah ts. AN heed rte a 3 = 7 = + atau megs Tagan, grid oma gore alae? rye et SE intial ae ee Ae Mig Rl tPF AS a ee jitter ie st eena rson ; ‘ayotyo tie retin (oy PS iane ¥ an, oft i : . . ae > jaeol ee * i dtp s-:1 70 i y ; ‘ ‘ tor#y loc ig, ahd Ss ta me | ah dia are ) ys ha : sibel mel _ Ayeraarae 31. aie Yara =i ria ( ; Pi . iy en tod ciao Me oF etreeiiieiondl ee ee eee T 1. . “aaa wm rete ine fiir aay" oi ih : ’ al F oT ayia: Wi} ihe "hi 4 AY we ge eee Dyas bo taliratinall « yolinkedia§ ri neat ‘9 ee | read era ota 6D tevele ry (PS ae on? Ys gia a toh il 7 ; | . , » x6 teed, gpl uy Aguenly. boeit 2 W WAELDER, ROBERT (1900-1967) An Austrian psychoanalyst who taught in the psychiatric section of Philadelphia Jefferson Medical College, Robert Waelder was born on February 20, 1900, in Vienna, and died on September 28, 1967 in Broomall, Pennsylvania. He was the son of Joseph Waelder, a Jewish merchant. After graduating from Maximilian gymnasium with honors in 1918, Waelder entered the university and in 1921 obtained a doctorate in physics. At the age of twenty-two, Waelder consulted Sigmund Freud about treatment and, following his advice, he started a personal analysis with Robert Hans Jokl; he subsequently underwent training analyses with Hermann Nunberg and Anna Freud. In 1924, Waelder became a member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, where he performed a variety of functions as librarian and as a member of the candidate committee. From 1932 to 1939, with Ernst Kris, Waelder edited Imago, becoming that journal’s editor-in-chief in 1934. As a representative of the Viennese analysts, and within the context of an exchange of views, in 1936 Waelder presented in London his critique of the teachings of Melanie Klein; “The Problem of the Genesis of Psychical Conflict” was published in 1936. Waelder also presented to the Royal Institute of International Affairs his work on psychology and politics, which was published as “The Psychological Aspects of International Affairs” and suggested how psychoanalytic notions might be applied to the study of war; in a similar vein, he had written a short study on collective psychoses; this was published first in French, and subsequently as Psychological Aspects of War and Peace. Another socio-political work, Progress and Revolution, was published in 1967. According to Richard Sterba, Waelder “showed a certain unworldliness that stood in contrast to the vastness of his scientific and literary knowledge” (Sterba, p. 138). He nevertheless created a considerable impression upon colleagues. “Waelder’s extensive knowledge and his vast vision are easily seen, particularly in his later writings” (p. 141). Waelder’s first marriage was to Jenny Pollak, who in 1928 also became a member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. In 1938, he emigrated to the United States and taught at the Boston Psychoanalytic Institute. Later, in 1943, he settled in Philadelphia and became a training analyst at the recently founded Philadelphia Psychoanalytic Institute. After a schism, in which members broke away to form the Philadelphia Association for Psychoanalysis, Waelder served as president of that organization from 1953 to 1955. In 1963, he was appointed professor of psychoanalysis at the psychiatry department of Jefferson Medical College in Philadelphia. ELKE MUHLLEITNER See also: United States Bibliography Sterba, Richard. (1982). Reminiscences of a Viennese psychoanalyst. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. Waelder, Robert. (1929). Psychological aspects of war and peace. Geneva Studies, 10, 2. . (1960). Basic theory of psychoanalysis. New York: International Universities Press. . (1967). Progress and revolution; a study of the issues of our age. New York: International Universities Press. 1845 Wacner-JAUREGG, JULIUS (1857-1940) . (1976). Psychoanalysis: Observations, theory, application: Selected papers of Robert Waelder. New York: International Universities Press. WAGNER-JAUREGG, JULIUS (JULIUS WAGNER RITTER VON JAUREGG) (1857-1940) Julius Wagner Ritter von Jauregg, an Austrian professor of psychiatry, was born on March 7, 1857, in the city of Wels, in Upper Austria, and died in Vienna on September 27, 1940. He was the son of a high ranking civil servant. While still a student and like Freud, he published the results of his original research in the laboratory of Salomon Stricker, professor of experimental pathology at the University of Vienna. After obtaining his doctorate in medicine in 1880, Wagner- Jauregg, for two years, remained an assistant in Stricker’s laboratory, where he met Freud. The two men became friends and colleagues. When he failed to be admitted to a training program in internal medicine, Wagner-Jauregg decided on psychiatry. He submitted his thesis for his habilitation in neuropathology in 1885 and qualified as a privatdozent in psychiatry in 1888. In 1889 he was appointed professor extraordinarius at the University of Graz. Four years later, in 1893, he was appointed professor ordinarus, or full professor, at the University of Vienna, where he also became director of the First Psychiatric and Neurological Clinic and, from 1902, of the Second Psychiatric Clinic. -The course of Wagner-Jauregg’s scientific work includes such empirical discoveries as the central role of iodine deficiency in the etiology of cretinism and the introduction of iodine therapy to treat goiter. Most significant was his use of malarial inoculations to treat general paresis, then a relatively common disorder in patients suffering from tertiary syphilis. This treatment represented his belief that inducing febrile illness could prove therapeutic in cases of psychosis, and in 1927 it won him the Nobel Prize in physiology or medicine. Wagner-Jauregg was accused of abusing soliderpatients in his clinic by employing extremely painful electrical treatments to treat shell shock. The 1920 debate protocols from the military commission investigating charges of brutality suffered by soldiers at the hands of army doctors during the First World War reveal a fundamental disagreement between Freud and 1846 Wagner-Jauregg in their respective views on the nature of what came to be known as war neuroses. Freud was appointed as an expert in the case after other psychiatrists, former students of Wagner-Jauregg, recused themselves. In Wagner-Jauregg’s view, as was commonly thought at the time, soldiers who seemed to be suffering from battle-related shell shock were actually malingerers. In contrast, Freud suggested the importance of the unconscious in such cases; he brought forward positive results of psychoanalytic treatment and proposed that war neuroses be treated more humanely and considered as purely psychological in nature. Freud emphasized that he believed Wagner-Jauregg could not be personally guilty of cruelty to patients. Despite Wagner-Jauregg’s negative attitude toward psychoanalysis, a number of analysts, including Helene Deutsch, Heinz Hartmann, Otto Pétzl, and Paul Schilder, all worked in his clinic as interns or assistants. Psychoanalytic training carried an obligation to work in a clinical setting in a university psychiatric department. Wagner-Jauregg’s congratulations on the occasion of Freud’s sixtieth birthday led to subsequent regular respectful exchanges between the two men. Eva LAIBLE See also: Freud, Anna; Hartmann, Heinz; Isakower, Otto; “Notes Upon-a Case of Obsessional Neurosis” (Rat Man); Nunberg, Hermann; Potzl, Otto; Schilder, Paul Ferdinand; War neurosis. Bibliography Brown, Edward M. (2000). Why Wagner-Jauregg won the Nobel Prize. History of Psychiatry, 11, 371-382. Eissler, Kurt R. (1986). Freud as an expert witness: The discussion of war neuroses between Freud and Wagner-Jauregg (Christine Trollope, Trans.). Madison, CT: International Universities Press. (Original work published 1979) Jones, Ernest. (1953-1957). Sigmund Freud: Life and work (3 vols.). New York: Basic. Lesky, Erna. (1976). The Vienna medical school of the 19th century (L. Williams and I. S. Levij, Trans.). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. (Original work published 1965) Miuhlleitner, Elke. (1992). Biographisches Lexikon der Psychoanalyse: Die Mitglieder der psychologischen Mittwoch- Gesellschaft und der Wiener psychoanalytischen Vereinigung, 1902—1938. Tubingen, Germany: Diskord. Whitrow, Magda. (1993). Julius Wagner-Jauregg (1857— 1940). London: Smith-Gordon. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS WALTER, BRUNO (1876-1962) The celebrated conductor and composer Bruno Walter was born in Berlin on September 15, 1876, and died in Los Angeles on February 17, 1962. Born German, Bruno Walter Schlesinger was naturalized as an Austrian citizen in 1911, took French citizenship in 1938, and became an American citizen in 1948. Dropping his surname in favor of “Walter” represented an identification with Walther von Stolzing, the hero of Wagner’s comic opera, Die Meistersinger von Niirnberg. Walter’s musical training took place in Berlin, Cologne, and Hamburg, where he met avant-garde composer Gustav Mahler, who became his mentor and whom he followed to Vienna. There he began a brilliant career as conductor and pianist, and was also Mahler’s staunch defender. Walter was an active participant on the unique and complex intellectual scene in turn-of-the-century Vienna, and his introduction to psychoanalysis occurred in 1906, while a young conductor and Mahler’s protegé. Then at a crucial stage in life, he suffered from a paralyzing neuralgia and, after consulting a number of specialists, he decided to seek help from Freud. From Walter’s autobiography we know the course and outcome of their meeting, which has been the subject of a small number of studies. Freud’s work with Walter was unusual in that he operated less as psychoanalyst than as a psychiatric consultant. Indeed, while the young Walter expected months of psychological investigation, Freud, after a physical exam and a single visit, prescribed sojourns in Italy and Sicily. The impact of the consultation had such an effect that Walter obeyed immediately. His subsequent treatment with Freud resembled therapy by suggestion such as was common in the nineteenth century. When Walter asked Freud if he would be able to play in front of an audience because he feared a relapse, Freud took upon himself the responsibility, assuming the role of a protective paternal figure and inducing an almost hypnotic effect upon Walter, traces of which were still discernable forty years later. The case history of Bruno Walter was discovered by the Austrian analyst Richard Sterba, who also emigrated to the United States and was a great music lover. Since his 1951 publication, this unusual affair has come regularly under scrutiny, whether for purely historical value, as a key example of brief therapy, for Freud’s use of a somatic approach, or even as a method of treating the so-called “actual neuroses.” INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Want oF BEING/LACK OF BEING The close-knit Viennese artistic milieu fostered fortuitous encounters. Mahler, for example, also had a therapeutic consultation with Freud; and Ernest Jones, in the second volume of Freud’s biography, mentions that it took place to the intervention of Viennese neurologist Richard Nepallek, who also happened to be a relative of Mahler’s wife, Alma. Others have suggested Walter as the source of the consultation, but have not been able to prove it. It is true that during the 1930s Walter collaborated with Herbert Graf, better known in psychoanalytic circles as “Little Hans.” Whether these experiences intensified Walter’s powerful admiration for Freud, as revealed by Sterba, is not known. NICOLAS GOUGOULIS See also: Music and psychoanalysis; Suggestion. Bibliography Chesire, Neil M. (1997). The empire of the ear: Freud’s problem with music. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 6, 1127-1168. Garcia, Emanuel E. (1990). Somatic interpretation in a transference cure: Freud’s treatment of Bruno Walter. International Review of Psycho-Analysis, 17, 83-88. Gougoulis, Nicolas, and Kapsambelis, Vassilis. (1996). Recherches sur le concept freudien des névroses actuelles. Topique, 61, 493-502. Sterba, Richard EF (1951). A case of brief psychotherapy by Sigmund Freud. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 38, 75-80. Walter, Bruno. (1946). Theme and variations. An autobiography. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. WANT OF BEING/LACK OF BEING For Jacques Lacan, human being is a “lack of being.” That was how he designated the subject’s fundamental emptiness as it was caused by the first symbolization and by the fact that desire originates in castration. From the beginning of his teaching, Lacan noted that for Freud the object is fundamentally lost, and the subject spends his life looking for it. The object of psychoanalysis is the lack of an object, and this lacking object is at the heart of being. Lacan started elaborating on this notion of a lack of being in 1957, when he 1847 War Neurosis set about describing the oedipal crisis in terms of the dialectic of desire and the question of the phallus. During the mirror stage, the infant identifies with a certain point within the maternal space. In fact, what the subject takes for its own being is an other, both an image in the mirror and an alter ego. This fundamental alienation establishes misapprehension whereby one’s being is confused with one’s ego. From the beginning the subject is torn. He is divided between the place from which he sees himself, and the image, the other with which he identifies. From this perspective, a human being can never experience a wholeness that would amount to being. Because language allows the child to symbolize the mother’s alternating presence and absence, it makes it impossible for the child to become one with the mother. From this point on, a gap is introduced between the mother and child and any illusion of totality is broken. The subject experiences his lack of being, and when father later appears to put the phallus into play, he proves the lack of being of the maternal phallus. “[T]he child’s desire manages to identify with the mother’s want-to-be” (Lacan, 2002, p. 197). This desire begins as a quest for an object that might fill this lack. Paradoxically the subject, as an effect of the symbolic (trapped within language), can only use language to search for the lost object. As Lacan wrote, “The being of language is the nonbeing of objects” (p. 253). Being is only a “lack of being,” and the thing that could fill this lack is forbidden. This prohibition maintains desire. Thus desire appears as the metonymy of a lack of being whose signifier is the phallus that marks what the mother lacks. The subject’s being is lack, and the cut that produced the symbolic is the object a, which is the real insofar as it is articulated in the symbolic and which is also a gap that the ego as image occupies. The image of the body, the principal mirage, indicates the place of desire insofar as it is desire for nothing. This is the relation of human beings with their own lack of being. But at the same time, the image is what prevents the human being from seeing it. ALAIN VANIER See also: Subject’s castration; Symbolic, the (Lacan). Bibliography Lacan, Jacques. (1958-1959). Le Séminaire-Livre VI, Le désir et son interpretation (unpublished seminar). 1848 _ (1997). The seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII, The ethics of psychoanalysis, (1959-1960) (Dennis Porter, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton, 1997. . (2002). Ecrits: A selection. (Bruce Fink, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton. WAR NEUROSIS Freud’s interest, and that of his disciples, in war neurosis (névrose de guerre) developed during the First World War (1915b). The first psychoanalysts had an opportunity to observe and to monitor many patients presenting — such distinctive symptoms as paralyses, tremors, recurring nightmares, the loss of sexual desire, and the like, all related to the experience of war. Observations and debate on these cases were presented in 1918 to the Fifth International Congress in Budapest, by Freud, Sandor Ferenczi, Karl Abraham, Ernst Simmel and Ernest Jones. As well as the scientific interest in these pathologies there was a need to prove to detractors of psychoanalysis (who were only too happy to see a picture of neurosis emerge that left, according to them, no room for the unconscious) that war neurosis had in effect a definite kinship with transference neuroses and hysteria. The common denominator would be trauma, which acts by breaching the psychic apparatus, and which may appear either from the outside (traumatic neurosis) or even from the inside (transference neurosis) of the subject. In every case the trauma consists of too great a quantity of excitation, which ruptures the protective shield system, the psychic envelope. Generally the symptoms appear after a clear interval and take hold as a defense against anxiety. From this period on, psychoanalysts have demonstrated that trauma acts as a precipitating factor, revealing a pre-existing neurotic structure; war then being the second instance or the “afterwardsness” of an infantile trauma. (Afterwardsness is Jean Laplanche’s neologism to translate apres coup and Nachtraglichkeit into English. Deferred action is the term used frequently in the Standard Edition.) The symptoms (rumination over the traumatic event, recurring nightmares, insomnia) appear as repeated attempts to bind and abreact the trauma. As the issue of the psychic after-effects of war is always unfortunately topical, these works are used as a benchmark for the teams who organize the treatment INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS of war victims in their countries, as the articles of Marie-Rose Moro testify. But furthermore there is a line of thought that results today in “Post Traumatic Stress Disorders,” and which breaks, unfortunately, with metapsychological topography and with the theory of afterwardsness. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Germany; Kardiner, Abram; Neurosis; Simmel, Ernst; Tavistock Clinic; Trauma; Traumatic neurosis. Bibliography Ferenczi, Sandor. (1980). Two types of war neuroses. In Further contributions to the theory and technique of psychoanalysis (pp. 124—141; John Rickman, Ed.; Jane Isabel Suttie et al, Trans.). New York: Brunner/Mazel. (Original work published 1916/1917). Ferenczi, Sandor, Abraham, Karl, Simmel, Ernst, and Jones, Ernest. (1921). Psychoanalysis and the war neuroses (The International Psychoanalytical Library, No. 2). London: International Psychoanalytical Press. Freud, Sigmund. (1919d). Introduction to "Psycho-analysis and the war neuroses.” SE, 17: 205-210. Moro, Marie-Rose. (1998), Lenfant en situation de guerre ou de catastrophe, réflexion préliminaire et Soutien psychologique aupres des ex-détenus bosniaques musulmans et de leur famille, Médecins sans frontiéres. Medical News, 7, 2. Further Reading Tucker, P., and Trautman, R. (2000). Understanding and treating PTSD: Past, present and future. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 64, 37-51. WASHINGTON PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY The organizational history of psychoanalysis in the Washington D.C.-Baltimore metropolitan area is as convoluted and complex as the intellectual weave that created it. Psychoanalysis started early in Washington, embraced by key U.S. psychiatrists, and it mutated and expanded over the better part of a century. Currents of thought and practice, often in conflict, came to include ego psychology, Freudian revisionism, Sullivanian interpersonal theory, and the use of psychoanalytic theory to understand and treat psychoses. Among the important figures in its history must be counted INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS WASHINGTON PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY psychiatric pioneers Adolf Meyer and William Alanson White, the maverick Harry Stack Sullivan and his colleagues Frieda Fromm-Reichmann and_ Clara Thompson, and the determined Viennese defender of orthodoxy, Jenny Waelder-Hall. The precursor to the Washington Psychoanalytic Society was founded in 1914, with William Alanson White as its chair. Like several other psychiatrists fascinated by Freudian ideas, White was superintendent of the Government Hospital for the Insane, soon to be renamed St. Elizabeth’s Hospital. White, who had been interested in Freud’s teachings since about 1909, became the first American author of a book on psychoanalysis when his Mental Mechanisms was published in 1911. Other significant figures early on the Washington scene included Adolf Meyer, who was associated with Johns Hopkins University, Ives Hendrick of Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital, and John MacCurdy, one of the founders of the American Psychoanalytic Association. Interest in treating the psychoses was common to all these figures, and the use of analytic ideas for therapeutic ends with severe psychopathology became an enduring feature of psychoanalysis in Washington-Baltimore. Members of the Washington Society originally met regularly and discussed papers. A hiatus at the end of the First World War lasted for several years, and for a time the organization changed its name to the Washington Psychopathological Society to distinguish itself from a competing society. By the late 1920s, however, distinguished analysts were visiting Washington from abroad and the society had attracted significant local psychiatric talent. Ernest Hadley, one of the first to open a private psychoanalytic practice in Washington, became a major administrative figure in the American Psychoanalytic Association (APA) over the next two decades. Efforts to create a more formal group culminated with the founding of the Washington-Baltimore Psychoanalytic Society in 1930. From the beginning the institute situated itself as a constituent of the APA, to which it became accredited in 1932; it also subsequently affiliated with the International Psychoanalytical Association. Members soon created a training program, formally established as the Washington-Baltimore Psychoanalytic Institute in 1940. Lewis Hill directed the institute until 1949; he was succeeded by Ernest Hadley for five years thereafter, until the latter’s death in 1954. Background and education of members of the Washington-Baltimore society in its early years distin- 1849 WASHINGTON PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY guished them in the broader context of the evolution of psychoanalysis in the United States. “From the beginning,” wrote Donald L. Burnham (1978) in an early historical evaluation, “diversity of membership and of approaches was a feature of the psychoanalytic groups which formed in this region.” He added, “This may have been partly because of their ‘home-grown’ quality. There was less leadership and dominance from analysts who had come originally form Vienna or Berlin” (p. 89). Analysts in Washington included Midwesterners, Roman Catholics, and children of rural America. Harry Stack Sullivan, a representative American who had grown up in upstate New York, strongly affected the whole trajectory of psychoanalysis in Washington- Baltimore; in retrospect, his influence was as pervasive and crucial as it was controversial and divisive Like Meyer and White, Sullivan came to psychoanalysis via the treatment of psychoses. Soon after establishing the Washington Psychoanalytic Institute, he went on, during the mid-1930s, to help found the William Alanson White Psychoanalytic (later changed to: Psychiatric) Foundation and Washington School of Psychiatry. Active and influential in psychoanalytic circles, Sullivan was also loudly not a conventional analyst and eventually he developed a systematic theory of development that emphasized the interpersonal determinants of psychological life and the cultural components of mental disorders. Sullivan’s predominance also expressed itself through the people he influenced in Washington and Baltimore, as well as those he antagonized. Clara Thompson was a friend, colleague, and ally who became a powerful figure in the Washington-Baltimore Psychoanalytic Society arid helped establish and lead the William Alanson White Institute in New York, originally as a satellite of the Washington-Baltimore Institute. Frieda-Fromm Reichmann, who was also influenced by Sullivan, became prominent in treating severe mental illness with intensive psychotherapy, and was active in all the local organizations. On Sullivan’s antagonistic side was Jenny Waelder-Hall, a Viennese-trained analyst who arrived in Washington in the mid-1940s. Considerable personal enmity grew up between her and Sullivan, said to be apparent from their first meeting. Donald Burnham (1978) suggested that “it is tempting to view Waelder- Hall and Sullivan not only as eloquent spokesmen but as literal personifications of Vienna orthodoxy and American eclecticism and of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of reconciling the two” (p. 102). The permutations that occurred in Washington psychoanalysis soon after the end of World War II pro- 1850 ceeded, in any event, along intellectual fault lines with the help of some personal and professional hostility. By 1946 the Washington-Baltimore Psychoanalytic Society split into two groups, although they would share a single training organizations until separate institutes were both officially approved in 1952 and fully accredited by the American Psychoanalytic Association three years later. The Baltimore Psychoanalytic Society represented a strong version of the European and Viennese current of orthodoxy led by Waelder- Hall; while the Washington Psychoanalytic Society, although it included orthodox analysts, also expressed Sullivan’s influence, which was to outlast his premature death in 1949. Using psychoanalysis to treat severe mental disorders followed a unique and separate but intertwined trajectory in Washington-Baltimore. Apart from the early work of Meyer and White, Sullivan, who declined to accept the therapeutic pessimism commonly seen in European psychiatry concerning psychosis, developed a treatment scheme for schizophrenia for which he claimed a high rate of success. By the late 1930s, Chestnut Lodge, a private sanatorium in Rockville, Maryland, became the site of efforts to treat patients with sever mental illness using psychodynamic principles. Invited by director Dexter Bullard, Frieda Fromm- Reichman became the first of a number of psychoanalysts to employ intensive, long-term therapy with schizophrenics at Chestnut Lodge Although tensions between orthodox analysis and dissident currents persisted through he 1950s and 1960s in Washington-Baltimore, the period saw steady growth in psychoanalysis at a time when the profession found support at the National Institute of Mental Health and a host of local institutions, including Walter Reed Hospital and Georgetown University Medical School. In the institutional skein, many prominent analysts held multiple appointments. When Fromm- Reichman’s celebrated Principles of Intensive Psychotherapy was published in 1950, for example, she not only was a leader at Chestnut Lodge but taught at the Washington School of Psychiatry and the Washington- Baltimore Psychoanalytic Institute, as well as the William Alanson Institute of Psychiatry in New York. By the 1970s, the decline of psychoanalysis as a medical specialty led to modifications in many programs that encouraged postgraduates outside of medicine, and those in Washington and Baltimore were not exceptions. The Washington Psychoanalytic Institute INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS expanded its theoretical base, and training has come to embrace a diversity of viewpoints in addition to a Freudian core, including object-relations theory, self psychology, intersubjectivist, and constructivist approaches. The Baltimore Psychoanalytic Institute, founded by Jenny Waelder-Hall on classical lines, was now the Baltimore-Washington Psychoanalytic Institute, and relocated to Laurel, Maryland. It modified its programs beginning in the 1960s, and now trains psychologists and social workers as well as psychiatrists. Other institutes also opened in the Washington- Baltimore metropolitan area in the last two decades of the twentieth century. The International Institute of Object Relations therapy, founded by David E. Scharff and Jill Savage Scharff, is based in Chevy Chase, Maryland, although it has created training modules in nearly a dozen other cities. The Institute of Contemporary Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis of Washington, founded by Joseph Lichtenberg and Rosemary Segalla, bases its training program on Heinz Kohut’s self psychology. JOHN GALBRAITH SIMMONS Bibliography Burnham, Donald. (1978). Orthodoxy and eclecticism in American psychoanalysis: The Washington-Baltimore experience. In J. Quen and E. Carlson (Eds.), American psychoanalysis: origins and development (pp. 87-108). New York: Brunner Mazel. Noble, Douglas, and Burnham, Donald. (1969). History of the Washington Psychoanalytic Society and the Washington Psychoanalytic Institute. Washington DC: Washington Psychoanalytic Society. WEANING Weaning is the name for the suppression or reduction of breast milk and/or baby formula to replace it with more solid food. Weaning is at the crossroads of biology, culture, and the psychic organization of the mother/child dyad. Weaning involves the interactive process of interruption of the corporeal relationship between mother and child. It begins spontaneously during the second six months of life as an effect of the infant’s maturation; the infant manifests a decreased interest in feeding, especially if it has been breast fed, and begins an active search INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS WEANING for autonomy that the mother can perceive and facilitate according to her affective syntony with the infant, as Benjamin Spock described in “The Striving for Autonomy and Regressive Object Relationship” (1963), according to her affective syntony with the infant. In his Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1916—1917a [1915-1917]), Sigmund Freud described weaning as traumatic, perhaps owing to syntony, but also as the moment when nostalgia for the mother appears, which is present in all infants, and above all in those who have not been breast fed. Melanie Klein studied the relations between weaning and the depressive position that accompanies it and that continues on thereafter. In “Les complexes familiaux dans la formation de lindividu” (Family complexes in the formation of the individual; 1938), Jacques Lacan organized the various points of view in the following way: Traumatic or not, he explained, weaning leaves in the psyche a permanent trace of the biological relationship it interrupts. This moment also presents the twofold aspect of a crisis in the psyche, the first that unquestionably has a dialectical structure. For the first time, a vital tension is expressed in terms of a mental intention. Weaning forms the basis for the positive aspect of the weaning complex, that is, the image of nourishment that tends to establish the most archaic and stable feelings uniting the individual with his or her family: It thus constitutes the basis of familial and social life. In LImage inconsciente du corps (The unconscious image of the body; 1984), Francoise Dolto discussed weaning as an oral castration of the child, that is, an imposed deprivation of what for him or her is cannibalism in relation to the mother. Dolto also elaborated E. Forman’s concept of motherhood as a developmental stage and associated the possibility of successful weaning with the mother’s ability to accept the interruption of body-tobody contact, and above all, to communicate with the infant in various ways, among them providing food, but also by means of words and gestures, which represent the desire and possibility to speak for the child: “The baby is talking about feeding, but not about the breast.” The time of weaning, ever earlier in our culture, represents the relational conflict characteristic of the late oral or oral-sadistic stage. Bernard Golse emphasized its ambivalent aspect, due to the fact that incorporating the mother becomes destructive with teething. The infant who suckles the breast attacks it and wins nourishment 1851 WEININGER, Otto (1880-1903) by inflicting hurt. The cannibalistic impulses of the two partners are reciprocally activated, and both must learn to sense and control aggression. This is indeed what happens in cases of “good” weaning, due both to a simultaneous establishing of distance by the mother and by the infant and to the working out of the child’s aggressive and libidinal requirements in the presence of the mother as an object. Failures in weaning include late weaning (often because of the mother’s desire to prolong the erotogenic pleasure of nursing), which can be experienced by the infant as punishment and which makes the process of separation/individuation difficult. Inversely, premature weaning—that is, before the infant has been able to invest other objects—has varying effects according to the circumstances. Among the most serious failures, there is fusion of the life instinct and the death instinct, as in cases of mental anorexia or addictions to orally ingested substances. In extreme cases of weaning following abandonment, Dolto explained in Les Etapes majeures de lenfance (The major stages of childhood; 1994), a behavioral regression, due to residual fantasies from before the trauma, compromises the previously acquired sound-producing capability of the larynx and the oral cavity. Psychogenic mutism can ensue, with or without loss of hearing. James S. Grotstein studied the end of analytic treatment as a weaning that makes possible a liberation of narcissism with the aim of accepting the world as it is. Paul-Claude Racamier more specifically described weaning from the sleeping treatment, during which patients are lavished with maternal care that helps them to emerge from the regression and to establish very deep bonds with the physician providing treatment. GrazIA MARIA FAvA VIZZIELLO See also: Anaclisis/anaclitic; Breastfeeding; Cruelty; Imago; Maternal; Oral eroticism; Psychosexual development; Psychanalyse et Pediatrie (Psychoanalysis and pediatrics); Technique with children, psychoanalytic; Sexuality. Bibliography Dolto, Francoise. (1984). L’Image consciente du corps. Paris: Le Seuil. . (1994). Les Etapes majeures de lenfance. Paris: Gallimard. Lacan, Jacques. (1984). Les complexes familiaux dans la formation de l’individu (pp. 23-30; written for Encyclopédie 1852 frangaise, Vol. 8). Paris: Larousse. (Original work published 1938) Spock, Benjamin. (1963). The striving for autonomy and regressive object relationship. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 18, 361-36. Further Reading Furman, Erna. (1982). Mothers have to be there to be left. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 37, 15—28.: Mahler, Margaret, Pine, Fred, and Bergman, Anni. (1975). The psychological birth of the human infant: Symbiosis and individuation. New York: Basic Books. Pine, Fred. (1994). The era of separation-individuation. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 14, 4—24. WEININGER, OTTO (1880-1903) Otto Weininger, an Austrian and Jewish intellectual, was born on April 3, 1880, in Vienna, where he committed suicide on October 4, 1903. Adelheid, Otto’s mother, whose health was frail, was a submissive wife to his father, Leopold, a renowned goldsmith and powerful personality. Of his six brothers and sisters, only four reached adulthood. A gifted student, Otto entered the University of Vienna in 1898 and took courses in all the various subjects he would later treat in his Sex and Character (1906). His professors included Friedrich Jodl, Ernst Mach, and Richard von Krafft-Ebing. He also frequently attended gatherings of the university philosophical society. In 1900 he traveled to Paris with Hermann Swoboda to attend a conference on psychology, where he sided with those in favor of an introspective approach to psychology as opposed to an experimental and biological approach. Weininger began writing Sex and Character (originally entitled Eros and Psyche) in the autumn of 1900, and the book progressed through an exchange of ideas with Swoboda. In 1901, after having registered the copyright to his manuscript, he sought to publish it, and with this in mind he showed an outline to Freud, who was not favorably impressed. In 1902 Weininger submitted a revised version of the book to obtain his doctorate in philosophy. On the day he received his degree, he converted to Christianity. A third version of his book—with the added chapters “Judaism,” “Women and Mankind,” and “Woman and Her Significance in the Universe”—was published in June 1903 by the major publishing firm Braumiiller. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS anMnliatteiat Weininger suffered from severe mood swings of exaltation and depression. During the summer of 1902, he traveled in Northern Europe and, writing to his friend Arthur Gerber, asked, “Am I anything?” Weininger left for Italy in somber spirits. In Calabria on August 21, 1903, he drafted a new will and testament that replaced the one he had written the previous February 13. Returning home depressed, he spent five days at his parents’ home. On October 3 he shot himself through the heart in a rented room in the house in which Beethoven, his favorite musician, had died. Weininger was buried in a Protestant cemetery; his father wrote the text for his gravestone. Leopold Weininger admired his son’s book and firmly defended Otto’s memory after his death, though Leopold did confide information about Otto to a psychiatrist, who betrayed his trust. In 1904, texts collected by Weininger’s friend Moritz Rappaport were published as Uber die letzten Dinge (translated as On Last Things [2001]). There Weininger’s suicide was explained as a logical conclusion to Sex and Character to insure its success both with a large general audience and among intellectuals. In 1906 Wilhelm Fliess’s charge of double plagiarism, specifically, that Freud had passed on Fliess’s original ideas about bisexuality to Weininger and Swoboda, also fueled the book’s notoriety. In the case of “Little Hans” (Herbert Graf), Freud wrote, “Weininger was completely under the sway of his infantile complexes; and from that standpoint what is common to Jews and women is their relation to the castration complex” (1909b, p. 36n). In his book, Weininger bears witness to the confusion about sexuality and science that was characteristic of the time. ERIK PORGE See also: Christians and Jews: A Psychoanalytical Study; Fliess, Wilhelm; Self-hatred; Swoboda, Hermann. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1909b). Analysis of a phobia in a fiveyear- old boy. SE, 10: 1-149. Le Rider, Jacques. (1982). Le cas Otto Weininger: Racines de Pantiféminisme et de l'antisémitisme. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Porge, Erik. (1994). Vol d’idées? Paris: Denoél. Rodlauer, Hannelore. (1990). Otto Weininger: Eros und Psyche. Vienna: Verlag der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Weiss, Evoarpo (1889-1970) Sengoopta, Chandak. (2000). Otto Weininger: Sex, science, and self in imperial Vienna. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Swoboda, Hermann. (1911). Otto Weininger Tod. Vienna: F. Deuticke. Weininger, Otto. (1906). Sex and character. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons. (Original work published 1903) . (2001). A translation of Weininger’s “Uber die letzten Dinge, 1904-1907,” On last things. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press. (Original work published 1904) WEISS, EDOARDO (1889-1970) Edoardo Weiss, a physician and psychoanalyst, was born in Trieste (then a part of Austria-Hungary), on September 21, 1889, and died in Chicago on December 14, 1970. He spent his childhood and adolescence in Trieste, part of a stable, well-to-do Jewish family originally from Bohemia. After studying German in high school, he enrolled in 1908 in medical school in Vienna. In October of that year, he visited Freud, whose essay on the Gradiva he had previously read. Weiss suffered from a slight case of agoraphobia and wanted to talk to Freud about his desire to practice psychoanalysis. Freud sent him to see Paul Federn, with whom he began therapy, which lasted until 1911. Weiss, the first president of the Italian Psychoanalytic Society and a member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society in 1913, was the real founder of the psychoanalytic movement in Italy. In 1914 he joined the Austro-Hungarian army as a physician. He was initially assigned to Lublin, Poland, then sent to the Croatian front. It was in Lublin, in a hospital train, that he met his friend and fellow student, Viktor Tausk, whose depression from the war and declining relations with Freud had affected him deeply. In 1917 Weiss married Wanda Shrenger. Weiss met his wife at the University of Vienna; she would become the first woman admitted to the Italian Psychoanalytic Society. In 1919 he returned to Trieste, then a part of Italy, to work as a psychiatrist in a provincial hospital. He also opened his own practice as a psychoanalyst, introducing the field to men such as Italo Svevo and Umberto Saba—in other words, the leading representatives of Italian literature. In 1927 he was forced to resign from the psychiatric hospital where he worked, due to his failure to join the Fascist party and Italianize his name. He moved to Rome, where he published Elementi di psicoanalisi (1931). In 1853 WELTANSCHAUUNG 1932 he re-established the Societa Psicoanalitica Italiana and launched the review, Rivista italiana di psicoanalisi. In 1932 Emilio Servadio, who had trained with Weiss and who was interested in parapsychology, organized several sessions with a medium in order to demonstrate the existence of paranormal phenomena. Weiss informed Freud of his conviction in the authenticity of the phenomena he had witnessed firsthand and received the following response: “Given your role as a pioneer of psychoanalysis in Italy, it would be unfavorable to consider you at the same time a pioneer of occultism.” In 1935 Weiss managed to obtain official recognition from the International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA) for the small Italian psychoanalytical society and, with his students Nicola Perrotti and Emilio Servadio, attended the International Congresses in Wiesbaden (1932), Lucerne (1934), and Marienbad (1936). Having emigrated to the United States in 1939, he joined the Meninger Clinic in Topeka, Kansas, in 1940, then moved to Chicago, where, together with Franz Alexander, he became interested in the application of psychoanalysis to psychosomatics. In 1942 he became a training analyst at the Chicago Institute of Psychoanalysis. In 1950 he took on the responsibility of collecting the writings of Paul Federn in order to promote an awareness of phenomenological ego psychology, which in his opinion had been misunderstood by Freud. In his last years Weiss taught at Marquette College in Milwaukee as a guest lecturer for a couple of years, while he was consistently a training analyst at Chicago for many years, until his retirement. In 1970 his correspondence with Freud was published under the title Sigmund Freud as Consultant. His writings include Agorafobia, isterismo d’angoscia (1936), Principles of Psychodynamics (1950), The Structure and Dynamics of the Human Mind (1960), Agoraphobia in the Light of Ego Psychology (1964), and some seventy articles. It was Weiss who introduced the term destrudo to express the death instinct, and the concepts of projective identification (created by Weiss in 1925, before Melanie Klein and with a slightly different meaning), psychic presence, resonance, and ego transition, which were critical for understanding the nature and modality of object relations. Weiss was especially interested in agoraphobia, our understanding of which he considerably deepened in several articles and two monographs. ANNA Marta ACCERBONI 1854 See also: Claustrophobia; Death instinct (Thanatos); Ego Psychology and Psychosis; Elementi di psicoanalisi, Libido; Italy; Rivista di psicoanalisi. Bibliography Accerboni, Anna Maria. (1988). Psychanalyse et fascisme: deux approches incompatibles. Le réle difficile d’Edoardo Weiss. Revue internationale d’histoire de la psychanalyse, 1, 225-243. . (1990). Sigmund Freud as remembered by Edoardo Weiss, the Italian pioneer of psychoanalysis. International Review of Psycho-Analysis, 17 (3), 351-359. Federn, E. (1982). Edoardo Weiss und der Beginn der psychoanalytischen Ichpsychologie. Sigmund Freud House Bulletin, 6 (1), 25-32. Freud, Sigmund, and Weiss, Edoardo. (1970). Sigmund Freud as a consultant: Recollections of a pioneer in psychoanalysis. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Roazen, Paul. (2004). Edoardo Weiss: The house that Freud built. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Weiss, Edoardo (1964). Agoraphobia in the light of ego psychology. New York: Grune & Stratton. WELTANSCHAUUNG The term Weltanschauung, literally, “view of the world,” had a very specific meaning for Freud, who defined it in the New Introductory Lecture as follows: “A Weltanschauung is an intellectual construction which solves all the problems of our existence uniformly on the basis of one overriding hypothesis, which, accordingly, leaves no question unanswered and in which everything that interests us finds its fixed place” (1933a [1932], p. 158). Indeed Freud had already used this concept as a stick with which to beat philosophies and religions— both lambasted, for example, in his Future of an IIllusion (1927c). In 1933, however, he broadened the notion, bringing science too under its aegis; this with the proviso, though, that “the Weltanschauung of science already departs noticeably from our definition. It is true that it too assumes the uniformity of the explanation of the universe; but it does so only as a programme, the fulfillment of which is relegated to the future.” (pp. 158-159). The fact was that the notion of Weltanschauung usefully supplemented that of culture, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS for it helped specify culture’s different spheres and point up their underlying emotional raisons d’étre. Freud extolled and defended the virtues of an intolerance that refused, in the name of “truth,” to consider all domains of human intellectual activity to be of equal value: “It is simply a fact that the truth cannot be tolerant, that it admits of no compromises or limitations, that research regards every sphere of human activity as belonging to it and that it must be relentlessly critical if any other power tries to take over any part of it” (p. 160). It has to be said, therefore, that Freud’s views on religion and especially on philosophy were rather narrow—judging, as he did, that they were totally closed to doubt. On the other hand, his opposition to dogmatism is much easier to comprehend if one bears in mind that dogmatism constitutes the major temptation for any theoretician, and no doubt for Freud himself with respect to psychoanalysis. And it was certainly for the sake of psychoanalysis that he defended the ideal of scientific ascesis. Apropos of the religious Weltanschauung, in 1933 Freud articulated ideas he had expressed in Totem and Taboo (1912-13a) on the formation of religions, while restating, in essence, some themes of The Future of an IIlusion concerning the way religion panders to humanity’s “desire for knowledge” and to its infantile need for protection. To emphasize how risky a religious view of the world is to thought, which it limits through its interdictions, he also revisited the ideas expressed in “Civilized Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness” (1908d). Most of Freud’s observations on the notion of Weltanschauung were in fact concerned with religion, but he did also mention art, which for him was “almost always harmless and beneficent; it does not seek to be anything but an illusion” (1933a [1932], p. 160), and philosophy, about which he wrote: “Philosophy is not opposed to science, it behaves like a science and works in part by the same methods; it departs from it, however, by clinging to the illusion of being able to present a picture of the universe which is without gaps and is coherent” (p. 160). Another kind of Weltanschauung, about which Freud usually had very little to say, save for his considerations on war, was politics, and specifically Marxism, to which he opposed a conception of the evolution of societies that was just as materialist as Marx’s, but without any real discussion of Marx’s theories, which seemed to him to be derived from “the obscure Hegelian philosophy, in whose school Marx graduated” (p. 177). Nihilism of the anarchist variety he denounced INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS “Wy War?’’ as pure sophistry; it nevertheless constituted an attack on the very core of scientific ideals, since it abolished the criterion of truth. Finally, Freud’s reflections on the notion of Weltanschauung were generally conflated with an earnest and vibrant pleading of the case of science, as when he said about the common man: “Truth seems to him no more capable of comparative degrees than death” (p. 172). His conclusion was a real rallying cry: “A Weltanschauung erected upon science has, apart from its emphasis on the real external world, mainly negative traits, such as submission to the truth and rejection of illusions. Any of our fellow-men who is dissatisfied with this state of things, who calls for more than this for his momentary consolation, may look for it where he can find it. We shall not grudge it him, we cannot help him, but nor can we on his account think differently” (p. 182). SOPHIE DE MIjOLLA-MELLOR See also: Ideology; Illusion; Linguistics and psychoanalysis; New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis; Psychoanalytic research; Science and psychoanalysis; Truth. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1908d). “Civilized” sexual morality and modern nervous illness. SE, 9: 177-204. . (1912—13a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13. . (1927c). The future of an illusion. SE, 21: 1-56. . (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22: 1-182. “WHY WAR?” In 1931 the Permanent Committee on Literature and the Arts of the League of Nations proposed exchanges of letters between intellectuals. Contacted in June 1932, Freud agreed to respond to Einstein’s letter, which he received in August. The result was a “Letter to Albert Einstein” titled “Why War?” On September 8, 1932, he stated to Max Eitingon that he had finally finished writing the “tedious and sterile so-called discussion with Einstein” (quoted in Jones, 1957, Vol. 3, p. 185). To Einstein’s question “Is there any way of delivering mankind from the menace of war?” (1933b [1932], p. 199), Freud would respond by returning to a number of issues that he had already addressed in his work on this subject, 1855 “Wry War?! from “Thoughts for the Times on War and Death” (1915b) to Civilization and Its Discontents (1930a). Instead of his correspondent’s proposal to consider the relationship between right and might, he preferred to consider the relationship between right and violence, and he argued that as distinct from the primitive law of the strongest, “right is the might of a community” (p. 205). But right itself cannot be exercised without violence. The wish to prevent war was no doubt embodied in the League of Nations, but that organization remained impotent, except on the level of ideas. According to Freud, Einstein was correct in positing an instinct of hate in humankind, a notion that fit with “our mythological theory of the instincts” (p. 212). “The death instinct turns into the destructive instinct when, with the help of special organs, it is directed outwards on to objects. The organism preserves its own life, so to say, by destroying an extraneous one” (p. 211). This was a factual circumstance that had to be taken into account; the Bolshevist utopia clearly pointed up the illusion of egalitarian material satisfaction. Freud acknowledged that he did not have much to propose: “We are pacifists because we are obliged to be for organic reasons” (p. 214). “We are shaped by the long process of the development of civilization, to which we owe the best of what we have become, as well as a good part of what we suffer from. Though its causes and beginnings are obscure and its outcome uncertain, some of its characteristics are easy to perceive. It may perhaps be leading to the extinction of the human race, for in more than one way it impairs the sexual function; uncultivated races and backward strata of the population are already multiplying more rapidly than highly cultivated ones. The process is perhaps comparable to the domestication of certain species of animals and it is undoubtedly accompanied by physical alterations; but we are still unfamiliar with the notion that the evolution of civilization is an organic process of this kind” (p. 214). “How long shall we have to wait before the rest of mankind become pacifists too? There is no telling. ... But one thing we can say: whatever fosters the growth of civilization works at the same time against war” (p. 215). In the spring of 1932, William C. Bullitt presented Freud with the manuscript of their jointly authored “psychological study” of President Thomas Woodrow Wilson (1966). This study was in line with the hope that Freud expressed in the last pages of his letter to Einstein: “One instance of the innate and ineradicable 1856 inequality of men is their tendency to fall into the two classes of leaders and followers. The latter constitute the vast majority; they stand in need of an authority which will make decisions for them and to which they for the most part offer an unqualified submission. This suggests that more care should be taken than hitherto to educate an upper stratum of men with independent minds, not open to intimidation and eager in the pursuit of truth, whose business it would be to give direction to the dependent masses. It goes without saying that the encroachments made by the executive power of the State and the prohibition laid by the Church upon freedom of thought are far from propitious for the production of a class of this kind. The ideal condition of things would of course be a community of men who had subordinated their instinctual life to the dictatorship of reason. Nothing else could unite men so completely and so tenaciously, even if there were no emotional ties between them. But in all probability that is a Utopian expectation” (1933b, p. 212-213). In London in 1948 it was suggested that political leaders be systematically required to undergo psychoanalysis. This naturally elicited particularly acute reactions among psychiatrists who were members of the French Communist Party. Written in that summer of 1932, on the threshold of the rise of Nazism and the deployment of the death instinct that would result from it, Freud’s reflections later became a premonition whose accuracy he could not possibly have imagined. ALAIN DE MIJOLLA See also: Civilization (Kultur); Death instinct (Thanatos); Mythology and psychoanalysis; “Thoughts for the Times on War and Death.” Source Citation Freud, Sigmund. (1933b [1932]). “Warum Kreig? (Brief an Albert Einstein [sept. 1932]), Warum Kreig? Pourquoi la guerre? Why War? Paris: Internationales Institut fur gestige Zusammenarbeit am Volkerbund (Institute for International Cooperation); GW, 16: 13-27; Why war? SE, 22: 197-215. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1915b). Thoughts for the times on war and death. SE, 14: 273-300. . (1930a [1929]). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21: 57-145. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Freud, Sigmund, and Bullitt, William. (1966b [1938]). Introduction. In their Thomas Woodrow Wilson, twentyeighth president of the United States: A psychological study (pp. xi-xvi). New York: Weidenfeld and Nicholson. Jones, Ernest. (1957). Sigmund Freud: Life and work. London: Hogarth. WIENER PSYCHOANALITISCHE VEREINIGUNG The history of the Wiener Psychoanalitische Vereinigung (Vienna Psychoanalytical Society) is the primal history of psychoanalysis. The members of the Psychological Wednesday Society commenced their meetings in Freud’s apartment in 1902. In 1908 the group adopted the designation “Vienna Psychoanalytical Society” and was registered under this name as a local group of the newly formed International Psychoanalytical Association in Vienna. Most of the members of the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society were of Jewish origin and shared the history of the Jews in the twentieth century. The Society’s first president was Alfred Adler, who resigned in 1911, after which Sigmund Freud himself took over the helm until 1938. The founding period was of course characterized by the genius of Freud, who built the Society’s fortunes not only through his theories but also by his skills as an organizer. Sandor Ferenczi described this as the time of heroism and guerrilla war. Adler and others resigned at the end of 1911 and formed the Society for Free Psychoanalytic Research, later known as the Society for Individual Psychology. Practically all activities of the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society ceased during the First World War because, as Freud put it, the voice of psychoanalysis could not make itself heard above the thundering of cannon. When the war was over, the society quickly resumed operations. As regards its organization, two groups of members can be distinguished: representatives of the society’s “heroic phase” like Paul, Otto Rank, and Eduard Hitschmann; and the second-generation analysts, most of whom had already undergone formalized training, such as Anna Freud, Helene and Felix Deutsch, Edward and Grete Bibring, Wilhelm Hoffer, Wilhelm Reich, Richard Sterba, Otto Fenichel, and Siegfried Bernfeld. When this new generation of psychoanalysts took over, training was institutionalized and a psychoanalytic outpatient clinic was established. The foundation of the clinic in 1922 was followed two years later by that of the INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS WIENER PSYCHOANALITISCHE VEREINIGUNG training institute. The clinic was headed by Eduard Hitschmann, with Wilhelm Reich as his deputy. In May 1936, after many peripatetic years, the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society finally acquired premises of its own at Berggasse 7, where the society itself, the training institute, the outpatient clinic and the Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag (the publishing house) were accommodated. The head of the training institute was Helene Deutsch, who already complained in her report for 1932 that the number of Austrian candidates had dropped sharply owing to the economic crisis. In the summer semester of that year the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society had 22 candidates, of whom 12 were American, 2 German and 8 Viennese. After Hitler’s coming to power in 1933, significant numbers of candidates from Germany found a place for themselves at the training institute of the Vienna society. After falling ill with cancer, Sigmund Freud was no longer able to take part in the society’s scientific meetings. Its affairs were managed by Paul Federn, who was elected deputy president after Otto Rank’s departure in 1925, and later by Anna Freud, who was elected second deputy and spoke for her father on the executive. A powerful influence on the affairs of the society was exerted by its “expanded executive,” which met on Wednesday evenings at the Berggasse premises. The imposition of an authoritarian constitution in Austria in 1934 and Hitler’s coming to power in Germany did not present an immediate threat to the Vienna society. Although many members of the Society sympathized with the then banned Social Democrats, few—among them Siegfried Bernfeld, Otto Fenichel, Hermann Nunberg, Buchsbaum, Wilhelm Reich, and Friedjung—were politically engaged. However, “administrative measures” were adopted to prevent politically “dangerous” activity in the illegal left-wing groups by members and candidates. The Vienna Psychoanalytical Society’s heyday was in the late 1920s and the 1930s. Some of the seminal works of ego psychology originated at this time—for example, August Aichhorn’s Wayward Youth (1925), Heinz Hartmann’s Die Grundlagen der Psychoanalyse (Fundamentals of psychoanalysis; 1927), Anna Freud’s Introduction to Psycho-Analysis for Teachers (1930) and later The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence (1936), or Hermann Nunberg’s Principles of Psychoanalysis (1932), which was based on lectures at the society. Whereas Vienna already had a rival in the thriving Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute in the 1920s, many Jewish psychoanalysts came to 1857 WIENER PSYCHOANALITISCHE VEREINIGUNG Vienna or to the society’s branch in Prague after the Nazis took power in 1933. Max Schur (1972) noted in his memoirs that Hitler had made an overwhelming impression on the Austrian people and that many of those in Schur’s group were convinced that the country would be unable to withstand the rising tide of Nazism. The first wave of emigration commenced in these years, those who left including Helene and Felix Deutsch, Siegfried Bernfeld, Ludwig Jekels, Wilhelm Reich, Hanns Sachs and Fritz Wittels. However, the endurance of Freud and his comrades who stayed behind was unrewarded. Freud’s view that the Austrian people were not quite so brutal, expressed in a letter to Arnold Zweig, proved to be false. The Wehrmacht marched into Vienna on March 12, 1938, and the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society's executive held its last meeting on March 13. It was resolved that everyone who could should flee the country and that the seat of the society should be transferred to wherever Freud settled. The 68 extraordinary and ordinary members of the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society, as well as an estimated 36 candidates, had to leave Vienna; only Alfred von Winterstein and August Aichhorn stayed put. Freud himself was able to depart with his family on June 4, 1938. At the 15th International Psychoanalytical Congress in Paris, Ernest Jones said in his opening address that it was breathtaking to think that, of all cities in the world, it was precisely in Vienna that psychoanalysis was no longer to be practiced. From 1938 August Aichhorn gathered a small circle about him. He noted in his “Gedenkschrift” [commemorative review]: “Starting with training analyses and continuing with regular seminars and courses and with the study of the works of the Freud school, the group strove to attain its goal. One of our friends, Count Karl von Motesicky, who had contributed much to the foundation of the group, died in a concentration camp.... Without formalities and difficulties, but exercising caution towards the outside world, the group worked on throughout the period in a genuine spirit of loyalty and friendship.” From 1938 until 1945, Vienna was a branch of the “German Reich Institute of Psychological Research and Psychotherapy”; it was headed temporarily by Aichhorn, who was replaced by Gebsattel in 1943. After 1945, The Vienna Psychoanalytical Society was spared the fate of the German Psychoanalytical Society and the arduous birth pangs of the German Psychoanalytical Association; it was eventually reopened by Aichhorn, 1858 who wrote: “Now our path is clear; everyone can follow his own research inclinations without hindrance, and everyone is indeed doing so.” Nor was it long before IPA recognition was forthcoming. However, it took decades for the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society to re-establish its links with international psychoanalysis. In setting about the task of reconstruction, it was pervaded by the melancholy realization that, while it had to preserve Freud’s legacy, it could no longer aspire to the intellectual greatness and influence of the old society. This was the prevailing atmosphere for many years. After the trauma of the expulsion and annihilation of the Jews and the ensuing destruction of psychoanalysis in Vienna, a cloak of silence descended over the unspeakable. Upon Aichhorn’s death in 1949, Winterstein succeeded to the presidency and remained in office until 19ST: In 1950 the Society had just one candidate in training, and the mood emerges clearly from a letter written by Winterstein to Glover: “The only tendency which I have observed in the last few years, and which I have been enjoining the members to follow since I became president, is to immerse themselves in the study of Freud’s writings and to explore new ideas with great caution.” Except for the interregnum of A. Becker (1972-74), Wilhelm Solms-Rédelheim and Harald Leupold- Lowenthal occupied the presidency from 1957 until 1982. Solms was one of the founders of the “Mitteleuropdische Arbeitstagung” (Central European Working Conference), which links the German-speaking psychoanalysts to this day, and also played an important part in the formation of the EPF. The International Psychoanalytical Congress held in Vienna in the summer of 1971 renewed the society’s ties with international psychoanalysis. The society began to grow again. After fierce argument over the incorporation of group psychoanalysis and the status of child analysis, a new generation of officers took the helm in 1982. Impelled by the candidates and younger members, a period of intense debate about the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society’s past commenced. Although the older members were politically relatively untainted after the war, their mentality had been molded by it, and the society effectively continued its subterranean existence. Peter Schuster became president in 1982 and was succeeded in 1984 by Wolfgang Berner, whose period of office was distinguished by the rapprochement with contemporary psychoanalysis and the holding of the EPF congress in 1993. The society’s president from INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 1993 until 1998 was Wilhelm Burian. A central concern of the organization since the 1980s has been the permanent reorganization of training so as to bring it into line with international standards. An indication of the laboriousness of this process is the fact that the third revision of the training regulations is as of 2005 being discussed. Unfortunately psychoanalysis has remained substantially a Viennese phenomenon for the Austrian public; debate is largely confined to the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society, the Vienna Arbeitskreis fiir Psychoanalyse (Psychoanalytic study group) and the Freud-Gesellschaft. Like many psychoanalytic organizations, however, the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society has been increasingly preoccupied with itself and has shown relatively little orientation towards the outside world. Around the start of the twenty-first century public relations functions have been assumed with great professionalism by the Sigmund-Freud-Gesellschaft and the Freud Museum. After prolonged peregrinations, the Vienna society moved into its new headquarters at Gonzagagasse 11 in 1986. By 2005, it had over 70 members and some 100 candidates, thus for the first time exceeding the membership level of 1938. Its work in the 1980s centered on anti-Semitism both within and outside analyses and the working through of the society’s wartime and postwar past. Other themes have included the relations between psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic psychotherapy— a debate that culminated in the incorporation of a seminar on psychoanalytic psychotherapy in the training syllabus. In the fields of theory and clinical practice there have been many, sometimes violent, arguments about the future direction of psychoanalysis and the influence of other psychoanalytic schools, such as the “modern Kleinians” and objectrelations theory as opposed to classical drive theory. The latter prevailed the late 1990s and still has a not inconsiderable number of adherents. Meanwhile, however, the society had also become an official professional organization, oscillating between the isolation of “toeing the line” and “traitorous participation” in the state bodies for psychotherapists. In 1989 the general assembly of the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society resolved by one vote to join the “Dachverband fur Psychotherapie” (Confederation of psychotherapy) and later the Psychotherapiebeirat (Psychotherapy advisory committee). Then, in 1993, the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society became the first training organization to obtain recognition under the provisions of the Psychotherapy Law. The political work on the committees INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS WitBur, Georce B. (1887-1976) and vis-a-vis the public has, in truth, not aroused much interest. However, if one were to compile an interim report, it would state that, although the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society is no longer the “hub” around which the other societies revolve, as it was before 1938, it has after a long period of hesitation shrugged off its self-imposed isolation and thereby Ba its place in international psychoanalysis. WILHELM BuRIAN See also: Austria; Lehrinstitut der Wiener psychoanalytischen Vereinigung; Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. Bibliography Berner, Wolfgang. (1992). The Viennese Psychoanalytic Society after 1945, In Peter Kutter (Ed.). Psychoanalysis International, 1. Europe. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstadt: Frommann-Holzboog. Huber, Wolfgang. (1977). Psychoanalyse in Osterreich seit 1933. Vienna-Salzburg: Geyer-Edition. Muhlleitner, Elke. (1992). Biographisches Lexikon der Psychoanalyse (Die Mitglieder der Psychoanalytischen Mittwoch- Gesellschaft und der Wiener Psychoanalytische Vereinigung 1902-1938). Tubingen: Diskord. Schur, Max. (1972). Sigmund Freud: Living and dying. New York: International Universities Press. Solms-Rédelheim, Wilhelm. (1976). Psychoanalyse in Osterreich. In D. Eicke (Ed.), Tiefenpsychologie. Beltz- Weinheim-Basle: Die psychoanalytische Bewegung. WILBUR, GEORGE B. (1887-1976) George B. Wilbur was the second editor of American Imago, following the death of its founder Hanns Sachs, and Wilbur maintained that editorial position from 1947 until 1963. Wilbur was born in Larned, Kansas, on December 22, 1887, and died on Cape Cod in Hyannis, Massachusetts, on April 4, 1976. Wilbur had first gone as an analytic patient to Otto Rank in New York City in the fall of 1926, at a time when Rank was over on one of his early trips to the United States. At the time there was little publicity about Rank’s problems with Freud; Ranks The Trauma of Birth (1923) was originally dedicated to Freud, and analytic pupils abroad then thought the book had Freud’s 1859 ““Witp’ PsYcHO-ANALYSIS”’ blessings. Wilbur also went to Paris in the spring of 1927 to conclude the analysis with Rank; Wilbur’s wife Joy also went to Rank then for treatment. The Wilburs had put a mortgage on their house to finance the trip to Paris, which cost three or four thousand dollars, with one thousand going to Rank. When Sachs died early in 1947, he had become a respected Boston analyst who also taught at Harvard Medical School, and Wilbur at that time went through all Sachs’s papers. By then Wilbur was an established early member of the Boston Psychoanalytic Society, although he practiced on Cape Cod. Sachs and Rank had been the original Viennese co-founders of Imago in 1912, but their intimate friendship did not survive the problems that arose between Freud and Rank. Wilbur insisted that there were no bitter feelings between Sachs and Rank, but that all the bitterness was in Jones’s biographical works. Wilbur himself stayed in close contact with both Sachs and Rank; for a time, when the American Psychoanalytic Association (APA) was first considering making the Boston Psychoanalytic Society a branch affiliate, Wilbur’s association with Rank meant that he had to resign temporarily in the early 1930s from his membership in the Boston group, on the understanding that he would be reinstated after the APA’s acceptance of the Boston group had been secured. By 1936 Wilbur was once again a Boston analyst in good standing, although still living in South Dennis. Wilbur became a great expert on the details connected with the intellectual differences between Freud and Rank. Although Wilbur had been stigmatized within psychoanalysis for going to Rank in a year of the worst “vintage,” Wilbur maintained that he had never heard anything at all in his own analysis with Rank about the concept of the birth trauma. Wilbur remained modest and unassuming, although he had graduated from Harvard College (1912) as well as Harvard Medical School (1916) before practicing as a psychiatrist. Wilbur was originally from Kansas, and heard about Freud first from his teacher, the psychologist E. B. Holt, at Harvard. Holt, like his own mentor William James, had been part of the Boston School of psychotherapy that preceded the coming of the Freudians. For a time Wilbur had practiced analysis in Iowa, until he first moved to South Dennis on Cape Cod in 1923. He preferred seeing patients a couple of times a week, and therefore felt himself more a Rankian than a Freudian, in that he became more interested in therapeutic improvements than in strict analysis. Wilbur, known among his 1860 friends as “Jake, appears in the American poet Conrad Aiken’s Ushant as “Jacob.” PauL ROAZEN See also: Rank (Rosenfeld), Otto. Bibliography Lieberman, E. James. (1979). The Rank-Wilbur correspondence. Journal of the Otto Rank Association, 14 (1), 7-24. Roazen, Paul. (2003). Interview on Freud and Jung with Henry A. Murray in 1965. The Journal of Analytical Psychology, 48, 1-27. Slochower, Harry, and Schupper, Fabian X. (1967). George Wilbur at 80. American Imago, 24(4), 287-289. Wilbur, George B. (1943) Isador H. Coriat: Obituary. Psychoanalytic Review, 30, 479-83. Wilbur, George (Ed.). (1951). Psychoanalysis and culture. New York: International Universities Press. “ ‘WILD’ PSYCHO-ANALYSIS” In a letter to Ferenczi dated October 27, 1910, Freud described this short text as a “little didactic paper” (vol. 1, p. 229). In “ ‘Wild’ Psycho-Analysis,” Freud ~ described a consultation with a divorced woman who had come to him complaining of the crude advice given to her by her regular doctor, who, invoking the authority of psychoanalysis, had told her that she could remedy her anxiety only by returning to her husband, taking a lover, or masturbating. Freud used this example to make several points. First, he stressed that, contrary to the claims of some of its detractors, psychoanalysis took “sexuality” to mean more than just sexual relations, and he preferred to use the word in a broader sense equivalent to that the verb “to love.” Second, he reasserted the sound basis for distinguishing the “actual neuroses” from those neuroses for which psychoanalysis was indicated, and he recalled that the analyst’s task is not just to explain the psychic causes of their conditions to patients, but also, and more importantly, to weaken the resistances that prevented them from discovering those causes for themselves. Psychoanalysis required an extended contact and the establishment of a transference relationship, without which the sudden revelation of secrets is “technically objectionable” (p. 226), even if on occasion the outcome is more INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS positive than that achieved by means of a pseudoscientific explanation. In this connection, Freud evoked the notion of tact, which would later become the subject of an article by Ferenczi (1955). Finally, because Freud’s case involved a doctor who had not been psychoanalytically trained, he was able to point out that psychoanalytic technique could not be “learnt from books” but had to be “learnt from those who are already proficient in it” (p. 226). He also took this opportunity to announce the creation, in March 1910 at the Second Psycho-Analytical Congress in Nuremberg, of “an International Psycho-Analytical Association, to which its members declare their adherence by the publication of their names.” Freud would return to the necessity of psychoanalytic training in The Question of Lay Analysis (1926e), where he observed that “doctors form a large contingent of quacks in psychoanalysis” (p. 230). ALAIN DE MIOLLA See also: Abstinence/rule of abstinence; American Psychoanalytic Association; Berliner Psychoanalytisches Institut; Groddeck, Georg Walther; International Psychoanalytical Association; Sexuality; Tact. Source Citation Freud, Sigmund. (1910k). “Uber “wilde” Psychoanalyse,” Zentralblatt fiir Psychoanalyse, 1, 91-95; GW, 7: 118-125; ‘Wild’ psycho-analysis. SE, 11: 219-227. Bibliography Ferenczi, Sandor. (1955). The elasticity of psycho-analytic technique. In his Final contributions to the problems and methods of psycho-analysis (pp. 87-101). London: Hogarth and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis. (Original work published 1928) Freud, Sigmund. (1926e). The question of lay analysis. SE, 20: 177-250. Freud, Sigmund, and Ferenczi, Sandor. (1993-2000). The Correspondence of Sigmund Freud and Sandor Ferenczi (3 vols.; Peter T. Hoffer, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. WINNICOTT, DONALD WOODS (1896-1971) Donald Woods Winnicott, British psychoanalyst and pediatrician, was born in Plymouth, England, on INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PsyYCHOANALYSIS Winnicott, Donato Woops (1896-1971) April 7, 1896, and died in London on January 25, 1971. He was the youngest child and only son of a prosperous provincial English merchant. He attended boarding school, where he read Darwin, and studied at the University of Cambridge, where he read Freud as an undergraduate. He entered the navy in 1917. In the First World War, while still a medical student, he both lost friends and saw action on a destroyer in’the navy. Winnicott qualified as a physician in 1920. He gained membership in the Royal College of Physicians in 1922 and became a pediatrician. From 1923 to 1924 he specialized in pediatrics, married, and began his training analysis with James Strachey. Later he had further analysis with Joan Riviere, and became a Kleinian training analyst. He became an associate member of the British Psycho-Analytical Society in 1934, a child analyst in 1935, a full member in 1936, and a training analyst in 1940. However, in the 1941-1945 controversial discussions in the British society between the adherents of Melanie Klein’s views and the adherents of Anna Freud’s, Winnicott played little part, finding himself unable to ally fully with either side. At that time, his interest in the effect of environmental factors on development made his ideas unacceptable to Klein. During the German blitz of the Second World War, he became a consultant to the Government Evacuation Scheme for London children. This work stimulated his thinking on the relationship between separation, deprivation, and delinquency, and it also introduced him to Clare Britton, a social worker who later became his second wife and lifelong colleague. In 1944 Winnicott was elected fellow of the Royal College of Physicians. After the war he became director of the Child Department of the London Clinic of Psycho- Analysis and twice served as president of the British Psycho-Analytical Society (1956-1959 and 1965-1968). He lectured and broadcast on infant and maternal welfare, and inaugurated public lectures on psychoanalysis. He became active internationally, writing copiously for many audiences. While not joining any group in the British society, his thinking influenced members of the Middle Group, later the Independents. Winnicott died in his sleep after surviving several heart attacks. Winnicott’s work was informed by his vast experience in observing mothers and babies as a pediatrician, which allowed him to develop his ideas about the early experience of individuation and about ways of assessing psychic development, such as his spatula game and the Squiggle Game, for communicating with older 1861 Winnicott, Donato Woops (1896-1971) children. He described the psychophysiological state of a new mother as the “primary maternal preoccupation.” In contrast to Melanie Klein and Donald Fairbairn, who saw the infant as having a definable ego from birth, he saw the young infant as being undifferentiated from the mother, cryptically stating “There is no such thing as a baby,” meaning that a baby cannot exist alone, that there needs to be a mother or mothering person too. Close maternal attunement and repeated bodily care (the “facilitating environment”) allows the baby to begin to become aware simultaneously of its own separateness and that of its mother. Gradual and progressive failure of attunement at a rate at which the baby can increasingly tolerate (“goodenough mothering”) strengthens the emerging ego. The baby thus emerges from “absolute dependence” to “relative dependence” and begins to adapt to reality and the painful awareness of the mother’s separateness and all that this entails. Such adaptation includes the development of concern and capacity for guilt. As the difference between the baby’s awareness of “me” and “not me” strengthens, many babies need a way of bridging a gap that might be too much for them. Such bridging explains the existence of transitional phenomena. The transitional space in which such phenomena occur provides room for the baby to develop play and an increasing ability to stand being alone. The baby becomes disturbed when lacking a “good-enough” environment, for instance, when a mother is physically or emotionally absent, disturbed, or intrusive, or when the baby has needs that cannot be fulfilled. When the mother cannot respond sensitively to the baby’s gestures but substitutes one of her own, her baby cannot be spontaneous, only compliant, even imitative—thus developing a “false self.” Winnicott also wrote about the effect of mother’s unconscious states, including her unconscious hatred of her baby, and he linked such hatred with the hate that those responsible for delinquents develop toward their charges and the idea of hate in the countertransference. This developmental framework, with its implication that pathology is linked to environmental failure (either deficient provision tor needs or impingement), allowed Winnicott to see that regression in analysis may be a search for the absent experiences, and it led him to emphasize that the analytic setting and the person of the analyst may stimulate the patient’s own inborn maturational tendency toward growth and individuation to bring about self-cure. 1862 Strongly influenced by Klein, Winnicott accepted much of her thinking, particularly with regard to the internal world and its objects, and fantasy. He differed from her on the effect of environmental provision and emphasized the importance of early real relationships. Together with Klein and Fairbairn, one of the founders of the British object-relations school, Winnicott extended his influence to social work, education, developmental psychology, and the probation service, in addition to pediatrics and psychoanalysis. His writing has been translated into almost all European languages; he has been published in the United States, South America, and Japan, and there is strong interest in his work in France and Italy. In Britain, the Independent Group of the British Psycho-Analytical Society has followed his work, and his ideas have interested those working in the field of infant observation in Great Britain and the United States, as well as those adhering to self-psychology theory and practice. Since his death, the Winnicott Trust, founded by his widow Clare, has continued and completed publication of his work, and funds raised have supported research in early mother-infant relationships at the Winnicott Research Unit at the University of Cambridge. The Squiggle Foundation, an organization devoted to the study of Winnicott’s thinking, holds an annual program of lectures and courses in London. JENNIFER JOHNS Notions developed: Breakdown; Capacity to be alone; False self; Good-enough mother; Handling; Holding; Integration; Primitive agony; Self (true/false); Squiggle; Transitional object; Transitional object, space; Transitional phenomena. See also: Abandonment; Addiction; Adolescence; Alcoholism; Annihilation anxieties; Autism; Breastfeeding; Bulimia; Childhood; Children’s play; Collective unconscious (analytical psychology); Creativity; Cruelty; Demand; Dependence; Deprivation; Empty Fortress, The; Envy and Gratitude; Family; Framework of the psychoanalytic treatment; Great Britain; Illusion; Infans; Infant development; Infantile omnipotence; Infantile psychosis; Infant observation (direct); Internal object; Intersubjective/ intrasubjective; Jokes; Lack of differentiation; Lie; Look/gaze; Maternal; Maternal care; Maturation; Mirror stage; Mutual analysis; Narcissism; Object; Object a; Omnipotence of thoughts; Partial drive; Splitting; Postnatal/ postpartum depression; Primary identification; INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Primary object; Psychosomatic limit/boundary; Protective shield; Puberty; Quasi-independence/transitional stage; Reality testing; Regression; Reverie; Self-image; Self, the; Suffering; Symbiosis/symbiotic relation; Symbolization, process of; Technique with children, psychoanalytic; Transference hatred. Bibliography Phillips, Adam. (1988). Winnicott. London: Fontana Press. Rodman, F. Robert. (2003). Winnicott: Life and work. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Publishing. Winnicott, Donald. (1958). Collected papers: Through paediatrics to psycho-analysis. London: Tavistock Publications. . (1964). The child, the family, and the outside world. London: Penguin Books. . (1965). The maturational processes and individual development. London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis. . (1971). Playing and reality. London: Tavistock Publications. WINTERNITZ-FREUD, PAULINE REGINE (PAULI)). See Freud, Sigmund (siblings) WINTERSTEIN, ALFRED FREIHERR VON (1885-1958) Austrian psychoanalyst Alfred Freiherr von Winterstein was born on September 25, 1885, in Vienna, where he died on April 28, 1958. Educated at the famous Theresianische Akademie and the Franz Josefs-Gymnasium, Winterstein obtained his Matura (or baccalaureate) in 1903. He completed his law studies in 1905. After reading The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), Winterstein contacted Freud, attended his lectures, and in 1910 became a member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. At that time he was writing articles for the Neue Freie Presse, a bourgeois liberal newspaper, and publishing poems in Karl Kraus’s Die Fackel. He also wrote plays and was member of the Pen Club. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS WINTERSTEIN, ALFRED FREIHERR VON (1885-1958) Winterstein submitted his thesis in 1911 and worked for a time under the famous experimental psychologist Wilhelm Wundt at the University of Leipzig. During a visit to Burghdélzli, while staying with Eugen Bleuler, he began an analysis with Carl Jung. During the First World War, Winterstein was in the dragoons and, after four years of duty, was promoted to cavalry captain. Returning to Vienna, he continued an analysis with Eduard Hitschmann and began practicing analysis himself. He was interested in the application of analytic ideas to literature and especially in the psychoanalysis of parapsychological phenomena. After the Nazi Anschluss, Winterstein elected to remain in Vienna, but because by the Nuremberg laws he was not considered a “pure Aryan,” he was forbidden to practice psychotherapy; this was also the case with August Aichhorn, the only other member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society who remained in the city during the war. Winterstein employed the war years to write a book on Adalbert Stifter, the great Austrian writer, poet, and painter. His Adalbert Stifter, Personlichkeit und Werk: eine tiefenpsychologische Studie was published in 1946. After 1945, Winterstein played a role in reconstituting the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, serving as its president from 1949. He enjoyed an international reputation and was invited in 1953 and 1955 to lecture at meetings of International Psychoanalytical Association. In 1957, poor health led to his retirement. HARALD LEUPOLD-LOWENTHAL See also: Austria; Wiener psychoanalytische Vereinigung. Bibliography Winterstein, Alfred F. (1911). Drei Falle von Versprechen. Internationale Zeitschrift fiir Psychoanalyse, 2, 292-293. . (1920). Die Nausikaepisode in der Odyssee. Imago, 6, 349-383. . (1928). Die Pubertatstriten der Madchen und ihre Spuren im Marchen: eine psychoanalytische Studie. Imago, 14, 199-274. . (1934). Contributions to the problem of humor. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 3, 303-316. . (1946). Adalbert Stifter, Personlichkeit und Werk: eine psychoanalytische Studie. Vienna: Phonix. . (1949). Telepathie und Hellsehen im Lichte der modernen Forschung und wissenschaftlichen Kritik. Vienna: Phonix. 1863 WISH FOR A BABY . (1954). A typical dream-sensation and its meaning. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 35, 229-233. . (1956). On the oral basis of a case of male homosexuality. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 37, 298-302. WISH FOR A BABY The wish for a baby is one of the fantasies of childhood, part of the set of significant motifs transmitted to the child unbeknownst to its parents along with the biological “breath of life” (Bydlowski, 1978), and that evolves in conjunction with individual libidinal development. It is marked by the Oedipus complex, by kinship relationships, by family experiences of death and mourning. In Freud’s account, the woman’s “wish to possess a penis is normally transformed into a wish for a baby” (1933a [1932], p. 101). The wish for a baby is superimposed, repressed, or revived in different forms at different times of life. From the oral stage, the wish for a baby inherits the urge to destroy the mother’s body entirely, including her belly and everything in it. From the anal stage—inclined to control and revenge—comes the theme of the stolen baby, used to try and compensate for the loneliness of the child confronted by the parental couple. Both the little girl and the little boy long for the power, at once marvelous and uncanny, to have a child: an imaginary child, manipulable at first anally, then mentally (Soule, 1982). The boy must in due course renounce this wish, whether by means of displacement or sublimation, of repression, or of reaction-formations ranging from the ritual of couvade to the disavowal of paternity, or even beyond, to delusion and paranoia (Soulé, 1982). The wish for a child is also relevant to narcissism. An ideal child, issuing from an ideal mother, is the equivalent of the penis for the mother whom it fulfils. With no third person to come between mother and baby, there is no corresponding denial of the anal, aggressive function of the imaginary child. On the oedipal level, for the girl, the child is a product of incest, obtained from the father without the mother’s knowledge and in rivalry with her. Maria Torok (1968) relates the wish for a child in its narcissistic dimension to death and mourning: “The wish for a child can be understood as a denial of the loss of a part of oneself?” CHRISTINE PETIT 1864 See also: Pregnancy, fantasy of; Female sexuality; Penis envy. Bibliography Bydlowski, Monique. (1978). Les Enfants du désir, le desir d’enfant dans sa relation a l’Inconscient. Psychanalyse a Université, 4 (13), 59-92. David, Didier. (1996). Le désir d’enfant." In D. David and S. Gosme-Séguret (Eds.). Le Diagnostic prenatal. Paris: E.S.F. Freud, Sigmund. (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22: 1-182. Soulé, Michel. (1982). Lenfant imaginaire: Fantasme d’enfant, le désir d’enfant, le désir de grossesse. In La Dynamique du nourrisson. Paris: E.S.F. Torok, Maria. (1968). Maladie du deuil et fantasme du cadavre exquis. Revue francaise psychanalyse, 32 (4). WISH-FULFILLMENT In Freudian theory, the fulfillment of a wish is an aspiration, theme, or, one might even say, motor principle, of unconscious formations like dreams, hysterical symptomsan,d fantasies. In these formations an unconscious, infantile sexual wish is expressed and fulfilled in imagination in a more or less disguised way. From this point of view, the fulfillment in question is neither total nor definitive, but unique and dynamic. Freud set forth his theory of wish fulfillment in chapter 3 of The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), though he had already mentioned the idea in the preceding chapter, “The Method of Interpreting Dreams,” in connection with his dream of Irma’s injection: “The dream represented a particular state of affairs as I should have wished them to be. Thus its content was the fulfilment of a wish and its motive was a wish. When the work of interpretation has been completed, we perceive that a dream is the fulfilment of a wish” (1900a, pp. 118-119, 121). In fact, four months before his dream of injecting Irma, in his correspondence with Wilhelm Fliess, Freud first alluded to the general principle of the dream as wish fulfillment. The context was in the account of the “dream of convenience” of “Mr. Pepi” (Rudi Kaufmann, a nephew of Josef Breuer), who dreamed he was in the hospital so as not to have to wake up in the morning (Letter of March 4, 1895, p. 114). INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Only interpretation and analysis can penetrate the disguise under which a wish-fulfillment is expressed. An unconscious wish is fulfilled in an imaginary way and appears to the dreamer in masked form. Dream work transforms the latent content of the dream into manifest content by means of the processes of condensation and displacement. Wish fulfillment is not the cause of the dream, but it shapes the intentional structure of the dream. Hence the need for the work of interpretation. To be fulfilled, the wish, as an instinctual intrapsychic force, must effect what Freud, in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), called “perceptual identity” (pp. 566-567). The path followed leads from the triggering of an internal need to its satisfaction in the experience of a hallucinated wish-fulfillment. Thirty years later, in New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1933a [1932]), Freud reaffirmed that “in every dream an instinctual wish has to be represented as fulfilled. The shutting-off of mental life from reality at night and the regression to primitive mechanisms which this makes possible enable this wished-for instinctual satisfaction to be experienced in a hallucinatory manner” (pp. 18-19). His study of traumatic dreams connected with accident neuroses led Freud, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g), to postulate aims of the dream other than the fulfillment of an unconscious wish. On the face of it, a dreamer whose dreams regularly culminated in anxiety could not be striving to satisfy an unconscious wish, yet even “if you want to take these latter objections into account, you can say nevertheless that a dream is an attempt at the fulfilment of a wish,” Freud wrote (1933a [1932], p. 29). With respect to hysterical symptoms, Freud noted that an unconscious, infantile wish was certainly being fulfilled, but so was a preconscious wish, so that two opposing wishes, issuing from two different mental agencies, were being fulfilled. As for fantasies or daydreams, “like dreams, they are wish-fulfilments. ... The wishful purpose that is at work in their production has mixed up the material of which they are built, has rearranged it and has formed it into a new whole” (Freud, 1900a, p. 492). A wish never arises in isolation; it always encounters other wishes, opposing it in an open structure, so that desire is always in the process of organizing meaning. Jacques Lacan considered this always-incomplete destiny of desire to be the basis of the dialectic between demand and desire, which for him defined the human condition. DELPHINE SCHILTON INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Wish, HALLUCINATORY SATISFACTION OF A See also: Amentia; Anxiety dream; Convenience, dream of; Dream screen; Experience of satisfaction; Fantasy; Formations of the unconscious; Illusion; Interpretation of Dreams, The; Nightmare; Reverie; Transgression; Wish, hallucinatory satisfaction of a; Work (as a psychoanalytical notion). Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. SE, 4: 1-338; 5: 339-625. . (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1-64. . (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. SE, 22: 1-182. Lacan, Jacques. (1998). Le séminaire. Book 5: Les formations de l’inconscient. Paris: Seuil. WISH, HALLUCINATORY SATISFACTION OF A The notion of the hallucinatory satisfaction of a wish is one of the key elements in the Freudian conception of psychic functioning. It postulates that, under certain conditions, there is an intense need, transformed into a wish for an object from which satisfaction is expected, which, under certain circumstances can produce sensations that are attributed wrongly to an external agent, yet present all the characteristics of reality. This is hallucinatory satisfaction. These certain conditions can be of four kinds: the immaturity of the psyche of the newborn baby, dreams, problems in psychic functioning in certain neurotics, or certain psychoses, called, as a matter of fact, delusional. Concerning the first kind, Freud expressed, from the time of his Project for a Scientific Psychology (1950a [1895]), a hypothesis that must be placed among the founding ones of psychoanalysis. What are the possible outlets, he asked, for the “need that has been excited” in the child? The child has no means of autonomous satisfaction at its disposal, so that “the primal powerlessness of the human being becomes the earliest source of all moral notions” (in other words: of the entire psychic life, insofar as it is pointed toward the wish—the italics are Freud’s). An “experience of satisfaction” can ensue, because of an intervening adult who creates an 1865 Wish, HALLUCINATORY SATISFACTION OF A association between the two “mnemic images,” that of need (or wish) and that of satisfaction. The reappearance of the former can, when the need (wish) is intense, reactivate this association: “Now, when the state of urgency or wishing reappears, the cathexis will also pass over on to the two memories and will activate them.... I do not doubt that in the first instance this wishful activation will produce the same thing as a perception, namely a hallucination” (1950c, p. 319), Freud adding forthwith: “If reflex action is thereupon introduced, disappointment cannot fail to occur.” This idea was taken up again a few years later in The Interpretation of Dreams: “The first wishing seems to have been a hallucinatory cathecting of the memory of a satisfaction. Such hallucinations, however, if they were not to be maintained to the point of exhaustion, proved to be inadequate to bring about the cessation of the need or, accordingly, the pleasure attaching to satisfaction” (1900a, p. 598). As Freud wrote, in 1911, in a text called “Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning”: “The state of psychical rest was originally disturbed by the peremptory demands of internal needs. When this happened, whatever was thought of (wished for) was simply presented in a hallucinatory manner, just as still happens to-day with our dream-thoughts every night. It was only the non-occurrence of the expected satisfaction, the disappointment experienced, that led to the abandonment of this attempt at satisfaction by means of hallucination.” At this point the reality principle is introduced, supplanting the pleasure principle. Freud answered a possible objection in a note at the bottom of the page: a being totally under the sway of the pleasure principle could not survive “for the shortest time,” responding, in fact: “the infant—provided one includes with it the care it receives from its mother—does almost realize a psychical system of this kind. It probably hallucinates the fulfillment of its internal needs” (1911b, pp. 219-220). This “provided one includes with it the care it receives from its mother” was well remembered by a number of later authors, especially Donald Winnicott. The notion returned in “A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams” (1916-17f, p. 231): “At the beginning of our mental life we did in fact hallucinate the satisfying object when we felt the need for it. But in such a situation satisfaction did not occur, and this failure must very soon have moved us to create some contrivance with the help of which it was possible to distinguish such wishful perceptions from a real fulfillment 1866 and to avoid them for the future. In other words, we gave up hallucinatory satisfaction of our wishes at a very early period and set up a kind of ‘reality-testing.” There is a certain hesitancy in these texts of Freud between the terms need and wish; and only in his later work did Freud come-to distinguish them more clearly, need being defined as the expression of an organic function (hunger, sexual and so forth), wish as something mental when this need is transformed into the wish to have an object. Accordingly, the status of the drive, as a “border concept” (between psyche and soma) is put into question (cf., among others, Laplanche, 1987). As a matter of fact, in all his writings Freud insisted on the “disappointment” following “inevitably” on hallucinatory satisfaction (a hallucination of milk supplies no nourishment ...). Accordingly, a reality principle is set up at the same time representation is born, pointing to what is “here inside,” not, as in the case of perception, to what is “also outside” (1925h). This notion was utilized by Freud, in very similar terms, in his theory about dreams (1900a): the dream is, in effect, a realization of a wish. In the framework of psychic functioning, cut off from perception and motor functions, “excitation follows a retrograde way.” There is a “topographical regression,” and a restitution of “the identity of perception,” or an association . between the “images” of the movement of desire and its satisfaction; but also regression to a primitive functioning as “the dream is a fragment of infantile psychic life.” If the pleasure principle prevails momentarily over the reality principle, this sort of satisfaction is quite liable to take on a hallucinatory quality. At the same time as he was forming these theories, Freud was also approximating dream functioning to the function of psycho-neurotic defense mechanisms, in particular those of hysteria: certain hysterical symptoms, especially those affecting perception, can be explained by an analogous schema. Psychoses lend themselves particularly well to the hallucinatory satisfaction of wishes, and, moreover, in a waking state: “In psychoses these ancient and repressed modes of psychic work return in force,” as the analysis of the Schreber case (Freud, 1911c) showed dramatically. Sandor Ferenczi (1913) took up the schema of Freud and used it to account for the omnipotence of thought, such as is observable in the young child (“stage of hallucinatory magical omnipotence,” char- INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS acteristic of infantile megalomania), but also of obsessional structures. Foremost among later authors who were interested in this question is Donald Winnicott (1971), who gave a further nuance to the idea by introducing the notions of illusion and transitional space, and also by describing the process of progressive re-autonomization of the mother (beyond the “primal maternal madness,” prolonged temporarily by the symbiosis of pregnancy). He saw in this the condition for the advent of disappointments, which in the Freudian model were both inevitable and necessary: the mother became “very good,” but would be also “very bad.” Winnicott wrote that a “perfect” mother, that is to say, one who immediately satisfied all her child’s needs, “could be nothing but a hallucination.” Denise Braunschweig and Michel Fain (1975) developed an analogous idea in a different theoretical context, opposing the “day mother” to the “night mother.” In this respect, the studies of André Green (1993) should be mentioned; he did significant work on “negativity,” on the basis of a case of negative hallucination (where a perception is banished from existence). Equally the work of César and Sara Botella are relevant, centering on the concept of the “hallucinatory, the term being taken as a substantive, as a description of a vast processual set. ROGER PERRON See also: Amentia; Convenience, dream of; Experience of satisfaction; Interpretation of Dreams, The; Wish/yearning; Wish-fulfillment; Word-presentation. Bibliography Botella, César, and Botella, Sara. (1990). La Problematique de la régression formelle de la pensée et de ’hallucinatoire. In La Psychanalyse: Question pour demain, colloque de la S.P-P. Paris: Unesco, Presses Universitaires de France. Ferenczi, Sandor. (1913). Le développement du sens de la réalité et ses stades. In Psychanalyse I, Oeuvres completes (Vol. 1: 1908-1912; pp. 51-64). Paris: Payot, 1968. Laplanche, Jean. (1987). Nouveaux Fondements pour la psychanalyse. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Winnicott, Donald W. (1969). Development of the theme of the mother’s unconscious as discovered in psychoanalytic practice. In C. Winnicott, R. Shepherd, M. Davis (Eds.), Psychoanalytic explorations. London: Karnac Books. . (1971). Playing and reality. London: Tavistock Publications. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS WisH/YEARNING WISH/YEARNING A wish may be described as an intrapsychic impulse accompanied by the intention to obtain some denied, forbidden, or withheld satisfaction, or to rediscover a primal satisfaction, mnemonic traces of which are unconsciously inscribed. In Studies on Hysteria (1895d), and in correspondence with Wilhelm Fliess in May 1897, Freud employed the term wish to designate a forbidden desire, speaking, for example, of the “wish to be ill” and especially of the “death wish.” This meaning was paramount in chapter 5 of The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), in the section on “Dreams of the Death of Persons of Whom the Dreamer is Fond” (p. 248ff), and again in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901b) at the conclusion of chapter 8, where it is considered in light of a neurotic conflict. Beginning with the seventh chapter of The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud placed increasing emphasis on a more precise definition of the wish, which became highly influential in the development of psychoanalytic theory. Dream analysis determined, in effect, that the wish was produced by unconscious mnemonic traces that were fixed indelibly by the earliest experiences of infantile satisfaction. The aim of the wish is to recreate that experience, following paths laid down by primary process thought, taking into account the “logic” of unconscious drives to bypass censorship. The wish accomplishes this by being articulated in the language of the most profoundly cathected ideas. This is what led Freud to define the dream as hallucinatory wish-fulfillment. GERARD BONNET See also: Aphanisis; Conflict; Demand; Experience of satisfaction; Kantianism and psychoanalysis; Prohibition; Transgression; Wish-fulfillment. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studies in hysteria. SE, 2: 48-106. —. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. Part I, SE, 4: 1—338; Part II, SE, 5: 339-625. . (1901b). The psychopathology of everyday life. SE, 6. Further Reading Holt, Robert R. (1976). Drive or wish? A Reconsideration of the psychoanalytic theory of motivation. Psychological Issues, 36, 158-197. 1867 Witcr of Metapsycxovoey, THE Rubinstein, B.B. (1996). On the concept of an unconscious wish. Psychological Issues, 62, 541-550. Simon, B. (1986). Power of the wish and the wish for power. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 6, 119-132. WITCH OF METAPSYCHOLOGY, THE Harking back to a remark of Freud's, “Witch Metapsychology” is occasionally invoked in an ironic or critical way to characterize the resort to general metapsychological principles as a way of avoiding some difficult problem. In his article “Analysis Terminable and Interminable,” Freud posed the following question: how, in the course of the analysis, can an instinct be “tamed”— that is to say, not suppressed, but brought, with its conflicts, “completely into the harmony of the ego.” “Tt is not easy to find an answer,” he wrote. “We can only say: ‘So muss denn doch hie Hexe dran!’ [We must call the Witch to our help after all!|—the Witch Metapsychology. Without metapsychological speculation and theorizing—I had almost said ‘phantasying— we shall not get another step forward. Unfortunately, here as elsewhere, what our Witch reveals is neither very clear nor very detailed” (1937c, p. 225; the quotation is from Goethe's Faust). And indeed Freud leaves his question unanswered in this paper, except for one sentence where he evokes the opposition between primary and secondary processes. This evasion is characteristic of the very problem he poses in the above-cited passage: when psychoanalytical thought runs into some difficulty or other (theoretical, practical, or technical), it is often tempted to wriggle out by invoking metapsychological principles of great generality. Their very generality renders the response of the “Witch” uncertain, however, for both question and answer can be reframed in such a way as to achieve harmony, opening the door wide to ill-defined disputes among the psychoanalysts themselves with no clear criteria to guide the discussion. Over and above her picturesque quality, therefore, the Witch metapsychology raises a basic epistemological problem. ROGER PERRON See also: “Analysis Terminable and Interminable”; Goethe and psychoanalysis; Literary and artistic creativity; Science and psychoanalysis. 1868 Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1937c). Analysis terminable and interminable. SE, 23: 209-253. WITTELS, FRITZ (SIEGFRIED) (1880-1950) Austrian physician and psychoanalyst Fritz (Siegfried) Wittels was born in Vienna on November 14, 1880, and died on October 16, 1950, in New York. The son of a stockbroker who claimed to be a descendant of Chaim Vital, a seventeenth-century Jewish cabbalist, Wittels attended the University of Vienna beginning in 1898 and completed his medical studies in 1904. He subsequently practiced at Vienna General Hospital and, in 1907, became assistant to Julius Wagner von Jauregg. From 1905, Wittels attended Sigmund Freud’s lectures, and in the spring of 1906 his uncle by his father’s second marriage, Isidor Sadger, introduced him to the circle that by then had formed around Freud. While a member of the Psychological Wednesday Society, Wittels also actively collaborated with Karl Kraus on his satirical review Die Fackel. Kraus’s criticisms of psychoanalysis from 1908 were not aimed at Freud, whose ideas he valued, but mocked the reductive application of psychoanalytic ideas to literature and art, such as found in publications by Sadger, Wilhelm Stekel, and Otto Rank. However, close ties with both Kraus and Freud affected Wittels’s relationship with both; a further complication was a young Viennese actress, Irma Karczewska. Wittels's ambivalence toward Kraus apparently contributed to the latter’s critical attitude towards psychoanalysis; it did not arise suddenly, as legend had it, after Wittels, in a lecture before the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, criticized Die Fackel as a neurotic symptom. The love triangle comprised of Wittels, Karczewska, and Kraus led to a rupture between the two men. Later, Wittels began work on his roman-aclet, Ezechiel der Zugereiste (Ezekiel the alien), through which he hoped to avenge himself upon his former friend. Kraus attempted to stop publication of the novel by legal means and Freud himself tried to persuade Wittels to forego publication, from fear that it would drag psychoanalysis into a damaging conflict with Kraus. Freud’s words, “You are impossible in my INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS circle if you publish this book,” quoted by Wittels in his memoirs (Timms, 1995, p. 98), led to Wittels’s resignation from the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society in 1910. Wittels had tried to attract private patients as early as 1908, but with little success and, with time out for World War I, he continued to practice as a psychiatrist and resident neurologist at the Cottage Sanatorium in Vienna. He had a long friendship with Rudolf von Urbantschitsch, the head of the sanatorium, whom he introduced to psychoanalytic circles about 1907. Wittels spent the First World War in Turkey and Syria as military physician. During and after the war, he lent strong support to the social reformist ideas of Josef Popper-Lynkeus. He also became close to Wilhelm Stekel and his group, and during the early 1920s he was analyzed by Stekel. Wittels’s biography of Freud, partly the result of collaboration with Stekel, was published in 1924, and soon published in England and America. Sigmund Freud: His Personality, His Teaching, His School won bitter remarks from Freud, but Wittels nevertheless returned to the Vienna Society in 1925, and two years later he was readmitted as a member. After his reconciliation with Freud he made some corrections and emendations to his biography (1932). In 1927, Wittels was elected to the propaganda committee of the Vienna Society and directed its publications. He was invited in 1928 by Alvin Johnson to teach at the New School for Social Research in New York; over the next three years he lectured in the United States and in 1932 settled definitively in New York where, the same year, he became a member of the New York Psychoanalytic Society. He made his last visit to Europe in 1934, remaining a member of the Vienna Society until 1936. He joined to the American Psychoanalytic Association and the New York Academy of Medicine; he taught at the New York Psychoanalytic Institute and the New School; and he was also associated with Bellevue Hospital in New York and Columbia University. Wittels married three times. His first wife, whom he married in 1908, was Yerta Pick, the daughter of a renowned psychiatrist in Prague; she died in 1913. In 1920 he wed Lilly Krishaber; and in 1947, he married Poldi Goetz. Wittels’s last book, The Sex Habits of the American Women, was published posthumously in 1951. In 1995 Edward Timms published Freud and the Child INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Wittkower, Eric (1899-1983) Woman, a highly edited version of Wittels’s not entirely frank or reliable memoirs (Lensing, 1996). ELKE MUHLEITNER See also: Applied psychoanalysis and the interaction of psychoanalysis; Fackel, Die; Death instinct (Thanatos); Kraus, Karl; Wiener psychoanalytische Vereinigung. Bibliography Lensing, Leo A. (1989). “Geistige Vater” und “Das Kindweib.” Sigmund Freud, Karl Kraus und Irma Karczewska in der biographie von Fritz Wittels. International Forum of Psychoanalysis, 30, 430-431. . (1996). “Freud and the child woman” or “The Kraus affair”? A textual “reconstruction” of Fritz Wittels’s psychoanalytic autobiography. German Quarterly, 69 (3). Mijolla, Alain de. Freud, biography, his autobiography, and his biographers. Psychoanalysis and History, 1 (1), 4-27. Muhlleitner, Elke. (1992). Biographisches Lexikon der Psychoanalyse (Die Mitglieder der Psychologischen Mittwoch- Gesellschaft und der Weiner Psychoanalytischen Vereinigung (1903-1938). Tiibingen: Diskord. Timms, Edward. (1986). Karl Kraus, apocalyptic satirist: Culture and catastrophe in Habsburg Vienna. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. . (Ed.) (1995). Freud and the child woman: The memoirs of Fritz Wittels. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Wittels, Fritz. (1924). Sigmund Freud, his personality, his teaching, his school. London: Allen & Unwin. . (1932). Revision of a biography. Psychoanalytic Review, 19, 241-256. WITTKOWER, ERIC (1899-1983) Eric Wittkower, although a British subject by birth, was born on April 4, 1899, in Berlin and died on January 6, 1983 in Montreal. He received his MD at the University of Berlin in 1924. From 1925 to 1930 he was assistant in the Medical Clinic at the Charité in Berlin; from 1930 to 1933 he became assistant in the Psychiatric Clinic at the Charité. From 1932 to 1933 he was privat dozent in psychosomatic medicine at the University of Berlin. Already he numbered among the European pioneers in psychosomatic medicine. Because of the situation in Germany, in 1933 he and his wife Claire moved to Switzerland, and 1869 WolFeNsTEIN, MartHa (1911-1976) thereafter on to England, where he first was a research fellow at the Maudsley Clinic and then at Tavistock. After further training in Edinburgh and Glasgow, he served as a psychiatrist in the British Army from 1940 to 1945. In England, he was analyzed by Eva Rosenfeld, then by John Rickman, and completed his psychoanalytic training at the London Institute in 1950. In 1951 the Kleinian—oriented Wittkower left Maudsley and Tavistock to go with his wife and two children to Montreal, where he taught at McGill University where he conceptually organized the domain of transcultural psychiatry and where he founded and edited the Transcultural Psychiatric Research Review. He was also one of the founding fathers of the Canadian Society of Psychoanalysis. In 1970 he helped to found the International College of Psychosomatic Medicine. The prolific Wittkower authored four books, including Emotional Factors in Skin Disease (1953), Recent Developments in Psychosomatic Medicine (1954), Divergent views in Psychiatry (1981), co-edited three more, and wrote more than two hundred and thirty articles, the great majority being on psychosomatic medicine and transcultural psychiatry. Despite those seminal contributions and his honorary recognition by various psychoanalytic, psychiatric, and psychosomatic organizations on four continents, he prized his teaching most of all—his grateful colleagues and students overwhelmingly agree. Patrick MAHONY See also: Canada; Tavistock Clinic. Bibliography Wittkower, Eric. (1953). Emotional Factors in skin disease. New York: Paul Hoeber. Wittkower, Eric, and Cleghorn, Robert (Eds.). (1954). Recent developments in Psychosomatic Medicine. London, Sir Isaac Pitman. Wittkower, Eric, and Dongier, Maurice (Eds.). (1981). Divergent views in Psychiatry. Baltimore, MD: Harper & Row. “WOLF MAN”. see From the history of an infantile neurosis (Wolf Man) 1870 WOLFENSTEIN, MARTHA (1911-1976) Martha Wolfenstein, a psychoanalyst and writer, was born on November 10, 1911, in Cleveland, Ohio, and died on November 30, 1976, in New York. She graduated from Radcliffe College, and then earned an MA in psychology and a PhD in aesthetics from Columbia University. She was analyzed by the art historian and lay analyst Ernst Kris and attended classes at the New York Psychoanalytic Institute between 1948 and 1953. A lay psychoanalyst, she was not a member of a society belonging to the American Psychoanalytic Association, but nonetheless was a widely admired teacher and supervisor in New York City. Wolfenstein’s mother died when she was a child, and there is a history of parental (especially maternal) loss extending back several generations in her family. Ellen Handler Spitz has written insightfully about this history and its role in Wolfenstein’s work. Wolfenstein wrote three classic papers on childhood bereavement: “How Is Mourning Possible?” (1966b), “Loss, Rage, and Repetition” (1969), and “The Image of the Lost Parent” (1973). She also wrote important studies of two artists: René Magritte and Francisco de Goya. In her paper, “Goya’s Dining Room” (1966a), she explicated the psychological fantasies portrayed in Goya’s paintings and argued that for Goya the loss of his hear- - ing was linked to his earlier losses, in their infancy, of all but one of his five children. She linked themes of grief, rage, and sexual guilt to the horrifying images that characterize the paintings that Goya painted after his illness in 1792. Wolfenstein books include Movies (1950), Children’s Humor (1954), and Disaster (1957), a seminal analysis of the impact of catastrophic events on individuals. With the anthropologist Margaret Mead, she edited Childhood in Contemporary Cultures (1955). This volume grew out of the project Columbia University Research in Contemporary Cultures, led by Mead and Ruth Benedict. As a member of this project, Wolfenstein made two trips to Paris in 1947 and 1953. While in Paris she observed the behavior of parents and children in parks and noted in her paper “French Parents Take Their Children to the Park” (1955) that French children quickly learn that displays of physical aggression are not permissible, and that verbal disputes are substituted. She concluded that for the French, childhood and adulthood are very distinct, and that the relation between childhood and adulthood is almost completely INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS opposite in France and in America. In America, childhood is viewed as a nearly ideal time, and adults feel nostalgic for their childhood. Adulthood is a ceaseless round of work, and the enjoyment of immediate pleasures is nearly lacking. For the French, the opposite is true: it is in adulthood that one can live in the present moment and that sensuous pleasures become ends in themselves; concern with such pleasures and ingenuity in achieving them are persistent themes of adult life. Wolfenstein’s books and essays are exemplary for their use of psychoanalytic insights as a prism with which to illuminate and connect the origins and vicissitudes of cultural values and attitudes to psychological imperatives. Her papers on childhood bereavement were important clinical contributions because they demonstrated that the child’s or adolescent’s inability to fully engage in mourning the loss of a beloved object, as opposed to adapting, is inextricably linked to their particular stage of development at the time of the parent’s death. NELtE L. THOMPSON Bibliography Spitz, Ellen Handler. (1998). Martha Wolfenstein: Toward the severance of memory from hope. Psychoanalytic Review, 85, 105-115. Thompson, Nellie. (2001). American women. psychoanalysts, 1911-1941. Annual of Psychoanalysis, 29, 161-177. Wolfenstein, Martha. (1954). Children’s humor: A psychological analysis. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. . (1955). French parents take their children to the park. In Margaret Mead and Martha Wolfenstein (Eds.), Childhood in contemporary cultures (pp. 99-117). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. . (1957). Disaster: A psychological essay. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. . (1966a). Goya’s dining room. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 35, 47-83. . (1966b). How is mourning possible? Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 21, 93-123. . (1969). Loss, rage, and repetition. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 24, 432-462. _ (1973). The image of the lost parent. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 28, 433-456. Wolfenstein, Martha, and Leites, Nathan. (1950). Movies: A psychological study. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Wo rr, ANToNiA ANNA (1888-1953) WOLFF, ANTONIA ANNA (1888-1953) Swiss analyst Antonia (“Toni”) Anna Wolff was born on September 18, 1888, in Ziirich, where she died on March 21, 1953. Wolff was the oldest of three daughters born to Konrad Arnold Wolff and Anna Elisebetha Sutz. The Wolff family had resided in Ziirich since the 1300s and was one of its most distinguished names. The family had been members of the Swiss Reform Church for many centuries. Konrad had been a merchant and a businessman in Japan prior to his marriage. Although the marriage was arranged, it has been described as a happy one. Wolff was her father’s favorite. When he died in 1910, her mother sent her to Jung for treatment of what today would be diagnosed as depression. Jung immediately sensed her aptitude for analysis, because in 1911 he invited her, along with his wife and several other women that showed promise, to the Weimar Psychoanalytic Congress. When Jung began his nekyia into the unconscious, Wolff was the one he turned to. He shared his dreams and active imaginations with her, which he recorded in his Red Book. She became his sou] mate for psychological matters in a way that Emma could not provide. She maintained this function for most of the rest of his life. Jung described her as his “second wife.’ Jung’s relationship to Wolff was completely public, and all immediate members of the Jung family, including Emma, were aware of the situation. Emma and Wolff often sat on either side of Jung when he gave a seminar, and Toni frequently traveled with Jung on his lecture tours. This arrangement did not sit well with the children and grandchildren, but it was completely accepted by Jung’s analysands. It has been said that Jung, as he got older, turned to her less frequently. She became a founding member of the Analytical Psychology Club in 1916 and was its president from 1928 to 1945. It was under her presidency that the tenper- cent quota on Jews was passed. From 1948 to 1952 she was honorary president of the club. The club, the only Jungian organization at the time, was her domain. From the 1920s on she worked as a professional assistant to Jung. Most people who entered analysis with Jung also saw her. She was considered to be more practical and worked in the personal aspects with the analysand, whereas Jung dealt mainly with the archetypal issues. She favored the term Complex Psychology over any other name for Jung’s psychology, and when the Jung Institute was founded she wanted to name it the 1871 Worb ASSOCIATION “Institute for Complex Psychology”. Her major paper was, “Structural Forms of the Feminine Psyche,” published in German in 1951 and translated into English by Paul Watziliwak. As of 2005 her other papers were being prepared for publication in English by Robert Hinshaw. On a personal level she was always described as elegant, and dramatic in her dress; a chain smoker who liked her cocktails, but was never drunk. She never married, as Jung was the man in her life. There were rumors of other flirtations, but nothing has been verified. She suffered from severe rheumatoid arthritis, which hampered her mobility toward the end of her life. She worked until the day she died. Gerhard Adler described having an excellent analytic hour with her the day before she suffered her fatal heart attack on March 21, 1953. THOMAS KirscH See also: Jung, Carl Gustav. WORD ASSOCIATION Word association is connected with the work that Carl Gustav Jung was engaged in at the Burghdlzli Psychiatric Clinic of the University of Zurich in the early stages of his career (Jung, 1917/1926/1943). . Under the directorship of Eugen Bleuler, the Burghdélzli Psychiatric Clinic was an international center of excellence in psychiatric research at the turn of the century. Jung became director of research on the Word Association Test. This test usually consisted of a hundred stimulus words that were read out singly to a subject who was to “answer as quickly as possible with the first word that occurs to you.” The reaction time, verbal response, and test behavior were recorded and analyzed. Verbal responses were classified according to several linguistic categories. The test was used to diagnose psychological typology and psychopathology. The Word Association Test (WAT) was based on earlier theories of the associationism school of psychology, which studied the associations. laws of mental Jung introduced significant innovations to this method. In addition to the cognitive dimensions, he emphasized the emotional aspects involved. He noted that the words to which subjects offered unusual 1872 responses were connected with themes having an emotional impact on them. He found that subjects invariably do not have conscious control over their responses. Therefore, he argued, this method was tapping both conscious and unconscious phenomena. He found that clusters of ideas, images, and words loaded with much affect (positive or negative) interfered with the ego (as the coordinating agency) by producing unusual responses. He called these clusters complexes. Jung used Freud’s theories of repression to account for the autonomous nature of complexes. Freud praised Jung for providing experimental proof of the existence of the unconscious, welcoming him in the early psychoanalytic movement as a much needed hard-nosed scientist. Although the term complex was used by Freud and Josef Breuer earlier, it was with Jung’s meaning that it finally entered the psychoanalytic vocabulary. Jung and his associates applied the Word Association Test to many psychiatric contexts, including forensic diagnoses, publishing some remarkable cases of successful detection. A much-neglected facet of Jung’s early work is his application of this method to families. He gave the test to members of the same families and found that there were psychological subgroupings in the same family. At the time, however, Jung possessed neither the theoretical understanding nor the clinical experience to take these findings further. One can argue that these unfinished questions contributed to the development of his theories about other manifestations of shared unconscious structures in subjects, for example, the archetypes (Papadopoulos, 1996). Gradually, Jung abandoned this method and the whole experimental approach to psychiatry, especially after leaving the Burghélzli Psychiatric Clinic. Nonetheless, his method of amplification (instead of free association) and his sensitivity to the role of language in psychotherapy owe their origin to the Word Association Test. As of 2005, the Word Association Test is hardly used, though it is taught in some Jungian training programs and some analysts use it as a technique to enhance the therapeutic process (Hill, 1975). RENOS K. PAPADOPOULOS See also: Amplification (analytical psychology). Bibliography Hill, John. (1975). Individuation and the association experiment. Annual of Archetypal Psychology, 145-151. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Jung, Carl Gustav. (1917/1926/1943). The psychology of the unconscious processes. In Coll. Works, Vol. 7: Two essays on analytical psychology (R. F. Hull, Trans.). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953. Papadopoulos, Renos K. (1996). Archetypal family therapy: Developing a Jungian approach to working with families. In Laura S. Dodson and Terrill L. Gibson (Eds.), Psyche and family: Jungian applications to family therapy. Wilmette, IL: Chiron Press. WORD-PRESENTATION In the Freudian model, word-presentations correspond to verbal language, and thing-presentations correspond to visual images. They differ as signifier differs from signified. In Freud’s view, although unconscious thingpresentations and thought antedate word-presentations, which are preconscious-conscious, he assigned a special role to verbal language in the mechanism whereby unconscious processes became conscious. In the associationist perspective of his prepsychoanalytic work, in particular, in On Aphasia (1891b), where Freud first presented the antithesis between thing- and word-presentations, the thing-presentation constituted an open complex of images, whereas the word-presentation was a closed entity whose special task was to gather the “associations of the object” together as the “complex” that constituted the object’s identity. What Freud was apparently referring to here was less the presence of something being represented than the difference between two series of associations, one of which is closed and the other open-ended. The specific role of language is to produce meanings that lie not in things prior to the advent of language but rather in thought before the advent of words. Upon discovering the unconscious, Freud came to question this nominalist theory of knowledge, inherited from John Stuart Mill, and embraced the idea that unconscious thinking, and by extension thingpresentations, were prior to language and wordpresentations. At the same time, however, spoken language acquired a privileged role in the mental processes whereby things become conscious. As early as “A Project for a Scientific Psychology” (1950c [1895]), the word-presentation was seen as a substitute for the hallucinatory satisfaction of a wish. This theoretical conception of the relationship between pleasure and language comports with psychoanalytic clinical INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS WoRD-PRESENTATION practice: in Studies on Hysteria (1895d), Freud said that in the treatment process there is a need to replace acts with words to permit the abreaction of repressed wishes. Freud thus stressed how the motor aspect of language can facilitate an emotional release, in connection with the revival of a memory, that is less costly than alternative adequate reactions (tears, revenge, etc.). Seen in this light, language constitutes the secondary process (the processes of the ego) and the process of emergence into consciousness, though it is true that Freud never denied the possibility of thing-presentations becoming conscious directly, as for instance in dream images and hallucinations. Verbal thinking nevertheless remained the ideal tool of psychoanalysis, for it allows all parts of the psychic apparatus to be accessible at all times to the thought process. In fact, the impartiality of language makes it possible for the demands of the pleasure principle to be placed in abeyance. No doubt this property of language later spurred Freud to assert that word-presentations, by virtue of the “hypercathexis” of thing-presentations, “make it possible for the primary process [the processes of the id] to be succeeded by the secondary process” and for “a higher psychical organization” to emerge, namely the preconscious system (1915e, p. 202). In “An Outline of Psychoanalysis” (1940a [1938]), however, he proposed a more restricted view, arguing that language did not in fact constitute the preconscious, though it was an important feature of it. He then acknowledged that for language to develop, the secondary process and the ego must have organized and there must also be in place a preverbal form of thinking correlated with the economic equilibrium between the principles of inertia and constancy. In this connection, in the “Outline” Freud spoke of the opposition between free and bound energy (p. 164), thus confirming his view that at an early, prelinguistic stage, the preconsciousconscious system binds the affects with ideational representatives in a process that is the corollary of primal repression. In this context, Freud viewed preconscious thought as depending on the formation of the categories of space, time, causality, and permanence during the first two years of life, categories that supply the foundation for the development of language. Should we subscribe to Jacques Lacan’s view that language is the precondition of the unconscious and that with regards to the mental organization necessary to constitute objects, “it is the world of words that creates the world of things” (2002 [1953], p. 65)? Or 1873 Worbd-PRESENTATION should we determine instead that the unconscious is a prerequisite of language, that the organization of the topography of the mental apparatus precedes and accounts for the emergence of language? The issue is important, for it decides the status of language relative to the discovery of the unconscious and of childhood sexuality. The crux of the question is Freud’s conception of the thing-presentation. The empiricist notions Freud employed tend to reinforce the idea that the thingpresentation refers only to the mental reproduction of things, just as the concepts of image and mnemic trace suggest. Contrasting with this Freudian empiricism is Lacan’s promotion of an unconscious “structured like a language”—an intellectualizing approach according to which language gives the world meaning. Both approaches lose sight of the fact that thingpresentations are the outcome of the psychic work of internalizing and reappropriating mmnemic traces bound up with the hallucinatory satisfaction of wishes. This work of representing and figuring the object is the foundation of fantasizing and has its roots in cathectic activity that antedates perception of objects. The object presents itself in the first instance by way of an affect. This totality can never be represented figuratively in a complete way or expressed in words in a discourse adequate to it. In its relationship with the secondary process, language appears defined essentially by its communicative function. But it is at the same time subject to the primary process, which tends to strip it of this function and to bring into question the signifying-signified relationship, thus introducing a factor ultimately against the linguistic system itself. When a similarity between signifiers serves to justify a conclusion that the things signified are similar, words, as Freud famously observed, are “treated like things” (1900a, pp. 295-296; 1915e, p. 199). Freud’s study of dreams and psychoneuroses brought him to this view. Yet dreams only partially bring into question the relationship between signifier and signified, between word-presentation and thing-presentation. As Freud reiterated, dreams modify not the “words themselves” but rather “the thing-presentations to which the words have been taken back” (1916-1917f, p. 229). In short, “treating words as things” means making words not into things but into other words, other signs, that retain their referential function despite successive substitutions. 1874 The primary process, meanwhile, can also alter the relationship between the linguistic sign and the referent. For example, in schizophrenia the elimination of the semantic relationship between signifier and signified also threatens the linguistic sign in its referential function to a thing in the external world. Indeed, psychosis implies a failure in the counter-cathexis of the hallucinatory representation of wishes, which makes it possible for the preconscious to operate. This failure gives rise to a defensive hypercathexis of language, which, though it constitutes an attempt at recovery by “regaining the lost object” (1915e, pp. 203-204), nevertheless relies on a like massive cathexis of the object. In this context, any word may carry the excitatory force of the primal scene, that is, the force of a sadistic combination of two poorly differentiated imagos. In the thought of schizophrenics, hypercathexis of language is basic to their linguistic distortions and “concrete” thinking, which in actuality, from the point of view of the relationship between language and reality, is an eminently abstract kind of thought. But concrete schizophrenic thought can foster the illusion that language is forever cut off from the world, whereas in fact the sign can have no meaning outside of that opening onto the outside world (thought) that is its very foundation. The symbolic function, and hence language, are linked to an economic process indicated by instinctual cathexis. Freud’s description (1920g, pp. 14ff) of an eighteen-month-old child playing with a reel on a string (the Fort-Da game) shows how, in this economic process, the work of symbolic substitution operates by means of signs that represent the mother’s absence and indicate acceptance of this fact, as distinct from mere signals (as for instance the child’s earlier tears), which are addressed to a mother who is effectively present and are meant as a practical response. Inhibition of the aim of the instinct, which results in a shift to tender feelings toward the object and acceptance of a delay in satisfaction, then allows sublimation and symbolization through play, gesture, and language. Thus the symbolic function, seen here in the process of the subject’s working over the absent object, does not arise from a learning process or from an experienced contiguity between word and thing. Rather, it is the means of articulating the double nature of the sign and its differential value in the linguistic system. This symbolic function is achieved through the work of negation carried out in silence, manifesting itself notably in the early split between ego and object, and find- INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ing its true fulfillment, as distinct from its raison détre, in language. As it accedes to speech, this representational function has less to do with language reduced to its role as signal than it does with language as sign, with the sort of sudden advance that can sustain the acceptance not only of a loss but also of a previously instituted social convention regarding the loss. ALAIN GIBEAULT See also: Thing-presentation. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1891b). On aphasia: A critical study. New York: International Universities Press. . (1915e). The unconscious. SE, 14: 159-204. . (1916-1917f [1915]). A metapsychological supplement to the theory of dreams. SE, 14: 217-235. . (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE, 18: 1-64. . (1940a [1938]). An outline of psycho-analysis. SE, 23: 139-207. . (1950c [1895]). A project for a scientific psychology. SE, 1: 281-387. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2: 48-106. Lacan, Jacques. (2002). The function and field of speech and language in psychoanalysis. In his Ecrits: A selection (Bruce Fink, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton. (Original work published 1953) WORK (AS A PSYCHOANALYTICAL NOTION) In its general sense, the word work denotes an expenditure of energy by a system or organism that produces an effect or transformation. In psychoanalysis, mental work is taken to mean any activity of the psychical apparatus that is designed to deal with instinctual excitations. As early as “Some Points for a Comparative Study of Organic and Hysterical Motor Paralyses” (1893c), a paper originally published in French, Freud introduced a notion cardinal to his entire work: “Every event, every psychical impression is provided with a certain quota of affect (Affektbetrag) of which the ego divests itself either by means of a motor reaction or by associa- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Work (As A PSYCHOANALYTICAL Notion) tive psychical activity.... [T]his conception (Vorstellung) does not become liberated and accessible so long as the quota of affect of the psychical trauma has not been eliminated by an adequate motor reaction or by conscious psychical activity” (pp. 171-172). It was therefore on the basis of clinical experience that the idea of mental work imposed itself on Freud the therapist as a necessary activity for the patient—as distinct, in particular, from the patient’s more passive role in treatment using hypnosis. In his earliest psychoanalytical writings, it was a cognitive kind of work that was seen as making it possible to resolve the contradiction between an unacceptable idea that had aroused a painful affect and the ego. The aim of such “associative working over (assoziative Verarbeitung)” (1894a, p. 50) was to integrate forgotten ideas—which Freud would later call repressed ideas—into the realm of consciousness. By drawing this distinction between associative mental work and a motor discharge comparable to the reflex arc, Freud not only described the aim of such work, namely to deal with the quota of affect, but also offered a first glimpse of what was to become psychoanalysis: the study of the functioning of the psychical apparatus, and at the same time a therapeutic method designed to bring back into consciousness, by means, precisely, of psychic work, ideas that had been repressed. The term work appears frequently in Freud’s writings, and very often it refers to one or other of these two aspects of psychoanalysis. It is significant that Freud chose a term belonging at once to ordinary and to scientific language in order to describe his view of the psychical apparatus: by analogy with the natural sciences, which he so often invoked, he took work to mean a physical measure implying a certain expenditure of energy. Throughout Freud’s writings, in fact, the idea of work supplied him with the yardstick with which to gauge every manifestation of mental activity, not only within the treatment (the work performed respectively by analyst and analysand, as discussed for example in the Studies on Hysteria [1995d]), but also in respect of the operation of various mental processes (as for instance the dream-work, joke-work, the work of mourning, or the psychic work of repression in the child during the oedipal period). Beginning with The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), Freud considered—‘“since nothing but a wish can set our mental apparatus at work” (p. 567)—that the dream was a wish-fulfillment, and that it was governed by the pleasure principle. The task of the dream-work, 1875 Work (As a PsYCHOANALYTICAL NoTION) whose chief mechanisms Freud described as condensation, displacement, considerations of representability, symbolization, and secondary revision, was to transform the formative components of dreams—daily residues, bodily stimuli, dream-thoughts—into a manifest content acceptable to the otherwise vigilant consciousness of the dreamer. In Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious (1905c), Freud discussed the work involved in the construction of jokes, an activity designed to produce pleasure, and demonstrated its kinship with the mechanisms of the dream. The Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905d) introduced the sexual instinct as a way of conceptualizing the pressure for work mobilized by desire; the work of the psychic apparatus was thus deemed to be the management of excitations emanating from the sexual instinct. In “Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning,” (1911b), Freud reasserted that the activity of the psychical apparatus was governed by the pleasure principle, but he added that in the course of development the reality principle could establish itself and modify things: “Just as the pleasure-ego can do nothing but wish, work for a yield of pleasure, and avoid unpleasure, so the reality-ego need do nothing but strive for what is useful and guard itself against damage” (p. 223). Later, in “Mourning and Melancholia” (1916-17g [1915]), Freud showed that mourning was responsible for the work of withdrawing libido . from the object in situations where the object was highly cathected. The word work was used throughout Freud’s writings, too, to denote effort expended during analytic treatment, whether by the analyst or by the patient. In his paper on “Constructions in Analysis,” for example, he reminded his readers “that the work of analysis consists of two quite different portions, that it is carried on in two separate localities [and] involves two people, to each of which a distinct task is assigned.” Moreover, the “person who is being analysed has to be induced to remember something that has been experienced by him and repressed; and the dynamic determinants of this process are so interesting that the other portion of the work, the task performed by the analyst, [may be] pushed into the background” (1937d, p. 258). The analyst’s said task Freud nevertheless compared first of all to that of the archaeologist; he then distinguished between two kinds of work on the analyst’s part that were undertaken in parallel: construction (or reconstruction) and working-through (durcharbeiten), the 1876 second being needed in order to overcome the resistances that the analyst’s constructions were liable to provoke in the patient. Finally, Freud did not overlook the everyday meaning of work as professional activity. Like Voltaire, whom he cited, he underscored the great value of work in this sense, but for his part he viewed it from the standpoint of the economics of the libido, and described it as a form of sublimation offering the possibility “of displacing a large amount of libidinal components, whether narcissistic, aggressive or even erotic”; to the extent that it made possible “the use of existing inclinations ... or ... instinctual impulses,” any profession could be “a source of special satisfaction” (1930a [1929], p. 80n). Many recent approaches to psychoanalysis have given a significant place to the notion of work. A notable example is André Green’s “work of the negative,” which, though it is a product of the death instinct, functions in a sense by making the negative positive: a void, a lack, or a state of mourning itself becomes an object of identification or an object susceptible of cathexis, to the detriment of the absent object itself. Negative hallucination, the function of disobjectalization, negative narcissism, or the complex of the dead mother are so many paradigms of the work of the negative in operation. Rene Angelergues (1993) has distinguished between two qualitative orientations of mental work, the one toward sublimation, the other toward erotization. It is also worth mentioning the “work of thought” (Anzieu, 1996; Mijolla-Mellor, 1992). And, lastly, the phenomenon of mentalization, which, according to the Ecole de Psychosomatique de Paris, deals with the quantity and quality of an individual’s ideas—and is thus closely akin to that mental work which has the capacity to cope with and manage anxiety and intraspsychic conflicts. MICHELE POLLAK CORNILLOT See also: Adolescent crisis; | Autohistorization; Construction/reconstruction; Dream work; Interpretation of Dreams, The; Mourning; Negative, work of; “Outline of Psycho-Analysis, An”; Preconscious, the; Secondary revision; Therapeutic alliance; Working-through. Bibliography Angelergues, René (1993). L’Homme_ psychique. Paris: Calmann-Levy. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Anzieu, Didier. (1996). Créer, détruire. Paris: Dunod. Freud, Sigmund. (1893c [1888-1893]). Some points for a comparative study of organic and hysterical motor paralyses. SE, 1: 155-172. . (1894a). The neuro-psychoses of defence. SE, 3: 41-61. . (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. Part I, SE, 4: 1-338: Part I, SE, 5: 339-625. . (1905c). Jokes and their relation to the unconscious. SE, 8: 1-236. . (1905d). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. SE, 7: 123-243. . (1911b). Formulations on the two principles of mental functioning. SE, 12: 213-226. . (1916-17 [1915]). Mourning and melancholia. SE, 14: 237-258. . (1930a [1929]). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21: 57-145. . (1937d). Constructions in analysis. SE, 23: 255-269. Freud, Sigmund, and Breuer, Josef. (1895d). Studies on hysteria. SE, 2. Mijolla-Mellor, Sophie de. (1992). Le Plaisir de pensée. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. WORKING-OFF MECHANISMS The term working-off mechanisms describes the work of the psychic transformation that is accomplished by the subject during or at the end of psychoanalytic treatment. This process, developed by the ego’s new capacities for binding, indicates the attainment of a psychic liberation or opening-up. The notion of working-off was mainly introduced by Edward Bibring (1943) in the context of what he called the “tension-controlling methods of the ego” (p. 513). Daniel Lagache (1962) later adopted and further developed it. In Lagache’s view, working-off mechanisms are different from defense mechanisms, because the former indicate that the defense has been lifted. The essential point entails the “recognition and assimilation of the fantasmatic conflict; which opens the way to the psychic capacities for “foresight” and “replacement.” Sigmund Freud did not explicitly mention the presence of working-off mechanisms. However, in the fifth of his “Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis” (1910 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS WorKING OveR [1909]) he emphasized how unconscious wishes are liberated by psychoanalysis: a) repression is replaced “by a condemning judgementcarried out along the best lines” (p. 53), such that the subject’s ego can thereafter “master” the “unserviceable” instincts of an incompletely developed ego that could previously only repress them; b) the instincts can then “be employed for the useful purposes which they would have found earlier if development had not been interrupted” (p. 53); c) the individual’s unrealizable inclination is replaced by a higher goal situated outside of sexuality: sublimation. Lastly, a reference to such processes can be read between the lines in some of Freud’s other texts: the chapter “The Ego’s Dependency Relations” in The Ego and the Id (1923), and “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” (1937). The notion of working-off mechanisms is difficult to delimit on the metapsychological level. If it implies an effort to account for the subject’s capacity for integration and elaboration, it has often been understood, especially by adherents of ego psychology, as an illustration of the attitudes and behaviors of the “conscious ego.” ELsA SCHMID-KITSIKIS See also: Bibring, Edward; Ego (ego psychology). Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1910 [1909]). Five lectures on psychoanalysis. SE, 11: 7 -55. . (1937). Analysis terminable and interminable. SE, 23: 209 —253. Lagache, Daniel. (1962). La conception de homme dans Pexpérience psychanalytique. In E. Rosenblum (Ed.), Oeuvres Completes, Volume 4: 1956-1962: Agressivite. Structure de la personnalite et autres travaux, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. WORKING OVER Psychical working over is the work of thought that links and associates mental representations among themselves and through the intermediary of language, leading to their evolution, through the successive translations and networks of symbolic associations put into operation by fantasies, from the stage of the primary processes to that of the secondary processes. It is 1877 Working Over an expression of the instinct’s requirement for psychic work owing to its link with the somatic. Sigmund Freud borrowed the term psychical working over from Jean Martin Charcot, who described a period of mental processing between the time of a trauma and the appearance of hysterical symptoms. As early as 1892, and then in the Studies on Hysteria with Josef Breuer (1895), Freud evokes a working out through association that has not been able to take place in hysteria, leading to stasis of the traumatic effect in a separate psychic group, with no possibility of liquidation. The mechanism takes into account the nucleus of the actual (defense) neurosis that is central to the neuro-psychoses (in this case, hysteria). The lack of psychical working over is even more clear cut in the actual neuroses, properly speaking. In the essay “On the Grounds for Detaching a Particular Syndrome from Neurasthenia under the Description ‘Anxiety Neurosis” (1895), Freud invokes the absence of a psychical working over of sexual tension as the cause of the actual neuroses, through either excessive discharge into the soma (melancholia, neurasthenia) or excessive accumulation (anxiety neurosis). Different levels of this work of linking and mentalization of the instincts can be described. The first level is the site of transformation of the physical quantity of an excitation tending toward immediate, reflexive discharge into a psychic quality that can be preserved and serve as a tool for thought and a guide for action. This transformation occurs through (1) the inhibitory effects of the lateral cathexes (according to Freud’s 1895 “Project for a Scientific Psychology”); (2) representational translations; and (3) the mechanisms of symbolic representation of the Preconscious and censorship (according to Freud’s writings from The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) through his essays on metapsychology [1915]). This level demonstrates the capacity of the psychic apparatus, by means of its representations, to direct and contain discharges, promote deferred action, and impose a waiting period. The containment of free psychic energy is accomplished through fixation of that energy within representations and symbolic networks that are relatively stable. In Freud’s account, memory traces form a hierarchical system of signs made up of successive strata (like the lava flows he describes in “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes” [1915]). He states this clearly in a letter to Wilhelm Fliess dated December 6, 1896, where he evokes 1878 the “re-transcription” (1950a [1887-1902], p. 233) of memory traces at several registers—at least three, perhaps more—of signs. Each register corresponds to a temporal stage in psychic life, and the passage from one register to the next occurs by means of a process comparable to translation. Each retranscribed memory trace “inhibits its predecessor and draws of the excitatory process from it” (1950a [1887-1902], p. 235). For Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis in their Vocabulaire de la psychanalyse (1967), psychical working over constitutes an important junction between the economic register (management of excitation) and the symbolic register (the network of associations) in Freud’s theory of the psychic apparatus. In the view of such authors as Michéle Perron-Borelli and Roger Perron (1997), Alain Gibeault (1989), or Francois Duparc, this symbolic elaboration occurs by means of symbolization processes that construct a network extending from the most primitive fantasies of action to the most elaborate fantasmatic organizations: the family romance, or infantile theories of sexuality. According to Duparc (1997, 1998), each system of signs (images of motion, visual forms or representations of things, representations of words, or elaborated fantasies) has its own capacity for temporal containment, which increases with the psychic delay that precedes discharge. But in order for psychical working over to be a flexible, creative process that is not limited to containing action and orienting the subject toward abstract signification, it must nevertheless allow for the possibility of the instinct’s deployment in all its dimensions, including the affects, resonances among fantasies and representational forms, and controlled breaking of the habits of language and thought. These tertiary processes, which enable regression, have the effect of freeing language from a state of mourning. For Duparc, representation is a living process in that it transports the drives through the various resonances charged with motricity and affect, among the forms pertaining to the most primary level of symbolization (forms conveying motion, primal protofantasies), the visual forms and mechanisms of figuration that fix the instincts’ movements within the censorship of the preconscious, and the elaborate forms of the rhetorical figures of language. FRANCOIS DUPARC See also: Conscious processes; Fundamental rule; Lifting of amnesia; Memories; Memory; Psychoanalytic treat- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ment; “Remembering, Repeating, and Working Through”; Resistance; Transference neurosis; Work (as a psychoanalytic notion). Bibliography Duparc, Fran¢ois. (1997). Hallucination négative, formes motrices et comportements autocalmants. Cliniques psychosomatiques. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Duparc, Fran¢ois. (1998). L’Elaboration en psychanalyse. Bordeaux, France: LEsprit du temps. Gibeault, Alain. Destins de la symbolisation. (1989). Revue francaise de psychanalyse, 53 (6), 1493-1617. Freud, Sigmund. (1950a [1887-1902]). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173-280. Perron, Roger, and Michéle Perron-Borelli. (1997). Fantasme. Action. Pensée. Algiers, Algeria: Editions de la Société algérienne de psychologie. WORKING-THROUGH Working-through is the name for an operation resulting from the putting into effect of several processes during treatment; it opposes the work of resistance by making the analysand better aware, through time, of the defensive mechanisms upon which resistance is based, and it sparks “processes of remodeling the ego” (1937c, p. 249). Freud accords it a primary place in the analyzand’s domain, to the extent the analyst allows him the time to accomplish it. At the same time however, this activity also seems closely tied to interpretation, and the interpretive modalities of the analyst. It is a term that may only be surmised in relation to economic principles, including those of resistance and elements of timing such as duration and “tempo.” The German term durcharbeiten is difficult to translate. Although the English translation “workingthrough” does successfully convey its dynamic aspect, it fails to capture the aspect of work that occurs at the surface. In the technical paper “Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through (Further recommendations on the Technique of Psycho-Analysis II)” (1914g), where Freud uses the term for the first time, it was to describe a “consistent technique used today” that prevails over hypnosis because it gives up on privileging the interrogation of the patient concerning a specific problem or factor. It is a technique, writes Freud, used to study “whatever is present for the time being on the surface of the patient’s mind” (p. 147)— though this does not pre- INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS WORKING- THROUGH vent him from deploying metaphors of in-depth work in the same article. The term durcharbeiten thus conveys two notions whose co-existence in a single word is difficult to maintain: depth and surface. Psychoanalytic technique came after that of hypnosis, and Freud sometimes placed the two in opposition in order to highlight ways in which Psychoanalysis represents a departure. Working-through comes out of a fundamental difference between the two techniques in that it assumes a gradual, step-by-step approach to resistance. Hypnosis circumvents the notion of resistance; it allows repressed memories to emerge but in no way involves “processes of remodeling the ego” and repression in its dimension as a part of processes of symbolization. The idea of resistance is necessary given the economic aspects of the drives, notably with regard to excesses of drive energy. But as Freud continually pointed out, the ego defends itself against dangers that are no longer current. Thus “to work through” implies the idea of a repetition that garners small quantities of energy to deal with the compulsion to repeat emanating from the id. Working-through is proposed answer to resistance in “Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through.” That the form of resistance forwarded at the time is repression, attests to the fact that Freud conceived the psychic apparatus as highly-advanced in the realm of symbolization—flexible and effective in its ability to confront the drives. But the effectiveness of the function of working-through must be relativized in the face of difficulties involving defusions of instinct, narcissistic fragility, and deficiencies in symbolization. Although it remains true in these instances that certain forms of resistance must be recognized, interpreted, and then given up when they no longer further the ends of self-preservation; more recent analytic technique has ways of handling the transference and a conception of the framework for treatment which are based on metapsychological representations that are more complex than in 1914. Thus working-through is no longer indicated at certain times during treatment; and sometimes a poor understanding of negative elements in the transference may lead the analysis into a working-through that is intellectual and falsely effective. Although Freud did not explicitly come back to this notion after 1920, it is useful to reconsider it while taking into account the upheavals brought about by the dual theory of the instincts and the negative currents it 1879 WORKING- THROUGH entails. Although he did not use the term durcharbetten, Freud reworks the idea of it in “Negation” (1925h), when confronted with the negative element that subtends a patient’s denial of the analyst's interpretation. It would be necessary to wait until “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” (1937c) for him to explore how the joint efforts of the analyst and patient to recognize and conquer resistance run aground upon the negative factor of the “bedrock” of castration. In theory, the more working-through can relate representational content to its corresponding affect, the more effective it is. We know that most of the defensive forms resistance takes, whether splitting, repression or negation, seek to divorce affect from representation and leave them strangers to one another. Certain defensive formations, notably those that combine splitting and negation, make workingthrough laborious, and its visible effects appear only in the long term. The forms then assumed by these psychic contents, ruled by resistances which stem from the instability of drive fusion, are subject to the repetition compulsion and are difficult to access by means of working-through, unless the analyst pays special attention to the psychoanalytic setting and to the analysis of his or her counter-transference. In “Remembering, Repeating and Working- Through,” Freud optimistically stated that symptomatic repetition compulsion could be rendered “harmless,” or even “useful,” if the analyst could bring it into the “transference as a playground in which it [the repetition compulsion] is allowed to expand in alniost complete freedom and in which it is expected to display to us everything in the way of pathogenic instincts that is hidden in the patient’s mind” (1914g, p. 154), where everything is accessible to the analyst’s interpretations. He cited the example of an analysis that seemed to be stuck in one place but that was actually evolving normally. What must be remembered, he then wrote, is “that giving the resistance a name could not result in its immediate cessation. One must allow the patient time to become more conversant with this resistance with which he has now become acquainted, to work through it, to overcome it, by continuing, in defiance of it, the analytic work according to the fundamental rule of analysis” (p. 155). Working-though is indeed linked to the notion of time, of duration, as is pointed out again at the end of the essay: “The working-through of the resistances may in practice turn out to be an arduous task for the 1880 subject of the analysis and a trial of patience for the analyst” (p. 155). The theme of the length of the analysis was much more explicit, if only because of its title, in the 1937 essay “Analysis Terminable and Interminable.” The justification for prolonging the length of the analytic cure is considered relative to the “acquired ... alterations of the ego” (1937c, p. 235) in its defensive struggle with the drives. These modifications of the ego seem like fixations, and the analyst’s task is to promote the “processes of remodeling the ego” in the patient. Moreover, it is this aspect of the work of analysis that, from the analyst’s viewpoint, supports the idea that “to analyze” is “an interminable task” (p. 249). In “An Outline of Psycho-Analysis” (1940a [1938]), Freud put the finishing touches on his metapsychological overview. The mental apparatus with its two topographies, his two theories of the drives, and his theories on anxiety constitute a complex whole, in light of which thinking about analytic technique must remain cautious. The notion of working-through retains its full importance, provided it is conceived in relation to the notion of drive fusion and defusion and the consequences thereof, as well as in relation to the analyst’s interpretation, whether it is explicit or latent, as Jean- Paul Valabrega proposed in La formation du psychanalyste (The training of the psychoanalyst; 1994). RENE PERAN See also: Conscious processes; Fundamental rule; Lifting of amnesia; Memories; Memory; Psychoanalytic treatment; “Remembering, Repeating and Working-through”; Resistance; Transference neurosis; Work (as a Psychoanalytical Notion). Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1914g). Remembering, repeating and working-through (Further recommendations on the technique ofp sycho-analysis II). SE, 12: 145-156. . (1925h). Negation. SE, 19: 233-239. . (1937c). Analysis terminable and interminable. SE, 23: 255-269. . (1940a [1938]). An outline of psycho-analysis. SE, 23: 139-207. Valabrega, Jean-Paul. (1994). La formation du psychanalyste. Paris: Payot. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS WULFF, MOSCHE (WOOLF, MOSHE) (1878-1971) Mosche Wulff (or Moshe Woolf), a physician and teacher, was born on May 10, 1878, in Odessa, Russia, and died in November 1, 1971, in Tel Aviv. The son of an German retailer, after graduating from the Lycée Richelieu in Paris and finishing his studies at a business school, Wulff undertook medical studies in 1900 in Berlin. He defended his thesis in 1905 under the direction of Theodor Ziehen. The psychiatrist Otto Juliusburger, whom he served as assistant at the Berlin-Lankwitz sanatorium, introduced Wulff to psychoanalysis. He never underwent a training analysis proper, although Karl Abraham, who worked at the sanatorium from 1908, became his teacher. In 1911 he joined the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, and in the same year he returned to Russia, establishing himselfi nO dessa. When World War I began, he left Odessa for Moscow. In 1922, after the Russian Revolution, Wulff founded, with Ivan Ermakov among others, the Moscow Psychoanalytic Society. This organization gave birth the next year to the Russian Institute for Psychoanalysis, officially recognized in 1924. From 1922 Wulff worked as a psychoanalyst at the Second Medical Clinic of the University of Moscow. As early as 1921 Wulff participated in creating a psychoanalytically oriented children’s home, which in 1923 became a polyclinic and expanded into a state institute where training programs were available. After Lenin’s death, however, rejection of psychoanalysis began to spread, eventually leading to the dissolution of the all psychoanalytic institutions and organized activity. Wulff was elected president of the Russian Institute for Psychoanalysis at the end of 1924, yet after a few months it was closed. In 1927 Wulff left the Soviet Union. Returning to Berlin, he worked at the famous Schloss-Tegel Sanitarium, founded that year by Ernst Simmel. Under financial stress, this institution closed in 1931. Wulff emigrated to Tel-Aviv in 1933 to found, with Max Eitingon and other members of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, the Psychoanalytic Society of Palestine. After Eitingon’s death, Wulff served as its president from 1947 to 1954 (in 1948 it became known as the Psychoanalytic Society of Israel). He remained honorary president of the society until his death, after a long illness. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Wutrr, MoscHe (Wootr, MosHe) (1878-1971) Among his most remarkable works are “Beitrage zur infantilen Sexualitat” (Contributions to infantile sexuality; 1912), his frequently cited 1932 paper “Uber einen interessanten oralen Symptomenkomplex und_ seine Beziehung zur Sucht” (An interesting oral symptom complex and its relation to addiction), and “The Child’s Moral Development” (1941). He wrote in Hebrew as well as in German and English. Additional articles in English include “On Castration Anxiety” (1955) and “Fetishism and Object Choice in Early Childhood” (1946). Mosche Wulff is mainly important for his pioneering work in introducing psychoanalysis to Russia and to Israel, where he trained a generation of analysts and psychiatrists. His translations of some of Freud’s works into Russian have been reprinted in recent years. He was primarily interested in the analysis of children and in psychoanalytically inspired pedagogy. Some of his works on infantile psychology became standard works of reference for training teachers and educators. RUTH KLOOCKE See also: Germany; Israel; Psychoterapia (Psixoterapija- Obozrenie voprosov lecenija I prikladonoj); Russia/USSR; Tegel (Schloss Tegel). Bibliography Jaffe, Ruth. (1966). Moshe Woolf: Pioneering in Russia and Israel. In Franz Alexander, Samuel Eisenstein, and Martin Grotjahn (Eds.), Psychoanalytic pioneers. New York: Basic Books. Kloocke, Ruth. (1995). Mosche Wulff, 1878-1871. Luzifer- Amor, 8 (16), 87-101. Miller, Martin. (1998). Freud and the Bolsheviks: Psychoanalysis in imperial Russia and the Soviet Union. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Woolf, Moshe. (1941). The child’s moral development. In K. R. Eissler (Ed.), Searchlights on delinquency (pp. 263— 272). London: Imago. . (1955). On castration anxiety. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 36, 95-104. Wulff, Mosche. (1912). Beitrage zur infantilen Sexualitat. Zentralblatftii rP sychoanalyse, 2, 6-17. . (1932). Uber einen interessanten oralen Symptomenkomplex und seine Beziehung zur Sucht. Internationale Zeitschriffiti r Psychoanalyse, 18, 283-302. . (1946). Fetishism and object choice in early childhood. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 15, 450-471. 1881 nae Be nee ee S he ial pele a -_- —t ag oabt wh radia 3 hal os ; . a a * 'ih..* ? AR. = $a) “ten in inn; ee “Pat Vaal “—— saa > 4 Ss ir wave carey aM ? . i = bari [ i aris ~ , uP =f ‘pip ioee sn herts 5 ets), Ove) - : ~ = eee eee ‘ . 1 7 , ‘ he “TiO et atainy : eto) fubwieree bees - ‘ i hitert ’ arg 7 7 od \ @ Uo ~ aA > 1 a) BAL a ions ina bict Pred Al ‘use : of05 ty ber ah Li ily ‘ ; Verve sat ; P at eng “a BE vireae : i *) ey, j : Fi 2. “e4) 5 ag YZ YOUNG GIRL’S DIARY, A Probably written by Hermine von Hug-Hellmuth, a non-medical psychoanalyst who was considered a pioneer in the field of child psychoanalysis, A Young Girl’s Diary was, upon publication, considered to be a watershed event (Sandor Ferenczi, December 26, 1919) and was highly successful. It was the first—and remained the only—book in a series entitled “Fundamental Texts on Spiritual Development,” which the new publishing company, created through the generosity of Anton von Freund, intended to publish. Because of its success the book provided considerable income. Introduced by an anonymous “editor” who claimed to have retained the girl’s style unaltered and uncensored, it was accompanied by an enthusiastic letter from Freud, dated April 27, 1915, which stated, “This diary is a little jewel. I truly believe that we will never again penetrate with such clarity and sincerity into the movements of the soul that characterize the development of a young girl in our society in the years before puberty, in the present state of our civilization.” The Diary contained the thoughts of the young “Rita,” written between the ages of eleven and fourteen and a half. Her lengthy commentary, which would be considered innocuous by twenty-first century standards, described the awakening of adolescent feelings in a girl living in Vienna at the turn of the twentieth century. The book describes, in Freud’s words, “how the secret of sexual life emerges, first obscurely, then taking complete control of the childish soul.” It is more of an interesting commentary on middle-class Viennese life and family relations during the birth of psychoanalysis. Welcomed by Lou Andreas-Salomé (“this young girl has lifted her diary to the rank of works esteemed for their literary value”), Stefan Zweig (“a quite remarkable document”), and the majority of critics, its authenticity was soon questioned by the psychoanalytic community. Siegfried Bernfeld began an investigation. The arguments in favor of fraud, published in August 1921 by Cyril Brut, an English critic, in the British Journal of Psychology, resulted in the exposure of Hermine von Hug-Hellmuth in 1922. Although she provided additional details on the presumed author, Hug-Hellmuth’s claims were not felt to be convincing, and a number of individuals—Karl and Charlotte Buhler, Josef Krug, Hedwig Fuchs—attempted to prove it was a fraud. It has come to be felt that a number of details in the diary are autobiographical. The murder of Hermine von Heg-Hellmuth by her nephew, Rudolf Hug, on September 9, 1924, served only to intensify the swirl of rumors circulating around the work, which in spite of its success was withdrawn from publication in 1927. It was translated into English in 1927. See also: Adolescence; Hug-Hellmuth-Hug von Hugenstein, Hermine; Technique with children, psychoanalytic. Source Citation Hug-Hellmuth, Hermine von. (1919). Tagebuch eines halbwiichsigen Madchen; von 11 bis 14 1/2 Jahren. Vienna: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag; A Young Girl’s Diary. London: Allen and Unwin; New York: Seltzer, 1924. Bibliography Hug-Hellmuth, Hermine von. (1911-1924). Essais psychanalytiques (D. Soubrenie, Ed.). Paris: Payot, 1991. MacLean, George, and Rappen, Ulrich. (1991). Hermine von Hug-Hellmuth. New York-London: Routledge. 1883 YUGOSLAVIA (EX-) YUGOSLAVIA (EX-) Three men—Stjepan Betlheim, Hugo Klajn, and Nichola Sugar—born at the end of the nineteenth century are at the root of psychoanalysis in Yugoslavia. Having completed their medical studies and specialized in neuropsychiatry in Germany and Austria, their return to what was then the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes marked the beginning of the spread of psychoanalytic ideas in this region. They had to contend with the resistance of the psychiatric milieu and the polite interest of the intellectuals, except in Belgrade where they met with great success in artistic circles. Because they were Jews, these pioneers naturally found themselves in the Resistance during World War II. The victory over fascism and Nazism conferred an authority on them that translated into the creation of psychoanalytically informed treatment centers. Psychoanalytic thinking spread very rapidly in Sarajevo under the impetus of Dr. Aleksandar Markovic, and in Ljubljana where a psychologist, Leopold Bregant, and a psychiatrist, Milan Kobal, played an important role. A new generation of Slovene psychoanalysts was being trained in the neighboring Italian city of Trieste. But it was mainly in Croatia and Serbia that the development was decisive. The war (1991-1995) put an end, for the moment, to scientific exchanges between Serb and Croatian analysts. However, both of these groups managed under difficult conditions to maintain vital contact with Western analysts, particularly in France and Italy. Croatia The history of psychoanalysis in Croatia is linked to the name of Stjepan Betlheim (1898-1970). He studied medicine in Graz and Vienna. After a first analysis with Paul Schilder, he completed his training with Sandor Rado, whom Abraham Arden Brill invited in 1932 to organize an institute of psychoanalysis in New York. Karen Horney in Berlin and Helene Deutsch in Vienna supervised Betlheim’s first analyses. An “associate member” of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society in 1928, he returned to Zagreb that same year. Until World War II he divided his time between a neuropsychiatric department and psychoanalysis in private practice. In 1948 his good reputation enabled him to introduce psychoanalysis in the medical faculty, and in 1953 to create a center for psychotherapeutic treatment in the framework of the neuropsychiatric clinic, thus offering the resources of psychoanalysis and its psychotherapeutic applications for individuals and 1884 groups. In 1952 he was elected a “direct member” of the International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA). In 1963 he published The Neuroses and Their Treatment, while simultaneously campaigning for the creation of an Association of Yugoslav Psychotherapists. The first steps in this direction were taken in 1964 at the Congress of Neuropsychiatrists at Ohrid, and the project bore fruit in Split in 1968. In the period after World War II Stjepan Betlheim personally psychoanalyzed his first students: Duska Blazevic, Eugenie Cividini-Stranic, and Edouard Klain. At the same time he created the Mokrice seminar, which, from 1966 until 1991, was a meeting place for therapists from the different Republics constituting the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. Professor Maja Beck-Dvorzak organized the psychoanalytic treatment of children and adolescents, followed by Professor S. Nikolic, who introduced the technique of the psychoanalytic psychodrama after a stay in Paris in Serge Lebovici’s department, while undergoing personal analysis with Jean Gillibert (1976-1979). In Zagreb Duska Blazevic and Edouard Klain created a psychoanalytically oriented review, Psychoterapja. It is the responsibility of the remaining members of this group to establish regular relations with the IPA, the only body authorized to recognize its training courses. Serbia _ Two men contributed initially to opening Belgrade up to psychoanalysis. The first, Hugo Klajn (1894-1981), physician and psychiatrist, did his personal analysis in 1922 with Paul Schilder in Vienna. On his return to Belgrade his public lectures and translation of a considerable part of Freud’s work met with an immediate success. He devoted himself mainly to theatre. As director of the Yugoslav dramatic theatre and Studio 122, his directing enriched the cultural domain. In 1955 he published War Neuroses in Yugoslavs. Nikola Sugar (1897-1945) was the second of these founding fathers. He was analyzed in Berlin between 1922 and 1925 by Felix Boehm, then in Vienna between 1925 and 1927 by Paul Schilder. An associate member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society from 1925 to 1933, he was a full member from 1935 to 1938. When he returned to the city of Subotica (Vojvodina), he also became a member of Budapest Psychoanalytic Society. In 1938 he founded the first psychoanalytic association in Belgrade. Without having any formal character, it comprised nine members: six physicians, psychiatrists, and neurologists, and three philosophy professors. Meetings were held in the Belgrade Arts INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Faculty and were soon forbidden under the regency of Prince Paul, who was close to Italy, Bulgaria, and Nazi Germany. Sugar was deported and died. Two of Sugar’s patients, Vladislav Klajn (1909- 1984) and especially Vojin Matic (born 1911) were prolific in developing psychoanalytic activities. The IPA awarded an honorary diploma to Professor Vojin Matic at the San Francisco Congress in 1995. Vojin Matic was an assistant at the university neuropsychiatric clinic until 1952, before becoming a professor at the Arts Faculty until his retirement. In 1953 he founded the Medico-Psychopedagogical Center, the first of its kind in Yugoslavia. Ten years later the center was closed but continued to be active in the form of the Institute for Mental Health. In relation with the European Federation of Psychoanalysis, the Belgrade group organized the Seminar for Eastern Countries in 1990. The subject was “Transference and Counter- Transference.” Protocols for psychoanalytic treatment were presented by S. Borovejki (Zagreb), V. Brzev (Belgrade), M. Cicek (Zagreb), I. Ivanovic and G. Marinkow (Belgrade). This seminar brought together more than eighty participants from Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, lCzechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia) and Western Europe (Germany, Spain, France, Great Britain, and Italy). Professors Nevenka Tadic, Ksenija Kondic-Belos, and Tamara Stajner-Popovic concentrated particularly on the development of psychoanalytic treatment for children and adolescents. The San Francisco Congress elected Stajner-Popovic and four of her colleagues direct members of the IPA. This election was the fruit of efforts by Hanna Groen-Prakken (of Holland) and John Kafka (of the United States) within the IPA. It opened the way for the constitution of a study group, then the formation of a provisional society, which could lead this group to recognition as a constituent society of the IPA. MICHEL VINCENT Bibliography Diatkine, Gilbert, Gibeault, Alain, Gibeault, Monique, and Vincent, Michel. (1993). La psychanalyse en Europe orientale. In La Psychanalyse et Europe de 1993, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Nikolic, S. (1987). La psychiatrie en Yougoslavie. Psychiatrie francaise, 6, 41-51. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ZAVITZIANOS, GeEorGeEs (1909-1995) ZAVITZIANOS, GEORGES (1909-1995) Greek physician and psychoanalyst Georges Zavitzianos was born in Corfu, Greece, in 1909 and died in North Bethesda, Maryland on December 13, 1995. Escaping from Turks who burned the village of Zavitza in 1700, the Zavitzianos family settled in the Ionian island of Corfu, where they produced a succession of scientists, writers, and artists. After secondary school in Greece, Zavitzianos studied medicine at Montpellier in France. Returning to his native country in 1934, he worked as a neuropsychiatrist with a psychoanalytic orientation; he had been briefly psychoanalyzed by the early French analyst, Edouard Pichon. During the late 1940s Zavitzianos participated in the creation of the first Greek psychoanalytic group, founded with the help and guidance of Marie Bonaparte; in 1950 he was elected a member of the Societé psychanalytique de Paris. However, soon thereafter he decided to emigrate to North America. He spent some time in Montreal and eventually settled in the United States. He took part in founding several psychoanalytic societies and institutes, and taught from 1950 to 1982. Seduced by her beautiful soprano voice, he married Sylvia Filyndras. He also underwent analysis with Leo Stone. Zavitzianos’s principal works concern female perversions (1982); problems of transvestism (1977); and what he called “homeovestism” (1972)—sexual enjoyment in wearing the clothes of one’s own sex. He also wrote about problems of psychoanalytic technique (1967) and the patient-therapist relationship. Before he died, in a letter to Anna Potamianou, written on December 12, 1995, he expressed what he called his only regret—the fact that he had not been able to share his great analytic experience with his Greek colleagues. ANNA POTAMIANOU See also: Canada; Greece. Bibliography Tzavaras, Athanase. (1996). Georges A. Zavitzianos: Corfu, 1909—Maryland/E.U, 1995. Cahiers de psychiatrie, 53, 10-13. Zavitzianos, Georges. (1967). Problems of technique in the analysis of a juvenile delinquent: therapeutic alliance and transference neurosis. International Journal of Psycho- Analysis, 48, 439-447. 1885 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PSYCHOANALYTISCHE PADAGOGIK . (1972). Homeovestism: perverse form of behavior involving wearing clothes of the same sex. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 53, 471-477. . (1977). The object in fetishism, homeovestism and transvestism.International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 58, 487-495. . (1982). The perversion of fetishism in women. Psychoanalytic Quarterly. 51, 405-425. ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PSYCHOANALYTISCHE PADAGOGIK Founded in 1926 by Heinrich Meng, a German psychoanalyst, and Ernst Schneider, a Swiss educationist, the Zeitschnift fiir Psychoanalytische Padagogik (Review of Psychoanalytic Teaching) was first published in Stuttgart, then in Vienna until 1937, with a view to disseminating psychoanalytic discoveries among educators and “inventing a new way of posing problems” (Balint, 1932). Contributors to the Review, many of whom were women, were recruited from among psychoanalysts and teachers from Austria (August Aichhorn, Siegfried Bernfeld, Paul Federn, Anna Freud, Melanie Klein, Wilhelm Reich, and Richard and Edith Sterba), Germany (Erich Fromm, Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, Georg Groddeck, Karl Landauer, and Nelly Wolffheim), Switzerland (Hans Behn-Eschenburg, Oskar Pfister, Ernst Schneider, and Hans Zulliger), but also from Hungary (Alice Balint and Sandor Ferenczi), Britain (Dorothy Burlingham and Mary Chadwick), France (Marie Bonaparte and René Laforgue), as well as Sweden, Poland, and Russia (Sabina Spielrein). The Review contained two articles by Freud, who welcomed the initiative of the founders. Although they initially nurtured the hope of being able to avoid the neuroses with the help of an appropriate education, the so-called psychoanalytic teachers progressively yielded to disenchantment, even pessimism. In 1936 Ruth Weiss presented a critical review of the questions remaining to be treated (Vol. 10). And in 1937, the Review (Vol. 11) published the papers presented at the Budapest symposium concerning the “revision” of psychoanalytic teaching: it analyzed the problems of the psychoanalytic educator (Dorothy Burlingham) and the shortcomings of a pedagogy that accorded insufficient importance to group phenomena (Hans Zulliger) and gave rise to misunderstandings (S. Bornstein-Windholz). And as 1886 a result of events at the time and the departure of many psychoanalysts into exile, the Review ceased to appear in 1937. Although there was relatively little response from the teaching profession, the provocation to think differently about the field of education and the subversive potential of the Review were important in the history of the relationship between teaching and psychoanalysis. Each issue, first monthly then quarterly, devoted considerable space to a review of psychological, psychoanalytic, and literary publications and reviews as well as statements and reports on psychoanalytic training and congresses. As a forum for exchanging experiences and theorizing about a new teaching practice that was at odds with a repressive education, the Review saw itself as the spokesperson for an education that was “enlightened” by psychoanalysis. Its feature articles were illustrated by case studies and focused on the manifestations of infantile sexuality, the role of the emotions in learning, intellectual inhibitions and academic failure, the importance of transference phenomena, and the unconscious of the adult educator. It pleaded for another type of teacher training and for a collaboration between psychoanalysts and teachers. It provided a critical analysis of the different educational institutions as well as of the ideals of the new education movement. The study of the phenomena of group psychology, the contradictions of the educational system, the psychic and social limits to the capacity to be educated, as well as political determinism oriented the movement for a psychoanalytically informed education and a sociological critique of education. JEANNE MOLL See also: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag; Meng, Heinrich; Schneider, Ernst. Bibliography Balint, Alice. (1953). The psycho-analysis of the nursery. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Original work published 1932) Cifali, Mireille, and Moll, Jeanne. (1985). Pédagogie et Psychanalyse. Paris: Dunod. Moll, Jeanne. (1989). La Pédagogie psychanalytique. Origine et histoire. Paris: Dunod. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ZENTRALBLATT FUR PSYCHOANALYSE In the wake of the Jahrbuch fiir Psychoanalyse, the psychoanalytic movement published its first monthly periodical, the Zentralblatt fiir Psychoanalyse (Central review of psychoanalysis) in 1911. For the first two years Freud was the editor and Wilhelm Stekel was the chief editor. Whereas the Jahrbuch addressed a specialist readership close to psychoanalysis and tended to reflect the specificity and specialization of clinical and theoretical psychoanalysis, the Zentralblatt had a more didactic mission. It tried on the one hand to afford a view of the rapidly growing wave of analytic literature and, on the other, to provide a forum for shorter works that were more accessible for the general public. Alongside more strictly medico-psychological articles, the Zentralblatt focused as well on interdisciplinary approaches involving history, literature, esthetics, teaching, and popular culture. The periodical addressed itself specifically to a lay readership both as the final consumer of psychoanalytic progress and as the author, thus becoming a witness to the “progress” of psychoanalytic knowledge. The new periodical was introduced with a contribution by Freud, “The Future Prospects of Psycho- Analytic Therapy” (1910d). A considerable amount of space was reserved for brief observations in the form of examples, for the interpretation of dreams, parapraxes, and symptoms resulting from the “psychoanalysis workshop.” In addition to providing a large space for reviews, intended as a guide to the mass of psychoanalytic publications, the Zentralblatt also provided the earliest information on psychoanalytic associations and their calendars of activities, beginning with the report on the first private psychoanalytic meeting held in Salzburg on April, 27, 1908. After 1912 the Zentralblatt also contained the “correspondence sheet” (Korrespondenzblatt), previously reserved exclusively for members of the International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA), and thus became its official organ. This official role provoked a conflict in 1912 between the association and the editor, Wilhelm Stekel: Freud withdrew as editor in November 1912 and Stekel, having disagreed with the master concerning the choice of Viktor Tausk to replace him, took singlehanded control of the position. That same year saw the founding of a new periodical, Imago, which acted as an alternative spokesperson for psychoanalysis. Asa result of this tension the IPA suspended its official collaboration with the Zentralblatt and in 1913 it INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ZETZEL-ROSENBERG, ELIZABETH (1907-1970) founded its own publication, the Internationale Zeitschrift fiir Psychoanalyse, which resumed publication of the “correspondence sheets.” Following this new configuration of the market for psychoanalytic publications, the Zentralblatt suspended its activity in 1914. LypIA MARINELLI See also: Abraham, Karl; Adler, Alfred; Internationale Zeitschrift fiir (drtzliche) Psychoanalyse; Jahrbuch der Psychoanalyse; Stekel, Wilhelm. Source Citation Zentralblatt fiir Psychoanalyse. Medizinische Monatsschrift fiir Seelenkunde, Wiesbaden, J. F. Bergmann, 1910/11-1914 (Central review of psychoanalysis, medical monthly for psychology). Bibliography Freud, Sigmund, and Jones, Ernest. (1993 [1908-39]). The complete correspondence of Sigmund Freud and Ernest Jones, 1908-1939, R.A. Paskauskas (Ed.), London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Stekel, Wilhelm. (1950). The autobiography of Wilhelm Stekel. The life story of a pioneer psychoanalyst. New York: Liveright. ZETZEL-ROSENBERG, ELIZABETH (1907-1970) Elizabeth Zetzel-Rosenberg, psychoanalyst and physician, was born March 17, 1907, in New York and died November 22, 1970, in Scarsdale, New York. Her father, James N. Rosenberg, was a distinguished jurist and philanthropist, who led a United States committee for the passage of the Genocide Convention at the United Nations after World War IJ. After graduating from Smith College, Zetzel pursued her medical education at the University of London. She began her analytic training in the 1930s at the British Psychoanalytic Society where her analyst was Ernest Jones. In a short memoir describing the years between 1936 and 1938, Zetzel (1969) recalled with pleasure her exposure to the work of Melanie Klein and her followers, Joan Riviere and Susan Isaacs. She credits Donald Winnicott, however, with most influencing her subsequent work because he was “fully alive to the 1887 Zutvticer, HANS (1893-1965) importance of the real mother-child relationship ... My first awareness of the importance of early object relations was attributable to my opportunity to work in his Clinic at Paddington Green Hospital.” Zetzel returned to the United States in 1949 and became a leading member of the Boston Psychoanalytic Society, where she was an influential training analyst and teacher; she was also secretary of the International Psychoanalytic Association under the presidency of Maxwell Gitelson from 1961 to 1965 (Rangell, 1971). Zetzel was a prolific writer and her collected papers (1970) include contributions to psychoanalytic technique—her name is practically synonymous with the term “therapeutic alliance”—and to the psychodynamics of hysteria and depression as delineated in her seminal papers “On the Incapacity to Bear Depression” and “The So-Called Good Hysteric.” But equally important as her original contributions to the psychoanalytic literature was her sympathetic interest in the work of Melanie Klein. In an astute and generous obituary written after Klein’s death, Zetzel (1961) decried the fact that many contemporary analysts still remained unfamiliar with Klein’s work. At the same time, Zetzel was deeply skeptical of the theoretical reconstructions that Klein posited in her writings. She also chided Klein and her followers for failing to acknowledge the work of other analysts, notably Anna Freud, Willi Hoffer, Rene Spitz, Phyllis Green- . acre, and Ernst Kris, whose findings on early psychic development were convergent with their discoveries. Zetzel’s advocacy of Klein’s work had significant implications for the development of psychoanalytic theory in the United States. Conventionally, psychoanalytic theory in America in the 1950s is portrayed as dominated by the variant of theory called ego psychology. But Zetzel’s writings on Klein and her followers, and her extended contacts with other analysts interested in preoedipal development, notably Edith Jacobson and Phyllis Greenacre, suggest a more fluid and complex state of affairs. In other words, among a group of influential psychoanalytic thinkers, there was a sophisticated awareness of Klein’s work and a recognition that her clinical discoveries should be considered in their own work. NELuE L. THompson Bibliography Rangell, Leo. (1971). Elizabeth R. Zetzel. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 52, 229-231. 1888 Thompson, Nellie. (2001). American women psychoanalysts 1911-1941. Annual of Psychoanalysis, 29, 161-177. Zetzel, Elizabeth. (1961). Melanie Klein 1882-1960. The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 30, 420-425. _ (1969). 96 Gloucester Place: Some personal recollections. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 50, 717-719. . (1970). The capacity for emotional growth. New York: International Universities Press. ZULLIGER, HANS (1893-1965) Hans Zulliger, a psychoanalytically oriented Swiss teacher and child psychoanalyst, was born on February 21, 1893, near Biel, Switzerland, and died in Illigen, Berne Canton, in 1965. Coming from a modest background, he was a student at the teachers school in Hofwil-Berne. The principal of the school, Ernst Schneider, taught psychology and psychoanalysis. All his life Zulliger remained a primary school teacher in Illigen- Bolligen, near Berne, continuing to teach working class, rural, and underprivileged children until 1959. From his first early encounter with psychoanalysis, Zulliger was passionately enthusiastic about the new theory of the unconscious. He read Freud and Alfred Adler, contacted the pastor Oskar Pfister, who became his analyst, and conducted his own research with his pupils. His observations and reflections on school failure, anxiety, and other symptoms, and on the need for and difficulties of sexual education, led to a publication in 1921, a work that was favorably received by the Swiss psychoanalytic world. Freud encouraged the young author, who visited the master twice. His subversively titled La psychanalyse a lécole (Psychoanalysis at school) appeared in France in 1930. As a member of the Swiss Psychoanalytic Society, Zulliger also played a part in elaborating projective tests. In addition to working as a schoolteacher, he also worked as a child psychotherapist, psychologist, and writer (in German and in dialect). He contributed many articles to the Zeitschrift fiir psycoanalytische Padagogik, which he coedited after 1932, and he also published in other Swiss teaching journals. In 1928 the Revue francaise de psychanalyse published one of his articles, “La psychanalyse et les écoles nouvelles” (Psychoanalysis and the new schools). Zulliger was without doubt the most popular representative of the psychoanalytic teaching propounded by the Zeitschrift fir psycoanalytische Pidagogik. He INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS excelled at recounting his practice in a lively style with colorful language. His many case studies illustrate his skillful mastery of the art of dialog and his profound understanding of children, both as individuals and in groups, as well as his insight into the games they play. He had a sense of the therapeutic power of the educational milieu, where the schoolteacher mediates between children’s instinctual egos and cultural values. After World War II, Zulliger’s lectures in Switzerland and Germany contributed to reigniting the movement for psychoanalytic teaching, of which he was a remarkable pioneer. JEANNE MOLL See also: Schweizerische Arztegesellschaft fiir Psychoanalyse; Switzerland (German-speaking); Zeitschrift fiir psychoanalytische Paidagogik. Bibliography Cifali, Mireille, and Moll, Jeanne (Eds.). (1985). Pédagogie et psychanalyse. Paris: Dunod. Zulliger, Hans. (1928). La psychanalyse et les écoles nouvelles (L. Leuzinger, Trans.). Revue fran¢aise de psychanalyse, 2 (4), 711-720. . (1930). Psychanalyse a l’école (Jean-Pierre Peyraube, Trans.). Paris: Flammarion. . (1934). Prophetic dreams. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 15 (2-3), 191-208. (1950). Psycho-analysis and the forminterpretation test. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 31 (1-2), 152-155. ZWEIG, ARNOLD (1887-1968) Born to a Jewish family in Glogau, Silesia, on November 10, 1887, novelist and author Arnold Zweig died in East Berlin, almost completely blind, on November 26, 1968. At his death Zweig was the most celebrated author in the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). Zweig was unrelated to the Austrian writer Stefan Zweig, but both men were important to Sigmund Freud, albeit in different ways. According to Ernest Jones: “Freud’s attitude toward the two men was indicated by his mode of address. Stefan was Lieber Herr Doktor, Arnold was Lieber Meister Arnold” (1957, p. 133). INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS Zweic, ArnoLo (1887-1968) Between 1927 and 1939 Zweig and Sigmund Freud conducted an exceptionally important correspondence. When it was published in 1968, Freud’s son Ernst and Arnold’s son Adam decided to withhold twenty-five letters as being too personal or of insufficient scientific value, creating an impression that they wished to conceal something in their fathers’ private lives. Originally a saddler by trade, Adolf Zweig became a supplier to the Prussian army before anti-Semitic regulations forced him to return to his former profession, an incident that seems to have had a powerful impact on his son. Zweig was a brilliant student who matriculated at various European universities before being conscripted during World War I, a painful experience that undoubtedly played a role in his later antimilitarism. Zweig began publishing fiction in 1911, and was a profound admirer both of Thomas Mann and of the nineteenth-century realists. Publication of The Case of Sergeant Grischa (1927) made him known to a wide audience and brought him to the attention of Freud. After the National Socialists came to power in Germany, Zweig emigrated to Palestine in 1933 and lived for some years in Haifa. He traveled widely, and a trip to New York in 1939 enabled him to meet other wellknown German emigrés. Zweig had long been interested in Zionism and socialism, but by the time Israel became a state he was both disillusioned and impoverished. He returned to East Germany in 1948, and was soon elected a parliament deputy in the new socialist republic. Zweig also succeeded Heinrich Mann as president of the German Academy of Arts. Henceforth, Zweig was a government-sponsored author and member of the Communist Party. For his efforts to legitimize East German literature, he was awarded the Lenin Peace Prize. Zweig’s literary workfeatures a severe critique of militarism and lively political and social convictions. These traits are also characteristic of his correspondence with Freud; their subjects range from incest and homosexuality to a wide variety of reflections on political, historical, and poetical issues. In one of the most famous letters in their correspondence (May 11, 1934), Freud’s comments about Zweig’s plan for a book on Friedrich Nietzsche served as an opening for his own ideas on the problems of psychological and psychopathological biography. He wrote: “I cannot say whether these are my true reasons against your plan. Perhaps they have something to do 1889 Zweic, STEFAN (1881-1942) with the way in which you compare me to him. In my youth [Nietzsche] signified a nobility to which I could not attain” (Jones, 1957, p. 460). This passage probably reflects the character of transference love that more or less pervades the Freud-Zweig relationship. Zweig also alludes briefly in the correspondence to the difficulties he encountered in his own analysis in Berlin, by which he hoped to treat severe depression and anxiety. The year Freud began writing Moses and Monotheism, he reported on the work and its difficulties in a letter to Zweig (September 30, 1934). In discussing the project with Max Eitington, Zweig remarked that he had advised Freud to publish his book in Palestine. Judaism was an important topic for both men and the subject of many of their letters. In one letter (May, 31 1936) Zweig reports on an archaeological discovery that might confirm Freud’s theory about the origins of the man Moses. In 1937, Freud, who thought that his “hereditary claim to life would run out in November,” (Jones, 1957, p. 213) asked Zweig, who was considering a visit to Europe, not to postpone it any longer. In 1938, Zweig made a final attempt to intervene on Freud’s behalf in favor of his being awarded the Nobel Prize. Freud held out little hope for this, considering opposition to psychoanalysis and his reputation in the eyes of the Nazis. He wrote Zweig on June 28, 1938: “[I]t can hardly be expected that the official circles could bring themselves to make such a provocative challenge to Nazi Germany as bestowing the honor on me would be.” (Jones, 1957, p. 234) Arnold Zweig was one of many celebrated literary figures whose friendship Freud cultivated. Their common interests in Judaism, pacifism, and such historical figures as Napoleon, Nietzsche, and Moses brought them particularly close. BERNARD GOLSE See also: Autobiography; Literature and psychoanalysis. Bibliography Freud, Sigmund. (1968a [1927—39]). The letters of Sigmund Freud and Arnold Zweig (Ernst L. Freud, Ed.; Professor and Mrs. W. D. Robson-Scott, Trans.). London: Hogarth Press, 1970. Jones, Ernest. (1957). Life and work of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 3). New York: Basic Books. 1890 Further Reading Mijolla, Alain de. (1993). Freud, biography, his autobiography, and his biographers. Psychoanalysis and History, 1 (1), 4-27. ZWEIG, STEFAN (1881-1942) Stefan Zweig, an Austrian writer, was born in Vienna on November 28, 1881, and committed suicide in Petropolis, Brazil, on February 22, 1942. From a wealthy middleclass Jewish family, Zweig enjoyed a privileged childhood. He grew up in an open-minded and multilingual home—a background that undoubtedly played a role in his subsequent commitment to humanist and supranationalist thought. While young he became a celebrated author, traveled widely, and developed friendships with a host of literary figures, among them the French novelist and playwright Romain Rolland and the Belgian poet Emile Verhaeren, whose work he translated. Zweig’s best-know works include the novels Amok (1922), Beware of Pity (1938), and Conflicts (1926), a collection that includes the novella Twenty-four Hours in the Life of a Woman. His autobiography, The World of Yesterday, appeared posthumously in 1943. Zweig’s work, at once distinguished by its richness and diversity, includes poetry, plays, essays, short stories, novels, and biographies. He was one of the most prolific authors of his time and played a major role in creating a rapprochement between French and German literature. In Mental Healers (1932), Zweig not only discussed Mary Baker Eddy, the founder of Christian Science, and Franz Mesmer’s animal magnetism; he also devoted an essay to Freud, for whom he expressed profound admiration and gratitude. In 1908 Zweig and Freud began a long correspondence that continued until the latter’s death in London in 1939. Zweig delivered Freud’s funeral oration. In Zweig’s letter to Freud of September 8, 1926, he wrote, “For me, psychology is today the great passion of my life (as you will understand better than anyone else). ... You still play the decisive role in the invisible struggle for the soul. You alone are always the one to explain to us, in a creative way, the mechanism of the spiritual. More than ever we need you and your activity.” Later, in his letter of October 21, 1932, he wrote, “Everything I write is marked by your influence and INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS you understand, perhaps, that the courage to tell the truth, probably the essential thing in my books, comes from you: You have served as a model for an entire generation.” Zweig’s interest in psychoanalysis found expression in his writings. In both his novels and fictionalized biographies, the main characters are presented in “case histories,’ made more intriguing by a nostalgic evocation of a society condemned by history. Freud recognized in Zweig an interest in, and aptitude for, psychological analysis. Although they argued several times—over errors Zweig made in translating Freud’s work and concerning Zweig’s appreciation of such detractors as Charles E. Maylan—Freud valued Zweig’s friendship until the end of his life. After the Nazis prohibited and destroyed his books in 1933, Zweig emigrated to London in 1934. Together with Salvador Dali, he visited Freud on July 19, 1938. Since Freud was near death, Zweig did not dare to show him the two sketches that Dali had made of him. In his last letter to Freud, dated September, 14, 1939, nine days before Freud’s death, he wrote, “I hope that you are suffering only from the era, as we all do, and not also from physical pain. We must stand firm now—it would be absurd to die without having first seen the criminals sent to hell.” After obtaining British citizenship in 1940, Zweig settled in Petropolis, Brazil, in 1941. He became a symbol of the anguish of exile and the refusal to accept Hitler’s early triumphs. Despite this, in profound despair after Nazi victories early in the war, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ZWEIG, STEFAN (1881-1942) he committed suicide together with his second wife, Lotte Altmann. In his final declaration Zweig wrote, “It seems to me therefore better to put an end, in good time and without humiliation, to a life in which intellectual work has always been an unmixed joy and personal freedom earth’s most precious possession.” “I greet all my friends! May they live to see the dawn after the long night is over! I, all too impatient, am going on alone” (Allday, 1972, p. 238). CHRISTINE DE KERCHOVE See also: “Dostoyevsky and parricide”; Goethe Prize; Literature and psychoanalysis. Bibliography Allday, Elizabeth. (1972). Stefan Zweig: A critical biography. Chicago: J. Philip O’Hara. Freud, Sigmund, and Zweig, Stefan. (1987). Correspondence. Paris: Rivages Poche. Niémetz, Serge. (1996). Stefan Zweig: Le voyageur et ses mondes. Paris: Belfond. Zweig, Stefan. (1932). Mental healers: Franz Anton Mesmer, Mary Baker Eddy, Sigmund Freud. New York: Viking Press. Further Reading Mijolla, Alain de. (1998). Freud, biography, his autobiography, and his biographers. 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